European Union decisions will be crucial to the future of Kosovo—and Serbia
THIS week Serbs and Kosovo Albanians (Kosovars) are meeting in New York to discuss the future of Kosovo—or so diplomats would have everyone believe. In fact, the two sides are simply restating their well-known positions. The Kosovars want independence; the Serbs say they cannot have it. Since the parties cannot agree, diplomats on all sides have merely been pretending that genuine negotiations are taking place.
There is a debate about Kosovo. But it is not between Serbs and Kosovars, nor even between Russians and Americans. Rather it is within the European Union. What EU countries decide will matter not just for the 2m inhabitants of Kosovo, 90% of whom are ethnic Albanians. It will also affect the credibility of the EU's nascent foreign policy.
On the map, Kosovo is Serbia's southern province. But since the end of the war in 1999 it has been under United Nations jurisdiction. Serbs in Kosovo live in heavily protected enclaves or in a compact patch abutting Serbia proper. The Kosovars have long demanded independence. Serbia has promised to grant Kosovo almost unlimited autonomy short of independence, but given its history the Kosovars are not interested.
In March, Martti Ahtisaari, a former Finnish president, gave the UN a plan for “supervised independence”, after 14 rounds of mostly fruitless negotiations. But Russia said it would veto a Security Council resolution backing this. In desperation, fresh talks were initiated. On December 10th the Russian, American and EU ambassadors overseeing these fictitious negotiations will report back. Western diplomats (and Kosovars) say that will be the end of the game; the Russians (and Serbs) say it will not be.
Given the Russian stance, and statements by the Americans that they will recognise Kosovo if it declares independence after December 10th, neither party has an incentive to take the process seriously. It is what the Europeans do that matters. America does not want to be the only big power to recognise an independent Kosovo. Britain and France would like to, and they do not like what they see as Russian interference in an internal European matter. But they also want to maintain EU unity.
So the spotlight will shift to Berlin. If Germany recognises Kosovo's independence, Italy and most (but not all) other EU countries will probably follow. Serbia would then be at a fork in the road. The prime minister, Vojislav Kostunica, is mounting shrill attacks on NATO and the West. Ministers from his party have also been saying that, if European countries recognise an independent Kosovo, Serbia will no longer seek to join the EU.
If Serbia ends its EU bid, it will head into isolation, and may drag all of the western Balkans with it. Yet Kosovo will not wait placidly forever: this week a bomb in Pristina killed two people. Faced with unpalatable choices, it will be no surprise if the diplomats, or their political masters, find another reason for delay when December 10th comes
Vuk Jeremic, the Foreign Minister of Serbia, confirms that the status of Kosovo remains the biggest hurdle to EU entry
Bronwen Maddox
“I personally agree that there is no Plan B,” Vuk Jeremic, the Serbian Foreign Minister, said. “There is only one bright future for the Balkans, and that is within Europe.”
But between Serbia and membership of the European Union lies the hurdle of Kosovo, so far insurmountable, and others in the form of indicted war criminals sought by The Hague tribunal.
Mr Jeremic told The Times yesterday that Serbia “is suffering a cooling of public support for the idea of Europe”. He added: “I am afraid that if things go wrong, if it is not handled well regarding the future status of Kosovo, then there will be a dominant majority within Serbia that will say, ‘This is not fair, it is humiliating, they [the EU] don’t want us. To hell with it’.”
That is his best card. Mr Jeremic, of the Democratic Party, part of the pro-European coalition that won a parliamentary majority in January, cautioned that if Serbia is not given more hope by the EU, and an acceptable deal on Kosovo, then it will turn its back on Europe.
The risk it runs is that other countries will not rate this threat highly enough to agree to its demands. The least controversial of these are the requests for signs of encouragement from the EU. In London this week, Mr Jeremic asked Britain, “as a strong supporter of EU enlargement in the Balkans”, to loosen visa restrictions, which are lengthy “and at times humiliating”.
Only a quarter of Serbs who had voted for pro-European parties had been able to travel to EU countries, he said. Serbia “has a lot of people with means who would like to travel”, he said. “For a long time, we were the most advanced, sophisticated”, and Serbs find it humiliating to see “Croats and Romanians travelling without visas” when they cannot.
Pride and humiliation are words that thread through the entire discussion; they lie at the heart of Serbia’s position on Kosovo. Mr Jeremic took part in talks yesterday with the “troika” of the US, the EU and Russia, before meetings with Kosovo representatives next week in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly.
Kosovo, which Serbia regards as its province, and to which it attaches huge historical romance, has been under UN administration since 1999, when Nato drove out Serb forces, accusing them of atrocities against the ethnic Albanians who make up 90 per cent of the population. Serbia has fiercely resisted that majority’s calls for independence.
The troika must report to Ban Ki Moon, the UN Secretary-General, by December 10. If there has been no progress, Mr Ban will have to decide whether to forge ahead with the plan of Martii Ahtisaari, the UN envoy, for “supervised independence”, although this might prompt a veto from Russia, a staunch Serb ally. Serbia has offered to grant autonomy but not sovereign independence.
Mr Jeremic said that it was unhelpful to speculate how Serbia might react if Kosovo unilaterally declared independence but dismissed the suggestion that it might take military action. “We will not use force, we will not contribute to the instability” of the Balkans, he said. But he added: “It is only if Belgrade and Pristina agree that we will have peace.”
He argued that Scotland could afford to toy with separation from the UK and that Belgium could split into two because they were at peace, but that in the Balkans, “where we are still struggling to stabilise”, indulging the nationalistic instincts of minorities was too dangerous.
If Serbia were within the EU, he added, then “borders have a different meaning and can be discussed”, although he refused to clarify what this might mean for Kosovo. He concluded: “I really hope that early in the next decade Serbia will be part of the EU.”
But the question is whether Serbs are prepared to sacrifice a European future to preserve their pride. Mr Jeremic’s warning is that many would do just that. The EU, and the UN, have to decide how much that would matter.
Serbia veers away from NATO using hard-hitting rhetoric and accusations, with the prime minister saying the country could not join hands with an alliance that bombed its territory.
Tuesday, September 18, 2007
By Igor Jovanovic
Eight years after NATO bombed Serbia in order to halt clashes between Serbia and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and force Serbian security forces out of the province, Serbian nationalists in Belgrade and NATO are once again at loggerheads.
And as Belgrade slowly moves away from NATO, most analysts here say Serbia is setting down a dangerous road toward isolation.
Meanwhile, the piercing rhetoric of certain Serbian ministers directed against NATO threatens to cause serious conflicts within the ruling coalition in Belgrade.
The exchange of accusations on the Belgrade-NATO front started with a series of statements by ministers from Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). They accused the US and NATO of trying to create "the first NATO state in the world" on the territory of the southern Serbian province by advocating independence for Kosovo.
According to the Serbian ministers, the foundations for that state lay in UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari's plan, which foresees no civil control over NATO troops in Kosovo.
In early February, after nearly a year of fruitless negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina on the status of Kosovo, Ahtisaari unveiled a plan that envisages internationally supervised independence for Kosovo.
Ahtisaari proposed a phased transition to independence, initially supervised by an EU bureaucrat and protected by NATO forces, which currently has 17,000 soldiers there.
The plan was backed by the Washington and Pristina and rejected by Belgrade and Moscow. Because of threats of a Russian veto, it was impossible to pass the resolution on Kosovo in the UN Security Council, and the negotiations were turned over to the Contact Group for Kosovo, which appointed three mediators for new talks between Belgrade and Pristina.
The so-called troika is to submit a report on the new negotiations to the UN secretary general by 10 December.
Joining the enemy?
Both NATO and the US have brushed off the accusations from Belgrade.
James Appathurai, spokesman for the NATO secretary-general, expressed "concern and disappointment over certain comments that have been coming from Serbia lately." Appathurai said that statements about the creation of a NATO state in Kosovo were "nonsense" and "neither welcome nor constructive."
