SNN: Oct 8, 2006

October 08, 2006

Serbia: The Bee Hive of the Balkans

Serbia: The Bee Hive of the Balkans

Serbia: The Bee Hive of the Balkans

Can Karpat,

AIA Balkan Section

Serbia, which has just adopted a new Constitution, heads towards early elections. According to the media speculations, the general elections would take place either in late December this year or in spring 2007. And the big wigs of the international community began to give the signal that the postponement of the Kosovo final status until after elections in Serbia is now a serious option. Will they really avoid inserting the stick into the most unpredictable bee hive of the Balkans?

Constitution: Not without Kosovo

In 1913, after the Balkan wars, the Ottoman Empire lost almost all of its European territory. While retreating, Ottoman officers promised those peoples, who had still some sense of loyalty to the declining Empire, that they would be back one day. The preamble of the new Serbian Constitution, which mentions Kosovo as the “constituent part of Serbia’s territory”, has no valour than the hollow promise of those Ottoman officers.



Serbian Parliament approves new Constitution

Many criticise this preamble as non-realistic, defiant or even belligerent. In fact, none of these qualifications are correct. Serbia would not have drawn up no other preamble but this, for two main reasons.
First, it is an incontestable fact that Kosovo is still de facto part of Serbia. Secondly, given the official position of Belgrade at the status talks, Serbia would not have been expected to trip up herself by omitting to mention Kosovo as an integral part of the country.
Therefore, this preamble is nothing but the logical continuation of the legal fiction, according to which Kosovo is still part of Serbia. Far from being a belligerent act, this is a just a symbolic gesture, an indirect message to the Serbian minority of Kosovo -and to the Serbian electorate of course- that assures that “we will be back one day”. Since no Serbian politician would ever sign the independence of Kosovo, these politicians will then be able to carry on with this fiction for years to come.
And after all, the preamble of the new Serbian Constitution is not that belligerent as long as it mentions a territory that still de facto belongs to the country as its own. For example, the preamble of the Armenian Constitution openly demands the eastern region of the neighbouring country, Turkey. In spite of Turkey’s numerous protests, the international community does not seem to care about this only too obvious belligerence from Armenia.

Referendum: With what electorate?

Serbian Parliament decided that the referendum on the new Constitution should be held on 28th October. In order to be valid, the new Constitution must be approved by the majority of the electorate.
In Serbia there are around 6.533.000 registered voters. However, some 1.300.000 are from Kosovo. Only 186.000 of them are ethnic Serbs.
This is an impossible situation:
- To exclude the Kosovo Albanians from the electorate would be not only democratically condemnable, but also contradictory. After all, why vote for a Constitution that claims Kosovo as the integral part of Serbia while excluding the inhabitants of this region from the electorate?
- To include them would be most ironic, for no Albanian would ever vote for a Constitution in which Kosovo is mentioned as an integral part of Serbia.
Moreover, here are three facts that make the situation even more complicated:
- Counting the Kosovo Albanian voters would increase the number of the Serbian electorate. If the Albanians boycotted the referendum -which is more than probable-, the adoption of the new Constitution would be seriously endangered, since it must be approved by the majority of the electorate.
- To establish a new electoral list which would exclude the Kosovo Albanians would be very contradictory, for in such case, the preamble of the Constitution would be automatically invalid.
- For Serbia has no real control on Kosovo, it is physically impossible for the Republic Election Commission (RIK) to determine an electoral list with exact number of voters. And the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has no permanent electoral list.
How the RIK will resolve this intriguing situation is indeed a real legal and political curiosity.

The matrix: Early elections in Serbia

Early elections in Serbia became the matrix according to which the exact timeline of the Kosovo final status will be determined. According to the speculations, the general elections would take place either in late December this year or in spring 2007.
Recent statements made by UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari and EU foreign policy and security chief Javier Solana insinuate that the postponement of the Kosovo final status until after elections in Serbia is now a serious option.
Last decision is up to the six-nation Contact Group. As to the timeline, it is known that the EU and Russia are more flexible and tolerant than the USA that insists for the end of 2006 as the timeline for the Kosovo status solution. Note that four countries of the Contact Group are EU-members and the other one is Russia.
Kosovo Prime Minister Agim Ceku warned that the postponement of the decision would increase risks and tensions. It seems that the international community must choose the least evil between two probabilities: risks and tensions created by the Serbs or risks and tensions created by the Albanians. One could claim that a possible delay would be easier for the Albanians to tolerate since the happy end unconditionally awaits them at the end of the process. However, with Serbia, things are a bit more complicated.
On the one hand, according to the polls, the two leading parties of these elections are expected to be Tomislav Nikolic’s Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and Boris Tadic’s Democratic Party (DS). In this regard, cooperation between DS and Vojislav Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) is essential in order to halt the rise of the Radicals. Will the two frères ennemies make truce for the sake of their country?
On the other hand, both opinion polls and sociological research show that the Serbian people are in fact somehow ready for Kosovo’s independence. And their main concern is the current difficult economic situation as any other standard electorate in any country. However, a wounded national pride should never be underestimated.
Thus the chances are fifty-fifty. Serbia obviously needs time. And it would be wise for the international community to grant a little break as long as it costs nothing.
Some analysts worry that for electoral reasons the pro-Western politicians indulge themselves in nationalistic rhetoric in order to nullify the propaganda of the Radicals, and that they become more inflexible than ever on the Kosovo status in their turn thereafter.
However, there is a basic difference between the Democrats and the Radicals: the former does not live in a political dreamland and are not keen for uncertain adventures. That is why, at the negotiation table, to confront Boris Tadic is always preferable than to confront Vojislav Seselj.

