Losing Serbia

Losing Serbia

By Nikos Konstandaras

The ethnic Albanians of Kosovo are expected to make a unilateral
declaration of independence within days. Kosovar Prime Minister Hashim
Thaci claimed on Friday that about 100 countries were ready to
recognize Kosovo when it breaks away from Serbia. Every nation seeks
its independence and no one can blame the Kosovo Albanians for the
persistence with which they have pursued theirs. Through the mistakes
and brutality of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic and by very cleverly
playing on the West’s guilt over its negligent handling of the war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Kosovar Albanians have managed to draw Western
public opinion in the direction that benefited them.

What is less
understandable is how Europe has acted in such a frivolous and
thoughtless way as to stoke division in Serbia and send this important
country into isolation. For the sake of Kosovo, Europe is in danger of
losing Serbia.

We may blame the Serbs for many things – among
them an inability to come to grips with the past and to send to the
international tribunal in The Hague those among them who are accused of
war crimes. But that is no reason to push them into desperation. The
reaction of many Serbs to the threats and deadlines they have faced is
what we would expect of a proud and talented people (who were among the
first to fight for and gain their liberation from the Ottoman yoke,
starting their revolt in 1804). Over the past few years, the Serbs have
suffered a series of humiliations in the breakup of Yugoslavia (a
disintegration in which they were instrumental). In 1999, there was the
secret annex to the Rambouillet talks aimed at averting war over
Kosovo, in which Serbia was ordered to accept the presence of NATO
forces on its territory. In 2001, after the war, the Serb authorities
arrested Milosevic on the day that a US ultimatum to do so expired.

Naturally,
the government of Prime Minister Zoran Djindic was criticized for
bowing to the Americans. Two years later, the man who assassinated
Djindjic claimed that the prime minister was a “traitor.”

No Serb
politician can acquiesce to the loss of Kosovo, the traditional
heartland of the Serb nation – neither pro-Western President Boris
Tadic nor nationalist Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica. In last
Sunday’s runoff presidential elections, Tadic won 50.5 percent of the
vote to 47.9 percent for Tomislav Nikolic, who ran on a strongly
nationalist platform. The nation is divided equally and no one has the
luxury of being able to provoke public anger by signing on to the
further loss of Serb territory. Policymakers in Washington, Brussels
and all other European capitals ought to be weighing the dynamics that
will arise with Kosovo’s independence. Among the many ills is the fact
that the progressive Serb president and his political friends will be
seen to have sat by quietly, betraying their national cause, while at
the same time being the victims of betrayal by their Western allies
abroad.

Unfortunately, in their demand that the Serbs accept the
loss of Kosovo, with the promise of EU accession sometime in the
distant future, European leaders do not appear to care much about what
will happen if the Serbs, out of national pride and their leaders’
political survival, turn their backs on Europe. The damage will not be
to Serbia alone. For example, what kind of independence can Kosovo
enjoy when it will forever face the enmity of a far more powerful
neighbor? What economic and social development will Kosovo achieve if
it must forever rely on foreign powers for its existence, and when
organized crime is rife? Where will the political scene in Serbia – and
Belgrade’s increasing dependence on Russia – lead? How long will Europe
be able to provide Kosovo with police officers and judges, in
accordance with a recent EU decision? It was this last decision that
raised the anger of Prime Minister Kostunica, who saw it as an active
move toward tearing Kosovo away from Serb sovereignty and therefore
refused to agree to the last-minute carrot the EU threw to Serbia a few
days ago: In the wake of the presidential elections, Brussels offered
Belgrade an agreement on trade, and easier visa requirements and
student exchanges.

If the Europeans truly wanted to solve the
Balkans’ most complicated problem (and win the steadfast cooperation of
Serbia) they would put Serbia on a fast track to EU accession and make
it crystal clear to the Albanians of Kosovo that they would get their
independence on the day that they and the Serbs both become members of
the European Union. The EU has not made that offer. Now we will all
have to live with the result, and watch as one problem succeeds another.

http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_columns_100024_11/02/2008_93222

Powered by ScribeFire.

Warning light on Kosovo by John Bolton - Washington Times

John Bolton is former permanent U.S. representative to the United
Nations. [Contributors] Lawrence Eagleburger is former U.S. secretary of state.
Peter Rodman is former assistant secretary of defense for international
security affairs.

letters@washingtontimes.com

http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080131/COMMENTARY/288472699/home.html&template=nextpage

The Washington Times

COMMENTARY

Warning light on
Kosovo

By John Bolton

January 31, 2008

The Bush administration has indicated its readiness to recognize a
unilateral declaration of independence by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, a
province of the Republic of Serbia that since 1999 has been under United
Nations administration and NATO military control.

Such a declaration may take place as early as February. American recognition
would be over Serbia's objections, without a negotiated solution between Serbia
and Kosovo's Albanians, and without modification by the United Nations Security
Council of Resolution 1244, which reaffirms Serbian sovereignty in Kosovo while
providing for the province's "substantial autonomy." U.S. recognition
may be joined by that of some members of the European Union, which has been
under heavy diplomatic pressure from Washington, though several EU states and a
number of countries outside Europe have said they would reject such action.

Attempting to impose a settlement on Serbia would be a direct challenge to
the Russian Federation, which opposes any Kosovo settlement not accepted by
Belgrade.

We believe an imposed settlement of the Kosovo question and seeking to
partition Serbia's sovereign territory without its consent is not in the
interest of the United States. The blithe assumption of American policy — that
the mere passage of nine years of relative quiet would be enough to lull Serbia
and Russia into reversing their positions on a conflict that goes back
centuries — has proven to be naive in the extreme.

We believe U.S. policy on Kosovo must be re-examined without delay, and we
urge the Bush administration to make it clear that pending the results of such
re-examination it would withhold recognition of a Kosovo independence
declaration and discourage Kosovo's Albanians from taking that step.

Current U.S. policy relies on the unconvincing claim that Kosovo is
"unique" and would set no precedent for other troublespots. Of course
every conflict has unique characteristics. However, ethnic and religious
minorities in other countries already are signaling their intention to follow a
Kosovo example. This includes sizeable Albanian communities in adjoining areas
of southern Serbia, Montenegro, and especially the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, as well as the Serbian portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Recognition of Kosovo's independence without Serbia's consent would set a
precedent with far-reaching and unpredictable consequences for many other
regions of the world. The Kosovo model already has been cited by supporters of
the Basque separatist movement in Spain and the Turkish-controlled area of
northern Cyprus. Neither the Security Council nor any other international body has
the power or authority to impose a change of any country's borders.

Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the current policy is the dismissive
attitude displayed toward Russia's objections. Whatever disagreements the
United States may have with Moscow on other issues, and there are many, the
United States should not prompt an unnecessary crisis in U.S.-Russia relations.
There are urgent matters regarding which the United States must work with
Russia, including Iran's nuclear intentions and North Korea's nuclear
capability. Such cooperation would be undercut by American action to neutralize
Moscow's legitimate concerns regarding Kosovo.