Kostunica's party responded by saying it was against Serbia joining NATO. The party's new program, unveiled in early September, says that Serbia should become a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace program (PfP), but not of the alliance itself.
In a recent party briefing, Kostunica said he opposed Serbia's NATO membership and that the country should stay militarily neutral, stressing that such a move was in the interest of the state.
"How can Serbia join the military alliance which first bombed us, then, bypassing the UN Security Council, sent its military forces to Kosovo, and threatens to recognize Kosovo's unilateral independence?" the prime minister asked.
The party also proposed to have Serbia's potential membership in any military alliance checked in a referendum.
Furthermore, Kostunica's party warned of the "danger" of Kosovo Albanians declaring independence unilaterally after 10 December, and of that independence being recognized by the US.
As a potential countermeasure, the DSS proposed to its ruling coalition partners the adopt of a decision in the Serbian Parliament that Serbia could join NATO.
According to the latest public opinion polls, some 50 percent of citizens oppose NATO membership, 32 percent support it, while 15 percent have no stance. At the same time, some 70 percent favor EU membership.
Bad blood
Back in 1999, Serbian authorities, led by Slobodan Milosevic, sued 17 NATO member countries for the bombing of military and civilian targets in Serbia and Montenegro. However, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where the suit was filed in December 2004, dismissed the case arguing that it did not have jurisdiction over the matter, as Serbia was not a UN member at the time, and was only recognized one year later.
Belgrade accused NATO member countries of violating Serbian sovereignty and breaking international obligations since the strikes were not authorized by a UN Security Council resolution.
Human Rights Watch estimates that between March and June 1999 some 500 civilians were killed as a result of the NATO bombing campaign.
Most Belgrade analysts described the actions by certain Belgrade government officials as hasty and potentially harmful for Serbia.
Belgrade analyst Zoran Dragisic told ISN Security Watch that such damage was "suicidal" and "would cost Serbia dearly in all areas."
Military analyst Aleksandar Radic echoed those sentiments. He told ISN Security Watch that Serbian was wandering along a dangerous divisive path.
"This is a very serious and long-term issue that will reflect on Serbia's reality in the years when the Kosovo problem is solved," he said. Radic warned that if Serbia pushed NATO away, given that the alliance offered guarantees for security in Kosovo, it would not have the moral right to call for the protection of Kosovo Serbs.
Cozying up to Russia
But plenty of analysts disagree with this assessment.
Analyst Slobodan Antonic, in his column in the Belgrade daily Politika, said the US and EU were pushing Serbia away, and that certain countries were trying to strip Serbia of a portion of the territory it considered its cradle (Kosovo) and expected Belgrade to take it calmly. According to him, this pushes Serbia toward Russia, but also jeopardizes democracy in the country.
Former US ambassador to Belgrade William Montgomery points out the nature of the association between Serbia and Russia. In an article written for Belgrade's B92 website, Montgomery said that the DSS' rhetoric reflected Russian President Vladimir Putin's vision of the world. Russia, by demonstrating its strength, aimed to create an alliance of states that had just one thing in common - disliking the US, he wrote.
But economic interests are also becoming a link between Moscow and Belgrade. Serbia is facing the privatization of large state-controlled companies, in which the Russians are very interested. Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska talked with Kostunica before the calling of the tender for a copper mine in the Serbian town of Bor, in which Deripaska's company is also taking part.
Russian air carrier Aeroflot representatives visited Kostunica prior to the beginning of the sale of Serbian air carrier JAT Airways, while Lukoil is mentioned as one of the potential buyers of the Serbian oil company NIS. But the Russians have not invested much money in Serbia so far. The leading investors are precisely members of NATO - Norway and the US.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently said that Moscow would not haggle over the US anti-missile shield in Europe and the status of Kosovo. Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili also tackled the possible reasons for Russia's interest in Kosovo, telling the German media that the recognition of an independent Kosovo outside of the UN could destabilize the entire Caucasus.
The Georgian foreign minister said Russia would then "probably recognize the Georgian province of Abkhazia," which would also be "a precedent for the separatist groups in the Russian part of northern Caucasus."
The Russian envoy in the troika for Kosovo, Aleksandr Botsan-Kharchenko, echoed this sentiment, saying that the Kosovo case could create a dangerous precedent. "Of course, that precedent can be used in other regions as well, where there are so-called frozen conflicts," Kharchenko told Russian news agency Interfax.
Internal rifts
Kostunica's strong policy on NATO has also led to rifts between the Serbian ruling coalition partners, where nationalist and radicals are against NATO membership while moderate parties believe that membership is in the state's interest.
The prime minister's DSS, the opposition Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), formerly led by the late Milosevic, oppose NATO membership, while the Democratic Party (DS), G17 Plus and Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) support alliance membership.
The strongest member of the coalition, formed in May, Serbian President Boris Tadic’s Democratic Party, did not miss the opportunity to point out that its priorities were both EU and Euro-Atlantic integrations.
"[…] Serbia's strategic goal is for its army to be an active participant in Euro-Atlantic integration and the Partnership for Peace, and to be honored and respected among its friends and allies," the president said at an army ceremony in Belgrade on 15 September.
Democratic Party whip Nada Kolundzija said that in resolving the Kosovo issue Serbia should count on as many countries as possible, not make enemies. She urged all Serbian parties to refrain from using the problem of Kosovo to forward their own interests.
Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic, Tadic's close associate, also reacted by warning the government that the anti-NATO rhetoric coming from certain members of the DSS had caused concern among Serbia's partners and the EU.
"Even countries with whom Serbia has traditionally had good relations have indicated concern over Belgrade's new foreign policy course," Jeremic told B92.
The head of the European Commission's delegation in Belgrade, Josep Lloveras, warns that the problems in Belgrade-NATO relations could affect Serbia's European integration, adding that although these processes are separate, they are nonetheless related.
Referring to Serbia's "anti-NATO rhetoric," Lloveras said in a statement that "Serbia will decide by herself on her future relations with NATO. But both processes should be regarded as coherent, or rather, complementary."
After all that, the DSS proposed the postponement of the presidential and local elections, which are to be called in 2007, for the period after the resolution of Kosovo's status. Tadic's Democrats interpreted this as a heavy blow, because they planned to make Tadic their candidate in the election.
They believe Tadic stands a much greater chance of victory against the SRS candidate before the end of the year and the resolving of the Kosovo issue. The entire matter brings the most benefit to the ultranationalist radicals, the single strongest party in Serbia.
With bickering within the ruling bloc and the resolving of Kosovo's status, time in Serbia is on the radicals' side.
Igor Jovanovic is a Belgrade-based correspondent for ISN Security Watch, where this article was published.
Kosovo: “Thinking Outside Of The Box”Author:Wes Johnson, author of Balkan Inferno: Betrayal, War 15 September 2007 - Issue : 747
A front page photo in the International Herald Tribune a few weeks ago of the blackened and twisted remains of an automobile blown up by the Basque terrorist ETA outside a police barracks in Spain was yet another reminder of the danger to peace and stability posed by various liberation movements that use violence to advance their cause.
By Wes Johnson
Only a few years ago both the Irish IRA and the French Corsicans were making their demands at the point of a gun – and sticks of dynamite. Today, we can add the Chechens; Turkish Kurds; Armenians in Nagorno-Karabagh; Abkhazians and Ossetians in Georgia and the Turks of northern Cyprus to the clamor for separatism and independence. And that is only in Europe. Consider Africa from the Western Sahara over to the Horn. In the Middle East, we have Palestinians divided amongst them-selves and an Iraq that may split up. In Asia, Tamils in Sri Lanka; Tibetans; and Kashmiri and Philippine Moslems. There are dozens of such movements and organisations around the world – some with legitimate grievances, some not. Why then is independence for Kosovo considered to be so very urgent – mainly by the Albanians themselves in this tiny impoverished Balkan back- water and their powerful US supporters in Washington?
