... Germany is economically powerful but needs economic coalition partners that contribute to German well-being rather than merely draw on it. A Russian-German relationship could logically emerge from this. If it did, the Americans and Poles would logically have their own relationship. The former would begin as economic and edge toward military. The latter begins as military, and with the weakening of the European Union, edges toward economics. The Russian-German bloc would attempt to bring others into its coalition, as would the Polish-U.S. bloc. Both would compete in Central Europe — and for France. During this process, the politics of NATO would shift from humdrum to absolutely riveting. ... ... With Greece symbolizing the weakening of the European Union and the Patriots representing the remilitarization of at least part of Europe, ostensibly unconnected tendencies might well intersect. Germany After the EU and the Russian Scenario May 25, 2010 | 0857 GMT By George Friedman Discussions about Europe currently are focused on the Greek financial crisis and its potential effect on the future of the European Union. Discussions these days involving military matters and Europe appear insignificant and even anachronistic. Certainly, we would agree that the future of the European Union towers over all other considerations at the moment, but we would argue that scenarios for the future of the European Union exist in which military matters are far from archaic. Russia and the Polish PatriotsFor example, the Polish government recently announced that the United States would deploy a battery of Patriot missiles to Poland. The missiles arrived this week. When the United States canceled its land-based ballistic missile defense system under intense Russian pressure, the Obama administration appeared surprised at Poland's intense displeasure with the decision. Washington responded by promising the Patriots instead, the technology the Poles had wanted all along. While the Patriot does not enhance America's ability to protect itself against long-range ballistic missiles from, for example, Iran, it does give Poland some defense against shorter-ranged ballistic missiles and substantial defense against conventional air attack. Russia is the only country capable of such attacks on Poland with even the most distant potential interest in doing so, and at this point, this is truly an abstract threat. In removing a system that was really not a threat to Russian interests — U.S. ballistic missile defense at most can handle only a score of missiles, meaning it would have a negligible impact on the Russian nuclear deterrent — the United States ironically has installed a system that could affect Russia. Under the current circumstances, this is not really significant. While much is being made of having a few U.S. boots on the ground east of Germany within 40 kilometers (about 25 miles) of the Russian Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad, a few hundred technicians and guards are simply not an offensive threat. Still, the Russians — with a long history of seeing improbable threats turning into very real ones — tend to take hypothetical limits on their power seriously. They also tend to take gestures seriously, knowing that gestures often germinate into strategic intent. The Russians obviously oppose this deployment, as the Patriots would allow Poland in league with NATO — and perhaps even by itself — to achieve local air superiority. There are many crosscurrents in Russian policy, however. For the moment, the Russians are interested in encouraging better economic relations with the West, as they could use technology and investment that would make them more than a commodity exporter. Moreover, with the Europeans preoccupied with their economic crisis and the United States still bogged down in the Middle East and needing Russian support on Iran, Moscow has found little outside resistance to its efforts to increase its influence in the former Soviet Union. Moscow is not unhappy about the European crisis and wouldn't want to do anything that might engender greater European solidarity. After all, a solid economic bloc turning into an increasingly powerful and integrated state would pose challenges to Russia in the long run that Moscow is happy to do without. The Patriot deployment is a current irritation and a hypothetical military problem, but the Russians are not inclined to create a crisis with Europe over it — though this doesn't mean Moscow won't make countermoves on the margins when it senses opportunities. For its part, the Obama administration is not focused on Poland at present. It is obsessed with internal matters, South Asia and the Middle East. The Patriots were shipped based on a promise made months ago to calm Central European nerves over the Obama administration's perceived lack of commitment to the region. In the U.S. State and Defense department sections charged with shipping Patriots to Poland, the delivery process was almost an afterthought; repeated delays in deploying the system highlighted Washington's lack of strategic intent. It is therefore tempting to dismiss the Patriots as of little importance, as merely the combination of a hangover from a Cold War mentality and a minor Obama administration misstep. Indeed, even a sophisticated observer of the international system might barely note it. But we would argue that it is more important than it appears precisely because of everything else going on. Existential Crisis in the EUThe European Union is experiencing an existential crisis. This crisis is not about Greece, but rather, what it is that members of the European Union owe each other and what controls the European Union has over its members. The European Union did well during a generation of prosperity. As financial crisis struck, better-off members were called on to help worse-off members. Again, this is not just about Greece — the 2008 credit crisis in Central Europe was about the same thing. The wealthier countries, Germany in particular, are not happy at the prospect of spending taxpayer money to assist countries dealing with popped credit bubbles. They really don't want to do that, and if they do, they really want to have controls over the ways these other countries spend their money so this circumstance doesn't arise again. Needless to say, Greece — and countries that might wind up like Greece — do not want foreign control over their finances. If there are no mutual obligations among EU member nations, and the German and Greek publics don't want to bail out or submit, respectively, then the profound question is raised of what Europe is going to be — beyond a mere free trade zone — after this crisis. This is not simply a question of the euro surviving, although that is no trivial matter. The euro and the European Union will probably survive this crisis — although their mutual failure is not nearly as unthinkable as the Europeans would have thought even a few months ago — but this is not the only crisis Europe will experience. Something always will be going wrong, and Europe does not have institutions that could handle these problems. Events in the past few weeks indicate that European countries are not inclined to create such institutions, and that public opinion will limit European governments' ability to create or participate in these institutions. Remember, building a super state requires one of two things: a war to determine who is in charge or political unanimity to forge a treaty. Europe is — vividly — demonstrating the limitations on the second strategy. Whatever happens in the short run, it is difficult to envision any further integration of European institutions. And it is very easy to see how the European Union will devolve from its ambitious vision into an alliance of convenience built around economic benefits negotiated and renegotiated among the partners. It would thus devolve from a union to a treaty, with no interest beyond self-interest. The German Question RevisitedWe return to the question that has defined Europe since 1871, namely, the status of Germany in Europe. As we have seen during the current crisis, Germany is clearly the economic center of gravity in Europe, and this crisis has shown that the economic and the political issues are very much one and the same. Unless Germany agrees, nothing can be done, and if Germany so wishes, something will be done. Germany has tremendous power in Europe, even if it is confined largely to economic matters. But just as Germany is the blocker and enabler of Europe, over time that makes Germany the central problem of Europe. If Germany is the key decision maker in Europe, then Germany defines whatever policies Europe as a whole undertakes. If Europe fragments, then Germany is the only country in Europe with the ability to create alternative coalitions that are both powerful and cohesive. That means that if the European Union weakens, Germany will have the greatest say in what Europe will become. Right now, the Germans are working assiduously to reformulate the European Union and the eurozone in a manner more to their liking. But as this requires many partners to offer sovereignty to German control — sovereignty they have jealously guarded throughout the European project — it is worth exploring alternatives to Germany in the European Union. For that we first must understand Germany's limits. The German problem is the same problem it has had since unification: It is enormously powerful, but it is far from omnipotent. Its very power makes it the focus of other powers, and together, these other powers can cripple Germany. Thus, Germany is indispensable for any decision within the European Union at present, and it will be the single center of power in Europe in the future — but Germany can't just go it alone. Germany needs a coalition, meaning the long-term question is this: If the EU were to weaken or even fail, what alternative coalition would Germany seek? The casual answer is France, as the two economies are somewhat similar and the countries are next-door neighbors. But historically, this similarity in structure and location has been a source not of collaboration and fondness but of competition and friction. Within the European Union, with its broad diversity, Germany and France have been able to put aside their frictions, finding a common interest in managing Europe to their mutual advantage. That co-management, of course, helped bring us to this current crisis. Moreover, the biggest thing that France has that Germany wants is its market; an ideal partner for Germany would offer more. By itself at least, France is not a foundation for long-term German economic strategy. The historic alternative for Germany has been Russia. The Russian OptionA great deal of potential synergy exists between the German and Russian economies. Germany imports large amounts of energy and other resources from Russia. As mentioned, Russia needs sources of technology and capital to move it beyond its current position of mere resource exporter. Germany has a shrinking population and needs a source of labor — preferably