spectator.org

Back to the Future: U.S. Negotiates With War Advocates and Criminals of Old

But at least the Trump Administration is not treating Serbia in the ugly way its predecessors (and NATO) went out of their way to do.

Doug Bandow

21-26 minutes

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The last couple of weeks brought momentous news from the Balkans. The Serb politician who began his career as chief propagandist to Yugoslavia's authoritarian leader throughout the Balkan wars enjoyed a big election victory. The Kosovo politician who served as one of the top insurgent commanders who helped win that nation's independence was indicted for war crimes. The Trump administration's effort to bring them together to resolve their nations' differences collapsed.

At the president's behest, his jack-of-all-trades aide Richard Grenell had hoped to clinch a stunning peace deal by inviting Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic and Kosovar President Hashim Thaci to meet at the White House last Saturday. But Grenell was embarrassed and frustrated. In contrast, the Europeans could barely suppress their glee after Grenell left them on the sidelines.

Indeed, for years successive Serbian governments found a dramatic way to ensure that memories of the West's perfidy when Serbia was attacked by NATO would not disappear.

Kosovo is one of many international issues dominated by ethnically-based interest groups. In 1998 and 1999 Albanian-Americans organized to push Washington to support the burgeoning insurgency in Kosovo, an autonomous territory within Serbia. The U.S. had no reason to get involved, since the bloody consequences were limited though tragic and had no meaningful security consequences for America.

Even the moral equities were complex. Kosovo's history recorded abuse by both ethnic groups, since Albanians predominated locally and Serbs nationally. In the late 1990s the Yugoslav military was playing rough, but insurgencies rarely are pleasant affairs. The Kosovo Liberation Army killed ethnic Serbs and Albanians with equal enthusiasm, especially the latter when accused of collaboration. U.S. envoy Robert Gelbard observed that the KLA was "without any questions, a terrorist group."

However, the lack of security relevance made the Balkans of interest to the Clinton administration, going back to the initial violent breakup of Yugoslavia, which was far more complicated than the morality play often assumed, with brutality, murder, and mayhem all around. It seemed the less strategically important, the greater the administration's desire to act. Led by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who had expressed her belief that there was no reason for America to possess such a "superb military" unless it was used, and used promiscuously, Washington's determined social engineers decamped for the French town of Rambouillet. There they tried to force the fast-diminishing country of Yugoslavia, which already had lost Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia, to accept NATO administration of Kosovo and effective occupation of the rest of the country, with freedom of movement and from prosecution guaranteed for allied personnel. When Belgrade refused, off to war went the Clintonistas.

The first consequence was to trigger a Serb plan to drive hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians from their homes. It was a terrible crime, yet it was actually a response to NATO's unprovoked attack on Yugoslavia. Belgrade badly miscalculated: other atrocity stories generated by the KLA and circulated by NATO were quickly disproved. But the mass ethnic cleansing retrospectively seemed to justify the very intervention that sparked the crime.

Even then the Clinton administration was unwilling to risk public displeasure by introducing ground troops, so it just bombed and bombed and bombed — for 78 days — until Belgrade finally agreed to the occupation of Kosovo, though not the rest of the country. American commander Wesley Clarke was barely prevented from starting World War III by his British deputy, who refused to block Russian forces racing to Kosovo to secure a place in the occupation.

Events only went downhill from there. Ethnic Albanians kicked out a quarter of a million ethnic Serbs, Roma, and other ethnic and religious minorities. The Kosovo government gained a reputation for corruption, criminality, and violence. The U.S. and Europe promoted faux negotiations, with the outcome preset as Kosovo's independence. Pristina eventually dropped all pretense and claimed nationhood, but Serbia, Russia, several members of the European Union, and others refused to recognize the new state, which remains barred from both the United Nations and EU.

Kosovo's politics has been dominated by former leaders of the KLA. Hashim Thaci, whose KLA nom de guerre was "the Snake," became the first prime minister of the new nation in 2008. As coalitions changed he later held positions as foreign minister and deputy premier. In 2016 he was elected Kosovo's president. Many KLA fighters, including Thaci, were accused of criminal behavior during the war. Nevertheless, the U.S. and Europe, though not Serbia, largely ignored the charges, working with those who dominated Pristina's politics.

Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who oversaw the campaign against the KLA, was subsequently defeated for reelection and then extradited to the Hague for trial for crimes against humanity (he died of a heart attack during the proceedings). Serbian politics remained on the nationalist side, as successive governments rejected Kosovo's independence and remained close to Russia. Nevertheless, hope for economic gain and eventual entry into the European Union led to intermittent negotiations and occasional agreements as well as unsurprising spats with Kosovo.

The dominant political figure in Serbia today is the surprising Vucic. He served as Minister of Information under Milosevic, went into opposition as a hardline nationalist after the latter's ouster, but in 2008 shifted parties and ideologies, becoming a moderate, populist conservative, pro-EU and economic reform. He entered government in 2012 as minister of defense and deputy prime minister. Two years later he was premier. In 2017 he was elected president.

He has come under sharp criticism for trending close to the authoritarian line, especially with press restrictions. He has remained close to Moscow and recently embraced China for its coronavirus aid. Yet he proclaimed his commitment to the EU and is widely viewed as an opportunist willing to make any deal that he believes to be politically advantageous.

While Thaci and Vucic came to dominate their respective countries, the EU devoted much time and effort to browbeating Serbia to accept the loss of what was viewed as the cradle of Serbian history. However, EU bureaucrats who thought everything could be compromised for money underestimated the power of nationalist passion and cultural identification. Although no Serb could seriously imagine a return of Kosovo to Serbian rule, resistance to abandoning the claim, as well as the thousands of ethnic Serbs who remained in Kosovo but desired to stay with Serbia, remained strong. Vucic insisted that "In reply to a possible offer to recognize Kosovo and that Kosovo enters the UN, and we receive nothing in return, except EU membership, our answer would be 'no'."

Enter Richard Grenell, the just retired ambassador to Germany. Although an atypical and controversial diplomat, President Donald Trump made him special envoy to the Balkans last fall. Grenell cheerfully jumped into Pristina's unique political snakepit, in April orchestrating the downfall of the prime minister, who refused to end Kosovar trade sanctions against Belgrade. The deposed Albin Kurti called the maneuver "a parliamentary coup d'état" and claimed that "It is the first time now that we have an American envoy, he has the same identical stance with Serbia."

The Europeans naturally were livid at Grenell's involvement, even though they had had no meaningful success in resolving the impasse. The typical Brussels Eurocrat is happy to negotiate everything and compromise anything, but not when Serbia was concerned. EU diplomats hosted meetings and encouraged talks, but proved powerless to get Serbs to abandon an emotional if hopeless claim to historic territory.

Yet all was not lost. Thaci and Vucic began talking about possible territorial swaps. Residents of the largely Serb enclave of Mitrovica in Kosovo's north desired to remain in Serbia. Those living in the largely Albanian Presevo Valley in Serbia's south would prefer to be in Kosovo. A trade, euphemistically called "border correction," could satisfy both sides. The State Department shifted position to endorse the idea in 2018.

However, the idea horrified the European establishment, which decried opening up border changes. Eurocrats who run the EU are the ultimate social engineers and complained since they favor federal, multi-ethnic states, irrespective of residents' wishes. Paddy Ashdown, who played dictatorial colonial governor in Bosnia after the 1995 Dayton Accord forced the warring parties to stay together, asserted: "Sustainable peace can only come when we learn to live in multi-ethnic communities, rather than re-drawing borders to create mono-ethnic ones." That's beautiful in theory but long experience demonstrates that it is foolish — and sometimes deadly — to allow the perfect to be the enemy of the good.

Also frantic were leaders of nations facing their own separatist movements, such as Spain (think Basques and Catalans). Nevertheless, the American and European governments had opened up the boundary issue when they dismembered Serbia, which required multiple and monumental territorial shifts. Allowing everyone but Serbian ethnic minorities to change their governments reflected obvious bias.

