STRATFOR: Flotillas and the Wars of Public Opinion

Flotillas and the Wars of Public Opinion

May 31, 2010 | 1828 GMT

By George Friedman

On Sunday, Israeli naval forces intercepted the ships of a Turkish nongovernmental organization (NGO) delivering humanitarian supplies to Gaza. Israel had demanded that the vessels not go directly to Gaza but instead dock in Israeli ports, where the supplies would be offloaded and delivered to Gaza. The Turkish NGO refused, insisting on going directly to Gaza. Gunfire ensued when Israeli naval personnel boarded one of the vessels, and a significant number of the passengers and crew on the ship were killed or wounded.

Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon charged that the mission was simply an attempt to provoke the Israelis. That was certainly the case. The mission was designed to demonstrate that the Israelis were unreasonable and brutal. The hope was that Israel would be provoked to extreme action, further alienating Israel from the global community and possibly driving a wedge between Israel and the United States. The operation's planners also hoped this would trigger a political crisis in Israel.

A logical Israeli response would have been avoiding falling into the provocation trap and suffering the political repercussions the Turkish NGO was trying to trigger. Instead, the Israelis decided to make a show of force. The Israelis appear to have reasoned that backing down would demonstrate weakness and encourage further flotillas to Gaza, unraveling the Israeli position vis-à-vis Hamas. In this thinking, a violent interception was a superior strategy to accommodation regardless of political consequences. Thus, the Israelis accepted the bait and were provoked.

The 'Exodus' Scenario

In the 1950s, an author named Leon Uris published a book called "Exodus." Later made into a major motion picture, Exodus told the story of a Zionist provocation against the British. In the wake of World War II, the British — who controlled Palestine, as it was then known — maintained limits on Jewish immigration there. Would-be immigrants captured trying to run the blockade were detained in camps in Cyprus. In the book and movie, Zionists planned a propaganda exercise involving a breakout of Jews — mostly children — from the camp, who would then board a ship renamed the Exodus. When the Royal Navy intercepted the ship, the passengers would mount a hunger strike. The goal was to portray the British as brutes finishing the work of the Nazis. The image of children potentially dying of hunger would force the British to permit the ship to go to Palestine, to reconsider British policy on immigration, and ultimately to decide to abandon Palestine and turn the matter over to the United Nations.

There was in fact a ship called Exodus, but the affair did not play out precisely as portrayed by Uris, who used an amalgam of incidents to display the propaganda war waged by the Jews. Those carrying out this war had two goals. The first was to create sympathy in Britain and throughout the world for Jews who, just a couple of years after German concentration camps, were now being held in British camps. Second, they sought to portray their struggle as being against the British. The British were portrayed as continuing Nazi policies toward the Jews in order to maintain their empire. The Jews were portrayed as anti-imperialists, fighting the British much as the Americans had.

It was a brilliant strategy. By focusing on Jewish victimhood and on the British, the Zionists defined the battle as being against the British, with the Arabs playing the role of people trying to create the second phase of the Holocaust. The British were portrayed as pro-Arab for economic and imperial reasons, indifferent at best to the survivors of the Holocaust. Rather than restraining the Arabs, the British were arming them. The goal was not to vilify the Arabs but to villify the British, and to position the Jews with other nationalist groups whether in India or Egypt rising against the British.

The precise truth or falsehood of this portrayal didn't particularly matter. For most of the world, the Palestine issue was poorly understood and not a matter of immediate concern. The Zionists intended to shape the perceptions of a global public with limited interest in or understanding of the issues, filling in the blanks with their own narrative. And they succeeded.

The success was rooted in a political reality. Where knowledge is limited, and the desire to learn the complex reality doesn't exist, public opinion can be shaped by whoever generates the most powerful symbols. And on a matter of only tangential interest, governments tend to follow their publics' wishes, however they originate. There is little to be gained for governments in resisting public opinion and much to be gained by giving in. By shaping the battlefield of public perception, it is thus possible to get governments to change positions.

In this way, the Zionists' ability to shape global public perceptions of what was happening in Palestine — to demonize the British and turn the question of Palestine into a Jewish-British issue — shaped the political decisions of a range of governments. It was not the truth or falsehood of the narrative that mattered. What mattered was the ability to identify the victim and victimizer such that global opinion caused both London and governments not directly involved in the issue to adopt political stances advantageous to the Zionists. It is in this context that we need to view the Turkish flotilla.

The Turkish Flotilla to Gaza

The Palestinians have long argued that they are the victims of Israel, an invention of British and American imperialism. Since 1967, they have focused not so much on the existence of the state of Israel (at least in messages geared toward the West) as on the oppression of Palestinians in the occupied territories. Since the split between Hamas and Fatah and the Gaza War, the focus has been on the plight of the citizens of Gaza, who have been portrayed as the dispossessed victims of Israeli violence.

The bid to shape global perceptions by portraying the Palestinians as victims of Israel was the first prong of a longtime two-part campaign. The second part of this campaign involved armed resistance against the Israelis. The way this resistance was carried out, from airplane hijackings to stone-throwing children to suicide bombers, interfered with the first part of the campaign, however. The Israelis could point to suicide bombings or the use of children against soldiers as symbols of Palestinian inhumanity. This in turn was used to justify conditions in Gaza. While the Palestinians had made significant inroads in placing Israel on the defensive in global public opinion, they thus consistently gave the Israelis the opportunity to turn the tables. And this is where the flotilla comes in.

The Turkish flotilla aimed to replicate the Exodus story or, more precisely, to define the global image of Israel in the same way the Zionists defined the image that they wanted to project. As with the Zionist portrayal of the situation in 1947, the Gaza situation is far more complicated than as portrayed by the Palestinians. The moral question is also far more ambiguous. But as in 1947, when the Zionist portrayal was not intended to be a scholarly analysis of the situation but a political weapon designed to define perceptions, the Turkish flotilla was not designed to carry out a moral inquest.

Instead, the flotilla was designed to achieve two ends. The first is to divide Israel and Western governments by shifting public opinion against Israel. The second is to create a political crisis inside Israel between those who feel that Israel's increasing isolation over the Gaza issue is dangerous versus those who think any weakening of resolve is dangerous.

The Geopolitical Fallout for Israel

It is vital that the Israelis succeed in portraying the flotilla as an extremist plot. Whether extremist or not, the plot has generated an image of Israel quite damaging to Israeli political interests. Israel is increasingly isolated internationally, with heavy pressure on its relationship with Europe and the United States.

In all of these countries, politicians are extremely sensitive to public opinion. It is difficult to imagine circumstances under which public opinion will see Israel as the victim. The general response in the Western public is likely to be that the Israelis probably should have allowed the ships to go to Gaza and offload rather than to precipitate bloodshed. Israel's enemies will fan these flames by arguing that the Israelis prefer bloodshed to reasonable accommodation. And as Western public opinion shifts against Israel, Western political leaders will track with this shift.

The incident also wrecks Israeli relations with Turkey, historically an Israeli ally in the Muslim world with longstanding military cooperation with Israel. The Turkish government undoubtedly has wanted to move away from this relationship, but it faced resistance within the Turkish military and among secularists. The new Israeli action makes a break with Israel easy, and indeed almost necessary for Ankara.

