Kosovo and the Post-Soviet “Unrecognized” – Time for Moscow to Make Up Its Mind

17.05.2007

Andrei ARESHEV

Kosovo and the Post-Soviet “Unrecognized” – Time for Moscow to Make Up Its Mind

Western
countries continue to push persistently for the adoption of the
Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo. Russia’s initiative to send a UN Security
Council mission to the province was no more than a temporary and
tactical success of Moscow. The possibility of Kosovo’s independence
remains on the agenda, and the Western community appears to be
concentrating its efforts in this direction. Condoleezza Rice was
expected to attempt to coerce Russia into accepting the “final
resolution” on the Kosovo problem before the end of May during her May
14-15 Moscow visit, so as to prevent Russia from vetoing the UN
Security Council Resolution granting independence to Kosovo.

Washington is in a hurry. In this context, all of the previous
steps taken by international organizations, including the UN Security
Council Resolution 1244, which has been adopted in 1999 and declared
Kosovo an inseparable part of Yugoslavia (Serbia), merely seem to
disguise the many-years-long process of putting to practice a plan to
cut off Kosovo from Serbia and to expel the Serb population from the
province. Currently, we witness a phase of the plan’s implementation.
The Moscow leadership is expected to “convince” the Serbs as former
Russian PM V. Chernomyrdin has done in the past.

At the same time, Western politicians keep telling that the
Kosovo independence will by no means set a precedent for the
unrecognized post-Soviet Republics. It is hard to say whether the
notion is a case of a self-hypnosis or of a downright cheat. Clearly,
the resolution on Kosovo, proposed by Washington, will require an open
demonstration of a total disregard for the international law, and will
inevitably have a long-term effect on the entire international legal
framework.

The contours of the Kosovo independence are getting
increasingly obvious, and the West has to explain why residents of
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transdnistria, Karabakh, or of a number of
cultural and historical regions of the “old” Europe (the May 3 triumph
of Scotch nationalists sends a clear message) are not allowed to get
what Albanian terrorists and drug dealers have.

Alla Yaz’kova writes: “A surge of crime was all that Europe got
from the Kosovo conflict. There is nothing in Kosovo except for drug
trafficking and other illegal businesses. Perhaps, the reason why the
US supports the plan is that some 500,000 Albanians reside in it, and
this diaspora has an influential lobby in the US Congress”. But this is
no news. We no longer hear the old promises that both Albanians and
Serbs will benefit in case Kosovo is recognized, since, allegedly, this
will open for them the way to Europe, where they will eventually live
in peace and happiness in the common European home.

It must be admitted that, by backing the current Pristina
authorities, the supranational Brussels organizations, together with
the US, prepare the old Europe for a surge of “drug trafficking and
other illegal businesses”, as Mrs. Yaz’kova now realizes. Previously,
she had no doubts concerning the “conditional independence” of Kosovo:
“… what is conditional independence? Chiefly, it means not being a
subject of the international law – that is, Kosovo will not be
represented in the UN as an independent country, which will limit
dramatically its potential to carry out international activities… As
for the complete independence, Kosovo will be able to gain it only upon
joining the EU together with other West-Balkan countries including
Serbia.”¹ Nothing of the kind is going to happen!

The post-Soviet states which project the developments around
this Serbian province on their own unsettled ethnic conflicts are
waiting for the resolution of the Kosovo problem with great concern.
Recently, Moscow was visited for consultations by Araz Azimov,
Azerbaijan’s Deputy Foreign Minister. In a lecture given at the Moscow
Institute of Foreign Relations he said: “Azerbaijan has concerns
related to the Kosovo problem. Naturally we are worried both by the
geopolitical divorce with Serbia in the middle of Europe and by certain
tendencies originating from the Ahtisaari plan. However, from my point
of view, the Ahtisaari plan is gradually dying. I hope that many of the
EU members understand that a great mistake is made or is proposed to be
made by a plan of a de facto stimulation of separatism, since the
perspective of Kosovo’s joining the EU and of a EU patronage over
Kosovo, inherent in the Ahtisaari plan, can foster likewise tendencies
in other contexts. Naturally, we cannot but worry about this… ”

Any direct analogies between Kosovo and Karabakh, which are
commonplace in papers dealing with the “unrecognized states” issue, are
entirely artificial, but in a number of respects juxtaposition is
inevitable. For example, the tragedy of the Serbian historical and
cultural heritage in Kosovo makes one recall the destruction of the
Armenian landmarks in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic. Similarly,
the Armenians in Karabakh avoided the destiny of the Krajna and Kosovo
Serbs solely because they had protected their right to live freely on
their lands in an armed conflict …

Nevertheless, nothing good can be expected from searches for
analogies which every side still sees in a different light. What is
necessary is a new complex approach to the complicated problem of the
“unrecognized”. The Russian expert community has suggested a number of
times that the principle of not using force, as well as of not
threatening to use it, must be adopted as a basic one in resolving
conflicts, and that a universal scale of criteria for recognizing or
not recognizing specific state and quasi-state formations must be
developed². Any attempts to resolve problems of unrecognized
states by force and rough political pressure, or using unilateralist
politically-motivated (non-legal) arguments, have no future.

What will Condoleezza Rice be told about this in Moscow?

D. Sedov, a political writer, wrote in a paper published at the site of the Strategic Culture Foundation:
“It is time for Moscow to decide on its position on self-proclaimed
states. The future of these territories depends largely on Moscow’s
ability to take decisive steps. Nobody doubts that everything actually
depends on Moscow… In case we choose not to accept the option proposed
by the US and to assert that Kosovo sets a precedent, a more open and
active position will be needed… However, this interpretation is flawed.
Kosovo absolutely cannot be compared with the problematic territories
of the post-Soviet space… Today’s Kosovo is nothing but a criminal
enclave led by terrorists and murderers… Kosovo “politicians” are
bandits hired by the US in order to turn the territory into a US ground
aircraft carrier. This was the main objective of the offensive against
Yugoslavia, and this was why they needed to make Kosovo independent
from Belgrade… The US, inspired by the chimerical goal of the global
dominance, will soon crack down on Iran. A new global drama will begin.
And what about us – shall we watch the developments from a distance
even in the areas crucial to Russia’s national interests – in
Transdnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and so on?”

_________________

¹ Research Notes of the Eastern Europe Institute. Issue 1. Unrecognized States. P. 56.

² V. Kazimirov. The “Political Atlas” of Conflicts and the Two Helsinki Principles. http//www.regnum.ru/news/814011.html

http://en.fondsk.ru/print.php?id=736

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Bitter road to baghdad began in belgrade

Bitter road
to baghdad began in belgrade

By Malcolm Rifkind

Last Updated: 11:36pm BST 12/05/2007

 

