Who bombed the markets in Sarajevo?

http://www.fantompowa.net/Flame/bosnia_sarajevo.htm

 

Flame

 

Who was responsible for the market place massacres in Sarajevo ?
Seán Mac Mathúna

 

"A few days ago Mr. Boutros Ghali informed me that the projectile which hit the Markale marketplace in Sarajevo was an act of (Bosnian) Muslim provocation". President Mitterrand of France, 1995

Open military confrontation in Bosnia-Herzegovina ended with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement on 14th December 1995. The conflict had resulted in more than 160,000 deaths, and 2.5 million refugees and displaced persons. Not long before, the United Nations (UN) had ordered the first combat units from its rapid reaction force into Sarajevo, after after Serb rebels killed two French peacekeepers. Three Bosnian Serb shells had hit the French and Danish areas of a U.N. compound in Zetra, north of Sarajevo's centre killing a French peacekeeper and wounding another French soldier and a Dane. A half-hour later, another French peacekeeper was killed and two wounded, one seriously, when a U.N. convoy was targeted by Serbs in the suburb of Butmir. The deaths brought the number of French dead to 42 since the Bosnian war began in April 1992 - and not all of them were killed by the Bosnian Serbs, a number of them were also killed in crossfire or deliberately by the forces of the Bosnian government.

Not only did the UN get tough with the Bosnian Serbs - whose political and military leaders have now been charged with war crimes - in 1995, NATO had become directly involved when when they ordered air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. These attacks had been preceded by a series of barbaric attacks against civilians in the Markele market in Sarajevo, all of which were assumed to be the work of the Serb army laying siege to Sarajevo.

There were three attacks on the markets, all of which were blamed on them: the first on 27th May 1992, killed 16 people, the second on 5th February 1994 killed 68, and the third on 28th August 1995, killed 37. The last attack is the most significant, as it has been widely alleged, by members of the UN Mission in Bosnia, UN Commanding officers and of course, predictably, the Bosnian Serbs themselves, that this one in particular was staged by elements within the Bosnian government to provide the pretext for NATO military involvement in the war. In subsequent attacks, bombs and bullets used by the NATO jets used Depleted Uranium (DU) which is now estimated to have claimed the lives of some Serb 300 civilians who lived in the vicinity of the bases hit by NATO, according to reports that surfaced in 2001. What evidence is there for the claims that the Bosnian government carried out these attacks ?

The first attack in 1992

The first of three attacks happened on 27th May 1992 when 16 people killed in a "mortar attack" on a bread queue in Vase Miskina street in Sarajevo. As The Independent (22nd August 1992) noted, the televised scenes of civilians cut to pieces by an explosion as they queued for bread horrified international public opinion, and added growing pressure for NATO to "intervene" in the civil war against the Bosnian Serbs. Vivid footage showed dead bodies littering the street and "terrified crying people sitting on the pavement in pools of blood". The attacks came shortly before a meeting by European Union ambassadors to consider imposing sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UN officials from the start were "suspicious about the circumstances but would not go public with their thoughts without jeopardising the UN mission" in Bosnia. Classified reports given to the commander of the UN peace keepers, General Satish Nambiar, concluded that it was likely that the army of the Bosnian government in Sarajevo carried out the attack. In fact, they were reported to believe it wasn't a mortar attack at all but a "command-detonated explosion - probably in a can". The impact mark left by the "mortar" on the market square floor was nowhere "near as large as we came to expect with a mortar round lading on a paved surface". This is also supported by another UN commander in Bosnia, General Michael Rose of the British army, who according to his book Dispatch the Bosnian government in Sarajevo shelled their own people to get a military response by NATO against the Bosnian Serbs (The Observer, 28th March 1999). NATO launched air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs as a result of this attack.

According to The Independent, United Nations (UN) officials and senior Western military officers believe that the attack in 1992 was carried out by the Bosnian government, "To win world sympathy and trigger intervention". This was also expressed in confidential reports circulating at the UN headquarters in New York, and in classified briefings to US policy makers in Washington, according to the British newspaper. The attack on the bread queue in Vase Miskina Street also led to draconian sanctions against Yugoslavia imposed by the Security Council (resolution 757) on 30th May 1992 (which had been preceded by Yugoslavia's expulsion from the WHO). All supplies of raw materials to the well-developed pharmaceutical industry of Yugoslavia for production of medicines were immediately suspended. The justification for blaming Yugoslavia for attacks carried out in Bosnia was based on Western intelligence disinformation that the country was directing the war on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs.

The second attack in 1994

The second attack on a market in Sarajevo happened on 5th February 1994 when a single mortar round left 68 dead and 200 wounded. Some people immediately questioned how son many civilians had been killed or wounded by one mortar bomb. Furthermore, officials from the Bosnian government did allow anyone from UNPROFOR to verify what had happened. Despite vehement denials from the Bosnian Serbs, the US news channel, CNN, immediately reported that they were responsible for the shocking carnage that the attack left, which CNN claimed was "caused by a Serb mortar bomb". The US President Bill Clinton added to this saying it was "highly likely" that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible for it.

Thus, US ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright and the US presidential security advisor Anthony Lake, immediately called for NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. Yet there were already people claiming that even the UN itself did not suspect the Bosnian Serbs, but this appears to have been suppressed by the Western media, possibly acting under covert British and American pressure, assuming the the whole purpose of the mortar attack was to provide the pretext for NATO military involvement in the Balkans for the first time. If this is not the case, then it is certainly hinted at by the former British Foreign Secretary David Owen in his book Balkan Odyssey (Victor Gollanz, London, 1995):

"People around General Rose never tried to hide the fact that at his meeting with Bosnian Muslim leaders (President Alia Izetbegovic and General Delic) he said that he had just received some information which shows that the mortar bomb did not come from the area under Serb control but from the Muslim part of the city . . ."

However, Owen's account of the the Market square massacre in 1994 has been criticised by Noel Malcom in a review of his book in The Sunday Telegraph on 12th November 1995.

When discussing the market-place massacre in Sarajevo of February 1994, Lord Owen goes on at length about a UN investigation which concluded that the mortar shell had been fired from a Bosnian Government position. Dramatically, he confirms that General Rose put pressure on Bosnian ministers by threatening to reveal this finding, unless they did as they were told. What Lord Owen does not tell us is that a second, more thorough investigation found that the first had made mistakes in its calculations, and concluded that the shell could equally have come from the Serb side. It is surely inconceivable that Owen is unaware of this second report; yet he chooses not to mention it. Readers will have to draw their own conclusions about the overall reliability of this grotesquely vainglorious book.

But, Owen also fails to give any clear evidence as to the perpetrators of this attack - if you read his statement carefully, he is only telling us that the second investigation, although on one hand, described as "more thorough", still concluded that the shell could "equally" have come from the Serb side. This indicates to me that their is still no hard evidence that either side were responsible. Bosnian Serb and Russian claims should be treated with scepticism (as they have a vested interest, from a propaganda point-of-view, in making sure these allegations are widely circulated). But the claims of the UN and representatives of various NATO countries serving as peacekeepers should be treated as serious and worthy of investigation.

From example, On 6th June 1996, Yasushi Akashi, UN special envoy for Bosnia, told a German journalist working for DPA in New York, that there was a secret UN report accusing the Bosnian government forces of this massacre. It was claimed that this secret report was passed on to the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, who did not publish it in the interest of "higher politics". Citing this UN report, B. Volker, a French journalist working for TV TF1 said that the mortar bomb was fired from Bosnian government positions. Volker also quotes the words of President Mitterrand: "A few days ago Mr. Boutros Ghali informed me that the projectile which hit the Markale marketplace in Sarajevo was an act of (Bosnian) Muslim provocation".

The third attack in 1995

The third attack, on 28th August 1995 also hit market and left 37 dead and 90 wounded. When UN issued a declaration blaming the Bosnian Serbs, it evidently ignored the report of the British and French experts as well as the assessment of the UN's artillery expert for the Sarajevo sector, a Russian colonel, A. Demurenko. Soon after the attack, NATO launched extensive air strikes against Bosnian Serb military and civilian targets. The strategy appeared pre-planned as it coincided with an joint Croat and Bosnian government offensive against the Bosnian Serbs. The attacks changed the course of the war in Bosnia as enabled NATO to enter the conflict on behalf of the Bosnian government and Croat forces. After this attack, President Yeltsin gave official credence to reports circulating in the Russian media that a "third party" was responsible for the mortar attack on the bread queue. Yeltsin said that Russia "insists" that the UN "look again" at the attacks as there was new evidence indicating that it was not the Bosnian Serb's who carried out the attack. Despite this, NATO went ahead and launched air strikes. One military adviser to the foreign ministry, General Boris Gromov, even claimed (with no evidence provided) that one of the NATO powers was involved in the mortar attack "as a provocation". Yeltsin also said:

"Why am l against the expansion of NATO ? This (mortar attack in Sarajevo) is the first sign of what might happen when NATO comes right up to the borders of the Russian Federation. Those who insist on the expansion of NATO are making a major political mistake. The flame of war would burst out across the whole of Europe" (The Guardian, 9th September 1995).

