http://kosovareport.blogspot.com/2005/12/kosovos-moment-of-truth.html
Kosovo report
December 25, 2005
Kosovo’s Moment of Truth
By Tim Judah
(Survival vol. 47 no. 4 Winter 2005–06 pp. 73–84)
For the last six years Kosovo has been run as protectorate of the United Nations. That chapter of its history is now coming to an end. Very soon – probably at least by December 2005 – talks should begin on the future status of this territory bitterly disputed between Serbs and Albanians. It is widely expected that, against the wishes of the government in Belgrade, Kosovo will be granted some form of ‘conditional independence’. Exactly what this means remains to be seen.
The roots of the Kosovo conflict lie in the fact that more than 90% of its two million people are ethnic Albanians.1 That Kosovo, within anyone’s living memory, has always had a high preponderance of Albanians made it a particular political problem within Yugoslavia. Since 1999, however, the link with Serbia has, in all but de jure terms, been severed. The likelihood that it can be restored seems fanciful to say the least.
In 1989 Serbia, under Slobodan Milosevic, abolished Kosovo’s autonomy. During the major Yugoslav wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Kosovo stayed quiet. In 1998, however, a guerrilla war broke out. Events escalated until NATO’s 78-day bombing campaign over what was then still known as Yugoslavia. After a period of frantic diplomacy Milosevic surrendered, Serbia pulled its forces out of Kosovo and much of the local administration collapsed. They were replaced by the UN and a NATO-led force called KFOR. This arrangement was blessed by UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which provided the legal basis for the current situation in Kosovo. The resolution recognised the territorial integrity of what was then called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and instructed what was to become the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to promote, ‘pending a final settlement … substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo taking into full account … the Rambouillet Accords’.
The ill-fated Rambouillet meeting outside Paris preceded NATO’s bombardment of 1999. The Serbian side did not agree to the text it was asked to sign, one reason being that this document had foreseen that Kosovo’s future would, after three years, be decided ’on the basis of the will of the people’. The Serbs argued that since the Albanians were in favour of inde¬pendence, this phrase could only mean that they would lose their southern province, which they regard as the cradle of their civilisation. Thus, at its very heart, Resolution 1244 contained a contradiction – pitting the Kosovo majority’s right to self-determination against the equally valid legal prin¬ciple of the territorial integrity of states. Up to now it has been possible to avoid resolving this contradiction. Today, however, in the words of UNMIK head Søren Jessen-Petersen, Kosovo is facing ’its moment of truth’.
Since 1999 Kosovo has changed beyond recognition. The first and most obvious change is that there are no longer any Serbs in any of Kosovo’s major urban settlements, bar north Mitrovica, which is a divided city. The end of Serbian rule culminated in the flight and ethnic cleansing of large numbers of Serbs (and Roma), very few of whom have returned. Today one-third of the estimated 100,000 Serbs who remain in Kosovo live in Mitrovica and the overwhelmingly Serbian-inhabited north of Kosovo, which is contiguous with Serbia. The rest live in enclaves scattered throughout the rest of the province. Some of these need 24-hour military protection, as do Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries. Economically, Kosovo remains extremely weak and unemployment high, though reliable figures are hard to come by. Average wages are now around €200 a month and many families depend on remittances from the large Kosovo diaspora living and working abroad, especially in Western Europe.
Since 1999, the UN has set up a government structure in Kosovo. Powers are gradually being devolved to elected bodies and their ministries. Most Serbs boycott these institutions, either at the behest of the authorities in Belgrade or because they believe that on those occasions when they did participate, they were simply used in an Albanian effort to deceive the outside world into believing that a real multi-ethnic society was being built in Kosovo. The boycott is controversial, however. Some Serb leaders believe they have lost more than they have gained by staying outside of Kosovo’s structures.
In December 2003 UNMIK, together with the government of Kosovo, promulgated a list of so-called ‘Standards’ against which Kosovo’s progress could be measured, covering everything from rule of law to minority rights. At the same time the UN and other diplomats – adopting the slogan ‘Standards before Status’ – made clear that the issue of Kosovo’s final status was not on the agenda for the immediate future. In November 2003, however, the ‘Contact Group’ of main outside powers announced that if all went well, by the middle of 2005 a comprehensive review of standards would open the way for talks on the future status of the province. The irony is that talks may soon begin not because things went well, but because they went disastrously wrong. In March 2004 riots broke out in which some 4,000 Serbs and Roma were driven from their homes and 19 killed. It became starkly clear that the status quo was untenable and, if there was a new upsurge in violence, UNMIK might even collapse. Immediately after the riots UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called in a diplomat with considerable Balkan experience to lead an inquiry into what had caused them. The insights of this diplomat, Norwegian ambassador to NATO Kai Eide, helped convince Annan and many others that dangerous stagnation had set in; the only way to avoid a new conflagration was to give the impression that Kosovo was somehow moving forward and was not doomed to remain forever a forgotten, poverty-stricken corner of Europe.
Kosovo’s Albanian leaders either quickly understood, or were made to understand by diplomats and the foreign leaders that they met, that the riots had been disastrous for their international image. In December 2004, following elections, a new government came to power headed by former Kosovo Liberation Army commander Ramush Haradinaj. With much force and skill, Haradinaj moved to get Kosovo to live up to the Standards and even to reach out to the Serbs. Being a skilful premier was not enough, however, to stop allegations about his past catching up with him. In March 2005 he was indicted by the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal in The Hague for war crimes dating back to 1998. With much dignity he resigned and departed but, contrary to expectations, Kosovo remained calm. In part this was because Albanian leaders understood that, if angry Kosovars began rampaging once again, the prospect of the comprehensive review would clearly diminish. This time they played their cards well and in June Kofi Annan invited Kai Eide back to begin the review.
Eide delivered his report on 4 October. Annan passed it on to the Security Council three days later, saying he accepted its recommendations. ‘The time has come’, said Annan, ’to move to the next phase of the political process.’ He added that he now intended to ’initiate preparations’ for the appointment of ‘a Special Envoy to lead the future status process.’ At the time of writing it was widely expected that he would choose Martti Ahtisaari, the former Finnish president who played a key role in securing Milosevic’s agreement to the terms which ended NATO’s bombardment of Yugoslavia in 1999.
Eide’s most important point was that talks on the future status of Kosovo should begin. He was not asked to say what he thought the final status of Kosovo should be and, significantly, he uses the words ‘future status’ rather than ‘final status’. This implies, and indeed Eide in places explicitly says, that international involvement in the contested province will continue for many years. ’The international community must do the utmost to ensure that whatever the status becomes it does not become a “failed†status’, he writes. ’Entering the future status process does not mean entering the last stage, but the next stage in the process.’
Progress in meeting the Standards as a whole has been uneven, Eide says: ’regrettably, little has been achieved to create a foundation for a multi-ethnic society’. Talks should nevertheless begin, he says, because the momentum and expectations have built up; ’having moved from stagnation to expecta¬tion, stagnation cannot be allowed to take hold’.
Some of Eide’s recommendations may be carried out whatever the result of status talks. The EU, he argues, should play a prominent role, especially in police and judicial matters. NATO, too, will have to stay, with at least some contribution from the US ‘in order to provide a visible expression of [America’s] continued engagement’. Certain elements of the international presence in Bosnia should be copied for Kosovo. These include the role of the ‘high representative’, currently Britain’s Paddy Ashdown, who exer¬cises huge powers and can fire any elected official in Bosnia. In Sarajevo, Ashdown holds a kind of hybrid position – both ‘high representative’ of the intervening powers and international community, vaguely defined, but also the EU’s special representative to Bosnia. Eide suggests a similar arrangement for the post-UNMIK era in Kosovo: a high represenative with extraordinary powers in the field of inter-ethnic relations, but who is also ‘firmly anchored’ in the EU.