John Major once remarked to me that one doesn't win a general election on foreign policy. "No," I replied, "but one can lose it." Reputations can be lost just as easily as elections. Tony Blair won't have any more elections to fight but his legacy will be dominated more by his foreign policy than has that of any British prime minister since Sir Anthony Eden. He will not find the comparison very comfortable. It was never meant to have been like that. He started his decade in power with an extraordinary degree of popularity and power not just at home but also abroad. If it has since soured, that should, however, not blind us to the positive aspects of his international role. Not least of these has been his global prominence. Britain, as a middling power, cannot assume that its prime minister will be known throughout the world. Who knows the name of the Chinese president, the Japanese or the Italian prime ministers? For 10 years, the world has known about Tony Blair. Like him or loathe him, that has helped project Britain as a country with a significant role in world affairs. Blair's contribution has also been serious rather than symbolic. One has only to compare him with Jacques Chirac. While the French President delighted in grand initiatives presented for the greater glory of France, Blair has made a series of thoughtful speeches offering a sober analysis of the world we live in and how Britain can play its part in building a global response to global problems. While the rhetoric has been splendid there has been little attempt to exaggerate Britain's power and his proposals have, for the most part, been put in an international context. That is the case for the defence. The charge against Blair is, however, far more serious. It does not relate to the Prime Minister's integrity or noble intentions. What has been of far greater concern has been his faulty analysis and poor judgement. When he came to power he brought with him no experience and little prior interest in foreign affairs. Despite that, he has acted as his own foreign secretary and has largely ignored the collective advice of diplomats, academics and others with relevant expertise. The Prime Minister made two fundamental errors in the first few years that he was in power. First, he concluded that a commitment to human rights and democratic values justified, and required, a policy of military intervention around the world. This was in accord with his own personality. He has approached foreign policy with all the zeal of a Victorian missionary. His is a muscular Christianity that was evident from early in his premiership. The most important example was Kosovo, which Blair believes was a great success. In fact, by his own declared objectives, it was a significant failure. It demonstrated that when you begin a war against a country that has not attacked you, you lose control of the consequences, which may be very different from those you intended. Nato's war against Serbia had two purposes. One was to restore Kosovo's autonomy within Serbia; the other was to prevent ethnic cleansing. Instead, Kosovo is now demanding, and will obtain, full independence, further fragmenting the Balkans. The ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo Albanians has been replaced by the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovo Serbs. Kosovo was important, not just in itself but because it confirmed Blair in his simplistic belief that complex international problems can be resolved by Western military might. In a very real sense, the road to Baghdad began in Belgrade. This led to Blair's second fundamental error. The end of the Cold War had concluded the global battle between Communism and capitalism, and between totalitarianism and democracy. The old certainties as to who we were and who the enemy was had disappeared. But 9/11 changed all that. Since the attack on the Twin Towers, both the rhetoric and strategy of Blair and Bush have been black and white: a global War on Terror, a new battle between good and evil. Chechnya, Palestine and Kashmir have all had to be fitted onto this template when, in reality, they are quite different issues. The result has been a simplistic distortion of a complex world. The consequence has also been the disaster of Iraq, which, quite rightly, will define Blair's legacy. Going to war is always a difficult decision. But when you go to war against a country that has not attacked you, without the support of the UN Security Council and with your own country and party deeply divided, you have to be sure that you get it right. Blair and Bush have got it terribly wrong. The result has been more than 100,000 killed, two million refugees fled abroad, a failed state in the heart of the Middle East, and Iran having been helped by Blair and Bush to become the most powerful state in the region. Blair's Iraq policy has been worse than a crime, it has been a blunder. Then again, some may argue it is the other way around. I began by comparing Blair with Eden. Maybe Neville Chamberlain would have been more appropriate. While no one can accuse Blair of appeasement, in every other respect the similarities are striking. Blair and Chamberlain: two prime ministers, both inexperienced in foreign policy, both convinced of their own rectitude, both disdainful of advice, both unable to acknowledge error, both contemptuous of their foreign secretaries and both believing in their own personal destiny. For Chamberlain read Munich; for Blair read Baghdad. Both were decent men out of their depth. At least Neville Chamberlain paved the way for Winston Churchill. As we wait for Gordon Brown to enter Downing Street, I realise that this is where the comparison ends. Sir Malcolm Rifkind MP was Foreign Secretary from 1995 to 1997

 

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/05/13/blairf.xml

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TERRORISM: U.S. ARMY BASE PLOT 'CONFIRMS EXISTENCE OF WHITE AL-QAEDA' BALKAN EXPERTS SAY

TERRORISM: U.S. ARMY BASE PLOT 'CONFIRMS EXISTENCE OF WHITE AL-QAEDA' BALKAN EXPERTS SAY   Belgrade, 9 May (AKI) - The arrest of four ethnic Albanians, a Jordanian and a Turk in the United States on Tuesday on suspicion of planning a terrorist attack at the United States army base in Fort Dix, New Jersey, confirms the existence of a "white Al-Qaeda", Balkan terrorism expert Darko Trifunovic told Adnkronos International (AKI) on Wednesday. Trifunovic said the arrests showed "white Al-Qaeda at work." He compared the Fort Dix plot to a February attack in Salt Lake City when a Bosnian Muslim youth, Sulejman Talovic went on a shopping mall shooting rampage. Six people including Talovic were killed another four were injured in the attack. Trifunovic, a professor at Belgrade University's Faculty of Security Studies, was the first to develop a theory of "white Al-Qaeda", which he said was introduced to the Balkans during 1992-1995 civil war in Bosnia when thousands of 'mujahadeen' from Islamic countries came to fight on the side of local Muslims. Many mujahadeen have remained in the country, and are believed to been indoctrinating local youths with radical Islam and even operating terrorist training camps, Trifunovic said, quoting western and Balkans intelligence sources.    Al-Qaeda has adopted a new tactics of using white European youths for terrorist attacks, "because of their non-Arabic appearance," Trifunovic told AKI. "The strategy is to   indoctrinate or poison the hearts and minds of youngsters to psyche them up for the future terror operations," Trifunovic said. "And that is exactly what is now happening in the United States," he added. The US authorities arrested three ethnic Albanian brothers from Serbia's breakaway Kosovo province, Sain, Elvir and Dritan Duka, another ethnic Albanian, Agron Abdulahu, a Jordanian, Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer, and Serdar Tatar, a Turk.      Michael Drewniak, a spokesman for the U.S. Attorney's office in Newark, New Jersey, said the suspects "were planning an attack on Fort Dix in which they would kill as many soldiers as possible". Drewniak described the group as "Islamist militants from the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East," who apparently had no ties to international terrorist organisations, but were organised on a local level. Several of the suspects said they were ready to kill and die ''in the name of Allah,'' according to court papers. The defendants, all men in their 20s, reportedly include a pizza deliveryman suspected of using his job to scout out Fort Dix, three builders and taxi-driver. They were arrested while trying to buy AK-47 assault weapons and M-16s from an informant, authorities said. Many Balkan terrorism experts have been warning for years that Al-Qaeda had active cells in Muslim-majority Kosovo and a training camp in the village of Ropotovo. Kosovo has been under United Nations control 1999, when NATO airstrikes drove Serbian forces out of the province amid ethnic fighting and allegations of gross human rights abuses. International officials have ignored the warnings and minimised the danger Al-Qaeda poses, according to Balkan analysts.   In a joint NATO-Bulgarian report in March 2005, the head of Bulgarian state security Kirco Kirov cited Kosovo as a "direct source of regional instability and a hub for international terrorism." The report called for joint action by all European countries.   The US authorities said that Abdulahu was a sharp shooter in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) before fleeing to the US. Fort Dix is a training ground for American soldiers and reservists before they are sent to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, but in 1999 it served as a shelter for thousands of ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo.   Serb immigrants' web sites noted that US officials carefully avoided identifying the four ethnic Albanians as such, calling them only "Islamic militants from former Yugoslavia." A commentator on the SerbBlog said that Washington, which backs independence for Kosovo, is embarrassed by the discovery of the Fort Dix plot, "because the truth might mess up the PR for Kosovo Albanians getting to rip off a piece of Serbia to create their own country - a move that has the full support of the US State Department."   Belgrade military analyst Zoran Dragisic said the Fort Dix plot "once again shows that Islamist terrorism is highly organised - from Kosovo to America - and the US intelligence services know this very well." Dragsic expressed doubt, however, that the latest incident would change the American stance on Kosovo, "because Washington doesn't change its positions easily."   http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Politics&loid=8.0.412776154&par=0

(Vpr/Aki)

__._,_.___

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On Kosovo, Ambassador Churkin Foreshadows a Veto

On Kosovo, Ambassador Churkin Foreshadows a Veto

After the Soviet Union disintegrated, ethnic Russians fled the newly independent states, Ambassador Vitaly

Churkin said on Wednesday, analogizing that to what the remaining Serbs in Kosovo would do if independence were granted.