The Russians and Bosnian Serbs have claimed that the third attack was prepared in advance over many months by "certain" Western secret services (probably including the CIA), and that Bosnian government troops under the commander of the General R. Delic carried it out. The reason for this, they argue, was to provide NATO with an opportunity not only discredit the Bosnian Serbs, but to provide the pretext to use heavy air strikes on them so as to destroy their military potential. The Russian intelligence service (FSB) were said to had known about the preparation of the plan since February 1995. Then a detailed plan, allegedly called Cyclone 2, was related to a secret memorandum, signed on 10th August 1995 at the Pleso airport in Zagreb, Croatia. The memorandum was signed for the UN by the commander of the UNPROFOR forces based Croatia and Bosnia,General B. Janvier and by Admiral L. Smith for NATO. This secret memorandum was only passed on, as "secret", on 13th September 1995 to the UN Security Council, when the main destruction of Serb targets had already taken place. According to article 7 of the memorandum UNPROFOR agreed to provide all information necessary for the NATO strikes against Serb targets to achieve the maximum success.

According to the FSB, the mortar was fired from the roof of a building near the market and they further claimed that the device was not a standard mortar bomb. Another author, Y. Bodansky, the director of the Republican parliamentary task force studying terrorism and unconventional warfare (Target America, Terrorism in the US Today, S.P.I. Books, Shapolsky Publishers, New York, 1993), believed that the Bosnian Serb intelligence service knew that "something was being planned" in Sarajevo. On 26th August 1995 (two days before the second massacre) he spoke by telephone to a senior official of the Republika Srpska in the Yugoslav capital, Belgrade, who told him anxiously that once again "something terrible is being planned against the Serbs" in Sarajevo. How much of this is true, made up or just a joint FSB-Bosnian Serb disinformation campaign is hard to assess.

Another report indicating that the Bosnian Serbs were not responsible for this market place attacks was published in The Sunday Times on October 1st 1995. It claimed that British ammunition experts serving with the UN in Sarajevo had "challenged" key evidence of the attack on the bread market which not only triggered NATO attacks against the Serbs in Bosnia, but turned the tide of the war against them. According to the newspaper, the British experts:

"found no evidence that the Bosnian Serbs had fired the lethal round"

Nora Beloff, writing in her book Yugoslavia: An Avoidable War (New European Publications, London, England, 1997), also allege that "that Bosnian government arranged to kill their own people" so as to get the Bosnian Serbs blamed. She alleges the news reporter Martin Bell, now an independent MP in Britain, had known about these allegations through his contacts with British UN officers but "he ignored what they might have told him". She repeats claims, as reported in David Owen's account of the bombings, that western experts had discovered that it was the Bosnian government forces and not the Bosnian Serbs who had been behind the attack in February 1994. Allegedly, when UNPROFOR wanted the Bosnian government to participate in truce negotiations, the British commander, General Michael Rose:

"Blackmailed the Bosnian Muslim leaders into submission. He told them that unless they agreed to cooperate, he would tell the international press that he had technical expertise proving that the grenade came from the Muslim, not the Serb, side" (Beloff, p112/113).

Other attacks supposedly carried out by the Bosnian government - and blamed on the Bosnian Serbs - include:

• 29th June 1992: Rocket attack on Sarajevo's TV station kills 5 people. Bosnian government troops implicated in this attack (The Sunday Times, October 1st 1995).
• 17th July 1992: A "choreographed" mortar salvo, 30 seconds after British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd entered a building for a meeting with the Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic. The attack killed or wounded 10 bystanders - but not Hurd's guard of honor, who had clearly been forewarned and ducked for cover seconds before the attack.
• 4th August 1992: Bomb attacks which were filmed by the Western film crews at a funeral of two orphans in a cemetery in Sarajevo. The attacks were blamed on the Bosnian Serbs.
• 13th August 1992: After the Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic arrives in Sarajevo airport for a meeting with Izetbegovic, a Bosnian government sniper kills US TV producer David Kaplan. The attacks disrupts the schedule of Panic, and he only manages to spend 20 minutes on the phone with Izetbegovic.

Philip Corwen, a senior member of the UN in Bosnia has recently written a book about his experience there (Dubious Mandate: A memoir of the UN in Bosnia, Summer 1995 [Duke, London, UK, 1999]):

"The French forces (the main UN armed force in Sarajevo) were continually harassed, shot at, blocked at, and threatened by Bosnian government forces . . . it was the French who pointed out that the Bosnian government was placing weapons systems next to UN facilities in order to draw fire from Serb artillery onto civilian and UN targets and thus provoke international outrage against the Serbs . .. (p178)

I recommend that readers interested in the background to the conflict in Bosnia read Corwen's book: His meticulous account shatters once and for all the "one victim - one enemy" myth promoted mainly by the Western media. For the record, l unequivocally condemn the war crimes and crimes against humanity carried out by the Bosnian Serb regime against the people of Sarajevo - whom they relentlessly bombed and shelled. The Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic have been rightfully indicted by the International war crimes tribunal in the Netherlands - but why has this tribunal failed to indict Alija Izectbegovic, the Bosnian President and other senior officials of his government when there is clearly enough prima-facie evidence of their complicity in war crimes carried out by the Bosnian army ? I believe that the UN probably has ample evidence to show that the Bosnian government carried out these attacks in Sarajevo, but along with NATO, decided not to pursue charges against Bosnian government leaders for political reasons, and decided to sweep the whole story under the carpet and suppress it.

Footnote: an estimated 300 civilians killed after NATO used depleted Uranium in reprisal attacks

"Up to 300 men, women and children who lived close to the site of the (NATO) bombings in 1995 have died of cancers and leukemia over the last five years". Robert Fisk, 2001

Finally the bombings of the market place unleashed a wave of NATO air-strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets in and around Sarajevo. In these attacks, bombs and bullets used by the NATO jets used Depleted Uranium (DU) that is now estimated to have claimed the lives of some Serb 300 civilians who lived in the vicinity of the bases hit by NATO. According to Robert Fisk, writing in The Independent of Sunday on 14th January 2001, NATO subjected the Serb military bases and surrounding civilian areas to an intense bombardment between 30th August to 15th September 1995, using jets and artillery from Mount Igman just outside Sarajevo. Civilians living in the area surrounding the bases starting to begin suffering from a variety of symptoms now linked to the use of DU by NATO in Bosnia. NATO governments have so far shown little interest in helping the civilian victims of DU in either Bosnia, Yugoslavia or during the assault on Iraq in 1990.

Mystery of the market massacre

 

 

Google:Eve Ann Prentice

http://www.google.be/search?hl=en&ie=ISO-8859-2&q=eve+ann+prentice&meta=lr%3Dlang_en%7Clang_sr

 

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http://www.balkanpeace.org/wcs/wct/wctb/wctb12.shtml

 

THE TIMES (UK), Tuesday, March 28, 2000 FEATURES

Mystery of the market massacre
by Eve-Ann Prentice

SIXTY-EIGHT people died and more than 200 were injured when a single shell exploded in a small Sarajevo market. The ghastly scenes were filmed and a horrified world was left in no doubt that the Serbs were to blame. The slaughter brought deeper American involvement in the Balkans, with the formation of the US-led Contact Group and an American-negotiated alliance between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats.

The massacre also ultimately paved the way for American airstrikes on Bosnian Serb positions in late summer, 1995. Furthermore, the killing brought about a deal whereby the Serbs pulled back their heavy guns from the mountains surrounding Sarajevo and the Muslims reluctantly signed a ceasefire. The easing of the siege, and the relief for the people of Sarajevo, was a notable achievement.

To this day no one knows who fired the deadly mortar round on Markale market in February 1994. Survivors and witnesses said they heard no characteristic whistle of an approaching missile; this later led to suggestions that a bomb had been placed under a stall. A Western diplomat who was in Sarajevo at the time told me in 1999 that he was convinced the bombing was perpetrated by the Muslim-led Government. The Muslims were sure that the Serbs would be blamed and hoped that outrage at the carnage would lead to airstrikes against their foes and increase pressure for a lifting of the arms embargo that was in place against all the warring sides. Britain and France were vehemently opposed to lifting the embargo, although America had shown signs of wanting to arm the Muslims.

