By Jan Oberg & Aleksandar Mitic
The Serbian province of Kosovo, largely populated by the Albanian majority, has failed to meet basic human rights and political standards set as prerequisites by the international community, but it should nevertheless enter - in the months to come - talks on its future status.
This basic conclusion of the long-awaited report by UN special envoy Kai Eide was approved by the UN secretary general Kofi Annan and fully supported by the EU and the US. But it fails to demystify the paradox.
From a legal point of view, Kosovo is an integral part of the sovereign state of Serbia and Montenegro. However, after Milosevic' clampdown on the province - including taking away its autonomy - and NATO's partwise destruction of Kosovo and Serbia in 1999, Security Council Resolution 1244 declared it a territory administered by the United Nations.
Thus UNMIK (the UN Mission in Kosovo), together with NATO, the OSCE and the EU make up the authority ever since. However, talks and negotiations about the future status and "standards" of the territory shall begin this autumn; UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has recently appointed former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari to lead this process.
EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana recently disseminated ideas of the European Union taking over law enforcement in Kosovo from the United Nations as part of a more active engagement in the Balkans.
Bluff from the start?
Only two and a half years ago, the international community had charged that talks on Kosovo's status could not start before a set of basic human rights standards was achieved.
Since then, however, as it became clearer that the Kosovo Albanian majority was unwilling to meet the criteria and the UN unable to enforce them. There has been a permanent watering down of prerequisites, until the proclaimed policy of "standards before status" was finally buried with Mr Eide's report.
Why has it failed? Is it because of fear of Kosovo Albanian threats of inciting violence if talks on status did not start soon, or was this policy a bluff from the start?
What kind of signal does it offer for the fairness of the upcoming talks? Will threats of ethnic violence in case "the only option for Kosovo Albanians - independence" - is not achieved again play a role? Or will the international community overcome its fear and offer both Pristina and Belgrade reasons to believe that the solution would be negotiated and long-lasting rather than imposed, one-sided and conflict-prone?
Recipe for future troubles
Advocates of Kosovo's independence such as the International Crisis Group, Wesley Clark, Richard Holbrooke and various US members of Congress argue "independence is the only solution."
The US has more urgent problems elsewhere. But full independence cannot be negotiated, it can only be imposed. "Independent Kosovo" implies that the Kosovo-Albanians achieve their maximalist goal while Belgrade and the Kosovo Serbs and Roma would not even get their minimum - a recipe for future troubles.
It would be also counter-productive for Europe and the US: to side with the Kosovo-Albanians and isolate Serbia - a highly multi-ethnic, strategically important, constitutional state with a market of 10 million people - would be foolish. Keeping on punishing Serbia and Serbs collectively for former President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic's brutality would be immoral.
An "independent Kosovo" would set a dangerous precedent for the region, not least in Bosnia and Macedonia, for international law and for European integration.
And if Kosovo becomes independent, why not Taiwan, Tibet, Chechnya, Tamil Eelam, Kashmir? The world has about 200 states and 5,000 ethnic groups. Who would like 4,800 new and ethnically pure states? The future is about human globalization and integration.
Independence would also violate UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999 on Kosovo. Not even liberally interpreted does it endorse independence.
The results of Milosevic's authoritarian policies clearly prevented Kosovo from returning to its pre-1999 status. Belgrade recognises that today.
Europe's largest - but ignored - refugee problem
The international community on its side refuses to see that the UN, NATO, EU and OSCE in Kosovo have failed miserably in creating the multi-ethnic, tolerant and safe Kosovo that it thought the military intervention would facilitate.
There has been virtually no return of the 200,000 Serbs and tens of thousands of other non-Albanians who felt threatened by Albanian nationalists and terrorists in 1999-2000.
Proportionately this is the largest ethnic cleansing in ex-Yugoslavia. Half a million Serbs in today's Serbia, driven out of Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, make up Europe's largest - but ignored - refugee problem. The economy of Kosovo remains in shambles 70% unemployment - and is mafia-integrated.
There is never only one solution to a complex problem. Between the old autonomy for Kosovo and full independence is a myriad of thinkable options combining internal and regional features.
They should all be on the negotiation table - for instance, a citizens' Kosovo where ethnic background is irrelevant, cantonisation, consociation, confederation, condominium, double autonomy for minorities there and in Southern Serbia, partition, trusteeship, independence with special features such as soft borders, no army and guarantees for never joining Albania.
Least creative of all is the "only-one-solution" that all main actors today propose - completely incompatible with every other "only-one solution."
Finally, no formal status will work if the people continue to hate and see no development opportunities.
If we ignore human needs for fear-reduction, deep reconciliation and economic recovery, independent Kosovo will become another failed state, perhaps consumed by civil war.
Kosovo is about the future of that province and of Serbia, but also about the region and the EU.
