Please find enclosed my article "The 10 Winners of a Kosovo Compromise" published in this week's issue of the Brussels-based newsweekly "New Europe".
February 19-25, 2006. Issue Number 665
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Page 2 - Opinion
The 10 Winners of a Kosovo Compromise
By Aleksandar Mitic
Positions on the future status of the Serbian province of Kosovo differ among interested parties and international factors. Yet, as the talks get underway, there is one principle that all believe should be taken as the basis for a sustainable and long-lasting solution: compromise.
There seems to be, however, a misunderstanding of what the word “compromise†implies. Kosovo Albanian leaders claim that their maximalist demand – independence – is a compromising solution. Go figure.
Some analysts, diplomats and lobbyists argue that compromise involves granting Kosovo Albanians independence on condition they start respecting the basic human rights of the Kosovo Serbs that they had been flagrantly breaching in the last six years through murders, kidnappings, arson and destruction of centuries of historic heritage. Notwithstanding the legal fallacies, this indecent proposal is an insult to 21st century European human rights.
Indeed, a compromise for the Kosovo status can only be found within the aim of the talks on Kosovo’s future status: it is to provide a fair, stable, long-term solution for this crisis region.
The majority Kosovo Albanians must get a maximum of opportunities and real means to manage their future without feeling threatened, but also without threatening the interests of Kosovo Serbs, other non-Albanians, Serbia, as well as the security and stability of the rest of the region.
The Contact Group has excluded several options: no return to the situation from before 1999 ( a reference to “standard autonomyâ€Â), no joining to neighbouring states (a reference to a “Greater Albaniaâ€Â) and no partition (a reference to a border division between the Serb and Albanian-populated areas of Kosovo).
Within these recommendations, a compromise can only be found between the standard autonomy for the province – unacceptable for the Albanian aspirations – and the full, be it “conditional†or immediate independence of Kosovo – unacceptable for international law, for the Serbs and the Serbian state.
The proposal of a “maximum autonomy†for Kosovo within the borders of Serbia-Montenegro appears set to satisfy all these criteria. Coupled with an autonomy for the Serb areas within the highly-autonomous Kosovo, it responds to realistic demands of the Kosovo Albanians for self-governing, but it also protects the interests of non-Albanians, of Serbia itself and of the principles of non-violability of borders.
Indeed, the option of an autonomy for the Kosovo Serbs within a “maximum autonomy†for Kosovo – all under EU supervision -- appears as the most reasonable, compromising and long-term solution.
It is a win-win situation for everyone:
1) The Kosovo Albanians will get the means to manage their future. Kosovo will get a full internal legislative, executive and judicial capacity, a limited external representation – in particular full access to the international financial institutions – a European perspective and a normalization of relations with Belgrade.
2) The Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians will be able to enjoy wide-scale decentralization, including horizontal linkage of Serbian municipalities which would benefit from the education, social and health system of central Serbia, as suggested by the UN special envoy Kai Eide.
3) Serbia will not have its borders changed and its historical cradle amputated. Instead of punishing a democratic government in Belgrade and blocking its road towards Europe, it would make Serbia look towards the future rather than the past.
4) Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina will receive formal and practical guarantees that the changes of borders in the Balkans are no longer tolerated. This would dissuade the division of Macedonia along the ethnic Macedonian-Albanian lines and the secession of the Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5) Albania will regulate and legalize its relations with Kosovo Albanians, and the Balkans will be freed from the threat of the creation of a “Greater Albania†or a second Albanian state.
6) The European Union will obtain regional stability in the Western Balkans and take fully in charge the European perspective for Kosovo. This is particularly important given that, after Bulgaria’s and Romania’s entry into the EU in 2007/08, the Western Balkans will become the “missing link†for the integrity of the EU.
7) The United States would be able to finally disengage their troops from Kosovo without losing the diplomatic leverage they now possess in both Belgrade and Pristina.
8) China, Russia, Spain, India, Moldova, Georgia and many other countries in the world facing secessionist tendencies would appreciate not having to deal with a dangerous precedent.
9) The UN will have the basis of international law system respected and its special envoy Marti Ahtisaari would be behind the brokering of a historic deal rather than an imposed solution.
10) Multiethnicity and the idea of Europe would finally win. The horizontal linkage of Serbian municipalities would be a model of integration and survival, as these municipalities would also be fully integrated into the Kosovo system run by Albanian-dominated Pristina. Property rights and the security of Serb Orthodox cultural and religious heritage would be ensured and the return of at least a part of the 220,000 expelled non-Albanians could begin. Under the supervision of the EU and the OSCE, human rights, freedom of movement and dignified life for all would finally triumph.
Aleksandar Mitic is a Brussels-based Correspondent of the Tanjug news agency, a Lecturer at the University of Belgrade and Analyst of the Institute 4S.
amitic5star@yahoo.com
February 20, 2006
The 10 Winners of a Kosovo Compromise
February 16, 2006
What will be discussed in Vienna (Express, Kosovo dailynewspapers)
What will be discussed in Vienna (Express)
Along with a paper, Express carried a document that the Daily claims UN Status Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, sent out to the Kosovo Negotiations Team. The paper writes that the meeting in Vienna, within the framework of decentralization, will also deal with issues like healthcare, education, social welfare, culture, police, justice and public services.
Express says the document prepared by Ahtisaari’s team shows a quite different approach to decentralization compared to the stances coming from Pristina and Belgrade Teams who concentrate more on territorial and political aspects.
1. Health
Current situation: The PISG Ministry of Health is responsible for policy-making, development and implementation of health strategies, and provision of secondary and tertiary health services. The health directorates in municipalities are responsible for defining the budget for, and implementation of primary health care (PHC) as well as supply management in health facilities. At the end of 2004, the PISG public health system has one university hospital, five regional hospitals, three other hospitals /clinics, 10 TB dispensaries, five health institutions, six community mental centres all run by central level, and 365 PHC facilities run by municipalities.
Ministry of public services sets the staff ceilings for all health facilities while staff management on the PHC level, including hiring is the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and municipality directorates. Kosovo Serbs enclaves manage their own PHC facilities and a hospital in Northern Mitrovica, with financing from Serbian Government and only very limited degree of collaboration with PISG structures.
Ground to be explored: Optional secondary health care in municipal responsibility as long as certain preconditions are fulfilled (extensive catchments are, some degree of use to capacity, profitability). Responsibility for supply management and staff reside with the municipalities (to the extent of the municipalities have functional competencies and within the context of overall policy responsibility of the Ministry of Health and existing KCB budget envelope).
With secondary health care as a voluntary municipal function (possibly by encouraging inter-municipal cooperation) potential drawbacks are to be considered, particularly financial aspects since voluntary functions are usually not reflected in the grant system.
A different approach could be to provide by law that secondary health care shall be delegated to municipalities (or inter-municipal bodies) which fulfil certain conditions. In this case the existing structures will be managed by the concerned municipalities. Delegation will guarantee the right of the Government to exert ultimate control (via a super visionary mechanism), but will also oblige it to transfer the resources necessary.
2. Education
Current situation: Kosovo currently administers an education system in which educational services are provided separately for the main ethnic groups. As a result Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs children pursue their studies in their own language according to their own curriculum, textbooks and materials. The PISG has implemented a 5+4+3/4 system of primary and secondary education.