Less than five percent of the Serbs who left Kosovo have returned,
Amb. Churkin said. In a five minute response to questions from Inner
City Press, Churkin focused on what he calls the non-compliance with
the Security Council's previous resolution 1244, and the lack of a
"normal life" in Kosovo at present. Video here, from Minute 2:49 to
8:15.



This is not the time, Amb. Churkin said, for the Council
to impose a solution, i.e. independence. "The international community
should respect itself," he said, and should make sure that its previous
resolution is complied with before considering enacting a new
resolution.



News analysis: While Kosovo comparisons, when made,
are generally to Georgia's flanks Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to
Transdniester and even Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara, Amb.
Churkin's call to assess and ensure compliance with previous
resolutions brought to mind to this report the Council's blithe
approach to Somalia. The Council imposed an arms embargo, then scoffed
at its own experts reports that all sides were violating the embargo.
In December 2006, when Ethiopian troops crossed the border and drove on
Mogadishu, the Council did nothing. Even now, when those troops and the
UN-supported Transitional Federal Government are shelling civilian
neighborhoods and blocking UN humanitarian shipments, the Council does
nothing.



Kosovo, however, is in Europe, if not in the EU. In
Russia, the Serbs have a veto wielding ally on the Security Council.
The U.S. deploys vetoes for Israel -- why not Russian for the Serbs? 
Russia's acceptance of language in the most recent Abkhazia resolution
bowing down to the territorial integrity of Georgia was a clue: Russia
will demand no less than the support of Serbia's integrity.



Wednesday
Amb. Churkin deployed the word pogrom, as in "the anti-Serb pogroms of
2004." He spoke of Serbs' fear, and of the international presence doing
nothing as these pogroms occurred. This is strong language and would
seem to foreshadow a veto.



Another correspondent, slated to
leave the UN press corps at the end of the month, told Amb. Churkin,
"you do not like using Chapter VII," the section of the UN Charter that
lets the Council order that things be done. "Be sure you attribute that
right," Amb. Churkin joked. We are: he used the word pogrom.
Developing..

http://www.lobi.com.mk/default-EN.asp?ItemID=5C7ABD66C0F0E54E997333E00AB688F4

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Islamists plan violence after Kosovo goes independent

Islamists
plan violence after Kosovo goes independent

April 30, 2007 -- In a Kosovo town of Gnjilane on April 16, top echelons
of the ethnic Albanian extremist leadership had a secret meeting where
they unveiled a plan code named "Small Serbia" that plans to activate al
Qaeda cells across the Balkans once Kosovo Albanians declare independence,
writes Marko Lopusina, a reporter for a Belgrade independent weekly Telegraph.

According to the information Lopusina obtained, the intelligence about
the Kosovo Albanian military plan and the meeting has been acquired by
the Spanish and French intelligence agents that have infiltrated al Qaeda
cells in the Balkans in the aftermath of al Qaeda attacks on Spain and
Muslim riots in France.

"It has been shown that individuals in al Qaeda attacks on Spain and
France came from Bosnia and Kosovo, and that has led these agents to spy
on these cells in the Balkans," says an unidentified intelligence officer
from Belgrade.

"In the course of monitoring their own terrorists, Spanish and French
uncovered that Islamists in the Balkans and those in Europe are in a tight
cooperation," says the officer.

According to Eliza Manningham-Buller, Director General of the Security
Service MI5, British agents have, so far, uncovered 30 large terrorist
operations that al Qaeda is planning from Balkans and some 1,600 Islamists
are being monitored. The intended target is Europe.

According to the reports, ethnic Albanian terrorists from Kosovo and
Macedonia have paid 100,000 Euros for a recent transfer of wahhabists extremist
gunmen from Tuzla in Bosnia and from the emerging extremist hotbed in Serbia's
southern city of Novi Pazar.

Sources indicate that the intent is to make Novi Pazar a logistic center
for all of the Islamists in Europe.

"There are indications that the Wahhabis of Novi Pazar have interpreted
recent statements by the German Ambassador in Serbia, Zobel, as a green
light to initiate violence against Serbia," says Darko Trifunivic, an expert
on Islamic terrorism in the Balkans.

German ambassador Andreas Zobel recently said that "Insisting on Kosovo
as part of Serbian territory would destabilize Serbia, because then the
issue of Vojvodina could open up, which is a new province in Serbia."

"This is not a threat," said Zobel.

In March, Serbian police has uncovered a Muslim terror camp and during
the gun battle that killed the leader, the brother of the killed leader
escaped to Kosovo and is being protected by local ethnic Albanian extremists.

At the funeral of Dženaz Ismail Prentic, the slain al Qaeda leader from
Novi Pazar, hundreds of locals came to pay their respects, and his body
covered in black has been carried throughout the town in a long drawn parade.

At Gnjilane meeting, sources have told Lopusina, the alleged independent
NGOs would initiate demands that southern Serbia requires cultural and
national autonomy which will be followed by demands from the local armed
Muslim Albanians that will be will be followed by armed violence.

NATO troops in Kosovo have been informed of this plan, writes Lopusina.

http://www.serbianna.com/news/2007/01613.shtml

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Moscow issues warning over Kosovo

Moscow issues warning over Kosovo

By Stefan Wagstyl

Published: April 26 2007 19:32 | Last updated: April 26 2007 19:32

After
weeks of shadow-boxing, Moscow could be preparing for a fight with
Washington over the disputed Balkan territory of Kosovo.

Vladimir
Titov, a Russian deputy foreign minister, said this week that the plan
prepared by Martti Ahtisaari, the United Nations envoy, for supervised
independence for Kosovo would “not get through the UN Security Council”.

It
was the strongest signal yet that Russia might veto the proposals,
which have been endorsed by the US, Britain and other leading European
Union members. So far, Sergei Lavrov, the foreign minister, has avoided
the veto question, saying that until a resolution is put to the
Security Council there is “nothing to veto”.

At Russia’s
instigation, the Security Council is on a mission to Europe, including
the Balkans, this week. The 15 ambassadors are visiting Kosovo, the
disputed and UN-administered southern province of Serbia, where the
ethnic Albanian majority demands independence. The team is also
visiting Serbia, which insists that Kosovo must remain part of its
territory.

One western observer said he feared the possibilities
for Russia ranged from a veto to grudging support for a weak resolution
– far removed from the Ahtisaari plan.

While Russian officials
deny they are deliberately delaying a settlement, they argue there
should be no rush to judgment. Yuri Fedotov, the Russian ambassador to
London, told journalists this month: “If we have been waiting a few
years, why should we take a decision in a few weeks?”

Russian
officials say they would support any settlement negotiated between
Serbia and Kosovo. But Mr Ahtisaari says negotiations cannot bridge an
unbridgeable gap.

The US and other western powers agree. They
fear that the ethnic Albanians might take matters into their own hands
and declare independence unilaterally if they are forced to wait much
longer.

Russia’s position seems rooted in four considerations.
First, Serbia is a traditional ally and a Balkan base for Russian
companies. Next, with Moscow keen to demonstrate its political
resurgence, Kosovo is an opportunity to assert Russia’s influence deep
in Europe. The Kremlin still resents the 1999 Nato assault which forced
Serbia from Kosovo.

Third, Russia might still hope to exploit
differences over the Ahtisaari plan within the EU, with Spain, for
example, having reservations. Finally, Russia has given warning that if
the ethnic Albanians win independence without UN agreement, a precedent
will be set for other separatists – not least in the former Soviet
Union.

President Vladimir Putin has explicitly linked Kosovo with
the troubled Caucasus saying “commonly recognised universal principles”
were needed.

In Georgia, for instance, Russian-backed separatists
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have sought independence. Moscow publicly
endorses Georgia’s territorial integrity, but has also given the
separatist authorities political and financial support. Georgia says
Russia has gone further and tried to exacerbate the conflicts.

