http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20060719-081857-6783r_page2.htm
Letters to the editor
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
July 20, 2006
New York
Balkan realities
Tod Lindberg is right that the EU and NATO countries should not turn
their backs on Balkan countries wishing to share in the peace and prosperity
of the new Europe. However, he is wrong to suggest that it was only Slobodan
Milosevic's "genocidal policies" that set the Balkans in flames in the early
1990s and wrong to condemn Serbian determination to maintain Kosovo as an
integral part of its territory ("Where Milosevic's butchery held sway,"
Op-Ed, July 11).
It has become fashionable to blame Milosevic and Serbia for everything
that went wrong in the former Yugoslavia while overlooking the concerns of
the Christian Serbian population in Bosnia and in Kosovo at the grim
prospects of having to live in Muslim-dominated states.
Alia Izetbegovic, the Muslim Bosnian leader, was an Islamist extremist
who made no attempt to hide his plans for destroying the Christian entity in
Bosnia, writing, "There can be no peace or co-existence between the Islamist
faith and non-Islamist institutions." As for Agim Ceku, the so-called prime
minister of Kosovo, the Canadian military knows what crimes he is guilty of
even if the Hague Tribunal refused to indict him.
In 1993, Mr. Ceku commanded Croatian forces that violated a
U.N.-brokered cease-fire and overran three Serbian villages in the Medac
pocket. When the Canadians counterattacked and re-entered the burned
villages, they discovered all of the inhabitants and domestic animals had
been slaughtered. Mr. Ceku later also ordered undefended Serbian villages
shelled in violation of the rules of war, causing heavy casualties among the
civilian population.
In 2002, Mr. Ceku was indicted by Serbia for responsibility as a Kosovo
Liberation Army commander for the murders of 669 Serbians and other
non-Albanians during the fighting that broke out in Kosovo in 1998. The
indictment includes murder, abduction, torture and ethnic cleansing of the
non-Albanian population from Kosovo. This is the man recently invited to
Washington to meet with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, a meeting
obviously planned to show U.S. support for Kosovo independence.
For many outside observers, including this writer, the continued support
by the United States for an independent Kosovo is incomprehensible. Granting
independence to Kosovo would be a serious violation of Serbia's territorial
integrity, which is one of the most cherished principles of international
law and is enshrined in the United Nations Charter. U.S. violation of this
principle would have far-reaching implications for the very framework of
international peace and security.
Independence for Kosovo also would create a criminal and terrorist state
in the heart of the Balkans. This is not a happy prospect in today's world.
Kosovo independence would set a precedent for other aspiring ethnic
groups for independent status and would destabilize not only the Balkans,
but many other parts of the world. It also would mark a low point in U.S.
foreign policy. It is difficult to be held up as the champion of the rule of
law, of democracy and the global war on terror, while at the same time
giving support to war criminals and terrorists.
JAMES BISSETT
Former Canadian ambassador
to the former Yugoslavia
Ottawa
Serbian News Network - SNN
news@antic.org
http://www.antic.org/
July 20, 2006
J. Bissett -Letters to the editor..BALAKAN REALITIES
Blind Eyes Over Kosovo
The original Monastery of the Holy Archangels was destroyed in the 16th Century by the invading Turks. Four centuries later the Orthodox Church constructed a small church, residence, and workshop among the ancient ruins. Two years ago a mob of 600 descended from Prizren, just 1.5 miles away, burning down the buildings and destroying anything that remained. Earlier they wrecked churches, the presiding bishop's residence, a seminary, and private Serbian homes in town.
Although the monastery was nominally guarded by German soldiers serving in the international Kosovo Force (KFOR), most of them packed up when the crowd began crossing the shallow creek separating the monastery from the road. They took the monks along but left the buildings and contents unprotected; a few remaining soldiers played tourists, photographing the monastery's destruction. This shocking behavior was the norm on a day of violence around Kosovo. Complained Rachel Denber of Human Rights Watch: "In too many cases, NATO peacekeepers locked the gates to their bases, and watched as Serb homes burned."
Since then the Church has built a small two-story building on the site of the workshop, where Brother Benedict and five other monks worship, eat, and sleep. The site is now surrounded by barbed wire, though Brother Benedict has little confidence in his supposed protectors. After the monastery's destruction the German commander downplayed a mob attack on one of his units as it guarded a German TV crew. After the monks publicized the incident, their "protectors" left them isolated for two weeks. Even now the KFOR soldiers refuse to escort the monks to buy food in Prizren, suggesting instead that they turn to the Kosovo Police Service -- which includes many former Kosovo Liberation Army guerrillas. Instead, the monks drive substantially further to the nearest Serbian community for supplies.
Unfortunately, any Serb who travels outside of few remaining enclaves does so at his own risk. At the quasi-border dividing Serbia from Kosovo (which nominally remains part of Serbia), drivers routinely replace their Serbian license plates with ones marked Kosovo to disguise their identities. To do otherwise would risk not only their cars but their lives.
Even foreigners are at risk. Some British tourists recently were roughed up and their car was destroyed because the vehicle had been rented in Belgrade. Had they been Serbian their lives probably would have been forfeited. More than 900 Serbs have been murdered since the allies took control and ethnic killings continue in the territory. But you will look long and hard to find an ethnic Albanian jailed for committing the crimes.
HIGHLIGHTING THE PLIGHT OF THE MONKS at the monastery, as well as other Christians in Kosovo, is a delegation led by Bishop Artemije (Radosavljevic) of Raska and Prizren, which is visiting the U.S. this week at the invitation of the Religious Freedom Coalition. The visitors are hoping to slow the apparent administration rush to grant independence to Kosovo.
Kosovo is an unpleasant bit of unfinished business that the West would prefer to forget. A fair and sensible resolution is well nigh impossible, especially since the behavior of Washington and NATO has been truly disgraceful. Far from creating a tolerant democracy, the allies have presided over one of the largest episodes of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. And if the U.S. continues on its present course, virtually everyone expects the ethnic majority to complete the job in just a few more years, if that long.
Like most of the Balkans, the problem of Kosovo goes back centuries. Serbian identity is rooted in both Kosovo's military history, particularly the 1389 defeat by the Turks in the Battle of the Blackbirds, and spiritual significance, represented by ancient churches and monasteries.
Over the years history was unkind to the Balkans, torn by conflict as the Ottoman Empire declined and in both World Wars, and then mostly dominated by communist regimes until the end of the Cold War. During the 1980s the territory (in Yugoslavia) enjoyed substantial self-rule and resulted in ethnic Albanian mistreatment of Serbs (behavior covered in the New York Times, among other publications). Roughly two decades ago Slobodan Milosevic launched his grab for power with a speech in Kosovo that played upon Serb nationalism. Then it was Albanians who suffered, leading to an increasingly bitter guerrilla war and NATO military intervention in March 1999.
The 78-day air war never made sense. Over the years most European states had mirrored Yugoslavia in fighting to suppress secessionist movements.
Although the conflict was ugly, it was nothing compared to the simultaneous humanitarian disaster in Sierra Leone, which killed a quarter of a million people but was ignored in the U.S. and Europe. Moreover, it was NATO intervention that sparked the worst Serbian crackdown and the mass Albanian exodus.
In any case, Western officials, starting with American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, developed policy in a dream world. They thought that a couple days of bombing would bring Belgrade to heel, completely missing the nationalism that animated most Serbs, even democrats and human rights advocates. Worst, the allies believed that they would be able to concoct a multi-ethnic Kosovo in which Albanians and Serbs would join hands singing Kumbaya around communal campfires. In fact, having used their American-supplied air force to eject the Serb military units, the victorious ethnic Albanians saw no need to compromise.