The International Crisis Group (ICG) has issued yet another report urging independence – even without the agreement of the UN Security Council. It calls Kosovo “a ticking time bomb in the EU’s backyard.” This so-called independent think-tank has pushed this issue for years, always issuing dire warnings should the Albanians not get their way. Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the architect of NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign, has often led the pack backed by Rand Corporation Director James Dobbins. It is striking how former senior US officials dominate the ICG: Thomas Pickering, Morton Abramowitz, Kenneth Adelman, Steven Solarz, Wesley Clark, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carla Hills, and Swanee Hunt. Leslie Gelb of the Council on Foreign Relations is there as well – and others. Former ICG country director Edward Joseph has called for US “brinkmanship” over Kosovo in order to block Russian influence. It was an unwelcome return to Cold War rhetoric, a blind unwillingness to accept the fact that others may see Kosovo differently from Washington.
Given ICG efforts to undermine and prejudge the outcome of the ongoing round of talks between the Kosovo Albanians and Belgrade in advance, the EU’s representative to the Contact Group, Wolfgang Ischinger, has urged both sides to “think outside of the box” – to even consider partition if both sides want it. Previously the Contact Group had considered such talk taboo. However, if one is to really “think outside of the box”, then one might well imagine that Belgrade may want to table other issues – which might promote flexibility and encourage them to consider trade-offs. Among these might be a “green light” for the Srpska Republic to leave an obviously dysfunctional Bosnia-Herzegovina to join their brethren across the Drina River in Serbia; an agreed autonomy for the Krajina Serbs of Croatia, as set out in previous UN-brokered negotiations; and finally a “dual autonomy” for Kosovo that would give the Serbs and Albanians their own symbols, schools, religious institutions, police, and local governing bodies. Each community could have its own banks; and both could have tariff-free trade and other services with Serbia and Albania respectively. Kosovo could enjoy representation in inter-national organisations, as others do, but not full sovereignty. As with being pregnant, there is no half way house to “independence”. A second Albanian state in the Balkans is not needed – nor is it desirable, as it would set a very unfortunate precedent internationally.
____________
Wes Johnson is the author of Balkan Inferno: Betrayal, War, and Intervention 1990-2005, Enigma Books, New York, NY, 2007.
Give up Kosovo to join EU: Not as enticing to Serbia as West thinks
By Nicholas Wood
Friday, September 14, 2007
BELGRADE: Eight years after it was hit by NATO airstrikes, the former Yugoslav Defense Ministry still lies in ruins, a reminder of what the Serbs consider unwarranted aggression by the West in the war over the Serbian province of Kosovo.
Their anger is flaring up again as Western governments, particularly the United States, speak of recognizing Kosovo this year as an independent state. The West says that in the absence of reconciliation, doing so would help stabilize the region by officially separating the Serbs from the ethnic Albanians who are the majority population of Kosovo.
Serbian politicians, even pro-Western ones, say that they worry that a recognition of Kosovo would introduce a new era of Serbian isolation and hostility toward the West - leaving Europe with little sway here.
Since the war ended in 1999, Europe has tried to integrate Serbia into NATO and the European Union. And as a regional power, Serbia expected an easy pathway into Europe, especially since many of its neighbors have joined the union.
But Europe has also demanded that Serbs make a fresh start by chasing down important war crimes suspects wanted at the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. Serbia has complied only fitfully.
If Western countries do recognize Kosovo, then "we do not need the European Union," Velimir Ilic, Serbia's minister for infrastructure and a key political ally of the Serbian prime minister, said in an interview. "It means they are not our friends."
He added: "It is a tough choice, but Serbia has its pride and its integrity."
Ilic, who has a reputation as a populist politician, is the only senior government politician to issue such a statement. But others agree that a nationalist backlash would chill relations with the West.
A widespread recognition of Kosovo "could lead to a chain of events with unforeseen consequences, including the loss of Serbia's European perspective," Leon Koen, the former head of Serbia's negotiating team on the province, wrote in the newspaper Dnevnik.
And Serbia's senior diplomat for European integration predicted that whatever support there is among Serbs for arresting war crimes suspects and sending them to The Hague would vanish if Kosovo was recognized.
"I can't see how anybody would be ready to support cooperation" with the tribunal, said Milica Delevic, a reformist who is Serbia's assistant foreign minister responsible for relations with the EU. "We will be in trouble."
Western governments are determined to resolve Kosovo's future to stabilize the province and calm the ethnic Albanians who make up more than 90 percent of the population and who largely clamor for independence. The United States has spoken openly of recognizing Kosovo and is pushing the Europeans to settle on a policy.
But the Europeans have painted themselves into a corner, having pushed for a deal at the United Nations Security Council that Russia has blocked.
That leaves Europe divided just as it is trying to display a strong foreign policy.
Kosovo has been administered by the United Nations since 1999, after a NATO bombing campaign to oust Serbian forces who had committed widespread atrocities against ethnic Albanians.
The wartime Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, was defeated in elections in 2000 and turned over to the war crimes tribunal in The Hague, where he died while his trial was under way. Yugoslavia continued its devolution, with Montenegro finally claiming independence from Serbia in May of 2006.
Meanwhile, Serbia has made faltering progress toward membership of both the EU and NATO. It hopes to complete formal agreements on closer ties with the EU this year.
Last year, Serbia became a member of the NATO partnership for peace program, one step short of full membership in the alliance.
Senior members of Serbia's pro-Western Democratic Party - including President Boris Tadic and Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic - have reassured Western allies that Belgrade remains committed to membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions regardless of what happens in Kosovo.
But signs of a break with the West are emerging, and officials close to Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica are advocating a closer relationship with Russia, the ally that so far has forestalled attempts in the Security Council to grant Kosovo independence.
Political analysts said that conservative newspapers and state-owned media have promoted more-favorable views of Russia and of President Vladimir Putin in particular.
At the same time, conservatives within Kostunica's circle are questioning the value of ties with NATO.
"We want cooperation but not full membership," said Dusan Prorokovic, Serbia's state secretary for Kosovo and a senior member of Kostunica's Serbian Democratic party, adding that most Serbs have never forgiven the alliance for its entry into the war and 78-day bombing campaign. "Personally, I cannot forget that."
Two senior government ministers have accused NATO of trying to make Kosovo a state for its own purposes.
In fact, public support for NATO has never been high, and skepticism of the European Union has increased as negotiations drag on, according to opinion poll professionals.
Support for EU membership fell to 53 percent in August, according to the Strategic Marketing agency.
"The debate is being steered in a direction that makes strategy toward NATO membership and the European Union very difficult," said Delevic, the assistant foreign minister responsible for relations with the EU.
European Union officials, meanwhile, insist that a compromise between ethnic Albanians and Serbs is possible.
Whatever the outcome, officials in Brussels argue that Serbia's long-term interests lie with the West.
"I don't think Serbs want to be part of the Russian Federation. They see their future in the European Union," Cristina Gallach, a spokeswoman for Javier Solana, the EU chief foreign policy representative, said in a telephone interview.
But as the decision time for Kosovo looms, regional analysts said that the nationalists who dominate Serbia's Parliament control events in the country.
"People in Brussels presume that every country in Europe is dying to get into the European Union," said James Lyon, Belgrade director of the International Crisis Group, a policy research group with offices throughout the Balkans.
But if Kosovo splits off, Lyon said in a telephone interview, Europe's leverage over Serbia will evaporate, along with its ability to promote reform.
"What do you do with a country that doesn't want EU membership?" he asked.
Relationship with Europe colored by war over province
By Nicholas Wood, New York Times News Service | September 14, 2007
BELGRADE, Serbia - Eight years after it was hit by NATO airstrikes, the former Yugoslav Defense Ministry still lies in ruins on Boulevard Knez Milosa, a reminder of what the Serbs consider unwarranted aggression by the West in the war over the Serb province of Kosovo.