If the U.S. moves forward with recognizing Kosovo,
Moscow's passivity cannot be taken for granted. It may have been one thing in
1999 for the United States and NATO to take action against Yugoslavia over the
objections of a weak Russia.

Today, it would be unwise to dismiss Russia's willingness and ability to
assist Serbia. On an issue of minor importance to the United States, is this a
useful expenditure of significant political capital with Russia?

Our Kosovo policy is hardly less problematic for our friends and allies in
Europe. While some European countries, notably members of the EU, may feel
themselves obligated to join us in recognizing Kosovo's independence, a number
of those countries would do so reluctantly because of Washington's
inflexibility and insistence. No more than the United States, Europe would not
benefit from an avoidable confrontation with Russia.

Even if Kosovo declared itself an independent state, it would be a
dysfunctional one and a ward of the international community for the indefinite
future. Corruption and organized crime are rampant. The economy, aside from
international largesse and criminal activities, is nonviable. Law enforcement,
integrity of the courts, protection of persons and property, and other
prerequisites for statehood are practically nonexistent. While these failures
are often blamed on Kosovo's uncertain status, a unilateral declaration of
independence recognized by some countries and rejected by many others would
hardly remedy that fact.

The result would be a new "frozen conflict," with Kosovo's status
still unresolved. The risk of renewed violence would further impede Kosovo's
development. Moreover, heightened tensions might require reinforcing the U.S.
presence in Kosovo when we can least afford it due to other commitments.

Serbia has made great strides in democratic development and economic
revitalization since the fall of the regime of Slobodan Milosevic. Current
policy with respect to Kosovo risks complete reversal of these gains. Faced
with a choice between Western partnership and defense of their sovereign
territory and constitution, there is little doubt what Serbia would decide.

The current positive trend could falter in the face of political
radicalization and possible internal destabilization. Serbia's relations with
countries that had recognized Kosovo would be impaired. Serbia would inevitably
move closer to Russia as its only protector.

We do not underestimate the difficulty and complexity of the Kosovo question
nor do we suggest the status quo can endure indefinitely. As with thorny
questions elsewhere, viable and enduring settlements should result from
negotiation and compromise. Such an outcome has been undermined by a U.S.
promise to the Kosovo Albanians that their demands will be satisfied if they
remain adamant and no agreement is reached with Belgrade. Such a promise cannot
be justified by the claim, often heard from proponents of independence, that
the Albanians' "patience" is running out, so independence must be
granted without delay. This is nothing less than appeasing a threat of
violence.

A reassessment of America's Kosovo policy is long overdue. We hope a policy
that would set a very dangerous international precedent can still be averted if
that reassessment begins now. In the meantime, it is imperative that no
unwarranted or hasty action be taken that would turn what is now a relatively
small problem into a large one.

John Bolton is former permanent U.S. representative to the United
Nations. Lawrence Eagleburger is former U.S. secretary of state. Peter Rodman
is former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

Powered by ScribeFire.

There Goes Kosovo

There Goes Kosovo

By Doug Bandow

Published 1/31/2008 12:07:49 AM

Kosovo is preparing to declare independence
with American support. Although the Bush administration apparently expects
nothing much to happen, the process is likely to be both divisive and destabilizing.



Relations among Europe, Russia, and America could sour. Serbian politics may
lurch further to the nationalist right; the Radical Party's Tomislav Nikolic
led the first voting round for president Sunday before last. Another Balkans
war is possible, though thankfully unlikely.



Friends of Kosovo's independence argue that stability isn't everything. The
U.S. has no intrinsic interest in Kosovo's status and would be best served to
stay out of it, but that ship sailed long ago.



Washington spent most of the 1990s working overtime to break up Serb-dominated
Yugoslavia while forcing ethnic Serbs to remain in the newly independent
states. The new countries Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Slovenia
were allowed to form, but Serbs locked in Bosnia and Croatia, in particular,
were expected to cheerfully accept their fate.



The U.S. applied the same policy to Kosovo, a constituent part of Serbia. In
1999 Washington led NATO in a military campaign to aid the ethnic Albanian
forces, eliminating Serb authority over the territory.



The Bush administration has built on the Clinton administration's policy. After
presiding over unproductive faux "negotiations" predicated on
Kosovo's ultimate independence, the administration now plans to recognize the
new nation even if it fails to win United Nations approval.



Of course, Washington insists that all ethnic Serbs
living in Kosovo must remain in the new state. As before, secession from Serbs
is okay, but secession by Serbs is prohibited. Sound fair?





GRANTED, SORTING THROUGH the conflicting claims involving Kosovo ain't easy.
Once Serbian heartland, it hosts the site of the Battle of the Blackbirds,
where the Serbs lost to the Ottomans in 1389 (the loss probably shaped Serbian
consciousness more than would have a victory -- such is the way of the
Balkans).



Over time the population shifted to an ethnic Albanian majority, in part due to
Yugoslav dictator Josip Broz Tito's efforts to dampen Serbian nationalism in
the multi-ethnic communist state.



In the 1980s it was Serbians who complained of misconduct by the
ethnic-Albanian majority in Kosovo. In 1982, the New York Times reported on "almost weekly incidents of rape, arson,
pillage and industrial sabotage, most seemingly designed to drive Kosovo's
remaining indigenous Slavs--Serbs and Montenegrins -- out of the
province."



That all changed after Slobodan Milosevic used an appearance in Kosovo in 1987
to ignite Serb nationalism and leapfrog into national leadership. With his
rise, Belgrade reasserted Serb control over Kosovo.



When Yugoslavia broke up, the secession of Bosnia and Croatia produced
particularly gruesome conflicts, since both of those provinces contained many
ethnic Serbs who wished to remain independent if not in Serbia.



Although ethnic Serbs may have been responsible for the bulk of atrocities,
Bosniacs and Croats also freely murdered Serbs and each other. The largest
single episode of ethnic cleansing prior to the Kosovo war was conducted
against ethnic Serbs in Croatia's Krajina region, where the battle damage
remained evident for years. Most of Krajina's ethnic Serb residents have yet to
return.



Serb-Albanian relations in Kosovo also deteriorated as the 1990s proceeded.
Serb rule was heavy-handed; Albanians, who made up the vast majority of the
population, created alternative government and social institutions; the Kosovo
Liberation Army (labeled a "terrorist" group by the U.S.) began
attacking Serb officials and Albanian "collaborators"; the Serbian
government responded brutally; fighting expanded and casualties increased.





EVEN AS 1999 dawned, the war, though tragic, was minor as ethnic and sectarian
conflicts go, costing perhaps two thousand lives over a couple of years. About
the same time a quarter of a million people were slaughtered in Sierra Leone.
But the Clinton administration, led by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright,
decided to go to war against Serbia, and American bombers forced a quick
surrender.



