The Moskva Riddle | The Vineyard of the Saker

thesaker.is

The Moskva Riddle | The Vineyard of the Saker

amarynth

6-8 minutes

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Get ready: something lethally "asymmetrical" may be about to pop up

By Pepe Escobar, posted with the author's permission and widely cross-posted

Neither NATO nor Russia is telling us what really happened with the Moskva, the legendary admiral ship of the Black Sea fleet.

NATO because in theory, they know. Moscow, for its part, made it clear they are not saying anything until they can be sure what happened.

One thing is certain. If the Russian Ministry of Defense finds out that NATO did it, they will let loose all the dogs from Hell on NATO, as in "asymmetrical, lethal and fast".

On Moskva's location: it was positioned near one of 3 drilling rigs, used for monitoring a whole sector of the Black Sea with hydrophones and NEVA-BS radar, the most westward one, BK-2 Odessa, approximately 66 km northeast from Snake Island. The whole thing was integrated in the regional monitoring systems. As in everything, literally, was monitored: ships, low flying targets, smaller echoes, even the bobbing head of an unsuspecting swimmer.

So there was a quite slim chance that anything – not to mention subsonic Neptune missiles and Bayraktar drones – could have slipped through this aerial net.

So what could have possibly happened?

It could have been some kind of underwater drone, released either from some sneaky sub, or by a SBS team, coming from the western coast, with a stopover at Snake Island. Then that drone somehow managed to drill itself through the Moskva's hull from below – and exploded its payload inside.

What follows comes from a top source in Brussels: serious, trustworthy, proven record spanning nearly two decades. Yet he may be just spreading disinformation. Or bragging. Or that may be rock solid intel.

Before we start, we should point out it's hard to believe the Neptune/Bayraktar fairytale angle. After all, as we've seen, the Russian fleet had established a multidimensional surveillance/defense layer in the direction of Odessa.

The Moskva was near Odessa, closer to Romania. A year ago, the source maintains, a new phased array locator was installed on it: the illumination range is 500 km. According to the standard Ukrainian narrative, first the Moskva was hit by a drone, and the locators and antennas were smashed. The Moskva was half blind.

Then – according to the Ukrainian narrative – they launched two Neptune cruise missiles from the shore. Guidance was carried out by NATO's Orion, which was hanging over Romania. The missiles zoomed in on the ship with the homing heads turned off, so that the radiation beam would not be detected.

So we have guidance by NATO's Orion, transmitting the exact coordinates, leading to two hits, and subsequent detonation of ammunition (that's the part acknowledged by the Russian Ministry of Defense).

A strategic hit

The Moskva was on combat duty 100-120 km away from Odessa – controlling the airspace within a radius of 250-300 km. So in fact it was ensuring the overlap of the southern half of Moldova, the space from Izmail to Odessa and part of Romania (including the port of Constanta).

Its positioning could not be more strategic. Moskva was interfering with NATO's covert transfer of military aircraft (helicopters and fighter jets) from Romania to Ukraine. It was being watched 24/7. NATO air reconnaissance was totally on it.

As the Moskva "killer", NATO may have not chosen the Neptune, as spread by Ukrainian propaganda; the source points to the fifth-generation NSM PKR (Naval Strike Missile, with a range of 185 km, developed by Norway and the Americans.)

He describes the NSM as "able to reach the target along a programmed route thanks to the GPS-adjusted INS, independently find the target by flying up to it at an altitude of 3-5 meters. When reaching the target, the NSM maneuvers and deploys electronic interference. A highly sensitive thermal imager is used as a homing system, which independently determines the most vulnerable places of the target ship."

As a direct consequence of hitting the Moskva, NATO managed to reopen an air corridor for the transfer of aircraft to the airfields of Chernivtsi, Transcarpathian and Ivano-Frankivsk regions.

In parallel, after the destruction of the Moskva, the Black Sea Fleet, according to the source, "no longer seems to have a ship equipped with a long-range anti-aircraft missile system". Of course a three-band radar Sky-M system remains in play in Crimea, capable of tracking all air targets at a range of up to 600 km. One wonders whether this is enough for all Russian purposes.

So what do we really have here? Fantasy or reality? There was only one way to know.

I ran the info past the inestimable Andrei Martyanov, who knew the Moskva "as Slava in 1981 when she was afloat in the Northern Bay of Sevastopol and my class which was at first summer practice on board of old cruiser Dzerzhinsky was given an extensive introduction to her. So, she was an old lady and it is too bad that she had to finish her long life this way and at this time."