Kurti accused Grenell of favoring the move. The latter claimed not to have talked about the issue, which seemed unlikely if he was serious about forging a compromise. To advance an agreement he had scheduled a meeting at the White House between Thaci and Vucic for Saturday June 27. Grenell said only economic issues would be on the agenda, to build trust. Of course, side discussions could easily occur even if the topic was not formally on the agenda. Moreover, he said broader peace talks were planned for later in the year. To be successful any negotiations would have to reach the fundamental issues of identity and nationhood.

Buoyed by his big election victory a couple weeks ago, Vucic could withstand any popular antagonism toward trading away the Serbian claim to Kosovo. Especially if he gained the return of Mitrovica, which would be an obvious nationalist achievement.

Thaci also looked like someone who could deliver. He was one of the people without whom Kosovo would not be independent. He enjoyed popular support and combat credibility which could deflect complaints for compromising with Serbia. Having gotten his hands dirty in the past he probably could help muscle any agreement through parliament.

But a funny thing happened on the way to the White House show. Last week Thaci and nine other Kosovars were indicted by a special prosecutor in the Hague for war crimes and crimes against humanity. He was charged with involvement in upwards of 100 murders. (So was a former parliamentary speaker.) Despite Thaci's vociferous denials, his responsibility would surprise no one. After the announcement he headed back to Kosovo. The new prime minister, Avdullah Hoti, was expected to act as substitute, but he would have been at sea in the negotiations and without the political clout necessary to defend the result. He also decided against attending.

So Grenell canceled the gathering. He hasn't given up. And he has a potentially powerful selling point: if Trump loses, the Biden administration is likely to start afresh. Moreover, the usual foreign service officers who would reemerge in a Biden administration would be more likely to defer to the EU, as in the past. In which case chances of a deal would diminish.

However, the way forward is unclear. Kosovar politics could become chaotic. Thaci is likely to be preoccupied and reluctant to take a potentially controversial position when he needs solid support at home. If he is extradited, Kosovars might focus their ire on outside actors, including Serbia and the EU, and be less willing to consider compromise.

The path for Vucic would seem to be clearer, with the recent renewal of his popular mandate. However, the magnitude of his victory — his party won three-quarters of the seats in parliament — reflects an opposition boycott to protest his anti-democratic practices. Moreover, it might not be as easy for him to sell a deal with an accused war criminal. The charges are not new but have been officially validated.

Further roiling the waters, Vucic recently added to his sometime tilt toward Moscow a kowtow to Beijing. He might prefer to keep his options open and maintain his leverage, since he has few fans in the EU other than Hungary's Viktor Orbán. Making a deal and fully committing to the EU might not be his best move at the moment.

In fact, Brussels and Washington will be very interested to see in what direction he decides to move. Vucic is no dictator, but as a strongman in a recent democracy with weak civil institutions he has undermined the liberal political order. Which left the group Freedom House to make an almost schizophrenic assessment:

 The Republic of Serbia is a parliamentary democracy with competitive multiparty elections, but in recent years the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) has steadily eroded political rights and civil liberties, putting pressure on independent media, the political opposition, and civil society organizations. Despite these trends, the country has continued to move toward membership in the European Union.

Concern over possible abuse of his authority for political advantage, though legitimate, isn't likely to have great effect. Although it is theoretically easier for the EU to punish a non-member, simply cutting aid and blocking entry, the organization has less reason to prioritize a state which cannot directly influence the organization. And with other Balkan states entering the EU, leaving out Serbia might create even more regional trouble.

Moreover, the Trump administration, at least, cares naught about human rights when friendly states are involved. The EU treats such concerns more seriously but has achieved little in the more important cases of Hungary and Poland. Vucic's machinations appear modest in comparison: He is no poster boy for tyranny. An organization made up of sovereign governments cannot easily discipline sovereign governments, especially when the perceived abuses are moderate and indirect.

Also at issue is Russian and Chinese influence in Belgrade. Indeed, the International and Security Affairs Centre figured that Serbia's agreement with EU foreign policy positions has dropped sharply since 2012. Yet several nations, including Greece and Italy, differ sharply with Brussels over important questions such as policy toward Moscow. Even Germany dissents from the U.S. line, which Congress attempted to enforce by sanctioning the Nordstream 2 natural gas pipeline with Russia, raising Berlin's ire.

Attempting to redirect Belgrade's perspective won't be easy — and probably isn't worth the effort. Moscow's role is historic: It was the Russian Empire which backed Serbia when Austro-Hungary issued its famous ultimatum in July 1914. Moscow backed Serbia in the early 1990s when the U.S. and Europe largely ignored attacks on ethnic Serbs during Yugoslavia's breakup. The allies continued their bias after occupying Kosovo, doing little to stop the ethnic cleansing of the Serb minority.

Since then Russia has defended Serbia and blocked Kosovo from international forums. More recently the Putin government sent COVID-19 aid, including biological war specialists to help disinfect hospitals. To emphasize the continuing bilateral relationship Vucic traveled to Moscow in June to attend the pandemic-delayed World War II victory parade. After meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov Vucic said that any deal would require Russia's consent.

Indeed, for years successive Serbian governments found a dramatic way to ensure that memories of the West's perfidy when Serbia was attacked by NATO would not disappear. The Serbian government placed the bombed-out Ministry of Defense building, which I jogged by years ago when visiting Belgrade, on its list of protected cultural monuments. The reconstruction process began only in 2015, sixteen years after it was wrecked, and proposals to either repair or replace the damaged structure remained controversial. The Association of Serbian Architects advocated the ruined building's preservation as a "monument of suffering and brutality of NATO force." Even today, after the country's shift Westward, not all Serbs believe President George W. Bush's claim, made as Kosovo prepared to declare independence, that "the Serbian people can know they have a friend in America." (At the time demonstrators responded negatively by attacking the U.S. embassy and setting it afire.)

Nevertheless, Belgrade still has far greater economic dealings with the rest of Europe and military relations with NATO than either with Russia. Moreover, Jelena Milic of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies contended that even the growing relationship with the PRC "is less about China and more about counterbalancing Russia, which is force-feeding Serbia weapons sales and various other forms of military cooperation."

The attraction to Beijing is more recent but more intense, given the toll taken by COVID-19. The People's Republic of China backed Yugoslavia during the war and shared in Serbians' suffering when the U.S. inadvertently bombed the Chinese embassy. The PRC, highly sensitive to separatism and "splittism" of any sort, also opposed Kosovo's independence. Indeed, argued Milic earlier this year:

The cooperative relationship between Serbia and China in recent years is at least partially an outgrowth of the Kosovo dispute. Belgrade appreciates and seeks to expand relations with virtually all countries that have not recognized Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence.

Unsurprisingly, China is Serbia's most important economic partner from Asia; imports from China lag behind only those from Germany and Italy. The Pupin Bridge over the Danube, financed and built by Beijing, and that nation's first large infrastructure project in Europe, is informally known as the "Chinese bridge." Prime Minister Li Keqiang attended the opening ceremony. In 2016 China purchased a failing steel plant, preserving jobs otherwise destined to disappear. The same year the two countries announced a strategic partnership and in 2017 made travel visa free.

This year the PRC provided assistance — a medical team and test kits — to fight the coronavirus. With Europe originally less helpful, Vucic dismissed "European solidarity" as a "nonexistent … fairy tale on paper" while lauding the Chinese as "the only ones who can help us in this difficult situation." On the Chinese personnel's arrival in Belgrade, Vucic kissed a Chinese flag and exclaimed: "Thank you very much to my brother, President Xi Jinping, the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people." Assistance did ultimately come from the EU and other European nations but received far less attention. A military exercise is planned with Chinese forces later this year.

Yet Belgrade is not alone in playing with others. Italy welcomed Chinese investment and workers, which is one reason COVID-19 hit its industrial north so hard, and Chinese medical assistance. Early sentiment trended sharply against the EU, though that may ebb as the health crisis continues to ease and the EU approves relief spending. Moreover, continental hostility toward the PRC has risen, especially after the delivery of defective medical equipment and pressure to toe Beijing's line.