Regarding Kosovo’s Serbian minority, Eide argues in favour of an ’ambi¬tious decentralisation plan‘ which would give Kosovo Serbs competences ’in areas such as police, justice, education, culture, media and the economy’. He also recommends that what he terms ’protective space’ should be created around Serbian Orthodox religious sites and institutions and that ways should be found to place them ‘under a form of international protection’. He adds: ‘it is important not only to protect individual sites as cultural and religious monuments, but also living communities’.
Albanian and Serb reactions to the Eide report were mixed. Albanian leaders reacted exuberantly to the fact that it had recommended that talks begin, but initially said little about the content of the report. Although giving praise where praise was due, the report was largely damning about corruption and the majority’s treatment of the Serb minority. Reactions in Serbia were on the whole positive, although not without criticisms. If the Standards had not been met, asked some, then why was Eide recommending that talks begin? To a great extent this was empty rhetoric, since by the time the report was issued Belgrade and Pristina were already readying themselves for talks, or at least were supposed to be.
As late as June 2005, on the Serb side a degree of denial still prevailed. Officials in Belgrade described Serbia’s policy as anticipating that Kosovo could have ‘more than autonomy, but less than independence’. What this meant was unclear. Some officials, such as Aleksandar Simic, an adviser to Premier Vojislav Kostunica, said that this meant that although being autonomous, the future Kosovo would send back deputies to the parliament in Belgrade and play a full role in running the whole country.13 Serbia has a population of 7.5 million, as against some 2m for Kosovo. The forcible reincorporation of such a large number of implacably hostile Albanians into the Serbian body politic seemed so far from reality or in the interests of a stable Serbia that one could only wonder: had Serbian strategists, unable in the past six years to visit Kosovo at will, simply lost any grasp of the reality there?
By autumn 2005, however, a more realistic concept of what was possible was emerging. Sanda Raskovic-Ivic, the head of the Serbian government’s Coordination Centre for Kosovo, was saying that she envisaged the province having full autonomy in the judicial, executive and legislative fields but that defence, foreign affairs and sovereignty would remain in the hands of Serbia. Dusan Batakovic, a historian and diplomat with a deep knowledge of Kosovo, and now advisor to Serbian President Boris Tadic, elaborated on this: he did not expect that the Albanians would want to return to parliament in Belgrade, though this option remained. He also said that, in preparing for talks, he was gaming various scenarios of what might happen.
It seems unlikely that the Serbian idea of ‘more than autonomy but less than independence’ will gain support amongst the big powers who will help arbitrate Kosovo’s fate. However, the new position, despite the occasional nationalistic outburst, is expressed in the mild language of compromise; the Serbs claim they are trying to find a happy median between the Albanian desire for self-rule and their desire to defend Serbia’s territorial integrity. In private, some senior Serbian leaders say they believe that ‘conditional independence’ for Kosovo is inevitable, but they will nonetheless put up a fierce rearguard struggle to prevent it. No Serbian leader wants to go down in history as the one who lost Kosovo, so if this rearguard action succeeds in staving off independence during their watch – which is conceivable, if unlikely – they will regard the talks as a success.
In Pristina, preparations for talks lag far behind those of Belgrade. Publicly, everyone from President Ibrahim Rugova to Premier Bajram Kosumi says that they are willing to talk with the Serbs about everything except independence, which is non-negotiable. Pristina’s position, in other words, is the mirror image of Belgrade’s. This position is understandable from their point of view, but what seems alarming is the lack of prepara¬tion for any succession issues, in light of the experience of the rest of the former Yugoslavia. Since 1999, for example, Serbia has not paid pensions to Albanian workers who had paid their contributions like other Yugoslav citizens. When Kosovo Albanian negotiators demand this money, the Serbs will retort that they have paid the interest on Kosovo’s interna¬tional debt for the last six years.
Indeed, diplomats in Pristina fret that the main Kosovan leaders are simply unprepared for talks and have been lulled, by talk of ‘conditional independence’, into a false sense of security. They do not seem to appreciate the threat, from their point of view, of the preparations being made by the Serbs.15 Indeed, Albanians recently were outraged when the International Telecommunications Union failed to quickly accede to a request from UNMIK to allot Kosovo an international direct-dialling code separate from Serbia’s. This was thanks to deft diplomacy on the part of Serbia, although the issue has not yet been finally settled.
Some skilled people will be at the coming talks, as part of a team already selected by Rugova. But the question is whether there are enough of them. The two best men on the team, not being major political figures, have the least clout. One is Blerim Shala, the editor of the daily Zeri, who has been asked to coordinate the team’s working groups; the other is Veton Surroi, the publisher and now leader of the small opposition party Ora. The rest of the team leave room for concern, quite apart from personal antipathies within the group. Nexhat Daci, the speaker of parliament, is widely regarded by diplomats who deal with Kosovo as an old-style, inflexible demagogue and by opposition leaders as unacceptably authoritarian. Next is Bajram Kosumi, the likeable but weak premier who succeeded Ramush Haradinaj. A whiff of scandal hangs over his premiership following allegations of corruption which appeared in the press. President Ibrahim Rugova is the best-known international symbol of Kosovo and his authority is unmatched. However, he has lung cancer and nobody knows how his health will hold up over the next few months. If he dies or is incapacitated soon this will provoke a major political upheaval as rival camps, which are already emerging, fight for the leadership of his Democratic League of Kosovo, the largest single party in Kosovo. His demise could also fatally weaken the Kosovo Albanian negoti¬ating team, as the others fight for a leadership role. Finally there is Hashim Thaci, the leader of the opposition Democratic Party of Kosovo, who used to be the political leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army. All these men, bar Daci, participated in the Rambouillet negotiations.
At the time of writing the Eide report was awaiting examination by the Security Council. According to diplomatic sources, once this stage has been passed and Ahtisaari or someone else has been selected to lead the talks, three deputies – from the US, EU and Russia -- will be chosen. A period of shuttle diplomacy will begin, perhaps in December, and at some point in early 2006 the team could retire to write a draft agreement. While working groups of Serbs and Albanians may go over certain individual questions, the main negotiators will not yet meet. Indeed, a proposal which had been floated behind the scenes in late summer for a formal opening of talks was quashed on the grounds that both sides would then be obliged to state positions publicly, which would later reduce their room for manoeuvre and flexibility. According to Veton Surroi, a realistic scenario foresees the Serb and Albanian main negotiating teams summoned to meet around May 2006 ‘in a castle in Austria’. In January Austria takes over the presidency of the EU.
What happens next is impossible to predict. One scenario outlined by a senior diplomatic source foresees that the Serbian team will fight hard to make sure that the agreement contains all possible safeguards for the Kosovo Serbs, acknowledging its own interests and in institutionalising international protection for Serbian Orthodox monasteries and churches.18 Having achieved this, the Serbs could then refuse to endorse the plan because it also points the way to Kosovo’s independence. Reluctantly, perhaps, the Albanians would then be compelled to accept more in terms of Serbian rights in Kosovo than they would have done otherwise, but under international pressure they might see such concessions as the price of independence.
At the same time Serbia’s leaders, none of whom want to take responsibility for losing Kosovo, could claim that, at this point and having fought as hard as possible, Kosovo was taken away from Serbia. Since Serbia did not give its consent, it will not recognise the emerging state and hence, as far as it is concerned, its status could (theoretically,) be reversed at a later date. If this is in fact how the situ¬ation develops, this Serb position will, sooner or later, have to be modified, if only as the price of EU membership – as recent quarrels over Turkey and the question of its recognition of Cyprus have demonstrated.
