Warning light on Kosovo by John Bolton - Washington Times

John Bolton is former permanent U.S. representative to the United
Nations. [Contributors] Lawrence Eagleburger is former U.S. secretary of state.
Peter Rodman is former assistant secretary of defense for international
security affairs.

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The Washington Times

COMMENTARY

Warning light on
Kosovo

By John Bolton

January 31, 2008

The Bush administration has indicated its readiness to recognize a
unilateral declaration of independence by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, a
province of the Republic of Serbia that since 1999 has been under United
Nations administration and NATO military control.

Such a declaration may take place as early as February. American recognition
would be over Serbia's objections, without a negotiated solution between Serbia
and Kosovo's Albanians, and without modification by the United Nations Security
Council of Resolution 1244, which reaffirms Serbian sovereignty in Kosovo while
providing for the province's "substantial autonomy." U.S. recognition
may be joined by that of some members of the European Union, which has been
under heavy diplomatic pressure from Washington, though several EU states and a
number of countries outside Europe have said they would reject such action.

Attempting to impose a settlement on Serbia would be a direct challenge to
the Russian Federation, which opposes any Kosovo settlement not accepted by
Belgrade.

We believe an imposed settlement of the Kosovo question and seeking to
partition Serbia's sovereign territory without its consent is not in the
interest of the United States. The blithe assumption of American policy — that
the mere passage of nine years of relative quiet would be enough to lull Serbia
and Russia into reversing their positions on a conflict that goes back
centuries — has proven to be naive in the extreme.

We believe U.S. policy on Kosovo must be re-examined without delay, and we
urge the Bush administration to make it clear that pending the results of such
re-examination it would withhold recognition of a Kosovo independence
declaration and discourage Kosovo's Albanians from taking that step.

Current U.S. policy relies on the unconvincing claim that Kosovo is
"unique" and would set no precedent for other troublespots. Of course
every conflict has unique characteristics. However, ethnic and religious
minorities in other countries already are signaling their intention to follow a
Kosovo example. This includes sizeable Albanian communities in adjoining areas
of southern Serbia, Montenegro, and especially the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, as well as the Serbian portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Recognition of Kosovo's independence without Serbia's consent would set a
precedent with far-reaching and unpredictable consequences for many other
regions of the world. The Kosovo model already has been cited by supporters of
the Basque separatist movement in Spain and the Turkish-controlled area of
northern Cyprus. Neither the Security Council nor any other international body has
the power or authority to impose a change of any country's borders.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the current policy is the dismissive
attitude displayed toward Russia's objections. Whatever disagreements the
United States may have with Moscow on other issues, and there are many, the
United States should not prompt an unnecessary crisis in U.S.-Russia relations.
There are urgent matters regarding which the United States must work with
Russia, including Iran's nuclear intentions and North Korea's nuclear
capability. Such cooperation would be undercut by American action to neutralize
Moscow's legitimate concerns regarding Kosovo.

If the U.S. moves forward with recognizing Kosovo,
Moscow's passivity cannot be taken for granted. It may have been one thing in
1999 for the United States and NATO to take action against Yugoslavia over the
objections of a weak Russia.

Today, it would be unwise to dismiss Russia's willingness and ability to
assist Serbia. On an issue of minor importance to the United States, is this a
useful expenditure of significant political capital with Russia?

Our Kosovo policy is hardly less problematic for our friends and allies in
Europe. While some European countries, notably members of the EU, may feel
themselves obligated to join us in recognizing Kosovo's independence, a number
of those countries would do so reluctantly because of Washington's
inflexibility and insistence. No more than the United States, Europe would not
benefit from an avoidable confrontation with Russia.

Even if Kosovo declared itself an independent state, it would be a
dysfunctional one and a ward of the international community for the indefinite
future. Corruption and organized crime are rampant. The economy, aside from
international largesse and criminal activities, is nonviable. Law enforcement,
integrity of the courts, protection of persons and property, and other
prerequisites for statehood are practically nonexistent. While these failures
are often blamed on Kosovo's uncertain status, a unilateral declaration of
independence recognized by some countries and rejected by many others would
hardly remedy that fact.

The result would be a new "frozen conflict," with Kosovo's status
still unresolved. The risk of renewed violence would further impede Kosovo's
development. Moreover, heightened tensions might require reinforcing the U.S.
presence in Kosovo when we can least afford it due to other commitments.