Nevertheless, Serbia's economic ties with the continent remain far stronger and EU membership would link Belgrade more tightly to its neighbors and the rest of Europe. Vucic said he does not plan on choosing among competing powers, explaining that: "As far as we are concerned, we are on the European path. We are not giving up on that." Indeed, last week while expressing his appreciation for "the efforts of Richard Grenell to find economic solutions between us and Pristina," Vucic emphasized that "we are completely committed to the EU-led political dialogue."

The best way to enhance Western influence would be to resolve the Kosovo standoff with a meaningful concession to Serbia. Vucic noted that we "unequivocally get that support for the integrity of Serbia from China and Russia and, on the other hand, we have very good economic cooperation and cooperation in all other areas." Remove Kosovo and much of the East's appeal would fade. Argued Milic:

The solution to Kosovo lies in Europe and the United States. Belgrade understands this well. Serbia is not seeking to replace the West as its principal partner and, despite the current rhetoric and public expressions of gratitude, no amount of Chinese aid to fight coronavirus is going to change that.

The Balkans long has spread instability throughout Europe. The Clinton administration should have stayed out of the geopolitical mess created by Yugoslavia's implosion, insisting that European nations again act like the serious actors they once were and address the problem. The Bush administration should not have pushed to dismantle Serbia while pretending to be Belgrade's friend. The Obama administration should not have joined with the EU to demand that Serbia surrender what it always defended, its territorial integrity. Yet Brussels and Washington treated Belgrade's, but not Pristina's, refusal to surrender as "intransigence."

However, the past will not be undone. The Trump administration deserves credit for making a serious attempt to stabilize at least one small part of the region, given the EU's continuing failure. Although the latest effort just went bust, the administration shouldn't give up. It still might succeed where the Obama administration failed dismally.

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire.

 

thesaker.is

White Privilege and Racism Debate: a British East European point of view

The Saker

10-13 minutes

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by Nebojša Radić for The Saker Blog

In this country^[1]I am regarded as White and therefore, privileged – it seems.

People in the streets and on television say that Whites should kneel and apologise.

Really?

How come I find myself in this bizarre situation?

How did I get here?

How did a refugee from warn-torn socialist Yugoslavia turned fisherman in the South Pacific become a privileged White male?

Did I miss anything?

Is it something I did?

Something I said?

No, it's not something I did or said. It has nothing to do with me.

Except that… it has everything to do with me and there is no-one to speak out for me!

So, there you go now, hear my voice.

I was born in Yugoslavia, the most multicultural country in Europe. Through the non-allied movement, it had many links with third-world countries and we used to call Africans: braća crnci, Black Brothers. I grew up in Belgrade listening to African American blues musicians such as BB King, Jimi Hendrix, John Lee Hooker and Blind Lemon Jefferson, playing basketball to better the likes of Michael Jordan and Magic Johnson! It was only in the late 90s that I noticed that the footballer Edson Arantes do Nascimento better known as Pele was black! And I remember watching him play for the first time in Sweden 1970! It took me thirty years or perhaps, ten years of living in an English-speaking country to think of the great football magician in terms of race.

In the early nineties, like many of my countrymen (and women, yes), I fled the war. I found myself in Nelson, New Zealand where a friend of a friend operated a fleet of fishing boats. I learnt the trade and a couple of years later, upon graduation, I could tell ALL the commercial fish species in the South Pacific. Filling the many forms of the New Zealand immigration service and later of the government, I identified as a Pakeha, the Maori term for white people and, apparently, also for a pig. Pakeha or Caucasian, that was the choice I had. At the same time, for most the Yugoslav immigrants in Aotearoa,^[2], I was naš – ours. I was just one of us, ex-Yugoslavs and we all spoke naški – our language. We never bothered (very wisely) to call it Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian or…

Locals struggled to tell us apart the same as we struggled to tell the English from the Dutch or the Maoris from the Pacific Islanders (nota bene: the great rugby player, Jonah Lomu was of Tongan origin, an Islander – not a Maori^[3]).

While in Nelson, down very South, a good friend of mine Kit Carson, a farmer, wood turner and artist taught me an important lesson. We were barbequing some meat near the Tahunanui beach when Max said that as an Irish-born immigrant, Kit wasn't a real Kiwi. The already well-aged and proud son of Joyce, Beckett, Heaney and a very long line of Celtic storytelling alchemists stood up from his chair with a drink in his mighty rugged hand and roared:

– You were born in this country, Max, but I chose to come here out my own free will. I am much more of a New Zealander than you will ever be!

Thus, spoke Kit Carson, Down Under Below, raising his glass to a thunderous – slaintè!

On the day the New York twin towers fell, I left Aotearoa^[4] and moved to Britain (this country?). I now live in Cambridge, a multi-cultural city with a peculiar town and gown historical (class, racial?) divide.

For the immigration service and the government here, I am White, the other White, mind you. The official government web page lists those options:

One of the home nations^[5] or Irish (Kit Carson!), Gypsy or Irish Traveller (Tyson Fury, the boxer) or any other White background. You can also belong to mixed ethnicities or declare yourself to be Jewish, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Chinese or of any other Asian background. You can be African, Caribbean or of any other Black background. You could be Arab too (Dr Ali Meghji^[6])!^[7]

So, all Europeans are other Whites. Nigel Farage however, the prominent and outspoken British politician, does not complain about his French, Italian or German and not even Greek neighbours. He just does not recommend living next door to a bunch of Romanians!

At the same time, 'Go home Poles' graffiti compete with Banksy's excellent artwork, anti-Russian hyper-hysteria (you don't really want me to give you any links for this one) and the already metastatic anti-Serbian bias (uh, where shall I start with links…) that I have been exposed to over these 30 years.

Nine in ten of my conversations that started with where are you from originally? and continued with me saying I am from Serbia, ended right there – in embarrassment and silence. A sure sign that my interlocutors were educated on the topic by alphabet soup corporations (CNN, BBC… ESPN, CIA?) rather than history or any other books. While I do not expect people to have read all the novels by the Nobel laureate Ivo Andrić or seen the films of multiple Palme d'Or winner Emir Kusturica, to have ever found themselves trapped in one of the Marina Abramović arty installations, to have understood the principles of Nikola Tesla's coil and wireless transmission of electricity or even watched Novak Đoković play tennis, it would be nice if they could make a small mental effort to move beyond the "murderous Serbs" stereotype and the likes of Milošević, Karadžić and Mladić.

So, the western political correctness pill may pretend to be covering Muslims, Blacks and Jews but it does not cover the others, with special reference to Eastern Europeans (our subject).

I can inform you, for instance, that there is no such a thing as an East European accent.^[8] Same as there is no such a thing as a Western European accent. The geographical Eastern Europe features languages that belong to different groups : Finno-Ugric, Greek, Romance, Slavic and Albanian among others. Native speakers of these language do not and cannot possibly have the same English accents. Again, is there such a thing as a Jewish, African or Muslim accent?

For instance,

• Talking to a woman wearing a burka you ask leisurely: Oh, is that a Muslim accent that I hear, darling?
• Talking to Shaquille O'Neal during a pick-up basketball game you say: Where does your accent come from? West Africa, perhaps? or,
• Talking to a rabbi who happen to be dressed as a rabbi: Interesting accent that you have – Semitic isn't it?

(Nota bene: do NOT try any of these techniques at home)

East European is not an ethnicity. East Europeans as a compact group do not exist linguistically, culturally оr religiously and they are no different from Western Europeans in that respect. East European is a prejudiced political, cold war denomination for marginalised white (other) people.

My ancestors fought the Ottoman Turks for centuries not to be enslaved or taken away by the Janissaries. As my name is not Muhammed and I am a Christian, grandad seems to have done well. Now both the descendants and victims of the British Empire slave traders tell me I should apologise. Uh, let me see…

Is racism, as we now know it, not a construct of Western European maritime imperial nations, of genocide, slave trade and slavery?

