July 05, 2010

Schoolbook used today in Serbia --The new way of interpreting medieval history!

 

Date: Monday, July 5, 2010, 3:36 PM

from Dr. J. P. Maher
Professor Emeritus of Linguistics
Northeastern Illinois University;
formerly University of Hamburg (Germany)

3 January 2009 to Radio Free Europe (Nenad Pejic)


Mr Pejic repeats propaganda on a subject of which he personally knows nothing. The claim of Albanian chauvinists and their sponsors (e.g. Frank Wisner, the ENRON man) to be the first settlers of the Balkans is nonsense. .

Scholars of Napoleon's time used the term "Illyrian" to refer to Serbo-Croatian. In a lecture at the University of Ljubljana in 1990, an ethnic Albanian professor from the University of Pristina demonstrated that Albanian is of northern origin since it shares with Rumanian, and only with Rumanian, a set of some 60 vocabulary items that are not found in other languages of the region.  He spoke in Serbian to the Slovenes.

Competent scholars reject as a political fiction, like Nazidom's "Aryan" concept, the claim that Albanians are descendants of the aboriginal Balkan people, who were pushed into the Dinaric Alps by waves of Slavic Serb invaders in the 6th Century AD. After the Huns migrated into the Balkans the region was sparsely populated. Greeks and some Hellenized peoples were the immediate predecessors of Slavs in the Balkans, and they themselves had migrated from the north into a land already settled for millennia by pre-Indo-European peoples.

If the ancestors of Albanians weree present in the Balkans classical times, there would be loanword evidence in Greek and Latin. There are no Albanian nor Slavic loan words in Ancient Greek, which however does evidence old contacts with Celts, Scyths, Persians, Semites (Phoenicians) and Egyptians. The Albanian lexicon is full of Greek, Slavic and Latin vocabulary.
Previous to Old European civilizations the Balkans were inhabited by hunting bands, e.g. at Lepenski Vir on the Danube in Serbia. Marija Gimbutas [1921-1994] demonstrated that agricultural "Old European" civilizations go back to 7000 BC in the Balkans. No Indo-European, hence Greeks, Latins or Slavs, above all no Illyrians, no Albanians.

The Albanians occupy part of the former territory of the Illyrians... Albanian is first attested only in the fifteenth century, already having undergone very substantial phonological changes."

-J. P. Mallory and D. Q. Adams, Editors. 1997. Encyclopedia of Indo-European Culture. London & Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn.]. It is most probable that the modern language only recently called "Albanian" and "Sqip" is NOT descended from ancient "Illyrian".

Indo-European languages are divided into two groups, termed centum-and satem-languages, respectively from the Latin (centum) and Avestan (satem) words for 'hundred ' Ancient Illyrians inscriptions are in a centum-language. Modern Albanian is a satem-language. –Wikipedia has good discursions of these terms. See also

Louis.H. Gray. 1939. Foundations of Language. New York: Macmillan. Professor of Comparative Linguistics in Columbia University NY. (Gray was an expert in the subject.)

J. P. Mallory. 1989. In Search of the Indo-Europeans. London & New York: Thames & Hudson.
Marija Gimbutas's biography and bibliography see Wikipedia


?body=http://www.rferl.org/contentspapers_Tell_The_Story/1365796.html?page=2&x=1#relatedInfoContainer



--- On Sun, 7/4/10, A Jekich Pullinger <ajpullinger@gmail.com> wrote:


From: A Jekich Pullinger
Subject: The new way of interpreting medieval history!
Date: Sunday, July 4, 2010, 1:15 PM

---------- Forwarded message ---------

 


In this text the author shows parts from schoolbook used today in Serbia, where it's author Rade Mihaljcic (a historian) writes about Albanians being the first to come to Balkan, while Serbs came later! This is what Serbian children learn nowadays about Kosovo, otherwise called 'the sacred land'... The author of the schoolbook forgot something quite important, to prove history one must have at least one proof of cultural heritage!

T

Српска историја у уџбенику за шести разред основне школе

 

Милан Дамјанац   

петак, 02. јул 2010.