Since 1999 the territory has been run by the UN and NATO, more or less. After
the allied victory ethnic Albanians kicked out 200,000 or more Serbs and other
minorities, such as Roma. Kosovo's guerrillas took over as leaders -- of both
the political system and abundant criminal enterprises. Three years ago ethnic
Albanian mobs arose to murder and displace ethnic Serbs, and to burn and wreck
Serb homes, churches, and monasteries.



Perhaps it's no surprise, then, the U.S. and Europeans want to be done with the
mess that they helped to created. Desultory negotiations over Kosovo's status
occurred over the last two years, but the outcome was never in doubt. The
allies made clear to the ethnic Albanians that independence would result if no
accord was reached, so no accord was reached.



The Serbs refused to be bought off with the promise of European Union
membership and the Russians said no to another Western fait accompli. So now
Kosovo plans to declare independence, perhaps in days, and the U.S. and most
Europeans say they will recognize the new state.



The most sensible policy for Washington would be to step back and indicate that
there will be no recognition without genuine negotiations, that is, talks
without a predetermined outcome, between Kosovo and Serbia.



On the table should be all options, including overlapping citizenships (Kosovo,
Serb, EU), and secession within secession, that is, allowing the ethnic Serbs
concentrated to Kosovo's north, principally around Mitrovica, to remain in
Serbia.





THE U.S. SHOULD halt the independence bandwagon, though not because Washington
has an intrinsic reason for objecting to Kosovo becoming a separate nation. In
principle the status of this particular piece of real estate should not matter
much to America. Whether the ethnic Albanians or Serbs rule in Pristina is
intrinsically irrelevant to U.S. interests.



However, Washington has spent more than a decade unbalancing the Balkans. By
accelerating the break-up of Yugoslavia with the early recognition of Slovenian
and Croatian independence, the allies short-circuited negotiations, most
importantly over the status of minorities within the breakaway states. U.S.
diplomats also discouraged early settlement of the Bosnian conflict,

further bloodying allied hands.



Washington and Brussels have done the same in Kosovo. Starting in 1998 the
allies took the side of the ethnic Albanians, encouraging their intransigence
in ensuing negotiations. Maybe a peaceful outcome was never possible. We will
never know because of U.S. and European intervention.



After the 1999 Kosovo war, the allies essentially promised the ethnic Albanians
independence and dismissed any compromise, such as allowing ethnic Serbs to
secede from Kosovo. All the while the West blamed Belgrade for refusing to
accept the ethnic Albanian position. Now those same allies are greenlighting a
declaration of independence by Pristina.



The outcome of this strategy is not likely to be pretty. There will be a new,
violent, and unstable state, permeated by crime and possibly open to
terrorists, in the Balkans.



This will push Serbia away from Europe, conceivably leaving a large economic
and political hole in the Balkans. The allied approval of Albanian
self-determination will encourage other secessionist movements in the Balkans
and elsewhere as ethnic and political minorities demand the same
"right" of independence. Western dismissal of Russia's interests will
make Moscow more antagonistic and assertive. Failure to resolve the status of
Serbs within Kosovo risks triggering conflict between ethnic Albanians and
Serbs, and possibly Kosovo and Serbia.



Nice work
all around.



Washington still has time to say no and mitigate some of the consequences of
its past meddling in the Balkans. But, at this point, the odds aren’t good.





Doug Bandow is the Robert A. Taft Fellow at the American Conservative
Defense Alliance. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is
the author of several books, including Foreign Follies: America's New
Global Empire (Xulon Press).

http://www.spectator.org/dsp_article.asp?art_id=12663

Powered by ScribeFire.

Palestine: Kosovo of the Middle East

Palestine: Kosovo of the Middle East

19:50 | 27/ 12/ 2007

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political analyst Dmitry Kosyrev) -
Victory has a thousand fathers, but defeat is an orphan. It was not one, but
hundreds of observers who hastened to declare the November international
conference in Annapolis America's success that allegedly gave a fresh start to
the Palestinian-Israeli peace process.

Now that the process has hiccupped, no one seems eager to
take the blame.

But, I repeat, it is only a hiccup: Israeli and Palestinian
diplomats have quarreled during a working group meeting. One may expect it to
be defused by another meeting between the two prime ministers, Mahmoud Abbas
and Ehud Olmert; they meet for negotiations roughly once every two weeks. But,
as always, the nuts and bolts of these talks are discussed in meetings at the
working level. And these meetings make it clear that Annapolis has not solved
any substantial issues.

The main issue is land. The Palestinian delegation demanded
a stop to building settlements in the occupied territories. The Israelis
countered by reminding the Palestinians of their commitment to neutralize the
radical groups on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. But that is not a very
credible response because building houses in the occupied territories is just
as real a problem as radicals and terrorists.

It was after Annapolis, early this month, that Israel
announced it was building houses in East Jerusalem. Such plans have also been
unveiled for the Jewish settlement of Maale Adumim and so on. All this is being
done within the existing settlements since Israel has promised not to take any
new Palestinian territories. But in general one of the issues in the Middle
East peace process is the Jewish development of the territories which, based on
the results of the talks, theoretically may not belong to them. In other words,
ahead of the negotiations, Israel is stepping up the activities that Palestine
wants it to stop.

Or take the question of Jerusalem where new developments are
planned. It is Israel's capital, but the negotiating process implies a joint
negotiated solution of the city's status. For the time being, in terms of
international law, the eastern quarters of Jerusalem are occupied territories.
The Israelis say they are ready to discuss the city's status with the
Palestinians, but what is the point of talking if new Jewish homes are already
being built there?

The settlements are only one item in the overall peace
process.

For "the father of the Annapolis victory," George
Bush, the problem now is that he is scheduled to go to the Middle East in
January. Even if he manages to wriggle out of that trip, he will still have to
come to grips with concrete issues, for example, to say what he thinks about
the building of Israeli settlements on Palestinian lands in parallel with the
talks. America's support for Israel is the Achilles heel of all its policy in
the greater Middle East and further afield, for example, right up to Muslim
Indonesia. These problems will have to be grappled with.

A land that has for centuries been inhabited by people of
one creed (or, to put it in other words, of one ethnic identity) and which as a
result of the use of force is now inhabited by a different people is not only a
problem of Palestine and Israel. The same is true of Kosovo. Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov and other Russian diplomats have repeatedly pointed out:
if the world has been wrestling with the Palestinian problem for half a century
and will continue to do so, why such a hurry in the case of Kosovo?

And indeed, the "settlement activities" of the Albanians
who infiltrated into Kosovo are very similar to what the Israelis have been up
to all this time: to create settlements taking advantage of the weakness of
their opponents and then to present the other side with an accomplished fact
during the course of negotiations, hoping to wrest at least partial
concessions.

What will happen to Europe if it tries to settle a similar
problem between the Serbs and the Kosovars after both are admitted to the
European Union as "independent states"? It may or may not pan out
because Kosovo's independence would not be legally complete without a formal
recognition by the UN. That would give the Serbs reason to seek redress for
half a century or for as long as they feel like it. It is unclear who will play
the role of the U.S., which, let us face it, is disliked in the Muslim world
because of Israel. America's other missteps (i.e. wars) look in many ways as a
derivative of the starting point of its Middle East policy.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and
do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20071227/94407036.html

Powered by ScribeFire.