There is only a small non-formal sector which includes eight vocational training facilities administered by the Ministry of Work and Social Welfare (MWSW). Recently, another centre (for agricultural training) has been opened in Lipjan/Lipljan through an agreement with Norwegian NGO Norges Vel.
University of Pristina is the main higher education institution in Kosovo (comprising of 22 faculties and colleges). There is also a university in Serbian language in Mitrovica as well as UP’s satellites in Peja/Pec and Prizren that work in Serbian and Bosnian languages. Education responsibilities are shared amongst central level (MEST and MWSW) and municipalities.
Responsibilities of the Ministry of Education Science and Technology (MEST) are broad and include higher education, school inspection, setting education standards, drafting of curriculum and textbooks, licensing private education institutions, appointment of school directors etc. MEST is represented in a regional level with five field offices. Municipalities are responsible for preschool, primary and secondary education. They are responsible for training the staff, entering the data for schoolchildren, financing, maintaining and repairing of schools, recruiting, contracting and paying administrative, teaching and non-teaching staff. Many municipalities are insufficiently equipped to meet these duties because the staff at disposal has little or no experience in administration of education and many responsibilities are not exercised in full.
School principals are appointed by panels consisting of MEST and municipality representatives, but the final appointment authority rests with MEST. Principals are responsible for academic issues and general administration of schools but they have almost no authority for employing or assessing the staff and organization which has been regulated by administrative instruction of MEST implemented by municipal directors of education. Almost all MEST instructions have been drafted and signed without participation of Kosovo Serbs and without taking into consideration specific concerns of minority communities in Kosovo. This has further aggravated isolation in the field of education.
Ground to be explored: Fundamental principles of decentralization in preschool, primary and secondary education remain valid. As far as education services, they are decentralized to a certain degree.
Structural improvements seem possible by taking into account selection of school principals (with a lesser impact of MEST representatives) as well as drafting of school textbooks (issue that can be left to an independent commission comprising of MEST, minority communities and international participants so that they timely agree on a general curriculum). Some responsibilities like school transport (for students and teachers) as well as food services of the school should be competencies of municipalities. The same goes for preschool education.
All administrative instructions of MEST that have to do with organizing and school staff should be reviewed with participation of Kosovo Serbs and include special measures for minorities. A possible temporary solution should be reviewed for a four-year transitional period during which the two systems of education would become compatible or mutually recognized.
3. Social Policies
Current situation: At present, social welfare services (social service and social assistance), employment, and pension services are under central level administration. Regulation 2005/45 on Family and Social Services, that had been promulgated in September 2005, provides for transfer of responsibilities in the field of social services from central to local level (for instance, Centres for social work, provisions for social services within the territory of municipalities – kindergartens, preschool facilities, household support, personal care, counseling, housing care), provisions on financial assistance to fulfill certain social needs of individuals (in a complementary way to the social assistance scheme that is managed by central level).
Ground to be explored: Regardless of receiving pensions transferred by the Yugoslav pension scheme and pensions received by Kosovo Serbs outside Kosovo (that will not be treated in this context), positions on “decentralization” of social policies should not be very different from one another.
In principle, pensions and other programmes of social protection should be addressed in the central level, therefore the responsibility for legislation, policy making, standards, budget coordination, coordination of trainings and licensing remain in the central level. Otherwise, social services, provided by Centres for Social Work (currently placed under municipal and sub-municipal level) will be transferred to local level as specified in Regulation 2005/45. It should be assessed whether increase of municipalities’ responsibilities should include specific functions transferred to implementation of social assistance programmes (contact centres should be established in municipalities).
In general, development of concrete social services should be led by local level with the greatest possible scope.
4. Culture (cultural heritage, sports, stage arts, etc) and the media
Current situation: Currently the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sports (MCYS) exercises a considerable number of responsibilities in the area of:
· Cultural heritage (general managing of cultural sites in Kosovo, the Reconstruction Committee, identification and recording of local and national heritage, archives, stage and visual arts, promotions and libraries, culture legislation, registry and inventory of premises, including protection, financing and policies through for Institutes for Protection of Monuments led by central bodies with many transferred competencies.
· Sports (federations for organizing sports, buildings and equipment. In accordance with Regulation 2000/45, the municipalities manage youth centres and Youth Network (with a financial help from Ministry of Culture, Youth and Non-Residential Affairs), local sports leagues, cultural events and some monuments (if they are not managed by the Institute for Protection of Monuments).
Out of 118 licensed broadcasters in Kosovo, 38 belong to minorities (32 of them to Kosovo Serbs, 2 to Turks, 2 to Bosniaks and 1 to Goranis). In general 30 broadcasters are to some point multiethnic, and a small number of owners broadcast one or more hours in the languages that are not the primary language of the station.
Awaiting the nomination of five local members for the Independent Media Commissioner, all broadcast media – from the municipal, regional or Kosovo wide level – get their licenses from the Temporary Media Commissioner. There are no municipality-owned broadcasters for the sake of protecting the freedom of the media and reducing the illegal local political interference, broadcasting licenses are not given to municipalities. All the radio and TV stations are as a consequence privately financed, with the exception of the RTK, which is a public broadcaster; with one television and two radio station.
Grounds to be explored: Although many responsibilities in the area of cultural heritage have been transferred, the Institute for Protection of Monuments (which in fact is led by the central level) needs to discuss further decentralization regarding maintenance, reconstruction and protection of religious sites. Protection and promotion like the inventorying and recording of the cultural heritage that has not explicitly been declared as ‘national’ should be transferred to municipalities (with some role in the hands of the MCYS in order for it to organize the work in accordance with European standards and to create a sustainable and comprehensive database of the Kosovo cultural heritage and also to organize awareness and education campaigns for respecting the cultural heritage of all the minorities).
The Reconstruction Committee should remain a direct responsibility of the MCYS, in cooperation with the international agencies (Council of Europe, UNESCO, and bilateral donors). However, a coordination/consultation mechanism/process can be recommendable to help transparency and to create the feeling of ownership and responsibility from municipalities.
Regarding the media, the position of the Temporary Media Commissioner/UNMIK is that the democratic principle of the free media rules out the media control by the state, no matter from what government level. Therefore, in no way will the municipalities be involved in managing or regulating the electronic media in Kosovo. There have been some measures taken by Kosovo institutions for a general media policy for minorities (minimal obligatory broadcasting for minority communities, reduction of custom duties and VAT in selling/importing of print media for the minority population), but not immediately linked to the decentralization schemes.
5. Police
Current situation: Gradual transfer of responsibilities in the area of policing and justice from the exclusive use by UNMIK to the local institutions is being developed trough the establishing of a Ministry for Internal Affairs late in 2005 and transfer of responsibilities to the already completed KPS.
Since the SRSG will have the last say until the end of UNMIK mandate, the responsibilities will be transferred gradually step by step and will be subject to a careful examination of the performance the ministries will show in their responsibilities at each stage; in this process the guarantees for the minority communities should be strengthened.