In Moldova, meanwhile, Russia has backed the breakaway region
of Transdniestria. In the past month, it has unilaterally proposed
plans for ending the conflict between Transdniestrian and Moldovan
authorities – ignoring mechanisms for consulting the EU.

While
there are no direct links between the Moldova and Kosovo disputes,
Russia’s unilateral approach could be seen as a response to what it
views as the west’s effort to impose a one-sided settlement in Kosovo.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/057975f0-f421-11db-88aa-000b5df10621,_i_rssPage=7c485a38-2f7a-11da-8b51-00000e2511c8.html

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USA: Proud Supporter of the Kosovo Piss Process (16 comments )

Julia Gorin Bio

04.20.2007

USA: Proud Supporter of the Kosovo Piss Process

(16 comments )

With
"UCK" (KLA) spray-painted on a church, an Albanian Muslim in Kosovo
snaps a photo of his fellow tribesman urinating on a burned-out remnant
of this formerly Christian land. These are our murderous "allies",
whose terrorism we will reward in the coming weeks and months with
independence -- which they will unilaterally declare in any case, along
with war against NATO, UN and the EU if necessary.

Below is an exclusive report from Tuesday's open hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs:

At the hearing, titled "The Outlook for the Independence of Kosova"
(the Islamic and dhimmi spelling of the province), Rep. Tom Lantos
(D-CA) -- Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee -- said the
following:

Just a reminder to the predominantly Muslim-led
government[s] in this world that here is yet another example that the
United States leads the way for the creation of a predominantly Muslim
country in the very heart of Europe. This should be noted by both
responsible leaders of Islamic governments, such as Indonesia, and also
for jihadists of all color and hue. The United States' principles are
universal, and in this instance, the United States stands foursquare
for the creation of an overwhelmingly Muslim country in the very heart
of Europe.

In other words, all this time, al Qaeda was just looking for us to
create an Islamic state in Europe, and so after such a gesture,
jihadists should be at peace with us.

State Dept. Under Secretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns was
the special Witness. He reiterated the U.S. position that immediate
independence without standards or compromise is the only acceptable
solution, because the growing violence is what guides our Kosovo policy:

It's our view that we have now [to] act resolutely in the
coming weeks...we looked at this very carefully with our European
friends. And we said, are we better off supporting a solution in the
spring of 2007 or delaying a year or two? We became convinced in
looking at it, all of us, that the prospects for violence would be
greater if we waited. Because 92 to 94 percent of the people who now
live in Kosovo are Albanian Muslims. They have been waiting a long,
long time...And so we the international community must act.

The State Dept. representative has just asserted that
explosive Muslims will attack if we don't give them what they want --
now. He also didn't miss the opportunity to invoke the usual Nazi
imagery in reference to the Serbs -- who have been getting hacked to
pieces over the past eight years by Albanians -- while praising the
Kosovo prime minister Agim Ceku, an indicted Serb-slaughterer, as "impressive" and "worthy".

Both Lantos' and Burns' statements were flush with references to the long disproved ethnic cleansing of Albanians in Kosovo.

Smiling and chewing gum as he spoke, Rep. Dana Rohrbacher (R-CA) was
muttering unintelligibly, his mannerisms flippant and his mood
inappropriate for the setting, a source reports, describing his
behavior as "jarring". She was able to make out that at one point he
said (with emphasis added): "The Albanians have a right to control
their destinies. We are pushing them in the right direction."

Incidentally, you will never meet a Kosovo Albanian who does not
support independence for the province. Because those have all been
killed, and the one or two remaining know to keep their mouths shut.
Such is the "democracy" that John McCain and Joe Lieberman look forward to in Kosovo.

Amid this theater of the absurd, Diane Edith Watson (D-CA) stood out
as a rare voice of dissent on Kosovo, making the following stunningly
sober statements:

I know the undersecretary will probably stress how unique
the situation regarding Serbia and Kosovo is. But I would ask my
colleagues to reflect on this for a moment and think about the reality
of this statement. There are a dozen such unique situations around the
globe, yet I do not see the United States advocating the independence
of Somaliland from Somalia, the independence of Taiwan from China, nor
the independence of Kurdistan from Iraq or Turkey.

...

There is broad international consensus that the status quo in Kosovo
will ultimately lead to upheaval if not resolved. But I do not
understand is why our State Department would seek to remedy the
situation by accelerating that upheaval... That one word [independence]
in an instant makes Kosovo's Albanian population winners and Kosovo's
Serbs losers.

If the goal of our strategy in the Balkans is to promote ethnic
cooperation and reduce conflict, this seems like a singularly misguided
strategy...

I see the United States acting ahead of the people who share the
ethnicity, share the region, et cetera. I was recently, over the last
10 days, in China, and one of the things we steered away from with
great caution was ever mentioning Taiwan...they talk about one country,
two systems. And I am trying to look at this situation and look at the
impact on Russia and the fact that we're suggesting independence, and
it just seems like we're getting into the middle of an age-old conflict.

Indeed, an Asia Times commentary
this week explained that to Russia (as to Serbia), an independent
Muslim Kosovo presents an existential threat. And it is to America's
eternal disgrace that a country like Russia is on the right side of
history on this matter while we pigheadedly pursue the path of
befriending evil. Burns' appalling response to Watson's concerns:

...Kosovo is different... and we believe that achieving the
independence of Kosovo will not lead others to justify similar
treatment from the United Nations or from the United States itself.

Because there's no such thing as setting precedents? Particularly by
rewarding violence, as the Kosovo Albanians watched the West do in the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Further, Burns believes that our actions
in Kosovo didn't embolden the Albanians to promptly move on to
terrorize neighboring Macedonia, and Montenegro and parts of Southern Serbia.

Burns then reverted to the favorite ploy of laying the blame of
"intransigence" and non-compromise on the one party that's willing to
compromise, Serbia:

If we felt that there was a real prospect of reconciliation
at the table, we would support it. There would be no reason not to. But
the Serb government has made a political decision not to participate,
and they've been very clear about that.

Rep. Dan Burton (D-IN) reminded the undersecretary that Serb
concerns, objections and amendments to the proposed plan were uniformly
dismissed. And Rep. Christopher Smith (D-NJ) reminded the room that "we
know for a fact that even with the intervention of [peacekeepers] there
has been an enormous amount of damage done to monasteries and churches
that have been targeted." To which Burns offered the following punch
line:

The majority leadership, the Albanian Moslems, are going to have to
step up and assure everyone and the United Nations that they will
commit themselves to minority rights.

When I met with them, when President Clinton did the other day in
New York, they signed a statement saying all -- the entire leadership
team -- saying that they would do so. And we all told them that we
would hold them to that standard. And I think that's fair, for members
of Congress to suggest the same thing to them. It would be very helpful
if you would remind them of those responsibilities.

They signed a piece of paper! That means once they get what they want, they'll do a one-eighty, and actually start prosecuting Albanians who kill the Serbs and Roma of Kosovo. (Notice that even Burns notes that they'll need "reminding.")

The piece de resistance came from Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY):

And I want to in a bipartisan fashion commend President
Bush and the administration, President Clinton as well. Both presidents
understand that this issue needed and needs to be resolved. And the
president, President Bush, has been steadfast in saying that this
really needs to be done now.

...And I couldn't agree with you more, Mr. Burns, that the
possibility of violence if we delay is something that increases as we
delay. People there have been waiting for years, and now really is the
time.

