December 15, 2006

The Untold Story of Kosovo Negotiations

NEWS VIEWS by Srdja Trifkovic











Friday, December 15, 2006



The Untold Story of Kosovo Negotiations



Vojislav Kostunica, Serbia’s prime minister for the past three

years, has one of the most challenging jobs in the world. He

nevertheless seems at ease with that burden, and appears more

confident than while he was Yugoslavia’s last president

(2000-2003). When we met in Belgrade last week, he was as

matter-of-fact about the problems he is facing as ever; but

whereas in the past he had occasionally agonized about the

magnitude and complexity of those problems, today he treats

them as facts of life that neither intimidate nor depress him.

It may be telling that in appearance he has hardly aged over

the past decade, while in substance he has become the key

figure on Serbia’s political scene for many years to come.







The most pressing of those problems is of course Kosovo. The

United States, NATO and several leading European Union

countries have occupied one-seventh of his country’s territory

for over seven years, and the officials who run the

“international community” appear keen—for now—to detach the

southern province permanently from Serbia. Kostunica’s best

defense against the pressure to sign Kosovo away—and that

pressure keeps coming from Washington, Brussels, London and

other power centers—has been to insist on the need for any

solution to be legal, to conform to the letter and spirit of

the international law.

The law is clear: Kosovo belongs to Serbia, and its status was

reiterated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that

stopped NATO bombing in June 1999. Detaching it from Serbia

against Belgrade’s will would be an unprecedented violation of

the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Ahtisaari

and his political masters know that, of course, but like to

pretend that it is but a minor irritant. As Kostunica says,

“When we mention the need for legality, some of these

officials become exasperated, even agitated. They respond with

various comments to the effect that we should not be bound by

‘mere’ legality.”

This, Kostunica adds, reminds him of the attitude of

Yugoslavia’s late communist dictator, Marshal Tito. When

commenting on how the country’s judges should try political

cases, Tito famously advised them “not to stick to the law

like a drunk sticks to a fence.” Such attitude irritates

Kostunica—a constitutional lawyer, whose nickname in Serbia is

“the Legalist”—but it does not surprise him. “The whole

negotiating process had been designed from the outset to lead

to only one outcome: Kosovo’s independence,” says he; and the

role of the U.N. mediator, Finland’s former president Marti

Ahtisaari, was simply to choreograph that outcome.

Kostunica’s account of Ahtisaari’s bungled attempt to

“deliver” the Serbs indicates that the promoters of the

Albanian cause had selected the wrong person for the job. The

Finn came to it as a self-declared proponent of detaching

Kosovo from Serbia and an associate of the Soros-funded

International Crisis Group, a leading pro-Albanian lobby

group. Ahtisaari’s opening gambit nevertheless was to try and

assure Kostunica of his good intentions: he really wanted to

assist Serbia, he said, in ridding herself of a problem—of

Kosovo, that is; and “we” should work together on finding the

formula to make it happen smoothly and painlessly, since “we”

(men of the world, big-time players in the “international

community”) surely realize that Kosovo is lost to Serbia

anyway.

Ahtisaari’s approach may have been based on six years’ worth

of flawed advice that he and others in the “international

community” had received from Western diplomats in Belgrade and

from a small but influential clique of “pro-Western” Serbian

officials and analysts. All along their assumption had been

that Serbia would cave in yet again and agree to Kosovo’s

detachment, albeit with some meaningless fig leaf

(“conditional independence,” “international guarantees for

minority rights,” etc, etc); that Russia and China would

endorse the deal at the Security Council; and that the problem

would be taken off the agenda by the end of this year with the

admission of yet another part of ex-Yugoslavia into the

“international community.”

Observers agree that the nature of the new entity would be

clear not so much for what Kosovo would be (an international

protectorate, an EU-NATO condominium, a future province of

Greater Albania) but for what it would no longer be: part of

Serbia. As a Washingtonian insider has noted, “The UN, the EU,

the Contact Group countries, would issue the appropriate

guarantees, mainly protection for the remaining Serbs—and

everyone would know the guarantees were just new lies on top

of the old. When all the Serbs were cleared out and their holy

places destroyed, there would be expressions of regret from

Washington, Brussels, London, etc: ‘Indeed, how sad. How

unfortunate that these Serbs should have made themselves so

hated’.”

The belief that this scenario might work was reinforced by

none other than President Boris Tadic’s chief foreign policy

advisor Vuk Jeremic, one of very few Serbian enthusiasts for

John Kerry’s victory in November 2004. Mr. Jeremic (who

happens to be a Muslim on his mother’s side) came to

Washington on 18 May 2005 to testify in Congress on why Kosovo

should stay within Serbia; but in some of his off-the-record

conversations he assured his hosts that the task is really to

sugar-coat the bitter pill that Serbia will have to swallow

anyway—and to ensure that the nationalist Radical Party does

not score excessive gains in the process.