Martyanov, once again, was the consummate professional, stressing no one, at this stage, really knows what happened. But he made some crucial points: "Per NSM (if we accept this version), even with its Low Observability and GPS guidance under normal (that is sea up to state 5-6) and normal radio-permeability, even the Moskva's old frigate radar would have seen those missiles in distances of tens of kilometers, somewhere between 15-20 for sure. NSM, as any NATO anti-shipping missile, are subsonic, with their velocity roughly 300 meters per second. That leaves, even in a 15 kilometer range, 45 seconds to detect track and develop a firing solution for whatever 'on duty' AD complex. More than enough reaction time."

Martyanov also stresses, "it is impossible to hide the external impact of the anti-shipping missile – one will immediately know what hit the ship. Moreover, to hit and sink such a target as the Moskva one has to launch a salvo and not only two missiles, likely 3-4 at least. In this case, Russia would know who attacked Moskva. Does NATO know? I am positive this event has NATO written all over it, if it is not an internal sabotage which absolutely cannot be excluded at this stage. I am sure if Nebo was operational it would have seen the salvo."

Which brings us to the inevitable clincher: "If NATO was involved, I am sure we will see some retaliation, after all, as I am on record all the time, US bases in Middle East and elsewhere are nothing more than fat prestigious targets."

So get ready: something lethally "asymmetrical" may be about to pop up.

http://thesaker.is/the-moskva-riddle/

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trtworld.com

Alexander Vucic's victory: What is next for Serbia?

TRTWorld

6-8 minutes

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It was like choosing the lesser of two evils for many Serbians.

On April 3, the incumbent Serbian President Alexander Vucic succeeded in winning almost 60 percent of the votes in the presidential election. Remaining in power for another five years means he must deal with the region's burning issues.

Once a member of the ultra-nationalist Radical Party, in 2008, Vucic founded the Serbian Progressive Party, a conservative and pro-European party. Then, Vucic, step by step, climbed the ladders of power. He took office as minister of defence, deputy premier, prime minister and president. 

He cemented his victory in the early April vote count by winning two million votes from 6.5 million registered Serbian voters. 

A leader or faute de mieux?

After the election victory declaration, Vucic thanked his voters for making him "the Serb (after Nikola Pasic) who has been in power in Serbia for the longest time." But what lies behind his success?

Speaking to TRT World's "Across the Balkans," Vuk Vuksanovic, a Senior Researcher at Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, explained Vucic's success by emphasising two main factors: First, he is a formidable person, and his party has a tremendous and well-mobilised influence on the media, state institutions, and national security setup. Second, the frailty of the opposition did not offer a better alternative. 

According to Vuksanovic, many Serbians are upset by the post-Milosevic economic and political transition. Some consider the opposition as part of that disappointment. The result is a tactical vote, which means people did not vote for Vucic because they liked him but because, from their perspective, he represents the lesser evil. 

Moscow vs Brussels

The Russian assault on Ukraine influenced the election campaign considerably. Vucic used this fact to his benefit. His main slogan was crafted accordingly. 

With "Peace and Stability," he promised economic growth and infrastructure development. He echoed his desire not to get the country entangled in the conflict. On the other hand, his opponent Zdravko Ponos, blamed him for building unity with "fear of war… abusing events in Ukraine." 

As Vuksanovic emphasises, Vucic benefited from the conflict. The image of an experienced politician who could lead the troubled country in these dark times overshadowed the opposition. 

In the same tone as his slogan, on the election night, Vucic emphasised the importance of having good relationships in the region and pursuing the European, alongside preserving "ties with its traditional friends." Serbia supported two United Nations resolutions condemning Russia's military assault. Moreover, Belgrade still refuses to be part of the sanctions imposed on Moscow. 

In an earlier speech, he said that Belgard continues on its European path, but "Serbia will not rush into enmity because someone else asks to." Speaking to TRT World, Srdjan Majstorovic, Chairman of the Board of European Policy Centre (CEP) and member of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BIEPAG), explained that these elections will have an important impact on Serbia's relations with the EU. The country started accession negotiations in 2014; however, issues like democracy and problematic relations with its neighbours brought the process to a standstill. With Belgrade's indecisive approach to Ukraine, its EU process is questioned again. 

Right after the elections, Vucic emphasised that Serbia would continue on the same path; keep the policy of military neutrality and stay away from any military alliance. 

For the first time since 1999, Kosovo Serbs weren't allowed to have open polling stations. The Kosovo government decided not to allow its citizens to vote in its neighbours' elections. With no polling stations opened, thousands of Kosovo Serbs crossed the border with their cars and buses to vote in Serbia. Majstorovic says this situation will have long-term consequences. The nationalist narratives on both sides will rise, and these elections will shadow future talks' tone and atmosphere.  