Where I come from we learnt about these sinister exploits at school. We were told about what happened to the American Indians, the Aborigines, the Mayas and the Incas, the Africans abducted from their ancestral homes, enslaved and shipped to the new brave world. We knew about the East India Company, the British concentration camps in South Africa, Churchill's racism and crimes, the utter high-tech barbarism visited upon the civilian populations of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Dresden.

This was all common knowledge among people outside the Anglo-Saxon imperial reach.

The British Empire is racist, you now tell me? No kidding.

The American fathers of the exceptional nation were slave owners? Say no more.

The Empire committed atrocities with the 'excuse' that their victims we not really human.^[9] If they now, suddenly accepted the humanity of the colonised, exploited and murdered peoples, their minds would blow and disintegrate along with all of their cherished ethical, religious principles and civilised posturing.

But let's go back to our topic, my Eastern European predicament. I am White, remember? Other White but still – sort of, White! To be better represented, I might want to join forces with the other Asians and the other Africans perhaps? So much for an identity crisis of the Others (capitalised though, mind you)!

I don't think I am either privileged or responsible for racial tensions. I support human rights and equality and will not kneel or beg for forgiveness.

One day, when I return to the Balkans I may lay down and die of shame for what we allowed to happen to my generation and my country in those mountains. But I will not kneel. Not here, not now, not ever!

So, East Europeans are other Whites. We are not privileged and we often find ourselves at the receiving end of prejudice and intolerance. Do not paint us thus, with the old, stained, black & white brush. There are too many dirty brushes around us already… and so many wonderful colours.

Nebojša Radić is a native of Belgrade, Serbia. He has published fiction, essays and academic work in English (nom de guerre Sam Caxton), Serbian and Italian. He is Associate Professor at the University of Cambridge in the UK. Nebojša has two PhDs, one in Creative Writing from the UEA in Norwich and one in fish chucking form Talley's Fisheries in Nelson, New Zealand.

Cambridge, UK

1. No-one ever says in Britain, England, the UK… ↑
2. New Zealand is officially bilingual and this is the Maori name. Aotearoa translates as The Land of the Long White Cloud) ↑
3. Advice based on personal experience acquired on the deck of a 15 metre-long fishing trawler at high sea during a storm: never call a Maori an Islander – BIG difference! ↑
4. Maori for New Zealand – The Land of the Long White Cloud. ↑
5. English, Northern Irish, Scottish or Welsh. ↑
6. ↑
7. https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/ethnic-groups ↑
8. My enunciations have been accused many times over of possessing such a dubious quality. ↑
9. "Churchill was a 'racist' and comparable to Hitler, says academic."↑

 

foreignpolicy.com

Collapse of Kosovo Talks Amid Leader's War Crimes Charges Are Rebuff for Trump

Amy Mackinnon

9-11 minutes

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Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic is having a good week. 

Last weekend, his party won a landslide victory in elections boycotted by opposition parties in protest of his strongman tactics. This coming Saturday, he was due to appear at the White House for peace talks with President Hashim Thaci of Kosovo, but the summit collapsed before it had even begun after an international tribunal announced on Wednesday that Thaci had been charged with war crimes. The prime minister of Kosovo, Avdullah Hoti, was due to take his place, but on Thursday he announced that he was canceling his trip too. 

Observers on both sides of the Atlantic are likely relieved at the collapse of the U.S.-led talks, which many feared could do more harm than good. U.S. President Donald Trump has been keen to bolster his deal-maker image by brokering a hasty agreement between the quarreling countries at any cost, taking a heavy-handed approach with U.S. ally Kosovo while asking little of Serbia. 

Trump's envoy for the peace talks, Richard Grenell, initially heralded Saturday's summit as "historic," but he later downplayed it, saying that the leaders would focus on economic issues to create jobs and "bring capitalism" to improve ties between the two countries while thorny political talks over Kosovo's declaration of independence from Serbia would be left to the European Union.

With the U.S.-led talks now on pause for the foreseeable future, Vucic can now "kick the can down the road" for a little while longer, said Dimitar Bechev, a research fellow at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 

"Vucic was never interested in a solution. He was interested in talking about it, because that's what he's offering basically, really," said Florian Bieber, a professor of Southeast European history and politics at the University of Graz in Austria. 

The United States played a decisive role in the collapse of the government of Kosovo in March, as Grenell had grown increasingly frustrated with headstrong then-Prime Minister Albin Kurti, who had resisted U.S. pressure. 

Kosovo has often been described as the most pro-American country on earth after a 1999 NATO bombing campaign intended to halt ethnic cleansing enabled Kosovo to break away from Serbia and later declare its independence in 2008. Serbia has refused to recognize the sovereignty of its former province. 

Kosovo's politics will likely be plunged into chaos by the charges announced against the president, who was one of the top commanders in the Kosovo Liberation Army. A mainstay of Kosovar politics since independence, Thaci has seen his future as president thrown into doubt because of the new charges brought by a special tribunal based in The Hague, Netherlands, which accused him and nine others of being responsible for the murder of nearly 100 Kosovar Albanians, Serbs, and Romani people. While the charges are still to be confirmed by a pretrial judge, the court took the unusual step of announcing them on Wednesday because of Thaci's efforts to "obstruct and undermine" the work of the Kosovo Specialist Prosecutor's Office. 

Thaci is a key backer of Hoti, who has served as prime minister for only three weeks, so the president's departure could lead to new elections. "I am doubtful that the Hoti government will survive for long in such circumstances," Bieber said.

There was a time when a slide into authoritarianism came with a cost, but in an increasingly multipolar and transactional world, Vucic has effortlessly played major powers off against one another while shoring up his grip on power at home. "Twenty years ago, there was basically no alternative to the EU. There was no one competing for influence or authority in the region, so they all had to orient themselves to the EU. And that's no longer the case, at least not economically," said Eric Gordy, a professor of political and cultural sociology at University College London. 

While Serbia seeks to join the European Union, attacks on the media and opposition there have increased under Vucic, prompting Freedom House to downgrade its assessment of the country from free to partly free in 2019. The EU's ability to check this has been hamstrung by flourishing authoritarianism within its member states. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban was one of the first international leaders to congratulate Vucic after his faction and their junior coalition partners won a dizzying 230 of the 250 seats in the Serbian parliament on Sunday. "The European Union and the United States have not done enough to hold Serbian government accountable and enact political consequences on Serbian government for its blatant disregard of democratic rules," said Majda Ruge, a senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. 

"Certainly the West is more circumspect when it comes to criticizing him because in some European capitals at least there's a perception that if you're too harsh on Serbia they may look elsewhere," said Bechev, the author of Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe.

Candidates for EU membership are expected to align their foreign policy with that of the bloc, but Serbia has instead steadily drifted in the opposite direction. An analysis by the International and Security Affairs Centre, a think tank based in Belgrade, Serbia, found that in 2019 Serbia aligned with 57 percent of the foreign-policy declarations made by the EU, down from 99 percent in 2012. 

"The EU should be clear that Serbia has to choose its direction," said Molly Montgomery, a former special advisor to U.S. Vice President Mike Pence for Europe and Eurasia. "I think there's an argument that the EU should focus less on wooing countries like Serbia that are trying to play powers off of each other, and more on supporting countries that are dedicated to moving full speed ahead on membership." 

Vucic has spoken publicly about this desire to continue balancing Russia and China with the West. While the European Union is by far Serbia's most significant business partner, accounting for more than two-thirds of the country's trade, the EU's leaders have failed to translate this into political clout. Asked in opinion polls who they think is Belgrade's most significant trade partner, almost three-quarters of Serbs said China and Russia. "This clearly suggests to me that there's misunderstanding, deliberately fostered by leaders like Vucic," said Bieber of the University of Graz. 