With roughly the population of Houston, Texas, Israel is just not large enough to withstand extended isolation, meaning this event has profound geopolitical implications.

Public opinion matters where issues are not of fundamental interest to a nation. Israel is not a fundamental interest to other nations. The ability to generate public antipathy to Israel can therefore reshape Israeli relations with countries critical to Israel. For example, a redefinition of U.S.-Israeli relations will have much less effect on the United States than on Israel. The Obama administration, already irritated by the Israelis, might now see a shift in U.S. public opinion that will open the way to a new U.S.-Israeli relationship disadvantageous to Israel.

The Israelis will argue that this is all unfair, as they were provoked. Like the British, they seem to think that the issue is whose logic is correct. But the issue actually is, whose logic will be heard? As with a tank battle or an airstrike, this sort of warfare has nothing to do with fairness. It has to do with controlling public perception and using that public perception to shape foreign policy around the world. In this case, the issue will be whether the deaths were necessary. The Israeli argument of provocation will have limited traction.

Internationally, there is little doubt that the incident will generate a firestorm. Certainly, Turkey will break cooperation with Israel. Opinion in Europe will likely harden. And public opinion in the United States — by far the most important in the equation — might shift to a "plague-on-both-your-houses" position.

While the international reaction is predictable, the interesting question is whether this evolution will cause a political crisis in Israel. Those in Israel who feel that international isolation is preferable to accommodation with the Palestinians are in control now. Many in the opposition see Israel's isolation as a strategic threat. Economically and militarily, they argue, Israel cannot survive in isolation. The current regime will respond that there will be no isolation. The flotilla aimed to generate what the government has said would not happen.

The tougher Israel is, the more the flotilla's narrative takes hold. As the Zionists knew in 1947 and the Palestinians are learning, controlling public opinion requires subtlety, a selective narrative and cynicism. As they also knew, losing the battle can be catastrophic. It cost Britain the Mandate and allowed Israel to survive. Israel's enemies are now turning the tables. This maneuver was far more effective than suicide bombings or the Intifada in challenging Israel's public perception and therefore its geopolitical position (though if the Palestinians return to some of their more distasteful tactics like suicide bombing, the Turkish strategy of portraying Israel as the instigator of violence will be undermined).

Israel is now in uncharted waters. It does not know how to respond. It is not clear that the Palestinians know how to take full advantage of the situation, either. But even so, this places the battle on a new field, far more fluid and uncontrollable than what went before. The next steps will involve calls for sanctions against Israel. The Israeli threats against Iran will be seen in a different context, and Israeli portrayal of Iran will hold less sway over the world.

And this will cause a political crisis in Israel. If this government survives, then Israel is locked into a course that gives it freedom of action but international isolation. If the government falls, then Israel enters a period of domestic uncertainty. In either case, the flotilla achieved its strategic mission. It got Israel to take violent action against it. In doing so, Israel ran into its own fist.

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Why Does Kosovo Get More Aid Than the Congo?

 

"Humanitarian aid in Kosovo in 1999 had an even closer link to the interests of the large powers, especially the Europeans. Certainly, one reason why large amounts of aid was provided to Kosovar refugees in Macedonia and Albania was to prevent the refugees from trying to immigrate to other countries in Europe. "Keep the refugees comfortable in Macedonia - and they won't try to go to Paris" was how one relief worker described to me a factor underlying the generosity of European aid donors. U.S. humanitarian aid to Haiti in the mid 1990s had much the same purpose: keep the Haitians at home.

 

"So, what is the answer to the question as to why Kosovar refugees received $207 each in UN assistance in 1999 and Congolese refugees and displaced persons received only $8? The Kosovars had on their side at least two of the above three factors: their plight had the attention of the media and they were important to the national interests of the large donors of international assistance. The Congo had none of the three factors listed above operating in its favor. "

 

 

http://www.icva.ch/doc00000937.html 

Humanitarian Emergencies:
Why Does Kosovo Get More Aid Than the Congo?

Larry Thompson
Director of Advocacy for Refugees International

Paper for the ICVA Conference on
NGOs in a Changing World Order: Dilemmas and Challenges
Geneva, 14-15 February 2003

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Introduction

The lives of tens of millions of people around the world are threatened by conflict, ethnic violence, drought and natural disaster. A large number of organizations - governmental, non-governmental, and United Nations - are devoted to providing humanitarian assistance to helping victims of humanitarian disasters survive.

Humanitarian aid to persons impacted by conflict or natural disaster is a growth industry. In 1990, international humanitarian assistance amounted to about $2 billion; by 2000 the total was up to nearly $5 billion ^1.. The huge humanitarian crises in Afghanistan and several regions of Africa likely mean additional large increases in humanitarian in 2002 and again in 2003.

The United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance with its share in recent years amounting to about 35 percent of the world total The 15 member countries of the European Union plus the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) are the second largest donors, and Japan ranks third.

The needs of refugees, displaced persons, and other victims of humanitarian disasters and conflicts are usually predictable. Protection, clean water, food, shelter, clothing, sanitation, and medical care in varying mixes are the requirements for sustaining lives in emergency situations.

But the response to those needs varies tremendously around the world and from emergency to emergency. An incomplete but illustrative measurement is UN spending on different humanitarian emergencies. In Kosovo, in 1999, for example the UN spent $207 for each affected person; In Sierra Leone, the UN spent $16 for each person; in Congo the UN spent $8 per person ^2.. These figures are not all-inclusive as they do not include bi-lateral humanitarian aid programs which would narrow -- but by no means -- close the gap. UN spending on refugees is largely determined by voluntary contributions from donors and thus, the major donors to the UN voted with their pocketbooks that they were far more interested and concerned about Kosovar refugees and displaced people than Congolese.

What I want to do is to suggest brief answers to three questions: First, why do some humanitarian emergencies receive more attention than others? Then, I want to turn the first question upside down to respond to a second question: How do you identify humanitarian emergencies which are not getting the attention they deserve? And finally I want to ask what my organization - Refugees International - and other organizations might do to help remedy the situation.

Why do some humanitarian emergencies receive more attention than others?

Answers to this question usually focuses on three topics. First, media coverage of the emergency; secondly, the national interests of the aid donors, and third, the influence of aid organizations.^3..

• Media coverage. This is what is often called "the CNN factor" Humanitarian emergencies which receive extensive publicity, such as Kosovo and, recently, Afghanistan are believed to get more attention and assistance from donors. Thus, humanitarian emergencies which are unpublicized, such as the Congo, may receive less assistance. The theory behind the "CNN factor" is that people and governments respond to the needs of people they see on their television screens.
• National Interests of the AID donors. Humanitarian assistance is perceived by the big donors as an arm of their foreign policy. Afghanistan is a recent example in which the United States and its allies perceived that providing humanitarian aid to Afghan civilians was important to achieving political and military objectives.