Ground to be explored: For KPS to fully cooperate with local authorities and Municipality Security Councils of local communities and, with other smaller areas within communities, Local Security Councils are being established in communities inhabited areas, and in respective areas where they are conveniently represented. The Commander of KPS local stations will be selected in consultation with Police Commissioner (similar to ‘Ohrid’ model),
Also, in consultation with village leaders, police sub-stations are being opened in villages of community areas with a considerable number of minorities (14 of which where already established during 2005), and main priority for employment will be given to KPS Officers from these areas. The recruitment, at all levels of KPS, should reflect the need for equal representation of all communities in Kosovo – during 2005 the percentage of minority employment doubled, from 12% to 22%.
6. Justice
Current situation: There are 25 Municipal Courts in total which operate in most existing municipalities in Kosovo (including a number of liaison offices established in smaller municipalities), 5 District Court, an Economic Court in Pristina and Kosovo Supreme Court.
All Municipal and District Courts that operated in Kosovo before March 1999 are transferred to Serbia and have built a parallel system. There are still some parallel courts in Northern Kosovo (Mitrovica, Zubin Potok, Leposavic), while parallel courts in central Kosovo (Strpce, Lipjan and Gracanica) seems to have seized the operation for ever.
The review of community guarantees in the field of justice has already started. In particular, access to Municipal Courts will be enhanced through establishing ‘courts departments’ in enclaves (like the model of Gracanica and Sterpce), and opening of ‘Court liaison offices’ in areas where a new court wouldn’t be economically sustainable. Ideas for transferring responsibilities for minor offences from courts to local administration are being discussed in the context of proposition of a new efficient and economically capable structure of courts in Kosovo. Furthermore, the plans for the transformations of court liaison offices to Offices of civic rights for the implementation of anti-discriminatory laws are sketched and could be implemented with the donors’ assistance.
Ground to be explored: In accordance with the Council of Europe applicable standards, the direct participation of municipalities for the nomination of judges is ruled out because of principles. Furthermore, it seems difficult to avoid practical obstacles for ensuring an unbiased role of judges of minorities in the Kosovo legal system, particularly Serb community, to apply for positions.
7. Public services
Current situation: So far, the management of municipal property and the settlement of public services (as: water, waste, irrigation, water surfaces, drainage, road cleaning services, etc) is done by KTA. Most of municipal properties that served social enterprises (land, materials…) were taken by KTA, although some of them (forestry, agriculture) are managed by municipalities. Water and waste management is done by 8 regional centers (extended throughout Kosovo – not always within municipal boundaries – excluding north, where a parallel waste management exists).
Under Resolution 1244, UNMIK is currently continuing the general policy of social enterprises privatization, without prejudging the status negotiations outcomes. Here consideration is given to the importance of subsidiary assistance that comes from public enterprises, financial transparency and modern business principles (private sector and public service structures).
Thus, accounting on a considerable transfer of competencies to the local level, gradual deviation from the general policy is also being considered, such as the transfer of competencies of some social enterprises (land and real property, but transport as well) to municipalities without adequate compensation and the increase of municipality representation in Supervising Boards of Public Enterprises, such as regional centres.
As for power supply, there are discussions going on regarding the need of a vertical division of energetic sector in: production and distribution, later on it could be regionalized, or even at the municipal level (with arguments favouring local property/communities of energetic network and those that believe that the industrial trend is more aggressive and that solutions should be more competitive in the energy sector.)
Ground to be explored: KTA has carried a process of incorporation of Public Enterprises in order to improve the management of companies, financial transparency and accountability procedures. Taking into account the fact that Public Enterprises can operate in individual municipalities, in several municipalities, or throughout Kosovo, discussions are underway to extend the company boards with more municipal representatives. Legal mechanisms are being reviewed for facilitating the transfer of competencies of social enterprises to municipal level without any compensation.
The vertical division of energetic system is part of Athens Agreement, where UNMIK is participatory. The vertical division is necessary in order to make the energetic market more competitive and efficient, and consumers (at least the major one) would have the possibility of choosing the supplier. Vertical division of KEK should address questions like how, when and the scale of problems that may arise when transferring KEK’s assets to new companies.
In the long-term, it is clearly visible that a number of public services should eventually be transferred to municipal institutions, or to be privatized and operate as private enterprises. This transfer should be planned clearly in order to prevent flaws of providing services. In this context, the ownership of key networks should not necessarily transfer to specific municipalities. The ownership over the network should be kept at central levels.
February 15, 2006
SN377:"Principles must be universal"
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PRAVDA
14.02.2006 Source:
It seems that Vladimir Putin has been mastering the art of double standards lately. This art gives an opportunity to many countries – the USA first and foremost – to adjust their national interests to formal democratic and international standards. Judging upon recent statements from the Russian president, it becomes clear that Putin prefers to concentrate on the real state of affairs rather than dwell upon political fantasies.
The first double standard of the Russian president is connected with his attitude to terrorists. Pravda.Ru reported before that Russia had invited Hamas leaders to come to Moscow for talks. Such an initiative caused quite a stir in Israel . The whole world sees Hamas as a terrorist movement which does not recognize Israel. However, Putin stated at the press conference for Russian and foreign media in the Kremlin on January 31 that Russia had never considered Hamas a terrorist organization. Yet, Russia has been taking great efforts lately trying to make the international community refer to Chechen separatists as 'terrorists' not 'rebels.' European politicians have repeatedly tried to make the Russian administration negotiate with "rebels." Putin firmly stated that "Russia does not negotiate with terrorists."
Needless to say that Russia is not the only country which uses double standards in international politics. The USA would never dare to launch a military campaign against Iraq if the US administration did not rely on double standards. The Bush's administration successfully used the conflict of such values as security and international rights.
Russia studies the art of the double standards technologies too. Western politicians claim that the Russian administration supposedly has a biased attitude to Ukraine. It is not ruled out that Russia decided to punish the new Ukrainian government for its pro-Western political orientation during the recent gas conflict. Russian politicians would never say that they wanted to make Ukraine stop stealing the Russian natural gas and make the country more Russia-dependent. Instead, it was clearly said that the conflict had occurred because of the need to introduce new market prices between Russia and Ukraine. It is noteworthy that Russia continues to sell natural gas to Belarus at a very low price of $50 per cubic meter.
Ukraine has given many other reasons to Russian politicians to train their skills in the art of realpolitik. Russia harshly criticized the Western stance during the presidential election in Ukraine claiming that the West was supporting one of the Ukrainian political forces. However, Russia openly supported Viktor Yushchenko's rival at the election, Viktor Yanukovich.
Double standards help Vladimir Putin achieve at least a little bit understanding in the relations with the West. Tax evasion, for instance, is considered one of the most severe economic crimes in the Western society. As a result, this aspect became the key argument in the notorious Yukos case. When a Spanish journalist asked Putin if the use of non-transparent companies in state-run transactions had a goal to avoid tax payments, the president answered negatively to that question.
The vast majority of Russian companies use Yukos 's financial schemes in their financial activities. Nevertheless, the police do not raid their offices nor do they arrest their accounts. Here is another example. The Russian administration does not consider oligarch Roman Abramovich an economic criminal because Abramovich takes the post of the Chukotka regional governor. Putin would never try to explain that the Russian property needs to be laundered within the scope of partnership between a wealthy entrepreneur and the state. If the president released such a statement in public, Russia would be deprived of foreign investments immediately. It just so happens that honesty comes in conflict with state security at this point.
