http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/michael_boyle/2008/03/kosovo_once_again_a_political_pawn.html
GUARDIAN (UK)
COMMENT IS FREE
Kosovo: once again a political pawn
Michael Boyle
March 11, 2008 1:30 PM
In the last few weeks, it has become increasingly clear that Kosovo's
declaration of independence on February 17 did not settle the matter once
and for all. The newly independent Kosovo is a tense place, roiling with
ethnic incitement in its predominantly Serbian north and struggling to
survive amid rumours of a potential partition. Worse still, it is a pawn in
two overlapping political games: first, between the US, EU and Russia and
second, between its ethnic Albanian Kosovo leadership and the Serbian
government.
The first thing that should be clear is that nobody walks out of this mess
with clean hands. That Kosovo would have to be independent was probably
inevitable. The campaigns of ethnic cleansing led by Slobodan Milosevic
expelled nearly 800,000 people from Kosovo (nearly 90% of the population),
and killed - according to an American bar association estimate - nearly
10,000 people. It's hard to imagine that the Kosovo Albanians who returned
to the province after this assault in 1999 could ever imagine themselves
again being part of Serbia, no matter how democratic it became or how much
minority protection it offered.
But that does not mean that all of the players can absolve themselves of
responsibility for this crisis. Both the US and the EU deserve a fair amount
of blame for tabling UN resolution 1244 in 1999, which promised to resolve
Kosovo's status at some unspecified future point. This "kick the can down
the road" approach might have worked if it was tied to a clear strategy to
get Serbia to accept Kosovo's independence. But it was rather an attempt to
gloss over a nearly intractable issue, while minimising the political
consequences for the political leadership at the time. This left the
successors of Clinton and Blair with a ticking time bomb and no particularly
compelling options for how to defuse it.
What has emerged now - a declaration of independence which makes even
European states that fought to protect Kosovo uneasy - is evidence of this
lack of strategic forethought. Recognising the independent Kosovo may have
been the least bad option, but it certainly did not need to happen with the
level of political cost that it incurred.
The European Union should also not congratulate itself on its behaviour in
Kosovo. While it has played an important role in state-building and in
deploying peacekeepers and police to prevent the outbreak of violence, it
nevertheless held on to the hopes of a negotiated settlement with Belgrade
for too long and proved reluctant to play hardball with Serbia.
For example, the EU could have made Serbia's admission into the European
Union conditional on its peaceful acceptance of a negotiated independence
for Kosovo. But this was a bridge too far for the EU, due to internal
opposition by its members, and thus it spent years experimenting with
unworkable proposals for things like "conditional independence".
Its preference for a negotiated settlement may have increased the political
shocks after independence happened. The EU-backed Athissari plan, which
promised a quasi-independent status for Kosovo, was a compromise, but one
which was fundamentally unacceptable to both Pristina and Belgrade. It was,
essentially, another "kick the can down the road approach" and in avoiding
the issue it may have magnified the severity of the political reaction from
Albanians and Serbs alike.
Moreover, when independence happened, the EU appeared to be caught almost by
surprise and, astonishingly, insisted on no common policy for the legal
recognition of Kosovo among its members. This has meant we have a new state
recognised by only some of the states in the regional organisation it wants
to join.
At the time of UNSCR 1244, Russia was happy to accept this sleight-of-hand,
to end the war and to rein in Milosevic's Serbia before the situation got
out of hand. But today we are dealing with a very different Russia: a surly
but resurgent power that resents the American and European posturing about
the democratic future of Kosovo. The Russia that Putin built is more than
happy to keep the Kosovo issue in play just to dish some humiliation back to
the US and the EU.
Keeping Kosovo as an issue in play has also paid off financially and
politically for Russia. Russia capitalised on its backing of Serbia and by
cutting several deals over gas and oil with Belgrade and then by suddenly
repositioning itself as the champion of international law against rogue
secessionist states. This is either ironic or cynical, because Russia is
simultaneously using the Kosovo precedent to openly flirt with the idea of
recognising Georgia's breakaway republic, Abkhazia, just to settle some old
scores. No matter how much it protests that Kosovo's independent was a
dangerous precedent, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Russia has
benefited most from this bungled affair.
