February 26, 2006

ICTY: The Show (Trial) must go on

Slobodan Milosevic Freedom Center
 
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CANADA’S FORMER AMBASSADOR TO YUGOSLAVIA TAKES THE WITNESS STAND
www.slobodan-milosevic.org

 February 23, 2006

Written by: Andy Wilcoxson

Prof. Dr. Marko Atlagic, an MP representing Benkovac in the Croatian Sabor from 1990 until 1992, concluded his testimony at the trial of Slobodan Milosevic on Thursday.

Mr. Nice showed Atlagic Milan Babic’s testimony in which he claimed that he received military support from both Milosevic and Borislav Jovic.

Atlagic dismissed Babic’s testimony as pure nonsense. He said that Babic was an opportunist who would say anything to advance his own interests. He pointed out that Babic never said anything like that before he got to The Hague.

Mr. Nice again dredged up the BBC documentary “The Death of Yugoslavia”. Twice Mr. Nice played clips from the movie only to have it turn out that the BBC’s subtitles were wrong.

Nearly every time Mr. Nice plays a clip from that film it blows-up in his face. The subtitles are frequently do not match the words actually being spoken. Judge Bonamy branded the film “tendentious” and asked Mr. Nice if it was a good idea for the prosecution to keep relying on it.

“The Death of Yugoslavia” relies on the fact that most English-speaking people have no knowledge of the Serbo-Croatian language. By attributing false and malicious subtitles to the people interviewed in the film the BBC has created a film that is a gross manipulation of facts and reality. It is disturbing that this film is widely and uncritically shown to students in Western classrooms.

Mr. Nice spent the balance of Atlagic’s cross-examination citing Serbian war actions in Croatia. Atlagic spent an equal amount of time citing the Croatian war actions that provoked the Serbian war actions in the first place.

Atlagic reiterated his testimony that violent Croatian provocations began as early as 1989, whereas Serbian retaliation did not begin until 1991.

After Mr. Nice concluded the cross-examination Atlagic was briefly re-examined by Mr. Kay because Milosevic too ill to continue. Milosevic, who suffers from high blood pressure, complained of intense pressure behind his eyes and ears as well as a loud roaring noise in his head.


Milosevic, in spite of his ill health, spent the last hour of the hearing examining James Bisset, the Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia from late 1990 until mid-1992.

 Bissett described the NATO bombing as an illegal and "appalling act" that precipitated the Kosovo refugee crisis.

 The witness testified that the NATO charter prohibits the use of violence to settle international conflicts. "And, yet, in March of 1999, it began to bomb a country that was a sovereign country, that was no threat to its neighbors," he said.

The opening article of the NATO's founding treaty commits the allies "to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means (and) refrain ... from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

Bisset told the tribunal that
Milosevic had been unfairly painted as the cause of the Yugoslav crisis when in fact he had worked to keep the country together.

Yugoslavia collapsed, Bisset testified, because Germany encouraged Slovenia and Croatia to secede and, later, American interference caused war to erupt in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Speaking of the Kosovo Liberation army, Bisset said Milosevic tried to "suppress an armed rebellion by an organization that had a year before been described by the US state department as a terrorist organization."

The witness challenged the prosecution charge that Milosevic ordered the dismissal of thousands of Kosovo-Albanian doctors, teachers, professors, workers, police officers and civil servants.

"To my knowledge they were not dismissed,” said Bisset. "They simply voluntarily withdrew from their positions (and) continued to do their work, but under a sort of underground, parallel government" in Kosovo.

His testimony was based on conversations at the time with diplomatic staff visiting Kosovo and ethnic Albanian delegations, meetings that he had with Milosevic, as well as intelligence sources within the Canadian government.

Bisset will continue his testimony when the trial continues on Friday.
 

# # #

TRIBUNAL DENIES MILOSEVIC MEDICAL TREATMENT AS CANADIAN AMBASSADOR CONCLUDES HIS TESTIMONY
www.slobodan-milosevic.org

 February 24, 2006

Written by: Andy Wilcoxson

 The trial of Slobodan Milosevic resumed on Friday. The hearing began with Milosevic objecting to the trial chamber’s ruling denying his request for medical treatment. Milosevic says he intends appeal the decision.

Milosevic has been diagnosed with severe hypertension and is at high risk for a heart attack or stroke. Russian cardiologists from the world-renowned Bakoulev medical center in Moscow believe that they can effectively treat his condition.

 The doctors retained by the tribunal have been unable to adequately treat Milosevic, and as a result the trial has been adjourned several times on account of his ill-health.

The Tribunal’s decision is a slap in the face to the Russian Government. The Russian Government guaranteed that it would return Milosevic to the tribunal’s custody after he was treated by the physicians at the Bakoulev center.  

In its ruling the tribunal stated, “the Chamber notes that the Accused is currently in the latter stages of a very lengthy trial, in which he is charged with many serious crimes, and at the end of which, if convicted, he may face the possibility of life imprisonment. In these circumstances, and notwithstanding the guarantees of the Russian Federation and the personal undertaking of the Accused, the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the first prong of the test has been met—that is, that it is more likely than not that the Accused, if released, would return for the continuation of his trial .” 

What the tribunal is saying is that the Russian Government can not be trusted to apprehend a 64-year-old man with a heart condition if he tried to escape. For all of its empty rhetoric about human rights, what the Hague Tribunal has shown by its decision is that it is perfectly happy to imperil a man’s life just for the sake of politics. 

After Judge Robinson announced that he would not hear any objections to the ruling. Milosevic continued with the examination of James Bisset, the Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia between 1990 and 1992. 

Bisset testified that the United States initially supported the preservation of Yugoslavia. He noted James Baker’s statement that the U.S. supported the use of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) to put down the secession of Slovenia and Croatia. 

Bisset said Germany’s foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, was partly to blame for the break-up of Yugoslavia. He said that the German government and Genscher in particular exerted pressure on the European Community by threatening to walk out of the EC and recognize Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally.   

Contrary to the prosecution’s assertions that Milosevic provoked the Krajina-Serbs to rebellion. Bisset testified that Serbs in Croatia were provoked by the Croatian government which was dismissing them from their jobs and expelling them from their homes. 

Bisset testified that Milosevic had no ambition to create “greater Serbia.” He said that the prosecution’s thesis that Milosevic engaged in a criminal conspiracy to expand Serbia’s territory was “pure fantasy”. 

The witness testified that Milosevic worked for peace, and that all of the peace plans Milosevic supported for Bosnia and Croatia would have made any expansion of Serbia’s territory impossible. 

Bisset, who met with Milosevic several times in his capacity as Canada’s ambassador, said that Milosevic supported the preservation of Yugoslavia, but was willing to allow others to secede as long as human rights were protected and as long as the secession was carried out in accordance with Yugoslavia’s laws and constitution. 

Unfortunately Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia did not secede in accordance with the provisions of the Yugoslav constitution. In stead they opted for war carried out their secession through violence. 

Speaking of the JNA, Bisset testified that they were subordinated to the federal authorities, not to Milosevic as claimed by the prosecution. 

Bisset testified that Milosevic used his political influence to obtain peace. He recalled how Milosevic used his political influence to exert pressure on Milan Babic to accept the Vance Plan in Croatia.  

The former Canadian ambassador testified that American interference caused war to erupt in Bosnia and Kosovo. 

He testified that in March 1992 (one month before the outbreak of war in Bosnia) Portuguese diplomat Jose Cutilhiero brokered a peace agreement in Lisbon between Bosnia’s Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. 

Bisset said that the agreement had been signed by Karadzic for the Serbs, Boban for the Croats, and Izetbegovic for the Muslims. The witness, a career diplomat, believed that the Cutilhiero plan was a good plan that would have avoided war in Bosnia if it had been implemented. 

Unfortunately the Cutilhiero plan was never implemented. Bisset testified that the American ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, flew to Sarajevo and met with Izetbegovic. He testified that Zimmerman sabotaged the peace plan by encouraging Izetbegovic to remove his signature from the agreement. 

Soon after his meeting with Zimmerman, Izetbegovic reneged on the agreement and civil war broke out in Bosnia. 