Another example of double standards in Russia can be found in the field of Russia's internal problems and their estimation. The children of Russian senior officials may not worry about their future: they will have most prestigious jobs owing to their parents' efforts. For example, the son of Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov has recently taken an important position at Vnesheconombank (Foreign Economic Bank). President Putin referred to such events as an "ugly trend." "We must always try to restrict the power of state officials, put them inside the legal framework and make their work transparent and public as much as possible. At the same time, we must guarantee the rights of their family members. They are humans too. They have a right for a career. But this is a very subtle aspect," Putin stated.
Indeed, it is extremely hard to find a definitive line separating human rights and the struggle against corruption. United Russia party is currently working on a draft law about Russian deputies' right for commercial activities. This opportunity would be equated with a right to accept bribes in the Western countries.
Cogency is the most important factor in the policy of double standards. "Principles must be universal, otherwise they will not make anyone trust the policies that we are running," Vladimir Putin said at the press conference for foreign media in the Kremlin.
Albanian Terrorists
Milan V. Petkovic
Albanian Terrorists
There is only one step from fanaticism to barbarism.
Denis Diderot1998., NIGP Kalekom, Beograd
© 1998 Milan V. Petkovic
CONTENTS
CHAPTERS
- Islamic Extremism and the European Quest
- Growing Iranian influence
- The Albanian Initiative
- The US Interest for Terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija
- Turkey, Albania and the "Republic Kosova"
- Using religion
- Turkey, Albania and Kosovo and Metohija
- Planning the "Republic of Kosova"
- The "Kosovo Liberation Army"
- What is the "Kosovo Liberation Army"?
- Profile of a terrorist
- "Dogs of War" are arriving
- Profession  Terrorist
- Miscellaneous
- Others about Balcan
- Milan V. Petkovic: Albanian Terrorists [in English language]
- Milan V. Petkovic: Albanski teroristi [in Serbian language]
- Documents
- Students
- Assosiation of Serbian hystorics
- Petitions
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February 14, 2006
The EU needs a bolder Balkan strategy
The EU needs a bolder Balkan strategy
In Short:
This article, written by former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt for the Centre for European Reform, argues that "the best thing the EU could do to promote Balkan stability would be to offer an indicative timetable to each state that shows an appetite for reform and a willingness to engage with the Union."
The Balkans are returning to the top of the EU's agenda. UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari has begun to negotiate Kosovo's future, while Montenegrins will probably vote in April on whether to break with Serbia. Both processes could destabilise a region that is suffering an economic crisis. Unemployment is about 30 per cent in Serbia and Montenegro, 40 per cent in Macedonia and 50 per cent in Kosovo.
The European Commission quite rightly wants to give the entire region a clear perspective of membership, as an incentive for the various governments to carry out painful reforms. The demise of the EU's constitutional treaty has turned some member-states away from the idea of further enlargement. Nevertheless, last year the EU began accession talks with Croatia, declared Macedonia a candidate, and started negotiating 'stabilisation agreements' with Serbia and Bosnia.
To read the article in full, visit the Centre for European Reform (CER) website.
February 13, 2006
Who bombed the markets in Sarajevo?
Seán Mac Mathúna
"A few days ago Mr. Boutros Ghali informed me that the projectile which hit the Markale marketplace in Sarajevo was an act of (Bosnian) Muslim provocation". President Mitterrand of France, 1995
Open military confrontation in Bosnia-Herzegovina ended with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement on 14th December 1995. The conflict had resulted in more than 160,000 deaths, and 2.5 million refugees and displaced persons. Not long before, the United Nations (UN) had ordered the first combat units from its rapid reaction force into Sarajevo, after after Serb rebels killed two French peacekeepers. Three Bosnian Serb shells had hit the French and Danish areas of a U.N. compound in Zetra, north of Sarajevo's centre killing a French peacekeeper and wounding another French soldier and a Dane. A half-hour later, another French peacekeeper was killed and two wounded, one seriously, when a U.N. convoy was targeted by Serbs in the suburb of Butmir. The deaths brought the number of French dead to 42 since the Bosnian war began in April 1992 - and not all of them were killed by the Bosnian Serbs, a number of them were also killed in crossfire or deliberately by the forces of the Bosnian government.
Not only did the UN get tough with the Bosnian Serbs - whose political and military leaders have now been charged with war crimes - in 1995, NATO had become directly involved when when they ordered air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. These attacks had been preceded by a series of barbaric attacks against civilians in the Markele market in Sarajevo, all of which were assumed to be the work of the Serb army laying siege to Sarajevo.
There were three attacks on the markets, all of which were blamed on them: the first on 27th May 1992, killed 16 people, the second on 5th February 1994 killed 68, and the third on 28th August 1995, killed 37. The last attack is the most significant, as it has been widely alleged, by members of the UN Mission in Bosnia, UN Commanding officers and of course, predictably, the Bosnian Serbs themselves, that this one in particular was staged by elements within the Bosnian government to provide the pretext for NATO military involvement in the war. In subsequent attacks, bombs and bullets used by the NATO jets used Depleted Uranium (DU) which is now estimated to have claimed the lives of some Serb 300 civilians who lived in the vicinity of the bases hit by NATO, according to reports that surfaced in 2001. What evidence is there for the claims that the Bosnian government carried out these attacks ?
The first attack in 1992
The first of three attacks happened on 27th May 1992 when 16 people killed in a "mortar attack" on a bread queue in Vase Miskina street in Sarajevo. As The Independent (22nd August 1992) noted, the televised scenes of civilians cut to pieces by an explosion as they queued for bread horrified international public opinion, and added growing pressure for NATO to "intervene" in the civil war against the Bosnian Serbs. Vivid footage showed dead bodies littering the street and "terrified crying people sitting on the pavement in pools of blood". The attacks came shortly before a meeting by European Union ambassadors to consider imposing sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UN officials from the start were "suspicious about the circumstances but would not go public with their thoughts without jeopardising the UN mission" in Bosnia. Classified reports given to the commander of the UN peace keepers, General Satish Nambiar, concluded that it was likely that the army of the Bosnian government in Sarajevo carried out the attack. In fact, they were reported to believe it wasn't a mortar attack at all but a "command-detonated explosion - probably in a can". The impact mark left by the "mortar" on the market square floor was nowhere "near as large as we came to expect with a mortar round lading on a paved surface". This is also supported by another UN commander in Bosnia, General Michael Rose of the British army, who according to his book Dispatch the Bosnian government in Sarajevo shelled their own people to get a military response by NATO against the Bosnian Serbs (The Observer, 28th March 1999). NATO launched air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs as a result of this attack.
According to The Independent, United Nations (UN) officials and senior Western military officers believe that the attack in 1992 was carried out by the Bosnian government, "To win world sympathy and trigger intervention". This was also expressed in confidential reports circulating at the UN headquarters in New York, and in classified briefings to US policy makers in Washington, according to the British newspaper. The attack on the bread queue in Vase Miskina Street also led to draconian sanctions against Yugoslavia imposed by the Security Council (resolution 757) on 30th May 1992 (which had been preceded by Yugoslavia's expulsion from the WHO). All supplies of raw materials to the well-developed pharmaceutical industry of Yugoslavia for production of medicines were immediately suspended. The justification for blaming Yugoslavia for attacks carried out in Bosnia was based on Western intelligence disinformation that the country was directing the war on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs.