Humanitarian aid in Kosovo in 1999 had an even closer link to the interests of the large powers, especially the Europeans. Certainly, one reason why large amounts of aid was provided to Kosovar refugees in Macedonia and Albania was to prevent the refugees from trying to immigrate to other countries in Europe. "Keep the refugees comfortable in Macedonia - and they won't try to go to Paris" was how one relief worker described to me a factor underlying the generosity of European aid donors. U.S. humanitarian aid to Haiti in the mid 1990s had much the same purpose: keep the Haitians at home.

• Influence of aid organizations. Another factor influencing the level of humanitarian aid is the lobbying and influence of aid and citizen's organizations for a particular cause. Southern Sudan, for example, is cited as one area in which donors have provided humanitarian assistance over a long period of time primarily because aid agencies and non-governmental organizations have maintained pressure on donor countries to provide assistance.

An even better example might be the cause of the Tibetans versus that of the Uighers. The plight of the Tibetans, whose culture is being overrun by the Han Chinese, is familiar to most of us. But how many have ever heard of the Uighers - a people in western China who have a similar cause? Why? Some observers have said the difference is that the Tibetans have a support structure of foreigners and foreign organizations plus a charismatic leader - and the Uighers do not.

So, what is the answer to the question as to why Kosovar refugees received $207 each in UN assistance in 1999 and Congolese refugees and displaced persons received only $8? The Kosovars had on their side at least two of the above three factors: their plight had the attention of the media and they were important to the national interests of the large donors of international assistance. The Congo had none of the three factors listed above operating in its favor.

We also have to acknowledge a racial and ethnic factor which influences the level of humanitarian assistance. Donors may be more generous with people who "look like them." This is true not only of Americans and Europeans, but others. Aid from rich Islamic states, for example, tends to be dedicated to helping other Muslims - and I would comment in passing that contributions to UN humanitarian organizations from most oil-rich countries are low and sporadic.

Traditional ties with other states play a factor. The British have taken the lead in trying to resolve the conflict in Sierra Leone, a former colony. France is famously perceived to be partial to French-speaking people and countries. And the traditionally close ties between Germany and Croatia contributed to the German decision to recognize Croatia as an independent state in 1991, thereby contributing to the violent breakup of Yugoslavia.

Important in some cases also are that, despite the UN and donor willingness to work in the country, the situation is so dangerous or the local authorities so obstructive that it is difficult to carry out humanitarian aid programs. North Korea is a country which has placed so many restrictions on aid agencies that many have been unable -or unwilling - to work there, despite the need. Chechnya is a region in which the lack of security for humanitarian aid workers chills efforts to provide humanitarian aid to the victims of the conflict between Chechens and Russia.

How do you identify humanitarian emergencies which aren't getting the attention they deserve?

The answer is that you turn upside down the three factors influencing humanitarian assistance listed above. Neglected, forgotten, or what are often called "silent emergencies" are those in which media coverage is sparse, in which the national interests of the large donors of humanitarian aid are not engaged, and where the country or region lacks a "support system" of influential and interested foreign aid organizations.

ECHO has worked toward developing a methodology to identify "forgotten crises" and expressed a commitment to increase assistance to forgotten emergencies. ECHO has identified the following countries as priorities for increased attention: Chechnya, Burmese refugees in Thailand, Western Sahara refugees in Algeria, and Uganda. ^4.. However, observers have noted that despite the ECHO pledge to address forgotten crises, former Yugoslavia was again the largest recipient of European humanitarian aid in 2001. ^5..

Another factor to be taken into consideration in identifying forgotten humanitarian emergencies is the level of contributions provided to UN agencies, especially the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Programme, to address the emergency.

To assist the victims of humanitarian emergencies, the UN issues "appeals" to member states to contribute to a fund to help the people of the country in need. The response to those appeals determines the level of UN assistance. A look at the response to the World Food Programmes appeal for 2002 gives an idea of neglected countries. The most undersubscribed appeals for food in 2002 include the following: Palestinian territories, Southern Africa, Pakistan, Eritrea, Kenya, and Central America. ^6.. Conclusions reached from this data should be used with some caution, however, as bi-lateral food assistance often fills some of the needs identified by the WFP. For example, the United States provides substantial bi-lateral food aid to Central America.

What can Refugees International -- and other non-governmental organizations - do to help focus attention on forgotten humanitarian emergencies?

My organization, Refugees International, is a non-governmental advocacy organization speaking on behalf of refugees, displaced persons, and other vulnerable people around the world. We are independent and we do not accept funds from governments or the UN.

We work as follows: our advocates visit the sites of humanitarian crises and talk to refugees and relief workers to determine the most urgent humanitarian needs of the people and the gaps in filling those needs. Sometimes, for example, the biggest problem is lack of food. Other times it may be shelter, and on some occasions it may be protecting innocent men, women, and children from being killed or injured in a conflict.

The purpose of our visits to humanitarian crisis areas is to stimulate humanitarian action on behalf of refugees and other vulnerable people. We distribute our findings and recommendations for actions to policy makers, the media, and the public, and push for action by governments and UN agencies to save lives.

We call ourselves an early warning/early action humanitarian organization. We try to identify developing humanitarian crises as quickly as possible and to stimulate early action to prevent human suffering - especially for the most vulnerable, most forgotten, and most neglected people.

What Refugees International as an organization can do is attempt to balance the unequal share of the attention given to some humanitarian emergencies by putting a spotlight on neglected and forgotten people who are not receiving the attention and resources they need to survive.

Too often, it seems, the emergency of the moment -- often a CNN moment -- captures the attention of the policy makers and the aid donors and other equally serious humanitarian problems are neglected. In identifying and publicizing neglected emergencies, Refugees International joins other organizations in trying to stimulate an increase in the political, economic, and humanitarian attention given by the major aid donors and international organizations to forgotten and neglected people around the world.

* * *

1. OECD/DAC estimates. 2000 figure does not include approximately $1.5 billion spent on refugees within donor countries.

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2. Jefferys, Anna, "Giving Voice to Silent Emergencies," Humanitarian Exchange - the Magazine of the Humanitarian Practice Network, March 2002 (revised October 2002).

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3. A recent study of these factors is "Olsen, Gorm Rye, Carstensen, Nils and Hoyen, Kristian, "Humanitarian Crises: What Determines the Level of Emergency Assistance? Media Coverage, Donor Interests, and the Aid Business," prepared for an October 23, 2002 conference in Copenhagen on forgotten humanitarian crises. See: http://www.forgottencrises.dk/speakers.htm

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4. Nielson, Poul, speech October 23, 2002. http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guestfr.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/02/510|0|RAPID&lg=EN&display=

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5. Jefferys, op cit

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6. "Status of 2002 Food Aid Needs and Shortfalls", WFP - assisted Emergency and Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (As of July 2002).

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Bosnia: Karadzic seeks court recess to study war diaries

Bosnia: Karadzic seeks court recess to study war diaries

The Hague, 27 May (AKI) - Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, who has been charged with genocide and war crimes, has asked the United Nations Yugoslav war crimes tribunal for a one-month recess to study the diaries of his wartime general Ratko Mladic. Serbian authorities in February confiscated 3,500 pages of Mladic's wartime diaries and gave them to the tribunal.