It is impossible to know in advance what the UN-led negotiating team might propose. But since the widespread assumption is that it will be some form of ‘conditional independence’, it is worth examining what this could mean. In broad terms it would certainly mean adopting some of the recom¬mendations discussed by Eide, but more specifically it may well be that the negotiators are guided by the blueprint of the International Commission on the Balkans. This independent group, which issued its report in April 2005, was chaired by former Italian Premier Giuliano Amato, and for the most part included people either from or with a deep knowledge and experience of the Balkans. They proposed that Kosovo should move towards independence in four stages. The first, ‘de facto separation of Kosovo from Serbia’, seems to describe the current situation. The second is called ‘independence without full sovereignty’, which is described as meaning that Kosovo is an independent entity but not yet a sovereign state and one in which the international community ‘reserves powers in the fields of human rights and minorities’ – a theme which was echoed by Eide. The third stage is called ‘guided sovereignty’, and would ‘coincide with Kosovo’s recognition as a candidate for EU membership’ and in which the international community would lose its reserve powers which would be replaced by ‘influence through the negotiation process’. The fourth and final stage is called ‘full and final sovereignty’, and is marked by the ‘absorption of Kosovo into the EU and its adoption of the shared sover¬eignty to which all members are subject’.
The Serbs hope that it will not come to this, and with skilful diplomacy they might stand a slim chance of at least making the technical status of Kosovo somewhat vaguer and more drawn out than that described above. For this they would probably need vigorous support from Russia, however, and according to diplomatic sources the Russians have already decided to betray the Serbs.20 For the benefit of the Serbian press, Russian diplomats say that they will not accept any solution for Kosovo which is not endorsed by Belgrade, but to Western diplomats they are saying precisely the oppo¬site. It has always been widely assumed that Russia, citing the precedent of Chechnya, would oppose Kosovo’s independence. Now, however, three things seem to have happened. In 2003 Russian troops were withdrawn from the Balkans. This has dramatically lowered Russia’s diplomatic leverage in the region. Secondly, Russian diplomats have concluded that there is no realistic way to reconnect Kosovo and its hostile population to Belgrade. Thirdly, they have concluded, and indeed told visiting foreign ministers, that as far as they are concerned the question of precedent could be used to their advantage. That is to say, they are noting that if Kosovo can secede from a sovereign state, then the same argument can potentially be applied in areas of the former Soviet Union where they have interests, specifically Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia and Trans-Dniester in Moldova.
China is unlikely to resist the independence of Kosovo if Russia does not, although this cannot be taken for granted. While China has never taken an active role or even interest in the Balkans, it did veto the continuation of a UN peacekeeping force in Macedonia in 1999. The Serbs might succeed in persuading China that independence for Kosovo would set a dangerous precedent for Taiwan or even Tibet. Whatever the repercussions for Tibet, Serbian politicians argue that if Kosovo is granted some form of independence this would destabilise the region in a way they could not control. They argue, for example, that if they cannot prevent the loss of Kosovo, Serbia might succumb to a renewed wave of angry nationalism and the Radical Party, led by Vojislav Seselj, now on trial in The Hague on war-crimes charges, might come to power. This is conceivable. The Radicals are already the largest party in parlia¬ment, although they are not in government. Outside of Serbia’s borders, the Serbian argument runs, Kosovo’s independence would embolden Albanian nationalists in Macedonia, thus perhaps prompting the disintegration of that state, with its large Albanian minority. The Serb part of Bosnia would again raise its wartime demand to secede and join Serbia.
Diplomats who follow the region are of course well acquainted with this line of argument, which played a decisive role in the EU’s decision in October to begin talks with Serbia on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA). Diplomats openly said that they decided not to let the outstanding issue of Ratko Mladic, the fugitive Bosnian Serb wartime commander wanted by the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal, stand in the way of the opening of negotiations. They are hoping that the good news of the conclusion of an agreement next year may help counteract the simultaneous bad news of the loss of Kosovo and likely secession of Montenegro from the loose federation which currently links it to Serbia.
Albanians counter these arguments about radicalisation in Serbia with the argument that, unless they get independence, it is certain that hardliners will again resort to arms; in the ensuing uprising KFOR and representa¬tives of the international community present in Kosovo will be targeted. UN vehicles are already targets of the occasional bomb.
In the shorter term there is another threat. Over the last few months, Albin Kurti, a 30-year-old former student leader and political prisoner, has been organising young people across Kosovo. Studying the techniques used by those who organised the overthrow of former regimes in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, Kurti wants to ready his people to come out in protest against the talks on Kosovo’s future status.
Kurti says that talks, by their very nature, aim at compromise and there can be no compromise on Kosovo’s independence. He fears that what he calls Kosovo’s ‘corrupt’ politicians might yet buckle on this if put under pres¬sure. He argues that talks with Serbia should only take place when Kosovo is already independent and thus can sit at the table as an equal. His slogan – ‘No negotiations! Self Determination!’ – already decorates walls across Kosovo but his strength is, as yet, untested. If, however, at some point in the near future or during talks one of the Albanian leaders, for example Hashim Thaci, decided to ‘play the Kurti card’ and swing his support behind him then the outcome would be not only unpredictable but in such an unstable and highly charged situation a fresh wave of anti-Serbian ethnic cleansing similar to that of March 2004 might break out.
Diplomats who deal with Kosovo all repeat the mantra that they have no preconceived agenda, beyond wanting to prohibit the physical partition of Kosovo or a possible future union with Albania, and that they want Serbs and Albanians to reach agreement on the territory’s future among themselves. All of them know, however, and admit in private, that the likelihood of this happening is nil. This is why ‘conditional independence’ is their aim. As to the fear of violence and instability, the most honest of them will admit that their fear of radicalisation in Serbia is simply less than their fear of an Albanian uprising. As to the question of the probable eventual recog¬nition of the new state, they argue that while it would be preferable for this to be done via the Security Council, especially in light of the fact that Kosovo is now under UN jurisdiction, if Russia or China prevented this another route would have to be found. After all, the UN Security Council played no role in the recognition of the other states which emerged from the former Yugoslavia. According to Richard Caplan, in the likely case of Serbia opposing Kosovo’s recognition, ‘there will be ample opportunities for lawyers on both sides to exploit what is a rather ambiguous case’. Realities on the ground will be decisive. ‘Here, I think, politics will trump law.’
posted by KosovoReport @ 4:44 PM 0 comments
December 26, 2005
Kosovo�s Moment of Truth
December 25, 2005
New book on US destruction of Yugoslavia
New book on US destruction of Yugoslavia
Workers World - Dec 29, 2005 issue
http://www.workers.org/2005/world/milosevic-1229/
New book gives different view of U.S. destruction of Yugoslavia
By Paddy Colligan
"The Defense Speaks for History and the Future: Opening defense
statement at The Hague by President of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic
with an introduction by Ramsey Clark" published by the International
Action Center, 2005. 120 pp. $19.95
Does this sound like a book to miss? Well, even if you do buy it,
would you let it languish on your bookshelf, without reading it? If
you followed either course of action, you would miss out on a
remarkable document. In fact, you would be react ing precisely as U.S.
administrations from Bush Sr. to Clinton to Bush Shrub have planned.
The demonization of Presi dent Milosevic has been so thorough that
even those on the side of the working class may not expect him to be
the source of historical insight. This is a pity, as he has been a
major political figure for many years in Yugoslavia, a once
significant workers' state.
This remarkable little book gives a lucid overview of the complex
history of the Balkans from World War II to the present. It includes
an analysis of the roots of the tragic inter-ethnic violence and the
way inter-imperialist rivalries have played out in the (now) former
Yugoslavia. At times it is quite detailed and examines arguments
primarily familiar to those who have closely followed the region's
political twists and turns. More often it offers difficult to find and
valuable background information that makes the region comprehensible.
Often books that are translations are awkward and convoluted. Not this
book. It is an excellent and authoritative translation of Milosevic's
opening statement, which he delivered in Serbo-Croatian before the
fraudulent International Criminal Court for the former Yugo slavia.
The writing is clear and even elegant. It is an achievement that
Milosevic was able to produce this in his isolated incarceration in
Scheveningen Prison in The Hague.