Their anger is flaring up again as Western governments, particularly the United States, speak of recognizing Kosovo this year as an independent state. The governments say that in the absence of reconciliation, doing so would help stabilize the region by officially separating the Serbs from the Albanians who are the majority population of Kosovo.
Serbian politicians, even pro-Western ones, said they worry that a recognition of Kosovo would introduce a new era of Serbian isolation and hostility toward the West - leaving Europe with little sway here.
Since the war ended, in 1999, Europe has tried to integrate Serbia into NATO and the European Union. And as a regional power, Serbia expected an easy pathway into Europe, especially since many of its neighbors have joined the union.
But Europe has also demanded that Serbs make a fresh start by chasing down important war crimes suspects wanted at the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague. Serbia has complied only fitfully.
If Western countries do recognize Kosovo, then "we do not need the European Union," Velimir Ilic, Serbia's minister for infrastructure and a key political ally of the Serbian prime minister, said in an interview. "It means they are not our friends."
He added: "It is a tough choice, but Serbia has its pride and its integrity."
Ilic, who has a reputation as populist politician, is the only senior government politician to issue such a statement. But others agree that a nationalist backlash would chill relations with the West.
A widespread recognition of Kosovo "could lead to a chain of events with unforeseen consequences, including the loss of Serbia's European perspective," Leon Koen, the former head of Serbia's negotiating team on Kosovo, wrote in the daily Dnevnik.
And Serbia's senior diplomat for European integration predicted that whatever support there is among Serbs for arresting war crimes suspects and sending them to the Hague would vanish if Kosovo were recognized.
"I can't see how anybody would be ready to support cooperation" with the tribunal, said Milica Delevic, a reformist who is Serbia's assistant foreign minister responsible for relations with the European Union. "We will be in trouble."
Western governments are determined to resolve Kosovo's future to stabilize the province and calm the ethnic Albanians who make up more than 90 percent of the population and who largely clamor for independence. The United States has spoken openly of recognizing Kosovo and is pushing the Europeans to settle on a policy.
But the Europeans have painted themselves in a corner, having pushed for a deal at the Security Council that Russia has blocked. That leaves Europe divided just as it is trying to display a strong foreign policy.
Kosovo has been administered by the United Nations since 1999, after a NATO bombing campaign there to oust Serbia forces who had committed widespread atrocities against ethnic Albanians.
The wartime Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, was defeated in elections in 2000 and turned over to the war crimes tribunal in the Hague, where he died while his trial was under way. Yugoslavia continued its devolution, with Montenegro finally claiming independence from Serbia in May of last year.
Meanwhile, Serbia has made faltering progress toward membership of both the European Union and NATO.
For wrong reasons, Russia has imposed its will in the Security Council and has been granted a deferment in the decision of the United Nations. The advantage of the gained time would be essential to reframe the question of Kosovo in accordance with the necessities and sensitivities of the present time. Ahtisaari is not the solution.
(Javier Ruperez, Ambassador of Spain to the UN, ABC)
Friday, September 14, 2007
NATO took military action in Kosovo from March 23 to June 10, 1999, during 78 days that seemed interminable. It was the first time in its history the Alliance triggered a military action. It was also the first time that it did so in a geographic space other than the one originally described in the Treaty of Washington, which was limited to the territory of its member states. The undertaken combat operation was not strictly a defensive action, but it was directed against a sovereign state, member of the United Nations, and it was conducted without authorization from the Security Council.
The military action was basically airborne, registering a total of 38,000 flights, of which 10,484 were bombing raids. The targets were at first of military order and concentrated against the Yugoslav armed forces, but as the resistance grew stronger than expected, the bombings started to target civilian infrastructures, that were damaged seriously, and civil victims were euphemistically described as "collateral damages". Among them, one can remember the bombing of the seat of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, which originated a bitter diplomatic conflict.
The conduct of the conflict was not devoid of tensions within the Alliance, but a part of the Alliance decided to go through and act within difficult conditions and in spite of them, with the conviction that the actions of Slobodan Milosevic, practicing a brutal policy of ethnic cleaning against the majority population of Albanian origin, led to a human catastrophe that was necessary to avoid whatever the cost.
The operation was settled with a clear military and political success for NATO. The allied Governments knew to maintain the cohesion until the end of the process and the existing dissidences in the respective public opinion or the opposition from Russia to the intervention never reached significant level. NATO knew to wage the war and knew to do it well.
Before, during and after the conflict the spokesmen of the Alliance and of its members made an effort in stressing that the goal of the combat operations was to prevent the annihilation of a human group, support the return to the stability in the Balkans, but never to favor the independence of Kosovo.
In fact the guarantee of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia constituted the best, in fact the only argument that the allies had in front in Belgrade: the war was not made to alter its borders.
The very day NATO ended its combat operations, on June 11, 1999, the Security Council in its Resolution 1244 stated that the political solution to the crisis of Kosovo must consider, among other ends, the respect "to the sovereignty principles and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia".
The same Resolution had reaffirmed the respect of "all the States members to the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia... in the terms of the Final Act of Helsinki". In that sense the Council echoed the declaration on Kosovo a few weeks earlier, on May 6, which had been signed by the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries members of the G-8 (the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan). According to these documents, the future of Kosovo had to be found within the framework of a "substantial autonomy" of the Yugoslav Federation - which is today, after the independence of Montenegro -- reduced to Serbia.
What the UN is proposing right now, based on the proposal by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, is purely and simply the independence of Kosovo. Unless there is vigorous reaction of the international community, Kosovo will indeed become independent in a not-so-distant future. This is not what the NATO airplanes fought for. This was not the aim which the Security Council set up after the "humanitarian intervention".
In fact, the Ahtisaari report, surely without premeditation, endorses the policy against which the allied military action took place in the first place, but this time with the changing elements of the equation: before, it was a fight to save Albanians from Serbs, and today the priority is given to Albanians, even at the cost of vanishing of the few Serbs who still populate the territory. And the offered reason is none other than the establishment of a failure: it is difficult to imagine the coexistence between Serbs and Albanians. That was already known before the beginning of the war.
The fact that eight years of intensive international presence (UN, NATO, EU) in the territory have passed since only to conclude that the only solution consists of violating some of the most elementary principles of international law, enshrined in the UN Charter, is certainly discouraging.
In the history of Kosovo, no one was completely innocent. The nationalistic fervor which the Serbs felt towards the old lost battlefield was always absurd and potentially bloody, the treatment towards the Albanian population was criminal, and the attempts of the post-Milosevic Serbia were not enough to face the gravity of the problem.
The Albanians take a large part of the blame because they used their numerical advantage to lead the same policy as the Serbs - they form armed terrorist groups, they absolutely exclude all those who are different, they satanize the adversary.
The reasons why Russia - the only permanent member of the Security Council which opposed the Ahtisaari plan - took the Serbian side are also wrong: this is not about a parochial national-cultural-religious solidarity, but about the opportunity to create in the post-Yugoslav Balkans a democratic coexistence and respect for racial, religious and cultural differences. Western countries have themselves been stuck in the policy aimed at punishing the Serbs.
But an independent Kosovo not only harms the principle of international law that demands respect to the territorial integrity of the States. It grants wings, from the peak of the international community, to all the separatist irredentisms. It means the creation of a society without shades, composed exclusively of those of the same color, same language, same race or same religion. It creates inevitably a new regional instability, that will finish affecting in a serious way all the neighbors. And it constitutes clearly a gigantic one step back in all the efforts of the humanity to construct communities of citizens different and free, able to coexist pacifically in spite of their differences.
For wrong reasons, Russia has imposed its will in the Security Council and has been granted a deferment in the decision of the United Nations. The advantage of the gained time would be essential to reframe the question of Kosovo in accordance with the necessities and sensitivities of the present time. Ahtisaari is not the solution.