Far from being the peace seeking humanitarians they claimed to be, Bisset testified that the Clinton Administration prolonged the Bosnian war by sabotaging the Vance-Owen plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. 

In Kosovo, Bisset testified that NATO caused the very humanitarian catastrophe that it blamed on Milosevic. He said that prior to the NATO bombing there were only a handful of Kosovo refugees. Once the NATO bombing began, the flow of refugees went from a being a trickle to a flood. 

The former Canadian ambassador testified that American intransigence made war unavoidable in Kosovo. He testified that Madeline Albright attached Annex B to the Rambouillet Agreement. Annex B would have given NATO the right to occupy all of Yugoslavia, not just Kosovo. Bisset said that no government on Earth could have accepted such an agreement. He pointed out that senior level U.S. diplomats have even admitted that Rambouillet was a provocation that was intended to give NATO an excuse to attack. 

It is worth noting that NATO’s original excuse for attacking Yugoslavia was Yugoslavia’s refusal to sign the Rambouillet Agreement. The bombing only became a “humanitarian mission” after it caused the humanitarian catastrophe that NATO blamed on Milosevic. 

In Bisset’s opinion, Kosovo-Albanian secessionists opted for war because they had seen that violence was an effective means to achieve independence in Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia. 

He testified that NATO used the Kosovo war to transform itself from a defensive organization into a renegade force that sees itself as having the power to wage aggressive war notwithstanding UN charter. 

Bisset was critical of NATO’s unwillingness to implement UN Resolution 1244 in Kosovo. He said that NATO did not protect the non-Albanian population, and as a result nearly a quarter of a million non-Albanians have been expelled from Kosovo. He also said that NATO has allowed Albanian extremists to destroy more than 160 medieval Serbian churches and cultural monuments in Kosovo. 

Not wishing to hear any criticism of NATO, the tribunal cut off Bisset’s examination-in-chief. 

Mr. Nice then cross-examined Bisset. It is worth noting that Mr. Nice didn’t challenge most of the testimony that Bisset gave during the examination-in-chief. Nearly all of it stood unopposed. 

In stead Mr. Nice challenged some magazine articles that Ambassador Bisset wrote about Racak, Srebrenica, and the Hague Tribunal.

In one of his articles Bisset claimed that Racak was a hoax. He based his conclusion on the forensic evidence found by the Finnish forensic team that examined the bodies of the so-called “massacre victims.” The forensic evidence indicated that the people had not been shot at close range and that they had been shot from various angles. In light of the forensic evidence they could not have been executed as claimed by the Tribunal. 

Mr. Nice challenged Bisset by asking him if he had spoken to survivors of the alleged massacre. Bisset said that he had not interviewed survivors. 

This is typical for Mr. Nice. He accused Bisset of making an irresponsible statement because he didn’t take the stories of the Albanians into account. But it doesn’t matter what the Albanians say, Bisset based his article on the scientific evidence. If the Albanians say something that is at odds with science then they’re lying. If an Albanian says the Sun revolved around the Earth it doesn't make it true.

Mr. Nice accused Bisset of being irresponsible for criticizing the Hague Tribunal, and branding the proceedings against Milosevic a “Stalinist show trial.” Bisset said that he made that remark when the tribunal denied Milosevic the right of self-representation.

 Of course being accused by Bisset is the least of the tribunal’s public relations concerns. The fact that they’re denying a 64-year-old heart patient medical treatment is even worse than denying him the right of self-representation. Denying Milosevic the medical treatment he needs could kill him.

 On Srebrenica Mr. Nice scolded Bisset for expressing doubt that 8,000 Muslims had really been executed there.

 Bisset explained that the number 8,000 came from the Red Cross which reported that 8,000 Muslims were missing from Srebrenica after the enclave fell. 5,000 of the 8,000 were already reported missing *BEFORE* the enclave fell (i.e. before the Serbs got there), and the remaining 3,000 were reported missing when the enclave fell.

 Bisset said that the media simply jumped to the absurd conclusion that all 8,000 of the missing Muslims had been executed by the Serbs. They did not take into account that there was two-way combat in the area and that many (if not most) of the supposed “massacre victims” died while attacking the Serbian lines in a failed bid to link Srebrenica up with Tuzla.

 Mr. Nice said that Bisset of advocated the Serbian cause. The ambassador responded by saying that the Serbs have been wrongfully demonized by Western politicians and media organizations, and that somebody needs to defend them and set the record straight.

 Following the conclusion of Mr. Nice’s cross-examination the witness was briefly re-examined by Milosevic. The trial will resume with a fresh witness next Monday.

----------------------
 
Interfax
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Russia & CIS

10:35 GMT, Feb 25, 2006

Moscow regrets court's rejection of Milosevic's request


<pre> MOSCOW. Feb 25 (Interfax) - Moscow regrets that the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has rejected former
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's request for a provisional
release to travel to Russia for medial treatment, Russian Foreign
Ministry spokesman Mikhail Kamynin said in remarks to the press, which
are available on the Russian Foreign Ministry website on Saturday.
"Russia has considered the ICTY decision. At the same time, this
decision can only cause Moscow's regret, especially bearing in mind that
all essential guarantees provided by the Russian Federation were in fact
ignored by the tribunal," Kamynin said.
"Russia was recently officially informed that the ICTY Trial
Chamber had rejected former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic's
request that he be provisionally released from the ICTY jurisdiction to
undergo medial treatment at the Bakulev Cardiovascular Surgery Research
Institute in Moscow," he said.

va md

February 25, 2006

The Madness of General Mladic

 
 
Justworld
Anmerkungen und Quellen zu Menschenrechten und Kultur und zur Verbreitung von Demokratie in der globalen Sphäre. Email-Adresse der Autorin: Caroline.Fetscher@tagesspiegel.de
Remarks and references on Human Rights, cultural issues and the spreading of democracy in the global village. Email address of the author: see above.
 
 
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22.02.06

Mladic brought to Justice?

Meanwhile the EU is actually and really seeming to consider consequences reagarding Serbia´s behaviour towards its indicted war criminals, as Olli Rehns reactions show. Let´s hope this will be crowned with the appropriate success which can bear one name only: Uhapsenje Mladica. Or: Mladic´s arrest. Some people in Belgrade now say the false alarm there was a trial and error attempt by the government to test just how much public outcry and unrest the news would arise. This test, at least, has weathered the storm: There were no mass protests at any point. Okay. So: Now´s the time. Sada je vreme.

Yesterday atleast we had the sad duty to read and post the following statement – and hope it may have been inspired more by strategic reasoning than by the actual facts. For the days must come: M-Day for Mladic and K-Day for Karadzic.

However, read this here for the time being, the statement of the Chief Prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague:

Statement by Carla Del Ponte; 22 February 2006

"Good afternoon, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The false rumors spread yesterday from Belgrade about the arrest of Mladic have absolutely no basis whatsoever. There is no indication at all that negotiations about his surrender are currently being conducted. I was in contact with the authorities in Belgrade yesterday and I was assured that there is not truth in all this. Mladic remains at large.

Mladic and Karadzic must be brought to justice in The Hague so that the genocide of 8000 Muslims in Srebrenica is not left unpunished.

Ratko Mladic is in Serbia, there is no doubt about this. He has been there since 1998. During all this time he has been, and he remains within the reach of of Serbian authorities. He can and
must be arrested immediately, and I expect all Serbian authorities to work much more intensely towards that objective.

The conditionality imposed by the European Union in the context of the negotiations on a stabilization and association agreement is
of key importance. Serbia knows that negotiations may be suspended or may never conclude if Belgrade fails to cooperate fully with the ICTY.
I always could count on the support of the European Union. But now the role of the European Union is crucial. I need now a stronger support of the European Union to have Mladic in The Hague very soon. Clear deadlines associated with clear sanctions will produce early results."

Afterwards, Mme. Del Ponte's spokeswoman, Florence Hartmann indicated that "nothing new" has happened that the OTP (Office of the Prosecutor) is aware of that even led to these rumors.
------------------------------------------------

For further news check this source. See also the latest article in Der Tagesspiegel. And for a stunning profile of Ratko Mladic click “mehr” below.

NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS
Volume 42, Number 15 · October 5, 1995
The Madness of General Mladic
By Robert Block

1.
The Serbian Orthodox church in the Bosnian Serb border town of Bijeljina is a modest, dark gray building a few blocks from the central square. On Wednesday, June 28, 1995, local peasants and Bosnian Serb refugees from Tuzla and Zenica packed the church to celebrate the feast of the fourth-century martyr Saint Vitus. This is one of the holiest occasions of the Serbian Orthodox calendar: it coincides with the day in 1389 when Prince Lazar Hrebeljanovic and his forces were crushed by the Ottoman Turks in the battle of Kosovo, beginning five hundred years of Muslim rule over the Serbs.
According to Serbian legend, the angel Elijah appeared to Lazar on the eve of battle offering him a choice over the outcome of the next day's events. Lazar could have a victory and win an earthly kingdom, or he could choose martyrdom and a place for his people in heaven. Thus a military failure was turned into a spiritual triumph, and a battlefield became the birthplace of the Serbian mission to recover the national homeland.
Every man, woman, and child present, whether in peasant dress or wearing smart Italian sports clothes, would have known this story. The people came hoping to catch a glimpse of their modern-day Lazar, General Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serbs' military commander, who was in town for the occasion. The rest of the Bosnian Serb leadership was also there—"President" Radovan Karadzic, "Vice-President" Nikola Koljevic, and "Parliamentary Speaker" Moncilo Krajisnik—but they were a sideshow. Their comings and goings aroused mild curiosity but little enthusiasm.
When General Mladic left the church, he was mobbed by adoring fans. Old women cried and tried to hug him. Babies were held up for him to touch. Throughout all this, Mladic looked uncomfortable, as if he were genuinely surprised by the attention. His awkwardness and seeming humility only served to impress the crowd further.
"He is a god," one well-dressed middle-aged woman told me. "I would follow him anywhere, through the woods or across rivers. He is our savior and the greatest man in the world." She clasped her breast and looked up at the sky.
A delegation of Greek Cypriots came to pay their respects. "When you are finished here, you are welcome to come to Cyprus to help us throw our Turks into the sea," the leader of the delegation told the general, who smiled politely at the invitation as if such a thought embarrassed him.

Two weeks later, around July 12, General Mladic was in Potocari, a village to which more than 28,000 Muslims from Srebrenica had fled in a vain search for refuge with the Dutch UN peacekeepers there. He was on a horse, surveying the faces of the refugees, when he spied a large number of men and boys. According to the testimony of one witness,[1] Mladic could barely contain his delight. "There are so many!" he exclaimed. "It is going to be a mezze [a feast]. There will be blood up to your knees."
During the next few days, between two and four thousand captured Muslim men, including teen-age boys, were slaughtered in an orgy of methodical revenge killings.[2] Intercepted radio transmissions indicate that Mladic was present at the beginning of the executions. According to a UN source, after the first days of slaughter, Mladic told the Dutch UN commander he held captive at Potocari that Serb forces had killed "lots of people because they were trying to break out of Srebrenica."[3]
Many witnesses to the murder of Muslims from Srebrenica have said that Mladic was, in fact, present during much of the butchery. One survivor of an alleged mass execution of hundreds of Srebrenica prisoners near the eastern Bosnian village of Karakaj swears that he saw General Mladic sitting in a red Ford car, watching as Bosnian men were taken in pairs off the back of a truck and summarily shot. A few hours earlier Mladic was reported to have told the prisoners: "You will be released and you have nothing to fear."
Mladic is adept at striking an apparently benign pose while planning killings. Shortly before his soldiers began separating Muslim men from their families in Srebenica for "screening," he arrived to comfort the conquered and to hand out meat and chocolate to the children. Serbian television cameras videotaped him swaggering among the crowds, patting children on the head, saying: "Don't be afraid. No one will harm you." The Bosnian men were taken away the minute the cameras were turned off.
A few weeks later, after Mladic had crushed Zepa, another Muslim enclave, the general told a Serb reporter without a hint of cynicism: "Do you think that I like to wage war? I would be the happiest man in the world if the war were over. A soldier knows best what kind of evil war is. But when their neck is being squeezed, people must be defended."
Such are the different faces of General Ratko Mladic: an adored soldier-hero and plausibly accused war criminal; a peace-loving killer with the common touch. To his soldiers and the Serbs of Bosnia, General Mladic is a warrior prince. To his enemies, the Muslims and Croats, he is the incarnation of the devil, a man willing to persecute and kill civilians with particular brutality. Those who know him best say that he is the most charming man who ever strangled a city or pounded a village to rubble. "You've never spent any time in private with him. He has a marvelous intelligence and a great sense of humor," said one of his friends, who also reluctantly admitted that at the same time Mladic can be uncompromisingly cruel.
Ratko Mladic was born on March 12, 1943, in Bozinovici, a village near Kalinovik in Herzegovina. His first name is a diminutive of Ratimir, meaning war or peace, or Ratislav, meaning war of the Slavs. These are names often given to boys born in wartime. Both his parents were partisans who fought the Nazi occupiers and their Croatian Ustashe allies. On his second birthday, his father, Nedja, was killed by the Croats, an event he rarely fails to mention to strangers.
After the war, Mladic went to a high school on the outskirts of Belgrade and then to Yugoslavia's military academy, graduating in 1965, the same year he joined the Communist Party. Sent to Macedonia, he commanded a platoon, then a tank battalion, then a brigade. In 1991, he became deputy commander in Kosovo, where the population is more than 90 percent ethnic Albanian.
In June 1991, he was assigned by Belgrade to go to Croatia, where fighting had broken out between Croatian militias and the Yugoslav army. In those days he did not speak about "Serbian national interests" or "Serbian military traditions." Being a Serb then had no evident importance for him. In the 1991 Yugoslav census, the last before the old Yugoslav federation collapsed, Mladic listed his nationality as Yugoslav, not Serb.[4] The reasons for his transformation into a Serb nationalist, if that is what it was, are unclear. A former colleague recalled that Mladic had an uncanny political sense. "He was sly enough to know what was to be said at any particular moment:"
Success in fighting the Croats brought him to the attention of the Bosnian Serb hard-liners who were looking for a high-ranking Yugoslav officer to be their top military leader in the war that they were planning. One of them, "Vice-President" Nikola Koljevic, a Shakespeare professor formerly at Sarajevo University, recalled recently: "We didn't know Mladic. But then we read about him in a Croatian newspaper that said 'Mladic is no social worker.' We decided that's the guy we need." In May 1992 he transferred to the newly formed Bosnian Serb army and the legend of General Mladic began to grow. It is not surprising that he was chosen for his capacity for ruthlessness. Many Serbs, particularly Bosnian Serbs, take it for granted that their soldiers will be implacable and brutal toward their enemies: "Do it to them first because if you don't, you can be certain they will do it to you."
Mladic's undoubted charisma is largely based (unexpected as this might seem to outsiders) on his reputation for "honesty" and "integrity." In a land where politicians and warlords have grown rich from the trade in war booty, Mladic is considered an ascetic. He leads a humble, some would say Spartan, existence. He has a modest house in Belgrade, and in Bosnia either sleeps on an army cot in his headquarters or out in the field with his men. His dislike of war profiteers is said to be intense. During an interview with me this summer he attacked the unscrupulous paramilitary warlords. "They went running around to jewelry stores, banks, and well-stocked super-markets. There is not a single hill that they kept or liberated. On the other hand, the soldiers and officers in the army lead modest lives."
Mladic prefers the company of soldiers in the field. He often commands in the mud of the frontlines, alongside his men, and they are committed to him. Most of the heroic myths of General Mladic have emerged on the battlefields of Bosnia, and then are repeated and elaborated endlessly in the taverns and trenches where Serbian soldiers chain-smoke cigarettes and sip thick black coffee and plum brandy.
The latest story I heard describes how one morning after the fall of Zepa, Mladic came across a small group of Serbian soldiers soaked from the cold rain the night before. "Where are you heading?" he asked them. "To find some place to dry our clothes," they replied, to which the general took off his hat, filled it with water, poured it over himself, and ordered, "Follow me."
Such stories are so common that on meeting Mladic for the first time, one is surprised to find he is not a big man. The enormous head and broad face pictured in newspapers and magazines may give the impression of a towering, barrel-chested person. But he is of average height and build, and has piercing blue eyes. When I saw him this summer, in the foyer of a theater in Bijeljina, just one week before the start of his offensive against Srebrenica, what he most wanted to talk about was the need for peace and how the "international sponsors" of the war in Bosnia had to stop backing Serbia's enemies.
"I think it is time for all peace-loving people of this world to start pondering where all this leads. I think it's high time that the weapons in this part of the world, and all over the world, were silenced.
"If humankind were to follow my advice and if it were in my power, I wouldn't allow the word 'war' to be uttered in any language, I would ban all weapons, even in the form of toys."
As he spoke, his plans were, in fact, well advanced to wipe out Srebrenica and the other Muslim enclaves. He even hinted at this in a speech just before I saw him. "The upcoming period is very important and can be decisive for the outcome of the war," he had said.