Russia's ties with Belgrade run long and deep, and Moscow has proved to be an invaluable ally in international institutions when it comes to blocking Kosovo's attempts to gain recognition. This week, Vucic met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow after attending a World War II victory parade previously postponed by the pandemic. 

Beijing's footprint in the region is new, but it has expanded significantly over the past decade, with China making billions of dollars of loans and investments in Serbia. In March, as the coronavirus was picking up speed in Europe, China sent a shipment of medical aid to Serbia. In a press conference, Vucic said, "European solidarity does not exist. That was a fairy tale on paper," and he sent a letter of thanks to Chinese President Xi Jinping in which he said he addressed the Chinese leader "not only as a dear friend, but as a brother."

"China is seen as the big piggy bank arriving. Of course, this perception is flawed because the money is recycled into Chinese companies and local contractors won't get much from it," said Bechev. While Chinese investments in Serbia are expected to reach $10 billion, of the total $2.2 billion that has entered Serbia so far, almost two-thirds were loans. 

While Vucic's balancing act may have paid off for him so far, he may end up painting himself into a corner, experts warn. The EU has typically led talks between Serbia and Kosovo, but under Trump the United States had sought to forge a parallel process. With the U.S.-led process likely now on pause, Europe may once again take the lead, and Brussels is less likely to be as accommodating of Vucic as Washington has been. 

With an overwhelming majority of the parliament now under his control, Vucic may face increased pressure from the European Union to make concessions with a view to striking a deal with Kosovo. For decades, Serbian leaders have used their fear of their political opponents as a reason for dragging their heels on peace talks. "He no longer has an excuse for doing things that he won't want to do. Any failure to deliver is all on him," said Gordy of University College London. 

 

A planned Kosovo-Serbia meeting at the White House is falling apart. It was always a bad idea.

washingtonpost.com

Opinion | A planned Kosovo-Serbia meeting at the White House is falling apart. It was always a bad idea.

Opinion by Nicholas Burns and Frank Wisner

6-8 minutes

---

Nicholas Burns is a professor at Harvard University and former undersecretary of state. He is an adviser to the Joe Biden campaign. Frank Wisner is senior adviser at Squire Patton Boggs and was special representative for Kosovo in the administration of President George W. Bush.

Kosovo, a major preoccupation for Washington in decades past, is back in the news in Washington.

President Trump's grand plan to invite Kosovo's President Hashim Thaci and Serbia's Aleksandar Vucic to meet at the White House on June 27 may be falling apart before it begins, after the Kosovo Specialist Chambers announced on Wednesday indictments against Thaci and others on war crimes charges.

Since Kosovo declared its independence in early 2008, with the strong support of President George W. Bush, it has been recognized by scores of countries, but not by Serbia, from which it seceded. The Trump administration was hoping to encourage the two leaders to put aside their many legal and political differences and begin working toward mutual recognition.

Trump's team is arguing that an infusion of international private investment will provide a foundation for an eventual settlement. This is a big bet by an administration that has shown little interest in Europe, yet alone the Balkans, during the past 3½ years. There are several potential problems with Trump's plan, and the indictment against Thaci should provide the administration an additional reason to reconsider its approach to the negotiations.

First, Trump has been conducting a solo diplomatic campaign in Kosovo rather than working in tandem with the European Union, including major allies Germany and France. He spurned the E.U.'s own negotiator and even French President Emmanuel Macron, who had also volunteered to host a summit. The United States and the E.U., for the first time in two decades, are leading separate and often conflicting negotiating campaigns, confusing both Serbs and Kosovars. This threatens to slow, rather than advance, ultimate progress toward an agreement.

Second, the E.U. has a strong case to lead diplomatically, rather than the United States. As poor Balkan countries with collapsing infrastructures and few growth engines in their economies, their greatest need is European economic aid and investment and, at some point in the future, association with or membership in the E.U. The United States, by contrast, has a far weaker economic presence in the region. By muscling the E.U. out of way, Trump's diplomatic gambit divides the region's friends and actually decreases the probability of a successful outcome. It is hard not to suspect that one of Trump's motives is spite, given his open and shameful contempt for German Chancellor Angela Merkel as well as his proclivity, unique among modern U.S. presidents, to refuse to work closely with the European allies on nearly any issue of consequence.

Third, the Balkans is a graveyard for high-profile diplomatic gambits. Many in the region doubt Trump and his emissaries have done the necessary spadework to produce much more than a photo op at the White House. We suspect Trump's real motive is to produce a high-profile but short-lived agreement to strengthen his thin foreign policy accomplishments before the Nov. 3 election. There's fear Trump might ultimately push Kosovo to make territorial concessions to Serbia that would be a potentially incendiary precedent in the unstable Balkan region.

As veterans of Kosovo diplomacy ourselves, we certainly wish the administration well. We doubt, however, the wisdom and potential success of such a unilateral approach. Presidents Bill Clinton, Bush and Barack Obama all started from a common premise that the Balkan countries — most notably Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, as well as Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece and Slovenia — should be secure in their borders and attached ultimately to both NATO and the European Union for their future security and prosperity.

The United States has always opposed territorial adjustments for fear of unleashing conflict and has specifically opposed a "Greater Albania," recognizing that its emergence would spark conflict with Serbia and others. Pushing Kosovo and Serbia to redraw their borders is a dangerous precedent that could undermine relations between North Macedonia and Greece as well as unravel the hard-earned Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia.

The United States has been a good friend to Kosovo since our intervention with NATO allies to prevent the massacre of ethnic Kosovar Albanians by the Serb army back in 1999. We ended that war. NATO forces, including U.S. contingents, have kept the peace since then. Our Foreign Service officers and military worked hard to help Kosovo attain and secure peace and independence.

The Trump administration's open pressure on Kosovar leaders in recent months, and its more accommodating posture to an authoritarian Serb government, has been crassly inconsistent with our friendship and has weakened Kosovo's fragile governing institutions.

The smarter move by Trump would be to join forces with Europeans, Kosovars and Serbs to agree on measures that will increase investment in the region's infrastructure and reduce barriers to trade and mobility. The western Balkans need to be linked to Europe and provided with an economic framework that will offer its inhabitants a more hopeful future. Without serious attention to the region's economic conditions, the future will be compromised by the flight of its young people.

U.S. aims are even more important now that Russia and a newly assertive China are seeking to divide Europe and to ace out Europe and the United States in the Balkans. Our support for a strong, active NATO presence in the region is the best investment we can make in ensuring peace. The Trump administration's threat to remove U.S. forces from the NATO mission in Kosovo would also be a serious mistake.

There are no "quick fixes" in the Balkans for a president notoriously fixated on that brand of diplomacy. Trump should adjust his course, lower his ambitions and lay the groundwork for a careful, patient American strategy before he commits additional damage to the fragile Balkans and our already weakened credibility in Europe.

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The Election of Losers

europeanwesternbalkans.com

The Election of Losers - European Western Balkans

Florian Bieber

8-9 minutes

---

One person appears to have won the election. His face was everywhere, his name was on the ballot, though not as a candidate, and the virtual rallies were dominated by him. Aleksandar Vučić is the apparent winner of Serbia's parliamentary election last Sunday.

While neither running for the election and president official standing above party politics, it was clear that the victory of Vučić was absolute. His party won around 62 percent of the vote, and gaining 191 of 250 seats in parliament, around 76% of the seats. The large majority opens the door to constitutional changes that would allow the regime, like in Hungary, to tailor the constitution to the needs of the ruling party.

His long-term coalition partner, the Socialists and their allies gained 10.4% and 32 seats, and the Serbian Patriotic Alliance, the vehicle of New Belgrade mayor Aleksandar Šapić gained 11 seats, just passed the 3% threshold with 3.64%. The threshold was lowered from 5% to 3% just weeks before the election in a transparent effort by the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) to boost the representation of minor parties in parliament to weaken the effects of the opposition boycott.

The remaining 16 seats are held by minority parties, which have a lower threshold. The only opposition in the Serbian parliament are two Albanian MPs from the majority Albanian municipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo, as the minority parties cooperated with the previous governments of the Progressive Party and Šapić also did not run against the government.