After the war -- under the occupation of the West -- the Albanian community kicked out a quarter million Serbs, Roma, Jews, and non-Albanian Muslims. Over the next five years isolated Serbs were killed, beaten, and kidnapped. Even Serbian enclaves were vulnerable to drive-by shootings.
Although Serbs disappeared from much of Kosovo -- roughly 40,000 in the capital of
Human Rights Watch's Rachel Denber observed that "This was the biggest security test for NATO and the United Nations in Kosovo since 1999, when minorities were forced from their homes as the international community looked on. But they failed the test." The events two years ago resulted in much hand wringing, but little else. No one was prosecuted and jailed for their crimes. Today many Serb refugees remain in small camps, unemployed and living in containers turned into homes.
The Albanian political leadership includes guerrilla leaders almost certainly guilty of atrocities. No one denies the explosion of organized crime, including sex trafficking, in Kosovo, which has been called the "black hole" of Europe. Radical Islam, too, may be on the rise -- more than 200 mosques have been built since 1999, and some unashamedly fly the Saudi Arabian flag. "Sex, crime, terrorism, it's all there," opines one U.S. diplomat stationed in Belgrade.
AS A POLITICAL ENTITY, KOSOVO is less ready for independence today, based on its commitment to a multi-ethnic republic with human rights guarantees, than when it was "liberated" in 1999. Warns Joseph Griebowski of the Institute on Religion and Public Policy, "the present record of rule of law, protection of the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, and the return/resettlement of internally displaced people by the Provisional Authority of Kosovo -- all of which are indispensable for democratic governance -- have been gravely unsatisfactory."
So what to do? Final (or future) status negotiations have begun under the tutelage of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, and it is obvious that officials in the West would like to take credit for their "success" in Kosovo, run a victory lap, and go home. The U.S. and Europeans have been pressuring the Serbs to voluntarily yield Kosovo and collect EU membership as their reward. Tod Lindberg of Policy Review reflects the conventional wisdom when he argues that "Serbia needs to decide whether its future is Western integration or instead a return to dead-end nationalist politics." Some Europeans have spoken of finding a win/win, or at least win/no lose, solution.
However, it doesn't exist. Roughly two million ethnic Albanians now live in Kosovo -- it's hard to know how many for sure, since the local authorities have no incentive to prevent a large in-migration, further strengthening their hold over the land. Understandably, none of them want to live under Serbia.
Moreover, no sane Serb (or Roma) in Kosovo wants to live under Albanian rule. Indeed, the Serbs who now dominate Mitrovica, north of the Irba River and close to the rest of Serbia, probably would forcibly resist Albanian rule. Even the Crisis Group, which remains dedicated to the mythical ideal of a multi-ethnic Kosovo, admits that the allies would have to make integration happen, somehow (the group suggests -- and I am not making this up, to quote humorist Dave Berry -- a PR campaign.)
Allied officials continue to talk in grand terms. Last year Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns told Congress that "Failure to secure a multi-ethnic Kosovo would be a failure" of years of effort. Yet the likely result of full independence is clear. A top U.S. official told me on my visit that he figures not a Serb will remain within five or ten years after independence, or even the status quo. That is, granting Kosovo independence means completing the process of ethnic cleansing that started seven years ago. Worse, since the West has been in charge, granting independence means ratifying the very process that the allies went to war to prevent.
IN ORDER TO GET AROUND this rather embarrassing dilemma, Western governments are talking about conditional independence, that is, independence only after ethnic Albanians meet certain standards. Perhaps proponents of this perspective are so naive as to verge on the delusional; more likely, they are cynically maneuvering to get out of Kosovo with a minimum of public embarrassment.
After all, if things are, as claimed by Kosovo's allied occupiers, better today than in 1999 or 2004, it is mostly because so many Serbs and other minorities have fled. The easy ethnic cleansing already has been done. There is less opportunity and reason to target minorities.
However, despite all the right public promises from Albanian officials, there is little reason to believe popular attitudes have changed. Bishop Artemije sadly observed simply: "Crimes happened not just seven years ago but are happening now as we speak." One resident of a refugee camp who fled deadly mobs two years ago told me that "we see people living in our homes and sleeping in our beds talking about how good democracy is."
And if seven years of tutelage by the allies under military occupation isn't enough to teach the majority Albanian community good human rights manners, how will a few verbal promises and some corresponding paper threats do the job? Nor will any conditions be enforced. The idea that the allies would get tough and block
At the same time, conditional independence, by leaving the issue formally open while effectively dispossessing the Serbs, is likely to radicalize both parties. Ethnic Albanians have been growing impatient. The group Self-Determination! has been leading non-violent protests against UN targets (for which some demonstrators actually went to jail, in contrast to those who murdered Serbs). More ominously, there have been attacks on allied vehicles, and resentment at more years of apparent indecision could spark more serious assaults on KFOR and UN personnel. Leading Kosovar political figure Adam Demaci has threatened the allies with "violence of such dimensions that 17 March 2004 will be forgotten."
As for Serbia, detaching Kosovo is likely to bring down the Kostunica government. Waiting in the wings is the Serbian Radical Party, a populist-nationalist movement headed by Vojislav Seselj, now awaiting trial for war crimes at The Hague. The U.S. will not even allow diplomatic personnel to meet with Radical members of parliament, terming the party "undemocratic." Yet some polls show it with 40-plus percent support, putting it within easy reach of dominating a new coalition government.
What a pretty picture this all would be. Ethnic Albanians step up attacks on Serbs and begin targeting allied forces in Kosovo. Serbs in Mitrovica fortify their enclave and look north to Belgrade for support. Hard-core, anti-Western nationalists take power in Serbia. Then what?
Like so many conflicts, it was a lot easier to get into Kosovo than it will be to get out. But there's still time to draw back from the brink. The West should insist on a genuine negotiation in which a variety of options are freely considered. An allied diktat, especially one mandating independence, will not be fair. Nor will it bring the regional stability that everyone desires. Only the residents of Kosovo and the rest of Serbia can find a lasting solution.
Doug Bandow is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (forthcoming, Xulon). A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is a member of the Advisory Board of the American Council for Kosovo.
July 19, 2006
Dividing the Pannonian Sea
Dividing the Pannonian Sea
By Russell GordonIf those who aspire to the fulfillment of the Wolfowitz Doctrine were nonplussed by the termination of the 50-year Cold War with the Soviet Union, existent blowback may be the answer to their hegemonic prayers.
The West has finally forced Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s hand, with Russia now supporting the North Korea-Iran/Syria Axis. Zbigniew Brzezinski’s less than stellar protégés have indeed revived the Cold War: by pushing NATO eastward, humiliating and bombing the Serbs, isolating Russia from its near-abroad through thinly-veiled, anti-democratic “color revolutions”, and covertly supporting al Qaeda terrorists in Chechnya. Russia, in turn, has escalated its support of Iran, Syria, possibly North Korea and some Iraqi insurgents, Columbian Marxist guerillas, and others in opposition to US global policies.
Blowback - intended or otherwise - is nothing new to the US foreign policy establishment. The US helped create the Viet-Minh while materially backing the French, thus setting the stage for French loss of former colonial possessions in Indochina, and US entry into the region. In a similar vane, the US heavily-armed the most extreme of Afghan and foreign mujahedeen factions, which helped lead to the Soviet Union’s demise, but as forecasted, created a stateless nemesis whose future eradication will prove much more tenuous.
And indeed, if Washington gives independence to Albanian Islamo-fascists in the Serbian province of Kosovo, Foggy Bottom may become up to its’ deaf ears in unforeseen consequences. Or are they?
