John Major once remarked to me that one doesn't win a
general election on foreign policy. "No," I replied, "but one
can lose it." Reputations can be lost just as easily as elections.
Tony Blair won't have any more elections to fight but his
legacy will be dominated more by his foreign policy than has that of any
British prime minister since Sir Anthony Eden. He will not find the
comparison very comfortable.
It was never meant to have been like that. He started his
decade in power with an extraordinary degree of popularity and power not just
at home but also abroad.
If it has since soured, that should, however, not blind us
to the positive aspects of his international role. Not least of these has
been his global prominence. Britain, as a middling power, cannot assume that
its prime minister will be known throughout the world.
Who knows the name of the Chinese president, the Japanese
or the Italian prime ministers? For 10 years, the world has known about Tony
Blair. Like him or loathe him, that has helped project Britain as a country
with a significant role in world affairs.
Blair's contribution has also been serious rather than
symbolic. One has only to compare him with Jacques Chirac. While the French
President delighted in grand initiatives presented for the greater glory of
France, Blair has made a series of thoughtful speeches offering a sober
analysis of the world we live in and how Britain can play its part in
building a global response to global problems.
While the rhetoric has been splendid there has been little
attempt to exaggerate Britain's power and his proposals have, for the most
part, been put in an international context.
That is the case for the defence. The charge against Blair
is, however, far more serious. It does not relate to the Prime Minister's
integrity or noble intentions. What has been of far greater concern has been
his faulty analysis and poor judgement.
When he came to power he brought with him no experience
and little prior interest in foreign affairs. Despite that, he has acted as
his own foreign secretary and has largely ignored the collective advice of
diplomats, academics and others with relevant expertise.
The Prime Minister made two fundamental errors in the
first few years that he was in power. First, he concluded that a commitment
to human rights and democratic values justified, and required, a policy of
military intervention around the world.
This was in accord with his own personality. He has
approached foreign policy with all the zeal of a Victorian missionary. His is
a muscular Christianity that was evident from early in his premiership. The
most important example was Kosovo, which Blair believes was a great success.
In fact, by his own declared objectives, it was a significant failure. It
demonstrated that when you begin a war against a country that has not
attacked you, you lose control of the consequences, which may be very
different from those you intended.
Nato's war against Serbia had two purposes. One was to
restore Kosovo's autonomy within Serbia; the other was to prevent ethnic
cleansing. Instead, Kosovo is now demanding, and will obtain, full
independence, further fragmenting the Balkans. The ethnic cleansing of the
Kosovo Albanians has been replaced by the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo
Serbs.
Kosovo was important, not just in itself but because it
confirmed Blair in his simplistic belief that complex international problems
can be resolved by Western military might. In a very real sense, the road to
Baghdad began in Belgrade. This led to Blair's second fundamental error. The
end of the Cold War had concluded the global battle between Communism and
capitalism, and between totalitarianism and democracy. The old certainties as
to who we were and who the enemy was had disappeared. But 9/11 changed all
that.
Since the attack on the Twin Towers, both the rhetoric and
strategy of Blair and Bush have been black and white: a global War on Terror,
a new battle between good and evil. Chechnya, Palestine and Kashmir have all
had to be fitted onto this template when, in reality, they are quite
different issues. The result has been a simplistic distortion of a complex
world.
The consequence has also been the disaster of Iraq, which,
quite rightly, will define Blair's legacy. Going to war is always a difficult
decision. But when you go to war against a country that has not attacked you,
without the support of the UN Security Council and with your own country and
party deeply divided, you have to be sure that you get it right. Blair and
Bush have got it terribly wrong.
The result has been more than 100,000 killed, two million
refugees fled abroad, a failed state in the heart of the Middle East, and
Iran having been helped by Blair and Bush to become the most powerful state
in the region. Blair's Iraq policy has been worse than a crime, it has been a
blunder. Then again, some may argue it is the other way around.
I began by comparing Blair with Eden. Maybe Neville
Chamberlain would have been more appropriate. While no one can accuse Blair
of appeasement, in every other respect the similarities are striking. Blair
and Chamberlain: two prime ministers, both inexperienced in foreign policy,
both convinced of their own rectitude, both disdainful of advice, both unable
to acknowledge error, both contemptuous of their foreign secretaries and both
believing in their own personal destiny. For Chamberlain read Munich; for
Blair read Baghdad. Both were decent men out of their depth.
At least Neville Chamberlain paved the way for Winston
Churchill. As we wait for Gordon Brown to enter Downing Street, I realise
that this is where the comparison ends.
Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP was Foreign Secretary from 1995 to
1997
| 