Relatem items:
Serbia or Swan that Refuses to Sing its Final Song in Kosovo (17.09.06)
Balkans under the Threat of a Fragmentation Bomb Called Kosovo (03.08.06)
Serbia: Between Empire of Heaven and Empire of Earth Again (23.07.06)
From the Wisdom of Suffocating Serbia (22.06.06)

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The future of both Kosovo and Bosnia gets murkier

The future of both Kosovo and Bosnia gets murkier

The Balkans

Troubling times

Oct 5th 2006 | SARAJEVO
From The Economist print edition

The future of both Kosovo and Bosnia gets murkier

THE Balkan endgame is starting to look messy. Expectations that Kosovo would be independent by early next year have just suffered a blow. Over 1.8m of the Serbian province's 2m people are ethnic Albanians who will settle for nothing less than independence. Yet the UN talks on Kosovo under Martti Ahtisaari, a former Finnish president, have got nowhere. Two weeks ago Mr Ahtisaari was given the go-ahead to draft his own plan for Kosovo's future. On September 22nd the UN Security Council said it hoped that the talks would finish by the end of the year.

Mr Ahtisaari, who is likely to propose some form of independence, was expected to present his plan later this month. But on September 30th the Serbian parliament adopted a new constitution that declares Kosovo to be an inalienable part of Serbia. This was a shrewd delaying tactic on the part of Vojislav Kostunica, the Serbian prime minister. The constitution must be ratified in a referendum at the end of October, and it will be followed by an election. Mr Ahtisaari can hardly put forward his plan before then, as the voters might react by switching in droves to the extreme nationalist Radical Party. That could destabilise the whole region.

Diplomats dealing with Kosovo prefer Serbia to have its election first, in the hope that democratic forces will win and then come round to accepting Kosovo's independence. But the election could be delayed. And if Kosovo's Albanians then start fretting that Serbia is successfully outmanoeuvring them, there is a risk that extremists among them will return to violence, which would not do their cause any good.

Voters in Bosnia also caused an upset on October 1st. A majority chose to put Bosnia's wartime foreign minister, Haris Silajdzic, into the Bosniak (Muslim) presidential seat in Sarajevo, turning out Sulejman Tihic, who was seen by Western diplomats as a moderate with whom they could work. Mr Silajdzic wants to scrap the Bosniak-Croat federation, as well as the Serbs' Republika Srpska. That upsets the Croats, who form a 14% minority, mostly in the south and west of the country. It also ruffles Milorad Dodik, who was easily re-elected as prime minister of Republika Srpska.

Many Bosnian Serbs see their republic as a legitimate legacy of the war. Mr Dodik has been making secessionist rumblings, claiming that, should Kosovo gain independence, his republic should be allowed to do so as well. The election of Mr Silajdzic will encourage more such talk, even though Bosnia's international overseers firmly reject the idea.

Christian Schwarz-Schilling, the German who now wields the power of international proconsul, has said that his office should be closed in mid-2007. It will be replaced by a lower-key European Union mission (and some of the 6,000 soldiers of the EU peacekeeping mission will stay). Although most parties in Bosnia say they want to get into the EU, one analyst, Senad Pecanin, fears that the necessary reforms could be blocked by the political radicalisation that is splitting the country into opposing camps. It does not help the moderates in Bosnia and Kosovo—nor in Serbia, for that matter—that the mood in Brussels and other EU capitals has recently turned against letting any more countries into their club.

Troubling times
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8001087

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Negotiating Kosovo's status

Negotiating Kosovo's status

http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20061006/news_lz1e6slomanso.html

   The San Diego Union-Tribune      October 6, 2006
   Opinion

         Negotiating Kosovo's final status

   By William Slomanson

   The international protectorate of Kosovo is perched in southern Serbia.
Kosovo
   has been under military occupation since the 1999 NATO bombing campaign
against
   Serbia's now defunct regime of Slobodan Milosevic.

   The United Nations previously announced its intent to end its unique
   governmental administration of Kosovo within the next 90 days. Kosovo has
been a
   major financial drain, at a time when U.N. members are demanding more
bang for
   the assessed dues buck. Serbia's government has just scheduled a new
   constitutional referendum for December, claiming its irrefutable right to
the
   province. Kosovo is therein proclaimed to be an "integral part" of
Serbia.