Part of Milosevic's opening statement reads, "An untruthful, distorted
picture of what happened in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was
created in internation al public opinion over a long period of time
with clear political intentions. These charges represent an
unscrupulous mani pulation of lies, a perversion of law, a defeat of
morals, and an extreme distortion of history. Everything has been
turned upside down in order to shield from responsibility those who
are truly responsible for the tragic events, to render the wrong
judgments and to draw the wrong conclusions about the nature and
background of the war against Yugoslavia."
It is worth our time to read Milo sevic's book so we can more fully
understand what the U.S. has done to Yugo slavia--this scenario of
systematically demonizing, dismantling and destroying countries that
won't do Washington's bidding continues to be the modus operandi of
U.S. governments.
This article is copyright under a Creative Commons License.
Workers World, 55 W. 17 St., NY, NY 10011
Email: w...@workers.org
Subscribe wwnews-subscr...@workersworld.net
Balkan's North-South Independence Blues
Xinhua : Macedonian president says borders must be established before Kosovo status talks
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/24/eng20051224_230472.html
Commentary and Analysis:
* Kosovo: behind-the-scenes hard talk begins
(by Tim Judah)
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=14024
* Kosovo 'domino effect’ no longer genuine issue
(by Igor Jovanovic )
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=14030
Hungarian tricolour adopted by ethnic Hungarians in Serbia
http://calibre.mworld.com/m/m.w?lp=GetStory&id=177416881
December 24, 2005
New book on US destruction of Yugoslavia
New book on US destruction of Yugoslavia
Workers World - Dec 29, 2005 issue
http://www.workers.org/2005/world/milosevic-1229/
New book gives different view of U.S. destruction of Yugoslavia
By Paddy Colligan
"The Defense Speaks for History and the Future: Opening defense
statement at The Hague by President of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic
with an introduction by Ramsey Clark" published by the International
Action Center, 2005. 120 pp. $19.95
Does this sound like a book to miss? Well, even if you do buy it,
would you let it languish on your bookshelf, without reading it? If
you followed either course of action, you would miss out on a
remarkable document. In fact, you would be react ing precisely as U.S.
administrations from Bush Sr. to Clinton to Bush Shrub have planned.
The demonization of Presi dent Milosevic has been so thorough that
even those on the side of the working class may not expect him to be
the source of historical insight. This is a pity, as he has been a
major political figure for many years in Yugoslavia, a once
significant workers' state.
This remarkable little book gives a lucid overview of the complex
history of the Balkans from World War II to the present. It includes
an analysis of the roots of the tragic inter-ethnic violence and the
way inter-imperialist rivalries have played out in the (now) former
Yugoslavia. At times it is quite detailed and examines arguments
primarily familiar to those who have closely followed the region's
political twists and turns. More often it offers difficult to find and
valuable background information that makes the region comprehensible.
Often books that are translations are awkward and convoluted. Not this
book. It is an excellent and authoritative translation of Milosevic's
opening statement, which he delivered in Serbo-Croatian before the
fraudulent International Criminal Court for the former Yugo slavia.
The writing is clear and even elegant. It is an achievement that
Milosevic was able to produce this in his isolated incarceration in
Scheveningen Prison in The Hague.
Part of Milosevic's opening statement reads, "An untruthful, distorted
picture of what happened in the territory of the former Yugoslavia was
created in internation al public opinion over a long period of time
with clear political intentions. These charges represent an
unscrupulous mani pulation of lies, a perversion of law, a defeat of
morals, and an extreme distortion of history. Everything has been
turned upside down in order to shield from responsibility those who
are truly responsible for the tragic events, to render the wrong
judgments and to draw the wrong conclusions about the nature and
background of the war against Yugoslavia."
It is worth our time to read Milo sevic's book so we can more fully
understand what the U.S. has done to Yugo slavia--this scenario of
systematically demonizing, dismantling and destroying countries that
won't do Washington's bidding continues to be the modus operandi of
U.S. governments.
This article is copyright under a Creative Commons License.
Workers World, 55 W. 17 St., NY, NY 10011
Email: w...@workers.org
Subscribe wwnews-subscr...@workersworld.net
What remains to be done in the Balkans
http://www.antiwar.com/blog/index.php?id=P2582
Antiwar.com
Blog
December 23, 2005
UNMIK Boss Gives Up on Human Rights for Kosovo
Marek Antoni Nowicki, ombudsmen for Kosovo, is notable for being one of the very few international officials to have remained in the UN mission there from the very beginning. But now he's on the way out, reports ADN Kronos.
He's also remarkable for being one a very few officials who consistently has stood up for the rights of the people of Kosovo, reminding a disinterested outside world of the chronic problems faced by the province's minorities. And Nowicki has not been afraid to criticize the UN administration for its failings, either.
During his tenure, Nowicki was one of the few UNMIK officials to win the respect and trust of all of Kosovo's ethnic communities because he did a rare thing: he listened to their problems. He was impartial. He tried to help the voiceless common people when the state or other groups treated them unfairly. Most fundamentally, he was respected because he was an international, and not from one of the rival ethnic groups.
You can read his interview with Balkanalysis.com here.
This is why, without being self-aggrandizing, Nowicki wisely noted that "the situation is likely to get worse unless the international community appoints a new human rights watchdog," according to the ADN Kronos report.
However, UNMIK boss Soren Jessen-Petersen - an avowed friend of the murderous war criminal Ramush Haradinaj - has decided to replace Nowicki by granting "human rights supervision to local ethnic Albanian authorities, a move that Novicky considers premature."
At the same time Jessen-Petersen, who has "wide arbitrary powers in the province," has decided, contrary to the UN's mandate and Kosovo's legal status, that he will create "Kosovo justice and police ministries, under majority ethnic Albanians’ control."
Anyone who thinks that granting human rights protection responsibilities to a partisan ethnic group widely feared (for good reason) by another has got to be smoking something very potent indeed.
And anyone who thinks that the same people who helped mastermind the March 2004 anti-Serb pograms can be trusted to exercise their duties responsibly and fairly is either deluded or a delighted supporter of full ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.
To sum up, it is all too clear that the UNMIK is looking to save its own hide from local Albanians who perceive it as an obstacle to independence. By placing the courts, the cops and the human rights observers in the latter's hands, they are paving the way for a fait accompli- the removal of all minorities from Kosovo, which will render moot the idea of a "negotiated solution," leaving Belgrade with nothing to protect save a heritage without a remaining population. And the UNMIK staff is making sure there will be no one left to call them on it, while they can move on to another high-paying job with a similar institutional protection from accountability somewhere else in the world. These people are truly reprehensible.
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Goldberg: US will keep supporting Kosovo (dailies)
Koha Ditore also quotes Goldberg as saying that in 2005, the Assembly has played a strong and constructive role in passing laws, which was necessary to enable work in standards implementation.
In Epoka e Re Goldberg is quoted as saying that 2005 is a historical year for Kosovo.
Assembly Speaker Daci said that the most essential thing is that Kosovo is on the right path toward status resolution and has the needed international support.
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http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2005/12/22/opinion/edkalin.php
International Herald Tribune
What remains to be done in the Balkans
Walter Kälin THURSDAY, DECEMBER 22, 2005
GENEVA GENEVA Ten years after the Dayton accord brought an end to the worst fighting Western Europe had witnessed since the World War II, there is much to celebrate. Peace has come to the Balkans, and the insidious results of ethnic cleansing have largely been reversed. Two and a half million refugees and internally displaced persons have returned to their homes, at least half to areas where they are an ethnic minority.
Nevertheless, the scars of war are far from healed. Much remains to be done before the Dayton accords can truly be considered a success. As the UN secretary general's representative on the human rights of internally displaced persons, I recently undertook a mission to the region. I left with mixed feelings.