He talked so much about peace, it seemed clear, because I had written an article for the London Independent on Sunday which had ironically named Mladic as a candidate for "man of the year"—in recognition of his singular ruthlessness and his horrifying success in calling NATO's bluff over Bosnia.
But the irony was lost on the general, as it was on most of the Bosnian Serbs. They actually thought he had been given this "honor" because of his virtues. So Mladic felt the need to speak like a statesman and show me that I had made a good choice. Yet every so often he could not resist changing his tone.
"We are fully aware that war is not the only way to defend our values. But if those values are fundamentally endangered, as is the case today, then war is the only way to defend them. Everything that hinders us in our effort to defend ourselves is an injustice. We did not want this war, it was thrust upon us, like all others. Defending one's people is a holy duty," he said.
Shortly after our talk, I happened to read the testimony of Hermann Goering at the Nuremberg Tribunal: "I did not want a war, nor did I bring it about. I have done everything to prevent it through negotiations.... The only motive which guided me was my ardent love for my people; its fortunes, its freedom, and its life."[5]
Mladic, indicted by the international war-crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia this July along with Radovan Karadzic, may eventually have his chance to repeat a similar defense one day. Like Goering, Mladic often views his enemies as inferior beings, less than human. In an intercepted radio message in April 1993, during the height of the Bosnian Serbs' first siege of Srebrenica, Mladic could be heard ordering his commanders to pound with artillery force the trenches and woods where enemy soldiers were hiding. "Hit the raw meat," he barked. More recently, he brushed off allegations that Serb soldiers had raped some of the Muslim women fleeing Srebrenica. It was impossible, he said. "We [Serbs] are too picky."
Sometimes he talks of himself as god-like. During an international peace conference in 1993 in Geneva, when Alija Izetbegovic, the Bosnian president, expressed doubts about Serbs keeping their promises, Mladic said, "When I guarantee something to you, it is the same as when the Almighty does." After the fall of Zepa, when the UN rushed to conclude a civilian evacuation deal with the Bosnian Serbs, Mladic, before television cameras, boarded a bus carrying civilians from Zepa to Sarajevo and announced, "I am General Mladic. You have probably heard of me. Has anyone here been raped by Bosnian Serbs?" When the cameras were switched off, he told the group, "No Allah, no UN, no NATO can save you. Only me."
Mladic does not see Muslims or Croats as people fighting, however misguidedly, for self-determination, or for a multicultural society, or to avenge the injustices inflicted on them by General Mladic's own soldiers. They are for him the forces of Modred, representatives of foreign powers bent on the destruction of the Serbs. For the general there is a diabolical plan behind every action of his enemy. The Bosnian Muslims are thus not fighting to take back a rocky hill in order to control the goat path beneath; they are acting under the instructions of their powerful masters in Tehran, Washington, and Bonn, particularly Bonn.
"Germany sponsored the war," he told me. "It turned the Croats and the Muslims against the Serbs and set them in motion to achieve the German aim to Germanize the Balkans."
The German theme recurs so often in the general's statements that it has led some Serbs who know him to suggest that his brutality is inspired in part by a desire for revenge. When he says, "This war was begun and declared on us by the same people as in 1941," he may be referring to the "same people" who killed his father. Gaja Petkovic, a retired Yugoslav army colonel and a former colleague of Mladic, suggested as much last year in a critical article on Mladic in a Belgrade magazine, writing: "Some used to say that by fighting Croatia Mladic was avenging the past, his dead father, and his unhappy childhood, that he was resolving his frustrations and venting his inborn sadism."[6] Soon after the article was published, Petkovic said, Mladic threatened him with violence—a claim Mladic denies.
What is clear is that there is hardly any difference between past and present for General Mladic. He talks about both in the same breath, and different periods of history become conflated as he speaks. The Serbs today are still fighting to turn an Islamic tide away from Europe; Germany has never abandoned its expansionist aims; and the world's newest imperial power, America, also wants a slice of the Balkan pie.
"The Balkans and Europe as a whole are very much in danger of being Germanized," he told me. No less a danger is the threat of Islamization. There is also, he said, a big and "quite openly expressed wish" to have the region put under American control. All of this, he continued, runs counter to prospects for peace, and to the "real interests" of the Balkan nations.
"The time is right," he added, "for the Serbian people to get what belongs to them, the right that derives from the past and the present."
Until the recent NATO air strikes, he brushed aside the possibility of international military intervention. During the UN hostage crisis, a friend warned him that he might have caught a tiger by the tail. "Don't you worry," he replied. "To me it doesn't look much like a tiger. More like an old nag."
The only enemies that he really fears, I gathered from some of his statements, come from within his own ranks, although when we talked he was reluctant to name any of his Serb opponents or to speak openly of a rift with Karadzic. This pretense of unity would soon disappear.
2.
"Maybe we went a little bit too far with General Mladic: we have made a legend of him." When Karadzic said this on August 4, 1995, he meant to cripple his military commander, not just wound him.
For a long time Karadzic had been worried by General Mladic. He feared the general's popular appeal and his ties to Slobodan Milosevic and the other Serb leaders in Belgrade who don't like Karadzic. He was bothered by Mladic's puritanism; his loathing of gambling and womanizing and war-profiteering, all of which have become part of political life in Serb-controlled Bosnia. Above all Karadzic feared the general's strength.
Relations were cool between the two men even before Karadzic broke with Milosevic, in August 1994. The split was over Karadzic's refusal to sign a peace plan supported by Milosevic. Mladic is viewed as loyal to Milosevic, but he has played down the stories that Belgrade was encouraging him to mount a coup against Karadzic and his allies in Pale. Mladic accepted a division of labor: he would run the war while Karadzic dominated the Bosnian Serb politicians in Pale and in the Bosnian Serb towns. As long as politics did not undermine the war effort, Mladic did not interfere. The two men, however, detest each other.
Karadzic became particularly angry in mid-June when Mladic did not show up for the wedding of Karadzic's daughter, Sonja, in Pale, the ski resort outside Sarajevo that serves as the Bosnian Serbs' political headquarters. The wedding was an ostentatious affair, with a bottle of Ballantine whiskey on every table and hundreds of guests trying to relieve the boredom of Pale and ingratiate themselves with the first family.
Privately Mladic said that what made the celebration particularly obscene for him was that it was held at the height of the Muslim attempt to try to break the siege of Sarajevo. During the wedding reception, above the sound of the dance music, the wail of ambulances carrying Serb wounded to the local hospital could be heard.
Mladic formally excused himself because of "official business." But when asked by a local magazine why he had not come, he mentioned perhaps the single most important event that has marked his life, apart from his father's death: the suicide in Belgrade of his daughter, Ana, a university medical student, in March 1994. She had been in a deep depression, exacerbated, some of Mladic's associates claimed, by particularly fierce criticism in the Serbian press accusing her father of war crimes. Whatever the truth about her death, friends say that Mladic never fully recovered from the loss. Whenever he gets a chance to go to Belgrade, they say, he spends time at her graveside.
"I visit feasts and celebrations reluctantly these days," he told the Serb magazine, "regardless of whose honor they are being held in. Ever since we had a family tragedy, ever since our Ana is gone, I deem it normal not to attend parties."[7]
Nothing he said smoothed relations with Karadzic. The break came on August 1, when Milosevic sent a peace proposal to the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims. The letter to the Muslims was addressed to Alija Izetbegovic, the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The letter to the Bosnian Serbs was addressed to Mladic, an open snub of Karadzic.
On Friday, August 4, 1995, with 100,000 Croatian regular forces being mobilized for attack against Serb-held areas in the Krajina, Karadzic announced that he was removing Mladic as Bosnian Serb military commander and assuming personal command of the army himself. Karadzic blamed Mladic for the loss of Grahovo and Glamoc, two key towns in western Bosnia populated entirely by Serbs, which fell to the Croats the week before. Karadzic used the loss of the towns as the excuse to announce his unexpected changes in the high command. General Mladic was demoted to an "adviser."
It turned out to be one of the most unsuccessful military reshuffles in recent history. Mladic refused to go, calling the move "unconstitutional." "I entered the war as a soldier and that is how I want to leave," Mladic said in a statement released by the army press office. "Therefore, I shall remain at the post of commander of the main headquarters of the Bosnian Serb Army as long as our fighters and people support me...."
Karadzic tried to retaliate by enlisting the support of politicians in the "parliament" of the self-styled Republika Srpska. But most of the deputies are seen as war profiteers and their decision carried little public weight. Mladic countered with a statement that he had the backing of twenty-one of the most important Bosnian Serb generals and "the people."
Karadzic then insisted that Mladic was a psychopath. "Ratko is a madman," he told a meeting of local officials in the northern Bosnian town of Banja Luka in August. "I am telling you this as a psychiatrist with long experience. He simply could not bear the strain anymore and went insane."
Within a week, Karadzic was outmatched. In a country built on war and in the midst of war, the decision of the men in charge of the guns is likely to be final. On August 11, Karadzic announced that no changes would be made in the Bosnian Serb army after all. But the confrontation left Karadzic looking weak. Instead of shoring up his own power, he turned General Mladic into the de facto leader of the Bosnian Serbs. More worrying for Karadzic, there was talk among Serbs about a military takeover of Bosnia in which he would be ousted. In late August there were unconfirmed reports of gun battles between Mladic's and Karadzic's supporters. A Serb publication claimed that during the last week of August one of Mladic's closest associates, General Milan Gvero, "detained" Karadzic for a day and berated him for his hostility to Mladic and the army high command. By the beginning of September, Karadzic, faced with NATO air strikes, appeared at least to accept the dominance of Mladic and Milosevic.
Karadzic's mistake was to think that the propaganda machinery which had brought him, a psychiatrist of dubious reputation, to the office of "president" was also responsible for creating the "myth" of General Mladic. He forgot that Ratko Mladic's legend emerged from the killing fields of Bosnia and Croatia, not from state-controlled television.
Even more astonishing than Karadzic's miscalculation was a growing consensus among Western (particularly French and British) diplomats that General Mladic may be the leader who could deliver peace in Bosnia. They thought that Mladic, as Milosevic's man, would agree to a deal awarding the Serbs a "viable" 49 percent chunk of Bosnia.
The folly of such thinking became apparent during the first weekend in September at a meeting between General Bernard Janvier, the United Nation's top military commander in the former Yugoslavia, and General Mladic. The meeting was held after the first wave of NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb military and communication installations. Janvier was dispatched by the UN and NATO to get Mladic to agree to remove his big guns from around Sarajevo and thus avoid any more air raids.
The meeting itself was set up by President Milosevic and held in Serbia, in the shabby border town of Mali Zvornik. For more than a year Milosevic had been trying without success to get his Bosnian comrades to see that peace was in their best interests. The main obstacle had always been Karadzic. But Milosevic also sent a senior military officer from the Yugoslav army to "advise" Mladic just in case he forgot Serbia's official position. Mladic, however, showed that he was no one's man but his own. He said he viewed General Janvier's demand for withdrawing guns from Sarajevo as tantamount to surrender. "All the tension and pressure for us to withdraw our weapons is senseless because the war is not over and yet they ask us to withdraw our weapons that we are defending our people with," he later said.
According to UN sources, Mladic stormed out of the fourteen-hour meeting at least four times. When he returned to negotiate, they said, he spent much of the time insulting the French general and his family and insisting that Serbs would not negotiate "at the point of a gun."
The Yugoslav officer then spent some time with Mladic explaining just what a renewed NATO air campaign would involve, urging him to agree to Janvier's demands. Mladic then reportedly made a lengthy statement complaining about how the Serbs had been unfairly treated and insisting they had a right to statehood.
Eventually at the end of the long session with Janvier, Mladic accepted the main demands, but he then hedged his letter of acceptance with conditions and qualifiers—a practice familiar from the previous behavior of Bosnian Serb leaders. Mladic agreed "in principle" to the removal of heavy weapons by "all parties," so long as "withdrawal will not confer advantages upon any party, or alter the balance of forces." NATO said Mladic's "acceptance" was unacceptable; only full compliance would avoid further bombing raids. Mladic literally stuck to his guns and in doing so almost seemed to welcome more air strikes. "The more they bombard us the stronger we are," he said.
His attitude was unlikely to endear him to Milosevic or to the Western leaders who are desperate for a political solution to the conflict. But to those people who gathered in Bijeljina on St. Vitus Day, their comparison of Mladic with Prince Lazar probably seemed more justified than ever.
"Their air power cannot harm us," Mladic told a foreign television crew in Pale just before NATO jets renewed their attacks on the Serbs on Tuesday, September 5. "They can cause destruction and violence but we are on our land and we will win."
—September 8, 1995