Serbia has made great strides in democratic development and economic
revitalization since the fall of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Current
policy with respect to Kosovo risks complete reversal of these gains. Faced
with a choice between Western partnership and defense of their sovereign
territory and constitution, there is little doubt what Serbia would decide.

The current positive trend could falter in the face of political
radicalization and possible internal destabilization. Serbia's relations with
countries that had recognized Kosovo would be impaired. Serbia would inevitably
move closer to Russia as its only protector.

We do not underestimate the difficulty and complexity of the Kosovo question
nor do we suggest the status quo can endure indefinitely. As with thorny
questions elsewhere, viable and enduring settlements should result from
negotiation and compromise. Such an outcome has been undermined by a U.S.
promise to the Kosovo Albanians that their demands will be satisfied if they
remain adamant and no agreement is reached with Belgrade. Such a promise cannot
be justified by the claim, often heard from proponents of independence, that
the Albanians' "patience" is running out, so independence must be
granted without delay. This is nothing less than appeasing a threat of
violence.

A reassessment of America's Kosovo policy is long overdue. We hope a policy
that would set a very dangerous international precedent can still be averted if
that reassessment begins now. In the meantime, it is imperative that no
unwarranted or hasty action be taken that would turn what is now a relatively
small problem into a large one.

John Bolton is former permanent U.S. representative to the United
Nations. Lawrence Eagleburger is former U.S. secretary of state. Peter Rodman
is former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

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There Goes Kosovo

There Goes Kosovo

By Doug Bandow

Published 1/31/2008 12:07:49 AM

Kosovo is preparing to declare independence
with American support. Although the Bush administration apparently expects
nothing much to happen, the process is likely to be both divisive and destabilizing.



Relations among Europe, Russia, and America could sour. Serbian politics may
lurch further to the nationalist right; the Radical Party's Tomislav Nikolic
led the first voting round for president Sunday before last. Another Balkans
war is possible, though thankfully unlikely.



Friends of Kosovo's independence argue that stability isn't everything. The
U.S. has no intrinsic interest in Kosovo's status and would be best served to
stay out of it, but that ship sailed long ago.



Washington spent most of the 1990s working overtime to break up Serb-dominated
Yugoslavia while forcing ethnic Serbs to remain in the newly independent
states. The new countries Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia
were allowed to form, but Serbs locked in Bosnia and Croatia, in particular,
were expected to cheerfully accept their fate.



The U.S. applied the same policy to Kosovo, a constituent part of Serbia. In
1999 Washington led NATO in a military campaign to aid the ethnic Albanian
forces, eliminating Serb authority over the territory.



The Bush administration has built on the Clinton administration's policy. After
presiding over unproductive faux "negotiations" predicated on
Kosovo's ultimate independence, the administration now plans to recognize the
new nation even if it fails to win United Nations approval.



Of course, Washington insists that all ethnic Serbs
living in Kosovo must remain in the new state. As before, secession from Serbs
is okay, but secession by Serbs is prohibited. Sound fair?





GRANTED, SORTING THROUGH the conflicting claims involving Kosovo ain't easy.
Once Serbian heartland, it hosts the site of the Battle of the Blackbirds,
where the Serbs lost to the Ottomans in 1389 (the loss probably shaped Serbian
consciousness more than would have a victory -- such is the way of the
Balkans).



Over time the population shifted to an ethnic Albanian majority, in part due to
Yugoslav dictator Josip Broz Tito's efforts to dampen Serbian nationalism in
the multi-ethnic communist state.



In the 1980s it was Serbians who complained of misconduct by the
ethnic-Albanian majority in Kosovo. In 1982, the New York Times reported on "almost weekly incidents of rape, arson,
pillage and industrial sabotage, most seemingly designed to drive Kosovo's
remaining indigenous Slavs--Serbs and Montenegrins -- out of the
province."



That all changed after Slobodan Milosevic used an appearance in Kosovo in 1987
to ignite Serb nationalism and leapfrog into national leadership. With his
rise, Belgrade reasserted Serb control over Kosovo.



When Yugoslavia broke up, the secession of Bosnia and Croatia produced
particularly gruesome conflicts, since both of those provinces contained many
ethnic Serbs who wished to remain independent if not in Serbia.



Although ethnic Serbs may have been responsible for the bulk of atrocities,
Bosniacs and Croats also freely murdered Serbs and each other. The largest
single episode of ethnic cleansing prior to the Kosovo war was conducted
against ethnic Serbs in Croatia's Krajina region, where the battle damage
remained evident for years. Most of Krajina's ethnic Serb residents have yet to
return.



