KOSOVO: A Separate Peace? A Separate Peace?by Doug Bandow
September 27, 2006
Most people think of Kosovo in the past tense. Democratic critics of
the Bush Administration cite Kosovo as a "good war." Allied
negotiators refer to Kosovo's final status—independence in some
form—as a foregone conclusion.
The Western alliance would prefer to forget the Kosovo war, having
become responsible for one of the largest episodes of ethnic cleansing
in the Balkans. The ninth round of U.N.-sponsored talks on Kosovo
recently ended with no agreement. Observes Albert Rohan, in charge of
the Vienna negotiations: "We're approaching a moment where by talking
alone we won't accomplish the goal. We could talk for another ten
years and not change anything."
Unfortunately, the United States and Europeans guaranteed failure by
attempting to predetermine the results. The ethnic Albanians know that
the West is desperate to get out. They have no reason to make any
concessions beyond formalistic promises to respect the Serb minority,
promises which are unlikely to be kept by them or enforced by the
allies.
The Serbian government has offered everything save independence.
After all, which Western government has cheerfully cut itself into
pieces? Czechoslovakia begins and ends the list. Belgrade has
received no reward for its concessions. Instead, Serbia is supposed to
accept prospective membership in the EU as payment for services
rendered.
Even as the U.S. and Europeans decided on independence, their
deteriorating relationship with Russia raises the possibility of
resistance by Moscow. China also has indicated disquiet at the
forcible dismemberment of Serbia. If either power vetoes an allied UN
resolution, the Balkans will become a
global problem.
>From the beginning Western officials have lived in a fantasy world.
They believed that they could maintain a multi-ethnic territory after
the war. It is no surprise, however, that the ethnic Albanians, after
using the American-supplied air force to eject the Serbian military,
saw no need to retain the Serbian population.
To the contrary, the victorious ethnic majority kicked out roughly a
quarter million Serbs, Roma, Jews, and non-Albanian Muslims. The few
remaining Serbs were regularly attacked. In March 2004 some 4000 Serbs
were displaced as rioters destroyed homes, farms, churches, and
monasteries.
While the Albanian political leadership did not publicly support the
attacks, its complicity is likely: the government is led by former
guerrilla leaders guilty of war-time atrocities. They also have been
implicated in the explosion of organized crime, including sex
trafficking.
Although Islam was never much of a factor in the past, radical Islam
appears to be on the rise, Christian converts have been threatened,
and some analysts believe that terrorists have infiltrated the Balkans
through Bosnia and Kosovo. "Sex, crime, terrorism, it's all there,"
one U.S. diplomat recently told me.
Despite seven years of Western occupation, Kosovo isn't ready for
autonomy, let alone independence. Joseph Grieboski of the Institute on
Religion and Public Policy warns:
"the present record of rule of law, protection of the rights of
religious and ethnic minorities, and the return/resettlement of
internally displaced people by the Provisional Authority of Kosovo—all
of which are indispensable for democratic governance—have been gravely
unsatisfactory."
There's no easy solution. The majority ethnic Albanian community,
understandably, does not want to live under Belgrade. Just as
understandably, the minority Serbs (and Roma) do want to live under
Albanian rule. The Serbs who currently dominate the northern city of
Mitrovica, near the rest of Serbia, likely would forcibly resist
control by Pristina. None of Kosovo's neighbors, except Albania,
desires the UN to forcibly redraw Serbia's borders.
Thus, a dramatic international train wreck beckons. The West decides
on independence for Kosovo. Serbia refuses to agree, and the
pro-Western coalition is replaced by a government dominated by the
nationalist/populist Serbian Radical Party. The EU ends any membership
hopes for Belgrade. Russia vetoes a UN resolution granting
independence.
The United States and Europeans move ahead without UN approval.
Individual assaults on Kosovo's Serbs increase. Those in Mitrovica
refuse to acquiesce to Albanian rule and are forcibly repressed by
Pristina. Thousands more refugees flood into Serbia, which prepares to
intervene. The West threatens war on behalf of the Albanian majority
even as the latter finishes the job of ethnically cleansing Kosovo.
Allied officials talk about protecting democracy.
Although the worst case might not occur, there is no best case. To
reach an acceptable compromise, allied officials need to return to the
so-called reality-based community.
First, final status negotiations should be negotiations. The ethnic
Albanians should understand that intransigence does not guarantee
victory.
Second, multi-culturalism is not a worthwhile objective. One proposal,
disliked by Washington, is to leave Mitrovica with Belgrade while
granting Kosovo independence. This may or may not be a good idea, but
Western officials pushing to partition Serbia cannot object to it in
principle.
Third, independence will not magically transform Kosovo into a model
of Western civility. To the contrary, independence will reduce allied
leverage. If the ethnic Albanian majority tolerates human rights
abuses when it has yet to win independence, how likely is it to act
differently once it is granted independence?
Fourth, conditional independence would be equivalent to full
independence. Allied governments will not return should Kosovo violate
its commitments.
Fifth, it is easy to carve up other people's countries. Serbia has
been routinely denounced for opposing proposals to detach Kosovo,
rather like blaming a rape victim for resisting her attacker. The
Serbs, no less than the ethnic Albanians, are entitled to defend their
perceived interests.
Sixth, Belgrade should be integrated into Europe even if it refuses to
validate the latest iteration of a flawed allied policy. Attempting to
blackmail Belgrade will generate long-term hostility and is likely to
fail.
For some time the received wisdom was that Kosovo would be granted
independence, despite Serbia's opposition. However, unease with this
prospect is appropriately growing. The impending impasse in the Vienna
talks makes it imperative that the West insist upon negotiations that
really mean negotiations, rather than unconditional surrender by
Belgrade.
Doug Bandow is a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign
Policy and the author of the forthcoming Foreign Follies: America's
New Global Empire (Xulon Press). A former special assistant to
President Ronald Reagan, he is a member of the Advisory Board of the
American Council for Kosovo.
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=12308
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