Notes
[1] Nedzida Sadikovic, as quoted by Roy Gutman, Newsday News Service, August 9, 1995.
[2] Robert Block, "Mass Slaughter in a Bosnian Field Knee-Deep in Blood," The Independent, July 21, 1995; and "At the Mercy of Mladic," The Independent On Sunday, July 23, 1995.
[3] Although Mladic has denied the reports of mass killings as enemy propaganda, in February 1994 he expressed his desire to get even with Srebrenica Muslims for their 1992–1993 guerrilla war against the Bosnian Serbs in which hundreds of Serb civilians were killed. Referring to the UN's efforts to stop him from overrunning Srebrenica in April 1993, he said: "Had there not been the involvement of the international community, they [the Muslims] would have paid dearly for everything they had done to the Serbian people. Srebrenica Turks committed some of the greatest crimes ever against the Serbian people." See Colonel Gaja Petkovic's article, "Guarantees of the Almighty," Nin magazine, Belgrade, March 11, 1994.
[4] David Binder, "Pariah as Patriot," New York Times Magazine, September 4, 1994, p. 26.
[5] Nuremberg: A Personal Record of the Major Nazi War Criminals, Airey Neave (Coronet Books, 1980), p. 280.
[6] Colonel Gaja Petkovic, "Guarantees of the Almighty," Nin magazine, Belgrade, March 11, 1994.
[7] Interview with Ratko Mladic, Svet magazine, Novi Sad, Yugoslavia, July 21, 1995.

Letters
December 21, 1995: David Binder, 'THE MADNESS OF GENERAL MLADIC'

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Did Germany in fact play any role in the sad events in Srebrenica?

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February 24, 2006

Kosovo issue inflaming separatism in EU neighbours


Kosovo issue inflaming separatism in EU neighbours

24.02.2006 - 09:55 CET | By Andrew Rettman

EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS - The idea of Kosovan independence as a precedent for other separatist states is catching on in South Caucasus, with damaging implications for EU energy interests.

The breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Armenian-occupied Azerbaijan region, Nagorno-Karabakh, are using the Kosovan model to legitimise their own "de facto states", UK-based analyst Oksana Antonenko said.

"The EU must develop a position on this. To say we don't recognise a linkage is not good enough," the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) expert added.

"The politicians and the elite continue to make a case to their people. The issue of Kosovo's status is changing their expectations, making them less willing to engage in the peace process."

Separatists will "scream about double standards" if the EU endorses independence in Kosovo but pushes reunification in South Caucasus, Brussels-based CEPS analyst Michael Emerson indicated.