In Croatia, many houses and apartments have been returned to their original owners. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, economic and political ties have been growing among Muslim, Croat and Serb communities, and almost all property has been restored to its rightful owners. Serbia and Montenegro have made huge efforts to accommodate the remaining 500,000 refugees and almost 250,000 displaced persons, straining their already faltering economies.
But some of the emotional scars I witnessed may be too deep to heal.
I met survivors of the Srebrenica massacre. They had returned to the villages close by, but many looked far older than their years, and without hope or courage for their future.
In Northern Mitrovica, in Kosovo, I visited Roma camps that had been hastily erected in areas that proved to be poisoned by lead. Three years after the first tests, the inhabitants had still not been evacuated, although the environment constitutes a serious threat to their health and to the lives of their children.
People from different ethnic groups still discriminate against each other. Throughout the Balkans, returnees can still expect prolonged and unjustifiable delays in having their houses connected to water and electricity. They are discriminated against when applying for jobs and are denied access to pension funds and the state health system.
Too little is done so that returnees' children can go to a school in their own language. In many places the police are perceived as biased. National and religious symbols are not used to create unity but to feed divisions and insecurity among minorities. And the overburdened and cumbersome judiciary systems are not able to enforce a strong rule of law.
The failure, moreover, to bring to justice thousands of people suspected of war crimes, in particular Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, who helped orchestrate ethnically motivated mass expulsions, continues to cast a pall over the progress made and has done nothing to reduce fears and insecurity.
There are still almost 500,000 internally displaced persons as a result of the Balkan wars. Thousands live miserably in ramshackle collective centers or "informal settlements" that were never intended to become permanent housing. Many of them have no place to go and are incapable of living on their own.
The international community has wound down its financial and political support for the region. There are no funds left to rehabilitate living conditions and find solutions for the most vulnerable among the refugees and internally displaced. There are no means to give 5,000 survivors the psycho-social care that would make their lives less of a living hell.
Several steps are needed urgently in the Balkans. First, there must be an immediate, concerted effort to find solutions for the most vulnerable people still in collective shelters - particularly the Roma in Northern Mitrovica.
Second, help must be extended to those who prefer to integrate locally, so that they have access to jobs and public services.
Third, efforts must be made to better inform displaced persons and minorities about their rights, to simplify administrative rules so they can claim their entitlements, and to halt discriminatory practices against them.
Fourth, donor governments and the World Bank should be encouraged to invest in rebuilding schools, health facilities, housing and other infrastructure, so that displaced persons and returnees begin to lead normal lives.
Finally, all crimes and acts of violence against the displaced and those returning must be investigated and prosecuted. Only then will the promise of Dayton be fully realized.
(Walter Kälin is the representative of the UN secretary general on the human rights of internally displaced persons)
December 11, 2005
Why NATO bombed Serb TV
Why NATO bombed Serb TV
The Spectator (UK)
December 06, 2005
Did George W. Bush make a tasteless gag about bombing al-Jazeera? Did Tony Blair dutifully laugh? How could two leaders of the free world think it appropriate to jest about whacking pesky Arab journos while a nation Iraq burned under their watch? These are the questions being asked by British journalists who are shocked by rumours of a conversation that allegedly took place between Bush and Blair in April last year. I have a different question: why do these journalists seem more outraged by this President's alleged scurrilous aside about bombing a TV station than they were by an earlier president's actual bombing of a TV station?
Six years ago President Bill Clinton sent cruise missiles to destroy a TV studio and knock off some media workers, and it was no joke. At 2.20 a. m. on 23 April 1999, at the height of the Kosovo campaign, the Nato alliance led by Clinton and Blair destroyed the headquarters of Radio Television Serbia (RTS) in central Belgrade. The missiles destroyed the entrance and left at least one studio in ruins. More than 120 people were working in the building at the time; 16 were killed and another 16 were injured all of them civilian workers, mostly technicians and support staff.
The BBC's John Simpson described seeing 'the body of a make-up artist lying in a dressing room'. That was 27-year-old Yelitsa Munitlak, burned to death in the small room where she applied make-up to the station's newsreaders. She was so badly disfigured that her body could be identified only by the rings she was wearing. One of the RTS technical team, trapped between two collapsed concrete blocks, had to have both his legs amputated at the scene. He died later in hospital.
Today journalists wonder whether Blair laughed at Bush's joke about al-Jazeera, or perhaps even talked the President out of a serious 'plot' to bomb the Arab channel.
Never mind all that. Here is what Blair said after the targeted killing of media workers in Yugoslavia: the media 'is the apparatus that keeps Slobodan Milosevic in power and we are entirely justified as Nato allies in damaging and taking on those targets'.
He was backed by Clare Short, who today poses as an anti-war warrior but who six years ago was Blair's cheerleader-in-chief for bombing Yugoslavia. After the attack on RTS she said, 'The propaganda machine is prolonging the war and it's a legitimate target.' Tell that to the family of Yelitsa Munitlak.
To add insult to grotesque injuries, Nato officials later tried to deny that they had purposefully targeted a studio packed with civilian workers, instead claiming they had meant to bomb the TV transmitter next door. Yet according to the final report of the UN committee to review the Nato bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 'Nato intentionally bombed the central studio of the RTS broadcasting corporation.' And as Amnesty International pointed out, 'intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects is a war crime under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court'.
How did British journalists react to this 'war crime'? Not very honourably; certainly with far less rage than they have directed against Bush and Blair for their alleged chat about al-Jazeera. Some in the media who supported the Kosovo campaign kept shtoom about the attack. The broadcasting union Bectu did not even comment on it.
There was almost a celebratory tone in the Guardian's initial coverage of the bombing of RTS. In its first report on the attack (written by Martin Kettle and Maggie O'Kane, both of whom supported 'punishing' the Serbs) the paper repeated Nato's justifications for the attack without question: 'Nato targeted the heart of . . . Milosevic's power base early today by bombing the headquarters of Serbian state television, taking it off the air in the middle of a news bulletin.' It failed to say how camera operators, soundmen and makeup girls were central to Milosevic's 'power base'. Some journalists criticised the bombing of RTS not because it was criminal but because it provided a 'gift to Nato's critics'; in short, it made their 'good war' look bad.
There were honourable exceptions to all this. The National Union of Journalists, for example, vigorously opposed the attack. But too many journalists tried to squeeze this bombing of media workers into their view of the Kosovo campaign as a 'humanitarian' war. Yet the idea that you can burn to death a make-up girl in the name of 'humanitarianism'
is surely as perverse if not more so than the thought of Bush and Blair talking about bringing freedom to Iraq (which presumably includes freedom of speech) while talking about blowing up journalists.
By: Brendan O'Neill
http://www.spectator.co.uk/article_archive.php?id=7013&issue=2005-12-03
December 07, 2005
Interview with Serbian President Boris Tadic
NIN, 01/12/2005
By Dragan Bujosevic
Interview w/Serbian President
Boris Tadic
“Elections – Now!”
After the two new disputable mandates “reallocated” within G17 Plus, do you regret that you did not first insist on elections and then on resolving the Kosovo problem?
“I am the President of Serbia and the state issues are for me older than those with party dimensions. But, I consider that it is very important that we have political stability for the extremely difficult Kosovo talks, and it would be good to have a government which enjoys support from the majority of the Serbian citizens.”
This Government is now supported by only 15% of the voters.
“The legitimacy of the Government obtained at the 2003 elections is shaken. As a reminder, the key objection that this Government had in regard to the previous one was that a government supported by 25% of the voters had no legitimacy.”
You think that elections should be organized first, and then we should embark on the story about Kosovo’s future?
“I think that would be the best and most useful solution, since the negotiating team should have full power, and full legitimacy. I am certain, on the other hand, that the current Parliament’s composition does not correspond to the mood of the electorate. However, there is a legal way of slating elections, and therefore, the ruling coalition undertakes responsibility for its alarmingly insufficient legitimacy among the people… The current Government stays in power at any cost by, in my opinion, violating the law. But, we are expecting a court decision.”