At the height of the March, 2004 Kosovo pogrom against Serbs, in
which another 4,000 Serbs fled the province and scores of homes,
churches and monasteries were set ablaze, Engel -- who has said he
wants to be the first U.S. lawmaker to stand on independent Kosovo soil
-- addressed the House of Representatives:

When there is no resolution of the final status, the people
in a country become restless because they see no future... Right now
there is rampant unemployment. Right now there is very little hope for
a future...Self-determination and, ultimately, independence for the
people of Kosovo is the only solution. When people do not see a chance
for self-determination, tensions fester beneath the surface when you do
not move to resolution... What we have seen...is this ridiculous plan
called standards before status.

These are the same words used to excuse or justify terrorism against
Israelis. For a Jewish congressman to be advocating statehood before
standards is interesting indeed. Let the record show that Engel is for
rewarding terror with independence. Palestine, take note.

More from Engel at Tuesday's hearing: "[T]he Kosovars are
pro-American, so pro-American it isn't funny, and they will be a strong
ally of the United States and of NATO and of the European Union."

But an officially sanctioned narco-terrorist gangster state that was
won with material help from al Qaeda will hurt us as much as it will
pretend to help. But we're supposed to operate under the "illusion that
concessions to violence and the threat of violence can promote the
creation of a moderate Muslim democracy," as James Jatras has put it.

Burns joined in this charade:

...There's a street named after President Clinton; there's a street
named after Congressman Engel, and I hope there'll be a street... named
after President Bush because this has been a bipartisan effort,
Democrats and Republicans.

There are also avenues named for Bob Dole and Wesley Clark, two
highly prized Albanian purchases. But when good will is acquired by
doing someone's bidding, pro-Americanism is won for the wrong reasons,
and the gratitude will turn on a dime the moment we stop furthering
that party's agenda. In Kosovo, it began happening as early as 2000,
when the Kosovars started calling for the UN and NATO "occupiers" to
get out. Nor do the American and British flags hanging upside-down from Pristina's Victory Hotel bode well for the future of pro-Americanism in "Kosova". And the Wahhabi Muslims who started flooding Kosovo upon our intervention have been making sure that young Albanians sour on us anyway.

Finally, toward the end, came an impressive, unexpected, long overdue smackdown, from Rep. Melissa Bean (D-IL):

You're saying it's taken a long time, but it does seem to
be a rush towards a so-called solution, independence. I don't
understand what independence solves. You talked about abandoning the
premise of standards before status. And if a provisional government has
been unable or unwilling to move forward on achieving those standards
that would protect ethnic Serbs in their own country, I don't know why
they would feel safer in an independent Kosovo.

...You talked about compromise, in that the Serbs were unwilling to
compromise. And I guess I'd ask what compromise[UN envoy Martti]
Ahtisaari was even willing to consider, given that there's pretty much
been an attitude of a foregone conclusion that independence is what
it's about, and if the Serbs want to talk about that then they can talk
about that. But what other options [were] even raised or considered
...How are you not concerned about the precedent of severing a
historically significant portion of a sovereign nation because of an
ethnic majority -- (audio break) -- majorities that exist in other
countries?

And how are we, as an international community and as a country,
going to respond to when other communities choose to sever themselves
from their countries towards independence?...how does this move us
forward? We talk about -- I think our nation has been a beacon of hope
for democracies around the world, where diversity works. And instead of
making diversity work in this country or helping and assisting as an
international community, we're saying it can't work, so let's just
separate. And I'm also concerned about that precedent...

But without the provisional government demonstrating an ability to
meet the standards that you're now hopeful that they're going to
achieve independently, what gives you any confidence that that's going
to change? Two hundred thousand Serbs have been driven out of their
homes, while returning ethnic Albanians were brought back safely under
the eye of the U.N. troops. But those Serbs have not been given the
right to return. They have not been made to feel safe...

Fourteenth, 15th century cathedrals and monasteries were destroyed
while our troops were there, and they said, "Well, we're here to
protect people, not property." And how -- help me understand how the
Serbian people are going to feel [safe with this] sort of solution,
given this recent history.

To which Burns replied, "The Serbs are welcome to return. Most of
the Serbs who left after June of 1999 left it of their own accord."
(Former KLA commander Hashim Thaci last month told a Vienna paper: "We expelled Serbs at that time together with NATO.")

Burns also pointed to "the great job that our troops have done with
very little loss of life. It's been a peaceful environment, relatively
speaking, over the last eight years."

Un. be. lie. va. ble.

Then again, for Kosovo killing a Serb a week is a relatively peaceful environment.

"The United States Should Welcome a New Era for Kosovo",
reads a Heritage Foundation headline by Sally McNamara -- a testament
to the cluelessness that has guided the Right's default to the deadly
and disastrous Clintonian-jihadist policies in the Balkans.

Toward the end, Burns said that "we'll celebrate the 60th
anniversary [of NATO] two years from now -- our finest moment was
stopping two wars, bringing about two peace agreements and freeing the
Muslim populations of Southeast Europe from potential annihilation in
two wars. It's a very proud accomplishment of NATO."

There was never
any intended annihilation of Muslims in the Balkans. There was a
crackdown on terrorism, something that we didn't understand yet and
therefore precluded, so that the accomplishment was actually this:

In the eyes of the radical Islamic circles, the
establishment of an independent Islamic territory including Bosnia,
Kosovo and Albania along the Adriatic Coast, is one of the most
prominent achievements of Islam since the siege of Vienna in 1683.
Islamic penetration into Europe through the Balkans is one of the main
achievements of Islam in the twentieth century. (Israeli Colonel Dr.
Shaul Shay, author of Islamic Terror and the Balkans)

Some people from the European parliament popped in and took a bow.

In closing, Lantos said, "And let me just add, as one who still
passionately believes in bipartisan -- in the bipartisan foreign
policy, this is an outstanding example of bipartisan U.S. foreign
policy succeeding. I want to salute you and the secretary, and we are
assured of our full cooperation in bringing about this result."

When there is this kind of bipartisan consensus and bipartisan
back-patting on an issue as terrifying as Kosovo -- the origin of the
explosives used in Madrid and the February attack on the U.S. embassy in Greece -- something is rotten in Denmark indeed.

Believe me, Mr. Lantos, jihadists have taken note.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julia-gorin/usa-proud-supporter-of-t_b_46424.html

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Unilateral decision on Kosovo status unacceptable - FM Lavrov

Unilateral decision on Kosovo status unacceptable - FM Lavrov

RIA Novosti

19/04/2007 13:29 BELGRADE, April 19 (RIA
Novosti) - Imposing a unilateral decision on the status of Serbia's
breakaway province of Kosovo is unacceptable and talks on the issue
should be continued, the Russian foreign minister said Thursday.

Sergei Lavrov is currently on an April 18-19 visit to Serbia,
Russia's traditional ally, to discuss a plan proposed by Martti
Ahtisaari, the UN envoy for Kosovo who is advocating internationally
supervised sovereignty for the province.

"We speak for the continuation of the negotiating process to find a
mutually acceptable decision," Sergei Lavrov said following his meeting
with Serbian President Boris Tadic.

Lavrov said Moscow completely backs Belgrade's position on the need to observe UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

"Any decision on the Kosovo issue should be acceptable for both Belgrade and Pristina," the minister said.

Adopted in 1999, the resolution determined to resolve the grave
humanitarian situation in Kosovo and to provide for the safe and free
return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes.

The Serbian president said in turn that, "Any form of independence
for Kosovo is unacceptable for Serbia, and in this regard Serbia
opposes Ahtisaari's plan, which stipulates gradual independence for
Kosovo."

Ahtisaari proposed that the province be granted internationally
supervised sovereignty, but Serbian authorities have strongly opposed
the plan as threatening Serbia's national sovereignty and territorial
integrity.

Serbia is strongly opposed to independence for the province, which
is dominated by ethnic Albanians, but the United States and the
European Union have expressed support for its sovereignty. However,
only four out of 15 member-states at the UN Security Council voted for
Ahtisaari's plan during the first round of consultations April 3.