Charading as Wilsonianism, the Wolfowitz Doctrine has shown itself to be a cheap knock-off of Bismarkian and Hitlerian doctrine, amplifying Bismarck’s Mittel-Europa to a global scale. Washington’s foreign policy elite have effectively shown any and all comers who might have defensible interests that all bets are off in regards to morality, justice, civility, ethics, nobility, and even logic. To say that the US global policies are even in defense of US strategic interests is presumptuous, given the obvious long term consequences.
In the short-term, the US already is seeing negative results. US forces are bogged down in Iraq, squaring off against Islamist and local insurgent forces supported by Sunni and Shi’ite entities – local and regional. Russia, China, Iran and former Soviet Central Asian states have formed a counter-veiling bloc via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Iran is saber rattling atomic capabilities, and playing the Hezbollah trump card to counter-balance Sunni Arab control in the Middle East.
Common misperception is that the Russians are the Serbs historical friends, but as the Serb saying goes, “God help us if the Russians arrive.” Indeed, as no nation has friends, but rather allies of immediate convenience, Putin is ready to sacrifice Kosovo to set a precedent for Trans-Dniestr, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and other regions, some of which will prove troubling for US plans in dominating the Caucasus oil supply. Moreover, Kosovo independence will affirm to countless separatist groups worldwide that military escalation combined with public relations will eventually yield results, thus making increased local warfare inevitable.
In the Balkans, it appears that Washington wishes not the continuation of Belgrade's current “collaborative” policies, but rather to force Serbia into a corner, thus driving the Serbian populace towards the Radicals, and thereby creating a justification to isolate Serbia yet again, all the while claiming the Serbs have “chosen the forces of darkness and isolation over a brighter European future.”
With the release of Muslim war criminal Naser Oric from ICTY Hague detention, and continued demands for the arrest and extradition of Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic, the Serbian populace may have achieved final proof that the international policy bias was not a series of mistakes, but rather intended as deliberate. Provoking Serbian inat – self-defeating spite –will again enable a free hand to Washington militarists to exact further reprisals in a continuing message to global rivals, and conveniently causing further disunity in Europe. As for the Serbs, damned if they do, and damned if they don’t.
Predictably, the US can then jump back into pre-determined paradigm of breaking Serbia up more by demanding special status for Sandzak/Raska, Presevo area, eastern Montenegro, Voivodina, and western Macedonia. Undoubtedly media war, and Albanian terrorist actions, will be employed as provocations, and already US Marines are training with maps of Montenegro, to 'intervene to stop a “genocide” against Albanians.' The humiliating psychological conditions are not too dissimilar to those imposed on Germany at Versailles, and may yet contribute to armed conflict at a later date. As far as NATO is concerned, this may be in their perceived interests.
Unfortunately, many Serbs are still stuck in outdated paradigms themselves, appealing to logic, reason and decency which have long since been forgone in the halls of power in Washington and the capitols of the co-opted. One Western analyst opined that “most Serbian politicians are fighting over money….” With gauleiters unwittingly assisting in a phased plan of dismemberment, time may be running short.
Possible encouraging signs include the appointment to DCI of Gen. Michael Hayden, who along with his mentor Gen. Charles G. Boyd has been outspoken in his criticism of US policy and media bias against the Serbs, singling out CNN and the New York Times by name for their duplicity. But as one intelligence analyst noted, Hayden may become “boxed into a corner [at the CIA] in five minutes.” Ohio National Guard troops are training Serbian Army troops in Serbia, and two US F-16’s recently touched down in a courtesy call to the Serbian military – sans accouterments explosives of 1999. Clearly there is some diversity of opinion in Washington and Langley.
But as one Serbian-American publisher said, “a conspiracy of silence continues” about the reality of the previous and current Balkan conflicts, which could prepare the way for US public support for continued US moves against Serbia -- should darker forces win out.
July 18, 2006
Independent Kosovo a model for breakaway regions worldwide
Independent Kosovo a model for breakaway regions worldwideJuly 18, 2006 8:42 AM
BRUSSELS, Belgium-Serbia's president warned Tuesday that if the province of Kosovo is allowed to secede, it could create instability in the Balkans and set a precedent for independence movements around the world.
President Boris Tadic also indicated he had not decided whether to attend an unprecedented round of direct talks with Kosovo's ethnic Albanian leaders next week in Vienna, as proposed by U.N. mediator Martti Ahtisaari.
Belgrade strongly opposes the possible independence for the region of two million people, which has been a de facto international protectorate since NATO forced Serbia's then-dictator Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw his troops from the province in a brief war in 1999.
But ethnic Albanians, who account for 90 percent of the province's people, are demanding independence, insisting they can never again be ruled by Belgrade.
Serbia's new democratic government has proposed granting the province self-rule backed by international guarantees, while formally retaining it within the borders of Serbia.
"From my point of view (independence) is not going to be a useful solution," Tadic said at a news conference with European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso.
"An independent Kosovo would be a precedent, it is going to be a problem for regional stability not only for the Balkans but for other regions in the world," Tadic said.
Analysts have said that if Kosovo is allowed to break away from Serbia, whose province it has been since the early Middle Ages, this would almost certainly be used by many other territories to justify their own secessionist designs.
These potentially include regions as diverse as Spain's Catalonia and the Basque country, Georgia's breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia statelets, Moldavia's rebellious Trans-Dniester, Azerbaijan's disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, and Indonesia's war-torn provinces of Aceh and West Papua.
Ahtisaari, the U.N. envoy, is currently trying to bridge the differences in talks on Kosovo's future status being held in Vienna. On Monday, he said he would try to bring the presidents and prime ministers of both Kosovo and Serbia together for the first time to discuss political issues.
Kosovo's President Fatmir Sejdiu and Prime Minister Agim Ceku have agreed to attend, but Tadic and Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica have not yet confirmed.
"We are expecting that Mr. Ahtisaari will send us some conditions for the talks," Tadic said without elaborating. "We will then decide whether to participate."
Tadic visited Brussels a day after Kostunica briefed EU leaders on the details of a new plan to track down and arrest fugitive war crimes suspect Gen. Ratko Mladic.
Serbia's failure to arrest Mladic, wanted on charges stemming from the 1992-95 war in Bosnia, and hand him to the U.N. tribunal in The Hague, Netherlands, led the EU to suspend talks on a so-called Stabilization and Association agreement. This is a stepping stone to possible membership in the bloc, and is considered crucial for the country's stability and economic growth.
Although no details of the new three-page plan were released, officials said it details measures to apprehend Mladic, who is wanted on charges of involvement in genocide during the 1992-95 Bosnian war. It also calls for the appointment of a government coordinator to put the plan into effect, who would have daily contact with U.N. prosecutors.
The plan is closely modeled on a similar document presented by neighboring Croatia last year, when Zagreb's talks with the EU were jeopardized by its failure to catch an army general indicted for crimes against humanity.
Belgrade is hoping the bloc will accept its assurances and restart negotiations even if Mladic remains at large, just as it did in Croatia's case.
Barroso welcomed the plan, but stopped short of endorsing a resumption of talks before Mladic's capture.
He underlined, however, that if full cooperation with the U.N. court is achieved, "there is still time to achieve the Stabilization and Association Agreement by the end of the year."
"It is not fair for the Serbian people that because of one or a few (individuals) that are accused of being war criminals, that the democratic and European future of Serbia is put on hold," Barroso said.
July 17, 2006
The dream of a Greater Albania
Kosovo gone, Montenegro gone: what is left for Belgrade?
The dream of a Greater AlbaniaBy Jean-Arnault DĂ©rens and Laurent Geslin
The Albanian minister of foreign affairs, Besnik Mustafaj, caused alarm when he said in March, “If Kosovo is divided, we can no longer guarantee its borders with Albania, or the border of the Albanian part of Macedonia” (1). Kosovo’s changed status has raised again the question of Balkan borders: nobody can predict what will happen.