"On the morning of the explosion some people were told that it was not a good day to go to the market," the Western diplomat said. "There was also no shelling from the Serb positions that day, and the injuries were mainly from the waist down, as if a bomb had exploded in situ." The diplomat said that another sign that the Muslim-led Government had been responsible was that government media with cameras were on the scene "within seconds", as if poised in advance to record the full horror of the carnage to gain as much world impact as possible.

The suggestion that the Muslims shelled their own people began to be discussed by diplomats, politicians and a few journalists after the UN's investigation into the massacre concluded that no one could be sure whence the shell had come. But most people recoiled at the idea of such self-inflicted mutilation. The majority of the world's press and politicians accepted the instant suggestion that the Serbs were responsible; questions were not encouraged and the general view was that the end justified the means: the siege of Sarajevo was eased. But blaming the Serbs without proof set a precedent, and the process of demonising them took deeper root.

 

Nothing happens without a reason

 

Reuters: Kosovo gets new president for independence talks

http://kosovareport.blogspot.com/2006/02/kosovo-gets-new-president-for.html

 

"President will provide leadership and continue the work to help the aspirations of the people of Kosovo to a peaceful, multi-ethnic, democratic and prosperous Kosovo"

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/HMYT-6LVQ9Z?OpenDocument&rc=4&cc=scm

 

"He brings with him a reputation for moderation and willingness to seek compromise"

http://kosovareport.blogspot.com/2006/02/statement-by-secretary-general-on.html

 

 

"Kosovo's independence is non-negotiable"

http://kosovareport.blogspot.com/2006/02/kosovo-president-interview.html

 

"Kosovo Independence Would Be Occupation  "

http://www.serbianna.com/news/2006/01212.html

 

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http://www.kosovo.com/news/archive/2006/February_10/1.html

 

KiM Info Newsletter 10-02-06

Serbian Orthodox Church specifies basic principles on future protection of the Serbian Orthodox religious and cultural heritage in Kosovo

Information Service of the Serbian Orthodox Church
Original document in Serbian (February 7, 2006)

 

 

SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

Taking into account the decisions from this yearÂ’s autumn session of the SOC Holy Assembly of Bishops (November 1-4, 2005), the Holy Synod of Bishops and the Council for Kosovo and Metohija of the Holy Assembly of Bishops hereby define the following with regard to forthcoming talks on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija.

BASIC PRINCIPLES

of the SOC Holy Synod of Bishops and the Council for Kosovo and Metohija of the Holy Assembly of Bishops with regard to forthcoming talks on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija

1. In the process of resolving the future status of Kosovo and Metohija the Serbian Orthodox Church, her faithful and her Holy Shrines in the Province should be provided with adequate protection and a free life in accordance with basic principles of religious freedom and human rights generally accepted in the democratic world.

2. The position of the Serbian community in Kosovo and Metohija should be regulated by a special form of decentralization enabling the effective protection of the vital interests of the Serbian people, especially in the areas of education, culture, media, health and social policy, economic and property issues, local police and judiciary. It is especially important to ensure the return of Serb refugees, their secure living conditions and lasting survival. Toward this end, the Serbian Orthodox Church gives its wholehearted support to the Negotiation Team on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija, which will represent the interests of the Serbian people and state.

3. In addition to fundamental interest in the institutional, legal and property protection of the Serbian people in Kosovo and Metohija, the Church is also vitally interested in the long-term protection of her holy shrines: monasteries, churches, property and cultural patrimony. For centuries, these Holy Shrines have been and remain the faithful guardians and witnesses of the spiritual and cultural identity of the Serbian people in the Province and as such they must be preserved for the future by being given a special position (status) within the framework of the future, comprehensive solution for Kosovo and Metohija. It is important to protect specific Holy Sites not only as cultural and religious monuments but also as living communities of a living people.

4. In cooperation with relevant experts, during the talks it is necessary to define concrete mod-els that would ensure the Serbian Orthodox Church, whose spiritual seat is the Pec Patriarchate, and its local Diocese of Raska-Prizren and Kosovo-Metohija with full internal autonomy, free pastoral and missionary work with its faithful, protection of property and other rights, protection of proper names and identity, and unobstructed communication with the canonic and administrative seat of the SOC in Belgrade. In this respect, it is very important that within the future Law on Religious Freedoms in Kosovo and Metohija the SOC is provided with full rights in accordance with the UN Charter and other relevant international acts on the protection of human and religious rights and freedoms.

5. It is also necessary to ensure special, internationally guaranteed status and models for lasting protection of the living Serbian Orthodox monasteries in Kosovo and Metohija by creating appropriate protective zones around monasteries, with the presence of international military forces wherever and for as long as necessary. In addition to the protective zones, it is necessary to provide special guarantees for the free, spiritually and physically unobstructed life and work of monastic communities, unhindered access for the faithful and for pilgrims, as well as appropriate customs, tax and other benefits enabling the economic sustenance of these communities, which support themselves by their work. The form and scope of protective zones would depend on their significance and on the fact whether a monastery is located in a part of the Province inhabited by an Albanian or a Serbian majority.

6. The complete arrangement for protection of institutions, sites and patrimony of the Serbian Orthodox Church should be under the special monitoring of the International Community, in full coordination with the Government of Serbia, Kosovo provincial institutions and UNESCO, which would ensure the sustainability of protective mechanisms within the framework of the international civil presence in Kosovo. This institution would concern itself with current issues and arbitration in the event agreed-upon principles are not honored. It would maintain ties with international factors, police and municipal authorities. Participation in this process should include appropriate experts from Belgrade and Pristina and experts of the Serbian Orthodox Church, as well as representatives of the International Community.

7. At the same time, in accordance with Resolution 1244, Annex 2, Item 6, it is necessary to enable the unobstructed engagement of experts of the Ministry of Culture from Belgrade and the Serbian Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments, who have already worked on the protection of Serbian spiritual, cultural and historical patrimony in Kosovo and Metohija in the past, and who possess complete documentation and specialized experience. The engagement of experts from Belgrade would also be realized in cooperation with representatives of local Kosovo institutions under the unique auspices of the EU. The eventual transfer of jurisdiction over the SOC cultural patrimony in Kosovo and Metohija to Kosovo institutions is unacceptable because the local Kosovo Ministry of Culture lacks the expertise for this jurisdiction and is inadequate to guarantee and ensure the protection of the identity and purpose of these Holy Shrines.

8. The resolution of the future status of Kosovo and Metohija should enable the complete restoration of all Orthodox churches and monasteries that have been destroyed or damaged since 1999, their return into liturgical function, the full protection for the property of the SOC, as well as special guarantees intended to make it possible for the SOC and other religious communities to ensure the restitution of property illegally confiscated after World War II in accordance with special legislation to be passed in accordance with European standards.

9. The resolution of the future status of Kosovo and Metohija should include special provisions protecting the identity, the historical and spiritual origin and the patrimony of the Serbian people. Even though our patrimony is physically located in Kosovo and Metohija, nevertheless it cannot be called the cultural patrimony of Kosovo but the Serbian cultural patrimony of Kosovo and Metohija (just as there is Albanian, Roma and Ottoman patrimony in Kosovo and Metohija). The imposition of a collective identity to this cultural patrimony represents a threat to the survival of Serbian cultural patrimony and to our people as a whole, as well as a change in the identity of Christian civilization in the Province.

10. The views of the Serbian Orthodox Church are completely complementary with the Plan of the Government of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija, and with the most recent plan of President Tadic regarding the two-entity reorganization of the Province as a part of Serbia. The SOC Holy Synod of Bishops has taken the view at its most recent session in November 2005 that the issue of the future status of the Province must be resolved in accordance with international principles on the inviolability of sovereignty and integrity of democratic states, including Serbia and Montenegro. The future solution for Kosovo and Metohija must take into account the interests of all citizens which live there and must be such that it does not destabilize the situation in the region, which after years of war and suffering needs peace, reconciliation, cooperation, spiritual, moral, economic and all other forms of progress.

 

 

Kosovo Serb leaders against withdrawing from negotiations (Tanjug)

 

 

Kosovo Serb leaders against withdrawing from negotiations (Tanjug) 

 

Kosovo Serb leaders have assessed that the Belgrade authorities should not give up negotiations on the future status of Kosovo regardless of western officials statements that anticipate the status of the province. SLKM head Oliver Ivanovic has pointed out that the withdrawal from negotiations before they have even begun would represent a big and fatal mistake. Our opponents expect that we give up the negotiations so that they would go on without us, like in Rambouillet, but with consequences for the entire Serb people, said Ivanovic. He added that such an action would prevent the Serb side from arguing with the results of those negotiations. SNC official Rada Trajkovic has assessed that as long as there is a chance for negotiations, there is the chance for Serbs to achieve the fulfillment of their requests. She warned that giving up the negotiations would result in the expelling of Serbs from Kosovo.