Parliamentary elections

Vucic's Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) won the Parliamentary election conducted on the same day. SNS's 43.5 percent was followed by United for Victory of Serbia with 12.9. The Socialist Party of Serbia, which is the SNS's partner party, won 11.6 per cent. The green-left Moramo got 4.4 per cent, and the right-wing NADA, Oathkeepers and Dveri also passed the threshold. 

The current picture portrays a sliding to the right, which could create a serious issue for Vucic's EU policy. The president's party did not have the majority needed to form a government and will need partners: probably the SPS or right-wing parties. On the other hand, Moramo entered the Parliament for the first time. Their green agenda helped people mobilise and protest against the exploitation of natural minerals last year. 

Majstorovic suggests that the formation of the new government would take until late summer. In this way, Vucic will be able to buy time, measure the public's opinion, oversee internal and external factors, and avoid having a net stance on the Russia-Ukraine crisis. 

Vuksanovic points out that Vucic's role depends on the trade-offs at a regional level. If he is perceived as a balancer for the region, he probably will accept this role. However, if there is a chance of getting a domestic rating, he will use the nationalist's card. 

As the only Balkan country president that does not impose sanctions on Russia, Vucic will have to balance appeasing Mother Russia and pleasing Brussels. This approach will affect Vucic's domestic policy and the region's delicate balance of power.   

 

eurasiareview.com

Orban And Vucic (And Tito) – OpEd

TransConflict

9-12 minutes

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By David B. Kanin*

The poor performance of Russia's military has galvanized a Western alliance that appeared disoriented and divided in the wake of the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Breathless rhetoric has called Putin's war "suicidal," [1] questioned his sanity, and speculated as to how he can find an off-ramp. Meanwhile, a bloodied but stolid Russia adjusts its sights and prepares to bludgeon eastern and southern Ukraine before returning to re-assault the country's capital and the West. Russia has lost the first six weeks of the war but shows no sign of giving up on eventual victory, no matter how ugly its strategic and operational performance. If Moscow is to lose this war it will have to suffer much more serious setbacks than have been evident so far.

Ukraine's ferocious resistance has led some Western pundits to wax enthusiastic about a supposed revival of the liberal world's hegemony. On March 17 I attended a Zoomfest organized by an American Balkans watcher who invited a number of analysts and academics from the region to comment on the impact of the war on their countries and the Balkans as a whole. Before he let any of them speak the American laid out a series of triumphalist slides declaring the victory of democracy, defeat of autocracy, robustness of nation building, and retreat of populism. (He went on for a long time and then put pressure on each of his many guests to cut their presentations short – those speakers presented more sober views of the situation).

The organizer alleged that Russia's failure marked the end of the line for Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic's policy of balancing his relations with Russia and the West. Vucic, the argument goes, will have to choose between falling in line with US and EU support for Ukraine or lash himself and Serbia to a losing Russian war effort. Similarly, Western media assessments have labeled Vucic as a Putin ally and linked him with Hungarian strongman Victor Orban. Such simplistic categorizations underestimate the subtlety and durability of these leaders' policies. They also ignore the existence of nationalist and anti-war sentiment in Hungary and nationalist and pro-Russian feeling among Vucic's constituents. And, by the way, the slant of this analysis overstates the attachment of each of these figures to Putin.

It should be remembered that non-alignment is far from a new concept in southeastern Europe. Josip Broz (Tito) confounded expectations when he survived his split with Stalin and Stalin himself but also managed to keep Washington and NATO at arms -length even as he accepted economic and financial assistance from the West. Tito was proud of his role as a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement and the memory of this stance continues to resonate in Serbia. Non-alignment helped orient a rickety structure that survived Tito's death for a decade. The collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe did not cause the collapse of Yugoslavia, but the end of non-alignment's relevance in wake of the events of 1989-91 removed one prop on which the Yugoslav identity and sense of purpose had rested.

Hungary, a former member of the Warsaw Pact and now in both the EU and NATO, never has been non-aligned. Nevertheless, Orban's politics and security policies have morphed a bit like those of Bosnian Serb strongman Milorad Dodik. Previous posturing as a young pro-Western democrat gave way to enthusiastic embrace of populism and friendlier relations with Russia.

Vucic came to his neutrality from a very different direction, starting out as a nationalist associated with Vojislav Seselj but becoming a pragmatic, skillful politician able to establish good relations with Angela Merkel as well as Putin. Orban and Vucic achieved their latest victories in elections on the same day (April 3). In both cases, the system was skewed in the incumbent's favor but there is little doubt these leaders' opponents did not have the popular support needed to force regime change.