The second attack in 1994
The second attack on a market in Sarajevo happened on 5th February 1994 when a single mortar round left 68 dead and 200 wounded. Some people immediately questioned how son many civilians had been killed or wounded by one mortar bomb. Furthermore, officials from the Bosnian government did allow anyone from UNPROFOR to verify what had happened. Despite vehement denials from the Bosnian Serbs, the US news channel, CNN, immediately reported that they were responsible for the shocking carnage that the attack left, which CNN claimed was "caused by a Serb mortar bomb". The US President Bill Clinton added to this saying it was "highly likely" that the Bosnian Serbs were responsible for it.
Thus, US ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright and the US presidential security advisor Anthony Lake, immediately called for NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs. Yet there were already people claiming that even the UN itself did not suspect the Bosnian Serbs, but this appears to have been suppressed by the Western media, possibly acting under covert British and American pressure, assuming the the whole purpose of the mortar attack was to provide the pretext for NATO military involvement in the Balkans for the first time. If this is not the case, then it is certainly hinted at by the former British Foreign Secretary David Owen in his book Balkan Odyssey (Victor Gollanz, London, 1995):
"People around General Rose never tried to hide the fact that at his meeting with Bosnian Muslim leaders (President Alia Izetbegovic and General Delic) he said that he had just received some information which shows that the mortar bomb did not come from the area under Serb control but from the Muslim part of the city . . ."
However, Owen's account of the the Market square massacre in 1994 has been criticised by Noel Malcom in a review of his book in The Sunday Telegraph on 12th November 1995.
When discussing the market-place massacre in Sarajevo of February 1994, Lord Owen goes on at length about a UN investigation which concluded that the mortar shell had been fired from a Bosnian Government position. Dramatically, he confirms that General Rose put pressure on Bosnian ministers by threatening to reveal this finding, unless they did as they were told. What Lord Owen does not tell us is that a second, more thorough investigation found that the first had made mistakes in its calculations, and concluded that the shell could equally have come from the Serb side. It is surely inconceivable that Owen is unaware of this second report; yet he chooses not to mention it. Readers will have to draw their own conclusions about the overall reliability of this grotesquely vainglorious book.
But, Owen also fails to give any clear evidence as to the perpetrators of this attack - if you read his statement carefully, he is only telling us that the second investigation, although on one hand, described as "more thorough", still concluded that the shell could "equally" have come from the Serb side. This indicates to me that their is still no hard evidence that either side were responsible. Bosnian Serb and Russian claims should be treated with scepticism (as they have a vested interest, from a propaganda point-of-view, in making sure these allegations are widely circulated). But the claims of the UN and representatives of various NATO countries serving as peacekeepers should be treated as serious and worthy of investigation.
From example, On 6th June 1996, Yasushi Akashi, UN special envoy for Bosnia, told a German journalist working for DPA in New York, that there was a secret UN report accusing the Bosnian government forces of this massacre. It was claimed that this secret report was passed on to the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, who did not publish it in the interest of "higher politics". Citing this UN report, B. Volker, a French journalist working for TV TF1 said that the mortar bomb was fired from Bosnian government positions. Volker also quotes the words of President Mitterrand: "A few days ago Mr. Boutros Ghali informed me that the projectile which hit the Markale marketplace in Sarajevo was an act of (Bosnian) Muslim provocation".
The third attack in 1995
The third attack, on 28th August 1995 also hit market and left 37 dead and 90 wounded. When UN issued a declaration blaming the Bosnian Serbs, it evidently ignored the report of the British and French experts as well as the assessment of the UN's artillery expert for the Sarajevo sector, a Russian colonel, A. Demurenko. Soon after the attack, NATO launched extensive air strikes against Bosnian Serb military and civilian targets. The strategy appeared pre-planned as it coincided with an joint Croat and Bosnian government offensive against the Bosnian Serbs. The attacks changed the course of the war in Bosnia as enabled NATO to enter the conflict on behalf of the Bosnian government and Croat forces. After this attack, President Yeltsin gave official credence to reports circulating in the Russian media that a "third party" was responsible for the mortar attack on the bread queue. Yeltsin said that Russia "insists" that the UN "look again" at the attacks as there was new evidence indicating that it was not the Bosnian Serb's who carried out the attack. Despite this, NATO went ahead and launched air strikes. One military adviser to the foreign ministry, General Boris Gromov, even claimed (with no evidence provided) that one of the NATO powers was involved in the mortar attack "as a provocation". Yeltsin also said:
"Why am l against the expansion of NATO ? This (mortar attack in Sarajevo) is the first sign of what might happen when NATO comes right up to the borders of the Russian Federation. Those who insist on the expansion of NATO are making a major political mistake. The flame of war would burst out across the whole of Europe" (The Guardian, 9th September 1995).
The Russians and Bosnian Serbs have claimed that the third attack was prepared in advance over many months by "certain" Western secret services (probably including the CIA), and that Bosnian government troops under the commander of the General R. Delic carried it out. The reason for this, they argue, was to provide NATO with an opportunity not only discredit the Bosnian Serbs, but to provide the pretext to use heavy air strikes on them so as to destroy their military potential. The Russian intelligence service (FSB) were said to had known about the preparation of the plan since February 1995. Then a detailed plan, allegedly called Cyclone 2, was related to a secret memorandum, signed on 10th August 1995 at the Pleso airport in Zagreb, Croatia. The memorandum was signed for the UN by the commander of the UNPROFOR forces based Croatia and Bosnia,General B. Janvier and by Admiral L. Smith for NATO. This secret memorandum was only passed on, as "secret", on 13th September 1995 to the UN Security Council, when the main destruction of Serb targets had already taken place. According to article 7 of the memorandum UNPROFOR agreed to provide all information necessary for the NATO strikes against Serb targets to achieve the maximum success.
According to the FSB, the mortar was fired from the roof of a building near the market and they further claimed that the device was not a standard mortar bomb. Another author, Y. Bodansky, the director of the Republican parliamentary task force studying terrorism and unconventional warfare (Target America, Terrorism in the US Today, S.P.I. Books, Shapolsky Publishers, New York, 1993), believed that the Bosnian Serb intelligence service knew that "something was being planned" in Sarajevo. On 26th August 1995 (two days before the second massacre) he spoke by telephone to a senior official of the Republika Srpska in the Yugoslav capital, Belgrade, who told him anxiously that once again "something terrible is being planned against the Serbs" in Sarajevo. How much of this is true, made up or just a joint FSB-Bosnian Serb disinformation campaign is hard to assess.