It is this resounding victory that makes the outcome a defeat for Vučić. A parliament without an opposition cannot serve as a fig leaf to legitimize the supposedly democratic rule of the president. Had more of the 21 running parties and groups entered parliament, such as the different far right and fascist groups or a few scattered democratic and reformists, the Progressive Party could claim that Serbia had a pluralist parliament. Now, it does not and thus reveals the authoritarian nature of the regime.

The opposition lost as well. While turnout was probably lower than official numbers, it was according to the independent monitoring NGO CRTA around 48 percent, thus 8 to 9 percent lower than previous parliamentary elections in 2016. This is a minor drop, that could not be claimed solely by the opposition, but rather also by COVID-19 and voter apathy. Clearly the main effort the regime has been to push up voter participation, as most irregularities CRTA noted focused on pushing up voter numbers and SNS official appear to have called potential voter on election day to pressure them to vote.

The boycotting opposition has succeeded in delegitimizing the opposition that participated, such as the Movement of Free Citizens headed by Sergej Trifunović that only gained 1.5% or the United Democratic Serbia that gained less than 0.9%.

At the same time the opposition that boycotted is far from united. The once large Democratic Party has been marred by infighting, including a scuffle at the party headquarter on election day between different wings. Otherwise, the opposition is an uneasy alliance between the far right Dveri, unpopular split offs of the previously ruling Democratic Party and few other groups. Now out of parliament, cut off from funding, without a clear strategy and few international allies and contacts, the opposition has a rough time ahead.

The EU is the final loser in the elections. Serbia has long been hailed, uncritically, as the front runner in the EU enlargement. Now, it is confronted with a parliament that lacks a democratic mandate and a regime, whose authoritarian nature has become more visible.

A joint statement of the High Representive Josep Borrell and Neighborhood and Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi was strikingly critical, noting limited voter choice and media dominance of the ruling party.

The European Parties fell, unsurprisingly along partisan lines. The Socialists and Progressives correctly called the elections a mockery of democracy and demanded a slowdown of accession, whereas Donald Tusk of the European Peoples Party congratulated their party family associate SNS, only noting ominously "more power, the more responsibility."

The enlargement process is seriously compromised by the elections. Serbia has been negotiating accession for more than six years, the same period during which democracy and rule of law has been backsliding by every indicator and all organizations monitoring democracy globally, including Freedom House, Bertelsmann Transformation Index, VDem Institute, and Economist Democracy Index.

The EU institutions, with the notable exception of the parliament, have been strikingly silent on this. If the EU returns to business as usual after the election, it will not only encourage the further consolidation of authoritarianism in Serbia, but also among others in the region, including Montenegro and Albania. More importantly, it suggests that the EU is not just struggling with keeping autocrats within the EU but also during the accession process, when more tools are available. To confront the authoritarian drift, the EU needs to engage with Serbia.

Back in 2014, the EU at first ignoring the authoritarianism of the Gruevski government and the eviction of the opposition. Only the 2015 wiretapping scandal triggered more sustained EU engagement. The risk is that in Serbia the political alternatives will become more Eurosceptic, as they see the government backed by the EU and its member states and as many of the parties already today oppose European integration.

A renewed EU engagement requires several components, namely a meaningful mediation between government and opposition on how to bring the opposition back into the political process based on tackling some of the most serious democratic restrictions. Furthermore, a rule of law mission, such as the Priebe report drafted in 2015 by independent experts that would identify the shortcomings and priorities for reform, and a follow process.

The European Party families should work together on their assessment of democracy rather than making democracy a partisan issue in the Western Balkans. Bipartisan statements and mediation by MEPs from the largest European Parties would reduce the risk of authoritarianism being further facilitated by partisan rift.

Finally, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Member States need to consider the full range of options regarding the accession talks themselves. These options include not opening new chapters in negotiations, a low-level signal. More serious would be to evoke the imbalance clause, which has been part of the accession negotiations for eight years. It allows talks to the frozen on all chapters if not enough progress is made in regard to rule of law.

Finally, the new methodology, set up by the Commission in response to France's veto over accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania offers further tools to put pressure on accession candidates. It allows Member States to put negotiations in some areas on hold and re-open closed chapters, as well as reassessing funding and other benefits of cooperation. The most serious option would entail suspending accession talks altogether.

While the latter option might be counterproductive at the moment, it would be good to consider some of the intermediate measures. The suspension of accession talks, however, has to be a credible threat unless the Serbian government makes some clear and verifiable steps to restoring democratic institutions. Considering the tools the EU has available now to insist on the core values of the EU in the accession talks, not using them would cement the election result as a lost opportunity for Serbia and the EU.

 

 

forbes.com

Russia's Putin Gives The West A WWII History Lesson: Here's Why

James Rodgers

4-5 minutes

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Russian President Vladimir Putin attends a meeting via video conference at the Novo-Ogaryovo ... [+] residence outside Moscow, Russia, Monday, June 15, 2020. (Alexei Nikolsky, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

ASSOCIATED PRESS

President Vladimir Putin of Russia may have had to postpone the parade planned to mark the 75th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in WWII. He has not missed the opportunity to make a point to the West.

Some 15,000 military personnel and hundreds of pieces of armour were originally due to take part in a parade scheduled for May 9: a tribute to the victorious Soviet troops who fought Hitler's forces, and a show of modern Russia's martial might.

The parade had to be postponed because of the coronavirus. It is now due to go ahead June 24, the anniversary of the first victory parade in 1945.

Then, the Soviet Union, the United States, and their allies celebrated together as victors united by a common cause.

This year, things are different—and history has become the latest battleground in the information war that is contemporary international politics.

Putin is not pleased by any prospect that his country's role in the defeat of Nazism might be diminished or disrespected.

Putin Warns Against 'Insulting The Memory' Of Moscow's Role

In a lengthy essay published on the website of The National Interest, and also on that of the Kremlin, Putin warned, "Historical revisionism, the manifestations of which we now observe in the West, primarily with regard to the subject of the Second World War and its outcome, is dangerous."

The Russian leader referred in particular to a European parliament resolution of September 2019 that, he wrote, "directly accused the USSR – along with the Nazi Germany – of unleashing the Second World War."

Putin's conclusion was clear, and defiant, "Desecrating and insulting the memory is mean."

Putin also wrote that it was not his intention to, "initiate a new round of international information confrontation in the historical field that could set countries and peoples at loggerheads."

He may end up doing that, intentionally or not—but he certainly wants to set the record straight as he sees it.

 

Russian soldiers march toward Red Square to attend a dress rehearsal for the Victory Day military ... [+] parade in Moscow, Russia, Saturday, June 20, 2020. (AP Photo/Pavel Golovkin)

ASSOCIATED PRESS

The Scale Of Soviet Sacrifice In WWII

Why, 75 years after the end of the conflict, and in a very different world, does this matter so much?

The first answer is the scale of Russia's sacrifice. The number of Soviet military and civilian dead is generally estimated to be in excess of 20 million. In his article, Putin writes, "Almost 27 million," adding, for comparison, that in WWII, "The USSR lost one in seven of its citizens, the UK lost one in 127, and the USA lost one in 320."

Then there's Russia's own history. In a 20th century scarred—in addition to WWI and WWII—by revolution, civil war, and regime change from monarchy to communism before that system too collapsed in 1991, victory over Hitler's Germany stands out as a triumph that is used still today as a force to unite the country.

So it does not go down well when, as happened on May 8 in a tweet from the White House, Russia's role is overlooked.

Facing Coronavirus Challenge, Putin Remembers WWII Glory

True, on April 25, there had been a joint statement from Presidents Trump and Putin celebrating U.S. Soviet military cooperation in WWII—but the perceived slight on VE day itself was not well received. Calling the tweet "bizarre", the Kremlin-backed RT website asked, "Forgetting someone?"