Interview with the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade (Blic)

 

 

Interview with the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade (Blic)

 

The Contact Group, in whose work Russia is taking part, has not passed any decision on the possible status of Kosovo, the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade Aleksandr Alexeyev told Blic on the occasion of the statement by British diplomat John Sawers that Kosovo independence had already been agreed.

 

What kind of solution Russia advocates?

 

“The solution for Kosovo’s status must be the result of a direct dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina along with significant support of the international community. It is a dangerous attempt to impose any kind of solution on anyone. Imposed solutions by rule aren’t long lasting.â€

 

Only Russia considers that it isn’t possible to achieve a solution this year.

 

“In the Contact Group statement from London, on which all member-states agreed, it is not mentioned anywhere that the negotiations must end in 2006, but it is stressed that all efforts will be undertaken so talks would be completed by the end of the year. If additional time is needed for working out a compromise and safe solution, that will not be a problem.â€

 

What does President Putin think when he says that a universal solution must be found for Kosovo?

 

“The Kosovo problem is not the only problem Europe is facing. If we want to resolve similar problems, and for this to strengthen and not to destroy European security, we must strongly adhere to the existing principles. If we approach individually, and often with political ideas, each individual conflict, then the results could be very serious and negative.â€

 

What kind of consequences could Kosovo’s independence have on the Balkans, the Russian Federation and Europe? 

 

“If someone is allowed to violate the principles of the inviolability of borders, then why couldn’t other do this as well.â€

 

Do you also have in mind B&H, Spain, Cyprus… 

 

“President Putin has turned the attention to the frozen conflicts that exist in the former USSR. This issue especially concerns us, because we are deeply involved in the resolution of these conflicts and we are very interested in finding an unambiguous legal solution. I imagine that similar problems are appearing in other parts of Europe as well.â€

 

 

 

 

 

Too Much Yugoslavia or too Little EU?

 

JOINT DECLARATION ON LAUNCHING OF ADRIATIC EUROREGION SIGNED IN VENICE

http://www.hina.hr/nws-bin/genews.cgi?TOP=hot&NID=ehot/politika/H2065379.4yc

 

Nobody wanted to create a new Yugoslavia

http://www.hina.hr/nws-bin/genews.cgi?TOP=hot&NID=ehot/politika/H2065470.4yc

 

 

Montenegro seeks to foster improved business climate

http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2006/02/06/feature-03

 

 

A Long Voyage: Macedonia Sets Sail for Europe

http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=647

 

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TRANSITIONS ONLINE:

 

The Western Balkans: Too Much Yugoslavia or too Little EU?
by Aleksandar Mitic
6 February 2006

 

The EU’s proposal for a free trade area in the Western Balkans don’t go far enough, Serbia’s deputy prime minister says.

BRUSSELS, Belgium | The European Commission on 27 January put forward a series of measures aimed at boosting economic cooperation and development in the western Balkans, but the plan has been met with little enthusiasm in the region itself.

From Croatian apprehension that the plan smacks of the former federation of Yugoslavia to Serbia’s criticism that it does too little to address the key question of investment, the Commission’s proposal is likely to be amended before it is presented to an informal meeting of foreign ministers from the EU and the western Balkans on 10 March in Salzburg.

THE PROPOSALS

In a strategy paper titled “The Western Balkans on the road to the EU: consolidating stability and raising prosperity,” the Commission proposed to foster trade and economic development, movement of persons, education and research, regional cooperation, and civil society in the western Balkans.

“While the Kosovo status process is moving ahead, we need to encourage the people of the western Balkans to look forward to their European future, not back to the nationalism of the past,” EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn said at the presentation of the paper, standing alongside the UN special envoy for the Kosovo status talks, Martti Ahtisaari. “The best way to do that is to focus on practical measures which will integrate their economies and societies into the European mainstream,” Rehn said.

The enlargement commissioner warned that the western Balkans “should not be allowed to remain a black hole or a ghetto in Europe.”

The proposals include the easing of visa requirements, increasing scholarships, a new regional school for public administration, a civil-society dialogue with the EU, contributions to the recently established European Fund for Southeast Europe (a public/private investment fund financed by international and national donors), and the creation of a diagonal-cumulation-of-origin formula, which would make it easier for a producer in one country to process raw materials from another.

But the key proposal is the creation of a regional free-trade agreement among the countries of the region: Serbia-Montenegro (including Kosovo), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia.

The rationale behind the free-trade measure is the relative inefficiency of the current web of bilateral trade agreements in the region – 31 in total – which have failed to produce a sufficient level of intra-regional trade or were not properly implemented.

This idea is not new: it has been on the table since mid-2005, when trade ministers from the region agreed to turn bilateral free-trade agreements into a single regional agreement. Rehn himself had cited the idea on several occasions.

THE OBSTACLES

But the proposal infuriated public opinion in Croatia, which saw the idea as evidence of a Brussels plan to resurrect the old Yugoslavia, which went up in flames in the early 1990s.

Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader tried to calm the outcry by saying there was no chance of anyone in the EU “trying to create something like Yugoslavia.” He suggested that, instead of creating a new regional zone, the existing Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) should be extended to the western Balkans.

After the last wave of EU enlargement, in 2004, only Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia remain members of the CEFTA. Bulgaria and Romania are slated to enter the EU in 2007 or 2008, and Croatia hopes to follow in 2008 or 2009.

The Croatian Chamber of Commerce harshly criticized the Commission’s proposal, saying it had more to do with politics than trade. It said the idea was “dangerous” because it demonstrated that the EU did not have a clear concept for resolving the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro, which could split this spring, or the status of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Serbian officials, by contrast, welcomed the proposal, but said it did not go far enough in attempting to boost trade and investment in the region.

In an interview with TOL, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus described what he saw as the proposal’s shortcomings.

“The free-trade reasoning is good, but we are still in a deep depression, in a post-conflict situation, and we need to boost development,” he said. “Free trade is a must, but it is not sufficient. We need investment, but there is not much investment policy in the paper.”

Labus said Serbia was firmly in favor of forming a single market in the region instead of the many bilateral free-trade agreements. “But until this single market is formed, we ask for these bilateral agreements to be fully implemented.”

He argued that the diagonal cumulation of origin should not be restricted to countries that have signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, that is, Croatia and Macedonia, but also to those which have asymmetrical preferential regimes with the EU, thus including the entire region. This rule would allow a producer in, say, Croatia, to treat raw materials or components from another country that is also party to the agreement (such as Serbia) as domestic when the final product is exported to the EU.

Tanja Miscevic, the head of the Serbian government’s EU integration office, agreed with Labus that the Commission’s free-trade proposal had its limitations.

“A single free-trade agreement without an institutional infrastructure but only a secretariat cannot really be efficient,” Miscevic said. She warned that under such circumstances the proposal might not be “realistic or sustainable.”

AMENDING THE PLAN

Another potentially difficult area is the relaxation of the visa regime of the Schengen agreement, which emerged outside the EU framework but has 15 European signatories, for citizens of western Balkans countries.

EU Justice and Internal Affairs Commissioner Franco Frattini said after meeting Labus in Brussels that some groups, notably students and business people, would benefit from such measures and travel more easily in the EU.

“Our opinion is that there is no free trade unless at least businessmen can travel freely. If this obstacle is not lifted, we will not see the full effects of free trade,” Labus said.

“My proposal is to make this plan much more effective than it is right now. This is not a criticism, but a suggestion that we should be truly looking for practical measures,” he added, suggesting there was sufficient time before the Salzburg meeting to revise certain aspects of the plan.

He says the Commission’s plan “perfectly” fulfilled all political promises the EU made at the 2003 Thessaloniki summit.

“They are really repeating that the Balkans will be a part of Europe in the future and we no longer have to worry about the dilemma of whether we will be in Europe tomorrow or not,” Labus said. “But there is a need to switch from the level of political promises to the level of practical measures in order to accelerate our way into the EU,” he said.

Miscevic said another problem was that most of the proposals set out in the Commission’s proposal, such as a single free-trade area or visa facilitation, would be implemented only in 2007. “This leaves us with an empty 2006,” she said.

At the same time, Miscevic said the Commission’s proposal was the maximum that the EU could propose “at this specific moment of time” given political constraints.

“Due to enlargement fatigue, the outcomes of last year’s referenda on the European constitution, and problems with the EU budget, ordinary citizens and politicians in the EU are not willing to commit more to enlargement than they already have,” Miscevic said.


Aleksandar Mitic is a TOL contributor from Brussels and Belgrade.