Both Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanian government in Pristina have also been
playing games with the Kosovo problem. On top of allowing rioters to attack
the US embassy, Belgrade has formally rejected the independence of Kosovo,
and instructed its 120,000 citizens to cut off all ties with the government
in Pristina. It has also fomented the dreams of a "soft partition" where the
Serbian community lives apart from its Albanian neighbours, without
specifying how this would happen or how exactly how this impoverished and
vulnerable community should sustain itself once it happens. Beyond denial,
what positive future is Belgrade offering the Kosovo Serbs once independence
is an established fact?
In a sign of how messy things are getting, the Kostunica government
collapsed yesterday, as the prime minister dissolved the government due to
concerns that his coalition partners are insufficiently committed to "the
battle to preserve Kosovo". This is a clever move: first to reconstitute the
government in May with hardliners who will make the Kosovo issue their top
priority, and secondly to exploit the divisions in the EU by forcing it to
clarify how it can admit both Serbia and Kosovo, given that some EU member
states do not recognise the partition and some do. It promises only a bigger
headache for the EU in the years to come.
Finally, the Kosovo Albanian government in Pristina cannot be absolved of
its responsibility for this mess. During the period after the war, the
interim Albanian government often turned a blind eye to reprisal attacks
against Kosovo Serb civilians (often allegedly by KLA splinter groups) and
watched with indifference as Serbs, Roma and other minorities were expelled,
trapped and harassed in enclaves. Now Pristina claims the moral high ground,
with Agim Ceku calling on the international community to stand up to Serbian
extremists to protect Kosovo's freedom.
While Pristina has every right to protect itself, it will need to recognise
the legitimate security concerns of the Kosovo Serbs and starts taking
serious measures toward providing them with jobs and a future in the new
Kosovo. Pristina will get nowhere by insisting on the purity of its moral
position while remaining blind to the sins of the KLA or to the needs of its
most vulnerable.
What we see in Kosovo at the moment is not an example of careful statecraft
at the level of great power politics, nor of considered and reasoned attempt
at reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs. The Kosovo situation is a
mess because its independence has become a bargaining chip in a series of
overlapping games for political power. All of these games are conducted at
the expense of the Albanian and Serbian citizens of Kosovo, who would
certainly trade them for some kind of hope for their future.
letters@guardian.co.uk
GUARDIAN (UK)
COMMENT IS FREE
Kosovo: once again a political pawn
Michael Boyle
March 11, 2008 1:30 PM
In the last few weeks, it has become increasingly clear that Kosovo's
declaration of independence on February 17 did not settle the matter once
and for all. The newly independent Kosovo is a tense place, roiling with
ethnic incitement in its predominantly Serbian north and struggling to
survive amid rumours of a potential partition. Worse still, it is a pawn in
two overlapping political games: first, between the US, EU and Russia and
second, between its ethnic Albanian Kosovo leadership and the Serbian
government.
The first thing that should be clear is that nobody walks out of this mess
with clean hands. That Kosovo would have to be independent was probably
inevitable. The campaigns of ethnic cleansing led by Slobodan Milosevic
expelled nearly 800,000 people from Kosovo (nearly 90% of the population),
and killed - according to an American bar association estimate - nearly
10,000 people. It's hard to imagine that the Kosovo Albanians who returned
to the province after this assault in 1999 could ever imagine themselves
again being part of Serbia, no matter how democratic it became or how much
minority protection it offered.
But that does not mean that all of the players can absolve themselves of
responsibility for this crisis. Both the US and the EU deserve a fair amount
of blame for tabling UN resolution 1244 in 1999, which promised to resolve
Kosovo's status at some unspecified future point. This "kick the can down
the road" approach might have worked if it was tied to a clear strategy to
get Serbia to accept Kosovo's independence. But it was rather an attempt to
gloss over a nearly intractable issue, while minimising the political
consequences for the political leadership at the time. This left the
successors of Clinton and Blair with a ticking time bomb and no particularly
compelling options for how to defuse it.
What has emerged now - a declaration of independence which makes even
European states that fought to protect Kosovo uneasy - is evidence of this
lack of strategic forethought. Recognising the independent Kosovo may have
been the least bad option, but it certainly did not need to happen with the
level of political cost that it incurred.
The European Union should also not congratulate itself on its behaviour in
Kosovo. While it has played an important role in state-building and in
deploying peacekeepers and police to prevent the outbreak of violence, it
nevertheless held on to the hopes of a negotiated settlement with Belgrade
for too long and proved reluctant to play hardball with Serbia.