On the evening of 21 May Montenegrin and Albanian flags flew side by side in Ulcinj, the southernmost town of the Montenegrin coast. Montenegro has become independent mostly because of the way the national minorities voted. The 50,000 Albanians living in the tiny republic have long been convinced citizens of the Montenegrin state.
According to Ibrahim Cungu, former police commissioner for Ulcinj and local leader of the Social Democratic party: “It is possible to be Albanian and a citizen of Montenegro.”
But the Montenegrin Albanians are an exception in the Balkans. In Macedonia, Albanians and Macedonians view each other with suspicion. The political and cultural rights of the Albanians have been recognised, and the Ohrid agreement of August 2001 ended the violent conflict between Macedonian security forces and the ethnic-Albanian National Liberation Army of Macedonia. Like the Macedonian Slavs, the Albanians are now considered a “second constitutive people” of the Macedonian republic. Albanian is the second official language in any commune where Albanians are over 20% of the population. “Before 2001 Albanian high school pupils had trouble getting into university, but the situation has improved since then,” said Afrim Kerimi, headmaster of the Albanian high school in Kumanovo.
The 2001 conflict has left deep scars, however. Many people are disappointed by the peace agreement and the guerrillas are itching to fight again. An elastic amnesty further feeds resentment and small guerrilla groups, often linked to criminal interests, are constantly springing up. One group formed in 2003 is led by Avdil Jakupi,“Commander Cakalla”; another, headed by Agim Krasniqi, occupied the village of Kondovo outside Skopje for six months in 2004.
Albanians living in Serbia’s Presevo valley are also dissatisfied with the peace. They want to take part in the Kosovo negotiations as they fear they may be completely passed over in a regional settlement.
Albanian guerrilla movements arose in Macedonia and the Presevo valley in 2001 because of Kosovo. By igniting local conflict, radical militants and supporters of a Greater Albania sought to remind the world that the international protectorate did not solve the Kosovo question. If future international decisions on Kosovo do not suit them, they will have no problem inflaming the whole region.
The Albanian nationalist movement developed only at the end of the 19th century, far later than those of the other Balkan peoples. After the Balkan war of 1912-13 Kosovo was divided between Montenegro and Serbia, with Serbia also getting a large area of Macedonia. The Treaty of London established “little Albania” on approximately the territory now occupied by Albania, but it left many Albanian people outside the new state.
There are two distinct ideas in Albanian nationalist rhetoric: Greater Albania and ethnic Albania. Greater Albania designates the lands that at various times were peopled by Albanians or their supposed ancestors, the Illyrians. Ethnic Albania corresponds to the regions where Albanians are the majority of the population (2). The nationalists tend to forget an important factor: that other communities live side by side with the Albanians in those regions.
After the dangerous ambitions of a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia, is it now the time for a Greater Albania? A number of radical, but marginal, militant networks openly campaign for it, but they may not have much popular support. There is still considerable distrust between the citizens of the republic of Albania and the Albanians from former Yugoslavia, long separated by history.
The only response to the challenge of a Greater Albania, as with a Greater Serbia, is full European integration. The prospect of a national unity that requires border changes is potentially dangerous for the region. Nevertheless the issue of a national trans-border “Albania” is a reality.
It should be possible for anyone writing a book in Shqiptari to address likely readers in Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, while an ethnic Albanian student should be free to study in Tirana, Tetovo or Pristina. But the borders will have to be far wider open than they are today.
July 16, 2006
Prof. Raymond K. Kent: THE KOSOVO TRIAL
Politicized Mythology
The Kosovo Dimension
R.K.Kent, Historian
In its llth July 2006 edition, the New York Times published a report from Paris by Marlise Simons, entitled “War Crimes Trial Begins for 6 Milosevic Aides,” (p. A3)
While the text seems to be a “matter-of-fact report,” it is marred by a priori judge-ments, skewed optics and tell-tale perceptions. Together, they suggest what the verdict is likely to be even if it will not be easy to prove the alleged centerpiece of collective sin a “secret plan” to expel all Albanians from Kosovo Her text also shows that there is hardly any depth to presumed knowledge of the subject..
The first inaccuracy is that “7,000 to 9,000 people were killed” at Kosovo while leaving no doubt that it was a one-way killing of Albanians by the Serbs. Numerous examinations, starting with the Helsinki Watch and terminating after NATO troops took over in Kosovo, came up with what should be considered as a defining verdict. There were about 3,000 casualties with a ratio of two Albanians to one Serb.
The second one consists of the assertion that “Serb terror” “drove out” of Kosovo an estimated 800,000 … Albanians..” Two facts remain unbreakable. The mass exodus of Albanians from Kosovo took place only after NATO began its bombing missions and not before. Moreover, a variety of sources, including Jewish spiritual leaders in Kosovo’s urban centers, reported that the so-called “Kosovo Liberation Army” agents actively urged the more sophisticated town dwellers to join the ranks of mainly rural refugees so as to swell the numbers. The purpose was to pave the ground for an eventual independence of a Kosovo under total Albanian control. The Serb Third Army and Police units jumped on the opportunity to “assist” the exodus by providing all sorts of transportation out. It was not “Serb terror” but rather a spontaneous accord between
legitimate Serb military and police and Albanian extremists, with different aims in mind..There, equally, can be no way to overturn the fact that no mass exodus of Albanians took place before NATO bombs and missiles began to drop from the sky over Kosovo itself. It does not really matter what Milosevic said in his defense. The facts stand out with Milosevic dead or alive and no “tribunal “ can change them.
The skewed optics derive from the fact any reader can verify. The “Kosovo Liberation Army” is mentioned nowhere in the article. Defined once as a terrorist organization by the State Department, the KLA became ”freedom fighters” overnight. As a surrogate of U.S. power “NATO” did not wish to put American soldiers on the ground and switched to the KLA for potential substitutes. The most ardent supporters of this switch were Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and General Wesley Clark, Commander of NATO.
(2)
Although numerous recent statements by members of the U.S. Government have made it clear that self-defense is inalienable as a right that belongs to all human groupings, the so-called “Hague Tribunal” has denied it to the Serb authorities at Kosovo. The KLA ambushed and killed about 300 Serb policemen before NATO entered into the matter.
But, the most glaring omission in the article, probably not deliberate, is the testimony of a German head of European Observers at Kosovo who sent daily, weekly, monthly and very detailed reports to the European Union. As he testified at the “Hague Tribunal” at lenth and in mufti, Herr Hartwig placed the entire blame for turmoil at Kosovo on the KLA and completely exhonorated the Serb authorities in respect to any criminal or “genocidal” charges. Hartwig stressed in his testimony that he was astonished after leaving Kosvo to find out what the media were “reporting” while his massive and meticulous reports compiled from hundreds of subordinate European observers never had any publicity at all.
The tell-tale sign comes from the so-called “secret plan” for total “ethnic cleansing” of
all Kosovo Albanians. It proved to be a forgery of Bulgarian Secret Services working for its German analogue (BDN) and “floated” by a German General. The Germans have had
a long association with Albanian extremists going back to WWII and the Albanian SS Skender Beg Division which initiated massive killings and expulsions of Serbs from Kosovo. It began to alter the Serb demographic advantage at Kosovo by the mid-Fortiies. There is not much doubt that our own policies in the break-up of Yugoslavia, while siding with former enemies of the US owe a great deal to influence of the Forth Reich on the CIA and the Pentagon as well as the State Department responding to our own Solons who had much support from Albanian PACs in the U.S..
It is amazing to those of us who have followed the details of the fratricidal drama in ex-Yugoslavia that self-admitted and externally documented men who butchered the Serbs
get away from jails in the Hague or return home after light sentences. Meanwhile any Serb in uniform at Kosovo and elsewhere gets a great deal of attention as a “criminal” with almost pre-determined sentences at the Hague. What is entirely lacking in this structured “set-up” is a sense of history as it does not pay in the long run to punish one’s certified and long-time friends while favoring their and our enemies, for whatever momentary and /or strategic reasons .stay hidden and away from home publics.