Kosovo Cannot Be the End of International Law

Kosovo Cannot Be the End of International Law

13.12.2007

Source:

URL: http://english.pravda.ru/opinion/columnists/102783-kosovointlaw-0

Kosovo-Metohija is the very heart and soul of the Serbian nation. Kosovo province is to Serbs what Westminster Abbey is to Britons, Paris is to the French or Jerusalem is to the three world religions. It is not something the Serbian nation is willing to surrender to NATO, Albanian Muslims or the US State Department, however mighty they might think they are, and however persistently they demand to steal it. The Serbian province of Kosovo, administered by NATO since June 1999, is the fourth region with the highest corruption rate in the world, right after Albania, according to a report from the organization Transparency International, an anti-corruption watchdog based in Berlin. Transparency International’s 2007 Global Corruption Barometer showed that the Kosovo province under the NATO-imposed Albanian KLA criminal gang, well known for illegal drug trade and human trafficking, is among the most corrupt regions in the world today. Unemployment is high and the farcical “election” recently held generated an extremely poor turnout showing that there is little effort or basis for such a pseudo political process. Sixty-seven percent of Kosovo province residents have stated they have to pay bribes to get services. The criminal governance of Kosovo does not meet any criteria whatsoever for a legal secession from Serbia. They are not self-sustaining, they have no viable political process, they have no historical connection to the land, they were offered wide autonomy by Serbia and they have no claims whatsoever regarding mistreatment by Serbian authorities, so no legal condition exits by which such unilateral action can be considered by the international community. Those who would encourage such illegal action should also consider that Kosovo is completely dependent on SERBIA for all its electricity and, like the rest of Europe, Kosovo also needs Russian GAS for heating. Unilateral declaration of independence would constitute a violation ofUN Security Council Resolution 1244 as well as the UN Charter, and it will subsequently be null and void in the UN. Russia, which holds a veto in the U.N. Security Council, will demand that any such decision be cancelled or be annulled. Washington and most EU member states support Kosovo independence. Albanians say they will declare independence within months. Without approval from the UN, any recognition given would completely lack legitimacy or a legal basis. Since the NATO war of aggression was a crime against international peace and, therefore, gives rise to international responsibility, the international community is duty-bound to mount an appropriate response, and that does not include allowing declarations of independence which would slice away fifteen percent of Serbian territory. When all peaceful options are exhausted, Serbia has a right under all provisions of international law to force the aggressor out of its territory in accordance with article 51 of the UN Charter. Yugoslavia was and Serbia is a UN member state. The UN Charter's prohibition of member states of the UN attacking other UN member states is central to the purpose for which the UN was founded in the wake of the massive death and destruction of World War II: to prevent war. This prevailing concern is also reflected in the Nuremberg Trials' concept of crimes against peace, "starting or waging a war against the territorial integrity, political independence or sovereignty of a state, or in violation of international treaties or agreements..." (crime against peace), was held to be the crime that makes all war crimes possible. The provision on the inviolability of state sovereignty was elaborated in the Declaration on the Principles of International Law adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1970, which in particular defines aggression as follows: "The first use of armed forces by a state in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression..." This is the Helsinki Final Act from 1 August 1975, upon which resolution 1244 calls: I Defining sovereignty: "The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations." In III Inviolability of frontiers: "The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers. Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State." In IV Territorial Integrity of States: "The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States. Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force. The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal." Russia has warned the West that recognizing a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo Albanians would set off a chain reaction of problems in the Balkans and beyond. "I want to stress that a unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo and recognition of such independence will not remain without consequences," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said during a visit to Nicosia. "It will create a chain reaction throughout the Balkans and other areas of the world," he said, speaking through an interpreter after talks with Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos. What are the real reasons behind the West strongly pushing this issue at this time? Are they nostalgic for war in Europe again? Are they attempting to force Russia to reciprocate in kind on Abkhazia and South Ossetia? Why not just leave Kosovo's status as is and continue negotiations? How do they explain to the people at home that they are fighting terrorists in Afghanistan and Iraq, yet they have been protecting them in Kosovo and Bosnia? Analysts warn that the Kosovo precedent may set into motion separatists in Spain, Belgium and Britain. Western media has been claiming that there were two million Albanians in Kosovo. They have also been underestimating the number of Serbs living there, who constitute approximately twenty-five percent of the population. The constant claim in the Albanian and Western press that there are “close to two million ethnic Albanians” in Serbian province is false, and the latest “elections“, where only around 43 percent of Albanian voters have taken part (minus the Serbs of course), have confirmed the earlier census data according to which there is no more than 1.1 - 1.2 million ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. If there is only around one million ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province, that also means that there is at least 25 percent Serbs remaining in Kosovo which is significantly more than the commonly repeated number that 10 or even only 5 percent of Serbs remain in Kosovo-Metohija. The Danish People’s Party broke for the first time with the VK [ruling coalition] government over an essential foreign policy question. The party refused to support the recognition of Kosovo. The Danish People’s Party wrote in a letter to the foreign minister that the international community is setting out to do an injustice to Serbia, and the decision to recognize Kosovo will violate the UN charter, which emphasizes the member countries’ territorial integrity. After horrendous and incredible sacrifices during two world wars, Serbs have been egregiously betrayed by former allies in favor of Albanians who sided with and served Hitler and the Axis. Serbs have had to endure the dissolution of the state of Yugoslavia in which they were not only ethnically cleansed and purged from every one of the former Yugoslav republics, but also falsely and wrongly singled out as both the instigators of each of the civil wars and perpetrators of the worst crimes conceivable. Is this what the west, the empire, stands for? Rewarding criminals, terrorists and alliances with and services to Hitler? Does international law get set aside and eliminated for the interests of corporate elitists seeking power, control and enrichment? It would seem that the lessons of history have been lost on them and that they have forgotten why these laws were enacted and why the UN was created. Lisa KARPOVA PRAVDA.Ru USA/CANADA

© 1999-2006. «PRAVDA.Ru». When reproducing our materials in whole or in
part, hyperlink to PRAVDA.Ru should be made. The opinions and views of
the authors do not always coincide with the point of view of
PRAVDA.Ru's editors.

Powered by ScribeFire.

Misreporting Kosovo

Misreporting Kosovo

December 13, 2007 | From theTrumpet.com

How the mainstream press has missed the single most important angle to what’s happening in Kosovo.

Brad Macdonald

On back-to-back days in December 1991, the New York Times
published two separate articles highlighting Germany’s alarming and
audacious decision to recognize and legitimize the efforts of Slovenia
and Croatia to break away from Yugoslavia. Both articles (you can read
them here and here)
are refreshingly honest and hold little back in their analysis of
Germany’s seminal role in the violent fragmentation of Yugoslavia.

