May 15, 2008

Socialists, the Unexpected Kingmakers

http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?p=591

Serbian Election: Socialists, the Unexpected Kingmakers
by Srdja Trifkovic

Last Sunday night, as the results of Serbia’s parliamentary elections became known, the country’s President Boris Tadiæ made a remarkable statement. “I warn the parties that have lost this election,” he declared, “not to play games with the will of the citizens and try to form a government that would take Serbia back to the 1990s. I will not allow any such government and I will prevent it by democratic means.” This was not just an ill-considered gaffe in the heat of the election night: on Wednesday he was at it again, criticizing attempts by his political opponents to form the government and pledging to “defend the will of the people with all democratic and legitimate means.”
The implications of Mr. Tadic’s statement are clear, and alarming:
1. There exists a “will of the citizens” (or “people”) that is distinct to, and in this case different from that expressed in the distribution of mandates in the National Assembly;
2. The “losers”—by which he means the outgoing Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) and the Radicals (SRS)—would plunge Serbia into wars and isolation (“back to the 1990s”).
3. It is within Tadic’s power as head of state to prevent the emergence of a coalition government not to his liking, even if such a coalition were to be supported by the majority of parliamentary deputies.
Tadiæ’s first claim harks back to Rousseau’s volonté générale that properly guides the decisions of a civil society, rather than the sum of their individual self-interests, the volonté de tous. His assertion is in line with the postmodern USA-EU understanding of “democracy,” which judges a process democratic entirely on the basis of the “rightness” of its outcome. His European and American mentors have long used the term “democracy” as an ideological concept. It does not signify broad participation of informed citizens in the business of governance, but it denotes the desirable social and political content of ostensibly popular decisions. The process likely to produce undesirable outcomes—a sovereignist coalition government in Belgrade, say, or a “no” vote in the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty—is a priori “undemocratic.” Contrary to his frankly outrageous claim, the common good is an aggregate of private interests which needs balancing and fine-tuning through the institutions of representative democracy. After such outbursts it is ridiculous to misrepresent Tadiæ as a “pro-Western democrat,” although he is certain to be thus described in a thousand MSM reports that are yet to be written.
Tadiæ’s Democratic Party (DS) did well at the election, considerably better than expected, but it did not “win.” With 102 deputies in the 250-seat assembly, the Democrats will be 24 seats short of the working majority. Even with the like-minded Liberal Democratic Party of Èedomir Jovanoviæ (14 deputies) and a couple of small ethnic minority parties (Hungarians, Sanjak Muslims), the DS cannot reach the magic number.
The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), with 20 deputies, is now the decisive factor in the equation, certain to decide the shape of the next ruling coalition. It will likely join forces with Koštunica’s DSS (30 deputies) and the Radicals (78) to create a government with a slim but workable majority. Its leader Ivica Daèiæ may yet be tempted by the DS, which is certain to make him a generous offer, but his party leadership has warned him that any such deal would split the party. It still includes numerous Miloševiæ loyalists who have not forgiven the Democrats—then led by the late prime minister Zoran Djindjiæ—the delivery of their leader to The Hague in 2001.
An agreement is already said to be in place between Daèiæ, Koštunica and the SRS to share power in the city of Belgrade, with the Radicals’ No. 3, Aleksandar Vuèiæ, becoming the new Mayor. The speed and ease with which the deal was struck on the country’s second most important government structure—with its many rich pickings—bodes ill for Tadiæ’s hopes that the SPS may yet be swayed his way.
The pro-Western camp is nevertheless trying hard. After almost a decade of relentless political and media campaign by the DS and its allies against the SPS, after years of public demonization of its late leader, the “Euro-reformist forces” have suddenly discovered that the Socialists are eminently salonfaehig. Tadiæ is now declaring that there are practically no ideological differences between the heirs to Miloševiæ and his own followers, as they are both true to the principles of the Socialist International. Yet less than two years ago, when this same Socialist Party—under the same leader and with the same program—supported Koštunica’s minority goverrnment, it was pilloried by the Euro-reformers as a dark and temporary remnant of Serbia’s unpleasant past.
Even if he manages to cobble together yet another coalition with himself at the helm, the biggest loser of the election is my old friend Vojislav Koštunica. He is a well-meaning man of principle, as we all know, and his decision on March 8 to “return the mandate to the people” may have been the honorable thing to do—but in the midst of the Kosovo crisis it was neither prudent nor conducive to the country’s best interests. Within the previous parliament, elected on January 21 2007, a “sovereignist” majority could have been created with far greater ease than today. Dr. Koštunica is now paying the price of his reluctance to part ways with the Eurofanatics and strike a solid deal with the Radicals a year ago, as many of his friends and supporters had urged him to do at the time and as it was certainly in his power to do.
Serbia is now more polarized and more evenly divided, but it is nevertheless far from having an “Euro-reformist” majority, as Mr. Tadiæ and his allies would have us believe. His DS-led coalition and the LDP, let us repeat, have 116 deputies. That is well below the score for the SRS-DSS-led emerging alliance, which is likely to stand firm on the defense of Serbia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and international legality.
After almost 8 years in the wilderness the Socialists are Belgrade’s unexpected kingmakers. It is to be hoped that by doing the right thing now they will atone for at least some of the many mistakes and misdemeanors of which they were guilty while running Serbia under Miloševiæ. It is also to be hoped that Mr. Tadiæ will respect his constitutional prerogatives and accordingly refrain from any attempt to resist the will of the people, as expressed by their democratically elected deputies.
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Balkan exceptionalism