Pristina and Belgrade are currently in talks to decide the status of Kosovo, a UN-administered province in Serbia since ethnic clashes subsided in 1999.

But senior UK diplomat John Sawers told Belgrade two weeks ago that the west has "decided" Kosovo should be independent.

Russian gambit
Russian president Vladimir Putin gave weight to the Kosovo precedent idea on Russian TV on 30 January, with Moscow diplomats discussing the notion at UN level since.

"We need universal principles to find a fair solution to these problems," Mr Putin said.

"If people believe that Kosovo can be granted full independence, why then should we deny it to Abkhazia and South Ossetia?" he asked. "We know that Turkey, for instance, has recognised the republic of Northern Cyprus."

Russian troops in Georgia and Armenia give Moscow leverage against the pro-EU drift of South Caucasus.

But Mr Putin's words confused some experts, with Russia historically opposed to Kosovan independence and facing a legacy of separatism at home in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan.

"It's hard to know if they are serious or just trying to create pressure against Kosovan independence," former Estonian foreign minister and socialist MEP Toomas Ilves indicated.

"If Kosovo becomes a precedent and Transniestria recognises Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus recognises Nagorno-Karabakh, we could have a real mess on our hands."

Bosnian region Republika Srpska "will" also call for independence if Kosovo has its way, Serbian contacts told British conservative MEP Charles Tannock on a recent trip to Belgrade.

EU peace efforts
Brussels does not recognise Abkhazia, South Ossetia, or Nagorno-Karabakh, but the EU is stepping up conflict resolution and EU integration efforts in South Caucasus under its neighbourhood policy.

The EU buys oil from Azerbaijan through the so-called BCT pipeline, with plans afoot to build a new Caspian Sea gas link via Azerbaijan and Georgia under the Nabucco project, reducing energy dependency on Russia.

"If there was a new conflict [in Nagorno-Karabakh], the first target would be the pipeline and the oil terminals," senior OSCE diplomat Bernard Fassier indicated.

"It's essential the EU uses all the tools at its disposal...to get the message across that you have to respect compromise," he added.

EU special envoy to the region, Heikki Talvitie, said Europe has promised peacekeepers and a "blessing ceremony" for Nagorno-Karabakh if Armenia and Azerbaijan can clinch a deal.

He recently went to Moscow to endorse a Georgian-Russian plan for demilitarising South Ossetia.

EU neighbours on dangerous path
International diplomacy's new interest in South Caucasus comes at a time when popular hardliners are gaining support for military solutions to the conflicts.

The region is arming for battle with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan all doubling their military spending in the past two years.

"There is a radicalisation of public opinion and a push for more hardline solutions in the future," the IISS' Antonenko said. "What we have seen in the past few years is a serious arms race in South Caucasus."

The OSCE's Bernard Fassier recalled that young soldiers die "on a monthly basis" in border skirmishes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict claimed 10,000 lives in 1994.

"Time is not on our side," he stated. "Chekhov has taught us, if you have a pistol on the table in the first act, it will be fired by someone before the curtain drops."


http://euobserver.com/9/20979




February 22, 2006

[Yugoland] International media on Kosovo

 
 

Serbs, Ethnic Albanians Don't Reach Deal

VIENNA, Austria_U.N.-mediated talks over Kosovo's disputed political status will resume in a month after a Serb and ethnic Albanian meeting on the issue Tuesday produced no agreement.
The two-day talks at Vienna's Daun-Kinssky Palace were aimed at resolving one of the toughest disputes left from the 1990s ethnic Balkan conflicts: whether Kosovo should gain full independence or remain part of Serbia-Montenegro.
Albert Rohan, the U.N.'s deputy envoy at the talks, said that the first encounter was held in a "cooperative spirit" and mediators found some common ground during discussions. He set the next meeting for March 17.
Rohan said the talks were not aimed at reaching a specific agreement but rather to finding common ground on issues not directly linked to Kosovo's status.
Ethnic Albanians, who comprise about 90 percent of Kosovo's population of 2 million, want independence. Serbia insists on retaining some control over the region, which it considers an integral part of the nation and the birthplace of its national identity centuries ago.
Leon Kojen, a Serb delegate, said the talks were "useful" but that the two sides remained opposed on Kosovo's future status.
"Solutions which contravene the territorial integrity of (Serbia-Montenegro) for us are unacceptable," Kojen said after the meeting.
Lutfi Haziri, the head of the Kosovo delegation, said the province should become independent "as soon as possible. If it is possible tomorrow, we would be happy," he said.
Rohan said U.N. mediators were tackling practical issues in the hope of reaching a final agreement by the end of 2006.
The United Nations has administered the province since 1999, after NATO launched air attacks to stop a crackdown on independence-minded ethnic Albanians by President Slobodan Milosevic's Serb forces.
Thousands of people died and hundreds of thousands were displaced during the war, and the end of hostilities did not bring the two sides any closer to a resolution.
Rohan conceded that it might take a generation for the two sides to live together in harmony after the bloodshed of the 1990s. For now the best hope for them is if they cohabit, Rohan said.
The overall process is being mediated by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari.
Diplomats from the so-called Contact Group _ the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Russia _ have already agreed that the province cannot return to its previous status under direct Serb rule, nor can it be partitioned along ethnic lines or join another country in the region, such as Albania. They also stipulate that any agreement should be acceptable to the province's ethnic Albanians.
The two sides have disagreed over how much power should be held locally, with the province's minority Serbs insisting they be allowed to run affairs in their communities, establish links to other Serb areas and have special ties to Belgrade. Kosovo's ethnic Albanians say such a solution is a recipe for ethnic partition.

Finally, final status Kosovo must soon secure conditional independence

 

The international community is finally summoning up the courage to try to settle the Kosovo question - the last big unsolved issue left by the violent collapse of Yugoslavia.
Not before time. While there are risks in pressing for a settlement, it is more dangerous for Kosovo to remain as it is - a United Nations protectorate with its future blighted by uncertainty, unemployment and rampant crime.
The Kosovo Contact Group, consisting of the US, European Union states and Russia, was right after the 1999 war to freeze talk of Kosovo's final status, given the danger of provoking renewed fighting between the ethnic Albanian majority, which wants independence, and the Serb minority which claims Kosovo remains part of Serbia.
But now conditions in the former Yugoslavia are improving. Slovenia has joined the EU, Croatia has started entry talks, Macedonia is a recognised accession candidate, and Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro have started association agreement talks. Meanwhile Slobodan Milosevic, ex-Yugoslav president, and other alleged war criminals are in custody, although Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic are still free. And the economy is recovering from the wars of the 1990s.
With unemployment, crime and corruption rife, the environment is not perfect. Serbia is in a particularly hard position: as well as the prospect of losing Kosovo, it faces a likely complete break with Montenegro, the last ex-Yugoslav republic linked to Belgrade.
But there may never be a better time to act on Kosovo. And, with the US and its allies embroiled in the Middle East, western diplomats badly need a settlement in the Balkans to show intervention can end in success.
The plan is for ethnic Albanians and Serbs to negotiate a settlement. But these talks will very likely break down as Belgrade refuses to accept independence and ethnic Albanians, who compose over 90 per cent of the population, want nothing less.
The Contact Group must then be ready to impose conditional independence as anything less would perpetuate instability and risk an ethnic Albanian backlash. In return, the ethnic Albanians must be pressed to grant the local Serbs constitutional safeguards.
A settlement can be imposed only if Russia co-operates. Moscow has voiced concern about the precedent independence might set for troubled zones of the former Soviet Union. But Russia must be persuaded that UN-sanctioned conditional independence would be a less frightening precedent than an ethnic Albanian uprising.
Whatever the final deal, international troops and administrators must remain in Kosovo for years to come. The EU must continue to support the region with aid and stick by promises of future EU membership. Nothing will help the region to break with the past and focus on the future more than the prospect of EU integration.
The international community is finally summoning up the courage to try to settle the Kosovo question - the last big unsolved issue left by the violent collapse of Yugoslavia.
Not before time. While there are risks in pressing for a settlement, it is more dangerous for Kosovo to remain as it is - a United Nations protectorate with its future blighted by uncertainty, unemployment and rampant crime.