Национални интерес сваке озбиљне државе јесте, пре свега, успешна и одговорна културна политика и квалитетно образовање деце. Нема ничег важнијег за будућност српског народа од демографске обнове, заштите културног наслеђа, очување националне свести и историјског памћења. У скорашњем тексту Слободана Антонића „Самомрзитељи"[1], имали смо прилике да прочитамо приказ лика и дела директора Народне библиотеке Сретена Угричића. Не само што је у нашој лепој држави могуће да неко попут Сретена Угричића постане директор једне од најважнијих установа, тиме доказујући да ова земља нема никакву културну нити образовну политику, већ су и уџбеници у служби дневнополитичких дешавања. Као што ћемо имати прилике да видимо, идеолошка злоупотреба младих пошиње од основне школе.
Албанци – староседеоци Балкана и дошљаци Срби
Претходних дана, помно сам ишчитавао и бележио занимљивости из уџбеника историја за шести разред основне школе у издању Завода за уџбенике Београд. Аутор овог уџбеника Раде Михаљчић износи неке фрапантне тврдње. Након читања овог уџбеника, нисам више сигуран да познајем српску средњовековну историју. Може бити да само нисам довољно проучавао дела албанских и хрватских историчара. Наиме, у овом уџбенику који се бави историјом средњега века, могао сам да научим да „...подела друштва увек води и стварању државе која штити богати, владајући слој"[2]. Занимљива опаска. Након што сам ову значајну лекцију савладао, упознао сам се са староседеоцима Балкана – Албанцима. Након описа доласка Словена на Балкан и сукоба са староседеоцима аутор каже „...међутим, староседеоци који су живели заједно и чија су насеља груписана у веће скупине нису словенизирани. Обичаје, језик, и друга народна обележја сачували су Албанци. Део досељених Словена примио је језик и обичаје Албанаца и стопио се с њима".[3] Запањен овом констатацијом, сасвим случајно сам пронашао објашњење у првој проширеној верзији истог уџбеника, у реченици које нема у садашњој: „Албанци воде порекло од староседелаца на Балканском полуострву, највероватније Илира, романизованих у мањој мери. Са њима су се мешали стари Грци, Словени и други народи...". [4]
После оваквог сазнања, нема смисла приговарати Албанцима на својатању Косова и Метохије, српских манастира и културне баштине. Они су ионако балкански староседеоци, а Срби су узурпатори. Читајте децо, учите српски ђаци, своју историју! Ви сте припадници дошљака и узурпатори албанске земље и све што доживљавате – доживљавате са разлогом. Албанци не узимају српску земљу, већ враћају своју натраг. Ето, и то доживесмо од српског историчара који нашу децу учи средњовековној историји. Тврди човек да су Албанци потомци Илира, и тиме директно помаже њихове освајачке походе и отимачину српске земље. Одавно је утврђено да Албанци немају поморску и рибарску терминологију, чиме нам је немачки лингвиста, академик, проф. др Густав Вајганд (G. Weigand, 1860–1930) доказао да Албанци нису Илири. Ово је један од његових дванаест чувених аргумената који су преведени, објављени и продискутовани (па и усвојени) од стране свих светских признатих истраживача. Штавише, и од самих албанских трезвених научника, лингвиста, историчара и академика, као што су академик, проф. др. Eqrem Çabej (1908-1980), др Ardian Klosi, Ardian Vehbiu, Fatos Ljubonja и пуно других. Без обзира на то што је научни свет прихватио истину о пореклу Албанаца, албанске власти, подржане од стране квазинаучних теорија, настављају да тврде да су пореклом Илири. Тиме су преплавили своју литературу, почев од буквара, који стављају у руке својој деци од првог дана школе, па све до "научних" студија и дисертација. Све то очигледно није довољно појединим српским академицима као што је случај са Радетом Михаљчићем. Кога брига за карту Европе из 814. године на којој се јасно види српска држава на Балкану и албанска која се граничи са Јерменијом и Азербејџаном. Моја непросвећена маленкост, недовољно заражена еврофанатизмом и регионалним духом сарадње и братства, не може да схвати овакву тврдњу у уџбенику за шести разред. Уколико сте помислили да је то све, варате се. Након тога сам проширио своја сазнања научивши да је „ Стефан Немања освојио Косово и крајеве северне Албаније" [5]. Наравно, писац уџбеника је могао рећи – крајеве данашње Албаније. Ништа од тога. Понадах се, у тренутку, да је у питању случајан превид. Постоји још један случајан превид, који додуше, вероватно није ауторова грешка, али показује стање духа људи који су учествовали у припреми овог уџбеника за штампу. У одељку „Историја и легенда", српски јунаци Топлица Милан и Косанчић Иван су, сасвим случајно, заменили имена, те се наводи „ ...њима је предање придодало измишљене, неисторијске ликове као што су Југовићи и побратими Милоша Обилића, Иван Топлица и Милан Косанчић". Као неко ко је одрастао на косовском завету и српским епским песмама, не могу да разумем овакав превид (да не говоримо о сигурности са којом аутор тврди да су ликови измишљени).