In his article, Putin referred to a note sent by Britain's wartime Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, to the then Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, in September 1944. Churchill acknowledged that it was, "the Russian army that tore the guts out of the German military machine."

As his country battles with the effects of the coronavirus on public health and the economy, and faces difficult relations with the West, Putin does not want either the people of Russia, or the world, to forget that.

 

NYT: Pushing for Serbia-Kosovo Peace Deal, U.S. Roils Allies

nytimes.com

Pushing for Serbia-Kosovo Peace Deal, U.S. Roils Allies

By Patrick Kingsley and Kenneth P. Vogel

9-12 minutes

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Upending American policy, the Trump Administration is sidelining the E.U., pressuring Kosovo and ignoring Serbia's erosion of democracy.

Credit...Andrew Testa for The New York Times

• June 20, 2020, 11:02 a.m. ET

BERLIN — Last October, with the Balkans unsettled and the old tethers of American diplomacy coming apart, the Trump administration dispatched a new envoy to try to solve one of Europe's longest-running territorial disputes: the two-decade standoff between Serbia and Kosovo.

The move was unconventional. The State Department already had a special envoy to the region, and President Trump's new emissary, Richard Grenell, was also ambassador to Germany, where his brash style and embrace of right-wing figures broke with diplomatic norms.

Before long, Mr. Grenell offended and alienated European diplomats who had worked hard on Kosovo for years. They accused him of ignoring their own, more evolved peace initiatives, of undermining democracy in Kosovo and of turning a blind eye to budding authoritarianism in Serbia, a Russian ally.

"I'm doubtful that in this way you can really resolve a situation like Kosovo, the way it's being tried by Grenell," said Wolfgang Petritsch, a former European Union envoy to Kosovo.

The appointment has been "very detrimental to the solution of the Kosovo issue," he added. "With Grenell, it's only been confusion."

Early this year, President Trump named Mr. Grenell acting director of national intelligence, though Mr. Grenell lacked expertise in intelligence and had a reputation as a partisan warrior, taking on what is supposed to be a nonpartisan job.

That stint, like the one in Berlin, has come and gone, but Mr. Grenell is still hoping to deliver a diplomatic victory in the Balkans before the November election for a president short on such achievements.

Last week, days before a much-disputed Serbian election on Sunday, Mr. Grenell announced on Twitter a surprise meeting between the Kosovar president, Hashim Thaci, and his Serbian counterpart, Aleksandar Vucic, at the White House on June 27.

Mr. Grenell said he intended the meeting as trust-building exercise, limited for now to trade issues, that could provide a platform for peace talks later in the year. His defenders, both Democrats and Republicans, say that before Mr. Grenell got involved, negotiations were going nowhere and they credit him with pushing the two sides closer to a deal.

Critics worry that a visit to the White House rewards two men whose opponents accuse them of undermining democratic institutions, and that the strategy simply won't work.

Formerly part of Serbia, Kosovo won autonomy following a NATO bombing campaign in 1999 that aimed to protect Kosovo's largely Muslim population from ethnic cleansing. But Serbia has never recognized Kosovo's sovereignty.

Until recently, Republican and Democratic administrations were similarly steadfast in guaranteeing Kosovo's security, and worked closely with European allies to do so.

But under Mr. Trump, collaboration with European partners has evaporated; next week's White House summit was arranged without consulting the European Union.

Mr. Grenell has tried to resolve the dispute by asking little of Mr. Vucic, a Russian ally, while heightening pressure on Kosovo and widening its domestic fissures.

"We've forgotten who our client is," said David L. Phillips, a Balkans expert and State Department adviser during the Kosovo war. "It's not Serbia, but Kosovo, a country we have helped birth, steward and protect."

Serbia's backsliding on democracy is evidenced by Sunday's parliamentary elections, which President Vucic's party is expected to win by a landslide because most opposition parties have boycotted the vote to protest Mr. Vucic's autocratic policies.

The Trump administration hopes a victory will give Mr. Vucic breathing space to address the tensions with Kosovo.

"The elections are not a contest, that much is clear," said Marko Savkovic, program director for the Belgrade Security Forum, an annual politics conference in Serbia.

But after the elections, "there is expectation that there will be momentum," he said. "But momentum to where? No one really knows."

Most of the American pressure has been put on Kosovo, not Serbia.

To force Kosovo into dropping tariffs on Serbian goods, which Serbia called an obstacle to dialogue, Mr. Grenell threatened to withdraw American support for Kosovo. Then in March, the U.S. froze $50 million in aid to Kosovo. The same week, prominent Republicans suggested withdrawing American troops from Kosovo.

These interventions exacerbated tensions between Mr. Thaci, the president, and Albin Kurti, the prime minister at the time, prompting a constitutional crisis and the replacement of Mr. Kurti's government with one closer to Mr. Thaci.

"Kosovo has never seen a diplomat such as Grenell," said Brikena Hoxha, the director of the Kosovar Stability Initiative, a research group. "Grenell's style comes across more like bullying than negotiating."

By contrast, the Trump administration said little about Serbia's campaign to block Kosovo's membership in international organizations, and ignored the strains Mr. Vucic has placed on Serbian democracy.

Mr. Vucic's invitation to the White House means he "implicitly gets support for his autocratic methods," said Dragan Djilas, a leading opposition politician.

Serbian officials, including Mr. Vucic, did not respond to requests for comment. Mr. Grenell also would not comment, nor did any other American official approached by The New York Times.

A vocal Trump supporter, Mr. Grenell was appointed envoy last October at his own request, stunning career diplomats. An experienced Balkans specialist, Matthew Palmer, had been appointed to a similar position barely a month earlier.

The overlap led to confusion among allies about whom to work with. It echoed the Trump administration's approach in Ukraine, where resident ambassadors worked alongside a trio of visiting envoys close to Mr. Trump.

Mr. Grenell had shown little previous interest in the region, other than two meetings in Berlin with Mr. Thaci. But he told associates that he had sought the post partly because he believed European mediation efforts had been inept, creating a vacuum for him to fill.

Even before Mr. Grenell entered the fray, the Trump administration had departed from past U.S. policy. In the summer of 2018, American officials expressed openness to fresh solutions to the Serbia-Kosovo logjam, including adjustments to their border.

For years, Americans had opposed redrawing it, in case a realignment along ethnic lines rekindled the conflicts of the 1990s.

But in 2018, the State Department changed course, after what a former U.S. official said was an internal decision to be more assertive in places like the Balkans, to avoid losing influence to rival powers like Russia and China.

The shift concerned some European governments, but it was made in partial coordination with officials from the European Union, which led mediation attempts at the time.

The rupture between American and European policy only fully occurred after Mr. Grenell's appointment. He wrested leadership of the negotiations from the European Union, and organized summits and news conferences without the bloc's involvement.

Earlier this year, Mr. Grenell brokered three mini-agreements that he hailed as a breakthrough in restoring transport links between Kosovo and Serbia. But in reality, the two countries signed separate texts with different wording, according to copies obtained by The Times.

The deals were not formal ones, but merely letters of intent signed by minor officials. And they duplicated pre-existing transport agreements brokered by the European Union.

During the recent political crisis in Kosovo, the American embassy posted a Tweet in support of the parliamentary process that led to the toppling of the government, while France and Germany argued against it.

Some of Mr. Grenell's supporters say that Mr. Thaci and his Serbian counterpart, Mr. Vucic, are secretly brokering a peace deal, validating the American approach. Though nominally figureheads, the two presidents carry influence that far exceeds their constitutional duties.

Behind the scenes, they have reached an understanding on some terms of a future treaty, including the idea of adjusting Kosovo's borders, according to four former American officials who cited people involved in the negotiations.

The talks stalled when Mr. Kurti, then the prime minister, asserted that he, not Mr. Thaci, had the constitutional right to set policy.

Mr. Grenell spoke out against Mr. Kurti, who he feared might derail whatever momentum Mr. Thaci and Mr. Vucic had created, said James R. Hooper, one of the four former American officials.