The Kosovo Contact Group, consisting of the US, European Union states and Russia, was right after the 1999 war to freeze talk of Kosovo's final status, given the danger of provoking renewed fighting between the ethnic Albanian majority, which wants independence, and the Serb minority which claims Kosovo remains part of Serbia.

But now conditions in the former Yugoslavia are improving. Slovenia has joined the EU, Croatia has started entry talks, Macedonia is a recognised accession candidate, and Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro have started association agreement talks. Meanwhile, ex-Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic and other alleged war criminals are in custody, although Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic are still free. And the economy is recovering from the wars of the 1990s.
With unemployment, crime and corruption rife, the enviroment is not perfect. Serbia is in a particularly hard position: as well as the prospect of losing Kosovo, it faces a likely complete break with Montenegro, the last ex-Yugoslav republic linked to Belgrade.
But there may never be a better time to act on Kosovo. And, with the US and its allies embroiled in the Middle East, western diplomats badly need a settlement in the Balkans to show intervention can end in success.
The plan is for ethnic Albanians and Serbs to negotiate a settlement. But, these talks will very likely break down as Belgrade refuses to accept independence and ethnic Albanians, who compose over 90 per cent of the population, want nothing less.
The Contact Group must then be ready to impose conditional independence as anything less would perpetuate instability and risk an ethnic Albanian backlash. In return, the ethnic Albanians must be pressed to grant the local Serbs constitutional safeguards.
A settlement can be imposed only if Russia cooperates. Moscow has voiced concern about the precedent independence might set for troubled zones of the former Soviet Union. But Russia must be persuaded that UN-sanctioned conditional independence would be a less frightening precedent than an ethnic Albanian uprising.
Whatever the final deal, international troops and administrators must remain in Kosovo for years to come. The EU must continue to support the region with aid and stick by promises of future EU membership. Nothing will help the region to break with the past and focus on the future more than the prospect of EU integration.

U.S.says a settlement of Kosovo problem must protect rights of minority Serbs

WASHINGTON_The State Department said Tuesday that a Kosovo settlement should be based on protection of rights for the territory's minority Serb population and acceptance by all the people of area.

Spokesman Adam Ereli said Kosovo was discussed Monday at a meeting in Vienna between U.N. envoy Martti Ahtisaari and leaders from Kosovo and Serbia.

It was the first direct dialogue between the parties since the status process began in November.

"They discussed how the decentralization of the government can better protect the rights of Kosovo's minorities and improve the delivery of public services to all of Kosovo's citizens," Ereli said.

He said he expects further meetings on decentralization in the coming weeks.

Kosovo, with an ethnic Albanian majority, is a province of Serbia. It has been controlled by the United Nations with mainly NATO peacekeepers since a NATO air war in 1999 ended a Serbian crackdown on the Kosovars.



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February 21, 2006

SN543:Montenegro slams EU's referendum threshold

 

Montenegro slams EU's referendum threshold

21.02.2006 - 18:09 CET | By Ekrem Krasniqi

Montenegro says the EU threshold of 55 percent for its independence referendum is undemocratic and could provoke instability, Balkans news agency DTT-NET.COM writes.

"The formula proposed by the EU harms the basic democratic principle that each vote should have the same democratic value," Montenegran prime minister Milo Djukanovic said at the Crans Montana economic forum in Przn, Montenegro, on Monday (20 February).

"The decision belongs to the majority and not the minority. The EU's formula contains a virus which is dangerous to the stability of society when it comes to the implementation of the results," he added.

Montenegro is set to hold the vote on whether to leave the Serbia-Montenegro alliance in April or May, with pro-independence campaigners led by Mr Djukanovic saying that a majority of 25 to 40 percent should be enough for the results to stand.

Serbian-led opposition parties favour a figure of 50 percent or above, with recent opinion polls showing that 41 percent support independence while 32 percent are against.

The Montenegrin law on referendums states that the decision is to be taken by a majority of citizens eligible to vote, but doesn't fix any exact figure.

Kosovo first round inconclusive
Serbia is facing the prospect of losing two territories this year, with UN-led talks currently under way in Vienna on the future status of Kosovo.

The talks have so far focussed on creating Serb-run municipalities in the majority ethnic-Albanian province, under UN protection since 1999, when Serb forces led by Slobodan Milosevic carried out attacks on Albanian communities.

Serb negotiators have argued the quasi-autonomous units are needed to safeguard the civil liberties of ethnic Serbs, but Kosovan Albanians attacked the plan as being based on a "territorial principle, division of communities and non-functional local institutions."

The talks, currently in their first round, are not expected to produce quick results, but the international community, led by the UK, France, Germany, Italy Russia and the US, is pushing for agreement on Kosovo's status by the end of the year.

opinion articles and interviews in Kosovo Albanian press today

CHALLENGES OF STATE-MAKING
(Zeri, by Bardh Hamzaj)

Since in the process of definition of Kosovo status are involved all main world centers, they also took care to make clearer the framework, within which this solution will be found.

Based on the statements of the personalities that lead the process of definition of Kosovo status, Kosovars have reasons to be satisfied with so-far development of this process.

First, it has to do with the decisiveness of the main western states, including the US, that the status is solved this year and secondly the principles of the Contact  Group made clear that Kosovo cannot return in any way to the situation before 1999 and that its status will bring stability and not open a new phase of the conflicts in the region.

In this context, the statements given to the German media by Martti Ahtisaari that at the end Kosovo people will decide how will Kosovo status look like, did not leave dilemmas about the future of Kosovo. So, the status, will be in accordance with the will of Kosovo people, which is its independence.

All this does not mean that the Albanians have already finished their job. Kosovo and its  people are before the historical moment of the fulfillment of their aspirations, but also at the moment of the biggest challenge, when it should be proved that the equal status with the mechanisms of the highest standards in the world should be reserved.

This implies the capabilities’ of a society to face with challenges of a state-making and creation of free and democratic Kosovo. Kosovo should reach this, otherwise all positive trends marked so far in the recently started process of the definition of the status, could be ruined very quickly.