Karadzic has been charged with 11 counts of genocide and war crimes, focusing on the shelling of capital Sarajevo and the massacre of 8,000 Muslims in the eastern town of Srebrenica in July 1995.

The same charges were brought against Mladic, but he and wartime leader of rebel Serbs in Croatia, Goran Hadzic, are still at large.

The Hague tribunal has indicted 161 people for crimes allegedly committed in 1991-1995 war that followed the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. More than 60 have been sentenced to over one thousand years in jail.     

As he ended the cross examination of the seventh prosecution witness, retired Irish colonel Colm Doyle, on Thursday told Karadzic to read Mladic's diaries before he cross-examines the next witnesses.

The court was expected to make a ruling on his request later.

Doyle, who was European Union observer in Bosnia during the 1992-1995 war, accused Karadzic of indiscriminately shelling Sarajevo during 44-month siege and of terrorising civilian population.

Karadzic said Doyle's testimony was "irrelevant", because he had displayed bias and "selective memory" in his account

 

http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=3.1.455483530

Kosovo Police Service Complicit in Scaring Serbian Refugees out of Kosovo

...  Serbian Minister for Kosovo-Metohija Goran Bogdanovic stated Thursday that the latest attack on Serb returnees in the village of Zac is part of a premeditated violence strategy that is aimed at another exile of the village inhabitants who have returned to their homes.  ...   [ The 'premeditated violence strategy' has worked extremely well for Albanians.  Why stop now?  Only 5% of Kosovo (if that) is now populated by Serbs.   The 'violence strategy' has a goal of 0%. ]      http://www.juliagorin.com/wordpress/?p=2345     Kosovo Police Service Possibly Complicit in Scaring Returning Serbian Refugees out of Kosovo   (You Think?)   by Julia Gorin  |   May 25, 2010   Last week I mentioned that a Serb returnee camp in the village of Zac was fired upon. It happened again there just a few days ago, and there are legitimate questions as to whether the KPS and NATO (at least the Slovenian contingent) allowed it to happen. Below are three reports. The first two come from the Serbian new agency Tanjug, for which there is no English link. Bogdanovic: Zac incident is part of planned violence campaign BELGRADE, May 20 (Tanjug) - Serbian Minister for Kosovo-Metohija Goran Bogdanovic stated Thursday that the latest attack on Serb returnees in the village of Zac is part of a premeditated violence strategy that is aimed at another exile of the village inhabitants who have returned to their homes. "EULEX cannot and should not watch violence and only condemn it. How come the incidents keep happening in this village, if the returnees are protected by the Kosovo Police Service (KPS)," Bogdanovic stated and underscored that EULEX, as well as KFOR, have to explain why the KPS has not identified perpetrators of any of the incidents and whether that implies that the KPS is an accomplice in the attacks. According to him, the incident that took place in the village of Zac on Wednesday evening proves that KFOR cannot entrust the protection of Kosovo Serbs to the KPS. "I urge EULEX and KFOR to react, find those who attacked the returnees in Zac and offer full support and security to the village inhabitants. I also urge KFOR to assume responsibility for the Zac inhabitants from KPS. I insist that the international community and the legitimate international presence should secure the return of the expelled to the province, that is persistently hindered by Pristina, which does not shrink from using violence," Bogdanovic said. Fire was opened from an automatic weapon near a Serb returnee camp in the village of Zac, near Istok, on Wednesday evening, although according to the returnees, police were at the entrance to the camp. This is the second shooting in the last ten days that occurred close to the camp, which is now home to 22 Serb returnees. Shooting near Serb returnee camp in Zac ZAC, May 20 (Tanjug) - Serb returnees told Tanjug that fire was opened from an automatic weapon near a Serb returnee camp in the village of Zac, near Istok, on Wednesday evening. "Fire was heard about 21:45 p.m. It was very close to the tent in which we are sleeping. Police were at the entrance to the camp, but obviously nobody minded," said one of the returnees, who wished to stay anonymous. This is the second shooting in the last ten days that occurred close to the camp, which is now home to 22 Serb returnees. "Fortunately, there were no injuries in either shooting. There are visible bullet traces on a demolished house within the camp that we use for cooking," the returnees said, adding that they are in fear since there is no one who could put a halt to such incidents. The police searched the area after the shooting, but did not manage to identify the perpetrators. Local ethnic Albanians are against Serbs' return to Zac, since they believe that some of the returnees committed crimes during the war. The returnees refute the ethnic Albanians' allegations, saying that no crimes took place in Zac and that in case any of them had committed such crimes, they would not have returned to their land. The report for which we do have a link comes from the Kosovo Compromise website. Note the logo:   We have here half of an Albanian flag and half of a Serbian flag. Such is the uber-fair nature of Serbs, who are obviously the ones running any site that would have the word "compromise" in it relating to Kosovo. (Though I would dearly love to hear that there is at least one Albanian among the staff of this website.) New shooting near Serb returnee camp There has been a new armed incident near a tent camp set up by Serb IDPs who returned to their homes in the village of Zac in Kosovo. "This is a textbook act of terrorism and the very fact that it has repeated twice, while there was no efficient action on the part of police, must worry everyone," Serbian Ministry for Kosovo State Secretary Oliver Ivanovic said. (KosovoCompromise Staff) Thursday, May 20, 2010 They say that on Wednesday, around 21:45 CET, fire was opened from an automatic weapon. "Police were at the entrance to the camp, but obviously, nobody minded," said one returnee who wished to remain anonymous. This is the second such incident in the past ten days that occurred close to the camp that is now home to 22 returnees. No one was hurt in either shooting. The returnees also said that there were visible bullet traces on one of their houses nearby. Kosovo police, KPS, said that they searched the area, but could not find out who the shooter was. Ever since the Serbs returned to their homes after a decade in exile earlier this year, they faced protests, and stoning incidents, organized by local ethnic Albanians, who claim that war criminals were among them. But returnees reject those claims, saying that in case any of them had committed crimes, they would not have returned to their property. The returnees went back to the village on their own, but UNHCR provided them with tents pending repair works on their destroyed houses. Serbian Ministry for Kosovo State Secretary Oliver Ivanovic described the shooting as an act of terrorism, and called on the EU mission in the province, EULEX, "to act at last". "This is a textbook act of terrorism and the very fact that it has repeated twice, while there was no efficient action on the part of police, must worry everyone. EULEX must get involved and start doing its job at last," he told FoNet news agency in Belgrade on Thursday. Ivanovic explained that EULEX stood back "expecting that local police can handle it". "I spoke to KFOR too. They too ought to start an investigation, because their members were involved in the previous incident. Slovenian contingent soldiers were in the tent when the shooting occurred," said he. Ivanovic warned that the returnees in the village of Zac, who now live in tents next to their destroyed homes, came under attack late on Wednesday despite the fact that a Kosovo police, KPS, patrol was deployed there 24 hours a day. "One wonders how that's possible? If Kosovo police are not providing protection and safety for Serbs, if they did not discover the perpetrators of the previous attack, then it's quite justified to ask whether they have been, through their inaction, protecting the assailants," Ivanovic was quoted as saying. The state secretary added that with all the incidents, "there can certainly be no return of Serbs to speak of", and once again rejected claims by ethnic Albanians that war criminals were among those who earlier this year decided to return to their homes in Zac.