a source that doesn't actually want to move to Germany. Russia's Soviet-era economy continues to de-industrialize, and while that has a plethora of negative impacts, there is one often-overlooked positive: Russia now has more labor than it can effectively metabolize in its economy given its capital structure. Germany doesn't want more immigrants but needs access to labor. Russia wants factories in Russia to employ its surplus work force, and it wants technology. The logic of the German-Russian economic relationship is more obvious than the German-Greek or German-Spanish relationship. As for France, it can participate or not (and incidentally, the French are joining in on a number of ongoing German-Russian projects). Therefore, if we simply focus on economics, and we assume that the European Union cannot survive as an integrated system (a logical but not yet proven outcome), and we further assume that Germany is both the leading power of Europe and incapable of operating outside of a coalition, then we would argue that a German coalition with Russia is the most logical outcome of an EU decline. This would leave many countries extremely uneasy. The first is Poland, caught as it is between Russia and Germany. The second is the United States, since Washington would see a Russo-German economic bloc as a more significant challenger than the European Union ever was for two reasons. First, it would be a more coherent relationship — forging common policies among two states with broadly parallel interests is far simpler and faster than doing so among 27. Second, and more important, where the European Union could not develop a military dimension due to internal dissensions, the emergence of a politico-military dimension to a Russo-German economic bloc is far less difficult to imagine. It would be built around the fact that both Germans and Russians resent and fear American power and assertiveness, and that the Americans have for years been courting allies who lie between the two powers. Germany and Russia would both view themselves defending against American pressure. And this brings us back to the Patriot missiles. Regardless of the bureaucratic backwater this transfer might have emerged out of, or the political disinterest that generated the plan, the Patriot stationing fits neatly into a slowly maturing military relationship between Poland and the United States. A few months ago, the Poles and Americans conducted military exercises in the Baltic states, an incredibly sensitive region for the Russians. The Polish air force now flies some of the most modern U.S.-built F-16s in the world; this, plus Patriots, could seriously challenge the Russians. A Polish general commands a sector in Afghanistan, something not lost upon the Russians. By a host of processes, a close U.S.-Polish relationship is emerging. The current economic problems may lead to a fundamental weakening of the European Union. Germany is economically powerful but needs economic coalition partners that contribute to German well-being rather than merely draw on it. A Russian-German relationship could logically emerge from this. If it did, the Americans and Poles would logically have their own relationship. The former would begin as economic and edge toward military. The latter begins as military, and with the weakening of the European Union, edges toward economics. The Russian-German bloc would attempt to bring others into its coalition, as would the Polish-U.S. bloc. Both would compete in Central Europe — and for France. During this process, the politics of NATO would shift from humdrum to absolutely riveting. And thus, the Greek crisis and the Patriots might intersect, or in our view, will certainly in due course intersect. Though neither is of lasting importance in and of themselves, the two together point to a new logic in Europe. What appears impossible now in Europe might not be unthinkable in a few years. With Greece symbolizing the weakening of the European Union and the Patriots representing the remilitarization of at least part of Europe, ostensibly unconnected tendencies might well intersect.
Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized by prominently displaying the following sentence at the beginning or end of the report, including the hyperlink to STRATFOR: "This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR" |
May 25, 2010
STRATFOR: Germany After the EU and the Russian Scenario
May 23, 2010
President Highlights Role of Iran, Serbia in New World Order
President Highlights Role of Iran, Serbia in New World Order TEHRAN (FNA)- Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Sunday underlined Tehran and Belgrade's significant role in the establishment of a new world order. |
"Iran and Serbia can have constructive and useful cooperation with each other in establishing new world orders on the basis of justice and humanity," Ahmadinejad said in a meeting with new Serbian Ambassador to Tehran Alexander Tacik here today.
"Iran and Serbia are two countries that have always accompanied each other in progressive activities and moves of the world," Ahmadinejad went on saying.
"The world is entering a new era, and all orders, systems and notions of the last 60 years have practically come to the end of the road due to their false view about man and the world and due to their unjust manner," he stressed.
On the bilateral ties, President Ahmadinejad said there is no impediment to the further expansion of Iran-Serbia ties, and called for bolstering cooperation between the two sides.
Ahmadinejad further pointed out that Iran and Serbia's memberships in such international bodies and circles as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) provides a proper ground for the consolidation of cooperation and coordination between the two countries in the international arena.
Tacik, who submitted a copy of his credentials to President Ahmadinejad, underlined Iran's regional and international role, and stated, "Iran plays a central role in the Middle-East and is among the important members of the international community."
"Serbia is willing to promote its ties with Iran in all fields," the envoy concluded.
http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8903021591
The Reemergence of German Dominance in Europe
May 02, 2010
The Reemergence of German Dominance in Europe
By Peter Glover and Michael J. Economides
The European Union was supposed to change all that, but it is a hard-boiled geopolitical maxim that nationalism trumps transnationalism whenever national interest -- military, economic or energy -- is at stake. Unfortunately, for Europeans, it is a fact of life which Europe's leaders have consistently ignored, with historically disastrous consequences.
While romantics, mostly liberals, like to dream about universal love, human selflessness, and the benevolence of transnational governance, national big hitters just keep batting them back to earthy reality. While the EU may believe its $40-billion bailout offer will buy desperately needed breathing space, the greater battle to harmonize the "un-harmonizable" -- sixteen vastly differing Eurozone economies -- is the far bigger story. Of even greater import is Germany's growing "fifth column" status in European politics, a direct corollary of its reemergence to political dominance in the new Europe.
A Greek Tragedy in 3-D: Debt, Deficit, Default
Though the political EU is made up of 27 member-states, only sixteen are signed up to Eurozone monetarization. But a Eurozone crisis has been brewing since Greece's economic free-fall from grace stemming from the general economic vulnerability of the southern states, those affectionately known as PIGS -- Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain (though Ireland too is normally included). While the spectre of economic debt, deficit, and default stalks all of these, the Greek economy is, at least for now, the weakest. It may appear exaggerated on the surface. After all, the Greek economy accounts for 2.6% percent of the Eurozone economy. But the interesting issue is that the Greek situation, if not resolved convincingly, will bring to the surface what many suspect and many others see clearly: a serious economic vulnerability in a Europe suffering from (just to name a few) enormous demographics problems, inability to grow economically, and suffocation by entitlements.
The immediate crisis was set in motion when Greece finally decided to admit that it had "misrepresented" (lied about) for years the extent of its debt and that it needed to borrow over 50 billion euros ($66.5 billion) to avoid bankruptcy before the end of 2010. But the root of the crisis is firmly bedded in the soil of Eurozone regulations for disparate economies -- a one-size-fits-all financial straitjacket. As a result, Greece's deficit is running at a rate four times higher than the Eurozone rules allow. The trouble is that Greek politicians were paralyzed into inaction.
There are the rioting Greek street mobs, but those are a tiny group of mindless anarchists. Many other demonstrators fail to see why they should pay for the incompetence of the nation's profligate politicians and dishonest bankers. Tax evasion was rampant. In a recent study by the current Greek government, it was found that fewer than 1,500 Greeks were reporting incomes larger than 100,000 Euros. Greece's deficit, having been recently revised up to nearly 13 percent of GDP, now threatens not only Greece defaulting on its loans, but the whole stability of the European Union project.
However, the debate is not just about the Greek economy and management; it goes to the heart of how the EU is run and what the whole experiment really means. Talk of a rule-changing Constitution and a new European Monetary Fund (an EU version of the International Monetary Fund) does not sit well with Europe's three major economies -- Germany, France, and Britain. In Britain, a new Constitution would be an impossible sell. Meanwhile, in Germany, an increasingly disillusioned electorate and political elite have simply had enough of picking up the tab for southern Europe's laggard economies.
By late March 2010, as the Greek financial crisis worsened, Germany, Europe's largest economy, had made it clear that while it would play the EU unity game, it would do so on its own terms, and that meant no EMF slush fund -- especially one with Germany as the largest contributor. By mid-April, as Greece's approach to the bond markets was palpably stalling, the new EU President, Herman Van Rompuy, felt impelled to steady jittery markets by reiterating the EU's pledge of a bailout for Greece. That meant one thing: the EU must go cap in hand to the IMF. The resulting agreement to offer Greece a $40-billion loan (it is not clear how much will actually come from the IMF) at around 5 percent interest is now on the table. While Greek ministers initially claimed that they would not need to pick it up, most investors believe they will have no choice. The investors were right. On April 25, Greek PM George Papandreou formally asked the IMF and EU to activate their joint bailout rescue package.