Taking a licking in the Balkans
http://www.cleveland.com/politics/plaindealer/index.ssf?/base/opinion/1152952590240110.xml&coll=2
Taking a licking in the Balkans
Saturday, July 15, 2006The drubbing that Serbia and Montene gro's combined soccer team took in the World Cup last month is a metaphor for what's happening to the final remnants of the former Yugoslavia.
The last chapters of Yugoslavia's end are being written in political backrooms instead of on the battlefield, but the final slice-up could still trigger a return to nationalist violence if solutions are forced on the region.
In May, the tiny, mountainous republic of Montenegro took the democratic option.
It voted to strike out on its own, achieving independence without a drop of blood spilled. But the voluntary defection of a nation whose majority population shares bloodlines, language and the Christian Orthodox religion with most Serbs was a huge psychological blow in Belgrade, where retro-nationalism is back in style.
Now it all comes down to Kosovo, a province in southern Serbia whose people overwhelmingly favor an independence that its legal owner, Serbia, declines to grant. The international community has made little secret of its intention to break this logjam with a deciding vote for the ethnic Albanians who make up 90 percent of Kosovo's populace and want out.
There are four serious problems with this approach.
First, it downgrades negotiations and makes the wishes of the affected people secondary to those of outsiders fed up with having to patrol and rule Kosovo themselves. Since a 1999 NATO air war wrested control of Kosovo from Serbian forces, NATO and U.S. troops have patrolled and the United Nations has ruled. Any imposed solution is likely to displease all sides.
Second, it rewards lawlessness and ethnic retribution. The U.N. pretends security problems are history, but the reprisal murders of ethnic Serbs continue - the latest a 68-year-old man shot in his home. Ethnic Albanian police were attacked recently simply because they were patrolling with ethnic Serbs. Independence talks were supposed to follow ethnic reconciliation, not precede them. The likely outcome will be another ethnic exodus and violent reprisals.
Third is the gleeful reaction from Moscow. Vladimir Putin has boasted about how he plans to cite Kosovo's independence as a precedent for the secession of pro-Russian, Christian ethnic enclaves in the former Soviet republics of Georgia and Azerbaijan. This is stoking fears about recharged independence movements from the Catalans and Basques in Spain to the Uighurs in China.
Finally and most significantly will be the erosion of the bedrock principle of territorial sovereignty enshrined in the U.N. charter. The United Nations probably will have to approve any solution imposed on Serbia - putting it in the position of approving the abrogation of territorial sovereignty of a member nation.
No wonder former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, the U.N. emissary trying to negotiate a way out of the Kosovo mess, reportedly is pressing to delay a resolution of the situation into next year. Washington, tired of having U.S. troops tied down in Kosovo, has made little secret that it wants forward movement by year's end.
Artificial deadlines in this case are not helpful, particularly given the potential of this final slicing up of Serbia to propel ultranationalists into power.
Serbia's reformers have found and returned the bodies of 836 murdered Kosovo Albanians hidden in mass graves around Serbia - the awful legacy of the most recent war.
But more than 2,000 people are still missing from the Kosovo conflict, representing most ethnic groups in the formerly multiethnic province. Reconciliation and face-to-face talks are the best way to cure the pain of these deaths - not an imposed solution that would violate core tenets of international law and simply propel another cycle of ethnic repressions and separation.
© 2006 The Plain Dealer © 2006 cleveland.com All Rights Reserved.
July 14, 2006
Russia Challenges UN Power on Kosovo, Calls for Talks
Russia Challenges UN Power on Kosovo, Calls for Talks
Created: 14.07.2006 09:45 MSK (GMT +3), Updated: 11:08 MSK , 20 hours 26 minutes ago
MosNews
Russia said on Thursday the United Nations had no authority to impose a solution on Serbia over the status of its breakaway Kosovo province and only a negotiated deal was acceptable, the Reuters news agency reported.
The statement by Russian UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin was significant as the leaders of Kosovo and Serbia have dug their heels in the international talks aimed at determining whether Kosovo wins independence or remains a part of Serbia, making an imposed solution more likely.
“I stated today in the closed meeting of the Security Council that I do not believe that the international community has legal, political or moral ground to force Serbia into a solution on this issue,” Churkin told reporters. “There is plenty of opportunity for the sides to have their discussions, and the only stable solution, the only solution good for regional and global stability, would be a solution negotiated between the two sides,” Churkin said.
Ethnic Albanians, 90 percent of the impoverished province’s 2 million people, demand independence while Serbia insists Kosovo must remain within its borders, albeit with substantial autonomy.
Kosovo has been run by the United Nations since June 1999 when NATO bombs drove out Serb forces accused of atrocities against civilians while battling a guerrilla insurgency.
Martti Ahtisaari of Finland is leading the U.N.-backed process set up to determine Kosovo’s eventual status. Direct talks on the fate of Kosovo began in February in Vienna, and he hopes for a result by the end of this year.
Churkin spoke after Ahtisaari briefed the council â€â€- and then talked to reporters â€â€- on his talks.
During the closed-door meeting, Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica again ruled out independence and accused the international community of seeking to change Serbia’s borders by force, diplomats attending the session said.
Ahtisaari, asked before Churkin spoke whether he thought a solution might have to be imposed because of Kostunica’s hard line, said it was “entirely premature to start talking how the end result of this exercise is going to be.”
But other council diplomats said an imposed solution would clearly be in order if a deal could not be negotiated. Ahtisaari said he had strong council support for his work. “I think everyone is interested that we have a thorough process â€â€- in the end of the day that we can say that we have done our utmost to try to find a negotiated settlement,” he said
Russia challenges UN power to impose Kosovo ruling
Russia challenges UN power to impose Kosovo rulingBy Irwin Arieff2 hours, 25 minutes ago
Russia said on Thursday the United Nations had no authority to impose a solution on Serbia over the status of its breakaway Kosovo province and only a negotiated deal was acceptable.
The statement by Russian U.N. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin was significant as the leaders of Kosovo and Serbia have dug in their heels in the international talks aimed at determining whether Kosovo wins independence or remains a part of Serbia, making an imposed solution more likely.
"I stated today in the closed meeting of the Security Council that I do not believe that the international community has legal, political or moral ground to force Serbia into a solution on this issue," Churkin told reporters.
"There is plenty of opportunity for the sides to have their discussions, and the only stable solution, the only solution good for regional and global stability, would be a solution negotiated between the two sides," Churkin said.
Ethnic Albanians, 90 percent of the impoverished province's 2 million people, demand independence while Serbia insists Kosovo must remain within its borders, albeit with substantial autonomy.
Kosovo has been run by the United Nations since June 1999 when NATO bombs drove out Serb forces accused of atrocities against civilians while battling a guerrilla insurgency.
Martti Ahtisaari of Finland is leading the U.N.-backed process set up to determine Kosovo's eventual status. Direct talks on the fate of Kosovo began in February in Vienna, and he hopes for a result by the end of this year.
Churkin spoke after Ahtisaari briefed the council -- and then talked to reporters -- on his talks.
During the closed-door meeting, Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica again ruled out independence and accused the international community of seeking to change Serbia's borders by force, diplomats attending the session said.
Ahtisaari, asked before Churkin spoke whether he thought a solution might have to be imposed because of Kostunica's hard line, said it was "entirely premature to start talking how the end result of this exercise is going to be."
But other council diplomats said an imposed solution would clearly be in order if a deal could not be negotiated.