• Ukraine's cause clearly did not move the needle in either case; it is important to stress that, like Vucic , the Serbian opposition refrained from supporting Western sanctions against Russia.

Going forward, there is no reason either of these newly reelected men needs to abandon their strategies. The EU is punishing Orban by threatening to withhold funds related to disputes preexisting and unrelated to Ukraine. This issue also failed to help his electoral opponents and likely has been discounted in Budapest. Orban's offer to host peace talks includes invitations to France and Germany as well as Russia and Ukraine but not the US and so plays to Moscow's goal of splitting NATO and marginalizing European security. The fact Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz continue to make futile phone calls to Putin suggests their interest in proving the EU is more than a marginal security actor might tempt them to accept what Putin would try to mold into a replay of the 1938 Munich agreement.

Vucic also can be relatively comfortable in his stance on the war. The fact there exists no credible path to EU membership for Serbia or the other Balkan non-members removes much of the leverage the Eurocrats would like to believe they have in Belgrade and other Balkan capitals. The well-trod argument that the West's outrage at Putin's invasion of Ukraine is hypocritical in the context of its bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 still carries much weight with the Serbian public. Vucic likely will keep as low a profile as possible as the conflict evolves – there is no reason for him to compete with Orban and Turkish President Recip Tayyip Erdogan for pride of place as potential mediator.

The emerging war crimes horror around Bucha and other towns in Ukraine recently evacuated by Russian troops so far does not seem to be changing this dynamic. The war coincides with the 30^th anniversary of the beginning of the war in Bosnia. BBC and other Western media have paid attention to this history and have reminded audiences of the Srebrenica genocide and other atrocities. Some have raised the trajectory of the war crimes trials after the Bosnian and Kosovo crises as cautionary tales relevant to possible criminal charges against Putin and Russian miscreants operating in Ukraine. So far, there does not appear to be an appetite to force Dodik out or to demand that Serbia act toward Ukraine differently than some believe it acted in Bosnia and Kosovo.

China is its own stool

In my view, it is nonsense to suggest China somehow faces great dilemmas about the war in Ukraine or that Beijing is missing a chance to prove it is a responsible actor in an international system that benefits it. China is properly looking out for its interests in an international system it is in the process of changing to suit those interests. The idea that China's integration in the global economy will or should lead it to cooperate with Western "partners" is one of the silliest fantasies emerging from the West's enthusiasm over the Putin-inspired renewal of its sense of supremacy. The current situation has its dangers but overall works to China's benefit. The other two superpowers are at each other's throats in a conflict Beijing can stay out of. China's economy will suffer some pain, but nothing unmanageable.

Meanwhile, China will benefit from what is becoming Putin's Mussolini moment. Well into the 1930s, Italy was the senior partner in the relationship with Nazi Germany – in 1936 Mussolini mobilized troops at the Austrian border to deter Hitler from trying to impose Anschluss. Within a short time that relationship reversed as Mussolini's Italy floundered and then collapsed.

Now, Putin's miscalculation in Ukraine and the imposition of Western sanctions much broader, deeper and – I believe – longer lasting than Moscow expected is making Russia increasingly dependent on Chinese economic support. For now, China probably will be judicious in how it uses this growing leverage over junior partner Russia because both countries share the primary goal of bringing down the US and the declining Western-dominated order. Nevertheless, Moscow and Beijing are engaged in what over time will become an increasingly competitive tussle for influence in Central and South Asia. A similar dynamic eventually will emerge elsewhere, including in the Balkans. Orban and specially Vucic will be able to look to Beijing as an alternative partner to both Russia and the West.

China's rise is beyond the scope of the war in Ukraine and out of the control of Western powers and their fictional "international community." However, NATO and the EU can do a lot to nurture their residual credibility if they make sure it is the Russian stool that collapses under the feet of Orban Vucic and not their own. It is not overstating the case to insist that Western strategic credibility depends on enabling Ukraine to win its war. So far, all the West is doing is helping Kyiv not immediately lose. Part of Putin's calculus in risking this invasion was the certainty that the West would not fight. Now, a bloodied Russia has as its goal an outcome in the field and/or at the negotiating table in which the West loses without firing a shot. This goal is attainable and, if attained, will strengthen Russian influence in places where its influence remains significant – in the Balkans that includes Bulgaria, North Macedonia, the Republika Srpska, and Montenegro as well as Serbia and Hungary.

*David B. Kanin is an adjunct professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University and a former senior intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Footnote:

1.  For example, Nina Khrushcheva in an interview on MSNBC on April 6, 2022.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of TransConflict.