So for the moment, while the promise of bailout may forestall fears of an imminent Eurozone collapse, the crisis itself has thrown into stark relief a seismic change in the anatomy of EU "unity." While the European Central Bank -- the former German Central Bank -- is content to act as Europe's banker, that no longer means that it is content to act as its chief investor and financial guarantor. It's a fundamental change that overtly exposes the EU's political frailty on the global stage, particularly its ability to keep its own house in order. But, just as significantly, it reflects Germany's "fifth column" status in Europe, too, as it now regularly subverts EU policy in its national interest; indeed, something we applaud. When it comes to key national security -- energy and otherwise -- all EU states need to consider extracting themselves from the politicized machinations of a transnationalist governance that, like the U.N., operates on the basis of the lowest common denominator principle, that being often against national interest.
The Russo-German "Special Relationship"
We have written elsewhere (see next link below) about the growing Russo-German trade and energy ties that have progressively usurped EU policy. Germany's penchant for cutting unilateral oil and natural gas deals with Russia, for instance, runs entirely counter to the EU's critical policy to escape the grip of Russian energy dependency. Clearly, while Germany talks the talk of EU unity, in reality, it is inclined to walk the walk all the way to Moscow to secure a more realistic national energy future, one that is far more pragmatic than that offered by the EU's absurdly optimistic alternative energy strategy. Indeed, Germany's so-called "Green" Chancellor had no compunction in green-lighting Germany's new generation of 26 coal-fired power stations, carbon storage or no carbon storage.
Most iconic, however, is how the Russo-German "special relationship" has consistently attempted to sabotage EU moves aimed at ending dependence on Russian oil and gas through what we have termed "The Nabucco Conspiracy." The Nabucco pipeline, due to begin construction in 2011, is still without a viable supply of natural gas. Yet Nabucco continues to be cited by European ministers as the key to European diversification away from Russian energy dependence. With Nabucco's future still uncertain, Russia has proceeded apace with its plans for the Europe-bound Nord and Sud Stream pipelines, with German connivance.
On April 9, Russia's Gazprom began laying over 1,200 kilometers of the Nord Stream pipeline. At the launch were Vladimir Putin and Nord Stream's chairman and former German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder. Herr Schröder has proved a redoubtable choice as chairman of Nord Stream, with his still powerful ties to Angela Merkel's administration, as well as a vital cog in Russia's "divide and conquer" energy strategy, when it comes to cutting energy deals with European states. These are states that inexplicably have an aversion to having their lights go out and heat turned off, and who have zero confidence in the EU's unrealistic energy policies.
More significant on the global stage is how increasing Russian energy dependency for European states is likely to prove a foreign policy game-changer, and one that does not augur well for future EU relations with the United States. It seems that though the EU ship of state(s) sails under an independent flag, the ship will continue to be Russia-fueled, with the German-dominated European Central Bank acting as rudder.
The Greek Tragedy: A Symptom of the Failure of Transnational Governance
It is a fact of geopolitical life that as a single culture will come to dominate wherever multiculturalism is trumpeted, so the largest national economy too must dominate wherever transnational governance is attempted. Margaret Thatcher saw the EU's Achilles heel from the start. In 2003, in her opus "Statecraft," Mrs. Thatcher noted how European Union enthusiasts preferred the expression "the United States of Europe." Mrs. Thatcher warned, "The parallel is deeply flawed and deeply significant. It is flawed because the United States was based from its inception on a common language, culture, and values -- Europe has none of these things." Thatcher added, "By contrast, 'Europe' is ... a classic utopian project, a monument to the vanity of intellectuals, a programme whose inevitable destiny is failure; only the scale of the final damage done is in doubt." Germany's contemporary reemergence as the dominating European power is not only likely, but has always been inevitable.
It is the irony of ironies that a European "supra-state" wholly conceived for the express purpose of suppressing German nationalist ambition should end up, within just two decades, in Germany's economic thrall.
The importance of how nationalism will always trump trans-national governance is dealt with in greater depth in "Energy and Climate Wars: How naive politicians, green ideologues and media elites are undermining the truth about energy and climate" by Peter C. Glover and Michael J. Economides, to be published by Continuum Books in September 2010 and now available for pre-sale here at Continuum and here at Amazon.
25 Comments on "The Reemergence of German Dominance in Europe"
http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/05/the_reemergence_of_german_domi.html
Life in the German empire
Life in the German empire
Germany's fortunes are now intimately linked to a circle of countries that have become economic colonies
Berlin today does not look or feel like an imperial centre. In fact, it does everything it can to be the precise opposite, a living monument to the horrors and follies of attempting to rule the world, its well-maintained bombsites, bunkers and wall fragments a permanent reminder of history's two bloodiest attempts, from the Reichstag and then the Kremlin, to expand control beyond one's own borders.
So you might understand why Germans, and their leaders, have been slow and wary to accept that their fortunes are now intimately linked to a circle of countries that have become economic colonies, and that this responsibility carries very large-scale, and non-optional, costs and responsibilities for the German taxpayer.
They don't like to think of it that way. When it became apparent this week that Berlin will have to contribute at least $32-billion toward a Greek rescue plan over the next three years, the front page of Bild, the flamboyant Berlin tabloid that represents a window into the country's unguarded id, went apoplectic: "Billions for Greece: What's In It For Us?" it asked in three-inch-high type.
Chancellor Angela Merkel had hoped that the big cash rescue could be put aside until after the May 9 regional elections in North Rhine-Westphalia, where news of a big foreign payout could hurt her party's fortunes.
But the Greek crisis, and the mounting Portuguese and possibly Spanish and Italian crises, are, at their heart, and in their origin, German crises.
Ms. Merkel realized, almost too late, that letting the rescue wait will only cost Germany more money and possibly destroy its institutions, so on Thursday she took action and primed the pumps for a bailout. Greece and its neighbours, she acknowledged, are not just nearby countries; they are umbilically linked to Germany, and their fates had become inseparable.
To understand this, you need to visit the residential shopping streets of southern Europe. What you will see is German: The food in the supermarkets, the electronics shops, the clothing outlets and a great many of the cars on the road, to say nothing of the olive presses, sewage-treatment plants and fishing boats. The banks used by consumers are often branches of German chains, and their loans have financed huge building booms.
Germany is the world's second-largest exporter, ahead of the United States and exceeded only by China, and its largest markets are its European neighbours. These countries are net importers: They meet most of their needs by buying things from other countries, especially Germany, which has used its size and wealth to build efficiencies, and economies of scale, that make its exports irresistibly cheap.
This leads to a balance-of-payments deficit: These importing countries have more money flowing out of their borders than they have coming in – for Greece, an amount equivalent to a tenth of the entire economy – and Germany has a surplus, with piles of it stacking up.
When other countries have balance-of-payments deficits, they can escape by devaluing their currencies and slashing the exchange rate. This, in essence, is what the United States is doing to ease its $2-trillion imbalance with China. But Greece and Germany share a currency, the euro, so that option isn't possible. And in a common-currency system, a balance-of-payments deficit becomes a fiscal deficit: It turns into government debt.
Money cannot sit still, and nature abhors a vacuum, so German banks disposed of those heaps of surplus export-payment cash by lending it to companies, especially property developers, in those same countries at low interest rates. And they lent it to their governments, too, to fill their need for missing cash, which would in turn be spent on more German goods and services.
Through this constantly repeated cycle of exports, payments, surpluses and then loans to southern Europe, Berlin became an imperial centre, tying its southern neighbours to dependencies on debt and cheap exported goods. Switching sides was impossible: Unlike China, Greece didn't have an undervalued currency in which to pay its workers and sell its goods, so it had no hope of developing a strong export sector. Germany had got the jump, by developing high-productivity big industries that its customer states could never match.
Ms. Merkel talked yesterday of using her country's patronage to cure Greece of its miscreant ways. "We will not shirk our responsibility," she said. "But the precondition is that Greece accepts an exacting program which will allow the restoration of market confidence in Greece."
That's a start. But as it stands, a complete rescue will only return Greece and its neighbours to the status quo ante: Dependency on German exports, German debt, German rescues. To end the cycle, Germany will need to dig in and help these countries develop real export economies. That's a lot more expensive, and a lot more complicated – but that's life in an empire.
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/life-in-the-german-empire/article1553140/
May 21, 2010
German company Ecolog accused of drug smuggling in Afghanistan
German company Ecolog accused of drug smuggling in Afghanistan
February 26, 2010 — Ms Sparky
February 26, 2010
Ecolog works for ISAF troops in Afghanistan A German waste management firm employed by the NATO mission in Afghanistan has been accused of involvement in drug smuggling. Allegations against Ecolog and the Macedonian family behind it date back to the war in Kosovo.