   The Vienna-based Contact Group leads the on-going process of resolving
Kosovo's
   final status. Membership includes the United Nations, European Union,
NATO,
   Russia and the United States. Tight-lipped negotiators are presumably
exploring
   the role that the European Union might play when the United Nations
departs.
   Unfortunately, European Union members have yet to commit the requisite
degree
   of resources needed to kick-start all levels of Kosovar infrastructure.

   A patient international community should eschew temporary remedies, given
the
   region's 400 wars in 300 years. Kosovo's currently unresolved status
makes it
   the black hole of Europe. Its Balkan neighbors are progressing toward
membership
   in NATO, the European Union, and other desired international linkages. As
the
   United States National Security Strategy warns, weak states can threaten
strong
   states.

   The major impediment to independence is Kosovo's historically mono-ethnic
   society. A number of former Serbian soldiers and governmental officials
have
   been prosecuted in the U.N.'s regional criminal tribunal for their war
crimes
   and genocidal acts against the Albanian population in the 1990s. Serbs
switched
   roles in post-conflict Kosovo. They became the ethnic minority.
International
   human rights organizations cannot guarantee their safety. The prime
example is
   the small-scale Krystal Nacht of March 17, 2004. Nineteen Serb churches
were
   torched. Thirty people were killed.

   The final status options include linkage with Albania. Sophisticated
Albanian
   Kosovars do not favor this compromise, because of Albania's comparatively
poor
   economic status in Europe. Another alternative is returning Kosovo to the
   autonomy it enjoyed in Tito's Yugoslavia, before Milosevic mounted his
   repressive ethnic cleansing campaign. But many Albanian Kosovars do not
want to
   risk the remote possibility that one day, after departure of the
international
   community, Belgrade would reinstitute repressive tactics.

   This ubiquitous fear lacks a solid foundation for two reasons. First, the
   Serbian government surrendered its former president, Milosevic, for trial
by the
   U.N.'s regional criminal tribunal. That concession appeased the United
States
   and its NATO allies, whose bombing was directed at his government.
Second,
   Belgrade would not want to short-circuit its incorporation into desirable
   European entities.

   The majority Kosovar Albanian population's desired option is statehood.
   A growing number of Serbs, both in an out of Kosovo, see the
international
   community's writing on the wall. They have acknowledged that Serbia's
retention
   of Kosovo is a recipe for economic and political disaster. Kosovo is in
the
   poorest part of Europe, and its rebellious population is nearly 95
percent
   Albanian.

   The Serbian government is no doubt negotiating for retention of the
northern
   15 percent to 20 percent of this province. The city of Mitrovica is
Kosovo's
   Mason-Dixon Line. This division was parented by Serb-friendly French NATO
   forces, upon cessation of the 1999 NATO bombing. Parallel Serb
institutions
   reign in this northern portion of Kosovo, where the United Nations has de
jure
   but not de facto control. This reality is most evident by the Serbian
flag at
   the northern edge of the Ibar River Bridge. It effectively divides Kosovo
into
   the Serbian north and Albanian south. The civilian-policed guard shack,
and the
   NATO installation on the river below, evince the ethnic undercurrent
forcibly
   restrained by their presence.

   Such a geographical division may be a convenient Contact Group pressure
point.
   But it would be a particularly discomforting precedent. International
practice
   abhors geographic divisions based on ethnicity. If Vienna's negotiators
were to
   force the Mitrovica division piece into this geographical puzzle, ethnic
   adversaries elsewhere would expect like treatment. For example, the
   international community possesses something Serbia wants. That is
international
   recognition of Republika Srpska, the unrecognized Serb entity in the
eastern
   half of Bosnia. Unlike the Kosovo situation, however, Bosnia's
constitution
   expressly provides that it consist of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and this
   otherwise unrecognized Serbian entity within Bosnia.

   Balkan news reports on the Vienna Contact Group negotiations are now
referring
   to "conditional independence" as a likely final status option. The term
   conditional implies that Kosovo's independence could not be complete
until
   Kosovar Serbs and other minorities enjoy a robust existence in terms of
equal
   opportunity education, employment and housing. During conditional
independence,
   NATO's barbed wire fences and its soldiers would gradually disappear from
the
   current Serb population enclaves in Kosovo.

   Regardless of what the Vienna Contact Group achieves, a functioning
multiethnic
   society will be the unavoidable price tag for full independence. This
cannot
   occur until the international community is satisfied that the majority
Albanian
   populace has convincingly demonstrated the requisite degree of tolerance.
The
   minority population's human rights cannot be passively inherited from the
   international community's occupation of Kosovo. True independence is
literally
   in the hands of Kosovo's majority population. They have to credibly
demonstrate
   that an independent Kosovo will not erupt into a fresh ethnic cleansing
crisis,
   requiring yet another humanitarian intervention in Kosovo.

___________________________________________________________________________

   Slomanson is a professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law in San Diego
   and visiting professor at the University of Pristina in Kosovo. He is
past
   chair of the American Society of International Law United Nations
Section.
   He can be reached via e-mail at bills@tjsl.edu.

   © Copyright 2006 Union-Tribune Publishing Co. o A Copley Newspaper Site

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