 

STRATFOR: Germany After the EU and the Russian Scenario

...  Germany is economically powerful but needs economic coalition partners that contribute to German well-being rather than merely draw on it. A Russian-German relationship could logically emerge from this. If it did, the Americans and Poles would logically have their own relationship. The former would begin as economic and edge toward military. The latter begins as military, and with the weakening of the European Union, edges toward economics. The Russian-German bloc would attempt to bring others into its coalition, as would the Polish-U.S. bloc. Both would compete in Central Europe — and for France. During this process, the politics of NATO would shift from humdrum to absolutely riveting.   ...   ... With Greece symbolizing the weakening of the European Union and the Patriots representing the remilitarization of at least part of Europe, ostensibly unconnected tendencies might well intersect.      http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100524_germany_after_eu_russian_scenario?utm_source=GWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=100525&utm_content=GIRtitle&elq=71086e93a21d4c1d969e3a54ac23939e   Germany After the EU and the Russian Scenario   May 25, 2010 | 0857 GMT By George Friedman Discussions about Europe currently are focused on the Greek financial crisis and its potential effect on the future of the European Union. Discussions these days involving military matters and Europe appear insignificant and even anachronistic. Certainly, we would agree that the future of the European Union towers over all other considerations at the moment, but we would argue that scenarios for the future of the European Union exist in which military matters are far from archaic. Russia and the Polish Patriots For example, the Polish government recently announced that the United States would deploy a battery of Patriot missiles to Poland. The missiles arrived this week. When the United States canceled its land-based ballistic missile defense system under intense Russian pressure, the Obama administration appeared surprised at Poland's intense displeasure with the decision. Washington responded by promising the Patriots instead, the technology the Poles had wanted all along. While the Patriot does not enhance America's ability to protect itself against long-range ballistic missiles from, for example, Iran, it does give Poland some defense against shorter-ranged ballistic missiles and substantial defense against conventional air attack. Russia is the only country capable of such attacks on Poland with even the most distant potential interest in doing so, and at this point, this is truly an abstract threat. In removing a system that was really not a threat to Russian interests — U.S. ballistic missile defense at most can handle only a score of missiles, meaning it would have a negligible impact on the Russian nuclear deterrent — the United States ironically has installed a system that could affect Russia. Under the current circumstances, this is not really significant. While much is being made of having a few U.S. boots on the ground east of Germany within 40 kilometers (about 25 miles) of the Russian Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad, a few hundred technicians and guards are simply not an offensive threat. Still, the Russians — with a long history of seeing improbable threats turning into very real ones — tend to take hypothetical limits on their power seriously. They also tend to take gestures seriously, knowing that gestures often germinate into strategic intent. The Russians obviously oppose this deployment, as the Patriots would allow Poland in league with NATO — and perhaps even by itself — to achieve local air superiority. There are many crosscurrents in Russian policy, however. For the moment, the Russians are interested in encouraging better economic relations with the West, as they could use technology and investment that would make them more than a commodity exporter. Moreover, with the Europeans preoccupied with their economic crisis and the United States still bogged down in the Middle East and needing Russian support on Iran, Moscow has found little outside resistance to its efforts to increase its influence in the former Soviet Union. Moscow is not unhappy about the European crisis and wouldn't want to do anything that might engender greater European solidarity. After all, a solid economic bloc turning into an increasingly powerful and integrated state would pose challenges to Russia in the long run that Moscow is happy to do without. The Patriot deployment is a current irritation and a hypothetical military problem, but the Russians are not inclined to create a crisis with Europe over it — though this doesn't mean Moscow won't make countermoves on the margins when it senses opportunities. For its part, the Obama administration is not focused on Poland at present. It is obsessed with internal matters, South Asia and the Middle East. The Patriots were shipped based on a promise made months ago to calm Central European nerves over the Obama administration's perceived lack of commitment to the region. In the U.S. State and Defense department sections charged with shipping Patriots to Poland, the delivery process was almost an afterthought; repeated delays in deploying the system highlighted Washington's lack of strategic intent. It is therefore tempting to dismiss the Patriots as of little importance, as merely the combination of a hangover from a Cold War mentality and a minor Obama administration misstep. Indeed, even a sophisticated observer of the international system might barely note it. But we would argue that it is more important than it appears precisely because of everything else going on. Existential Crisis in the EU The European Union is experiencing an existential crisis. This crisis is not about Greece, but rather, what it is that members of the European Union owe each other and what controls the European Union has over its members. The European Union did well during a generation of prosperity. As financial crisis struck, better-off members were called on to help worse-off members. Again, this is not just about Greece — the 2008 credit crisis in Central Europe was about the same thing. The wealthier countries, Germany in particular, are not happy at the prospect of spending taxpayer money to assist countries dealing with popped credit bubbles. They really don't want to do that, and if they do, they really want to have controls over the ways these other countries spend their money so this circumstance doesn't arise again. Needless to say, Greece — and countries that might wind up like Greece — do not want foreign control over their finances. If there are no mutual obligations among EU member nations, and the German and Greek publics don't want to bail out or submit, respectively, then the profound question is raised of what Europe is going to be — beyond a mere free trade zone — after this crisis. This is not simply a question of the euro surviving, although that is no trivial matter. The euro and the European Union will probably survive this crisis — although their mutual failure is not nearly as unthinkable as the Europeans would have thought even a few months ago — but this is not the only crisis Europe will experience. Something always will be going wrong, and Europe does not have institutions that could handle these problems. Events in the past few weeks indicate that European countries are not inclined to create such institutions, and that public opinion will limit European governments' ability to create or participate in these institutions. Remember, building a super state requires one of two things: a war to determine who is in charge or political unanimity to forge a treaty. Europe is — vividly — demonstrating the limitations on the second strategy. Whatever happens in the short run, it is difficult to envision any further integration of European institutions. And it is very easy to see how the European Union will devolve from its ambitious vision into an alliance of convenience built around economic benefits negotiated and renegotiated among the partners. It would thus devolve from a union to a treaty, with no interest beyond self-interest. The German Question Revisited We return to the question that has defined Europe since 1871, namely, the status of Germany in Europe. As we have seen during the current crisis, Germany is clearly the economic center of gravity in Europe, and this crisis has shown that the economic and the political issues are very much one and the same. Unless Germany agrees, nothing can be done, and if Germany so wishes, something will be done. Germany has tremendous power in Europe, even if it is confined largely to economic matters. But just as Germany is the blocker and enabler of Europe, over time that makes Germany the central problem of Europe. If Germany is the key decision maker in Europe, then Germany defines whatever policies Europe as a whole undertakes. If Europe fragments, then Germany is the only country in Europe with the ability to create alternative coalitions that are both powerful and cohesive. That means that if the European Union weakens, Germany will have the greatest say in what Europe will become. Right now, the Germans are working assiduously to reformulate the European Union and the eurozone in a manner more to their liking. But as this requires many partners to offer sovereignty to German control — sovereignty they have jealously guarded throughout the European project — it is worth exploring alternatives to Germany in the European Union. For that we first must understand Germany's limits. The German problem is the same problem it has had since unification: It is enormously powerful, but it is far from omnipotent. Its very power makes it the focus of other powers, and together, these other powers can cripple Germany. Thus, Germany is indispensable for any decision within the European Union at present, and it will be the single center of power in Europe in the future — but Germany can't just go it alone. Germany needs a coalition, meaning the long-term question is this: If the EU were to weaken or even fail, what alternative coalition would Germany seek? The casual answer is France, as the two economies are somewhat similar and the countries are next-door neighbors. But historically, this similarity in structure and location has been a source not of collaboration and fondness but of competition and friction. Within the European Union, with its broad diversity, Germany and France have been able to put aside their frictions, finding a common interest in managing Europe to their mutual advantage. That co-management, of course, helped bring us to this current crisis. Moreover, the biggest thing that France has that Germany wants is its market; an ideal partner for Germany would offer more. By itself at least, France is not a foundation for long-term German economic strategy. The historic alternative for Germany has been Russia. The Russian Option A great deal of potential synergy exists between the German and Russian economies. Germany imports large amounts of energy and other resources from Russia. As mentioned, Russia needs sources of technology and capital to move it beyond its current position of mere resource exporter. Germany has a shrinking population and needs a source of labor — preferably a source that doesn't actually want to move to Germany. Russia's Soviet-era economy continues to de-industrialize, and while that has a plethora of negative impacts, there is one often-overlooked positive: Russia now has more labor than it can effectively metabolize in its economy given its capital structure. Germany doesn't want more immigrants but needs access to labor. Russia wants factories in Russia to employ its surplus work force, and it wants technology. The logic of the German-Russian economic relationship is more obvious than the German-Greek or German-Spanish relationship. As for France, it can participate or not (and incidentally, the French are joining in on a number of ongoing German-Russian projects). Therefore, if we simply focus on economics, and we assume that the European Union cannot survive as an integrated system (a logical but not yet proven outcome), and we further assume that Germany is both the leading power of Europe and incapable of operating outside of a coalition, then we would argue that a German coalition with Russia is the most logical outcome of an EU decline. This would leave many countries extremely uneasy. The first is Poland, caught as it is between Russia and Germany. The second is the United States, since Washington would see a Russo-German economic bloc as a more significant challenger than the European Union ever was for two reasons. First, it would be a more coherent relationship — forging common policies among two states with broadly parallel interests is far simpler and faster than doing so among 27. Second, and more important, where the European Union could not develop a military dimension due to internal dissensions, the emergence of a politico-military dimension to a Russo-German economic bloc is far less difficult to imagine. It would be built around the fact that both Germans and Russians resent and fear American power and assertiveness, and that the Americans have for years been courting allies who lie between the two powers. Germany and Russia would both view themselves defending against American pressure. And this brings us back to the Patriot missiles. Regardless of the bureaucratic backwater this transfer might have emerged out of, or the political disinterest that generated the plan, the Patriot stationing fits neatly into a slowly maturing military relationship between Poland and the United States. A few months ago, the Poles and Americans conducted military exercises in the Baltic states, an incredibly sensitive region for the Russians. The Polish air force now flies some of the most modern U.S.-built F-16s in the world; this, plus Patriots, could seriously challenge the Russians. A Polish general commands a sector in Afghanistan, something not lost upon the Russians. By a host of processes, a close U.S.-Polish relationship is emerging. The current economic problems may lead to a fundamental weakening of the European Union. Germany is economically powerful but needs economic coalition partners that contribute to German well-being rather than merely draw on it. A Russian-German relationship could logically emerge from this. If it did, the Americans and Poles would logically have their own relationship. The former would begin as economic and edge toward military. The latter begins as military, and with the weakening of the European Union, edges toward economics. The Russian-German bloc would attempt to bring others into its coalition, as would the Polish-U.S. bloc. Both would compete in Central Europe — and for France. During this process, the politics of NATO would shift from humdrum to absolutely riveting. And thus, the Greek crisis and the Patriots might intersect, or in our view, will certainly in due course intersect. Though neither is of lasting importance in and of themselves, the two together point to a new logic in Europe. What appears impossible now in Europe might not be unthinkable in a few years. With Greece symbolizing the weakening of the European Union and the Patriots representing the remilitarization of at least part of Europe, ostensibly unconnected tendencies might well intersect. Tell STRATFOR What You Think For Publication Not For Publication Read What Others Think Reader Comments   Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized by prominently displaying the following sentence at the beginning or end of the report, including the hyperlink to STRATFOR: "This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR"