Allegations have surfaced that a German-based company contracted by NATO's ISAF troops in Afghanistan may have been involved in smuggling drugs out of the country.
"There is a chance that drugs or other such things have been smuggled," NATO General Egon Ramms, chief at ISAF headquarters in the Netherlands told German public broadcaster NDR.
The German general confirmed that an investigation was underway into allegations that Dusseldorf-based Ecolog used contracts with NATO or ISAF for illegal activities. The firm had been working for NATO in Afghanistan since 2003, Ramms said.
Ecolog dismissed the allegations as "absurd," telling Deutsche Welle in an e-mail message that none of the accusations made against it were true.
"Since 2002, the company has been a reliable partner to both NATO and the German military Bundeswehr in crisis regions," Ecolog said.
Allegations date back to Kosovo war
Drugs from poppy plantations are a major - though illegal - export from Afghanistan
Ecolog is employed by ISAF to handle laundry services at various locations in Kabul as well as garbage disposal at the military airport and ISAF headquarters in the Afghan capital. The company had been in charge of fuel deliveries to NATO troops in the past.
According to NDR, initial allegations against Ecolog and the Macedonian-Albanian family behind the company date back to the war in Kosovo. Then NATO-led KFOR troops had already suggested there may have been links between the Destani family and organized crime.
NDR quoted a current confidential KFOR report as saying that "the Destani family from Tetovo controls crime and smuggling activities at the Kosovar-Macedonian border."
Ecolog contracts under scrutiny
"This has only now come to my attention," said ISAF General Ramms. "Of course this will automatically trigger an investigation to see whether Ecolog is still a respectable business partner for us."
NDR reported that information regarding the suspicions about the company was readily available in NATO's databases.
Ecolog's two contracts with NATO could be cancelled, should the allegations turn out to be justified.
The German government has confirmed that it is aware of the investigations into the company and is reviewing its contracts with Ecolog. The Defense Ministry's 2010 budget includes contracts worth around 50 million euros ($68 million) with the firm. (click HERE for original article)
I had blogged about this back in December 2009, but the US media doesn't seem to be picking up on it for some reason. Here's a little Ecolog/KBR trivia for you. Retired Lt. General and former LOGCAP III Project General Manager Steve Arnold left KBR and served as the Ecolog President and CEO in 2007.
Ms Sparky
http://mssparky.com/2010/02/german-company-ecolog-accused-of-drug-smuggling-in-afghanistan/
May 18, 2010
Is it the Euro or the Yugo?
Is it the Euro or the Yugo?
The highly-touted European currency, the Euro, is performing more like the ill-fated Yugoslavian car maker, the hapless Yugo. And, there is a pretty good analogy between the problems inherent in the fractious group of countries that make up the European Union and the fractious group of countries that made up the now-defunct country of Yugoslavia, where the Yugo was born. You know the regions I'm thinking of–Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro etc. Once the veneer of nationality was swept away, Yugoslavia quickly descended into a hellish nightmare of civil war and racial hatred.
Maybe I'm overstating things a bit, but the events in Greece over the past few weeks do not suggest a peaceful outcome is nigh as riots, strikes and social strife rock the country.
David Callaway, Editor-in chief, at MarketWatch, recently wrote a lengthy piece on the history of the Euro and what is going on. He believes the Euro can and should be saved, but only if the European Community goes to extraordinary lengths to do so [emphasis added].
Malignant market forces set sights on Europe (MarketWatch, May 6, 2010, David Callaway)
…A cover story in Business Week magazine, perhaps 15 years ago before the euro was adopted, envisioned how it would collapse. As Greece was not seen as an eventual member then, the story imagined the crisis would start in Italy, and almost exactly as it has played out in Greece, with poor budget management leading to economic punishment from Europe, leading to rioting in the streets.
The story was shrugged off by the winners of the euro debate at the time, who with the momentum of historic change behind them claimed it was scare-mongering by a reckless financial media. Once instated, the euro could not collapse without economic chaos if member states tried to revive their former currencies, they argued. Now the markets are looking at the very real possibility of that happening.
There is still time to save the project, and indeed, it should be saved. But it will take an extraordinary effort not just by Jean Claude Trichet at the ECB, and the IMF, but by the leaders of the major European nations, Germany, France, and yes, the non-euro U.K., once it votes on a new government this week.
…The euro can be saved. But Europe's leaders will need to trash their playbook and roll out a much more ambitious and expensive plan — one that will call for an unprecedented degree of cooperation and sacrifice among each other and their nations. And they need to realize that at the moment, nobody is betting that can happen.
The reason the financial markets are skeptical about the Euro is that Europe's leaders have already given the crisis their best shot. They united briefly on this nearly $1 trillion bailout, but that is almost certainly about as far as they can go. In fact, the bailout is already causing severe political problems for Germany's leadership.
Unfortunately, as New York Times columnist and Nobel prize-winning economist, Paul Krugman wrote at the end of a column about the Greek crisis, the bailout won't be enough to do the trick [emphasis added]:
…The good news here is that for the first time in this crisis, European policy makers have gotten ahead of the curve, acting more strongly than almost anyone expected. That's a shock, and it has awed the markets. But I still don't think it's nearly enough.
The problem Krguman refers to is solvency, not just liquidity. That is, Greece has a budget deficit north of 13% of GDP and there is little likelihood that the political and social will exists to cut that back in a meaningful way. Government debt amounts to 125% or more of GDP. Deficits and debt of that magnitude are well beyond what that economy can manage. In other words, Greece is broke.
Earlier in the column referenced above, Krugman spelled out what has to happen if Greece is get become solvent [emphasis added:
…What the country must do, regardless of how it's accomplished, is achieve relative deflation — reduce its costs and prices compared with Germany and France, regaining competitiveness. With German inflation low, this means an extended period of deflation, with high costs in employment and output. It also means fiscal difficulties, requiring spending cuts and tax increases that deepen the slump…
The prescription for regaining fiscal health as outlined above above would probably work, but it would also trigger negative consequences including lower economic growth and social unrest. Truly, a no win situation. And, I sincerely doubt if the political will exists in Greece or the EU to take the steps outlined by Krugman.
The currency markets have looked at the Euro and, at least for now, the trend is down as this MarketWatch report indicates:
The euro slumped Friday to the lowest level against the dollar since October 2008, as worries about financial stability on the Continent and the political will to enact unpopular deficit-reduction measures led traders to dump the shared currency. The euro's decline was sparked by a report, since denied, that France's president had threatened to pull his nation out of the euro zone.
…The shared currency touched an intraday low of $1.2357, its weakest level since at least October 2008…
…"The euro is in a no-win situation at this point," said strategists at Brown Brothers Harriman. "There is also concern that the much tighter fiscal stance in the euro-zone periphery will have significant negative impact on the growth outlook, with potential serious negative social consequences."…
So, where does that leave the Euro. Is it:
- The Euro, the vaunted currency that is poised to supplant the U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency
- The Yugo, a failing currency whose time has come and is now going?
I believe we will see some countries leaving the common currency as they become increasingly unable to manage their own economies under the Euro straitjacket. Candidates for this would be Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. It also has become unlikely the United Kingdom will agree to give up the British Pound to go with the Euro. What will be left are stronger countries such as Germany and France and perhaps a few more. At that point, there will not be much reason to keep the battered Euro going.
Though it will take a long time, I believe the Euro is really the Yugo and it is doomed to a similar fate.
http://blogs.marketwatch.com/fundmastery/2010/05/15/is-it-the-euro-or-the-yugo/
Uncovering Albania's role in the Kosovo war : - TRUTH FOR ONCE
Uncovering Albania's role in the Kosovo war
After the arrest of a man in Kosovo on war crimes charges this month, the BBC's Nick Thorpe visits Albania, which is at the centre of the EU-led investigation into torture and murder.
Durres is a popular holiday spot, but is implicated in a dark chapter of history |
The Hotel Drenica still graces the sea-front in Durres, on Albania's Adriatic coast - one of a long line of hotels and restaurants waiting for the summer influx of tourists.
Children take their first dip of the season in the warming sea, while their parents sip coffee and watch them from the terraces, and boys play football on the sand.
Ties to neighbouring Kosovo run deep. Tens of thousands of refugees found shelter here during the war, and local people are proud of their role in helping their ethnic-Albanian brethren in their hour of need.