Ahtisaari said he had strong council support for his work. "I think everyone is interested that we have a thorough process -- in the end of the day that we can say that we have done our utmost to try to find a negotiated settlement," he said.
Back to the Balkans: Serbia's Darkest Year
Serbia's Darkest Year
By Erich Wiedemann and Renate Flottau
It hasn't been a good year for Serbia: First Montenegro voted to secede and now Kosovo wants independence. The football catastrophe suffered by the country's team during the World Cup in Germany has merely added insult to injury.
"A present for your chancellor," he says. "Please, take it, it's free." The tousle-headed merchant in Belgrade's Pioneer Park unwraps a yellow porcelain cup and places it on a cardboard box. The inscription reads: "You can take the lives of our heroes, but not our country." What would German Chancellor Angela Merkel do with this patriotic coffee cup? "It'll make her understand that you can't just push around a great people," he explains.He certainly means what he says, but the man's premise is false. The Serbian people, after storming themselves into irrelevance in a blind rage, are now sitting on the edge of Europe. Because of this, they now feel resentful. It's an understatement to say that 2006 so far hasn't been a good year for Serbia. Indeed, it's rare to see a country -- in peacetime -- forced to endure so many setbacks and disgraces in such a short time span.
The European Union slammed its door in Serbia's face in early March, indefinitely suspending talks over future Serbian EU membership. It was punishment for Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica's government's failure to hand over former General Ratko Mladic, the man accused of the mass murder of almost 8,000 Muslims in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica.
On March 20, unflattering television coverage of the funeral service for deceased dictator Slobodan Milosevic was broadcast around the globe. Montenegro then declared its independence from Serbia in May.
And, of course, there was Serbia's catastrophic showing at the World Cup in Germany, where its national football team lost 0:1 against the Netherlands, 0:6 against Argentina and 1:2 against Ivory Coast. After the match against Argentina, Belgrade newspaper Politika summed up its dejection over the fiasco in an acerbic cartoon depicting an empty football goal and six headstones lined up in front of it. Tabloid Blic wrote that what Serbian fans were witnessing "a descent into hell," clearly the lowest possible point for team and country.
Kosovo pushes for independence
But 2006 isn't over yet -- nor is Serbia's steady disintegration. The next item on the region's agenda is a decision over the future of breakaway province Kosovo. It'll likely end with Albanian-dominated enclave declaring independence from the Republic of Serbia. And then there isVojvodina, an autonomous province threatened by separatism. Balkanization has undoubtedly returned to the Balkans.
Not all the blame lies with Belgrade, of course. The European Union, which sees its role in providing order and stability in the Balkans, has also dropped the ball. EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana now faces precisely the kind of secessionist domino effect he had wanted to avoid. And now that Montenegro is independent, yet another tiny state will be pushing for EU membership.
Controversial Austrian poet Peter Handke has written that Serbia is "Europe's most forlorn country." Handke's political assessments are always a step away from the truth, but when he's right, he's right. Indeed, detractors call him "Serbian Peter."Is there no light at the end of the tunnel for Serbia? The last politician thought capable of leading Serbia out of the darkness was the pro-European former Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. He battled corruption and nepotism and turned over Milosevic to the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. He was assassinated in 2003 by gunshots ordered up from the swamp he had tried to drain.
The retired university professor with a Communist Party pin on his label is drowning his sorrows in red wine in the Writers Club at Franzuska 7. He believes that it will take something on the order of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje for Serbia to regain some of its national pride. What exactly he means by this comparison isn't quite clear.
The Battle of Kosovo Polje figures prominently in the Serbs' nationalist mythology. On June 28, 1389, the Serbian Prince Lazar led an army of 30,000 knights and soldiers against 70,000 Turks. Lazar and his forces lost the battle.
Nationalist zealots have embellished Serbia's woes to a point beyond recognition. In their view, no one has suffered more than the Serbs. They even believe that their ancestors' heroic battle against the Turks somehow set the stage for the idea of a united Europe. It must come as a slap in the face to Serbs that Romania and Bulgaria will be joining the EU first.
Dwelling on their dreams and the good days over glasses of homegrown red Vranac is a favorite pastime among the members of Belgrade's retired intellectual elite. The Writers Club is the kind of place where one can acquire an educated perspective on Serbia's miseries and their presumed causes. Or on Serbia's sacrifices as a result of a European conspiracy leading up to World War II, a conspiracy that led to oppression of the Serbs at the hands of the Europeans -- at least according to the prevailing view here.
The Writers Club was the epicenter of political heresy in the days of former Yugoslav dictator Josip Tito. But it has lost much of its aura of rebellious charm, now that practically everything is allowed -- at least politically -- in Serbia.
Three young men are standing in the street in front of a bridal gown rental shop, vocally discussing Serbia's woes. The tenor of their conversation is the same as it is in the Writers Club, but the delivery is a little more direct. Our problems are the fault of the Jews, says the leader. But the gypsies, Croats and Muslims are also at fault, he adds -- they're the ones who stirred up so much hatred for Serbia in the EU. One of the men has the flag of football club Red Star Belgrade wrapped around his midsection. Red Star is about the only bright light shining for them in the current Serbian darkness.
A war invalid leans against a shop window next door. A cardboard sign informs passersby that the man lost both arms in the Bosnian war and needs money for bread.
Deep-seated misery
Belgrade's misery is so deep-seated that all hopes for improvement are shattered as quickly as they appear. Fifty percent of the city's youth are unemployed. The average monthly income is €200, with incomes four times as high in neighboring Croatia. Unlike Serbia, Croatia enjoys excellent economic ties to the rest of Europe. According to Germany's ambassador in Belgrade, even Bulgaria seems more attractive than Serbia, with more and more German companies moving their Belgrade offices to the neighboring country.
Ironclad nationalism shows its ugly face all over the city. Street vendors sell T-shirts depicting war criminal Mladic. A giant portrait of Milosevic, soiled by tossed eggs, hangs from the top of a four-story office building opposite a bank building.
His death in a prison cell made Milosevic a martyr to many Serbs. Austrian poet Handke says that the UN War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague has essentially accepted his death. Most Serbs, Prime Minister Kostunica included, would likely agree. Nevertheless, they are also pleased to be rid of him.
Young people are forming right-wing parties and action groups with names like "Marching Column," "Blood and Honor" and "Serbia Now." Their heroes are Bishop Nikolaj Velimirovic -- who was canonized by the Serbian Orthodox Church and who considered Adolf Hitler "Europe's savior" -- and people wanted for war criminals like Ratko Mladic.
Prime Minister Kostunica obviously knows where Mladic's old boy network is hiding the leader of the Bosnian Serb army. But he faces pressure from the right-wing radicals who tolerate his government, as well as from their leader, Vojislav Seselj, who is also awaiting trial in The Hague. For the far right, Mladic's extradition to UN tribunal would be treason.
Radicals in the wings
If Kostunica's administration collapsed and elections were held tomorrow, the radical left and right could expect to capture the majority of seats in the Serbian parliament. But this is less a reflection of the country's political preferences than of its desperate emotional state. After a decade and a half of misfortune, the Serbs want nothing more than a way out of their crisis. But propping up Kostunica's government must be in the EU's interest, because it has been reluctant to force the prime minister to finally hunt down General Mladic and agree to a formal separation from Kosovo.
Before its wars of secession, Yugoslavia was almost the size of the former West Germany. Now Serbia, stripped of Montenegro, is only a rump just larger than Bavaria. Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic told SPIEGEL that he hopes that the referendum over Montenegrin independence has finally put a stop to the country's steady disintegration. Prime Minister Kostunica, who recently paid a symbolic visit to the Serb Gracanica Monastery in Kosovo, apparently agrees.Draskovic doesn't expect any further amputations. All appearances to the contrary, he continues to count Kosovo as part of Serbian territory. The majority Albanian breakaway province has been under a UN protectorate since the NATO bombardment of Serbia in the summer of 1999. "We will not recognize" the declaration of an independent state, says Draskovic, adding that the Serbs could retaliate by establishing a Serb state within Bosnia. He also rejects demands for autonomy by Vojvodina's Hungarian majority.