"We are appalled"

Sunday, 5th February 2005

PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY                                                                   COUNIC OF EUROPE

ASSEMBLEE PARLEMENTAIRE                                                                 CONSEIL DE L’EUROPE

 

Doc. 10819

 

     The situation of the Serbs expelled from the Republic Serbian Krajina (UN Protected Area) and the Republic of Croatia in 1990-1995

 

Written Declaration No 374

 

This written declaration commits only the members who have signed it

 

1.            Reminding that, due to the pressure and terror against the Serbs, the ethnically motivated military offensives of 1995 in particular – entire territories were ethnically cleansed of the Serbs.

2.            Regretting that Croatia, ten years later, has not enabled the expelled Serbs to return and enjoy their human rights, resulting in small number returnees so far.

3.            Stressing that in 1990 Croatia was a state of the Croats and the Serbs as its equal constituent peoples and that the Croatian Parliament, violating its own Constitution, by a vote of Croatian ethnic deputies only, changed the status of the Serbs to national minority.

4.            Fully respecting the PACE Opinion No. 195 (1996) and the ECHR, the undersigned members strongly appeal to the Croatian Government to stick to its international responsibility and take all necessary measures to enable the Serbs to retrieve their status, full authority and individual and collective rights and freedoms and call the Assembly to urge Croatia to implement the CoE, EU and UN standards.

Signed: NIKOLIC, Tomislav, Serbia and Montenegro, NR BOJOVIC, Bozidar, Serbia and Montenegro, EPP/CD CHERNYSHENKO, Igor, Russian Federation, EDG EXNER, Vaclav, Czech Republic, UEL GLIGORIC, Tihomir, Bosnia and Herzegovina, SOC GOJKOVIC, Maja, Serbia and Montenegro, NR HOOPER, Gloria, United Kingdom, EDG JOVASEVIC, Ljubisa, Serbia and Montenegro, EPP/CD KOLESNIKOV, Victor, Russian Federation, EDG KOVALEV, Nikolay, Russian Federation, EDG MELNIKOV, Ivan, Russian Federation, UEL MILICEVIC, Ljiljana, Bosnia and Herzegovina, EPP/CD MILOJEVIC, Goran, Bosnia and Herzegovina, EPP/CD MOKRY, Vladimir, Russian Federation, EDG NAGHDALYAN, Hermine, Armenia, ALDE NAROCHNITSKAYA, Natalia, Russian Federation, UEL

OSKINA, Vera, Russian Federation, EDG OSTROVSKY, Alexey, Russian Federation, NR RUSTAMYAN, Armen, Armenia, SOC SLUTSKY, Leonid, Russian Federation, SOC Sobko, Sergey, Russian Federation, UEL/GUE TODOROVIC, Dragan, Serbia and Montenegro TOROSIYAN, Tigran, Armenia, EDG ZHIRINOVSKY, Vladimir, Russian Federation, NR ZIUGANOV, Guennady, Rusian Federation, UEL ZIZIC, Zoran, Serbia and Montenegro, SOC     Total: 28                               - SOC: socialist Group -              EPP/CD: Group of the European People’s Party -              ALDE: Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe -              EDG: European Democratic Group -              UEL: Group of the Unified European Left -              NR: not registered in a group

 

#####

 

 

http://www.hina.hr/nws-bin/genews.cgi?TOP=hot&NID=ehot/politika/H2065458.4yc

 

HTV REPORTERS APPALLED AT STATEMENTS BY FORMER EDITOR

ZAGREB, Feb 6 (Hina) - Croatian Television (HTV) reporters at the Croatian Journalists' Association (HND) said on Monday they were appalled at statements made by a former HTV editor in a newspaper interview, and called on the national broadcaster to take urgent action.#L#

Tomislav Marcinko, former editor of the HTV News Department and currently director of the HTV-owned Orfej music recording company, said in an interview with Vecernji List on Saturday that he was in possession of a document containing the names of HTV employees who had worked for the Yugoslav Counter-Intelligence Service (KOS) and State Security Service (SDB) up until 1990 and that he was prepared to make it public in order to stop accusations against him that he persecuted ethnic Serb journalists at HTV in 1991.

"We are appalled by lies, half-truths and insults from Tomislav Marcinko," the Executive Board of HTV Reporters at the HND said in a statement, adding that the interview had set off "an avalanche of comments and new interviews" challenging the credibility of the national broadcaster.

The HTV reporters said they were angered by renewed discrimination against their colleagues on ethnic grounds, and that they were confident that it was "a continuation of a well-planned and coordinated attack" on HTV.

The statement urged the HTV Board of Governors to take action against Marcinko and called on the HND to condemn the editorial policy of Vecernji List as unprofessional and unethical.

Later in the day, the HTV Board announced an investigation into the case and said that charges would be brought against Vecernji List for incorrect and offensive reporting on HTV and causing damage to its image.

(Hina) vm

06.02.2006. 19:35 MET

 

 

 

 

Aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaw those Serbians

 

dpa: British official urges Kosovo to embrace multi-ethnicity

http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ABES-6LRR2T?OpenDocument&rc=4&cc=scm

 

Reuters: Kosovo can win independence, says British diplomat

http://kosovareport.blogspot.com/2006/02/kosovo-can-win-independence-says.html

 

People's Daily Online: UN mission chief appeals against possible U.S. troops cut in Kosovo

http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2006/February_06/21.html?w=p

 

Lavrov urges Kosovo, Cyprus settlements without external pressure

http://www.interfax.com/3/127614/news.aspx

 

Beware your steps in the Balkans

http://en.rian.ru/world/20060204/43332094.html

 

Police detains three Albanian weapons bootleggers

http://english.pravda.ru/news/world/06-02-2006/75471-0

 

Busek: Kosovo negotiations will lead to elections in Serbia

http://www.irna.ir/en/news/view/menu-234/0602066533171121.htm

 

Stratfor: Kosovo: The Power Struggle After Rugova's Death

http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2006/February_06/16.html?w=p

 

---------------------

http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/02/2C5F41A9-B175-45E5-B12D-A03FDD4D68EC.html

Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

Monday, 06 February 2006

Kosovo: U.S. Official Expresses Hope For Final-Status Progress

On 1 February, Arbana Vidishiqiof the Kosovo subunit of RFE/RL's South Slavic and Albanian Languages Service spoke with Philip Goldberg, the U.S. Head of Office in Kosova, about the prospects for a resolution of Kosovo's status in 2006.

RFE/RL: The Contact Group issued a statement last night [31 January] calling for all possible efforts to be made to reach a settlement in the course of 2006. Do you think this is possible and what would be the risks that can jeopardize this phase?

Philip Goldberg: Clearly the United States has said that we are interested in the process moving as fast as possible, trying to reach a conclusion in the final-status discussions. That will require hard work by all sides, especially here in Prishtina. The death of [Kosovo] President [Ibrahim] Rugova of course has understandably caused a short period, we believe, in respect of his memory, from working in the negotiating team. But that will start again and it will require hard work, hard decisions, and compromise by Prishtina, Belgrade, and the active involvement of the international community. So I do believe that in 2006, as the Contact Group said, that this is possible.

RFE/RL: The statement issued by the Contact Group has been evaluated as of very high importance for Kosova. How would you comment the context of the statement?

Goldberg: I believe that any statement by the Contact Group by definition, especially at the ministerial level, is of great importance. And yet I think it again restates that we are very active in trying to reach a resolution of the final-status decision; it expresses great support for former [Finnish] President [Martti] Ahtisaari, as the [special] UN envoy [on the status talks] and his efforts. I know that Ambassador [Frank] Wisner, the US envoy who was in London, will be arriving in Prishtina later this afternoon and will make his initial consultations with the negotiating team and the political players here, both from the Albanian side and the Serb side and the non-Serb minorities. So I think the process is well under way, and the Contact Group statement supported that process. I think that is good.

RFE/RL: The official talks on status are due to begin at the end of February, with a meeting on decentralization. International negotiators have said they are ready, but according to you, how ready are Prishtina and Belgrade?

Goldberg: I can't speak about Belgrade. I'll allow my colleague [U.S.] Ambassador [to Serbia and Montenegro Michael] Polt to do that, if you are interested in the American perspective on it. What I can tell you about the Prishtina side is that there was a lot of good work that went on in the political and strategic group. A paper was developed that appears to be a very good one and a good starting point from this side. And I believe that the team will be ready to discuss those issues in late February, after the selection of a new president, after the meeting of the negotiating team that is necessary to help put them on that course to Vienna. As I mentioned, this is a mourning period now for President Rugova and that has delayed the process a couple of weeks.

RFE/RL: Do you think that the death of President Rugova can impact the political scene and the negotiating process itself as a whole?