Veto-wielding Russia has opposed the internationally backed plan,
insisting that a decision on Kosovo should satisfy both Kosovar and
Serbian authorities and that it must be reached through negotiations.

Tadic also said that "Serbia believes granting independence to
Kosovo will set a most dangerous precedent and will have serious
consequences for the Balkans region and other conflict zones."

Moscow repeatedly expressed its concern that Kosovo's independence
could set a precedent for other breakaway republics, including in the
former Soviet republics of Georgia and Moldova.

Kosovo, which has a population of two million, has been a UN
protectorate since NATO's 78-day bombing campaign against the former
Yugoslavia ended a war between Serb forces and Albanian separatists in
1999.

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Serbia after Kosovo

Serbia after Kosovo Vicken Cheterian 18 - 4 - 2007 Serbian views about the prospect of independence for the territory it lost in 1999 are more complex than they often appear, finds Vicken Cheterian in Belgrade.

A joke circulating in Belgrade says: "Serbia until Tokyo, Kosovo until April". But after brisk smiles, the tone gets more serious. In April 2007 the United Nations Security Council has been discussing the United Nations special envoy Martti Ahtisaari's plan, announced on 2 February 2007, for the future status of the territory - which proposes effective independence for Kosovo under international supervision. A fact-finding mission from a still-divided Security Council is preparing to visit Kosovo as the delicate end-game reaches a vital stage. The public feelings in Belgrade about the outcome in Kosovo are more mixed than might be expected. On the one hand, many would like to turn the page and start a new life for Serbia within well-defined borders, resolutely looking towards a European future. On the other, there is anguish about the fate of Kosovo Serbs and their security, and a fear that the definitive loss of the territory will follow with the deportation of the remaining ethnic Serbs from Kosovo. Between these positions - and within the hearts of people who espouse them - there is a combination of confusion, powerlessness and uncertainty. Srdja Popovic cannot be labelled a "Serbian nationalist". He was one of the founders of Otpor, the youth movement that led the struggle to bring down Slobodan Milosevic. After the 2000 "October revolution" in Serbia, he was elected a member of parliament, and appointed advisor to prime minister Zoran Djindjic. After the assassination of Djindjic, he co-founded the Centre for Applied Non Violent Action and Strategies (Canvas) which is engaged in spreading the experience of "colour revolutions" abroad. Yet, Popovic is revolted by the stand of the international community over Kosovo. What is happening in Kosovo now is a "reverse ethnic cleansing", he told me, for which "the United States should bomb Kosovo, but instead they are giving it independence." This malaise is very much shared by many pro-democratic political activists in Belgrade, where frustration towards the loss of Kosovo is mixed with disillusionment with political change after the fall of Milosevic, and with the unfulfilled promises of the west. Vicken Cheterian is a journalist and political analyst who works for the non-profit governance organisation CIMERA, based in Geneva Also by Vicken Cheterian in openDemocracy: "The pigeon sacrificed: Hrant Dink, and a broken dialogue" (23 January 2007) The international community would like to place "the last piece of the Balkans jigsaw" on the map, the notion being that independence of Kosovo will end the epic hurricane of violence that started with the disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991-92, and the internecine wars that followed. UN officials fear that in case the current situation is frozen further, the growing frustrations among Kosovo Albanians will lead to violent explosions. There were demonstrations by some Kosovo Albanians on 10 February after the Ahtisaari plan failed to endorse full independence, and amid violent clashes, UN police in Pristina shot dead two protestors and wounded seventy others. The incident was a disturbing echo of the far more widespread clashes in March 2004 that led to twenty-two deaths among both main populations and scores wounded in orchestrated attacks on Serbian targets. The latest revisionism The UN officially wishes to see Kosovo's future in a "multi-ethnic" society that "(governs) itself democratically". Yet there is little sign that Kosovo Albanians, Serbs, Roma, and other minorities will live side-by-side the day after Kosovo becomes independent. The ethnic Serb enclaves in the north and west of Kosovo, around the town of Mitrovica, live cut off from their Albanian neighbours; new roads have been built to allow them to avoid passing through Albanian-held territories; and even the source of their water and electricity is different. When Serbs travel, their convoys that pass through Albanian land is protected by United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (Unmik) troops. The Serbian authorities - who are relying on Russian and Chinese support for their stance in the UN Security Council - have rejected Ahtisaari's plan. On 15 February, the Serbian parliament overwhelmingly rejected it. The statements of prime minister Vojislav Kostunica were particularly harsh: "Serbia warns that, no matter what, it will not be an accomplice to such violence," and added, "if anyone dares seize Serbia's territory, it must take into account that it takes full responsibility for such violence." Kostunica also dismissed the fact that 90% of Kosovo's inhabitants are ethnic Albanians, saying: "we don't need the talk about a sense for reality. The reality is that Kosovo is part of our territory". The head of the Serbian Radical Party, Tomislav Nikolic, went further, threatening an uprising in Serbia if the United Nations Security Council accepts the Ahtisaari plan. Dubravka Stojanovic is a historian at University of Belgrade. She is a specialist of contemporary Serb historiography, and studies the manner in which Serbian history schoolbooks have been revised in the last two decades (see Dubravka Stojanovic, "Serbia: History to Order", Transitions Online, 20 March 2007). She concludes the current revision of the past is not on the right track, and that there is a revival of nationalism in Serbian political as well as academic circles today: "the new wave in current history is anti-communism... we are not only facing [revision of] interpretations of the wars in the 1990s but also the second world war"... this revision is important because the new historical line is that "the wars of the 1990s were led by the communist Milosevic, and they keep saying that communism was defeated on 5 October (2000) - which is not true. Communism was defeated when Milosevic came to power and he went to war for nationalist ideas (...) he never said he's going to fight Croatia for the interests of the working class, he was fighting for Serbia's interests." The political consequences of this historic revision are important: Milosevic "did not lead these wars in a proper way because a communist cannot lead a proper Serbian war. He by definition does not understand Serbian position and Serbian interests" and in consequence he could not lead the war of the Serbian nation "until the end". The implied conclusion is that the new leadership is capable of better defending Serbian national interests, and if they had been in power in the 1990s Serbia would have scored victories and not a series of defeats. Also in openDemocracy on Serbian politics and Kosovo in the early 2000s: Dejan Djokic, "Serbia: one year after the October revolution" (18 October 2001) Dejan Djokic, "Serbian presidential elections" (18 September 2002) Katerina Bezgachina, "Serbia: the election that wasn't" (23 October 2002) Dejan Djokic, "The assassination of Zoran Djindjic" (13 March 2003) Dusan Velickovic, "Belgrade: war crimes in daily life" (28 June 2005) Julie A Mertus, "Slobodan Milosevic: myth and responsibility" (16 March 2006) Eric Gordy, "The Milosevic account" (17 March 2006) Vesna Goldsworthy, "Au revoir, Montenegro?" (23 May 2006) Eric Gordy, "Serbia's elections: less of the same" (23 January 2007) TK Vogel, "Kosovo: a break in the ice" (2 February 2007) Marko Attila Hoare, "Kosovo: the Balkans' last independent state" (12 February 2007) After the declaration What will happen the day after Kosovo is declared independent? "The Albanians will make a big party", said Dejan Anastasijevic, a reporter from Belgrade weekly Vreme and an expert on Kosovo. "But the Serb National Council [which represents Kosovo Serbs] will declare its own independence" from Kosovo, and try to keep the links between the region of Mitrovica and Belgrade. "There will not be violence, not immediately. But after few months it is a possibility", according to Anastasijevic. A few days after our discussion, Dejan Anastasijevic himself was a victim of violent attack: on 14 April his house was targeted by two grenades, though luckily no one at home was hurt (see Dejan Anastasijevic, "The Price of Speaking Out in Serbia", Time, 17 April 2007). "Part of the reason why changes are so slow in Serbia is that we are intentionally humiliated by the international community", said Srdja Popovic. This feeling of humiliation is the result of Serbia's inability to move neither forwards, nor make a definite retreat. Kosovo was lost by Belgrade following the 1999 war between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (yes, it was Yugoslavia at the time) and Nato, when after eleven weeks of aerial bombing, Milosevic gave in to the demands and withdrew his forces from Kosovo. Yet, in the current political atmosphere in Serbia, the fact that Kosovo was lost back in 1999 is hardly mentioned by the political elite, and the most vestigial consent to Kosovo's independence is seen as "betrayal". Since the 5 October 2000 revolution, Serbia continues to be haunted by the national question. The international community continues its pressure to hand suspected war criminals to the international court at The Hague; the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro, after long discussions and a referendum, was decided in May 2006 by Montenegro declaring its independence; and the status of Kosovo continues to sap energy much needed elsewhere. On all those matters, Serbian society remains polarised between conservative nationalist positions, pro-western democrats, and an intermediate group reflected by Kostunica's attempt to articulate a desire for "national unity". Today, the fact is that most of Kosovo is outside the rule of the Serbian state. The return of this territory to Serbian rule could only be made possible by the use of massive violence. Many people in Belgrade think that most Serbian leaders - despite their bellicose positions - are conscious that Kosovo is "lost". Yet in the current political atmosphere, no political party - with the notable exception of the marginal Liberal Democratic Party of Cedomir Jovanovic (which fused with the Civil Alliance of Serbia [GSS] on 7 April 2007) - is capable of publicly supporting the Kosovo's self-determination. Belgrade must decide what is most important in the Kosovo issue: the land or the people? If it is the land, the problem is one of symbolism, identity politics, and myth-making - which cannot be addressed by pragmatic political steps. If it is the people - the security and well-being of Kosovo people, minority as well as majority - then a totally new approach is needed. For the moment, Belgrade is a city in suspension, not knowing in which direction it should take its next step.