 

President Highlights Role of Iran, Serbia in New World Order

President Highlights Role of Iran, Serbia in New World Order   TEHRAN (FNA)- Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Sunday underlined Tehran and Belgrade's significant role in the establishment of a new world order.

 

"Iran and Serbia can have constructive and useful cooperation with each other in establishing new world orders on the basis of justice and humanity," Ahmadinejad said in a meeting with new Serbian Ambassador to Tehran Alexander Tacik here today.

"Iran and Serbia are two countries that have always accompanied each other in progressive activities and moves of the world," Ahmadinejad went on saying.

"The world is entering a new era, and all orders, systems and notions of the last 60 years have practically come to the end of the road due to their false view about man and the world and due to their unjust manner," he stressed.

On the bilateral ties, President Ahmadinejad said there is no impediment to the further expansion of Iran-Serbia ties, and called for bolstering cooperation between the two sides.

Ahmadinejad further pointed out that Iran and Serbia's memberships in such international bodies and circles as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) provides a proper ground for the consolidation of cooperation and coordination between the two countries in the international arena.

Tacik, who submitted a copy of his credentials to President Ahmadinejad, underlined Iran's regional and international role, and stated, "Iran plays a central role in the Middle-East and is among the important members of the international community."

"Serbia is willing to promote its ties with Iran in all fields," the envoy concluded.

http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8903021591

The Reemergence of German Dominance in Europe

May 02, 2010

The Reemergence of German Dominance in Europe

By Peter Glover and Michael J. Economides

 

The European Union was supposed to change all that, but it is a hard-boiled geopolitical maxim that nationalism trumps transnationalism whenever national interest -- military, economic or energy -- is at stake. Unfortunately, for Europeans, it is a fact of life which Europe's leaders have consistently ignored, with historically disastrous consequences. 

 

While romantics, mostly liberals, like to dream about universal love, human selflessness, and the benevolence of transnational governance, national big hitters just keep batting them back to earthy reality. While the EU may believe its $40-billion bailout offer will buy desperately needed breathing space, the greater battle to harmonize the "un-harmonizable" -- sixteen vastly differing Eurozone economies -- is the far bigger story. Of even greater import is Germany's growing "fifth column" status in European politics, a direct corollary of its reemergence to political dominance in the new Europe.