In this
article, Paul Lewis cites European diplomats who warned that Germany’s
decision to support Croatia and Slovenia, despite opposition from
virtually the rest of the world, “underscored Germany’s growing
political power in the 12-nation European Community.” Germany’s
incursion into the Balkans, wrote Lewis, “has worried many in Europe
who see it as an attempt to re-exert traditional Germanic influences over this area of the Balkans” (emphasis mine throughout).

Lewis exhibited little reticence in exposing the German
undercurrent gushing beneath what was unfolding in Yugoslavia, even
when it meant connecting Germany’s decision to recognize Croatia and
Slovenia in 1991, to its sordid history with these entities during
World War ii.

Moreover, in its unusual assertiveness in
moving ahead with a plan to extend diplomatic recognition to the
breakaway Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Slovenia, Germany has stirred troubling historical associations …. Nazi Germany dominated the two Yugoslav regions during World War ii, absorbing Slovenia into the Third Reich and creating a puppet regime in Croatia.

Then there’s this piece from the Times a month later: “Germany’s decision to press for quick recognition of the two republics, disregarding
appeals from the United States and the United Nations, marked a new
assertiveness that some Europeans find disconcerting” (Jan. 16, 1992).

The point?

In 1991-92, a mainstream news organ like the New York Times
was not afraid to confront the reality that Germany was manipulating
the Balkans in an effort to “re-exert traditional Germanic influences”
over the region. A willingness to analyze the Balkans through the
German prism was plainly evident.

How times have changed.

On Monday, the deadline for a mutual solution to the Kosovo dilemma
expired, and Kosovar Albanians, led by former terrorist leader Hashim
Thaci, said they would immediately start finalizing their declaration
of independence from Serbia, which they will likely announce within the
first two months of 2008.

The subject of Kosovo’s independence does not lack coverage. What
it lacks is the kind of fresh, up-front, in-depth reporting practiced
by the likes of the New York Times
when it covered Yugoslavia’s dissolution in 1991-92. When Croatia,
Slovenia and Bosnia broke away from Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, the Times
didn’t hesitate to declare Germany’s pivotal and alarming role in the
crises (though later, when the U.S. and British governments switched
sides, so too did the Times).

Now Kosovo is about to erupt, and few people, certainly not the
mainstream press, are talking about Germany’s fundamental role in this
crisis!

Why not? It’s a blockbuster angle!

What’s happening in Kosovo is covered with German fingerprints. It
was Germany (and the Vatican) that first legitimized the dissolution of
the state formerly called Yugoslavia. The day Bonn threw its weight
behind Croatia’s and Slovenia’s decision to break away in 1991, every
republic in Yugoslavia that was thinking about breaking away, including
Kosovo, learned that it could do so and have the support of Germany and
the Vatican.

But Germany’s intimate relationship with Kosovo runs deeper than
mere ideological support. The involvement in the province by Germany,
one of Kosovo’s most important and long-standing supporters, has
manifested itself in very practical—and dangerous—ways. The German
government has been closely linked to the Kosovo Liberation Army (kla),
a terrorist organization that during the early to mid-1990s was linked
to the mafia in Kosovo and other Islamic terrorists in the region.

In 1996, the German foreign intelligence service (bnd), established a major outpost in the Albanian city of Tirana, where kla terrorists were trained to fight against Serbian authorities. According to Le Monde Diplomatique,
“special forces in Berlin provided the operational training and
supplied arms and transmission equipment from ex-East German Stasi
stocks as well as black uniforms” (May 1999).

Here’s what Trumpet editor in chief Gerald Flurry wrote in July 2002:

Kosovo’s “internationally unrecognized government-in-exile” had a prime minister who was based in Germany and operated freely with the blessing (perhaps even the direction) of the German government!
So Germany recognized Kosovo’s government-in-exile when nobody else
did. But the international community submissively followed Germany’s
lead. The kla guerrillas didn’t just happen. They were essentially raised up and directly supported by Germany—the powerhouse of Europe.

How many analysts, when they consider Kosovo’s independence today,
are factoring in Germany’s central role in the growth and expansion of
the kla? How many wonder why
Germany would be so interested in, and go to such great lengths to
secure, Kosovo’s independence from Serbia? What’s in it for Germany?

These questions lie at the heart of analysis on Kosovo—but few are asking them!

The Trumpet has explained how, under the umbrella of the United States and nato,
Germany and Europe have, since 1991, dramatically increased their
influence in the Balkans. By employing a subtle diplomatic
divide-and-conquer policy, Germany has precipitated the systematic and
violent fracturing of Yugoslavia. It was Germany, through cunning use
of exaggerated and inaccurate claims and emotive language, that in 1999
stirred nato, predominantly comprised of U.S. troops, to bomb Serbia.

In March 1999, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping said in a television interview on zdf that “genocide is starting” in Serbia. His alarmist vocabulary turned the collective Western mindset against Serbia. The Australian
reported on April 1, 1999, “With thousands of refugees continuing to
stream out of the war-torn province, German Defense Minister Rudolf
Scharping claimed in Bonn last night that evidence had emerged of
concentration camps being set up by Serb forces.”

“People watched television and saw the streams of Albanian
refugees,” wrote Gerald Flurry at the time. “Then they totally blamed
the Serbs. Most knew very little about Kosovo, yet spoke of ‘genocide’—the deliberate and systematic destruction of a race. Then came talk about ‘concentration camps.’ Genocide and concentration camps—words introduced by the German defense minister” (The Rising Beast).

Are Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic’s supposed atrocities against Albanians the real reason America and nato bombed Belgrade into submission? During the 1990s, actual genocides were occurring in Rwanda and Sierra Leone—not to mention the slaughter of Serbs
by Croatians and the Kosovo Albanians themselves—and the Clinton
government did little to intervene. Why was America prepared to bomb
Serbia into submission, but not the evil forces killing hundreds of
thousands of innocent victims in Rwanda or Sierra Leone? Because
America was pressured into bombing Serbia! Germany and Europe convinced all of nato to fight for their Balkan cause!

From the very beginning, Germany and Europe have been determined to
conquer the Balkans, be it by force or in a web of diplomatic
maneuvers.

In 2003, EU Commission President Romano Prodi promised that all
Balkan countries—if they danced to the EU’s tune of course—could
“become members of the EU one day.” While they might not necessarily
become members on the same day, and each would have to follow its own
course, he said, nonetheless, “in the long run, [the] Balkans belong strictly to the EU” (EUobserver, Jan. 10, 2003).

Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks!

This is why Germany wanted Serbia, its historical enemy and counterweight in the region, destroyed by nato.
Germany and Europe believe the Balkans belong “strictly to the EU.”
Without the pesky Slobodan Milosevic around to interrupt their plans,
Germany and Europe could more easily conquer the Balkans!

Any in-depth analysis of the events unfolding in Kosovo must account for this history.

The International Herald Tribune
reported yesterday on a plan concocted by Slovenia (which will likely
be holding the EU presidency when Kosovo declares its independence) by
which the European Union will embrace Kosovo when it declares
statehood. Europe is prepping itself for action in Kosovo.