Although you have told the Blic daily that the elections are not necessary as long as the Kosovo talks are in progress, the DS deputy leader Gavrilovic said a couple of days earlier: elections first.
“Let me clarify that. At the final stage of the Kosovo talks, elections would not be useful. In am certain that for conducting the coming Kosovo talks with full strength and full legitimacy, the elections would be most efficient just at this moment. However, it is not up to me, but the Government and the Parliament, to decide on that.”
Don’t you think that the electorate is totally confused when you first say that the Government snatches mandates, and they you form a negotiating team with it? If they are thieves, then they are thieves?
“The Constitution does not oblige me only to send messages to my voters and those who support my politics, it also obligates me to send clear messages to all the Serbian citizens. I am obliged to cooperate both with the Government and the Parliament, to a smaller extent… However, as the Serbian President, I am also obliged to point at all the violations of the Constitution and law, while fighting, within the law and only with political means, and not by legal or physical violence. I am convinced that this Parliament is rump, and has a big problem regarding its own legitimacy. The Serbian President was elected by the direct will of the citizens, while all the other representatives of the citizens were elected indirectly on party tickets. The citizens do not know who their representatives in the Parliament are, and the situation in Serbia would be far more stable if the MPs were elected directly by the citizens, if we had a majority electoral system, and if the citizens had a recall mechanism for these MPs, like they have for the President of the State.”
Have you proposed to PM Kostunica to call for elections?
“I proposed that both to him and other leaders of the ruling coalition, with one firm stance – that after the early elections, a government of the democratic forces and with full legitimacy should be formed. The response was that it would not be useful at the moment.”
The minority Government is now going to make such important decisions on Serbia’s future?
“I do not understand such political logics. It may lead to temporary and illusive peace, but essentially leads to the disintegration of political processes. The Government resorts to two arguments to defend itself from early elections. One is that early elections would bring the Radicals to power, and the other is that elections are not necessary, considering that the Kosovo talks are already on the agenda. Thus, the inability of the ruling coalition regarding the fight against the radicalization of Serbia is taken as an argument in the international public against the elections, while on the other hand, the Kosovo talks are used as an explanation why the Government should remain until the end of its mandate. Both arguments are, however, incorrect.”
By entering the negotiating team, you pardoned the Government and enabled it to rule at least for another year?
“No. By entering the negotiating team, I fulfil my constitutional obligation to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of this country. With the Kosovo talks, they are more jeopardized than in any other moment over the past 15 years.”
Did the Democratic Party (DS) accept the Parliament’s Resolution by joining the negotiating team, although it abstained from voting for it?
“No. The Resolution is not a negotiating platform. It is the Parliament’s stance on Kosovo and Metohija (KiM), and it says what Serbia does not want an imposed solution, and that it wants a compromise within the constitutional and legal solutions that were defined by Slobodan Milosevic. The negotiating platform cannot include the latter and that is why the DS and I were against this stance, which has no ground either in the political reality or in the stances of the UN Security Council and the Contact Group, which will make a solution at the end of the talks.”
At the beginning of the talks, you say that the Resolution cannot be applied?
“The Serbian Government and the MPs who voted for it know that. The Resolution was adopted as an explanation or justification before their voters, and less as an expression of a real approach in resolving the KiM problem. My approach is different. I think that Serbia has no reason to deceive itself. The institutions like the Parliament or Government are even forbidden to deceive the citizens over what we will face in KiM. I can guarantee that a solution to KiM will not be found within the constitutional-legal principles set by Milosevic. This can be confirmed by the documents of the UN Security Council, which is in charge of the administration in the Province, as well as by the Contact Group’s documents, and others.”
It is known that the even the State Union is formed against this Constitution, so why are you bothered by the detail of its mentioning in the Resolution?
“It is not a detail, but an essential problem which is decisive for the KiM talks. A difficult discussion is being led in the international community over which principle it will cling to. One principle is that there is no return to the time of before 1999, and the second is that KiM will not be any more part of Serbia. If the international community opts for the first principle, we have some room for negotiations. If the second prevails, then the task of the negotiating team is extremely hard. Therefore, I am saying: there is no return to the situation of before 1999, but we offer a solution to a sustainable, intact KiM with the sovereignty of our country, through creating two entities which will enable coexistence. First of all, I am interested in the survival of the Serbs with the guarantee for institutional connections between the Serb entity and the central institutions in Belgrade. Then come the relations with the ethnic Albanian community, which will be the subject of the forthcoming talks.”
But, The Contact Group has another stance as well – that Kosovo’s borders are unbreakable. Thus, it is independent. EU Commissioner Rehn speaks today with SRSG Jessen-Petersen about Kosovo’s entry into the EU; Kosovo without Serbia?
“There are currently four policies for KiM in Serbia. The first says – we can imagine it as independent. The Second says, without false patriotic emotions, that we would rather lose our lives than Kosovo, while we actually only think of the political ratings at the next elections. The third policy says: we do not accept imposed solutions, either conditional or unconditional independence, but it does not say what we want, and it directly leads to an imposed solution. The fourth policy, which is my policy, says what Serbia wants in KiM. That is the only way to prevent imposed solutions. If we only say what we do not want, we increase the possibility for imposed solutions. We should convince the Contact Group members that Serbia’s long-term interest is in accordance with the interests of the international community and all the Contact Group members. The international community has three principles: there is no return to the situation of before 1999, there is no border change of KiM, and there is no annexation of KiM to any country. In all my international contacts, I keep saying that the principle of inviolability of KiM’s borders is acceptable if the principle of inviolability of Serbia’s and the SCG borders is also applicable. If not, then we have a violation of the basic principles guaranteed by international agreements, which would introduce a legal-political precedent, dangerous not only for Serbia but also for many other countries in the region and the world.”
It has been claimed that you harmonized the Resolution on Kosovo with Kostunica’s office three weeks before its adoption in the Parliament.
“It is true that the two offices adjusted the PM’s speech at the UN SC, and I am behind what Kostunica said there. I did receive the draft resolution from the Premier, and said that I had some objections. During my visit to Israel, the Government consulted some other parties, and while I was in Russia, the Government stated that the Socialists and the Radicals had agreed with the draft which I had not accepted. Upon my return from Moscow, I presented my objections directly to D/PM Labus. After that, the Government held consultations on the document and did not accept my suggestions. I want to stress again that the limitation to Milosevic’s time Constitution is out of reality, and the talks are led to change this constitutional-legal framework for KiM, and every citizen and politician is aware of that. There is not reason to deceive ourselves about that. I do not want to give my vote to some political unreality. If this unrealistic clause had been excluded, the DS would have supported the Resolution, but the DS demonstrates responsibility for what will happen in a couple of months.”
Being dissatisfied with the accord between Kostunica and [SRS deputy leader] Nikolic, you announced your plan on two entity in Moscow as a tit-for-tat?
“Not at all. Before my departure for Moscow, I presented my plan to Kostunica, like I had told him earlier what our negotiating goal should be.”
What was Kostunica’s response?
“That it is in line with the policy conducted so far, and that he will analyse all the consequences of such a negotiating team. Finally, the Government agreed with my proposal.”
It has been speculated in the media that you received an unfavourable scenario from the US, and in accordance with it, you changed your stance, i.e., gave up the Resolution and offered two entities.
“If someone knows about some US scenario, I am requesting him to immediately send it to me. I have not received such a scenario. That the US is in favour of a quick outcome is not a news, at least not in the past ten months. But, Washington officially does not plead for any solution. It is a different issue whether some influential circles in America favour an independent Kosovo. Yes, they do, and not only in the US, but also in most Contact Group member countries, and our public should now that, and we should fight against that with legal, political and diplomatic arguments.”