 

A Greek Tragedy in 3-D: Debt, Deficit, Default

 

Though the political EU is made up of 27 member-states, only sixteen are signed up to Eurozone monetarization. But a Eurozone crisis has been brewing since Greece's economic free-fall from grace stemming from the general economic vulnerability of the southern states, those affectionately known as PIGS -- Portugal, Italy, Greece, and Spain (though Ireland too is normally included). While the spectre of economic debt, deficit, and default stalks all of these, the Greek economy is, at least for now, the weakest. It may appear exaggerated on the surface. After all, the Greek economy accounts for 2.6% percent of the Eurozone economy. But the interesting issue is that the Greek situation, if not resolved convincingly, will bring to the surface what many suspect and many others see clearly: a serious economic vulnerability in a Europe suffering from (just to name a few) enormous demographics problems, inability to grow economically, and suffocation by entitlements.

 

The immediate crisis was set in motion when Greece finally decided to admit that it had "misrepresented" (lied about) for years the extent of its debt and that it needed to borrow over 50 billion euros ($66.5 billion) to avoid bankruptcy before the end of 2010. But the root of the crisis is firmly bedded in the soil of Eurozone regulations for disparate economies -- a one-size-fits-all financial straitjacket. As a result, Greece's deficit is running at a rate four times higher than the Eurozone rules allow. The trouble is that Greek politicians were paralyzed into inaction.

 

There are the rioting Greek street mobs, but those are a tiny group of mindless anarchists. Many other demonstrators fail to see why they should pay for the incompetence of the nation's profligate politicians and dishonest bankers. Tax evasion was rampant. In a recent study by the current Greek government, it was found that fewer than 1,500 Greeks were reporting incomes larger than 100,000 Euros. Greece's deficit, having been recently revised up to nearly 13 percent of GDP, now threatens not only Greece defaulting on its loans, but the whole stability of the European Union project.

 

However, the debate is not just about the Greek economy and management; it goes to the heart of how the EU is run and what the whole experiment really means. Talk of a rule-changing Constitution and a new European Monetary Fund (an EU version of the International Monetary Fund) does not sit well with Europe's three major economies -- Germany, France, and Britain. In Britain, a new Constitution would be an impossible sell. Meanwhile, in Germany, an increasingly disillusioned electorate and political elite have simply had enough of picking up the tab for southern Europe's laggard economies.

 

By late March 2010, as the Greek financial crisis worsened, Germany, Europe's largest economy, had made it clear that while it would play the EU unity game, it would do so on its own terms, and that meant no EMF slush fund -- especially one with Germany as the largest contributor. By mid-April, as Greece's approach to the bond markets was palpably stalling, the new EU President, Herman Van Rompuy, felt impelled to steady jittery markets by reiterating the EU's pledge of a bailout for Greece. That meant one thing: the EU must go cap in hand to the IMF. The resulting agreement to offer Greece a $40-billion loan (it is not clear how much will actually come from the IMF) at around 5 percent interest is now on the table. While Greek ministers initially claimed that they would not need to pick it up, most investors believe they will have no choice. The investors were right. On April 25, Greek PM George Papandreou formally asked the IMF and EU to activate their joint bailout rescue package.

 

So for the moment, while the promise of bailout may forestall fears of an imminent Eurozone collapse, the crisis itself has thrown into stark relief a seismic change in the anatomy of EU "unity." While the European Central Bank -- the former German Central Bank -- is content to act as Europe's banker, that no longer means that it is content to act as its chief investor and financial guarantor. It's a fundamental change that overtly exposes the EU's political frailty on the global stage, particularly its ability to keep its own house in order. But, just as significantly, it reflects Germany's "fifth column" status in Europe, too, as it now regularly subverts EU policy in its national interest; indeed, something we applaud. When it comes to key national security -- energy and otherwise -- all EU states need to consider extracting themselves from the politicized machinations of a transnationalist governance that, like the U.N., operates on the basis of the lowest common denominator principle, that being often against national interest.      

 

The Russo-German "Special Relationship"

 

We have written elsewhere (see next link below) about the growing Russo-German trade and energy ties that have progressively usurped EU policy. Germany's penchant for cutting unilateral oil and natural gas deals with Russia, for instance, runs entirely counter to the EU's critical policy to escape the grip of Russian energy dependency. Clearly, while Germany talks the talk of EU unity, in reality, it is inclined to walk the walk all the way to Moscow to secure a more realistic national energy future, one that is far more pragmatic than that offered by the EU's absurdly optimistic alternative energy strategy. Indeed, Germany's so-called "Green" Chancellor had no compunction in green-lighting Germany's new generation of 26 coal-fired power stations, carbon storage or no carbon storage.  

 

Most iconic, however, is how the Russo-German "special relationship" has consistently attempted to sabotage EU moves aimed at ending dependence on Russian oil and gas through what we have termed "The Nabucco Conspiracy." The Nabucco pipeline, due to begin construction in 2011, is still without a viable supply of natural gas. Yet Nabucco continues to be cited by European ministers as the key to European diversification away from Russian energy dependence. With Nabucco's future still uncertain, Russia has proceeded apace with its plans for the Europe-bound Nord and Sud Stream pipelines, with German connivance.

 

On April 9, Russia's Gazprom began laying over 1,200 kilometers of the Nord Stream pipeline. At the launch were Vladimir Putin and Nord Stream's chairman and former German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder. Herr Schröder has proved a redoubtable choice as chairman of Nord Stream, with his still powerful ties to Angela Merkel's administration, as well as a vital cog in Russia's "divide and conquer" energy strategy, when it comes to cutting energy deals with European states. These are states that inexplicably have an aversion to having their lights go out and heat turned off, and who have zero confidence in the EU's unrealistic energy policies.

 

More significant on the global stage is how increasing Russian energy dependency for European states is likely to prove a foreign policy game-changer, and one that does not augur well for future EU relations with the United States. It seems that though the EU ship of state(s) sails under an independent flag, the ship will continue to be Russia-fueled, with the German-dominated European Central Bank acting as rudder.  

 

The Greek Tragedy: A Symptom of the Failure of Transnational Governance

 

It is a fact of geopolitical life that as a single culture will come to dominate wherever multiculturalism is trumpeted, so the largest national economy too must dominate wherever transnational governance is attempted. Margaret Thatcher saw the EU's Achilles heel from the start. In 2003, in her opus "Statecraft," Mrs. Thatcher noted how European Union enthusiasts preferred the expression "the United States of Europe." Mrs. Thatcher warned, "The parallel is deeply flawed and deeply significant. It is flawed because the United States was based from its inception on a common language, culture, and values -- Europe has none of these things." Thatcher added, "By contrast, 'Europe' is ... a classic utopian project, a monument to the vanity of intellectuals, a programme whose inevitable destiny is failure; only the scale of the final damage done is in doubt." Germany's contemporary reemergence as the dominating European power is not only likely, but has always been inevitable.   

 

It is the irony of ironies that a European "supra-state" wholly conceived for the express purpose of suppressing German nationalist ambition should end up, within just two decades, in Germany's economic thrall.

 

The importance of how nationalism will always trump trans-national governance is dealt with in greater depth in "Energy and Climate Wars: How naive politicians, green ideologues and media elites are undermining the truth about energy and climate" by Peter C. Glover and Michael J. Economides, to be published by Continuum Books in September 2010 and now available for pre-sale here at Continuum and here at Amazon.