Many bars incorporate Kosovo in their names. In the 1998-99 conflict, the Hotel Drenica was at the centre of everything - it was the local headquarters of the Kosovo Liberation Army.
There is still an engraving on a red marble block at the back of the hotel, of a soldier and the initials UCK - the KLA.
But the arrest of Sabit Geci in Pristina on 6 May, and an ongoing investigation by the War Crimes Unit of Eulex - the European Union Law and Justice Mission in Kosovo - look set to show the role of Durres in a different light.
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Former prisoner, Kukes detention centre |
We panicked every time they opened the door, wondering who they were going to pick on next 
Mr Geci, 51, stands accused of the torture and killing of ethnic Albanian prisoners of the KLA at a detention facility within a KLA base in the north-east Albanian town of Kukes in 1999. According to investigators, some of the 40 people who were mistreated in Kukes were detained by the KLA in Durres.
There were also Serb prisoners kept in Kukes - apparently kidnapped and smuggled in from across the border, and kept in a separate room.
Lawyers for Mr Geci say he denies all charges, and was receiving medical treatment in Slovenia during the period mentioned by Eulex, April-June 1999.
Interrogated
As Serb military and paramilitary forces swept through Kosovo in the spring of 1999, forcing 800,000 Kosovo Albanians from their homes, and killing more than 10,000, many refugees found shelter in Albania.
Many Kosovan refugees ended up in a refugee camp in Kukes, Albania |
Some stayed in makeshift refugee camps near the border. Others were redistributed around the country, and an out-of-season tourist resort like Durres proved very useful.
But the KLA was curious about some of the new arrivals. Why were young men of military age not joining their ranks in the desperate conflict with the Serbs? Had some collaborated with the Serbs in the past? Did some belong to rival Albanian political and military factions? Had some even been sent as spies for the Serbs, to uncover KLA supply routes for men and guns into the country?
In Durres, the interrogations took place in the Hotel Drenica.
"Bad things happened here," said a man on the beach at Durres, nodding in the direction of the Hotel Drenica, "but I am not willing to talk about them."
Buses bedecked with red and black Albanian flags took the willing - and less willing - recruits back to the front.
Some men were taken prisoner and held in terrible conditions in detention facilities inside KLA camps. The one at Kukes, in a disused factory, was among the worst. A BBC investigation last year contacted former inmates.
"We panicked every time they opened the door, wondering who they were going to pick on next," one survivor of the Kukes camp told us.
"There were no good guards there. The ones who came from the fronts and had lost relatives would beat us up, or threaten us with automatic rifles.
"One man was killed in front of all the prisoners in that room, including myself. He was shot and left to bleed to death."
He could have understood such mistreatment, the witness added, if he had really been a traitor to the Albanian cause.
'Misuse of uniform'
The Prime Minster of Kosovo, and former political commander of the KLA, Hashim Thaci, last year denied that the KLA had mistreated prisoners in Kukes or elsewhere, telling the BBC: "It just didn't happen. At any time, in any case, in any place... this has nothing to do with the Kosovo Liberation Army."
Like many local venues, the Hotel Drenica is proud of its links to Kosovo |
He admitted that war crimes had been committed after the war, but said the culprits were "pretending they belonged to the KLA", by wearing its uniform.
But Eulex war crimes investigators believe Mr Geci, who is said to have been a key figure in KLA intelligence in Kukes, took part in the beatings there.
On 12 May, the house of another Kosovo Albanian suspect, Xhemshit Krasniqi, was raided in the western Kosovo town of Prizren. Some items were reportedly removed.
Eulex inherited 980 war-crimes cases from the outgoing UN mission in Kosovo. They have narrowed their investigations to just 20 cases - two of them across the border in Albania.
But they say their requests for help from the Albanian government - to visit former camps, interview witnesses, and exhume graves - have been stonewalled.
In February this year, Philip Alston, UN special rapporteur for extra-judicial killings, visited Albania and reported that "none of the international efforts to investigate KLA abuses in Albania has received meaningful co-operation from the government of Albania".
Ilir Meta, the Albanian deputy prime minister and foreign minister, denied that.
"Albania is willing to co-operate for respecting... international law with the international community, and I think that for every request we... will give the right answer," he told the BBC.
"Including with Eulex?" I asked.
"Why not?" he replied.
May 17, 2010
Mosque Coming to Ground Zero
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Facebook Group Opposes Mosque at Ground ZeroControversial new neighbor at Ground Zero: A mosqueBy LYNDA BAQUEROUpdated 5:56 PM EDT, Thu, May 13, 2010Construction continues in and around Ground Zero more than eight years after the events of September Eleventh. And one of the newest construction projects could be a mosque two blocks away. A former Burlington Coat Factory building on Park Place is being eyed as the future home of the Cordoba House, sponsored by the American Society for Muslim Advancement, in partnership with the Cordoba Initiative. Community Board 1 has reportedly already passed a resolution in favor of the proposal. In addition to a mosque, the Cordoba House would have rooms for community events, a performance space, fitness facilities and classrooms. It would cost about $100 million to build, and fundraising efforts are just now underway. The mosque could be open in three years. But before construction even begins, there's already opposition from a group on Facebook. The page is called "1,000,000+ people who disapprove of building a mosque at Ground Zero!" and just days after launching, there are already over 20,000 members. Mosque Coming to Ground Zero The page's administrator spoke with NBCNewYork by telephone from his home upstate. He asked that we not name him, because of "security concerns." He said the idea behind the page is "not to bash Muslims or tell them they can't practice their faith", but to express his belief that the location is an "inappropriate place". He added that the page is "growing at a rate of 200 people an hour." Supporters though say the mosque's location is ideal because it would address the growing number of Muslims downtown. Nooh Al-Arcon, who lives in Brooklyn but works near Ground Zero, told us, "there's a very small amount of mosques throughout New York", and added, "I think it's better to definitely have more mosques in more places because this is the best way to integrate into society." As for opponents of the planned mosque, Al-Arcon says "I would hope that people would have an open heart and mind to the dignity and respect that Islam portrays." First Published: May 12, 2010 6:09 PM EDT |
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© NBC Universal, Inc. | All Rights Reserved.
May 15, 2010
The Islamization of Canada
The Islamization of Canada
Posted GMT 5-14-2010 16:31:48
Seven years after its application, Al Jazeera English has been launched in Canada. The three largest cable providers (Bell TV, Rogers and Videotron) are carrying the digital channel. Al Jazeera (AJ), a.k.a. the "CNN of the Arab World" was given its approval papers by the Canadian broadcast regulator--the CRTC (Canadian Television and Telecommunications Commission).
Not surprisingly, the Managing Director of Al Jazeera English is Tony Burman, former Editor in Chief of the CBC--the leftist network propped up by its infinite bank payroll--taxpayer dollars. Yet the publicly funded CRTC has blocked several applications by Fox News, which by the way is in demand in Canada, but not Liberal and politically correct enough for a country long dominated by leftist media ideologues.
Oh, and there's something else funded by Canadian taxpayers: Harems! Hundreds of GTA (Greater Toronto Area) Muslim men in polygamous marriages are receiving welfare and social benefits for each of their spouses.
Mumtaz Ali, president of the Canadian Society of Muslims, said wives in polygamous marriages are recognized as spouses under the Ontario Family Law Act, providing they were legally married under Muslim laws abroad. -- Toronto Sun
So here we "stand on guard" in Canada incorporating foreign Muslim laws into our provincial social benefits system. This is possible because, while polygamy is officially outlawed in Canada, there is a loophole in the law which is, it goes without saying, being capitalized upon by fundamentalist Muslims.
Canada is a very liberal-minded country, Ali said…way ahead of Britain in this respect. -- Toronto Sun
It's a troubling statement given that Canada shares its borders with the United States -- the leader on the terrorist war front. And let's not even mention the fact that Britain has actually gone so far as to sanction Sharia law to rule to replace common law in civil cases between Muslims.
That's bad, but it becomes even worse. A Montreal man, Mohamed Omary, has been collecting welfare cheques for nearly two decades, crisscrossing ' Europe to meet with six other men who have since been killed, convicted or linked to global terrorism.
Lawyers for RCMP and CSIS have filed documents, alleging Omary has been living off taxpayers ever since he arrived from Morocco, yet finding cash to fund his escapades throughout Europe.