http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-yugoslavia/serbia_after_kosovo_4539.jsp

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Kosovo Partition: A Deadly Trap for Serbia

 

  http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/cgi-bin/chronicles.cgi/Foreign%20Policy/The%20Balkans/James_George_Jatras.Kosovo_Partition_A_.html?seemore=y

  

  Kosovo Partition:
A Deadly Trap for Serbia by James_George_Jatras

  

    Tuesday, April
17, 2007 -- Only a few months ago, the relatively advantageous position in
which Serbia today finds herself with respect to the future status of her
southern province of Kosovo and Metohija would have been unimaginable.

   

---------------------------------

 

  The Ahtisaari
plan is foundering at the UN Security Council. Even UNMIK and KFOR personnel
are being told the plan will not get through the UNSC and they should prepare
for the worst from the Albanian side, according to information from
confidential sources inside the international administration. Europe is more
divided than ever, and recognition of any unilateral declaration of
independence would falter without European support.

  

 

  Perhaps most
importantly, even without an agreement on forming a new government, Serbia’s
leadership has spoken with a remarkably unified voice—a key prerequisite for
Russia’s support, which has been growing steadily more solid. Before month’s
end, Pristina faces at Moscow’s initiative a UNSC fact-finding mission whose
examination it can hardly welcome.

  

  Under such
circumstances, it is unfortunate that suggestions are heard from various
quarters that the best outcome for Serbia would be a partition of Kosovo.
Indeed, as claimed by James Lyon in the Sorors-financed Belgrade media
conglomerate B92, partition is the secret goal of Serbia’s leadership,
which—according to Lyon—is rubbing its hands in anticipation of the majority of
Serbs’ eradication from Kosovo, so as to have a pretext to keep the area north
of the Ibar. All Belgrade’s brave defense of principle, suggests Lyon, is just
maneuvering toward that end.

  

  For whatever it
is worth, I do not for a minute believe any such nonsense, which smells of a
deliberate effort to sow discord and confusion. To start with, even if any such
pro-partition intention existed with anyone in the Serbian government, it is
hard to credit the secret collusion necessary to achieve such an outcome amid
the obvious political rivalries. Thankfully, the current political dynamic is
such that each party vying for power must tout its principled stand on Kosovo
while ready to pounce on any opponents foolish enough to weaken their
commitment to Serbia’s constitutional and territorial integrity. Oddly enough,
the current disunity has redounded to Serbia’s advantage. Even those who might
wish to sell out have no chance to do so. 

  

  Still, the
question of partition now has been raised. I can confirm that there are some in
the United States who are not at all hostile to Serbia and have suggested to me
that maybe it’s “better to keep something than lose all.” And even some Serbs,
perhaps conditioned by years of mind-numbing propaganda that “Kosovo already is
lost,” may be tempted to think the same way. So, as we face the last gasp of
the West’s failing policy, the disastrous consequences for Serbia of even
considering the possibility of partition must be addressed. Both partition and,
should it ever be toyed with, a policy of secretly aiming at partition fail as
a matter of practicality, of principle, and of political advantage.

  

  As a practical
matter, Serbia’s aiming for partition just as the Ahtisaari plan stands on the
brink of collapse would be snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. If those
“friendly” western governments that wish to detach all of Kosovo from Serbia
could do so, they would. If they cannot—and it is increasingly clear they
cannot—why should Serbia compliment their failure by conceding the majority of
what they have failed to seize?

  

  Moreover, if a
pro-partition scheme were hatched by Belgrade (per Lyon’s scenario, following
an outbreak of Albanian violence and the clearing out of the smaller enclaves),
Serbia in all likelihood would end up with nothing at all. The resulting rump
“KosovA,” controlling all south of the Ibar and having won internationally
recognized statehood, would press its “legitimate claim” to the rest of its
“sovereign” territory with NATO, EU, and UN backing.

  

  Agim Ceku has
already hinted at an “Operation Storm”-type solution to any Serbian
“occupation” of Northern Mitrovica. Or more likely, the resulting pressure on
Belgrade would be such that the northern holdout would eventually suffer the
fate of Vukovar and the rest of UN Zone East in Slavonija, dying not with a
bang but a whimper.

  Especially
dangerous would be any behind-the-scene feelers that might be put out by the
west to suggest to Belgrade that Washington and Brussels might now consider
partition an acceptable option. If any such feelers are received, Belgrade
should be sure of two things: first, that those governments wishing to detach
Kosovo know they have lost, and are trying a new ploy; and second, if Belgrade
were to fall for it, and to try to cut a deal based on partition, the west
would not live up to any assurances given.

  As for the
question of principle, if a thief claims my car as his own, what kind of
victory is it if through a clever ruse I manage to hold on to one of the tires?
By contemplating partition, Belgrade would already have fatally conceded the
point that Serbia’s “inviolable” territory was not so inviolable after all.
Such a surrender would make it impossible for Serbia to press the case that any
part of Kosovo should be retained. It also would place in an untenable position
those countries, notably China as well as Russia, that have extended their
support not so much for Serbia but for Serbia’s position on the inviolability
of state borders. Partition of Kosovo would mean Serbia had put her arm on the
chopping block, and the argument is only about where to make the cut: at the
wrist, the elbow, or right up to the shoulder. Territorial sovereignty is
seamless and indivisible; to concede part is to concede all. In terms of the
negative precedent Kosovo’s detachment would set,  despite western assurances to the contrary,
the destabilizing impact across the globe, especially in Africa, would hardly
be less devastating.

  As to the
political consequences, partition, or trying to achieve partition, it would
result in Belgrade’s loss of lands it would otherwise have been able to keep
and the unnecessary expulsion and deaths of yet more Serbs. It would mean
devastation of Serbia’s spiritual and national patrimony in the province,
almost all of which concerns sites south of the Ibar. It would soon be seen for
what it is: the catastrophe for which every politician in Serbia had tried
mightily to avoid blame.