25 Comments on "The Reemergence of German Dominance in Europe"

 

http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/05/the_reemergence_of_german_domi.html

Life in the German empire

Life in the German empire

Germany's fortunes are now intimately linked to a circle of countries that have become economic colonies

• Comments (80)

Doug Saunders

Berlin today does not look or feel like an imperial centre. In fact, it does everything it can to be the precise opposite, a living monument to the horrors and follies of attempting to rule the world, its well-maintained bombsites, bunkers and wall fragments a permanent reminder of history's two bloodiest attempts, from the Reichstag and then the Kremlin, to expand control beyond one's own borders.

So you might understand why Germans, and their leaders, have been slow and wary to accept that their fortunes are now intimately linked to a circle of countries that have become economic colonies, and that this responsibility carries very large-scale, and non-optional, costs and responsibilities for the German taxpayer.

They don't like to think of it that way. When it became apparent this week that Berlin will have to contribute at least $32-billion toward a Greek rescue plan over the next three years, the front page of Bild, the flamboyant Berlin tabloid that represents a window into the country's unguarded id, went apoplectic: "Billions for Greece: What's In It For Us?" it asked in three-inch-high type.

Chancellor Angela Merkel had hoped that the big cash rescue could be put aside until after the May 9 regional elections in North Rhine-Westphalia, where news of a big foreign payout could hurt her party's fortunes.

But the Greek crisis, and the mounting Portuguese and possibly Spanish and Italian crises, are, at their heart, and in their origin, German crises.

Ms. Merkel realized, almost too late, that letting the rescue wait will only cost Germany more money and possibly destroy its institutions, so on Thursday she took action and primed the pumps for a bailout. Greece and its neighbours, she acknowledged, are not just nearby countries; they are umbilically linked to Germany, and their fates had become inseparable.

To understand this, you need to visit the residential shopping streets of southern Europe. What you will see is German: The food in the supermarkets, the electronics shops, the clothing outlets and a great many of the cars on the road, to say nothing of the olive presses, sewage-treatment plants and fishing boats. The banks used by consumers are often branches of German chains, and their loans have financed huge building booms.

Germany is the world's second-largest exporter, ahead of the United States and exceeded only by China, and its largest markets are its European neighbours. These countries are net importers: They meet most of their needs by buying things from other countries, especially Germany, which has used its size and wealth to build efficiencies, and economies of scale, that make its exports irresistibly cheap.

This leads to a balance-of-payments deficit: These importing countries have more money flowing out of their borders than they have coming in – for Greece, an amount equivalent to a tenth of the entire economy – and Germany has a surplus, with piles of it stacking up.

When other countries have balance-of-payments deficits, they can escape by devaluing their currencies and slashing the exchange rate. This, in essence, is what the United States is doing to ease its $2-trillion imbalance with China. But Greece and Germany share a currency, the euro, so that option isn't possible. And in a common-currency system, a balance-of-payments deficit becomes a fiscal deficit: It turns into government debt.

Money cannot sit still, and nature abhors a vacuum, so German banks disposed of those heaps of surplus export-payment cash by lending it to companies, especially property developers, in those same countries at low interest rates. And they lent it to their governments, too, to fill their need for missing cash, which would in turn be spent on more German goods and services.

Through this constantly repeated cycle of exports, payments, surpluses and then loans to southern Europe, Berlin became an imperial centre, tying its southern neighbours to dependencies on debt and cheap exported goods. Switching sides was impossible: Unlike China, Greece didn't have an undervalued currency in which to pay its workers and sell its goods, so it had no hope of developing a strong export sector. Germany had got the jump, by developing high-productivity big industries that its customer states could never match.

Ms. Merkel talked yesterday of using her country's patronage to cure Greece of its miscreant ways. "We will not shirk our responsibility," she said. "But the precondition is that Greece accepts an exacting program which will allow the restoration of market confidence in Greece."

That's a start. But as it stands, a complete rescue will only return Greece and its neighbours to the status quo ante: Dependency on German exports, German debt, German rescues. To end the cycle, Germany will need to dig in and help these countries develop real export economies. That's a lot more expensive, and a lot more complicated – but that's life in an empire.

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/life-in-the-german-empire/article1553140/

German company Ecolog accused of drug smuggling in Afghanistan

German company Ecolog accused of drug smuggling in Afghanistan

February 26, 2010 — Ms Sparky

February 26, 2010

Ecolog works for ISAF troops in Afghanistan A German waste management firm employed by the NATO mission in Afghanistan has been accused of involvement in drug smuggling. Allegations against Ecolog and the Macedonian family behind it date back to the war in Kosovo.

Allegations have surfaced that a German-based company contracted by NATO's ISAF troops in Afghanistan may have been involved in smuggling drugs out of the country.

"There is a chance that drugs or other such things have been smuggled," NATO General Egon Ramms, chief at ISAF headquarters in the Netherlands told German public broadcaster NDR.

The German general confirmed that an investigation was underway into allegations that Dusseldorf-based Ecolog used contracts with NATO or ISAF for illegal activities. The firm had been working for NATO in Afghanistan since 2003, Ramms said.

Ecolog dismissed the allegations as "absurd," telling Deutsche Welle in an e-mail message that none of the accusations made against it were true.

"Since 2002, the company has been a reliable partner to both NATO and the German military Bundeswehr in crisis regions," Ecolog said.

Allegations date back to Kosovo war

Drugs from poppy plantations are a major - though illegal - export from Afghanistan

Ecolog is employed by ISAF to handle laundry services at various locations in Kabul as well as garbage disposal at the military airport and ISAF headquarters in the Afghan capital. The company had been in charge of fuel deliveries to NATO troops in the past.

According to NDR, initial allegations against Ecolog and the Macedonian-Albanian family behind the company date back to the war in Kosovo. Then NATO-led KFOR troops had already suggested there may have been links between the Destani family and organized crime.

NDR quoted a current confidential KFOR report as saying that "the Destani family from Tetovo controls crime and smuggling activities at the Kosovar-Macedonian border."

Ecolog contracts under scrutiny

"This has only now come to my attention," said ISAF General Ramms. "Of course this will automatically trigger an investigation to see whether Ecolog is still a respectable business partner for us."

NDR reported that information regarding the suspicions about the company was readily available in NATO's databases.

Ecolog's two contracts with NATO could be cancelled, should the allegations turn out to be justified.

The German government has confirmed that it is aware of the investigations into the company and is reviewing its contracts with Ecolog. The Defense Ministry's 2010 budget includes contracts worth around 50 million euros ($68 million) with the firm.  (click HERE for original article)

I had blogged about this back in December 2009, but the US media doesn't seem to be picking up on it for some reason. Here's a little Ecolog/KBR trivia for you. Retired Lt. General and former LOGCAP III Project General Manager Steve Arnold left KBR and served as the Ecolog President and CEO in 2007.

Ms Sparky

http://mssparky.com/2010/02/german-company-ecolog-accused-of-drug-smuggling-in-afghanistan/