Was [former CCK head] Nebojsa Covic mentioned as a possible negotiating team member?
“Covic constantly talked about KiM with Kostunica and me, but after a conflict with the Government, he was eliminated. I still think that his place is in the negotiating team.”
One of the team members is Professor Fleiner, whose Government (Switzerland) was the only one to support Kosovo independence. Is that a problem?
“He is a man whose stances are close to the interests of Serbia. I do not know whether the Institute for Federalism, at which he works, is on the Swiss Government’s budget. It would be good to check that.”
Does Slobodan Samardzic [Kostunica’s advisor and negotiating team member] receive a scholarship from the Swiss Government?
“I do not know, and it should be checked. It would not be good if it was so. We must protect the interests of the State and every member of the negotiating team. However, prior to that, I would not question the loyalty to the State of any of its citizen, including Slobodan Samardzic.”
There is a noticeable difference between your plan and the one adopted in the Parliament last March. Your plan does not mention the resettlement of people, there is no territorial continuity, and the entity you mention is rather a political term?
“That is a more realistic solution. At the time when [former Serbian PM] Zoran Djindjic drafted a plan for KiM, and what I am now talking about is essentially that plan, the return of the army and police to the Serb entity was anticipated. Unfortunately, although it is stipulated in UN SC resolution # 1244, it is no longer a reality.”
Can your plan be applied as long as the one adopted by the Parliament exists?
“The Parliament is not participating in the negotiations.”
That is true, but its plan is obliging until it has been annulled?
“My plan is the continuation of what is essential; it is only adjusted to a real situation. After all, that is demanded from politicians who hold specific posts. Today in the world, the disputable issues are not negotiated by nations and parliaments, but by individuals elected by the citizens to negotiate. It is now important that both the Premier and President demonstrate capability of taking responsibility and making strong moves in accordance with our interests. The Premier and President are not supposed to be a mere transmission of the Parliament. The Premier is responsible to the Parliament, and the President, to the people. Our job is to impose sustainable solutions. I am ready for such moves, and I am responsible before the people. I would like to reiterate that I am not responsible for the Parliament’s political moves, although I respect and accept what it passes.”
The Resolution, however, stipulates something else: “Government, you will negotiate, but the decision belongs to the Parliament?”
“That is an expression of politics which does not include individual responsibility, and that is a way of conducting politics that smells of the old time. This is how Milosevic ruled, and he always tried to have the citizens justifying his moves through referenda or the will of the Parliament. I respect the Parliament, but it must also accept the authority of the executive power and the Serbian President. A parliament that wants to be an executive power as well, and not only the legislative power, is a parliament which does not understand its place in a democratic state.”
Does the Resolution include a possibility for the PM, if the talks go wrong, to withdraw from the whole process, saying that he has no mandate, and ask for early elections at which KiM would be the only question?
“No responsible politician would do that. There is nothing easier for a politician than saying: I give up. I asked Tomislav Nikolic what he would do if the country faced an ultimatum regarding cooperation with The Hague tribunal. He said he would resign. I do not accept such political philosophy. If you are elected for some work, you should take the responsibility in the most difficult conditions too… When I was elected the President, I knew that I was assuming responsibility for the most difficult solutions, and I am aware of all the risks… “
Aren’t you involved in deceiving the public as well when you say that you will not accept an imposed solution, since, unfortunately, Serbia may be imposed a solution, whether it accepts it or not?
“When I say that I will not accept an imposed solution, I express my political principle that I want to fully fight against any imposed solution. I do that with proposals which are possible and feasible. If I said that I would not accept an imposed solution without saying what I want, then I would seek an alibi for my next political post and would not really fight against an imposed solution. There is no dilemma: any, even the most unfavourable solution, must be carefully analyzed, but we must fight with all political means to defend our legitimate state and national interests.”
NIN
Kosovo: Virtual Rebels
TRANSITIONS ONLINE:
Kosovo: Virtual Rebels
by Alma Lama
5 December 2005
TOL
A new armed group threatens violence if Kosovo does not become independent – but are they for real?
PRISTINA, Kosovo | N.K. is a 32-year-old from Decani in western Kosovo who describes himself as being “close†to the masked gunmen of the self-styled Kosovo Independence Army, or UPK. He doesn’t want to see his full name in print.
Pristina media have widely reported that black-clad and masked UPK fighters appeared on some roads in the Peja region, which includes Decani, erecting roadblocks to search cars and check passengers.
As the international community gears to start direct talks between Pristina and Belgrade on the status of the province, the security situation for Kosovo’s minorities remains volatile. Just this past weekend, a bus on its way from southern Kosovo to Belgrade was attacked by someone with a grenade launcher. Luckily, the grenades pierced the bus but did not explode. The incident prompted Kosovo’s UN administration (UNMIK) to raise security measures once again.
OUR FRIENDS FROM THE UPK
N.K., himself a former member of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), smiles and says the UPK “are our friends.†He says they are former UCK members who now feel abandoned by the politicians, including former UCK leaders, amid a very difficult economic situation.
But is the UPK for real? It emerges rather like a ghost from the tales of people with “contacts†to the rebels and investigations by the local police and the NATO-led peacekeepers (KFOR).
Even N.K. thinks the Pristina media are exaggerating a bit when covering his buddies of the UPK. “Decani is a small town, less than five thousand inhabitants, and we know each other very well,†he says, implying that the locals would have a pretty good idea of who’s a member and who’s not.
N.K is unable to say how many people might belong to the UPK, but there seem to be a sufficient number of them to have disturbed the peacekeeping forces in Kosovo. After international forces started overflights with helicopters and unmanned aircraft in the region around Decani and Peja, where some of the fiercest fighting against Serbian forces took place in 1998-1999, the gunmen disappeared from the streets and have since switched to communications through the Internet.
But just because they’ve gone virtual hasn’t made them any less threatening.
On 9 November, the UPK threatened the international community with “events a hundred times more dramatic than those of last March [2004],†when thousands of Serbian houses and historical and religious monuments were destroyed by mobs.
In one of their media statements, the UPK called on the Kosovo assembly to declare independence, or else deputies would have “a hard time in future days.â€
On 16 November, they threatened to launch a military operation on Pristina if independence was not declared immediately. They then seemed to have accepted a resolution passed by the Kosovo parliament the next day which, although it did not declare independence, made clear that independence was the only acceptable outcome of status talks.
The UPK has used similar, though rather less subtle, language with people they stopped on the road.
“We’ll kill all the traitors of the nation and the members of the Kosovo negotiation team if they won’t behave in the right way,†two people wearing military-style uniforms with UPK insignia and black facemasks told D.S., a man from the village of Rogova in Rahovec municipality. The "team" is the Kosovo delegation to the talks on the province’s final status that are about to get under way.
Former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, who is the UN's envoy to the status talks, said last week he hoped direct negotiations can begin early in the New Year.
D.S. said the gunmen stopped him and his nephew in Rogova and forced them to show identity papers. He too doesn’t want his name used because he’s afraid for his safety. “I don’t want any problem with them,†he said.
ONLINE ONLY?
Another source interviewed by TOL had asked a UPK gunman for an interview but was told that the group weren’t interested in giving statements other than those they disseminated on the Internet.
There are good reasons to suspect that the UPK is more of a virtual group than a military formation.
Two years ago, another force called the Albanian National Army also sent threatening communications to politicians via the Internet. But after a short burst of activity the organization seems to have died out.
According to another former UCK rebel from Decani, what is happening in this area is a form of blackmail. “It’s a hidden political issue, nothing else,†he said. “Everything depends on the status of Kosovo; if independence will not be given, the problem [of armed bands] will spread and become very serious,†he said, pointing to what he described as an increasing number of extremists in Kosovo.
KFOR confirmed that armed individuals had been spotted in the Peja region but excluded the possibility they might be part of an organized military group.
The Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti on 27 October accused Ramush Haradinaj, the former UCK commander of the region and a former Kosovo prime minister currently facing charges at the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, of being behind the mysterious paramilitary UPK, calling him "the sponsor and main ideologue of this terrorist army."
Haradinaj stands accused of crimes against Serbian civilians during the ethnic Albanian rebellion against Belgrade’s rule in 1998-1999. He was released by the ICTY last June, pending trial.
But according to a TOL source in Decani, the armed men in the area are very angry at Haradinaj because he failed to help them after the war.
The UPK appeared on the scene just a few days after an article in the Kosovo daily Koha ditore, in which Mikan Velinovic, a former wrestler and writer of aphorisms, claimed to be the commander of the Serbian Antiterrorist Liberation Movement, or SOAP, a group he claimed had 7,500 members that were unarmed but ready to act if necessary. “Every Serb is a member of this organization, because we are threatened by terrorists,†the paper quoted Velinovic as saying.
Fears are flying high that the opening of status talks will provide incentives for extremists on both sides to make trouble.
Ramadan Qehaja, a security adviser to Prime Minister Bajram Kosumi, is concerned that the situation might be exacerbated by foreign secret services present in Kosovo, especially from Serbia. “Elements of the Serbian Interior Ministry are active in Kosovo, especially in the northern part,†he told TOL, saying that the fact that Kosovo did not have a regular secret service made it very difficult to monitor the presence of other secret services.
Political analyst Shkelzen Maliqi also told TOL that the threat of extremism was a convenient pretext that the sides could use to their advantage, but that the threat by these groups was real. “I fear the organized groups of Serbs and Albanians that are out of control. Serbs especially, because they have much more motivation and discontent. But Albanians at the same time may be determined to get their revenge if there’s a domino effect.â€
For UNMIK spokesman Neeraj Singh, messages, real or fake, like that the UPK delivered to Kosovo's status negotiators are to be expected given what’s at stake in the status talks.
“Despite the comments in the media, the threats, electronic messages, and other forms of pressure, the status of Kosovo will not be decided on the street or through the Internet, neither from Pristina nor from Belgrade,†Singh told a press conference in remarks that were echoed by KFOR commander Giuseppe Valotto.
Alma Lama is a journalist for the public Radio Television of Kosovo and a correspondent for Osservatorio sui Balcani.
December 04, 2005
The status of Kosovo
Hashim Thaci argues that Albanians in Kosovo are entitled to independence from Serbia ("My people deserve their independence," Views, Nov. 26). Thaci's main argument for independence is that his Albanian people have suffered so much. But while Slobodan Milosevic's policies were indeed ruthless and indefensible, Thaci's historical account lacks vital elements of Albanian nationalism and separatism, including the fact that Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo have suffered over the last six years. Thaci claims that minorities will be protected in an independent Kosovo. But the percentage of Serbs left in Kosovo has dropped dramatically in recent decades - including the nearly 200,000 Serbs who left the province in the wake of the 1999 war. Thaci was a leading politician at the time. In contrast, Serbia has remained multi-ethnic. The "old nationalism" that Thaci blames on the Belgrade of today is not exactly eradicated in today's Kosovo. The world has about 200 countries and thousands upon thousands of ethnic groups. Should we have thousands of new countries, one for each ethnic group? Thaci mentions Serbian war criminals, but there are indicted Kosovo-Albanian war criminals too. Thaci would like Kosovo to join the European Union with protection from NATO as part of a demilitarized area. The idea of demilitarization is news to us. Jan Oberg, Lund, Sweden Aleksandar Mitic, Brussels Hashim Thaci had the nom de guerre Snake. That, in itself, is very telling. Thaci, a former leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army, which was once branded a terrorist group by the U.S. government, has now apparently morphed into a sage purveyor of advice via your prestigious newspaper. So, what is behind this sudden transformation? It is more than obvious that the ongoing terror tactics against the Serbs and other minorities in Kosovo, perpetrated first by the KLA and then by its successor criminal offshoots, continues to be ignored and disguised by the West's mainstream media and politicians. Why? Because, they have no other way to justify NATO's aggression on Yugoslavia in 1999. If Thaci's people have "earned" sovereignty, then the criteria for independence are murder, mayhem and barbarism. Is Europe ready and willing to embrace an intolerant and terrorist-supported Islamic state in its underbelly? L.M. Milanovich Edmonton, Canada
International Herald Tribune
SUNDAY, DECEMBER 4, 2005
Copyright © 2005 The International Herald Tribune | www.iht.com
Hashim Thaci argues that Albanians in Kosovo are entitled to independence from Serbia (RMy people deserve their independence,R Views, Nov. 26).
December 02, 2005
BALKANS: STAR TREATMENT FOR ACQUITTED KOSOVARS
http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level.php?cat=Politics&loid=8.0.235868612&par=0
ADN Kronos International (Italy)
December 2, 2005
BALKANS: STAR TREATMENT FOR ACQUITTED KOSOVARS
-The verdict will only strengthen “anti-Hague sentiments in Serbia”, argued [Belgrade University professor of international law Vojin] Dimitrijevic, adding that court has demonstrated “partiality in favor of Kosovo Albanians, who turned out to be privileged participants in all these wars”.
Pristina - The Kosovo Albanian language media on Friday gave star treatment to Fatmir Limaj and Isak Musliu, two Kosovo Albanians acquitted by UN war crimes tribunal in the Hague.
The two man were indicted by the International Tribunal for War Crimes in Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on charges of killing civilians in a Kosovo prison camp during ethnic Albanian rebellion against Serbian rule in 1998.
A third man facing the same charges was convicted. The acquittals have been harshly criticised by Belgrade and Serbian leaders in Kosovo who argues that it proves that the tribunal is anti-Serb.
Limaj and Musliu, who operated a prison camp in the village of Lapusnik in which 23 Serb and Albanian civilians, suspected of collaborating with Serbian forces, were killed, arrived in Pristina on Thursday night, greeted by a crowd of their supporters.
They were acquitted by the Tribunal on Wednesday, while a third indictee, Haradin Bala was sentenced to
13 years for killing nine civilians.
Kosovo newspapers celebrated their return in celebratory front page articles and the daily “Koha ditore”, quoted Limaj as saying their release was a “victory for Kosovo, which will surely become independent”.
The two were commanders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which started a rebellion against the Serbian authorities [which]led to a NATO bombing campaign and forced Serbian troops from the province, which has been under United Nations control since 1999.
“There was no need to go to the Hague to prove the holiness of the war conducted by the KLA,” said Limaj.
He predicted Bala would soon also be freed on appeal.
Meanwhile, Vojin Dimitrijevic, a professor of international law at Belgrade University, until now a staunch supporter of the Tribunal, said that the Hague prosecutors haven’t shown “the usual diligence” in proving Limaj and Musliu guilt.
Furthermore, the “chain of command responsibility” was completely neglected in this case, since Limaj and Musliu, as commanders, were freed while Bala, who was a guard in the prison camp, was convicted.
The verdict will only strengthen “anti-Hague sentiments in Serbia”, argued Dimitrijevic, adding that court has demonstrated “partiality in favor of Kosovo Albanians, who turned out to be privileged participants in all these wars”.
George Bush & Tony Blair Forced Clinton to Bomb Serbia!
News Flash: George Bush & Tony Blair Forced Clinton to Bomb Serbia!
November 30, 2005The Opinion Journal , caught this mind-bender this past weekend:
Simon Jenkins, a columnist for London's Sunday Times, ( http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2088-1892515,00.html ) comments on reports that President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair toyed with the idea of bombing al-Jazeera, the Qatar-basedTV network: That Blair and Bush should have discussed bombing the Al-Jazeera building in Qatar is hardly surprising. They agreed to bomb the headquarters of Serbian television during the Kosovo war.Well, color us impressed. Who knew President Bush was already conducting foreign policy back in 1999, when he was still governor of Texas?
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