The Tribune quoted one diplomat who said that if violence breaks out in Kosovo, Europe’s response must be “fast and decisive because the EU is showing it’s boss in its own courtyard. We want to show we don’t need Washington or Moscow to tell us what to do.”

Considering the history we just covered, against whom do you think Germany and Europe will take action?

On Monday, the Itar-Tass news agency reported
that Wolfgang Ischinger, the German diplomat representing the EU in the
group of three international mediators (Russia, the United States and
the EU) at the talks that were held between Serbia and Kosovar
Albanians, told Radio Berlin Brandenburg that the EU would soon be in
agreement on the Kosovo issue.

Ischinger’s interpretation of what Kosovo’s independence will look
like was intriguing. “It will be a state entity,” he said, “which will
continue to be under broad international observation. The nato troops will continue to be deployed there. A further international presence of the UN and, consequently, of EU, will be ensured.”

Germany and Europe are making plans to cement their control of Kosovo via the UN and nato!

In 1991, both Germany and Europe as a whole were significantly
weaker, less unified and less defined than they are today. Germany was
a newly united, largely inward-focused state in the early stages of
resurrecting itself as the leader of Europe and on the global scene.
Europe was even more amorphous than it appears today.

But this seemingly innocuous appearance didn’t stop a major
newspaper from ringing alarm bells when Germany boldly announced it
would support Croatia and Slovenia in their quest for independence, a
decision that many knew would set a dangerous precedent and likely
cause Yugoslavia’s dissolution. At that time, even a mainstream news
source analyzed the breakdown of Yugoslavia in the context of German
ambition in the Balkans!

Today, we don’t see any such analysis in the news media. Germany
and the EU are widely embraced as legitimate and influential global
powers with a formidable economic, military and geopolitical imprint.
Europe, with Germany at its vanguard, has become a respected and
increasingly powerful geopolitical force motivated by lofty ambitions
of becoming a united superpower.

Still, the mainstream media today refuse to analyze the Balkans in
the context of what’s happening in Germany and Europe, and of Germany’s
history with the region. This is the most dangerous and ominous angle
of the story, and the most underreported one!

In time, this shameful ignorance will prove to be an expensive mistake.
•

http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?q=4556.2818.0.0

Powered by ScribeFire.

The case against Kosovo independence

The case against Kosovo independence

---

Miodrag Isakov , THE JERUSALEM POST

Dec. 12, 2007

---

If
I were to say that Israel deserved to qualify for the European championship,
most local football fans might agree. Israel played really well - the best
ever. However, England deserved to qualify too - especially if you look back in
history: They invented the game, after all. Nevertheless, neither of them will
be heading to the championship because there are certain rules and conditions
which preclude that from happening.

If
someone came along insisting that Israel and England take part in the finals
anyway and made room for them by excluding teams that had won their places fair
and square, such behavior would destroy the entire football enterprise. The
championships would become meaningless.

This
is how things work in professional sports. Agreed upon rules must be applied -
equally across the board.

And
that's also how international relations must work. Fair is fair and rules are
rules.

For
instance, when someone states: "Kosovo deserves independence," as my
colleague Tonin Gjuraj, ambassador of Albania, did in his Jerusalem Post op-ed
(November 27), people of good intentions would be inclined to first ask: What
are the rules of the game?

OK,
they would say, if that's possible, why not? But in this case the rules are
clear: It is not possible without agreement from Serbia! International law,
above all the UN Charter and its fundamental principle of sovereignty,
guarantees territorial integrity and equality of states, and Kosovo is part of
sovereign state - the Republic of Serbia. That has been approved once again by
Resolution 1244 of the Security Council.

Regarding
the rights of national minorities, Albanians of Kosovo included, it is clear
that creating a state of their own is not one of those rights.

That
is why Albania's ambassador, wisely choosing his words, claims that Kosovo
deserves independence; he does not say that it has the right. He is advocating
for his fellow Albanians - that is understandable - but also carefully avoiding
mentioning that an independent Kosovo would be another Albanian state in
Europe.

Two
states, side by side, for about four million people - that would be difficult
to explain to Israelis who are struggling to preserve a single Jewish state.

Creating
a state for Kosovo could be a first step toward joining it with the Albanian
state - that was Hitler's solution. Only during the Hitler period did a
so-called Greater Albania exist, and only during the Nazi regime was Kosovo
treated as a separate region by itself, named New Albania.

That
was a time of ethnic cleansing which produced the Albanian majority in the
area. How could anyone justify such an approach today? Wherever you look in
history, Kosovo was part of either Serbia or some other empire that
occasionally dominated in the Balkans, but never part of the Albanian state. In
fact, there was no Albanian state until 1912.

A
MODERN Serbian state was established after the war in the Balkans. The Kingdom
of Serbia, on most of the territory of the old Serbian Empire, included Kosovo
and Macedonia.

Distorting
history can only have a boomerang effect. My Albanian colleague claims:
"The area was annexed by Yugoslavia against Kosovar resistance in 1918.
This annexation violated the right of the Kosovars to self-determination and,
therefore, violated international law."

He
is wrong on three counts.

First,
in 1918, Yugoslavia did not exist at all. With the downfall of Austro-Hungarian
and Ottoman empires in 1918 the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians"
was established.

Second,
the pillar of that new state was the Kingdom of Serbia, and Kosovo was part of
it. Finally, since the right to self-determination never belonged to the
minorities, it became proof that Albanians in Kosovo always had a status of a
minority.

Since
there was no annexation of Kosovo in 1918, that raises the question: Where does
that idea come from?

There
is only one case in history when the notion of annexation was connected with
Kosovo - from 1941 to 1944 when the Nazis annexed Kosovo to Albania and it was
called "annexed territories."

So,
here we are again at the idea of Greater Albania, which besides Albania and
Kosovo, at that time included large parts of Macedonia, Montenegro and South
Serbia. The idea of Greater Albania established by the "1878 First League
of Prizren," was and still is the dream of Kosovar irredentists, who
organized a so-called liberation movement on the eve of the last century which
Serbia treated as a terrorist organization.

It
is worth recalling that during World War II the 21st SS Division
"Skenderbeg" was created and comprised primarily of Kosovar Muslim
recruits. They committed genocide against the Serbian and Jewish populations in
Kosovo as well as in Bosnia and Croatia. Therefore, trying to make the Albanian
case to Israelis - as the ambassador did in his op-ed - using the example of
the 200 Jews who survived the Holocaust in Albania (under Italian control) is
disingenuous.

It
is equally cynical to claim that "Kosovo is not and will not be a Muslim
state" considering that during the past eight years over 150 Christian
churches have been destroyed while 400 mosques financed by Islamic countries
have been constructed.

The writer is ambassador of Serbia in Israel. The
case against Kosovo independence | Jerusalem Post

Powered by ScribeFire.

Kosovo’s Independence Will Stir Up Trouble. Who Will Benefit?

Kosovo’s Independence Will Stir Up Trouble. Who Will Benefit?