Goldgberg: I believe that President Rugova would want this process to go forward, and his life's project was to reach a decision on Kosovo's status. We all know what he believed that status should be. But that will require hard work and compromise and will require people here to respect each other in reaching decisions. I do believe that this can be done and has to be done now, keeping in mind President Rugova's legacy, but obviously without President Rugova.

RFE/RL: After the late president passed away, many have said that Kosovo may face political crises. What do you think, is there really such an anxiety in this regard?

Goldberg: I don't believe that's the case. I think, actually what we saw over the last week, 10 days, is enormous respect, an enormous outpouring of grief over the president's loss. But I think that the political world has remained stable and now the president's political party is in the process of choosing someone for the post of president to offer at the Kosovo Assembly. So that is the normal course of events. Of course this is not an easy situation either for the LDK the Democratic League of Kosovo], the president's political party, or for Kosovo as a whole. They have only known one president. So it will be a difficult period. But I think it is an important period for Kosovo to show its maturity both politically and as a society that this is a collective effort and an issue in terms of a status decision that will effect everybody, not just one person.

RFE/RL: You have raised the issue of a consensual president. Fatmir Sejdiu from the LDK is most likely to be nominated as a candidate for Kosova's president. Does he fit the description you were referring to when you mentioned the consensual president?

Goldberg: What I meant when I used the term "consensual president" was somebody who would gain wide respect, not just within the LDK, but also in the Kosovar society, among the opposition parties. Somebody who would be able to unite people at this time. And I think that the reaction to Mr. Sejdiu, at least what I have seen in the press and among the political figures here, indicates that that is the case with him. So I believe that yes, he is among those who would fit the description of the consensual president.

RFE/RL: Mr. Goldberg, the talks on status are expected to be more concentrated on minorities issues, especially on the Serb minority. How much have the Kosovars done and what do they need to do further in this regard? 

 

 

[Graffiti in Prishtina calling for no negotiation on independence (epa file photo) ]

Goldberg: The decentralization paper that I mentioned is one of the key issues that relates to the minorities and their ability to live safely, securely and with confidence in Kosovo. That is an important step. The key issue really is what does the majority, really the vast majority, probably 90 percent of the population, feel about having the minority living with them and enjoying not just full rights, but also the ability to maintain their culture, their language, their educational facilities, and the rest. These are important issues that they need to think about a lot. I think you can also see that what Kosovo and the negotiating team will have to deal with in considering all these issues, is that the international community, which has actually been in charge through the UN over the last 6 1/2 years until the final-status decision, is going to make sure that these are issues that are front in center. So it is both a part of getting the situation internally correct, because it says a lot about Kosovo's democracy that minorities will have that ability to live comfortably and securely, but also in a way Kosovo's policy toward the world, what kind of place is going to be.

RFE/RL: Many experts say the development of the economy is a precondition for a stable situation. Many are expecting that after the status definition, the issue of economy is going to be resolved. Is it realistic to expect that, and is it realistic to expect that international aid is going to be more approachable after the status is defined?

Goldberg: It is not a question of aid; it is a question of development. The question is if the World Bank and the IMF [International Monetary Fund] are able to come in and help with international funding for productive projects, such as a new electric plant for example, which as we have seen the last couple of weeks is badly needed here. If companies see certainty in the final-status outcome and decide that there is something to invest in here, whether it will be the mines or the agriculture areas that have been identified as places in the economy that can be developed, then that's what is in Kosovo's future. Aid has never developed a place alone. It can help and may be is needed here. But this isn't a question of aid. It is a question of what can Kosovo do to develop economically.

Related Stories About Kosovo:

• The Legacy Of Ibrahim Rugova
• Rugova's Death Complicates Final-Status Process
• Premier Says Independence Shouldn't Be 'Bargained For'
• U.S. Says Ethnic Albanians Must Demonstrate Good Governance
• UN Envoy Backs Launch Of Final Status Talks
• RFE/RL Speaks With UN Special Envoy Kai Eide

 

#######

http://www.fpri.org/enotes/balkansturkey.19980710.radu.whowantsgreateralbania.html

 

Foreign Policy Research Institute

 

Publications

 

E-Notes
Who Wants a Greater Albania?

by Michael Radu

July 10, 1998

Michael Radu, a Senior Fellow at FPRI, is author of Collapse or Decay? Cuba and the East European Transitions from Communism.

CNN’s heart-wrenching images and the New York Times' strident editorials on the suffering of allegedly innocent Albanian civilians in Kosovo at the hands of the ruthless Serbs have the Clinton Administration on the same kind of meaningless rhetorical and diplomatic offensive as it was in Bosnia and Rwanda, Somalia and Haiti. And the results, as in those cases, are predictable: misguided sentimentalism, outrage, and protest; increased but covert costs for Americans; and complete disregard of the implications of bellicose statements and a diminishing foreign policy stick. The most disturbing of those implications, the Administration’s protestations to the contrary, is the inadvertent encouragement by Washington of the creation of a Greater Albania, including Kosovo and areas of Macedonia.

Kosovo, annexed by Serbia in 1912, became a highly autonomous province of the Republic of Serbia under the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia— a status it lost in 1989 as a result of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic’s machinations. Although the more developed Slovenia and Croatia had subsidized Kosovo for decades, the region remained the most backward in the former Yugoslavia. Barely larger than Delaware, Kosovo, even more than Albania itself, largely lacks natural resources. Its young, fast growing, poorly educated, and unskilled population of 2.8 million— 80% of which is ethnic Albanian, 10% Serbian/Montenegrin and the rest of various origins, mostly Gypsy— has no economy to speak of, beyond smuggling, remittances from (mostly illegal) emigrants to Western Europe and the United States, and most recently foreign aid. Simply put, Kosovo is, like Albania, the archetypal social, political and economic basket case— a Haiti in Europe.

Although Kosovo is now largely Albanian, it did not have such a large majority prior to 1912. The high Albanian Muslim fertility rate, in addition to Serbian emigration, helped create the present situation. Nonetheless, Serbian and Montenegrin history, sentiments and geopolitical considerations are all strong reasons as to why Kosovo should remain part of Yugoslavia. Indeed, the religious and cultural roots of medieval Serbian nationhood are to be found in today’s Kosovo: the first Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate at Pec, the great monasteries of Decani and Gracanica, and most importantly, the location of the 1389 lost battle of Kosovo, the source of Serbia’s national mythology.

It is easy to dismiss such emotional attachments as irrelevant or obsolete, just because they come from the Balkans, that motherlode of historic delusions; but it is also dangerous to dismiss Serbian motivations, which are truly nationalistic and involve Serbia’s most revered institution— the Orthodox Church. Not surprisingly, the Belgrade Patriarchate is at the forefront of Serbian and Montenegrin sentiments on Kosovo. Nor are Serbian and Montenegrin fears of the implications of Kosovo irredentism all emotion — an independent Muslim Albanian Kosovo, or a Greater Albania, would probably provoke secessionist pressures in the Sandjak of Novi Pazaar, the largely Muslim area linking Bosnia and Kosovo— enough to bring relatively liberal Montenegro back into the arms of conservative and nationalist Serbia. Then there is the little matter of international law, which recognizes Kosovo as an integral part of Yugoslavia, as do all world governments, including the United States.

On the other side of the ledger are the Albanians, whether the “moderate” followers of Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo or those of the increasingly active and violent Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)— and they all share the same objective— independence as a first step toward joining Albania. The Rugova forces use an increasingly sophisticated public relations campaign, including ubiquitous English language banners during their made-for-TV marches in the capital of Prishtina. The KLA is more direct: it threatens the moderates and, more ominously, it uses civilians as propaganda tools. Its money, arms and ideas come from (mostly illegal) Albanian emigres in Western Europe and the United States, its leaders seem to be former Stalinist followers of the Enver Hoxha regime, and its ideology is a hodgepodge of totalitarianism, ultranationalism, and contempt for the West and its values.

Indeed, from the murky images coming from Kosovo through the double screens of Serbian censorship and Western media emotionalism, it appears that the KLA has selected a risky but so far successful strategy. On the one hand it engages in a hopeless static “defense” of villages against superior Serbian forces, resulting in heavy civilian casualties, and on the other it counts on the usual Serbian brutality to make sure that those casualties are widely known (and exaggerated) abroad — in other words creating victims today for the glory of tomorrow— and for provoking a NATO military intervention. And the glory of tomorrow, for the KLA and Rugova alike, is a Greater Albania, which would include large parts of Macedonia (another fragile and largely fictitious Balkan state with its 600,000 irredentist Albanians) as well. Indeed, the U.S. position only encourages the Kosovo Albanians as well as the violent operators of the KLA to pursue their maximalist goal.