Some advice: if Canadian taxpayers' dollars aren't lucrative enough, then go the Arar route, which means: sue, big time. Maher Arar originally had the audacity to demand $400-million, but settled for a meager 10.5 million. He's still on a U.S. terrorist list, yet received an apology from Prime Minister Stephen Harper and 10.5 million dollars in a legal settlement from the government (read: taxpayers) because of a s0-called injustice. Arar-- with dual Syrian and Canadian citizenship-- was detained by American authorities in New York on terrorism suspicions, sent back to his country of origin (Syria), where he was imprisoned and tortured. A judicial inquiry subsequently found that the Canadian RCMP mislabeled him as an Islamic extremist with suspected ties to al Qaeda (al Qaida) (AQ) and shared that "misinformation" with U.S. authorities which led to his deportation to Syria.
Down the road, Omar Kadhr, the Canadian kid raising all kinds of controversy among naïve, bleeding hearts because he's stuck in Guantanamo, said he saw Arar in safe houses and Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. Well, 10.5 million dollars later, who cares? Arar is happy with his new found wealth and personal apology from the Prime Minister's Office. It takes little imagination to predict what he'll do with these millions.
Conclusion: with its lucrative potentials and its strategic location so close to the United States, dhimmi Canada has made itself the ideal place to live for extremist Muslims.
By Christine Williams
www.frontpagemag.com
© 2010, Assyrian International News Agency. All Rights Reserved. Terms of Use.
012 05-14-2010 The Islamization of Canada |
Croatia should apologize for World War II genocide before joining the EU
Croatia should apologize for World War II genocide before joining the EU
Croatian fascists murdered hundreds of thousands of victims as part of a campaign against Serbs and Jews.
Ottawa
Croatia is nearing the finish line of a multiyear race to join the European Union. Its accession has been pushed along by traditional ally Germany, and by the United States, which has encouraged the EU's southwest expansion to include all of the Balkans and even Turkey.
Croatia has complied with most of the formal entry requirements and is expected to join in 2012.
However, there is another – moral – requirement Croatia should have to meet for its own sake before being admitted.
It should fully and publicly acknowledge its role in World War II as a loyal ally of the Nazi cause, and its ardent participation in genocide against its Serbian, Jewish, and Gypsy (Roma) populations. The scattered, vague, and half-hearted denials masking as apologies that Croatia has used to improve its image in recent years don't count. The country should come to grips with its genocidal role in the same way Germany has come to grips with its Nazi past.
Just this week, the Serbian parliament apologized for its role in the infamous Srebrenica massacre of 1995 that killed some 7,000 Bosnian Muslims. Such an apology was considered unthinkable even a few years ago, yet the pressures of joining the EU helped nudge that nation to account for this war crime.
It's time Croatia did the same. Croatia has more than its share of apologies to make for crimes it committed during the Balkans conflict of the 1990s, but it can start with the massive killings it unleashed during World War II.
Although estimates vary, between 300,000 and 700,000 victims were murdered by Croatian fascists during the war.
When Hitler's forces invaded Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941, Croatian right-wing extremists, under the leadership of Ante Pavelic and his fascist "Ustashi" movement, were given control of Croatia. Pavelic aligned the country enthusiastically to the Nazi cause and immediately launched a horrific onslaught against the Serbian minority. The official policy was popularly expressed as: Kill one-third of the Serbs, convert another third to Roman Catholicism, and expel the remaining third from Croatia.
The Roman Catholic Church insists it condemned the atrocities, but the record suggests a mix of official responses, ranging from weak condemnations to tacit support. While the killing was under way, the Croatian archbishop, Aloysius Stepanic, blessed the new regime and Pavelic was granted an audience with Pope Pius XII. A number of Franciscan monks participated in the killing. After the war ended, the Vatican helped Ustashi criminals evade capture and flee to South America.
During the war, Serbian Orthodox churches were burned and many Serbian communities wiped out. Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies were interned in concentration camps, where thousands of victims were slaughtered like animals.
The nature of the carnage was so horrific that senior ranking German officers in Croatia, including SS-Obergruppenführer Artur Phleps, sickened by the slaughter and worried that it was driving Serbians and anti-Ustashi Croats into the ranks of resistance groups, urged Berlin to demand a stop to the slaughter. These protests were in vain and the genocide continued. Senior Italian officers also were appalled at the killing and are on record as not only complaining but frequently offering protection to fleeing victims.
When the war ended and Josip Broz Tito's communists took command of Yugoslavia, they had no desire to renounce these dreadful events. Yugoslavia's slogan was "Brotherhood and Unity." Every effort was made to bury the past and, because Yugoslavia did not align itself with the Soviet Union, Western democracies had little interest in exposing the genocide.
Unlike Germans, who recognized the moral obligation to acknowledge their crimes committed under the Nazi regime, citizens of Tito's Yugoslavia and the Croat state felt no such obligation. Consequently, the slaughtered victims and their surviving family members still await justice.
Even today, Pavelic is looked upon by many Croatians as a national hero, as are some of the most vicious Ustashi criminals.
In 2001, Croatian President Stepjan Mesic apologized to Jews in an address delivered at the Israeli Knesset. In 2003, he joined Serbia's president in a mutual apology for "all the evils" each side had brought during the Balkan conflict.
Such carefully worded official apologies are a step in the right direction, but authentic repudiation of the past should be demonstrated by Croatians themselves.
Evidence suggests they still have a long way to go. Crowds at Croatian soccer games and concerts flaunt Ustashi and Nazi symbols and sing old fascist chants and songs. Croatians indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia are also hailed as defenders of the nation.
Croatia needs to purge itself of its dark past. Its prolonged denial of outrageous crimes committed in the 20th century has created what the Croatian exiled writer Dubravka Ugresic has described as a "culture of lies." Until Croatia can learn to tell the truth about its history, there should be no place for it in the European Union.
James Bissett is the former Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia (1990-92)
http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2010/0402/Croatia-should-apologize-for-World-War-II-genocide-before-joining-the-EU
Noam Chomsky: The U.S. Continues to Be a Terrorist State
Guernica / By Joel Whitney
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Noam Chomsky: The U.S. Continues to Be a Terrorist State
Noam Chomsky discusses his forthcoming book, the hypocrisy of neoliberalism and where he feels hopeful about democracy despite U.S. terrorism.
May 12, 2010 |
If Noam Chomsky's critics have a common refrain, it is pointing to his habit of being far too hard on America's motives and too easy on its opponents. The former, of course, is his métier. The latter criticism has limited (though a few important) instances. In fact, Chomsky's central question is how do you punish the crook who owns the jailhouse, pays the police their salaries, and fails consistently to see his crimes as such? Or perhaps, how do you get a self-enamored hypocrite to reckon with his pathology? Certainly not by repeating the praise, or what Chomsky sometimes calls America's "state religion" of self-worship. And despite this, in a very limited way, Chomsky does give credit where credit is due.
In his forthcoming book Hopes and Prospects, Chomsky admits that a black family in the White House is historic. But he credits not "America," a "system of power" defined by "market interventions" in the economy that once tolerated, and even fought for, the right to own humans as slaves. Nor does he give much credit to "Brand Obama," as he calls the phenomenon that elected our new president, insisting that the new president is "likely to 'have more influence on boardrooms than any president since Ronald Reagan.'" In fact, Chomsky gives credit for the 2008 election, in a way, to himself and his ilk.
In an early manuscript of the book, Chomsky writes, "The two candidates in the Democratic primary were a woman and an African-American. That, too, was historic. It would have been unimaginable forty years ago. The fact that the country has become civilized enough to accept this outcome is a considerable tribute to the activism of the nineteen sixties and its aftermath, with lessons for the future." As such, this small tome is Chomsky's legacy book.
And high time. His landmark critique of B.F. Skinner that crippled behaviorism's predominance in psychology and linguistics turns fifty this year. His first book on politics, American Power and the New Mandarins: Historical and Political Essays, turns forty. The Essential Chomsky, edited by Anthony Arnove, came out from the New Press last year, in time for Chomsky's eightieth birthday. And Chomsky's wife died of cancer last winter, which would make anyone take stock. Regularly voted into the "top public intellectual" polls various magazines frequently run, the linguist and foreign policy critic, said to be worth two million dollars, remains a polarizing figure.