(translation from Spanish by the KosovoCompromise Staff)
Arguably, the future of Kosovo is now at its most important juncture since the crisis in 1999. For the past eight years almost nothing has been accomplished to resolve the Kosovo issue. By and large, the fault for this can be laid at the doors of the major Western powers. Their lack of imagination, innovation and creativity in attempting to resolve the problem has been the major impediment. Western efforts have been arbitrary and capricious, blind to the realities on the ground and offering solutions that serve their own interests rather than those of the people in Serbia and Kosovo.
At the same time, Belgrade and Pristina have mostly talked past each other in anger, when they talked at all. But, for the most part they waited for the major powers to provide answers and assumed no concrete, meaningful initiative of their own. As a result, Kosovo has joined the long list of dangerous “frozen conflicts” and if positive action—action that can be “owned” by Belgrade and Pristina—is not taken soon the Kosovo issue will become “unfrozen” through violence.
But, all of that is about to change. Since the Kosovo issue has been moved out of the United Nations and to the Contact Group, there is a genuine opportunity for Belgrade and Pristina to agree on a compromise settlement. But the window of opportunity will not be open long before violence flares again and the conflict “re-freezes”—as it certainly will if Pristina declares independence unilaterally. To take advantage of the opportunity, however, it is necessary for both Belgrade and Pristina to recognize six hard realities—some of which are unpalatable to one side or the other.
Six Realities
First, the Ahtisaari Plan is dead and, despite calls by some UN members and political commentators to resurrect parts of it, this is very unlikely to happen. Events have moved well beyond Ahtisaari’s proposal to create a series of ethnically stove-piped communities in Kosovo. At its heart, the Ahtissari plan was an attempt primarily by the United States, the UK, France and Germany to force a settlement on both Serbs and Albanians that avoided ground reality and served the interests of those countries much more than the interests of those who live in the region. The collapse of the Ahtisaari Plan means that, if there is to be any hope of a permanent settlement, the United States and its West European allies will have to include the Serbs and Albanians as true partners in meaningful negotiations.
Second, U.S. influence has diminished. Although Washington may try to restore some of its clout in the full Contact Group, the comments of the EU and Russian representatives on the troika that visited Kosovo recently have effectively undercut the American position. Several times during the Troika’s “fact finding trip”, EU representative Ischinger and Russian representative Botsan-Kharchenko said that “nothing is impossible” and that everything is “on the table.” This is a positive development. The evolving position of the EU and Russia easily could lead to a “negotiating period” longer than the additional 120 days allotted by the UN Security Council. If so, Washington might be tempted to unilaterally “recognize” an independent Kosovo. But, this would be a very risky move because it could cause serious strains with European “allies” and put the United States at odds with the widely accepted view (especially in the EU) that the construction and recognition of new states requires the approval of the United Nations. In the wake of the debacle in Iraq, Washington cannot be seen to be so dismissive of international law and procedures.
Third, officially Belgrade and Pristina remained locked in a nasty, dangerous zero-sum game that, if it is not broken, almost certainly will hasten violence. All levels of power in the Albanian community insist that independence of Kosovo—within its current boundaries—is the only course acceptable and that Pristina will not back away from this position. By the same token, Belgrade says that the only acceptable solution is for Kosovo to remain within Serbia, albeit with considerable autonomy. Indeed, the new Serbian Constitution stipulates that Kosovo is a Serbian province. At the same time, there is a glimmer of hope in Belgrade because some officials have begun to suggest that perhaps they might be willing to back away from this hard line.
Fourth, multi-ethnicity is dead in Kosovo. By and large, survey research as well as anecdotal information indicates that most Serbs and Albanians do not want to live together in the same society or to be governed by a government controlled by the other ethnic group. At times multi-ethnic states have “worked” in Europe and at times they have not. But the general trend—despite some notable exceptions—over the past century has been for states in Europe to be controlled by a single ethnic or cultural group. The point was well demonstrated after World War I with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian, German and Ottoman Empires, and since the end of the Cold War by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. It would be ideal perhaps if ethnicity were not a determining factor in the construction of political communities in the Balkans today. But, it is a reality despite the wishful thinking of well-meaning but naive Western policy makers.
Fifth, a surge of new violence in and around Kosovo likely will lead to renewed outside military intervention. The major powers of Western Europe and the U.S. almost certainly will not allow the Western Balkans to spin out of control again. Although this will not lead to a “permanent NATO” base in Kosovo as some in Serbia have argued, it almost certainly will lead to a stronger Western military presence in the province that could last for several years. Although the Europeans likely would shoulder the bulk of any new military undertaking, it is also possible that there would be some limited number of additional U.S. forces deployed to Camp Bondsteel. The introduction of more troops to Kosovo would be designed primarily to separate warring Serbs and Albanians, but it also likely would set back efforts to find a permanent political and security solution.
If these six realities are deemed accurate and accepted by the political leadership in Serbia and Kosovo, and it is possible for them to bargain in good faith and come to agreement on four basic points they could—in time—construct a permanent settlement on the future of Kosovo.
First, both sides need to accept the fact that a negotiated partition, with attendant border adjustments, can provide the basis for an equitable—not perfect—division of territory. Although partition has been discussed throughout Serbia by officials and scholars, it has not been sanctioned officially in Belgrade. The Albanian side adamantly has rejected any consideration of partition, but Pristina needs to reconsider this position or risk violence and the unilateral declaration of independence by Serbs north of the Ibar River.
Logically, partition—and a new border—would be established along the Ibar River, with the northern part remaining with Serbia and the southern part becoming an independent Albanian state. This is no one’s first choice, but it can work if Belgrade and Pristina accept the rationale of ethnic territoriality and the right of the other side to territorial sovereignty. There is not now and there never has been anything sacred about borders—especially in Europe (as well as the United States). Borders have changed in Europe for 2000 years for a variety of reasons and the spate of border changes throughout Central Europe and the former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War demonstrates that the configuration of states can change peacefully—if there is the political will to do so.
Second, partition and border changes alone will not be enough. Certainly, it will be necessary to get past a period of painful adjustment, including some violence by “rejectionists” on both sides. Moreover, there are many Serb holy and historic sites and Serbs south of the Ibar and some Albanians north of the river. As part of any negotiated settlement that accepts partition, the United States, Russia and the EU, perhaps through the UN, need to guarantee the safety of the sites, Serb access to them and the minority populations in both ethnic communities that chose to remain on the “wrong side” of the border—to include sanctions against the governments that do not protect their minorities from harm or discrimination. For those Serbs and Albanians who cannot remain where they are now and chose to leave, the UN needs to establish a substantial fund to relocate them to other political communities.
Third, an innovative settlement needs to go even further to consider a broader realignment in the Western Balkans. Specifically, the most likely candidate is the Republika Srpska. There is little doubt that most the leaders and citizens of the RS do not want to be part of Bosnia and, if they had their way, they would have left Bosnia many years ago, either to become independent or part of Serbia. There also is little doubt that Bosnia is a “forced” state—one that was arbitrarily willed into existence by the United States and the major powers of Western Europe and has “failed” to live up to its patrons’ hopes and expectations.
Consequently, Banja Luka and Belgrade should have the right to discuss whether the RS and Serbia should be linked and under what circumstances, so long as those circumstances are validated in a democratic vote by the people of the RS. Although this same logic could be applied to the relationship of the Presevo Valley with an independent Kosovo, it cannot be stretched to apply to western Macedonia, where the Ohrid Agreement, has—at least for now—“settled” the ethnic issue, or to Sandjak or Vojvodina, where there is no major agitation for independence from Serbia.
Finally, once the political and security underpinnings of an agreement have been reached, negotiations should begin immediately between Belgrade and Pristina on economic cooperation. Despite some encouraging economic news in Serbia, most important indicators in Kosovo and Serbia proper are not good, especially with respect to unemployment, per capita income, foreign debt and trade. Consequently, irrespective of whether a political and security settlement can be reached, a poor regional economy almost certainly would sow the seeds of new instability in Kosovo, Serbia and beyond.