Albania proper can best be described as a Balkan Somalia. Its Western-installed regime, led by the barely reformed ex- Stalinist Fatos Nano, hangs on to the capital by a thread. Smugglers, criminals and local clans, in effect, control most of the country. In fact, foreign aid and smuggling— of drugs, emigrants, weapons and anything else — are Albania’s economy. An Albania almost double the size of today’s would not only intensify the clan conflicts and corruption that have already destroyed the state, but also magnify mass emigration to Italy, provoke further "humanitarian crises,” and require more and more foreign aid. Who needs it? Who needs a Greater Albania? And who will pick up the inevitable bill to keep it afloat?

Officially, the Clinton Administration recognizes that Kosovo is, and should remain part of Serbia/Yugoslavia, and has even declared the KLA a terrorist organization. On the other hand, it makes no secret of its sympathy for Rugova, and for the Albanian government whose weakness and duplicity allow the KLA to exist. More seriously, it threatens the Serbs with dire consequences if they defend their territorial integrity, as they have every right to do. Washington demands the withdrawal of Serbian police from Kosovo, protests the mining of the border with Albania, and forces Belgrade into negotiations with Rugova. Symbolically, during his recent trip to the area, Richard C. Holbrooke, the Administration’s factotum in the Balkans, did not even see fit to meet with Serbian religious leaders in Kosovo— as if they are not a party to the conflict.

How do these attitudes combine with the provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, forbidding territorial changes by force? Seeking a “peaceful solution” in Kosovo may sound good, but the Administration cannot have it both ways— professing respect for recognized borders while at the same time supporting committed irredentists and condemning the state that tries to protect its borders. If Washington has decided that Kosovo should be independent, then it should explain that decision; if not, it should act accordingly.

By manifesting sympathy for the Albanians and threatening Serbia/Yugoslavia with military intervention for using force in Kosovo, the Clinton Administration (like the Bush administration before it) is making impossible negotiations that might lead to the only solution, if there is one, to the Kosovo problem: the region’s autonomy within Serbia/Yugoslavia— i.e., a return to the 1974 old Yugoslav status quo. That would mean forcing Rugova, before KLA completely destroys his political support, to accept a return to the pre-1989 situation. The same should be required from Belgrade. The alternative is more bloody, useless insurgency by Afghan Muslim ideological veterans, Islamic mercenaries, and fanatical volunteers seeking the creation of a Greater Albania, opposed by a brutal, well- armed, and zealous Serbian and Montenegrin state supported by the masses.

The Congress of the United States has the responsibility to ask questions and to compel the Clinton Administration to answer for its decision to push the Serbians into an unacceptable concession of territory to an ethnic group totally incapable of ruling itself, either alone or with its even less prepared brethren across the mountains in Albania and Macedonia. Meanwhile, Americans should be prepared for a protracted diet of selective CNN images of Serbian atrocities against Albanian “innocents” with no corresponding images of Albanian terrorism, no analysis of the implications of a possible KLA victory, and no analysis of the Serbian motivation for resistance.

You may forward this email as you like provided that you send it in its entirety, attribute it to the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and include our web address (www.fpri.org). If you post it on a mailing list, please contact FPRI with the name, location, purpose, and number of recipients of the mailing list.

If you receive this as a forward and would like to be placed directly on our mailing lists, send email to FPRI@fpri.org. Include your name, address, and affiliation. For further information, contact Alan Luxenberg at (215) 732-3774 x105.

#######

 

http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2006/February_06/15.html?w=p

 

Aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaw those Serbians

Sitnews

February 06, 2006

 

VIEWPOINTS

By Iliya Pavlovich

In view of today's conflicts in Kosovo, where Albanian (drug trafficking, prostitution, white slavery funded operations) violence against a Serbian minority is tantamount of danger of being an extinct nation, we make more fuss about the endangered whales, seals, flowers and minerals, and much less about a rarely valuable contributor to our own humanity.

My son was born at St. Vincent's hospital in downtown NYC, Manhattan, Greenwich Village - so by all standards he's an American.

I am not. I was born is Belgrade, Serbia, but being a self-appointed American (by choice) I gave myself many of the "American rights"- (probably various delusions, that I am still trying to decipher).

In my early views on America as a country and a culture (word culture used in a most generous sense), I saw it fit to endow my son with his European heritage, as I was strongly convinced that the greatness of America is derived from the "frontier spirit" that can be found even among more recent immigrants (like myself). It was that "frontier spirit" that always gave you more power, more resilience, more impetus to try new things - and that is why America has produced the most Nobel Prize winners on Earth (probably another one of my partially accurate delusions - but maybe it's not).

Let me try to translate the following into English. This a quote from M. Danojlic's book "Personal things" published 2001:

"Kada se samo setim u sta sam sve verovao, koga sam sve uzimao ozbiljno, sta mi se sve cinilo jasno kao sunce ... Ne, ne odricem se svojih zabluda, naprotiv, samo ih idioti nemaju, i jedino ih podlaci ne priznaju. One su sustastvena iskustva naseg postojanja. Do konacnih i nepomerljivih istina ionako se nikad necemo probiti. Ostaje nam dostojanstveno i posteno suocavanje sa nasim ogranicenjima, posrtanjima i protivrecnostima." (Milovan Danojlic)

translation: "When I only think of all the things I believed in, all the people I took seriously, and it all appeared very clear to me No, no, I'm not reversing my delusions, to the contrary, only idiots can have no delusions, and only the crooked ones will not admit to ever having them. Our delusions are integral parts of our existence. To ever arrive at permanent and final accuracy/truth is most impossible so all we have left is our own weaknesses, our own limitations, our own existence and contradictions with daily stuttering in pursuit of [wider truths]."

We are all entitled to all sorts of delusions and they should be guarded and dear to us. Without those delusions we'd be paralyzed in some small Balkan war laden country with God-only-knows what type of tyrant for president. It is our permanent and mature views that have grown out of uncovering those delusions so it's quite good to have them and work with them, never to entirely suppress them. In the following few paragraphs (and images), I shall offer you two widely opposed views on the same people (Serbians), you can choose which delusion to keep, and which to reject.

Here is a rather simplistic (and possibly partially delusional) view on some Serbians that is vastly unknown (even in Serbia).

Let me give you a visual presentation what my son view when he watches me. Here is the image that my son described to me. My nickname often being "buzdovan" - the large wooden bat with nails as pictured below. Now in all truth, I am 6'4" and one of the shortest guys among my Serbian friends (strangely enough most are 6'5", 6'6" and over) - so we do look like giants and his vision is understood (he is now about 6'4" himself).

Within this colossal image it is hard to see what I determined is a very deeply embedded feeling of justice, democracy, charity and kindness - and they all seem totally incompatible with the images I offered here. Let me give you three small chapters (literature, based on eyewitness accounts, published as fiction):

1. During the Winter of 1915 as the Austro-Hungarian forces (mainly composed of Bosnians, Croats, Checks, Slovaks and other Slavic people in light blue uniforms) were advancing through the North Eastern Serbia (Valjevo, Sabac, Macva region), the peasants came out of their homes and gave the passing occupiers prunes, bread, apples, milk or whatever the little food they had. They spoke a common language and it was later established that the conquering army didn't look like the victorious army of the mighty empire, but rather a the scared common-folk grouped by force of conscription and threatened by the Austrian and German officer staff to go to battle. Serbian villagers had this rarest of human qualities (mercy, charity, forgiveness) called MILOSRDJE, for which there isn't even an adequate word in most languages with a few exceptions (Greek: ELEOS, Hebrew: Gemuilt Chasidim)

2. During the retreat of the Serbian Army (Summer of 1916), a Serbian sentinel surprised a Bulgarian (opponent-enemy) soldier who was taking a rare bath in the nearby river. It turned out that the Bulgarian was a sergeant, while the sentinel was only a private. The two languages are somewhat close and it is very easy for them to understand one another (especially in those times when there were no such new words as: cell-phone, TV-set; download, upload, Internet, etc.). The Bulgarian tells the captor: Batko (brother in Bulgarian) I am wounded and I was trying to wash my wound, how far are you taking me? I may not be able to walk any long distance. The Serbian sentinel puts his captive on the back of his horse and walks him a good 11km (7.5 miles) to Serbian headquarters. As the strange party is arriving the young sentinel sees one of the lead commanders of the Serbian Army, General Stepa Stepanovic (later duke - Vojvoda), pacing in front of his log cabin that served as the staff quarters. A day later the young sentinel is summoned to the General's quarters. He is terrified that he will be reprimanded for having given the captured enemy his horse while he walked on foot. To his amazement the General listened patiently while the private was explaining that the Bulgarian sergeant was wounded and could not walk, so in his view there was no need to further torture the one who is already suffering. The General congratulated the soldier and blessed him with words: "may you and yours be prolific and populous so that the face of our nation is always saved by people like yourself, it is an honor for anybody to be your prisoner, as it is an honor to be your commander"

It took the private a few days to fully understand how did he ever earn such praise as in his view he did the only decent thing he could do and barely had any choice in the matter.