What's remarkable is how Chomsky's criticism of the Vietnam war and America's many interventions seem even more relevant today, prescient in their understanding of how American greed, dehumanization of others, cultural ignorance, and hypocrisy are rewritten as pragmatic, not moral, mistakes. In "The Remaking of History," from Toward a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There, he writes, "They may concede the stupidity of American policy, and even its savagery, but not the illegitimacy inherent in the entire enterprise." He continues a page later, "One may criticize the intellectual failure of planners, their moral failures, and even the generalized and abstract 'will to exercise domination' to which they have regrettably but understandably succumbed. But the principle that the United States may exercise force to guarantee a certain global order that will be 'open' to transnational corporations—that is beyond the bounds of polite discourse."
Yet Chomsky has been criticized for accuracy and balance, for the petty (citing statements made by an "embassy" rather than "ambassador") and the heinous (apologist for Pol Pot; a distortion, he insists, of his views), but most commonly, it seems, for comparing U.S. behavior to Hitler's. In Prospect Magazine, Oliver Kamm writes of Chomsky's early political writings as going "beyond the standard left critique of U.S. imperialism to the belief that 'what is needed [in the US] is a kind of denazification.'" "This diagnosis," Kamm continues, "is central to Chomsky's political output. While he does not depict the U.S. as an overtly repressive society—instead, it is a place where 'money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print and marginalize dissent'—he does liken America's conduct to that of Nazi Germany. In his newly published Imperial Ambitions, he maintains that 'the pretenses for the invasion [of Iraq] are no more convincing than Hitler's.'"
On balance, Chomsky is a vital, even indispensable voice in the American cultural debate, needed to remind us of the outrage we should feel as the modernization of American life brings us to accept as necessary and understandable the devastation of foreign countries with little actual public debate and no input from the citizens of those countries. How do our presidents' "terrorist" campaigns (in Chomsky's terms) become a normal functioning of the state? How does a country that so readily welcomes outsiders, or purports to, so easily bury them by "overthrowing governments around the world and installing malicious dictatorships, assassinating people" or write them off as collateral damage? Perhaps we should, or do, on some level, share his outrage. And yet his voice has been every bit as ruthless, and occasionally selective (like most good rhetoricians), as his opponents suggest. Does that run counter to, or complement, the voice and methodology of the systems of power he criticizes?
—Joel Whitney for Guernica
Guernica: You've been savaging U.S. foreign policy for a long time. What's new in Hopes and Prospects? Or would you say that you're reworking a single thesis with new examples?
Noam Chomsky: There are new things that are happening. But I don't think the basic principles of international affairs or social organization or aspirations for the future change very much. In fact, they haven't for a long time.
Guernica: Does that imply that your approach as a critic isn't effective?
Noam Chomsky: On the contrary, it has been quite effective in ways I have discussed repeatedly and at length, even though it hasn't reached as far as changing fundamental principles and their institutional basis.
Guernica: One thing that never changes in your work is the meditation on the devastating effects of U.S. foreign policy. Here in the U.S., we endlessly tell ourselves, and our leaders especially do this, that "we're good." No matter the results, our intentions are good.
Noam Chomsky: Systems of power don't have good intentions. You'll occasionally in history find a benevolent dictator or a king who has the interests of the people at heart. But fundamentally, structures of power are not moral agents. We don't look for good intentions. Of course, they all profess good intentions. But of course that's also true of Hitler.
Guernica: Are "structures of power" amoral or immoral?
Noam Chomsky: Structures of power are amoral. The CEO, say, of the American Petroleum Institute may care a lot about whether his grandchildren will have a decent world to live in. But as CEO of the American Petroleum Institute, he's going to try to make that impossible by doing what they're doing right now, in fact. Working out ways to try to duplicate the success of the insurance industry in undermining any kind of health reform. They've already announced, "We're gonna try to learn from [the health insurance industry's] tactics and block any kind of energy or environmental bill." Now he knows (he's not an idiot) that could lead to a serious catastrophe which could undermine the prospects for the life of his grandchildren whom he cares a lot about. But as the director of a petroleum institute, he can't consider that. If he did, he'd no longer have that position.
Guernica: You write about how corporations have these super-human rights and that investors and by-laws force them to take every advantage to maximize profits. But what you just said about structures of power being amoral, it seems to me that your work is actually asking them to be moral, no?
Noam Chomsky: I'm not addressing CEOs of corporations or President Obama or anything like that. I'm addressing people, saying, "Look, you've got a lot of opportunities. You can effect changes, which will change the actions of structures of power, which will in fact dissolve the structures of power."
Guernica: What are those changes you mention above that can dissolve the structures of power?
Noam Chomsky: Consider the systematic dismantling of industrial capacity, say GM plants, destroying the workforce and communities, while Obama's transportation secretary is abroad seeking to use federal stimulus money to contract with Spanish firms to provide high-speed transport—which could be produced by converting the plants that are being dismantled, by the skilled workforce being abandoned. It might require takeover of the facilities by "stakeholders"—workforce and community. There's no economic principle that bars that, and it could happen with sufficient consciousness and popular support.
Guernica: One group you seem to expect a little more out of, by way of intermediaries between us people and the "power structures," seems to be intellectuals. In the "Responsibility of—"
Noam Chomsky: The people we call intellectuals aren't necessarily smarter or more knowledgeable than anyone else. But they happen to have a lot of privilege, and privilege confers responsibility. And so they oughta do things. I don't expect them to.
Guernica: You've called "the inability of educated classes to perceive what they are doing" an "historical universal."
Noam Chomsky: Close to it.
Guernica: And you cite a story in the New York Times where "the reviewer," you write, "constitutional lawyer Noah Feldman, described Osama [bin Laden]'s descent to greater and greater evil over the years, finally reaching the absolute lower depths, when 'he put forth the perverse claim that since the United States is a democracy, all citizens bear responsibility for its government's actions, and civilians are therefore fair targets.'" What's significant about this?
Noam Chomsky: What's significant is what directly follows it. There had been an election in Palestine, actually the first really free election in the Arab world, and two days after Noah Feldman's article appeared, Steven Erlanger on the front page of the New York Times reported blandly that the U.S. government has just undertaken to punish the people of Palestine for voting the wrong way in a free election. Well, that makes Osama bin Laden look pretty tame. And these things appear right next to each other, and no one notices it.
Guernica: Am I right to believe that you essentially make no distinction between U.S. "terrorism," i.e. interventions, and, say, al Qaeda's terrorism?
Noam Chomsky: Yeah, U.S. terrorism is often far worse because it's a powerful state. Take 9/11. That was a serious terrorist act. In Latin America, they often call it "the second 9/11" because there was another one, namely September 11, 1973.
Guernica: In Chile.
Noam Chomsky: Suppose that al Qaeda had not just blown up the World Trade Center, but suppose that they'd bombed the White House, killed the president, established a military dictatorship, killed maybe fifty to a hundred thousand people, maybe tortured seven hundred thousand, instituted a major international terrorist center in Washington, which was overthrowing governments around the world and installing malicious dictatorships, assassinating people, [and] brought in a bunch of economists who drove the economy into its worst disaster maybe in history. Well, that would be worse than what we call 9/11. And it did happen, namely on 9/11/1973. All that I've changed is per capita equivalence in numbers, a standard way to measure. Well, okay, that's one we were responsible for. So yeah, it's much worse.
Guernica: Some critics of U.S. foreign policy have been arguing for a universally accepted definition of terrorism to standardize in media, governments, etc.
Noam Chomsky: I agree. Reagan declared a war on terror in 1981—he said that'd be the core of our foreign policy. And since then, I've been writing about terrorism using the official definition in the U.S. code, and in Army manuals, and, in fact, in British law. It's a pretty good definition. Now that's considered outrageous. And the reason is when you use the official definition, it follows pretty quickly that the United States is a leading terrorist state. Now that's the "wrong" conclusion, so therefore we can't use that definition. There are academic conferences and sober volumes on terrorism trying to find some appropriate definition, and the "appropriate" definition has a very definite condition to meet. It has to include the terror that they carry out against us but exclude the terror that we carry out against them.
Guernica: True or false: no one did more to oppose the tyrannical communism of the Soviets?
Noam Chomsky: I don't know what you mean by "tyrannical communism of the Soviets." That was one particular form of tyranny, one that was out of U.S. control, and perceived as offering a model for others, so naturally the U.S. generally opposed it—though not when it was bearing the brunt of the war against the Nazis. The U.S. has also opposed democracies and repeatedly overthrew them and established tyrannies. And it supported, and still supports, brutal tyrannies. The question is misformulated and can't be answered.