The key to economic growth and prosperity is multilayered. First, it would be necessary for Belgrade and Pristina to identify specific areas that need serious attention and genuine potential and agree on a bipartisan plan of development (for example, hydroelectric power in Kosovo, the Trepca mines along the border between Serbia and Kosovo, and agricultural programs in southern Serbia and Kosovo). Once Belgrade and Pristina have identified likely areas of economic cooperation, then—and only then—it would be possible to approach the EU for technical and financial support. Although the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe (established in 1999) has been a relatively weak instrument thus far, it is possible that Working Table 2 on economic development could provide a useful vehicle to establish productive programs between Serbia and Kosovo.
Steven E. Meyer is professor of National Security Studies in the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at the National Defense University in Washington, DC. The views expressed here are those of the author alone.
The Kosovo issue is far from resolved, and acceptance and imposition of the Settlement Plan by the Security Council could lead to renewed violence and instability, and have repercussions far beyond the Western Balkans.
ANALYSIS: Kosovo, NATO and Montenegro strain Serbian coalition
Belgrade - The Serbian government coalition, forged three months ago under huge pressure from the West, already seems worn out over key issues and has been sending contradictory, confusing signals ahead of crucial decisions on the country's future status. The uneasy alliance of President Boris Tadic's Democratic Party (DS) and Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) was produced to avert the rise of ultra-nationalists to power or repeat elections and reset the country's course towards NATO and the European Union.
But Kostunica, a nationalist himself, has become an increasingly loud Russophile, while the pro-Western Tadic appears helplessly carried away in a bid to remain moderate amid resurging nationalist rhetoric, reminiscent of the 1990s.
Despite winning far more votes in January's polls than the DSS, Tadic and the DS have been weakened by the Kosovo rhetoric, a nationalist trademark, to the point of being blackmailed into conceding the post of prime minister to Kostunica in May.
It has become worse for the DS since. Most recently, in a dangerous populist turn, the DSS has started pushing for Serbia's turn away from the West and even hinted at a possible violent response from Belgrade in case Kosovo declares independence.
Kosovo, where Serbia has had no say in government since NATO ousted it in 1999 to stop bloodshed, has been the sacred source of rhetoric for Serbian nationalists.
But the breakaway province is vastly dominated by majority Albanians who impatiently expect independence this year - which would force Serbian politicians to do something, one way or another.
After eight years of life in a diplomatic and economic limbo, the Albanians expect the West, particularly the United States, to promote what is still nominally Serbia's province into a sovereign state.
That outcome would degrade any pro-Western leader into a traitor, again in a manoeuvre commonly practised during the Slobodan Milosevic era.
Kosovo independence appeared to be on the verge of happening already in mid-2007, but Serbia's awakened ally Russia blocked the process in the United Nations and delayed the decision on Kosovo at least until mid-December by forcing three more months of talks.
Serbs and Albanians will certainly not find a mutually acceptable solution - which everybody hopes for, but nobody expects - as the Serbs are adamantly insisting on sovereignty over Kosovo and the Albanians want nothing less than independence.
Meanwhile, Kostunica has been gushing love for Moscow, offering the national economy to Russian investors, while launching an anti- NATO campaign, accusing the alliance of aiming to build a "NATO state" in Kosovo.
In another populist move, his DSS launched an initiative to block Serbia's approach to NATO.
The hostility peaked when the state secretary for Kosovo and DSS cadre, Dusan Prorokovic, hinted that Serbia could deploy its armed forces to the UN-run and NATO-protected territory to prevent independence.
That time Washington reacted, saying Thursday that it would "seek clarification" of the "inflammatory and unfortunate" remark.
While Kostunica remained silent, Defence Minister Dragan Sutanovac, the most hawkish advocate of Belgrade's western course among the DS leaders, verbally slapped Prorokovic for "waving an empty gun" and warned him to "keep his nose in his own ministry."
While a reaction to the possible declaration of Kosovo's independence has not been defined, "there will be no unilateral military response to it," Sutanovac told Friday's edition of the daily Blic.
He also assured that Serbia's course toward NATO was not in question, but the damage may have already been inflicted and the tear in the ruling coalition widened.
It was the same disjointed message with Serbia's former sister republic Montenegro, which formally sought an apology Thursday after one of Kostunica's advisors, Aleksandar Simic, denigrated it.
Criticizing Montenegro's refusal to allow entry to a Serbian Orthodox priest suspected of aiding war crime suspects, Simic said Montenegro was a "quasi-state."
Rubbing salt into the wound, a Serbian cabinet minister failed to show up for a scheduled meeting with a Montenegrin host, offering no explanation other than he was backing the priest.
Montenegro became independent last year, enraging Serbian nationalists, including Kostunica.
Reflecting his bitterness, Belgrade has still not sent an ambassador to Podgorica, though Tadic and the DS tried very hard to remain friendly with it.
Podgorica reacted to the insults with a protest note, handed by its own ambassador to Belgrade, but the only apology, informal so far, came from a DS official.
"Serbia recognizes and respects Montenegro as a state and is building good neighbourly relations,' Vice Premier Bozidar Djelic said in an interview. "I apologize to Montenegrins."
Time will show whether the DS will manage to save the potatoes of Kosovo, NATO, Montenegro and other issues thrown into the fire by DSS populists.
Presidential and local elections, due this year, will show if Serbs will reward or punish the effort to appease.
Many times over the past eight years have I been asked about the actual number of people killed in Kosovo during the NATO campaign of helping the terrorist KLA's separatist agenda. Back in 1999, U.S. officials bandied about numbers exceeding 100,000 and when pressed to provide evidence gleefully repeated rumors of Serb crematoria and corpse-choked mines.
After NATO occupation forces entered the province in June, however, the alleged genocide proved ephemeral. Just over 2,000 bodies were found, belonging to Albanians as well as Serbs, Roma, and others who lived in Kosovo, killed by NATO bombs, KLA terrorism, and yes, Yugoslav police and military. The total number of bodies found was 2,788, including both Serbs and Albanians (several mass graves were in fact those of Serbs massacred by the KLA). The International Red Cross is listing another 2,047 persons as still missing, "including approximately 500 Serbs, 1,300 Albanians and 200 members of other ethnic groups."
This is a far cry from "an estimated 10,000 people, mostly ethnic Albanians," which is used in every report about the occupied province, including and especially those dealing with the constant KLA terror against the remaining Serbs and other non-Albanians. The repetition is meant to provide a justification for NATO intervention, but it also tends to bolster the bogus case for independence claimed by the Albanian separatists. Little wonder, then, that all the mainstream media keep repeating the 10,000 mantra.
Last week, however, a U.S.-based intelligence publication Defense & Foreign Affairs,analyzed the Kosovo death toll fraud, and showed conclusively that the figure of 10,000 Albanians has been a fabrication all along.
Every man, woman and child the U.S. forces kill in Iraq is transformed into an "insurgent" by the magic of propaganda. That same propaganda turned every KLA terrorist the Yugoslav forces killed - in battles raging for a year before NATO bombers took the KLA side - into an innocent civilian, then multiplied that number by three, five, ten, a hundred. The same thing was done in Bosnia.
In both cases, numbers are meant to override reality. Iraqi body counts are supposed to provide a metric of "progress", covering up the reality of failure. In Bosnia, and later in Kosovo, numbers were meant to provoke outrage, anger and shock, blocking out rational thought and providing cover for aggression, occupation, and support of unsavory client regimes. The greater the deception, the bigger lie it required. Under the umbrella of those lies, the "democratic" authorities in Croatia accomplished what their Nazi predecessors could not, ethnically cleansing most Serbs; Alija Izetbegovic achieved his dream of forcing the Muslims of Bosnia back into Islam, this time of the Saudi variety; and the Albanians of Kosovo have at least temporarily restored the "Greater Albania"of WW2, and set upon eradicating every trace of Serb presence in the land.