Indeed, Kosovo is about global politics. In this 11th hour, the UN, EU and the US should re-evaluate their post-1990 policies and recognise the need for much more intellectually open and politically pluralist approaches than those that have been promoted so far.
Otherwise, political rigidity, lack of principle and wishful thinking could once again prove to be the enemies of sustainable peace in this region.
Aleksandar Mitic was Belgrade correspondent for Agence France-Presse (AFP) from 1999-2005. Jan Oberg is Director and co-founder of the Swedish Transnational Foundation, TFF, a think tank in peace research and conflict mitigation.
Kosovo: New War in the Balkans?
November 22, 2005 17 40 GMT
Summary
The current stalemate over Kosovo's status is a perfect example of the palsied international system. One would think that a province that has been a de facto international protectorate for more than six years, by now, would have its status decided; yet the concerned parties in Kosovo ostensibly cannot perform the necessary tasks. The responsibility for this impasse rests first on the shoulders of the Kosovar Serbs and Albanians, who cannot agree, and second on the shoulders of the Contact Group members -- including the United States -- who dare not impose a solution.
Analysis
U.N. status envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his deputy Albert Rohan on Nov. 21 began their Balkan trip in the Kosovar capital of Pristina, with the clear intent of ensuring that status negotiations scheduled for December in Vienna, Austria, do not fail. However, their visit probably will have the opposite effect. At this stage it appears Ahtisaari merely wants to take notice of the contradictory positions at play in the negotiations rather than come up with a clear plan. A further sign of the chaos reigning in and around Kosovo is that disagreement exists both between and among the Albanians and the Serbs.
Two major views have emerged in the Serbian ranks. Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic maintain that "Kosovo-Metohija" must remain part of Serbia. It can receive more than autonomy but less than independence, and the inhabitants' minority and property rights must be respected to the utmost. Hence, the Serbian government prepared a resolution Nov. 15 that was adopted by the Serbian Parliament on Nov. 21.
Also on Nov. 15, Serbian head of state Boris Tadic expounded his own views during talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Tadic said Kosovo should be decentralized to create separate Serbian and Albanian entities within the region and allow Serbs to have a relationship with Serbia that would be close but regulated by Kosovar institutions. Earlier, Serbian Vice President Miroslav Labus came forth with a similar proposal, maintaining that a Serbian enclave should be created in northern Kosovo and along the Kosovar part of the River Morava.
What the Serb positions have in common is a simple fact: Kosovo must not, under any circumstances, be allowed to achieve independence.
Here, it must be noted that the international community -- the majority of U.S. and European politicians involved in this process -- are striving to extinguish the independent Serbian enclave in Bosnia-Herzegovina and create a unified state. Hence, it is possible that Tadic and Labus' proposals are designed to safeguard the existence of Serbian entities not only in Kosovo but also in Bosnia.
Events during the last few months testify to the uncertainties among Albanians, too. Though all the Albanians agree that Kosovo must be independent, in October some radical groups attempted to pressure the Kosovar Parliament to declare independence immediately. However, as a result of international pressure -- primarily from Jesen Petersen, leader of the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo -- on Nov. 17 a public proclamation was issued stating that Kosovar Albanians want an independent and sovereign Kosovo, and that this position will be represented during negotiations with Belgrade.
The international community could resolve this predicament -- especially if the major powers represented in the Contact Group (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) legally sanctioned the de facto protectorate. That would translate into at least five years of conditional independence for Kosovo, supervised by the Contact Group and protected by international forces, which would give the Serbs in Northern Kosovo not only minority rights (a term they consider an affront in itself) but also the ability to organize themselves -- inside Kosovo -- as a separate entity.
If the Contact Group members are not ready to impose the solution of conditional independence as soon as possible, a new war in the Balkans is almost a certainty. Historical patterns simply are not working: Neither the Ottoman Empire nor Tito's Yugoslavia can be resurrected. But a sort of Bismarckian realpolitik -- a protectorate imposed and supervised by a concert of major powers -- might be worth trying.
Regardless of what path is approached, any removal of international forces will lead to Albanian-Serb bloodshed. Consequently, the international community only has two options. First, the Contact Group could adopt a position of de facto support of Albanian independence. Such a stance would anger Belgrade, but Belgrade currently lacks the tools to retaliate effectively (although the Bosnian Serbs would certainly feel forced to act to protect their own interests). Second, the Contact Group could simply attempt to extend the existing legal limbo.
Unfortunately, another bit of Serbia and Montenegro -- namely, Montenegro -- is champing at the bit to vote on independence itself. And should Montenegro go, the Kosovar Albanians are certain to not wait around for the international community to make up its mind. This leaves just one question in Stratfor's mind: Do the Kosovar Albanians possess the military fortitude to seize their independence should they not receive a blank check from the Contact Group?