Guernica: Soviet communism—you don't know what that is?
Noam Chomsky: I know what I think it is, and has been since 1918: the most severe attack on socialism/communism apart from fascism. What I don't know is what you think it is.
Guernica: Your definition sounds fine. Utne characterized your work as having "an unflagging sense of outrage." I'm wondering, when you diligently dissect exactly what your country has done in places like Chile, Vietnam, Iraq, and elsewhere, when you log numbers of innocent civilians killed, and carefully present these outrageous quotes from members of government or heads of corporations, what you're feeling. I believe the anger comes through. What else is going on? Shame? Guilt?
Noam Chomsky: All of them. Shame and guilt, of course, because there's much that we can do about it, that I haven't done. And outrage because, yes, it's outrageous. And disgust at the hypocrisy in which it's veiled. But there's no point in revealing those emotions. You know, maybe I can talk about them with my wife or something. But what's the point of going public with them? Doesn't do any good.
Guernica: Yet those emotions come through in your work as a subtext.
Noam Chomsky: Maybe. And it very much angers supporters of state violence; in fact, they're infuriated by it, when it comes out.
Guernica: What do you mean?
Noam Chomsky: When it comes out, they are sometimes infuriated by it. I happened to be in England a couple of days ago [for] an interview at BBC. One of the things the interviewer brought up is a statement of mine showing how incomparably awful I am. The statement is "One has to ask whether what the United States needs is dissent or denazification." And that's so utterly outrageous; it shows I'm kind of a maniac from outer space. So I asked him what I always do when somebody brings it up. I said, "Did you read the context?" And of course he hadn't. So I said, "Okay, here's the context." During the Vietnam War, the Chicago Museum of Science set up a diorama of a Vietnamese village in which children could be on the outside with guns and shoot into the village and try to kill people. And there was a protest by a group of mothers, a quiet protest, protesting this thing. There was an article in the New York Times condemning—not the exhibit, but the mothers—because they were trying to take away fun from the kiddies. And in that context I said, "Sometimes you have to wonder whether what's needed is dissent or denazification." I think it's just the right thing to say.
Guernica: You've written how utterly Iraqis are excluded from the decisions made about their country...
Noam Chomsky: Or Vietnamese or Central Americans, or a long list of others. In fact, we don't even care about them. If you listen to National Public Radio and happened to have it on last night (or maybe it was PBS), they were discussing the debates about what to do in Afghanistan. One of their correspondents was asked to comment on the costs of the war. She went through the costs of the war, so many hundreds of billions, and then the most severe cost—you know, a thousand American soldiers killed—and then the discussion ended. Now, is that the only cost? There's no cost to Afghans?
Guernica: One of the ironic "hopes" in your book is the term "hope" as used by what you call "Brand Obama." Brand Obama seemed to buttress Americans' assumptions that because we elected a part-black president, we must be over our racism and this is more evidence that we have a noble purpose and a basic goodness. But you point to other countries, India, Bolivia—and where else?—where an outsider was elected.
Noam Chomsky: It's happening in many parts of Latin America. Bolivia is particularly dramatic. But it's also true in Brazil. Lula, the president of Brazil; he's a peasant, steel worker, union organizer, didn't have much higher education. What put him into power are these vast popular movements. They don't go along with his policies altogether; by any means, they're pretty critical of them. But part of the electoral base, like the Landless Workers' Movement may be the most important mass popular movement in the world. The same is happening elsewhere. Comparing that with our system should lead us to a deal of introspection about just who and what we are.
Guernica: Are you and Hugo Chavez friends?
Noam Chomsky: We've met on a friendly basis, but I think you might ask yourself why you are asking this question, and not asking, for example, whether Lula, Correa, and others are friends (for the record, they are, to the same extent). I think we know the answers, but they might be useful for you to think about the matter more carefully.
Guernica: I am unaware of either of those others holding up one of your books and giving your sales a renewed jolt.
Noam Chomsky: It doesn't answer my question. The fact that he held up my books says nothing about whether we are friends. We've never met. I've praised work of Hume's, but it doesn't mean he was my friend. The question arises about Chavez, not Lula (who I know a lot better) or Correa (who I just spent a few hours with) or many others who are at the heart of the "pink tide" because Chavez is demonized by state/media propaganda. I don't accept that. Nor, I think, should you.
Guernica: You just said you have met him. Now you haven't? Your reflexive antagonism aside, I'm happy to give you a moment to explain why we shouldn't accept state/media propaganda against Chavez.
Noam Chomsky: I hadn't met him when he held my book up at the UN. Since then, I did spend a few hours with him, like Correa, nothing like Lula, who I spent several days with and got to know pretty well. Sorry if it sounds like reflexive antagonism. It's rather that I think we should be asking ourselves why the reflexive question is about Chavez—not Lula, or Correa, or for that matter Morales, who I haven't met but have written about far more than Chavez.
Guernica: In the new book, you hit Obama pretty hard over his cabinet and the Wall Street types in his administration. You also basically allege that neoliberalism and the free market policies that we recommend to others—not only do we not follow them, but they don't work, in terms of standard of living, wages, etc. You actually say protectionism does work and point to some interesting examples. Ronald Reagan. South Korea.
Noam Chomsky: Adam Smith had advice for the American colonies in the seventeen seventies. He advised the colonies to follow classical economic principles—they're not very different from neoliberalism. In fact, it's pretty much what economists today recommend to the third world. He said, Keep to your comparative advantages—the term "comparative advantage" hadn't been invented yet—produce what you're good at, which is catching fish, hunting fur, and growing food, and export it to us in England. And import superior British manufactures. But the U.S. gained its independence, so it didn't have to follow that advice, and didn't. It immediately set up under Alexander Hamilton high protective barriers to try to bar superior British textiles, in later years British steel. And it built up its own manufacturing base under protective barriers and by an enormous amount of state intervention. Take, say, cotton, the fuel of American industrialization. Well, how did America produce cotton? First of all, by exterminating the indigenous population. Secondly, by slavery. Those are pretty severe market interventions. Yeah, they worked.
Guernica: So your greater point is...
Noam Chomsky: I'm not recommending protectionism. I'm just saying, let's be honest. Before we preach to others, let's find out the truth about what we ourselves do. So take Ronald Reagan whom you mentioned. He's considered the high priest of free markets. In fact, he was by far the most protectionist president in post-war U.S. history.
Guernica: So what are you recommending?
Noam Chomsky: I think decisions should be made in an entirely different manner for entirely different ends. Should producing more goods and consuming more goods be the highest value in life? That's not obvious, by any means.
Guernica: And what would be?
Noam Chomsky: Living decent lives, in an environment that provides for people's essential needs, offers them opportunities to become creative, active, to work together in solidarity, [and lead] more happy, creative lives. That's a more important goal, I think.
Guernica: Here's one critic of your work, Nick Cohen in the Observer: "The lesson of 11 September is that no constraints of morality or conscience would stop al-Qaeda exploding a nuclear weapon. If however, it is all our fault, as Chomsky says, perhaps we can avert catastrophe by being nicer and better people. Perhaps we can, but Chomsky is as reluctant to admit that al Qaeda is an autonomous movement as he is to admit the existence of the democratic and socialist opposition to Saddam Hussein."
Noam Chomsky: They're mentioning somebody with my name. But it doesn't relate at all to anything I've ever said or believe. Who did you say you're quoting?
Guernica: Nick Cohen in the Observer.
Noam Chomsky: Oh, Nick Cohen's a maniac. If you'll notice, he never cites anything. Does he cite anything? That already gives you the answer. Go back and check. He doesn't cite anything. These are just diatribes, tantrums. I'm not interested in them.
Guernica: The greater point is that there are maniacs who have sought from their clerics and received permission to use nuclear weapons on civilians.
Noam Chomsky: Yes, there are. And we should try to prevent it. And there are ways to prevent it, and I discuss them, but they're not his ways. His ways are just bomb everybody in sight. Well, I think that's the way to increase terror. In fact, it has increased terror.
Guernica: It's increased terror sevenfold, you write (citing analysts on the Iraq war).
Noam Chomsky: But he doesn't like what I say, so he'll scream and shout and slander. Why pay attention to him? Do you read Stalinist party acts?
Guernica: I don't.
Noam Chomsky: Okay.
Joel Whitney is a founding editor of Guernica.
