http://www.mw.ua/1000/1600/62441/
ZERKALO NEDELI (UKRAINE)
28 March 2008
Kosovo a Month After: Quo Vadis?
Author: Nazar BOBITSKI
It has been a month since unilateral proclamation of Kosovo independence.
During that time the eyes of the international media have been fixed on the
dramatic protests of the Serbs of Northern Kosovo, a seemingly unstoppable
but geographically limited stream of international recognitions and frantic,
mostly diplomatic efforts by Belgrade to stem it. Ukraine and other
countries anxiously reacted to attempts by other separatist regions to use
Kosovo events as a 'road-map' to advance their own cause. So far these
attempts in breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia have amounted to nothing
more than mere copycats of public appeals by Kosovar leaders to third
countries and international organizations. A far-reaching step was taken by
Moscow to withdraw from the CIS sanctions against Abkhazia and legalize its
long-standing trade ties with the region.
The media fixation on the situation in Mitrovica and Belgrade has pushed to
the background some other events which yet may play a decisive role in the
fate of Kosovo. On February 28 in Vienna representatives of 15 countries
which recognized Kosovo held the first session of what was called the
founding meeting of the "International Steering Group for Kosovo". Along
with the US delegates, the session was attended by representatives of 12 EU
Member States as well as Turkey and Switzerland. The group derives its
mandate from the provisions of Ahtisaari Plan. According to the Plan, were
it approved by the UN Security Council, the governance of the province would
have been discharged by the international steering group of countries which
would appoint an 'international civil representative' for this purpose. The
international civil representative would at the same time hold the post of
the EU special representative for Kosovo.
However, the next day after the group's session the UN Secretary General
received the letter from the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs pointing
out at the lack of legality in the status of the 'international steering
group' and its 'international civil representative'. In the opinion of
Serbia, it renders illegal the activities of the group and its
representative in Kosovo as they constitute the breach of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Serbia. Belgrade also considers as illegal attempts
to transfer the governing powers from the UN Mission in Kosovo, which it
considers legitimate under the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, to the
'international steering group'. On the same day, February 29, the Serbian
position was officially supported by Russia in the UN Security Council. As a
result the UN Secretary General was obliged to officially notify the
government of Slovenia as a current EU Presidency about objections of
certain UN Security Council Members against the transfer of powers of the UN
Mission in Kosovo to the EU Special Representative.
These developments may help shed light on the profound problem of governing
Kosovo which currently stays in the shadow of other events. With the absence
of the decision of the UN Security Council on Kosovo status, in particular,
on the fate of Ahtisaari Plan, the status of the EU special representative -
'the international civil representative' has murky legal grounds. Therefore,
it casts doubt on the status of the EU special mission to Kosovo sent there
to assist the EU special representative. This doubtful position raises the
question of the ability of the mission to fulfill its primary task -
implementation of Ahtisaari Plan which in essence is about bridging the
unbridgeable - granting independence to Kosovo while securing the greatest
possible autonomy and safeguarding the interests of the province's Kosovo
Serb community. The attempts by the EU mission to implement the Plan will
inevitably meet resistance from the newly-made sovereign Kosovo authorities.
Their resistance will only grow with realization of the fact that Kosovo
independence came about not as a result of the will of the international
community through the UN Security Council decision but as a result of their
sovereign choice as a people in accordance with the principle of
self-determination.
We can only ask ourselves whether the Albanian leaders of Kosovo will be
responsible and wise enough to accept the EU way even if it leads to
considerable devolution of their power in favour of their old adversaries,
the Serb minority. The entire history of interethnic relations in the
region speaks against it. In the pessimistic scenario the EU special
representative and the mission will be forced to regularly adapt the
Ahtisaari Plan to the realities on the ground. However, with each and every
compromise and derogation the relevance and hence legitimacy of the Plan
will be undermined and along with it - the mandate of the EU
representatives. Once again the European Union will find itself in a
situation of a hostage of those for whose fate it has assumed
responsibility. The gravity of the situation is further compounded by the
fact that the EU primary political weapon to deal with instabilities in the
region - the promise of membership, is currently out of reach for Kosovo as
the EU still lacks internal consensus to recognize a new state, let alone to
negotiate new contractual links for trade, political association and so on.