Another report indicating that the Bosnian Serbs were not responsible for this market place attacks was published in The Sunday Times on October 1st 1995. It claimed that British ammunition experts serving with the UN in Sarajevo had "challenged" key evidence of the attack on the bread market which not only triggered NATO attacks against the Serbs in Bosnia, but turned the tide of the war against them. According to the newspaper, the British experts:
"found no evidence that the Bosnian Serbs had fired the lethal round"
Nora Beloff, writing in her book Yugoslavia: An Avoidable War (New European Publications, London, England, 1997), also allege that "that Bosnian government arranged to kill their own people" so as to get the Bosnian Serbs blamed. She alleges the news reporter Martin Bell, now an independent MP in Britain, had known about these allegations through his contacts with British UN officers but "he ignored what they might have told him". She repeats claims, as reported in David Owen's account of the bombings, that western experts had discovered that it was the Bosnian government forces and not the Bosnian Serbs who had been behind the attack in February 1994. Allegedly, when UNPROFOR wanted the Bosnian government to participate in truce negotiations, the British commander, General Michael Rose:
"Blackmailed the Bosnian Muslim leaders into submission. He told them that unless they agreed to cooperate, he would tell the international press that he had technical expertise proving that the grenade came from the Muslim, not the Serb, side" (Beloff, p112/113).
Other attacks supposedly carried out by the Bosnian government - and blamed on the Bosnian Serbs - include:
- 29th June 1992: Rocket attack on Sarajevo's TV station kills 5 people. Bosnian government troops implicated in this attack (The Sunday Times, October 1st 1995).
- 17th July 1992: A "choreographed" mortar salvo, 30 seconds after British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd entered a building for a meeting with the Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic. The attack killed or wounded 10 bystanders - but not Hurd's guard of honor, who had clearly been forewarned and ducked for cover seconds before the attack.
- 4th August 1992: Bomb attacks which were filmed by the Western film crews at a funeral of two orphans in a cemetery in Sarajevo. The attacks were blamed on the Bosnian Serbs.
- 13th August 1992: After the Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic arrives in Sarajevo airport for a meeting with Izetbegovic, a Bosnian government sniper kills US TV producer David Kaplan. The attacks disrupts the schedule of Panic, and he only manages to spend 20 minutes on the phone with Izetbegovic.
Philip Corwen, a senior member of the UN in Bosnia has recently written a book about his experience there (Dubious Mandate: A memoir of the UN in Bosnia, Summer 1995 [Duke, London, UK, 1999]):
"The French forces (the main UN armed force in Sarajevo) were continually harassed, shot at, blocked at, and threatened by Bosnian government forces . . . it was the French who pointed out that the Bosnian government was placing weapons systems next to UN facilities in order to draw fire from Serb artillery onto civilian and UN targets and thus provoke international outrage against the Serbs . .. (p178)
I recommend that readers interested in the background to the conflict in Bosnia read Corwen's book: His meticulous account shatters once and for all the "one victim - one enemy" myth promoted mainly by the Western media. For the record, l unequivocally condemn the war crimes and crimes against humanity carried out by the Bosnian Serb regime against the people of Sarajevo - whom they relentlessly bombed and shelled. The Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic have been rightfully indicted by the International war crimes tribunal in the Netherlands - but why has this tribunal failed to indict Alija Izectbegovic, the Bosnian President and other senior officials of his government when there is clearly enough prima-facie evidence of their complicity in war crimes carried out by the Bosnian army ? I believe that the UN probably has ample evidence to show that the Bosnian government carried out these attacks in Sarajevo, but along with NATO, decided not to pursue charges against Bosnian government leaders for political reasons, and decided to sweep the whole story under the carpet and suppress it.
Footnote: an estimated 300 civilians killed after NATO used depleted Uranium in reprisal attacks
"Up to 300 men, women and children who lived close to the site of the (NATO) bombings in 1995 have died of cancers and leukemia over the last five years". Robert Fisk, 2001
Finally the bombings of the market place unleashed a wave of NATO air-strikes against Bosnian Serb military targets in and around Sarajevo. In these attacks, bombs and bullets used by the NATO jets used Depleted Uranium (DU) that is now estimated to have claimed the lives of some Serb 300 civilians who lived in the vicinity of the bases hit by NATO. According to Robert Fisk, writing in The Independent of Sunday on 14th January 2001, NATO subjected the Serb military bases and surrounding civilian areas to an intense bombardment between 30th August to 15th September 1995, using jets and artillery from Mount Igman just outside Sarajevo. Civilians living in the area surrounding the bases starting to begin suffering from a variety of symptoms now linked to the use of DU by NATO in Bosnia. NATO governments have so far shown little interest in helping the civilian victims of DU in either Bosnia, Yugoslavia or during the assault on Iraq in 1990.
February 12, 2006
Mystery of the market massacre
Mystery of the market massacre
by Eve-Ann Prentice
SIXTY-EIGHT people died and more than 200 were injured when a single shell exploded in a small Sarajevo market. The ghastly scenes were filmed and a horrified world was left in no doubt that the Serbs were to blame. The slaughter brought deeper American involvement in the Balkans, with the formation of the US-led Contact Group and an American-negotiated alliance between Bosnia's Muslims and Croats.
The massacre also ultimately paved the way for American airstrikes on Bosnian Serb positions in late summer, 1995. Furthermore, the killing brought about a deal whereby the Serbs pulled back their heavy guns from the mountains surrounding Sarajevo and the Muslims reluctantly signed a ceasefire. The easing of the siege, and the relief for the people of Sarajevo, was a notable achievement.
To this day no one knows who fired the deadly mortar round on Markale market in February 1994. Survivors and witnesses said they heard no characteristic whistle of an approaching missile; this later led to suggestions that a bomb had been placed under a stall. A Western diplomat who was in Sarajevo at the time told me in 1999 that he was convinced the bombing was perpetrated by the Muslim-led Government. The Muslims were sure that the Serbs would be blamed and hoped that outrage at the carnage would lead to airstrikes against their foes and increase pressure for a lifting of the arms embargo that was in place against all the warring sides. Britain and France were vehemently opposed to lifting the embargo, although America had shown signs of wanting to arm the Muslims.
"On the morning of the explosion some people were told that it was not a good day to go to the market," the Western diplomat said. "There was also no shelling from the Serb positions that day, and the injuries were mainly from the waist down, as if a bomb had exploded in situ." The diplomat said that another sign that the Muslim-led Government had been responsible was that government media with cameras were on the scene "within seconds", as if poised in advance to record the full horror of the carnage to gain as much world impact as possible.
The suggestion that the Muslims shelled their own people began to be discussed by diplomats, politicians and a few journalists after the UN's investigation into the massacre concluded that no one could be sure whence the shell had come. But most people recoiled at the idea of such self-inflicted mutilation. The majority of the world's press and politicians accepted the instant suggestion that the Serbs were responsible; questions were not encouraged and the general view was that the end justified the means: the siege of Sarajevo was eased. But blaming the Serbs without proof set a precedent, and the process of demonising them took deeper root.
February 11, 2006
Nothing happens without a reason
KiM Info Newsletter 10-02-06
Serbian Orthodox Church specifies basic principles on future protection of the Serbian Orthodox religious and cultural heritage in Kosovo
Information Service of the Serbian Orthodox Church
Original document in Serbian (February 7, 2006)
SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
Taking into account the decisions from this yearÂ’s autumn session of the SOC Holy Assembly of Bishops (November 1-4, 2005), the Holy Synod of Bishops and the Council for Kosovo and Metohija of the Holy Assembly of Bishops hereby define the following with regard to forthcoming talks on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija.