Trouble is, what would have been possible a century or half a century ago - because who could find out the truth, safely locked away in classified archives? - is not so possible now. The lies are getting exposed after a few short years. Sure, a lot of the damage has already been done, and not all of it can be reversed. But the time between the lie and its exposure has shortened exponentially. And once exposed, it is just a matter of time and willpower before the edifice built on the lies is torn down. And maybe next time - for, given the human worship of violence, there will be a next time - lies won't be so easily believed in the first place.
Chris Deliso’s book The Coming Balkan Caliphate describes the ordeal of former OSCE official and Kosovo whistle-blower Tom Gambill as he tried to sound the warning about terror groups operating in the Balkans. In the process, Deliso sheds light on the difference between the type of soldier my erstwhile KFOR source is and the types of military hacks who muzzled him are:
[Gambill] knew from police reports and photos that the group [Revival of Islamic Heritage Society] was active in the central Kosovo village of Malisevo and was presumed to be dangerous. The security officer made a point of bringing it up at security meetings and in written correspondence with the U.S. Department of State throughout 2003. However, he ran up against a brick wall. “I had this info [about the charities] all the way back in 2001,” says Gambill. “But the State Department didn’t want to hear about it.” He recalls:
“I brought it up at every meeting I went to that included [the U.S.] military, but nada. Many of the American KFOR guys were there for their six months — you know, get the ribbon, do a few good deeds, and go home. And those who confided in me didn’t want to rock the boat with their superiors…the thinking was, ‘hey, we’re here for only six months — let’s get the job done as assigned and get home.’
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Cases such as that of the RIHS attracted attention, says Gambill, from a handful of “motivated” American security officials….However, he says, “they were held back in some cases by orders from those higher up in the pecking order. This was much to the disappointment of the lower echelons — lieutenants, captains, some majors…the same thing with the CivPol [UN Police].” When Gambill presented photographic evidence of the RIHS presence in Kosovo, and waved the UN decree outlawing the group, the FBI representative at the time was “somewhat peeved.” Later, he claims, “I was verbally attacked via e-mail by an American major…He said that I was not qualified to make comments, and that neither my information nor comments were accurate…After forwarding his comments to my point of contact on the American base, he (another major) was taken back at this kind of behavior.”
… Yet most who dismissed Gambill’s concerns, he contends, only claimed to be experts — though they visited Kosovo once or twice a year:
“The ones who did not believe my reports were many internationals who argued that these things [Wahhabi penetration, etc.] didn’t occur in Bosnia, and that therefore the Islamic fundamentalists were not a threat. They claimed that there were no organized efforts on the part of the Islamic fundamentalists and that the [Albanian] rebel groups causing trouble were not a significant concern. That line came from many of the U.S. military commanders who came through the region once every six months. There was no continuity in the passing of intelligence from one unit to another — ever.”
These realities have been only too evident throughout the Bosnian and Kosovo peacekeeping missions, where arrogant, careerist diplomats and military men claim to know the situation on the ground better than do those working there. Yet these were the people shaping policy — by listening to the underlings who said what they wanted to hear and ignoring those who, like Gambill, had a less flattering story to tell about the aftereffects of the Western intervention.
Quietly, however, some of the whistle-blower’s colleagues were thanking him for his contributions: “In several meetings of the combined group (U.S. military, UN, and CivPol), just as many commended me for the information that I brought to the table,” he recalls. “I was told that my sources and reports were 90 percent accurate and were appreciated. In one case, a commander came to me after a meeting and commended me on my participation in all his meetings and gave me a unit coin for my contributions. It was done quietly, of course.”
…
The chronic changeover of civil and military staff meant that whereas the locals had learned early on how to understand and manipulate the internationals, the latter were always starting from square one… “The UN didn’t really understand what was going on — and they didn’t want to know,” he charges, citing cases such as higher-ups’ apparent disinterest in investigating six Albanian-American radicals with stated foreknowledge of the 9/11 attacks. “There was no continuity of mission, or pass-on intel.” The endless stream of fresh-faced, ignorant personnel posed no threat to Kosovo’s powerful criminals and extremists. Peacekeeping in Kosovo became a thankless and truly Sisyphysian labor.
But it actually gets more sinister than a Sisyphysian labor, as Deliso continues:
One American special police investigator recalls how, in early 2006, several wanted men — North African Islamists — with passports from a Western European country were sheltered in a Kosovo apartment belonging to local Islamic fundamentalists. “A police buddy and I staked out this building, and interviewed some people,” he said. “We had photos and good information that showed these guys should be dealt with. You think anyone [in UNMIK] cared? No chance. Why do you think I’m leaving?”
Further, the officer charged that the Kosovo Albanian government leaders — the same ones that, according to Jane’s [Intelligence Review], are supplying the United States with “intelligence” on Islamic extremists in the province — have blocked investigations and staffed the civil administration with the often underqualified friends and relatives of known Islamists. “The Kosovo Department of Justice won’t act on [counterterrorist information], because the people inside the institution are from the ‘other side.’ It’s very frustrating — and a very dangerous thing for the future.” Michael Harrison [UNMIK Field Coordinator for Protection of Minorities] refers to another case later in 2006, in which an undercover investigator from a Central European country posed as a mafia figure interested in buying rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) from an Albanian Islamist. “No one cared. No one [in UNMIK] gives a shit. We have terrorists here, and the Wahhabis coming in from everywhere. Instead of doing something about it, you have the Germans donating 30 tons of weapons for Kosovo’s future army, the TMK, now in storage.” Tom Gambill added in the fall of 2006 that a NATO internal map from 2003 listing some 17 illegal paramilitary and terrorist training camps was “still currently valid, to the best of my knowledge.”
There are jihadists even among the multinational peacekeeping force in Kosovo, who are there to keep an eye on the internationals more than on the locals, as witnessable from the April 2004 incident (just a month after the orchestrated riots and attacks on churches in Kosovo) in which a Jordanian CivPol officer opened fire on American ones, killing two female American peacekeepers and leaving 10 others injured — a story that disappeared from the news almost sooner than it appeared. I recently heard from a KFOR criminal intel analyst who helped load the women’s bodies onto helicopters. Apparently, the State Department suppressed information that the Jordanian peacekeeper had Hamas and Hezbollah literature in his dorm; as well, the source reports that “after this incident, there were other weird things that happened — mostly threats/waving of guns at American CIVPOL by foreign CIVPOL.” He too paints a grim picture of our “progress” in the region:
March ‘04 riots, Wahhabis and Salafis, Nationalists, Islamist[s], training grounds for paramilitary stuff, it goes on…KLA begat Kosovo Police Service and PDK [Democratic Party of Kosovo]…These two REMF’s (OK, intrepid journalists!) are completely unaware. [He is referring to the Fellenzer-Staggs duo; REMFs stands for “Rear Echelon Mother F–kers” — those who do not venture outside the wire — known in Iraq as FOBBITs.]…The place is a snake pit…Anyway, glad to see that someone is on it. The whole existential threat thing just isn’t catching on here in the US.
The first one, Xhabir Zharku, is a former “soldier” and current politician in the smuggling town of Kacanik near Macedonia, where his radio station is influential. Deliso describes the implications of the non-border between Kosovo and Macedonia (and Albania):
The danger of Kosovo becoming a terrorist transfer zone has been increased since the internationals handed over border control duties to the local Albanian authorities. What this means, in essence, is that there is no longer a border with Albania itself. While border policing was hardly stellar during the period of UNMIK’s direct control, it has now effectively vanished. For the United Nations, relinquishing control of Kosovo’s borders is just another of the scheduled “transfer of competencies” from international to local rule. In Macedonia, too, where an experiment in ethnic coexistence has left the western third of the country largely in the hands of former NLA [National Liberation Army, Macedonia] leader Ali Ahmeti’s men, there is no appreciable border with Albania either. According to one Macedonian military intelligence officer, even though small militant groups are “smuggling heavy weapons in every day from Albania,” there is no will to stop the trade, “because all the local police are Albanian, they are in it together, and they don’t talk [to outsiders].” The officer feared that the well armed groups could act to destabilize the country in the case of any failure to make Kosovo independent — indicating the complex trap the West has made of the region through its interventions.