Serb-Albanian relations in Kosovo also deteriorated as the 1990s proceeded.
Serb rule was heavy-handed; Albanians, who made up the vast majority of the
population, created alternative government and social institutions; the Kosovo
Liberation Army (labeled a "terrorist" group by the U.S.) began
attacking Serb officials and Albanian "collaborators"; the Serbian
government responded brutally; fighting expanded and casualties increased.





EVEN AS 1999 dawned, the war, though tragic, was minor as ethnic and sectarian
conflicts go, costing perhaps two thousand lives over a couple of years. About
the same time a quarter of a million people were slaughtered in Sierra Leone.
But the Clinton administration, led by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,
decided to go to war against Serbia, and American bombers forced a quick
surrender.



Since 1999 the territory has been run by the UN and NATO, more or less. After
the allied victory ethnic Albanians kicked out 200,000 or more Serbs and other
minorities, such as Roma. Kosovo's guerrillas took over as leaders -- of both
the political system and abundant criminal enterprises. Three years ago ethnic
Albanian mobs arose to murder and displace ethnic Serbs, and to burn and wreck
Serb homes, churches, and monasteries.



Perhaps it's no surprise, then, the U.S. and Europeans want to be done with the
mess that they helped to created. Desultory negotiations over Kosovo's status
occurred over the last two years, but the outcome was never in doubt. The
allies made clear to the ethnic Albanians that independence would result if no
accord was reached, so no accord was reached.



The Serbs refused to be bought off with the promise of European Union
membership and the Russians said no to another Western fait accompli. So now
Kosovo plans to declare independence, perhaps in days, and the U.S. and most
Europeans say they will recognize the new state.



The most sensible policy for Washington would be to step back and indicate that
there will be no recognition without genuine negotiations, that is, talks
without a predetermined outcome, between Kosovo and Serbia.



On the table should be all options, including overlapping citizenships (Kosovo,
Serb, EU), and secession within secession, that is, allowing the ethnic Serbs
concentrated to Kosovo's north, principally around Mitrovica, to remain in
Serbia.





THE U.S. SHOULD halt the independence bandwagon, though not because Washington
has an intrinsic reason for objecting to Kosovo becoming a separate nation. In
principle the status of this particular piece of real estate should not matter
much to America. Whether the ethnic Albanians or Serbs rule in Pristina is
intrinsically irrelevant to U.S. interests.



However, Washington has spent more than a decade unbalancing the Balkans. By
accelerating the break-up of Yugoslavia with the early recognition of Slovenian
and Croatian independence, the allies short-circuited negotiations, most
importantly over the status of minorities within the breakaway states. U.S.
diplomats also discouraged early settlement of the Bosnian conflict,

further bloodying allied hands.



Washington and Brussels have done the same in Kosovo. Starting in 1998 the
allies took the side of the ethnic Albanians, encouraging their intransigence
in ensuing negotiations. Maybe a peaceful outcome was never possible. We will
never know because of U.S. and European intervention.



After the 1999 Kosovo war, the allies essentially promised the ethnic Albanians
independence and dismissed any compromise, such as allowing ethnic Serbs to
secede from Kosovo. All the while the West blamed Belgrade for refusing to
accept the ethnic Albanian position. Now those same allies are greenlighting a
declaration of independence by Pristina.



The outcome of this strategy is not likely to be pretty. There will be a new,
violent, and unstable state, permeated by crime and possibly open to
terrorists, in the Balkans.



This will push Serbia away from Europe, conceivably leaving a large economic
and political hole in the Balkans. The allied approval of Albanian
self-determination will encourage other secessionist movements in the Balkans
and elsewhere as ethnic and political minorities demand the same
"right" of independence. Western dismissal of Russia's interests will
make Moscow more antagonistic and assertive. Failure to resolve the status of
Serbs within Kosovo risks triggering conflict between ethnic Albanians and
Serbs, and possibly Kosovo and Serbia.



Nice work
all around.



Washington still has time to say no and mitigate some of the consequences of
its past meddling in the Balkans. But, at this point, the odds aren’t good.





Doug Bandow is the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative
Defense Alliance. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is
the author of several books, including Foreign Follies: America's New
Global Empire (Xulon Press).

http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=12663

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