The US government has summoned Prime Minister Kostunica to Washington this week to secure his commitment to a joint program of reforms with President Boris Tadic, as well as to pledge economic aid to Serbia. But convincing the two Serb leaders, who are bitter enemies, to join forces and pull their country out of its quagmire will be an uphill battle.
Translated from German by Christopher Sultan
Interview with Serbia's Vuk Draskovic: "The Time for Demagogues has Returned"
INTERVIEW WITH SERBIA'S VUK DRASKOVIC
"The Time for Demagogues has Returned"
In an interview with SPIEGEL ONLINE, Serbia's Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic warned about the danger Kosovo's possible independence poses for the Balkans and the legacy of Slobodan Milosevic.
SPIEGEL ONLINE. Mr Draskovic, Serbia is a shrinking state. Are you bitter?Draskovic: I would have liked for Serbia and Montenegro to co-exist under one umbrella. But we accept reality. The disintegration of former Yugoslavia is now complete.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Not necessarily. The province of Kosovo could soon become independent as well.
Draskovic: In that case the Kosovo Contact Group, the UN Security Council and the governments of those states that are calling for the independence of Kosovo ought to come out and say plainly that Serbs have no right to protection in Kosovo, because they're Serbs.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Why would it not be possible to protect the rights of Serbs in an independent Kosovo -- through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or other international bodies, for example?
Draskovic: The talk about a multiethnic community is farcical. Ever since the NATO entered Kosovo, about 220,000 Serbs and non-Albanians have been driven out of the province; 40,000 Serbian houses have been destroyed and more than 1,000 Serbian civilians have been killed. Now the Albanians want a state of their own as a reward. Europe is just soothing its own conscience with its ostensible concern for these tiny Serbian enclaves in Kosovo. Almost 80 percent of Kosovo's territory is ethnically pure.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: How would Belgrade react if Kosovo should indeed become independent?
Draskovic: If an internationally recognized Albanian state should be formed on Serbian territory, we wouldn't recognize it.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: What consequences would an independent Kosovo have for the region?
Draskovic: This criminal solution would turn the entire region into a dangerous flahs point and cause political earthquakes in the neighboring countries. No authority in the world could then explain to the Serbs why they don't have a right to an autonomous state, while the Albanians do.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Would Russia allow for this scenario to become a reality?
Draskovic: Russian President Vladimir Putin certainly doesn't support an independent Kosovo. Speaking to the Kosovo Contact Group in January, he didn't mince his words, but said clearly that if Kosovo becomes independent there will be no guarantees that this won't be cited as a precedent by the Caucasus, Karabakh and numerous other regions. It's also an open question how the Turkish part of Cyprus would react to such a development. And what would happen in Catalonia, in the Basque territories of Spain, in Scotland or in Taiwan?
SPIEGEL ONLINE: What is the maximum you would be willing to concede in negotiations over the future status of Kosovo?
Draskovic: We're making large concessions. We're saying to the Albanians: Rule Kosovo by yourself; you're the majority. You'll receive internal independence for Kosovo -- but within Serbia. You can follow your own path to Europe and become a member of international organizations directly -- with the exception of the United Nations, NATO and those organizations that strictly represent international independence. The only demand would be that the current borders of the Serbian state are respected, that the Serbs living there are protected along with their churches and monasteries and that there be special cultural and economic relations between the Kosovo-Serbs and Serbia.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Such a model doesn't exist anywhere in the world...
Draskovic: Specific situations require specific solutions.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: What do your discussion partners from Western governments have to say about this proposal?
Draskovic: They agree as far as the right to the inviolability of our borders is concerned. But they point out that the Albanians would be very unsatisfied with this solution and would perhaps opt for terror. But isn't it absurd for the world to go as far as to congratulate the Albanians just because they're giving their "word of honor" that they will respect the rights of Serbs in case of independence?
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Belgrade doesn't rank behind the Kosovo Albanians as far as empty promises are concerned. Don't you think it's shameful how the Serbian government is making a fool of the international community with its ostensible search for Ratko Mladic? Now it's been openly admitted that he was in Belgrade until the end of 2005.
Draskovic: I have no explanation and no justification for the fact that Mladic is still a free man. But I believe Premier Vojislav Kostunica when he says Mladic has become a nightmare and that he would do anything to arrest him. Kostunica will present his plan of action for better cooperation with the Hague War Crimes Tribunal to the EU in mid-July. There will be a radical break with the legacy of Milosevic -- in all areas. Then Europe should tell us where it can help us -- especially in the seizure of war criminals.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: You say support for Mladic comes mainly from the army, the police and the intelligence service. Why did the current government not purge dangerous individuals from these institutions when it overthrew Milosevic?
Draskovic: We've lost much time and paid dearly for our fatal mistakes. Following the overthrow of Milosevic, we should have used the referendum in order to destroy the intelligence service, open the secret files and build a new security agency with the help of European experts. The remaining functionaries from Milosevic's regime have killed our former Prime Minister Djindjic, and they've tried to murder me twice.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: But why are the murderers still being protected? Consider how slowly the trial against the assassins of Zoran Djindjic is proceeding, and you'll understand the people's disappointment.
Draskovic: Of course something isn't quite right there. The trial is being slowed down and obstructed. It almost seems as if someone wanted to gain time.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Time? To do what?
Draskovic: To re-establish the system we had before October 5, 2000 -- before the fall of Milosevic. Look at the polls. If elections were held tomorrow, the radicals and the socialists could get back into power. The people quickly forget their misery and who was responsible for it. The time for demagogues has returned.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Given the danger of a return to the Milosevic regime, why don't you form an oppositional democratic bloc, instead of bickering within the government?Draskovic: Of course the current government deserves to be criticized not just on 100, but on 1,000, and we've made thousands of mistakes. But there is one mistake we haven't made: We haven't played with human lives, we haven't provoked war and no one has lost their life because of our policies. But Milosevic hasn't just left us a political catastrophe -- several million people were also shaped mentally by his regime.
SPIEGEL ONLINE: Is Serbia's population even still interested in EU membership today?
Draskovic: More than 80 percent are in favor of EU membership; 60 percent are in favor of the Partnership for Peace. But if Kosovo should become independent, the pro-European attitude could change quickly. Then our people would feel humiliated, and that's no foundation on which to build a European policy.
-- Interview conducted by Renate Flottau
July 13, 2006
Justice for Serbia
Justice for Serbia
By Vojislav Kostunica
Kosovo Independence Imperils Our Democracy
Washington Post
July 12, 2006The demands for the independence of Kosovo present Southeast Europe and the rest of the world with a compelling question: Will absolute justice be made to yield to relative political interests -- and will authentic democratic values be sacrificed for a mere semblance of peace?
The arguments given by Serbia against independence for its southern province are well known. From the point of view of international law, these arguments are simply irrefutable. They are based on the fundamental documents and pillars of international order: the U.N. Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and relevant resolutions of the U.N. Security Council.
Depriving a democratic country of a part of its territory simply because one ethnic group that has aspirations for that territory threatens violence is impermissible, not only morally but also from the perspective of historical experience. Indeed, tragic occurrences have taught mankind that a policy of appeasement toward those who threaten force only opens the way to more and even greater violence.
There is another, purely pragmatic argument that is equally indisputable: An independent Kosovo could not help becoming a hotbed of chronic tension in the region, both because of the probability of new territorial demands and because of its economic unviability and its widespread network of organized crime.