Which brings us to last week’s news reflecting precisely this reality:
If the international community fails to recognize the right of the Albanian people for self-definition, and the status is defined on the basis of compromises, we would naturally resume the fight…Every other decision different from [independence] would lead to violence for which both the politicians and the international community would be guilty.
Serblog’s Melana Pejakovich paraphrases: “If we have to make any compromises, there will be a war and it will be the international community’s fault…Give us exactly what we want or we will start killing people, and YOU will have made us do it!”
Pejakovich further breaks down the Klinaku interview thus:
1. Albanians consider wherever they live (or have ever lived) to automatically be “Albania” and the non-Albanian governments of wherever they live — including the governments of the sovereign countries of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Greece — to simply be “Occupiers”. If Albanians live in a place in significant numbers, they consider it to be “theirs”, independent of any international borders — and they consider the non-Albanian governments of those countries to be “the enemy”…
2. If Kosovo is granted independence, then that automatically justifies “the right of self-determination” (and secession) for Albanians in Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Greece.
In other words, “Kosovo Independence” is just the beginning of a series of conquests in the “Greater Albania Project” and to grant Kosovo independence, is to encourage the conquest of the rest…So much for the delusion that granting Kosovo independence will “bring peace and stability to the Balkans”…
3. According to Klinaku, Albanians believe that they fought “a war of liberation” for Kosovo and part of Macedonia, and they won, so there is no need for them to compromise with Serbs or anyone else. Albanians were “the victors” so there is no need to consult anyone else re their “self-determination” or to “discuss anything in Vienna”. The 1999 NATO Bombing of Yugoslavia appears to be perceived as irrelevant to Albanians, because Albanians did it all.
Here we are faced with the consequences of letting Albanians believe they can have it all — and for the most part delivering it to them — sans legality or any kind of established norms of statecraft, while holding them to none of the agreements governing the region. In fact, just yesterday we saw what happens when you do something uncharacteristic and crazy, such as say the words “UN Resolution” to Albanians:
[Commentary by Express Chief Editor Berat Buzhala: “This Is Provocation, Mr. Ruecker“]
At a time when an entire nation is desperately waiting to hear what will happen to the final status of Kosova [sic], the Kosova [sic] chief administrator [Joachim Ruecker] returned from holidays and provoked us openly by saying that no one should be hasty by setting dates for declaration of independence because the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 is still valid.
… We have waited beyond every limit. Besides, I can say that we are about to burst into tears and it is regrettable that we are being provoked, because we might now easily fall prey to this provocation. I recall a press statement made by the Israeli defence minister on the very first day when this country began the war against Hezbollah troops operating in Lebanese territory. He has said, “If someone meant to provoke us by kidnapping two of our soldiers, then they have managed to do so.”
That’s right. To Albanians, rule of law is provocation. On par with kidnapping.
…Leaving all these things aside, tell me, Mr. Ruecker: What happened inside you that made you issue such a surprising threat? Will this mean that in the days to come you will say that, based on that resolution, Kosova territory is part of Serbia’s sovereignty? Or perhaps, reading carefully the text of the resolution, will you mention the possibility of the return of a limited number of Serb forces based on a request made by Belgrade?
Do you believe that that resolution, which you mention so improperly, will be implemented one day? Perhaps it may be, but only through a new war that would be bloodier and less controllable and have more consequences for the region. Mr. Ruecker, we have become used to living in freedom [impunity] — something for which you, your country, and all Western countries deserve credit — therefore, it will be a very big problem to convince us to go [back].
Where have we seen this before? Oh yes — in Bosnia, as Balkans analyst Neboojsa Malic aptly illustrated when writing about the departure of UN High Representative Paddy Ashdown in 2005 (emphasis added):
So used were they to Ashdown’s support, Izetbegovic’s heirs found it shocking when last month the viceroy quashed their plan to rename the Sarajevo international airport after the departed First Bosniak [wartime Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic]. Leaders of Izetbegovic’s SDA party howled in protest and denounced Ashdown, forgetting instantly his support for their agenda, or that his decision didn’t say “no,” so much as “not yet.” Ashdown thus found himself sharing the fate of every foreign official who came to Bosnia sympathetic to the Muslim cause, only to end up an object of invective as soon as he deviated even slightly from the SDA dogma of Muslim innocence and victimhood.
And now for the Kosovo punch line of the week. Because it comes from the kings of secession and border-redrawing, the Albanians: “We can never approve of partition [of Kosovo]. It is unacceptable. If we start redrawing borders, who knows when and where it will stop.” — Kosovo “Prime Minister” Agim Ceku
Summing up the Kosovo Effect is Deliso:
Indeed, longtime UNMIK employees in Kosovo who have watched the process disintegrate over the years express disbelief at how the Western Media and politicians can get away with calling the intervention a success. As has been recounted, the direct link between Kosovo Albanians and terrorist plots, up to and including the London July 2005 attacks, has materialized in the form of arrests…
For the American special police investigator in Kosovo, a formidable ex-military man with long experience in the Balkans, the sluggish response of Western security services in the Balkans to the terrorist threat is vexing. “I saw some of the same shit in Bosnia, not going after the terrorists, letting ‘em hang out and stay comfortable,” he says. “But seeing this stuff here in Kosovo — it really ripped me out of the old red-white-and-blue, you know what I mean?
The picture gets more disturbing still, especially when one realizes that Kosovo’s future is a window into our own. Deliso:
The small semblance of order remaining in Kosovo owes to the fact that the UN has allowed former KLA leaders and the mafia to control society…Today, this chaotic situation has moved from the unfortunate to the scandalous, with the CIA, MI6, BND, and others eager to build “special relationships” with Islamic extremists bent on killing Christians, attacking Western targets, and creating a fundamentalist caliphate.
Western officials currying favor with extremists, perhaps in subconscious preparation for a future with Muslims as our masters, is by now a familiar phenomenon even on our shores. When it interferes with terror investigations, I call it the Kosovizing of police work in America, and it’s something that first hit home for me when Debbie Schlussel wrote about lasers being pointed from Dearborn, Michigan at commercial airline pilots in flight, and the reluctance of our authorities to do much about it. She specifically cites the terrorist-friendly Brian Moskowitz, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Special Agent in Charge for Michigan and Ohio:
[W]e’ve heard from several of Abu Moskowitz’s agents, who tell us they’ve brought to his and his top lieutenants’ attention Arab Muslim smuggling rings and restaurants in the same Dearborn and Dearborn Heights areas (from which the laser pointers emanated), which routinely employ illegal alien Muslims and launder funds from their all-cash businesses, sending the money “back home.” Mr. Moskowitz and his top underlings have repeatedly said they are “not interested” in pursuing those cases.
…
[B]oth Moskowitz and Murphy were in fawning attendance at the Hezbollah mosque, where they gushed over an Islamic cleric who openly praised terrorists, and they joked with him about why Hezbollah is on the State Department terrorist list…
We also note that Murphy, the chief U.S. Justice Department official in the heart of Islamic America, sought a very light sentence for Nemr Ali Rahal, a member of the mosque who is a member of Hezbollah and committed fraud and money laundering to send the money “back home”. Explosive material was found on the man’s and his young son’s passports. Where was Abu Moskowitz’s investigation into where the money was going (which is under his purview at ICE)? Where was Murphy’s press conference on that? (No charges on the explosives or even money laundering were ever filed — and won’t be.)…[Y]ou have a giant, radicalized, concentrated Muslim population located in one single armpit of America, and yet authorities not only kowtow to it, but put investigations into that community off limits to law enforcement…
I am just trying to help people get usually under-reported news and sources so that they can go for a news coverage comparison. But I would never suggest what "the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth" is. I do believe the average people is capable of drawing his or her own conclusions. I hope I'm helping them create their own criteria for judging who is who or what really happened.