BASIC PRINCIPLES
of the SOC Holy Synod of Bishops and the Council for Kosovo and Metohija of the Holy Assembly of Bishops with regard to forthcoming talks on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija
1. In the process of resolving the future status of Kosovo and Metohija the Serbian Orthodox Church, her faithful and her Holy Shrines in the Province should be provided with adequate protection and a free life in accordance with basic principles of religious freedom and human rights generally accepted in the democratic world.
2. The position of the Serbian community in Kosovo and Metohija should be regulated by a special form of decentralization enabling the effective protection of the vital interests of the Serbian people, especially in the areas of education, culture, media, health and social policy, economic and property issues, local police and judiciary. It is especially important to ensure the return of Serb refugees, their secure living conditions and lasting survival. Toward this end, the Serbian Orthodox Church gives its wholehearted support to the Negotiation Team on the future status of Kosovo and Metohija, which will represent the interests of the Serbian people and state.
3. In addition to fundamental interest in the institutional, legal and property protection of the Serbian people in Kosovo and Metohija, the Church is also vitally interested in the long-term protection of her holy shrines: monasteries, churches, property and cultural patrimony. For centuries, these Holy Shrines have been and remain the faithful guardians and witnesses of the spiritual and cultural identity of the Serbian people in the Province and as such they must be preserved for the future by being given a special position (status) within the framework of the future, comprehensive solution for Kosovo and Metohija. It is important to protect specific Holy Sites not only as cultural and religious monuments but also as living communities of a living people.
4. In cooperation with relevant experts, during the talks it is necessary to define concrete mod-els that would ensure the Serbian Orthodox Church, whose spiritual seat is the Pec Patriarchate, and its local Diocese of Raska-Prizren and Kosovo-Metohija with full internal autonomy, free pastoral and missionary work with its faithful, protection of property and other rights, protection of proper names and identity, and unobstructed communication with the canonic and administrative seat of the SOC in Belgrade. In this respect, it is very important that within the future Law on Religious Freedoms in Kosovo and Metohija the SOC is provided with full rights in accordance with the UN Charter and other relevant international acts on the protection of human and religious rights and freedoms.
5. It is also necessary to ensure special, internationally guaranteed status and models for lasting protection of the living Serbian Orthodox monasteries in Kosovo and Metohija by creating appropriate protective zones around monasteries, with the presence of international military forces wherever and for as long as necessary. In addition to the protective zones, it is necessary to provide special guarantees for the free, spiritually and physically unobstructed life and work of monastic communities, unhindered access for the faithful and for pilgrims, as well as appropriate customs, tax and other benefits enabling the economic sustenance of these communities, which support themselves by their work. The form and scope of protective zones would depend on their significance and on the fact whether a monastery is located in a part of the Province inhabited by an Albanian or a Serbian majority.
6. The complete arrangement for protection of institutions, sites and patrimony of the Serbian Orthodox Church should be under the special monitoring of the International Community, in full coordination with the Government of Serbia, Kosovo provincial institutions and UNESCO, which would ensure the sustainability of protective mechanisms within the framework of the international civil presence in Kosovo. This institution would concern itself with current issues and arbitration in the event agreed-upon principles are not honored. It would maintain ties with international factors, police and municipal authorities. Participation in this process should include appropriate experts from Belgrade and Pristina and experts of the Serbian Orthodox Church, as well as representatives of the International Community.
7. At the same time, in accordance with Resolution 1244, Annex 2, Item 6, it is necessary to enable the unobstructed engagement of experts of the Ministry of Culture from Belgrade and the Serbian Institute for the Protection of Cultural Monuments, who have already worked on the protection of Serbian spiritual, cultural and historical patrimony in Kosovo and Metohija in the past, and who possess complete documentation and specialized experience. The engagement of experts from Belgrade would also be realized in cooperation with representatives of local Kosovo institutions under the unique auspices of the EU. The eventual transfer of jurisdiction over the SOC cultural patrimony in Kosovo and Metohija to Kosovo institutions is unacceptable because the local Kosovo Ministry of Culture lacks the expertise for this jurisdiction and is inadequate to guarantee and ensure the protection of the identity and purpose of these Holy Shrines.
8. The resolution of the future status of Kosovo and Metohija should enable the complete restoration of all Orthodox churches and monasteries that have been destroyed or damaged since 1999, their return into liturgical function, the full protection for the property of the SOC, as well as special guarantees intended to make it possible for the SOC and other religious communities to ensure the restitution of property illegally confiscated after World War II in accordance with special legislation to be passed in accordance with European standards.
9. The resolution of the future status of Kosovo and Metohija should include special provisions protecting the identity, the historical and spiritual origin and the patrimony of the Serbian people. Even though our patrimony is physically located in Kosovo and Metohija, nevertheless it cannot be called the cultural patrimony of Kosovo but the Serbian cultural patrimony of Kosovo and Metohija (just as there is Albanian, Roma and Ottoman patrimony in Kosovo and Metohija). The imposition of a collective identity to this cultural patrimony represents a threat to the survival of Serbian cultural patrimony and to our people as a whole, as well as a change in the identity of Christian civilization in the Province.
10. The views of the Serbian Orthodox Church are completely complementary with the Plan of the Government of Serbia for Kosovo and Metohija, and with the most recent plan of President Tadic regarding the two-entity reorganization of the Province as a part of Serbia. The SOC Holy Synod of Bishops has taken the view at its most recent session in November 2005 that the issue of the future status of the Province must be resolved in accordance with international principles on the inviolability of sovereignty and integrity of democratic states, including Serbia and Montenegro. The future solution for Kosovo and Metohija must take into account the interests of all citizens which live there and must be such that it does not destabilize the situation in the region, which after years of war and suffering needs peace, reconciliation, cooperation, spiritual, moral, economic and all other forms of progress.
February 09, 2006
Kosovo Serb leaders against withdrawing from negotiations (Tanjug)
Kosovo Serb leaders against withdrawing from negotiations (Tanjug)
Kosovo Serb leaders have assessed that the Belgrade authorities should not give up negotiations on the future status of Kosovo regardless of western officials statements that anticipate the status of the province. SLKM head Oliver Ivanovic has pointed out that the withdrawal from negotiations before they have even begun would represent a big and fatal mistake. Our opponents expect that we give up the negotiations so that they would go on without us, like in Rambouillet, but with consequences for the entire Serb people, said Ivanovic. He added that such an action would prevent the Serb side from arguing with the results of those negotiations. SNC official Rada Trajkovic has assessed that as long as there is a chance for negotiations, there is the chance for Serbs to achieve the fulfillment of their requests. She warned that giving up the negotiations would result in the expelling of Serbs from Kosovo.
Interview with the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade (Blic)
Interview with the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade (Blic)
The Contact Group, in whose work Russia is taking part, has not passed any decision on the possible status of Kosovo, the Russian Ambassador in Belgrade Aleksandr Alexeyev told Blic on the occasion of the statement by British diplomat John Sawers that Kosovo independence had already been agreed.
What kind of solution Russia advocates?
“The solution for Kosovo’s status must be the result of a direct dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina along with significant support of the international community. It is a dangerous attempt to impose any kind of solution on anyone. Imposed solutions by rule aren’t long lasting.â€
Only Russia considers that it isn’t possible to achieve a solution this year.