In these circumstances the best course of action for Serbia and the Serb
inhabitants of Kosovo seems to be cessation of acts of violent dissent which
only divert the international opinion and turn them into the villains of the
situation. Instead, Belgrade should pressure the EU as a de-facto authority
in the province to take all necessary measures to protect human rights and
rights of Serbian minority in Kosovo. It should emphasize that any further
progress in bilateral dialogue as well as peace in Northern Kosovo will
obviously depend on it. This approach does not in any way entail Serbia's
approval of Ahtisaari Plan or the surrender of its sovereignty over Kosovo.
The time will show to what extent the Serbian government will be able to
adopt a more rational posture and not build its position mostly on the basis
of emotions.
On top of that, in the absence of the 'blessing' by the UN Security
Council, the continued activities of the 'international steering group for
Kosovo' may lead to certain controversial outcomes elsewhere. The group has
a clearly regional (West European) mould which limits her moral authority to
speak on behalf of 'the international community'. At the same time, it shows
the way for similar 'regionalized' settlements of other 'frozen' conflicts.
For instance, another 'steering group' can be easily propped up by the
countries of another region or a regional grouping of Europe to assume
interim governance of breakaway provinces without much need for
international legitimacy. However, the probability of the second group is
quite low as its potential sponsors will soon painfully discover their true
position in the international pecking order of power of influence as
measured in the number of international recognitions. This is why one should
not expect any time soon any new steps by Russia towards recognition of
Abkhazia or South Ossetia. It is much more profitable politically for Moscow
to play a role of the defener of primacy of international law and the
exclusive role of the UN Security Council to settle regional conflicts
rather than pursue a dubious course of wrecking the Georgian state.
For Ukraine this situation, riddled with controversies, dictates to refrain
from any actions leading to recognition of Kosovo's independence. At this
stage it seems more beneficial, as well as right from the point of view of
international law, to call the parties in question to respect the UN Charter
and the exclusive powers of the UN Security Council. Ukraine should also
protest vigorously against any attempts to use Kosovo as a precedent for the
settlement of the other 'frozen conflicts' around the world.
ZERKALO NEDELI (UKRAINE)
28 March 2008
Kosovo a Month After: Quo Vadis?
Author: Nazar BOBITSKI
It has been a month since unilateral proclamation of Kosovo independence.
During that time the eyes of the international media have been fixed on the
dramatic protests of the Serbs of Northern Kosovo, a seemingly unstoppable
but geographically limited stream of international recognitions and frantic,
mostly diplomatic efforts by Belgrade to stem it. Ukraine and other
countries anxiously reacted to attempts by other separatist regions to use
Kosovo events as a 'road-map' to advance their own cause. So far these
attempts in breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia have amounted to nothing
more than mere copycats of public appeals by Kosovar leaders to third
countries and international organizations. A far-reaching step was taken by
Moscow to withdraw from the CIS sanctions against Abkhazia and legalize its
long-standing trade ties with the region.
The media fixation on the situation in Mitrovica and Belgrade has pushed to
the background some other events which yet may play a decisive role in the
fate of Kosovo. On February 28 in Vienna representatives of 15 countries
which recognized Kosovo held the first session of what was called the
founding meeting of the "International Steering Group for Kosovo". Along
with the US delegates, the session was attended by representatives of 12 EU
Member States as well as Turkey and Switzerland. The group derives its
mandate from the provisions of Ahtisaari Plan. According to the Plan, were
it approved by the UN Security Council, the governance of the province would
have been discharged by the international steering group of countries which
would appoint an 'international civil representative' for this purpose. The
international civil representative would at the same time hold the post of
the EU special representative for Kosovo.
However, the next day after the group's session the UN Secretary General
received the letter from the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs pointing
out at the lack of legality in the status of the 'international steering
group' and its 'international civil representative'. In the opinion of
Serbia, it renders illegal the activities of the group and its
representative in Kosovo as they constitute the breach of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Serbia. Belgrade also considers as illegal attempts
to transfer the governing powers from the UN Mission in Kosovo, which it
considers legitimate under the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, to the
'international steering group'. On the same day, February 29, the Serbian
position was officially supported by Russia in the UN Security Council. As a
result the UN Secretary General was obliged to officially notify the
government of Slovenia as a current EU Presidency about objections of
certain UN Security Council Members against the transfer of powers of the UN
Mission in Kosovo to the EU Special Representative.