3. From the book "Personal things" from Milovan Danojlic published 2001 same type of events that he recalls in his youth (1944 and 1945) chapter "Nasi i njihovi" (translated as Ours and theirs) page 14 in loose translation:

"Before the communist partisans were consolidating their power in the aftermath of WW2, the Chetniks ruled some villages in Serbia proper and their rule was obeyed. As the most villages had members in both armies that were often opposed to one another as well as to German occupiers, the villagers never knew which side to turn to. At an earlier point in the war the village mayor was close to the author's (Danojlic's) father, who was pro-Chetnik and often had advance notices when the chetnik-troikas would be coming to town, usually in pursuit of their prime enemy (the other Serbians who joined the communist lead partisans). Danojlic states that he was often sent on a clandestine mission by his father with words: "Go to so-and-so, and tell them to hide tonight and tomorrow, while "ours" are here. To the common villager "ours" were closer but "theirs" were not immediately discarded and belittled. Danojlic continues:

"A warning to the non-compliants or "theirs", of the impending doom, to be perpetrated by "ours" was, to me, one of the highest forms of tolerance and a deeply rooted democratic principles. Opposing views were tolerated, even understood and guarded, so that even utopian communism was (as bad as it was) watched after and protected in spite of the prevalent opposing beliefs. The communists in those days were thought of as pro-Russians, hotheads, idealists who keep preaching topics of the impossible justice and unattainable freedoms with non-balanced equality. There are stories that should be told, regardless of veracity and fact-finding."

IN CONCLUSION: The present day Serbia (in spite of my son's imagery) is not some God-forsaken country of mountain goats and giants with medieval torture systems, but a simple group of good-natured people who are probably the closest to the American view on democracy in countless ways. So much was the Clinton implemented NATO bombing of Serbia received as a shock by these peaceful people (true even in the most peaceful people there will be criminals, tyrants and similar bad apples) - but if the society overall is endowed with such strong Christian values and endless generosity, Clinton should have thought twice about his legacy which will stay forever besmirched by those thoughtless acts.

Iliya Pavlovich,
Deerfield Beach, FL - USA

About: Iliya Pavlovich, PhD, sociology, culture, Europe, international relations and a frequent commentator at Baltimore Independent Media Center.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

SN16:Christian Schwarz-Schilling: How to move Bosnia forward

 

How to move Bosnia forward

Christian Schwarz-Schilling International Herald Tribune

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2006

 

SARAJEVO, Bosnia-HerzegovinaBosnia and Herzegovina has traveled a long way in the past decade as the country has sought to rebuild itself with international support in the wake of Europe's most devastating conflict since World War II. But progress will only be irreversible when Bosnians take responsibility for the peace process. It is my task as Bosnia's last high representative to oversee the transition from today's quasi-protectorate to local ownership.

The office I have just inherited was created by the Dayton Peace Agreement to oversee implementation of the accord ending the Bosnian War in 1995. In response to massive obstructionism in the first two years of Dayton implementation, the powers of the high representative were augmented at a meeting in December 1997 in Bonn, enabling him to dismiss officials and to impose laws if this was deemed necessary.

In the intervening years, my three immediate predecessors - Carlos Westendorp of Spain, Wolfgang Petritsch of Austria, and Paddy Ashdown of Britain - all made use of these so-called "Bonn powers" to establish the institutions necessary for a viable, modern democracy. In this way, they succeeded in taking the peace process forward.

There are, however, limits to what can be achieved by imposition and these limits have almost certainly been reached.

It is not possible to decree reconciliation, opportunity and prosperity. Institutions that have been created by imposition will never function effectively unless Bosnians of all ethnicities buy in to them and until Bosnian citizens expect them, and not in to international organizations, to deliver reform.

This requires a shift in mind-set both among Bosnians, who have grown accustomed to an intrusive international presence in their country, and within the international community, which has grown accustomed to intervening in all levels of decision making.

One consequence of seeking to avoid using the Bonn powers could be a slowdown in the perceived pace of progress in the coming year. But neither stagnation nor a return to the zero-sum attitudes that once characterized Bosnian politics are inevitable. Indeed, I believe it is possible that Bosnians surprise us and prove to the world that the caricature of their country as a "failed state in Europe" is no longer accurate.

I have traveled through Bosnia for more than a decade, brokering more than 60 mediation agreements on highly sensitive issues, and I have seen impressive changes as a result of the efforts of local people and institutions.

There are huge incentives for success. This year, Bosnia could both sign a stabilization and association agreement with the European Union and join NATO's Partnership-for-Peace program. These are key milestones on the road to European and Euro-Atlantic integration. My office will do what we can to help Bosnia reach these objectives. But to take these processes forward, Bosnia must be a fully sovereign country. That means that I must step back.

Elections in October should provide Bosnians with an opportunity to debate the way forward and to choose leaders who are best equipped to secure their country's European future. For they - not I - will be responsible for negotiating the terms and speed of their country's entry into Europe.

Termination of the office of the high representative - and with it, the Bonn powers - does not signal the end of international engagement in Bosnia. Rather it will herald the beginning of a new chapter in the country's relationship with the wider world and in particular with the rest of Europe. Moreover, I will not leave the country when I cease to be high representative. Instead, I will remain here as a special representative of the European Union to help steer these processes.

Europe has not always done the right thing for Bosnia. I have been acutely aware of this since I resigned from the German government in 1992 in protest of our collective failure in Bosnia. But today tried-and-tested mechanisms, in particular in the form of the European Union's pre-accession negotiations but also NATO's Membership Action Plan, exist to focus the minds of Bosnian leaders on required reforms.

The process of European integration has been remarkable for all countries that today make up the European Union and has helped create unparalleled peace, prosperity and opportunity. It has also helped heal the wounds of the most devastating war the world has known.

Those of us who experienced Europe's darkest days and have lived long enough to see the European Union and NATO grow to include countries that used to be part of the Eastern bloc realize how far and fast it is possible to move when countries are on the right track. While clearly Bosnia still has a long way to go, the goal of eventual membership in these institutions should be sufficiently powerful to help Bosnians overcome divisions and shape their own destiny.

(Christian Schwarz-Schilling is High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina.)

http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/01/opinion/edschill.php?rss

The goal of eventual membership in the EU and NATO should be sufficiently powerful to help Bosnians overcome divisions and shape their own destiny.

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UNSG Annan criticises Kosovo institutions on standardsimplementation

 

UNSG Annan criticises Kosovo institutions on standards implementation 

 

Under the headline Delays in standards can postpone resolution of final status, Koha Ditore carries as the leading front-page story the latest political report on Kosovo done by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. According to the paper, the report speaks of delays in the implementation of standards after the start of status negotiations, except for the standards on the Kosovo Protection Corps and the protection of property.

 

“While I welcome preparations on the process of future status, I am very concerned about delays in most areas of standards implementation. The implementation of standards by the political and institutional leaders is an obligation toward the people of Kosovo. I strongly call on Kosovar leaders to enliven their efforts in order to ensure a substantial progress in standards implementation,†UNSG Annan is quoted as saying.

 

According to Koha Ditore, the 8-page political report also criticises the functioning of the Kosovo Assembly and calls for more democratic debate. The report also criticises delays in the appointment of members of the anti-corruption agency.

 

SG Annan said that demonstration of progress in main areas of standards implementation, such as returns, dialogue and decentralisation, can contribute and reduce tensions between the communities. Annan also said that Belgrade authorities must encourage Kosovo Serbs to constructively participate in the provisional institutions of self-government in Kosovo, especially on practical issues.

 

In his report, Annan also called for direct meetings at a higher political and technical level between Pristina and Belgrade, in order to advance the political process.

 

Koha Ditore notes that despite the critical approach toward most areas of standards implementation, the report however also brings about the positive sides. “On the positive side, jobs have been created for minorities in the Central Government and the Kosovo Protection Corps.â€

 

The report also said that work in the reconstruction and preservation of Serb cultural heritage has continued and has become one key point of contact between the provisional institutions and Serb representatives.

 

Commenting on the issue, Koha Ditore editor-in-chief Agron Bajrami notes: “Kofi Annan’s criticism is a warning that delays of processes by the Kosovars can cause a change in the international position vis-à-vis Kosovo, which would not annul the building of the international consensus for giving Kosovo ‘conditional independence’, but could go in favour of conditions in damage of independence.â€