INDEPENDENCE OR OCCUPATION
(Express, by Tim Judah

The moment of truth has finally arrived. More than six years after the end of the Kosovo war, talks on its future status open this morning in Vienna. They are to be chaired by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari.
For several months diplomatic sources have indicated that, not only do they expect the talks to lead Kosovo’s independence, but that they are not really even about its future status, but rather about the future of the Serbian minority within Kosovo.
Kosovo has a population of some 2 million people of whom more than 90 per cent are ethnic Albanians. They have long demanded independence from Serbia.
War began in Kosovo in 1998 and NATO intervened in 1999. Following a 78-day bombardment of Serbia, its southern province came under the jurisdiction of the UN, although technically the sovereignty of the province remained with Serbia.
An exodus of non-Albanians, primarily Serbs and Roma followed the war. Now some 100,000 Serbs live, either in the north of Kosovo, in an area that abuts Serbia, or in enclaves scattered across the province.
Over the last year, diplomats working on the Kosovo question have predicted that the talks would lead to some form of “conditional independenceâ€. This foresaw the breaking of the sovereign link with Serbia, NATO-led forces remaining and some form of international presence that would have the right, as in Bosnia, to interfere in everyday politics.
Now, however, sources close to the talks process in Vienna have told ISN Security Watch that Kosovo is likely to have far more independence than this. According to these sources, even the term “conditional independence†is now politically incorrect and is being replaced by “sovereignty with limitations†or “monitored independenceâ€.
Talks in Vienna on Monday will center on decentralization. This is diplomatic code for autonomy for Serbian areas. Among things to be discussed will be the redrawing of municipal boundaries to create more Serbian dominated municipalities.
Two questions of highly symbolic importance that are unlikely to be discussed at the Vienna talks - but rather imposed by the UN Security Council in any status decision it is likely to take later this year - are about whether Kosovo will have a seat at the UN and whether it will have an army.
Diplomatic sources have told ISN Security Watch that they expect that Kosovo will have a UN seat sooner rather than later, which means that this could be within the next two or three years rather than say, waiting to time this with Kosovo’s eventual accession to the EU, which is certainly, at the very least, a decade away.
Under any settlement, Kosovo’s security is to continue to be provided by forces from mostly NATO member states and a role in policing is likely to be played by the EU.
As to the question of Kosovo’s own future army, ideas being discussed include a re-branding of the Kosovo Protection Corps. This was set up in the wake of the 1999 war to absorb several thousand former ethnic Albanian guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK/KLA). Today, despite its military ranks, it is supposed to be an unarmed, civil emergency force. One idea is that it should be given an arsenal of light weapons and given a new role as a “gendarmerie†force.
Although it has been clear for much of the last year that Kosovo was heading towards independence little has been done by Serbian leaders to prepare their population for this eventuality.
Tomislav Nikolic, the leader of the nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS), the largest in Serbia’s parliament, says that Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica has agreed with him that if Kosovo becomes independent then it should be declared “occupied territoryâ€.
Kostunica has not denied this claim, which would end Serbia’s bids to join both the EU and NATO, as both of them would presumably be occupying powers, along with Kosovo’s native Albanian population.
Aleksandar Simic, an adviser on Kosovo to Kostunica, said recently that Serbia would “never†accept the independence of Kosovo and: “The Kosovo Albanians have to be aware that they will not receive independence from Serbia and that Serbia will retain the right to take back everything which it lost in an illegal manner.â€
Another possibility currently under discussion in Serbia is whether or not to hold a referendum on the future of Kosovo, in effect, to ask Serbian voters to reject independence.
This idea recalls the referendum held in 1998 when the then-Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic asked Serbs to reject foreign mediation in the Kosovo conflict.
Indeed, the current level of discussion about the future of Kosovo has been greeted with dismay by some in Serbia. Daniel Sunter, head of the Belgrade think tank, the Euro-Atlantic Initiative, says there has been no serious debate in Serbia about what Serbs could expect if Kosovo was not given independence.
Quite apart from the demographic issues involved in trying to live in peace with a young, growing, and hostile Albanian population, he says: “What would it mean for Serbia? That it would take 500,000 soldiers to keep it under control or what?â€
Kosovo Albanian leaders are, of course, in good cheer since independence is the goal they have been working towards since the collapse of the old Yugoslavia.
They are already turning their minds to the period after independence. Veton Surroi, a prominent opposition leader, says that the election of Fatmir Sejdiu as the new president of Kosovo following the death of Ibrahim Rugova last month brings with it an opportunity to clear out a lot of the corrupt old guard of Kosovo politics and usher in new people better able to deal with some of Kosovo’s massive economic problems.
According to Surroi, the 6 February declaration by John Sawers, the political director of the British Foreign Office, that Kosovo would be independent, meant that “the Rubicon has been crossedâ€. That, he said, coupled with the political opportunities that may follow the election of Sejdiu, leads him to feel a new and positive “critical energy†among Kosovo Albanian decision makers.

SOMEONE SAID SOMETHING
(Kosova Sot, editorial)

While the Kosovo delegation started the first round of talks in Vienna as a part of the process for solution of Kosovo’s status, senior leaders in Prishtina were loudly critical towards the delays about the appointment of the two new Ministers. The weakest reaction came from the Kosovo PM, who seems to deal with serious political issues therefore, he has forgotten that according to the Constitutional Framework, he is responsible for the functioning of the Government. But it should be accepted that the decision-making process about this issue exceeds his competencies.

Kosovo should have had the Minister of Internal Affairs and Justice appointed by now. PM Kosumi should have constantly asked and make this issue his priority. It is not known if a meeting was held regarding this issue since the time when the regulation about the creation of these two ministries was approved.

But while PM Kosumi does not want to have bad relationships with the coalition partners, Assembly speaker Nexhat Daci booed his political party. The statements he made yesterday are a severe critique addressed to his party, the LDK, and a sincere concern about the huge stagnation regarding the appointment of the new Ministers. President Ftmir Sejdiu was a bit more laconic and softer, but he did not spare the governing coalition from critics regarding this issue.

The ongoing prolongation is senseless and it is empowering the idea that Kosovar politics has still many defects. The interests about power and competition within parties have been challenging the state’s interests. They have been creating a dangerous precedent just before the recognition of the Kosovar state. These negative models would not help Kosovo to keep the positive image and this may reflect on the relations with the EU and US.

INTERNATIONALS WITH THE EXPIRED MANDATES MIGHT CAUSE RIOTS
(Epoka e Re by Hamdi Miftari)

I was witness of the case when Temporary Media Commissioner Robert Gillette tried to close TV Mitrovica, by confiscating broadcasting equipment. Everyone was surprised when saw that Gillette himself came to Mitrovica, and take the stairs to the 12th floor (since the elevator was not in function) to the studio of Mitrovica TV, handover the confiscation document and return with empty hands.

What I saw there is a very important moment of Kosovo society development. Gillette has announced an inspection to TV Mitrovica and he found himself as violating law not protecting its implementation, what his post as commissioner obliges him. Seeing the case I thought why Gillette is doing this to TV Mitrovica. The reason is very simple: Gillette’s mandate has expired long time ago. The Kosovo Assembly has passed the Law on Independent Media Commission, the SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen has signed this law, but since the Assembly has not appointed the commissioner, Gillette is trying to find a job for himself by creating troubles there where the situation is sensitive, in Mitrovica.

He allowed broadcasting of TV Most and TV Mir from illegal points and now when his mandate has expired he remembered to stop the illegal broadcast. The justification was found, Gillette’s predecessor Anna De Lellio been hasn’t serious when had licensed TV Mitrovica which covered more than half of Kosovo.

By not having law on his side Gillette tried to confiscate all equipments of TV Mitrovica. The KPS police have no idea about all this. They only knew that an international who had the power wanted to destroy an institution that had many scarification on its way of build, and which had served to the society any time.

All this made me think that if UNMIK had more people like Gillette is, riots in Mitrovica and Kosovo would have been unavoidable.

ROHAN: RETURN OF THIS TERRITORY UNDER SERBIA IS NOT REALISTIC
(Most dailies)  

Most dailies rerun the interview that Austrian diplomat Albert Rohan had with the ‘Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,’ regarding the beginning of talks in Vienna.  Here are some highlights of it.

FAZ: There is an estimation in Serbia that in Vienna talks on Kosovo there is onluy one status that should be clarified: the Kosovo Serb minority status. for having an independent Kosovo the decision should have been made long time ago.   

Rohan: We as mediators can only follow up the atmosphere in the international community and at the Contact Group. There is a thinking there that Slobodan Milosevic has lost Kosovo in 1999 ad that the return of that territory under Serbia is not realistic. In order not to follow with the main status issue, we are following a strategy so we start concrete issues in the talks, and possibly find many joint solutions on the issues which should necessarily be solved-no matter what would be Kosovo status. our goal is to find a solution which would find the accordance of both parties. If this becomes unachievable, we will report to the UN General Secretary and he will present it to the UN SC.

FAZ: But Government in Serbia is not raising any intentions to rule Kosovo. It wants to protect Serbia’s territorial integrity and disable Kosovo win a place and a vote in the UN.

Rohan: I cannot predict result of talks and I cannot exclude the possibility that an agreement can be achieved now, what seem not to be possible. In case that no agreement will be achieved, the Security Council should decide where four countries are permanent members of the Contact Group.

FAZ: During talks in Vienna the initial issue of discussion will be decentralization. Do you see signs of compromise?

Rohan: There are four issues in the area of decentralization, which should be quickly treated one after another. Then we will have financing of local administration and connections between municipalities, respectively Serb municipalities with Belgrade. The last point is new borders lines between municipalities. In this case it is the wish of Serbs who want delineation of Serb municipalities, that we do support. But these municipalities should be big enough so they could function. We cannot create municipalities with 400 people. Parallel with the decentralization there are also other issues such as protection of Orthodox Churcyh and protection of minorities in the area of legislation and institutionally.             

FAZ: Is there a timeframe for Vienna Negotiations?

Rohan: All these issues will be treated in the beginning, until we reach to the main issue. Then, sooner or later, the political leaders of both parties will have to meet. We aim at solution of Kosovo issue till the end of 2006.