These developments may help shed light on the profound problem of governing
Kosovo which currently stays in the shadow of other events. With the absence
of the decision of the UN Security Council on Kosovo status, in particular,
on the fate of Ahtisaari Plan, the status of the EU special representative -
'the international civil representative' has murky legal grounds. Therefore,
it casts doubt on the status of the EU special mission to Kosovo sent there
to assist the EU special representative. This doubtful position raises the
question of the ability of the mission to fulfill its primary task -
implementation of Ahtisaari Plan which in essence is about bridging the
unbridgeable - granting independence to Kosovo while securing the greatest
possible autonomy and safeguarding the interests of the province's Kosovo
Serb community. The attempts by the EU mission to implement the Plan will
inevitably meet resistance from the newly-made sovereign Kosovo authorities.
Their resistance will only grow with realization of the fact that Kosovo
independence came about not as a result of the will of the international
community through the UN Security Council decision but as a result of their
sovereign choice as a people in accordance with the principle of
self-determination.
We can only ask ourselves whether the Albanian leaders of Kosovo will be
responsible and wise enough to accept the EU way even if it leads to
considerable devolution of their power in favour of their old adversaries,
the Serb minority. The entire history of interethnic relations in the
region speaks against it. In the pessimistic scenario the EU special
representative and the mission will be forced to regularly adapt the
Ahtisaari Plan to the realities on the ground. However, with each and every
compromise and derogation the relevance and hence legitimacy of the Plan
will be undermined and along with it - the mandate of the EU
representatives. Once again the European Union will find itself in a
situation of a hostage of those for whose fate it has assumed
responsibility. The gravity of the situation is further compounded by the
fact that the EU primary political weapon to deal with instabilities in the
region - the promise of membership, is currently out of reach for Kosovo as
the EU still lacks internal consensus to recognize a new state, let alone to
negotiate new contractual links for trade, political association and so on.
In these circumstances the best course of action for Serbia and the Serb
inhabitants of Kosovo seems to be cessation of acts of violent dissent which
only divert the international opinion and turn them into the villains of the
situation. Instead, Belgrade should pressure the EU as a de-facto authority
in the province to take all necessary measures to protect human rights and
rights of Serbian minority in Kosovo. It should emphasize that any further
progress in bilateral dialogue as well as peace in Northern Kosovo will
obviously depend on it. This approach does not in any way entail Serbia's
approval of Ahtisaari Plan or the surrender of its sovereignty over Kosovo.
The time will show to what extent the Serbian government will be able to
adopt a more rational posture and not build its position mostly on the basis
of emotions.
On top of that, in the absence of the 'blessing' by the UN Security
Council, the continued activities of the 'international steering group for
Kosovo' may lead to certain controversial outcomes elsewhere. The group has
a clearly regional (West European) mould which limits her moral authority to
speak on behalf of 'the international community'. At the same time, it shows
the way for similar 'regionalized' settlements of other 'frozen' conflicts.
For instance, another 'steering group' can be easily propped up by the
countries of another region or a regional grouping of Europe to assume
interim governance of breakaway provinces without much need for
international legitimacy. However, the probability of the second group is
quite low as its potential sponsors will soon painfully discover their true
position in the international pecking order of power of influence as
measured in the number of international recognitions. This is why one should
not expect any time soon any new steps by Russia towards recognition of
Abkhazia or South Ossetia. It is much more profitable politically for Moscow
to play a role of the defener of primacy of international law and the
exclusive role of the UN Security Council to settle regional conflicts
rather than pursue a dubious course of wrecking the Georgian state.
For Ukraine this situation, riddled with controversies, dictates to refrain
from any actions leading to recognition of Kosovo's independence. At this
stage it seems more beneficial, as well as right from the point of view of
international law, to call the parties in question to respect the UN Charter
and the exclusive powers of the UN Security Council. Ukraine should also
protest vigorously against any attempts to use Kosovo as a precedent for the
settlement of the other 'frozen conflicts' around the world.