Viewed strategically, and not just with regard to preserving stability in the Balkans, the arguments against an independent Kosovo are equally strong: Independence for Kosovo would surely be viewed as a precedent, setting off similar demands elsewhere. Those who argue otherwise are, quite simply, closing their eyes to the hard facts. Resolving the problems of national minorities through self-determination (especially in the case of nationalities that already have their own countries nearby) inevitably leads to border changes and all the dangerous complications that this entails.
But even if it remained deaf to all of these arguments, the international community would have to take account of the impact that Kosovo's eventual independence would have on democratic Serbia. Let us recall that Serbia liberated itself from a communist regime on its own by investing enormous effort and taking huge risks. Can such a country, by any measure a democratic one, survive the forcible taking of 15 percent of its territory? What democratically elected government could explain to its voters after such an act that they should continue to believe in the principles of tolerance, liberalism and the sacrosanct will of the people -- the values of enlightened Western civilization, in the name of which they toppled an evil, authoritarian regime?
To put it simply, a young democracy, which in a mere six years has achieved impressive results in developing its economy, building institutions, protecting human rights, battling corruption and crime, and fostering international relations, would stand little chance of survival under such circumstances.
Democracy, in Serbia as anywhere else, is essentially based on the equality of all and, no less important, on trust. If people stop believing in the rules of democracy, if they start thinking that a set of rules is applicable to one nation but not to others, if they feel betrayed by powerful institutions, and if the standards and norms of behavior for relations among individuals and nations alike are trampled upon, then people will lose faith. And where faith is lost, there can be no democracy.
In attempting to preserve the province of Kosovo within its borders, Serbia has acted in the most reasonable and constructive way possible. It is prepared to accept any form of compromise that does not entail independence, and it offers Albanians the greatest possible autonomy, including all legislative, executive and judicial powers, while expecting in return only the inviolability of borders and safety for the non-Albanian population of the province.
In its struggle for Kosovo, Serbia is also struggling for fundamental principles of international justice and order. And, by defending an inalienable part of its territory, Serbia may even be defending the future of democracy as a way of life and a view of the world.
http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/sover/emerg/2006/0712serbia.htm
July 12, 2006
Serbia rejects independent Kosovo
Serbia rejects independent Kosovo
By Nicholas Kralev
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
July 12, 2006
Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica told Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice yesterday that Belgrade would not agree to Kosovo's independence, offering instead "the highest possible autonomy" for the United Nations-run province.
During the first visit of a high-level Serbian official to Washington since Belgrade lost Montenegro, the last of the former Yugoslav republics to break away, Mr. Kostunica said independence for Kosovo is "out of the question."
"I had a chance to explain the advantage of the position Serbia stands for, the highest possible autonomy," he told reporters at the State Department after meeting with Miss Rice. "It's a solution based on international legal standards regarding territorial integrity."
Talks on Kosovo's final status began in February but have not produced results. The next round is scheduled for later this month in Vienna, Austria.
The United States has avoided making definitive statements that would prejudge the outcome, but along with other Western countries, it supports the aspirations for independence among Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority. Russia has sided with Serbia.
"Independence is something the Serbian authorities cannot accept," Mr. Kostunica said yesterday.
Kosovo, although still a Serbian province, has been ruled by the United Nations since the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia in response to President Slobodan Milosevic's treatment of the Albanians there.
Mr. Milosevic was arrested in 2000 under the presidency of Mr. Kostunica and sent to The Hague war-crimes tribunal, where he died in March before his trial had ended. Other suspects including former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his military commander, Gen. Ratko Mladic, remain at large.
Certain U.S. assistance to Serbia is contingent on its cooperation with The Hague tribunal, and this year, Miss Rice refused to certify Belgrade's compliance, resulting in the withholding of $7 million in aid.
The secretary urged Mr. Kostunica to do everything possible to deliver the suspects to The Hague.
The May referendum in Montenegro that led to its independence prompted some changes in the Serbian government structure, although they have been smooth so far, said Jelena Cukic Matic, spokeswoman for the Serbian Embassy in Washington.
The Foreign and Defense ministries, which used to be part of the union government of Serbia and Montenegro, have been folded into the Serbian Cabinet headed by Mr. Kostunica.
The ministers and all other Serbian personnel remain the same, while the representatives of Montenegro in those agencies now work for the new Montenegrin government, Mrs. Matic said.
July 11, 2006
Greece and the Balkans
Greece and the Balkans
By Alexandros P. Mallias
July 11, 2006
Greece's involvement in the Balkans is not new. Even before the foundation of the modern Greek state, the idea of a Balkan cooperation existed. The idea of a Balkan Federation, which Greece would lead, was conceived, toward the end of the 18th century, by Rigas Velestinlis, a man inspired by the ideals of freedom and democracy. Rigas visualized a Balkan region where people could move freely from country to country, where trade would be conducted without barriers, a region of prosperity for its peoples.
Now, more than 200 years after its conception, this idea, modified to some extent, is to become a reality. The Balkans are now at the doorstep of the European Union. Greece gave a historic boost to the Western Balkans' legitimate European aspirations at the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, during its EU presidency.
Greece devised a long-term policy based on three solid pillars: (a) integration of the countries of the region into the EU and NATO, (b) economic development and investment and (c) regional cooperation.
The integration of Greece's neighborhood into the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, upon fulfillment of specific criteria and conditions, has become our policy's fundamental strategic goal. In January 2007, Bulgaria and Romania will be the first Balkan countries to join the EU. Greece was the first among its EU partners, in the mid-'90s, to advocate Bulgaria's and Romania's accession. European integration and the prospect of EU membership is the strongest single soft power mechanism for encouraging reforms, consolidating democracy, establishing the rule of law, strengthening institutions and eventually bringing economic prosperity.
Greece has become a leading investor in the Balkans, with investments of more than $10 billion, and the generation of 200,000 new jobs. The volume of trade between Greece and its Balkan neighbors is more than $4 billion. In addition, Greece launched in 2002 a five-year development aid initiative called the Hellenic Plan for the Economic Reconstruction of the Balkans, which amounts to a $670 million program, and aims at promoting the economic development of Greece's neighboring Balkan countries.
Many problems that the Balkans face are common to the countries of the region. It is therefore natural to deal with them in common. Regional cooperation is essential for ethnic reconciliation, to increase regional ownership and allow the Balkan counties to address, in a coordinated manner, issues of mutual concern. Greece was the driving force in revival of the South East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) in the 1990s. It has gradually evolved into the only genuine scheme of cooperation in the Balkans, acting at the same time as the region's authentic voice.
Now, in 2006, we are about to witness the closing of another chapter in the history of the Balkans, begun by the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. Montenegro's peaceful secession from its state union with Serbia and the settlement of Kosovo's status will be the epilogue of this chapter.
On Kosovo, especially, Greece, with strategic interests at stake, has contributed concrete ideas both within the EU and within the framework of the Greek-U.S. strategic partnership. We need a win/win or at least a win/no lose solution, which will have the support or at least consent of both Belgrade and Pristina.
Greece opposes partition of Kosovo. We cannot afford to have a Kosovo divided exclusively along ethnic lines, or to have Kosovo annexed by or united with any neighboring country or part of a country. We cannot have our region integrated into the European Union while, at the same time, we promote a solution that perpetuates division. We want to see a solution for a multi-ethnic and multicultural Kosovo based on European standards and values.
A new chapter will soon open; a chapter which will be remembered by generations to come as an era of stability, prosperity and cooperation; an era when respect for the different is the rule and not the exception; an era when the Balkans are embraced by the European family, where they have always belonged.
Alexandros P. Mallias is ambassador of Greece to the United States.
http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20060710-082052-1159r.htm