For example, the EU could have made Serbia's admission into the European
Union conditional on its peaceful acceptance of a negotiated independence
for Kosovo. But this was a bridge too far for the EU, due to internal
opposition by its members, and thus it spent years experimenting with
unworkable proposals for things like "conditional independence".
Its preference for a negotiated settlement may have increased the political
shocks after independence happened. The EU-backed Athissari plan, which
promised a quasi-independent status for Kosovo, was a compromise, but one
which was fundamentally unacceptable to both Pristina and Belgrade. It was,
essentially, another "kick the can down the road approach" and in avoiding
the issue it may have magnified the severity of the political reaction from
Albanians and Serbs alike.
Moreover, when independence happened, the EU appeared to be caught almost by
surprise and, astonishingly, insisted on no common policy for the legal
recognition of Kosovo among its members. This has meant we have a new state
recognised by only some of the states in the regional organisation it wants
to join.
At the time of UNSCR 1244, Russia was happy to accept this sleight-of-hand,
to end the war and to rein in Milosevic's Serbia before the situation got
out of hand. But today we are dealing with a very different Russia: a surly
but resurgent power that resents the American and European posturing about
the democratic future of Kosovo. The Russia that Putin built is more than
happy to keep the Kosovo issue in play just to dish some humiliation back to
the US and the EU.
Keeping Kosovo as an issue in play has also paid off financially and
politically for Russia. Russia capitalised on its backing of Serbia and by
cutting several deals over gas and oil with Belgrade and then by suddenly
repositioning itself as the champion of international law against rogue
secessionist states. This is either ironic or cynical, because Russia is
simultaneously using the Kosovo precedent to openly flirt with the idea of
recognising Georgia's breakaway republic, Abkhazia, just to settle some old
scores. No matter how much it protests that Kosovo's independent was a
dangerous precedent, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Russia has
benefited most from this bungled affair.
Both Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanian government in Pristina have also been
playing games with the Kosovo problem. On top of allowing rioters to attack
the US embassy, Belgrade has formally rejected the independence of Kosovo,
and instructed its 120,000 citizens to cut off all ties with the government
in Pristina. It has also fomented the dreams of a "soft partition" where the
Serbian community lives apart from its Albanian neighbours, without
specifying how this would happen or how exactly how this impoverished and
vulnerable community should sustain itself once it happens. Beyond denial,
what positive future is Belgrade offering the Kosovo Serbs once independence
is an established fact?
In a sign of how messy things are getting, the Kostunica government
collapsed yesterday, as the prime minister dissolved the government due to
concerns that his coalition partners are insufficiently committed to "the
battle to preserve Kosovo". This is a clever move: first to reconstitute the
government in May with hardliners who will make the Kosovo issue their top
priority, and secondly to exploit the divisions in the EU by forcing it to
clarify how it can admit both Serbia and Kosovo, given that some EU member
states do not recognise the partition and some do. It promises only a bigger
headache for the EU in the years to come.
Finally, the Kosovo Albanian government in Pristina cannot be absolved of
its responsibility for this mess. During the period after the war, the
interim Albanian government often turned a blind eye to reprisal attacks
against Kosovo Serb civilians (often allegedly by KLA splinter groups) and
watched with indifference as Serbs, Roma and other minorities were expelled,
trapped and harassed in enclaves. Now Pristina claims the moral high ground,
with Agim Ceku calling on the international community to stand up to Serbian
extremists to protect Kosovo's freedom.
While Pristina has every right to protect itself, it will need to recognise
the legitimate security concerns of the Kosovo Serbs and starts taking
serious measures toward providing them with jobs and a future in the new
Kosovo. Pristina will get nowhere by insisting on the purity of its moral
position while remaining blind to the sins of the KLA or to the needs of its
most vulnerable.
What we see in Kosovo at the moment is not an example of careful statecraft
at the level of great power politics, nor of considered and reasoned attempt
at reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs. The Kosovo situation is a
mess because its independence has become a bargaining chip in a series of
overlapping games for political power. All of these games are conducted at
the expense of the Albanian and Serbian citizens of Kosovo, who would
certainly trade them for some kind of hope for their future.
letters@guardian.co.uk