Mr. Hooper, a former Balkans expert at the State Department, said that Mr. Grenell "realizes that the window is closing and he wants to get it concluded, ratified and implemented."

Mr. Grenell, Mr. Thaci and Mr. Vucic all deny a grand deal is close, and Mr. Grenell says land swaps aren't now under discussion.

This week, Mr. Vucic also denied he was about to recognize Kosovo's independence.

"That won't be on the list," he said. "We won't allow that."

Patrick Kingsley reported from Berlin and Pristina, Kosovo, and Kenneth P. Vogel from Washington. Reporting was contributed by Eric Lipton, Michael Crowley and Julian Barnes from Washington, and Benjamin Novak from Budapest. Kitty Bennett contributed research.

 

Russia-Serbia partnership does not depend on Belgrade’s dialogue with Brussels

tass.com

Russia-Serbia partnership does not depend on Belgrade's dialogue with Brussels - article

9-11 minutes

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MOSCOW, June 18. /TASS/. Russian-Serbian partnership does not depend on Belgrade's dialogue with Brussels, Foreign Ministers of Russia and Serbia, Sergey Lavrov and Ivica Dacic, said in a joint article published by Russia's Rossiisakaya Gazeta and Serbia's Kurir dailies on Thursday.

"Moscow and Belgrade are strategic partners. We are geared towards closer mutually beneficial cooperation in a wide spectrum of areas. This approach does not depend on Serbia's plans to negotiate accession to the European Union: it will continue to develop ties with Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union," the ministers noted.

Touching on the Kosovo settlement, the two top diplomats said the two countries would continue close cooperation on that matter on the basis of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. "At the same time, we note that some continue to use Serbia's plans to join the European Union as a tool to exert pressure on Belgrade to make it recognize Kosovo's 'independence.' So, it means that an applicant state is to cede part of its territory," they noted.

The ministers slammed such requirements as absurd. "Russia and Serbia continue to insist that United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 be observed. A compromise is to be reached in the course of negotiations and this is the exclusive prerogative of Belgrade and Pristina," the stressed.

Lavrov and Dacic emphasized that it is up to the parties to the conflict to word and adopt a final solution that would be approved by the United Nations Security Council. "Moscow will accept only such a variant of settlement that will be acceptable for Belgrade. As for external mediation, it should be an unbiased monitoring of the observance of international laws during the dialogue, without imposing ready-to-use designs," they added.

No support to Kosovo sovereignty concept anywhere in world

The concept of Kosovo's self-proclaimed independence has failed as it enjoys unanimous support neither in Europe nor anywhere in the world, Foreign Ministers of Russia and Serbia, Sergey Lavrov and Ivica Dacic, said in a joint article.

"The concept of Kosovo's self-proclaimed sovereignty has failed. It enjoys unanimous support neither in the Balkans nor in Europe nor elsewhere in the world," the ministers stressed. "About half of the United Nations member states do not recognize Kosovo's notorious 'statehood,' and the number of such countries is growing."

According to the two top diplomats, more and more countries begin to understand the perniciousness of Kosovo's precedent of coercive intervention into domestic affairs of an independent state under far-fetched pretexts. "In the recent months, the European Union and the United States have been calling, quite enthusiastically, for the resumption of dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. Naturally, we support political methods of settlement but we think that talks are to rest on the principle of honest implementation of what has been agreed," Lavrov and Dacic emphasized. "The core agreement in this context is the establishment of the Community of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo, which will have due competences."

According to the two ministers, the European Union's responsibility as a mediator in the negotiating process is to push the Kosovo authorities towards implementing its commitments. "So far, no progress has been made towards the establishment of the Community of Serb Municipalities," they pointed out. "Let us hope that EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell and EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue Miroslav Lajcak will act as honest brokers.".

US, EU seeking to take settlement of Kosovo problem in their hands

The United States and the European Union are seeking to take the settlement of the Kosovo problems in their hands, not reckoning with the opinion of other parties concerned, Foreign Ministers of Russia and Serbia said.

"Public discussions about possible solutions to the Kosovo problem have heated up in the recent time," the article reads. "The United States and the European Union have been demonstrating increased activities, seeking to take the settlement of this issue in their hands and claiming to have the leading role in this process. But, as it was before, they tend not to reckon with the opinion of all parties concerned, thus calling to question the very possibility of a fair solution."

The ministers noted that in order to avoid new mistakes it is worth looking back and analyzing the sad experience of external interference in to the regional affairs. "We also think it important to share our common views on the current situation and principled approaches to the problems of the Kosovo settlement," they said. "For more than twenty years, the unsettled Kosovo problem has been hampering comprehensive stabilization in the Western Balkans and triggering new escalations of tensions."

According to the two top diplomats, the 'time bomb' was planted when the Western countries, which had bombed former Yugoslavia back in 1999, made it their crusade to ensure Kosovo's independence in bypassing of international law. "It was done under a cynical disguise of 'muiltivariance': either with Belgrade's consent or without it," they noted. "In other words, Serbia's opinion was not taken into account from the very beginning. Such detrimental approach, which flagrantly violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, is meant solely to satisfy Kosovars' separatist aspirations."

Later on, in 2008, when Pristina declared its independence, Moscow and Belgrade were told that the negotiating potential had allegedly been exhausted and their calls for further talks were ignored. "Since then, the international community has seen for itself more than once that only effort to find a solution based on UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and reckoning with the interests of all parties can give chances to elaborate a viable settlement option," Lavrov and Dacic emphasized.

Kosovo has turned into nest of criminals and terrorism accomplices

Kosovo has become a nest of criminals, including those linked with terrorist groups, Foreign Ministers of Russia and Serbia said in a joint article.

"Rampant crime in Kosovo, with criminal elements linked with terrorist groups in the Middle East, first of all in Syria, and with criminal communities in the Balkans and other parts of Europe, is an evidence that the province, with its rich historic and cultural heritage, has become a nest for terrorists of all sorts," the ministers noted.

This situation, characterized by political chaos, proves that Kosovo has failed as an independent state. "Local parties are bogged down in dirty power scramble, scheming and clan wars amid economic decline and orgy of crime. In such conditions, the so-called statecraft local politicians and their foreign sponsors are so fond of speaking about has turned to be a bogus thing," they pointed out.

No efforts are being taken in Kosovo to fight against international criminals, former chief of the Kosovo Liberation Army, with the Kosovo Special Court, tasked to investigate their crimes, including murders and kidnappings for the purpose of trading in human organs, taking no action. "We still expect this body of justice to begin to work and bring charges against the criminals," the ministers stressed.

Lavrov and Dacic also drew attention to the fact that the presence of international forces does not promote normalization of the situation in the province. Thus, in their words, the NATO-led international Kosovo Force, which is mandated to ensure Serbs' security "has been passive for years."

"On this background, the fact that the Bondsteel facility, which was initially meant as a peacekeeping one, has been turned into a closed zone and a training ground for Kosovo's 'armed forces' arouses serious concern," they said, adding that United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is demonstrating poor efficiency.

"The question about NATO's responsibility for the use of depleted uranium munitions in Serbia, especially in Kosovo, during the bombardments in 1999 is still open," the two foreign ministers noted, adding that not only local residents but also peacekeepers are still suffering from the consequences of radioactive contamination.

The ministers also warned that the Greater Albania rhetoric coming from Pristina and Tirana may "bury the system of regional security that has been built for decades."

Serbia's Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija unilaterally proclaimed independence in February 2008, which was recognized by the United Nations Court of Justice in 2010. However more than 60 countries, including Russia, China, India, Israel, Greece, India and Spain, are categorically against recognizing Kosovo's independence. Nevertheless, Kosovo has been seeking to join international organizations, including UNESCO and Interpol.

Serbia's diplomats have been urging developing countries to revise their decisions to recognize Kosovo's independence. Thus, over the past year, eighteen countries, including Ghana, Papua New Guinea, Burundi, Guinea Bissau, Surinam, Liberia, Lesotho, and Madagascar, sided with Belgrade.