“In the Contact Group statement from London, on which all member-states agreed, it is not mentioned anywhere that the negotiations must end in 2006, but it is stressed that all efforts will be undertaken so talks would be completed by the end of the year. If additional time is needed for working out a compromise and safe solution, that will not be a problem.â€
What does President Putin think when he says that a universal solution must be found for Kosovo?
“The Kosovo problem is not the only problem Europe is facing. If we want to resolve similar problems, and for this to strengthen and not to destroy European security, we must strongly adhere to the existing principles. If we approach individually, and often with political ideas, each individual conflict, then the results could be very serious and negative.â€
What kind of consequences could Kosovo’s independence have on the Balkans, the Russian Federation and Europe?
“If someone is allowed to violate the principles of the inviolability of borders, then why couldn’t other do this as well.â€
Do you also have in mind B&H, Spain, Cyprus…
“President Putin has turned the attention to the frozen conflicts that exist in the former USSR. This issue especially concerns us, because we are deeply involved in the resolution of these conflicts and we are very interested in finding an unambiguous legal solution. I imagine that similar problems are appearing in other parts of Europe as well.â€
February 07, 2006
Too Much Yugoslavia or too Little EU?
Nobody wanted to create a new Yugoslavia
BRUSSELS, Belgium | The European Commission on 27 January put forward a series of measures aimed at boosting economic cooperation and development in the western Balkans, but the plan has been met with little enthusiasm in the region itself.
From Croatian apprehension that the plan smacks of the former federation of Yugoslavia to Serbia’s criticism that it does too little to address the key question of investment, the Commission’s proposal is likely to be amended before it is presented to an informal meeting of foreign ministers from the EU and the western Balkans on 10 March in Salzburg.
THE PROPOSALS
In a strategy paper titled “The Western Balkans on the road to the EU: consolidating stability and raising prosperity,” the Commission proposed to foster trade and economic development, movement of persons, education and research, regional cooperation, and civil society in the western Balkans.
“While the Kosovo status process is moving ahead, we need to encourage the people of the western Balkans to look forward to their European future, not back to the nationalism of the past,” EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn said at the presentation of the paper, standing alongside the UN special envoy for the Kosovo status talks, Martti Ahtisaari. “The best way to do that is to focus on practical measures which will integrate their economies and societies into the European mainstream,” Rehn said.
The enlargement commissioner warned that the western Balkans “should not be allowed to remain a black hole or a ghetto in Europe.”
The proposals include the easing of visa requirements, increasing scholarships, a new regional school for public administration, a civil-society dialogue with the EU, contributions to the recently established European Fund for Southeast Europe (a public/private investment fund financed by international and national donors), and the creation of a diagonal-cumulation-of-origin formula, which would make it easier for a producer in one country to process raw materials from another.
But the key proposal is the creation of a regional free-trade agreement among the countries of the region: Serbia-Montenegro (including Kosovo), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Albania, and Macedonia.
The rationale behind the free-trade measure is the relative inefficiency of the current web of bilateral trade agreements in the region – 31 in total – which have failed to produce a sufficient level of intra-regional trade or were not properly implemented.
This idea is not new: it has been on the table since mid-2005, when trade ministers from the region agreed to turn bilateral free-trade agreements into a single regional agreement. Rehn himself had cited the idea on several occasions.
THE OBSTACLES
But the proposal infuriated public opinion in Croatia, which saw the idea as evidence of a Brussels plan to resurrect the old Yugoslavia, which went up in flames in the early 1990s.
Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader tried to calm the outcry by saying there was no chance of anyone in the EU “trying to create something like Yugoslavia.” He suggested that, instead of creating a new regional zone, the existing Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) should be extended to the western Balkans.
After the last wave of EU enlargement, in 2004, only Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia remain members of the CEFTA. Bulgaria and Romania are slated to enter the EU in 2007 or 2008, and Croatia hopes to follow in 2008 or 2009.
The Croatian Chamber of Commerce harshly criticized the Commission’s proposal, saying it had more to do with politics than trade. It said the idea was “dangerous” because it demonstrated that the EU did not have a clear concept for resolving the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro, which could split this spring, or the status of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Serbian officials, by contrast, welcomed the proposal, but said it did not go far enough in attempting to boost trade and investment in the region.
In an interview with TOL, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus described what he saw as the proposal’s shortcomings.
“The free-trade reasoning is good, but we are still in a deep depression, in a post-conflict situation, and we need to boost development,” he said. “Free trade is a must, but it is not sufficient. We need investment, but there is not much investment policy in the paper.”
Labus said Serbia was firmly in favor of forming a single market in the region instead of the many bilateral free-trade agreements. “But until this single market is formed, we ask for these bilateral agreements to be fully implemented.”
He argued that the diagonal cumulation of origin should not be restricted to countries that have signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU, that is, Croatia and Macedonia, but also to those which have asymmetrical preferential regimes with the EU, thus including the entire region. This rule would allow a producer in, say, Croatia, to treat raw materials or components from another country that is also party to the agreement (such as Serbia) as domestic when the final product is exported to the EU.
Tanja Miscevic, the head of the Serbian government’s EU integration office, agreed with Labus that the Commission’s free-trade proposal had its limitations.
“A single free-trade agreement without an institutional infrastructure but only a secretariat cannot really be efficient,” Miscevic said. She warned that under such circumstances the proposal might not be “realistic or sustainable.”
AMENDING THE PLAN
Another potentially difficult area is the relaxation of the visa regime of the Schengen agreement, which emerged outside the EU framework but has 15 European signatories, for citizens of western Balkans countries.
EU Justice and Internal Affairs Commissioner Franco Frattini said after meeting Labus in Brussels that some groups, notably students and business people, would benefit from such measures and travel more easily in the EU.
“Our opinion is that there is no free trade unless at least businessmen can travel freely. If this obstacle is not lifted, we will not see the full effects of free trade,” Labus said.
“My proposal is to make this plan much more effective than it is right now. This is not a criticism, but a suggestion that we should be truly looking for practical measures,” he added, suggesting there was sufficient time before the Salzburg meeting to revise certain aspects of the plan.
He says the Commission’s plan “perfectly” fulfilled all political promises the EU made at the 2003 Thessaloniki summit.
“They are really repeating that the Balkans will be a part of Europe in the future and we no longer have to worry about the dilemma of whether we will be in Europe tomorrow or not,” Labus said. “But there is a need to switch from the level of political promises to the level of practical measures in order to accelerate our way into the EU,” he said.
Miscevic said another problem was that most of the proposals set out in the Commission’s proposal, such as a single free-trade area or visa facilitation, would be implemented only in 2007. “This leaves us with an empty 2006,” she said.
At the same time, Miscevic said the Commission’s proposal was the maximum that the EU could propose “at this specific moment of time” given political constraints.
“Due to enlargement fatigue, the outcomes of last year’s referenda on the European constitution, and problems with the EU budget, ordinary citizens and politicians in the EU are not willing to commit more to enlargement than they already have,” Miscevic said.
Aleksandar Mitic is a TOL contributor from Brussels and Belgrade.