When confronted with Kostunica’s polite but firm refusal to

operate on those assumptions, Ahtisaari tried subterfuge,

suggesting tête-à-tête off-the-record conversations with

individual Serbian leaders. Aware of the potential for

intrigue and double-dealing contingent upon such arrangements,

Kostunica refused. All his meetings with Ahtisaari were

strictly official, on-the-record, minuted, and attended by

advisors. In the meantime the negotiations between Serbs and

Albanians in Vienna, supposedly mediated by Ahtisaari, failed

because they were doomed to fail. As Kostunica says, the

Albanians were led to believe that they would get independence

anyway, and therefore had no incentive to negotiate.

The biggest internal challenge for the prime minister was to

ensure coherence of the official Serbian position, between

himself, President Tadic, and foreign minister Draskovic. That

has not been easy, and may have become impossible were it not

for the remarkable unity of the country’s public opinion on

this issue, manifested in the referendum on Serbia’s

constitution last October that reiterated Kosovo’s status as

integral part of Serbia. Confronted with the strength of

popular sentiment, Kostunica’s coalition partners and

Tadic—whose Democratic Party is not in government—realized

that breaking ranks would be tantamount to political suicide.

Some of the lingering ambiguities in Belgrade’s leadership

remain, however, and became apparent only days after our

meeting when President Tadic announced that he would fight to

save Kosovo—but added that he does not believe that the fight

would be ultimately successful.

Kostunica disagrees with that assessment, and believes that

the chances of success—of a compromise that would give

self-rule to the Albanians but keep Kosovo within Serbia’s

boundaries—are better now than at any time since 1999. The

fact that Ahtisaari felt compelled to move the deadline, long

set for the end of this year, has tremendous psychological and

political significance: the surest means of denial is delay.

Many proponents of Kosovo’s independence now realize that

setting a firm deadline was a grave mistake. We are witnessing

a shift in momentum that does not work to their advantage.

The shift would not have been possible without Russia’s firm

and unambiguous commitment not to support any Security Council

resolution that is not acceptable to Serbia. We can only

speculate whether Moscow’s stand would be so solid had the

United States promised to treat Kosovo as a valid precedent

for Transdnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and

Nagorno-Karabakh; but having rejected any such possibility out

of hand, Washington has ensured that Putin has no incentive to

play ball. As for China, the danger works in the opposite

direction: had Peking supported Kosovo’s independence, it

could have facilitated the creation of a precedent that could

be and therefore would be used against it vis-à-vis Taiwan (or

even Tibet) at some future date.

Option B for the proponents of Kosovo’s independence was

stated by the province’s “prime minister,” war criminal Agim

Ceku, earlier this week: Albanians proclaim independence

regardless of the UN and invite bilateral recognition by

individual countries, most crucially the United States. The

trouble is that the Europeans hate that option, even those

(notably in London and Berlin) who are supportive of

independence. Option B cannot work unless the European Union

supports it as a whole, and within the EU so many countries

have announced their opposition—Spain, Greece, Rumania, and

Slovakia unequivocally—that it is not practicable. No

individual EU country will recognize a self-proclaimed “state”

in Kosovo unless it is an agreed policy consensually approved

in Brussels. Ceku et al may try it nevertheless, but

Washington is certain not to extend recognition that bypasses

the Security Council if that risks a rift with the Europeans:

the U.S. needs them on board to manage the mess in

Afghanistan, and for the forthcoming disengagement from Iraq.

In conclusion, the untold news is that Kosovo will not become

independent. The New York Times, the Washington Post and the

rest of the Western “mainstream” will go on huffing and

puffing and pretending otherwise, but there is not much they

can do: Kostunica will not be duped, Serbia will not cave in,

Russia will not relent, and the Albanians will not give up on

what they had been promised by those who had never had the

right to make the promise in the first place. They threaten

renewed violence, but the threat only serves to reinforce the

argument that they should not be allowed to get away with it.

As Russia’s ambassador to the U.N. told his Western colleagues

last Wednesday, “you may be willing to give in to Albanian

blackmail, but we are not.”

As Kostunica says, once the reality sinks in we’ll finally

have some real negotiations. We do not know what the end

result will be, but that is in the nature of all genuine

negotiations: their outcome is unknown. Ahtisaari has failed,

and his supporters are getting very nervous. As Misha Glenny

confided to the former U.S. ambassador in Belgrade William

Montgomery on December 7, “I am seriously worried about the

Kosovo situation . . . entre nous, I am very disappointed with

Martti’s performance.”

Good. Very, very good.

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Srdja Trifkovic is the

foreign-affairs editor of

Chronicles: A Magazine

of American Culture and

director of The Rockford

Institute's Center for

International Affairs.

Click here to find out when

Dr. Trifkovic is scheduled

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