  The ugly fact is,
we are in for a hot summer. When it becomes clear the Ahtisaari plan is dead,
the Albanians will resort to violence. (Or more correct to say, stepped-up
violence, since the violence from their side never has been absent.) The
targets will be not Serbs only but the international presence. But it should
not be imagined that even if Kosovo were separated from Serbia (and I
emphasize, I don’t think this will happen if Belgrade remains firm), the
violence would begin with wiping out the smaller enclaves; cracking the tougher
nut of Northern Mitrovica would become a more protracted affair but with the
same eventual result.  Further violence
could then be expected in Bujanovac-Medvedja-Presevo, Tetovo, Sanjak and
so-called “Malesia” in Montenegro. (This is not even to address the political
violence to the rest of the Serbian state, and consequences for Vojvodina as
well, as per German Ambassador Zobel’s timely candor.)

  Accordingly, in
addition to holding a firm line on the detachment of any part of Serbian
territory—which also means no partition—Belgrade must now focus on convincing
the west that violence in the first instance is more containable and less
destabilizing to the region than the second scenario. The real question is not
how much land Serbia is willing to see amputated but under whose authority the
Albanian community in Kosovo will be governed, and under what circumstances.
Washington, alas, can be reasoned with only after the definitive collapse of
the Ahtisaari plan, but there is reason to believe that Brussels—which must see
both Serbs and Kosovo’s Albanians as future EU citizens—may be willing to
listen to reason.  Whatever the
continuing threat of organized crime, jihad, intolerance, and instability, it
will be laid mainly on Europe’s doorstep, not America’s.

  It is time for
Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica to issue a formal and public invitation for
the EU to take over the mission in Kosovo in which the UN has so abjectly
failed, and to do so without a change in Serbia’s borders.

  Belgrade
repeatedly has said it does not intend to exercise supervision of Kosovo’s
Albanians, but it is clear to everyone that given the terrorist and criminal
quality of administration by the likes of Ceku, Haradinaj, and Thaci, someone
else must do so. Of the concerned outside powers Europe has the most direct
interest in providing reasonable people among the Kosovo Albanians—and there
are some, who cannot today come forward without hazarding their lives—a
civilized future in Europe with Serbia.

  Such an
arrangement, involving shared administration between Belgrade and Brussels,
with a degree of decentralization and community separation needed to ensure
human security at the local level, would have the best chance of splitting some
portion of the Albanian population from their corrupt and terroristic present
leadership. Serbia’s public proposal to this effect would also exacerbate the
current divide among the European countries, where efforts are already underway
to whip the dissenters into support for a “common” policy. 

  In any case,
Serbia must press its advantage over the next few weeks and months with all its
strength and imagination. While it is possible to consider a division of
administrative powers in Kosovo within Serbia’s borders, detachment of even one
hectare of territory from sovereign Serbia is out of the question. The siren song
of partition resonates only with unwarranted perceptions of Serbia’s weakness
and reliance on timeworn assumptions about Serbia’s options. It must be
rejected as categorically as any surrender of Kosovo as a whole.

  

  

  James George
Jatras is director of the American Council for Kosovo in Washington, D.C.

 

  /Foreign
Policy/The Balkans | print | permanent link | writebacks (0)

 

 

 

Boba Borojevic

  ckcuboba@yahoo.ca

  http://serbianna.com/columns/borojevic/

  http://f2.pg.briefcase.yahoo.com/pertep

    (613) 852-1971

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Czech expert: Consider Kosovo’s partition

Czech expert: Consider Kosovo’s partition

13 April 2007 | 14:37 | Source: B92, Beta, Reuters

PRAGUE, WASHINGTON, BELGRADE, PRIŠTINA -- Jan Pelikan believes the idea of Kosovo’s partition should not be rejected offhand. In an op-ed published in Prague daily Pravo, the Czech historian and Balkans expert argues that incorporation of Kosovo’s northern, Serb-inhabited municipalities into Serbia proper should not be ruled out as an alternative solution to Kosovo’s status problem. “The time has obviously come to consider Kosovo’s partition,” Pelikan wrote. “Realistically, it [supervised independence] was decided on eight years ago. Back then it was clear the international protectorate was only a transitional step toward the province’s separation from Serbia,” he said. “A force that will prevent the long-term unification of Kosovo, Albania and a part of Macedonia does not exist,” Pelikan warned. Pelikan criticized the Serbian side for its “sentimental, instead of realistic” approach to Kosovo, while much of the Serbian political elite, in his opinion, deliberately refrains from wondering what the return of Kosovo might entail. In Pelikan’s opinion, it would bring with it huge economic losses, new conflict with Kosovo’s Albanians, and halted modernization processes.   “The current phase in the process of solving Kosovo’s future status once again brings forward the principle of maintaining existing borders while creating new states in the territories of former federations,” Pelikan said. In his opinion, it was precisely this “strict insistence” on the principle that prolonged and complicated the breakup of former Yugoslavia and created “an unviable Bosnian state.” “Granting Kosovo independence will do away with this principle, since that territory never enjoyed statehood, but was an autonomous area instead. Annexing the northern municipalities, with a Kosovo Serb majority, should not be ruled out as an alternative,” Pelikan suggests. “Real goal” In a report from Belgrade, Reuters quotes analysts and suggests  “Serbia plans to defy the West and partition its province of Kosovo if it wins independence this year”. “And in the opinion of some Western experts, partition, a land swap or a population transfer might better reflect the realities and wishes of the ethnic groups involved than the multi-ethnic blueprint the West is so dogmatic about,” the agency says. "The elephant in the room that no one wants to acknowledge is that Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo don't really want to live together in the same state," professor Steven Meyer of the National Defense University in Washington said. "Whether we like it or not, that should be respected." If Kosovo were allowed "a vote on what people want and who they want to live with, one would get a very different picture to what is now pushed" by the United States, the European Union and special UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari, he told Reuters. The northern slice of Kosovo above the River Ibar is home to some 40,000 Serbs. About 60,000 more live in isolated enclaves to the south, surrounded by two million Albanians. NATO allies and the European Union reject partition, but on the ground, “Kosovo is already partitioned.” In terms of administration, telephone links, water and electricity, the north has no ties to the Kosovo capital, Priština. Kosovo laws and UN decrees go unheeded, and Serbs continue to use Serbian number plates and the dinar rather than the UN-imposed “KS” plates and euro, the agency says. Meyer said Ahtisaari's plan "will institutionalize ethnically based municipalities on both sides", creating the base "for the Serb areas ... to declare their own independence". Kosovo's northern triangle has been a no-go zone for Albanian leaders since the war. Plain-clothes police from Serbia patrol the divided city of Mitrovica at its gate. Amitai Etzioni, professor at George Washington University, says UN efforts to create a multi-ethnic state have been "a complete failure, unwise and authoritarian". "The ethnic groups are as far apart as before the war," he told Reuters. "We need separation." "If Kosovo becomes independent, Serbs in the north will declare their own separation from Kosovo," said Oliver Ivanović, a Kosovo Serb politician. International Crisis Group’s special Balkans advisor James Lyon believes Serbia has already made plans, Reuters reports, quoting his recent blog entry at B92. “For now Serbia is trying to delay a UN decision on Ahtisaari's recommendation that Kosovo be granted independence, under EU supervision.” “Serbia wants its ally Russia, which has veto power on the UN Security Council, to stall the process so the Albanians lose patience and declare independence unilaterally, triggering a Serb exodus from the southern enclaves to the northern haven,” Reuters repots. Officially, Serbia is not interested in partitioning Kosovo, provided it is not forced to give up 15 percent of its territory, and lose land steeped in Serb history and myth. But Belgrade, privately, knows it cannot recover Kosovo and its "real goal" is partition, Lyon said.

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