From the desk of John Laughland on Wed, 2007-12-12 20:20

Perhaps
the most striking things about the impending declaration of
independence about Kosovo is that is happening at all. Why should the
Kosovo Albanians be striving for independence from Belgrade now, since
there has been peace in the province for eight years (interrupted only
in 2004, when a mob of Albanians killed 25 Serbs) and since the regime
in Serbia, of which the Kosovo Albanians are citizens, has been
democratic and pro-European since 2000?

Why, indeed, did the
Kosovo Albanians spend the whole of the first part of the 1990s in
peace, when the rest of Yugoslavia was in flames? If their desire for
independence had really been so intense as their national propaganda
claims, then surely the time to act would have been when the Yugoslav
federation was collapsing in 1992-1992, or during the Bosnian civil war
of 1992-1995.

For that matter, why did the Albanians inside
Serbia, who are in the majority in the area around the Southern towns
of Presevo and Bujanovac, start their attacks there in 2001, a year
after the fall of Slobodan Milošević’s fall from power, whereas they
had been left in peace during the civil war between Serbs and Albanians
in neighbouring Kosovo in 1998-1999?

None of this seems to make any sense.

One
thing is certain: the Kosovo Albanians would not have threatened to
declare independence if they were not certain that they would receive
diplomatic recognition from the United States and most European states.
The Kosovo leadership (which means the leadership of the Kosovo
Liberation Army, the guerrilla force whose head, Hashim Thaci, is now
the “Prime Minister” of Kosovo) has very close ties to the West. Thaci
famously kissed Madeleine Albright during the Kosovo war of 1999 and
also visited Tony Blair at Number 10; one of his predecessors as Prime
Minister, Ramush Haradinaj, who has since been indicted by The Hague
for war crimes, is known as a major CIA asset.

No doubt the
Kosovo Albanians have some claim to independence, although it is
notable how seldom they refer to the persecution of which they were
supposedly the victims in 1999 under Milošević. This is no doubt
because everyone knows that those claims of genocide bore as much
relation to reality as did the claim made in 2002-2003 that there were
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Indeed, the charge of genocide
turned out to be so unsustainable that it was never even included in
the indictment against Milošević.

The loss of Kosovo by Serbia
would be a terrible blow to the values of Christian civilisation, since
that region is itself a symbol of the victory over the European spirit
over the superior military force of Islam, having been the scene of
Serbia’ historic battle against the Turks in 1389. The province
contains some of the jewels of European architecture, the monasteries
of Peć, Dečani and Gračanica. But the truth is that the new battle of
Kosovo was lost a long time ago, when the Serbs, like most Europeans,
stopped having babies while the Albanians, like many other Muslim
peoples, continued having them – and at a vast rate. The demographic
battle having been lost, there is very little the government in
Belgrade can do now to halt the inevitable.

Worse, perhaps, is
the effect which the independence of this small province will have on
the region and the wider world. The anger of Bosnian Serbs is inflamed
by the West’s double-standards. While it demands autonomy and now
secession for the Kosovo Albanians, it is pushing ever greater
centralisation and curtailment of autonomy in neighbouring
Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbs there have been told they must never hold
a referendum on independence from Bosnia, while the EU-back “High
Representative” is determined to abrogate what remains of the autonomy
of Republika Srpska. Independence for Kosovo will, in all likelihood,
lead to the fragmentation of the artificial and largely bogus state of
Bosnia-Herzegovina.

But the double-standards are not confined
to the Balkans. The narrative in Cyprus is almost identical to that in
Kosovo: a Muslim population there, the Turks, was the subject of
persecution by its Orthodox co-nationals, the Greeks, until they were
protected by military intervention according to international law:
Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974 and invoked the terms of the 1960 Treaty
of Guarantee (between Britain, Turkey and Greece) which guaranteed the
constitution of Cyprus. Yet Northern Cyprus (the Turkish part) has been
the victim of an embargo and international isolation ever since then,
an international pariah while Kosovo’s leaders are the toast of the
world’s chancelleries.

The same goes for Transnistria.
Transnistria is a small sliver of land along the left bank of the
Dniestr river, North-West of Odessa. When the Romanian province of
Bessarabia was illegally annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940, according
to the terms of the secret protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact,
Transnistria became part of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova.
It had never before in history been governed from the Moldovan capital,
Chişinău, and most of its inhabitants speak Russian. The Soviet Union
started to collapse in 1990 precisely when Moscow admitted, after years
of denial, the existence of the secret protocol to the
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and this led to the secession of the Baltic
states and, eventually, the dissolution of the USSR itself.
Transnistria naturally said that its incorporation into Moldova was as
illegal as Moldova’s incorporation into the Soviet Union and demanded
independence. Although it has indeed been de facto independent since
1992, the West has consistently told it that it will not allow it to
secede from Moldova. Ditto for Nagorno-Karabakh (formally part of
Azerbaijan, populated now exclusively by Armenians), South Ossetia
(part of Georgia but culturally linked to North Ossetia, which is
inside Russia) and Abkazia (also part of Georgia but de facto
independent since 1992).

Encouraging independence for Kosovo
will only re-ignite the conflict which has been basically frozen there
since 1999, as well as the similarly frozen conflicts in the Balkans,
in Moldova and the Caucasus. What is the point of this when the other
option is to let sleeping dogs lie? Does someone have an interest in
causing trouble?

The only common denominator in all these
various conflicts, indeed, is attitudes to Russia. Russia supports
Serbia on Kosovo and Bosnia; it is broadly supportive of Transnistria
and the other non-recognised states on the territory of the former
Soviet Union (although it has done little concrete to help them). Any
trouble in these area is trouble for Moscow in its own backyard, which
President Putin told me in September is the last thing he wants. Maybe
that is why the West is determined to provoke it.

http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/2764

Powered by ScribeFire.

What will be Russia's response to Kosovo's independence?

What will be Russia's response to Kosovo's independence?

19:40 | 07/ 12/ 2007

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti political commentator Yelena
Shesternina) - The troika of international mediators (the U.S., EU and Russia),
after several months of trying to think up an elegant solution to the Kosovo
problem, has admitted its failure.

The final report, which it decided to submit to UN Secretary
General Ban Ki-Moon ahead of schedule (the original deadline was December 10),
does not contain a single concrete recommendation to Belgrade or Pristina, or
indeed, to the UN. What will happen next? How will Moscow respond if the Kosovo
authorities carry out their threat and proclaim independence unilaterally?

The troika mission has failed, as it should have. The
positions of its members were too wide apart.

Washington was pressing for the province's independence and
Moscow went out of its way to argue that there should be no haste. The European
Union, supposed to represent the interests of all its 27 member countries, was
doing a balancing act between the two positions.

Not everyone in Europe would welcome the appearance of a new
state on the world map. The most vocal opponents are Spain, Greece, Cyprus,
Romania and Slovakia. They know that as soon as Kosovo declares its
independence their own separatists will be quick to put forward similar
demands.