Balkan exceptionalism


May 15th 2008
From The Economist print edition

What Serbia's election says about the European Union's enlargement


Illustration by Peter Schrank



A BRITISH tabloid set a high standard for bombast when it once took
credit for the re-election of a Tory government with the headline:
“It's The Sun Wot Won It”. This week European Union leaders
were taking credit for another election upset: the unexpected success
of the pro-European coalition led by the Serbian president, Boris
Tadic, in the general election on May 11th. The Serbs had “clearly
chosen Europe,” said the French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner. Jan
Marinus Wiersma, a Dutch member of the European Parliament, declared
that the election was “a form of referendum in which citizens gave
their support for the country's future membership of the EU.”



That may be a little premature. It is true that Mr Tadic's block is
called the “Coalition for a European Serbia”. His supporters waved the EU
flag of gold stars on blue. But Mr Tadic did not win outright, and it
matters enormously which parties end up in a new coalition government.
If the wrong parties cobble together a deal, they could yet lead Serbia
into deeper isolation.





Yet it would be absurd to deny that the EU
played a role in the election. European governments agreed to offer
Serbia a couple of timely (if symbolic) concessions just days before
the vote. Serbs may feel “humiliated” that 19 EU countries have recognised the independence of Kosovo after the province broke away in February, says a diplomat. But the EU also reminded them that Europe is about good things, such as freedom to travel. If it was not exactly the EU “wot
won it”, European governments did at least send a signal that they
would rather have Serbia in the club than brooding dangerously outside.



That holds true also for Serbia's neighbours in the western
Balkans, who are being jollied along with visa concessions and the
like, and assured that they enjoy a “European perspective” (to use the
Brussels jargon for eventual membership). It all feels rather
pragmatic, even generous. And that is odd, because when it comes to
enlargement in general, older members of the club are in a foul temper.



It is not only the future that causes alarm. The mood is sulphurous
over Romania and Bulgaria, which joined in 2007. Bulgaria has already
seen tens of millions of EU funds frozen
amid fears of fraud. The figure of suspended aid could rise to billions
when a European Commission monitoring report comes out this summer. The
new Italian government is talking menacingly about restricting Romanian
migrants. The latest Eurobarometer poll on enlargement found majority
support for the admission of only one new country: Croatia, a
relatively advanced place whose beaches heave with sizzling Italians
and Germans each summer. Croatia is on course to join in 2010 or 2011.



Even more paradoxically, some of the countries keenest on admitting
Serbia and others have voters who are the most alarmed by enlargement.
Migrant-phobic Italy led the way (together with Greece) in arguing for
the EU to be flexible over demands that
Serbia co-operate with prosecutors hunting war criminals. Austria has
lobbied tirelessly for Balkan bits of the former Austro-Hungarian
empire, starting with Croatia. Yet Austrian voters now oppose admitting
any Balkan country other than Croatia by large margins (and a whopping
81% are against Turkish membership). Similarly, French ministers may
rejoice that Serbia's voters choose Europe, but in 2006 France was
pushing the idea that future enlargement should be assessed according
to the EU's “absorption capacity”, a
dangerously vague term that includes voters' “perceptions”. The French
president, Nicolas Sarkozy, is publicly against Turkey's membership.



If enlargement is so unpopular, why do so many EU
leaders want the credit for Serbia's vote for Europe? There are two,
linked explanations. The first is that holding the door open to Balkan
countries such as Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia and the rest does not
imply support for enlargement in general—it is a specific strategy for
preventing further instability in Europe's backyard. And the second is
that enlargement mostly works like that.


Consolidation, not enlargement



Arguably, enlargement as a general project does not exist. Moves to expand the EU
are more often responses to particular crises, and they trigger big
squabbles until it becomes clear that no better alternative exists (the
1995 expansion to take in Finland, Sweden and Austria being the
exception). Greece was admitted in 1981 to bind it to the West, even
though everybody feared it was not ready. It took nine years of
argument to get Spain and Portugal in, amid cries of alarm (loudest in
France) over cheap Iberian workers and farm produce. In December 1989,
as Communist regimes fell across eastern Europe, the French president,
François Mitterrand, proposed that ex-Warsaw Pact nations should be
invited to join a loose “European confederation” (the idea died, not
least because Mr Mitterrand invited Russia too). The EU hopes of Bulgaria and Romania only became plausible during the Kosovo crisis of 1999, when their airspace was needed to allow NATO jets to bomb Serbia.



Today's Serbia and the other Balkan applicants for entry may not be
easy cases. But their admission does not pose “existential” questions
for the EU, notes one diplomat, just a lot
of hard work on building up clean, capable governments, in which scary
nationalists are marginalised. Croatian negotiators even talk smoothly
of “consolidation” rather than “enlargement” nowadays. Larger
candidates for the EU, notably Turkey and
Ukraine, cannot do that. They pose big questions, such as how to relate
to the Muslim world or how to live with Russia.



The Serbian election could have been a lot worse. A thumping win for nasty nationalists would have seriously delayed EU
expansion into the western Balkans. But supporters of admitting Turkey,
say, should avoid premature congratulation. The western Balkans remains
an exceptional case. Enlargement as a broader cause was not the winner
this week.

http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_ID=11375822