But it is not the position of the mediators that is the main
stumbling block. The Serbs were prepared to offer Pristina everything,
including the broadest autonomy, the likes of which no other autonomy in the
world enjoys, as long as the word "independence" is not used.

The Kosovars, however, were determined from the start that
secession from Serbia was only a matter of time. Yes, they were ready to go
through the diplomatic motions, even to sit down at the negotiating table with
the Serbs, but no more than that. And why should they if the United States and
several European countries had promised them independence in advance? The
Kosovars do not quite know themselves what they will do with the independence.
They seem to hope that the West will address their numerous economic problems
with greater zeal than now.

Moscow is still behaving as if the issue of the province's
independence has not been closed. But it seems that it has. The Kosovars are
right when they say it is only a matter of time. The question that remains is
when the independence will become official and how it will be "acted
out"?

The scenario until the end of the year is more or less
clear. After Ban Ki-Moon reads the report it will be submitted to the UN
Security Council. The discussion promises to be stormy, but the result is a
foregone conclusion: Moscow will categorically object to any document that
contains the word "independence." If it manages to persuade the West
that another round of talks is needed, it would be its biggest foreign policy
triumph of the year.

Most experts believe the Kosovars will not dare to proclaim
independence immediately after the collapse of the UN debate. First, they have
to wait for the presidential elections in Serbia, where the first round will
take place on January 20. Second, it would be good to enlist the support of the
"united Europe" in addition to that of the United States. The EU
leaders will try to agree their actions on the "Kosovo issue" at their
summit in Brussels next week. The declared position so far is encouraging: the
EU says it is necessary "to prevent unilateral moves on Kosovo's
part."

The Europeans, at least those of them who do not think
Kosovo would set a dangerous precedent, are developing at least two secret
plans. According to the report of the International Crisis Group, Britain,
Germany, Italy and France will support independence before May 2008. For
starters, they will try to get the Brussels meeting to pass a joint statement to
the effect that the EU considers the Kosovo negotiations closed and the best
way out of the impasse is to revert to the Ahtisaari Plan (Martti Ahtisaari is
the UN Secretary General's special representative who developed a plan for
Kosovo's independence). If Spain, Greece and other countries opposed to the
Ahtisaari Plan put their foot down, the European Commission will give every
country a carte blanche to decide whether or not to recognize Kosovo's
independence.

The second plan has been worked out in Paris. According to a
leak to the press, Pristina will issue its "final warning" in January
and officially proclaim independence in February. Albania would be the first to
recognize the new country, followed by the United States, Muslim countries and
some EU members.

What are Moscow's options in this situation? There are not
many. The "adequate response" variant (recognizing the independence
of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdnester) is unlikely to be used.

Sergei Lavrov has said more than once that the Foreign
Ministry will proceed strictly within the legal framework and will not violate
the territorial integrity of other states. And there is no point in aggravating
the quarrel with Georgia, especially because the West would certainly throw its
weight behind Tbilisi (it is not for nothing that it has prudently declared the
Kosovo case "unique").

Such a response will not lead to a reversal of Kosovo's
independence, and Russia will end up with more troubles on its borders than it
can handle. Tbilisi would not take the secession of rebel republics lying down,
no matter who wins the presidential election.

So, the chances are that we will again see Moscow trying to
do some diplomatic footwork. For example, stopping Kosovo from being admitted
to the OSCE and, far more importantly for Pristina, to the UN. After all,
Kosovo cannot join the United Nations without the consent of the Security
Council.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and
do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20071207/91418613.html

Powered by ScribeFire.

Kosovo 'mess' could spark ethnic violence: ex-KFOR chief

8 hours ago

LONDON (AFP) — The Kosovo situation is "a mess" that threatens to
spill over into ethnic violence again, the man who first commanded
NATO-led forces in the Serbian province said Sunday.

General Sir
Mike Jackson, the former British Army chief who commanded the Kosovo
Force (KFOR) when it entered the province in June 1999, said there was
a minefield ahead in which all parties must "tread carefully", in an
article in the British weekly newspaper The Sunday Telegraph.

Last-ditch
talks between Serbia and ethnic-Albanian-majority Kosovo have failed
and the southern province could soon declare independence once the
United Nations deadline for sorting out its future expires on Monday.

"It
is, sadly, anything but clear: the Albanian Kosovars expect
independence, which Belgrade refuses to concede. We should not
underestimate the volatility of this situation," Jackson wrote.

"While
both Kosovar and Serb leaders claim to oppose the use of force to
achieve their aims, the same cannot be said of the ethnic paramilitary
groupings."

UN Security Council resolution 1244 stipulated that Kosovo was to remain part of Serbia, but under UN administration.

"At
this point, we have a mess. It seems that UNSCR 1244 remains extant
until the Security Council removes it -- but Russia will not allow
this," Jackson said.

"So what happens to the current UN mission
in Kosovo? Do the staff of recognising countries leave, while those of
non-recognising countries remain? What of KFOR? Will Kosovo qualify for
UN membership?

"All of this will provide much work for diplomats and lawyers -- but not, I fervently hope, for soldiers.

"I
do not believe the Serbs would be so foolish as to invade Kosovo in the
face of KFOR, but I do fear further ethnic violence, and thus the need
for KFOR reinforcement."

NATO has said its 17,000 strong peacekeeping force would "resolutely" deal with any violence in Kosovo.

"Perhaps the international community's aversion to boundary change should be re-examined in this case," Jackson added.

"The
largest concentration of Kosovo Serbs live north of the River Ibar,
adjacent to Serbia proper. This small area was transferred from Serbia
to Kosovo only 40 years ago. A restoration might have merit.

"Overall, I suspect that the die is cast. Understandably, Kosovo's independence will go very hard in Serbia.

"The
Serbian government's current sad predicament is (former Yugoslav
president Slobodan) Milosevic's wretched legacy, but all parties must
now tread carefully.

"If Kosovo's independence really is to be
the last piece of the Balkan jigsaw, there must be an unprecedented
generosity of spirit in all concerned."

http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5ie7RcMnMnejw01bISqr-E9r8sdWg

Powered by ScribeFire.

Gen. Sir Mike Jackson warns on Kosovo

Gen. Sir
Mike Jackson warns on Kosovo

Last Updated: 1:11am GMT 09/12/2007

General Sir Mike Jackson has warned that the Balkans could be engulfed in violence unless the crisis surrounding the future of the province of Kosovo can be resolved. Sir Mike fears that British troops will be sent to intervene if Kosovo's leaders unilaterally declare independence from Serbia. Serbian officials have stated they will use "all means" to preserve sovereignty over the ethnically Albanian province. The current crisis follows the failure of a peace initiative between the rival governments in Pristina and Belgrade. Writing in The Sunday Telegraph today, Sir Mike says: "The situation is volatile and likely to become more so." Many of the Serbian minority living in Kosovo have already left their homes for Serbia in the belief that they are about to be attacked. Kosovo is to be discussed at a meeting of European foreign ministers on Monday, and at a European summit this week before going before the Security Council on December 19.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/12/09/wkosovo109.xml

Powered by ScribeFire.