Након свега овога, био сам убеђен да читам дело из албанске историографије. Нажалост преварио сам се. Понадам се да ће се аутор исправити у одељку о османлијским освајањима, међутим: „После Маричке и Косовске битке, Турци су све више угрожавали албанске области"[6]. Након тога говори о јунаштву Ђорђа Кастриота Скендербега и ниједном речју не напомиње да је Скендербег пореклом био Србин, нити долазак Албанаца на Балкан након слома арапске Сицилије.
„Македонски Словени" и њихова национална самобитност
Уколико нисте знали – ваша деца знају.
 Македонци су стари европски народ. Некада су се звали „Македонски Словени" и међу првима су прихватили ћирилицу: „ ...на Балканском полуострву ћирилицу су прихватили Срби, Македонски Словени и Бугари".[7] Међутим, каже аутор, ћирилицу су, сем Срба, Македонаца и Бугара прихватили и људи који живе у „ Босни и приморским крајевима југоисточно од Сплита". [8] Ко ли би ти, непознати људи, могли бити? Да ли је разумно претпоставити да су у питању били Срби? Не, не, то нипошто, бошњачки историчари у својим уџбеницима уче децу да у средњем веку у Босни није било Срба. Нећемо ваљда пропагирати великосрпску политику у уџбенику за историју, није европски од нас да исказујемо претензије на суседне и пријатељске нам државе. Зато ћемо, како бисмо изгледали европеизовано и сорошевски, рећи да постоје неки неидентификовани људи, ван границе данашње Србије, који су користили ћирилицу. Та формулација звучи модерно. Аутор је овај маневар искусно извео, и самим тим заслужује награду „Најевропљанин". Заслужни носилац овог престижног признања је и Ивица Дачић. Аутор даље говори и о патњама и страдању „Македонских Словена". Наиме, „после слома Бугарске, над Македонским Словенима успостављена је византијска власт. Нова управа изазвала је незадовољство које је прерасло у отпор... "[9]
О патњама „Македонских Словена" говори и у одељку о српским средњовековним освајањима: „ ... Од Византије краљ Милутин је освојио Македонију, у којој су живели Македонски Словени..."[10]
Такође, Душан Силни је освојио „већи део албанских крајева"[11]. Одмах се види да смо лидери у региону. Председник Тадић решава хрватско – словеначке спорове, а историчар Михаљчић разрешава велику енигму историје и дневнополитичких збивања. Срби и Бугари су вршили претензије на македонску територију тероришући македонски народ (шта би са свим оним Србима у Македонији који су се тако изјашњавали до 1945, они су изгледа, статистичка грешка) а Грци без разлога нападају Македонце за узурпацију грчког имена и злоупотребу историје. Дневнополитичка енигма. Управо је то и суштина овог уџбеника – пропаганда у служби дневнополитичких збивања и потреба, корак напред ка „помирењу у региону". Научио сам, такође, да је Маричка битка била катастрофа македонске, а не српске државе и народа.[12] Македонија је, каже аутор, „ изгубила самосталност".
 Значи, наши преци су ослобађањем јужних српских крајева 1912 године у ствари извршили агресију на македонски народ. Боже, нисам имао представу да смо ми Срби народ освајача. Што би рекао Брана Црнчевић, „ колико Србија треба да буде мала да не би била велика".
На овом месту не могу а да не споменем неколико речи Данка Поповића из уста његовог јунака Милутина: „ Заузесмо ми Кајмакчалан, синовче. Прекрисмо га лешевима. Само коња шта је остало да се распада на оним падинама... Добро, благо ујаку, а што ми онда љубисмо земљу?...  Имадосмо ли ми нека друга посла него да по Македонији гинемо? Јесу ли, благо ујаку, велим, јесу ли ти чија је земља знали раније да је њина? Ако јесу, што је не освајаше и ослобађаше, како се тек сад сетише чија је?... – смеје ми се у брк... Сви они пишу сад и говоре да смо ми отели Македонију кад смо прешли преко Кајмакчалана. А ја, синовче, видим нас како љубимо земљу кад смо прешли на ову страну Кајмакчалана, па ми криво. Што је нама било потребно да љубимо земљу Кајмакчалана па да се Македонци љуте на нас... Што да Македонија буде за нас три пута гробница, па да нас чак и наши школовани људи кајмакчаланским аветима називају и да нас подругљиво зову Солунцима, ко да је лако бити Солунац. Зашто се заборавља да је и од оне шаке јада што је са Халкидикија пошла као десеткована српска војска до краја изгинуло више од половине... Зашто да испаднемо смешни на крају? "[13]
Закључак
Сваки народ покушава да у својим уџбеницима „улепша" историјске догађаје и представи себе у бољем светлу, те често претера. Једино је код нас немогуће очекивати бар минимум објективности, бар минимум самопоштовања и поштовања историјске истине. Како изгледа концепција будуће регионалне сарадње у погледу заједничке историје и чињеница у уџбеницима, најбоље можемо видети по публикацији Сорошевог Фонда за отворено друштво Босне и Херцеговине „ Образовање у Босни и Херцеговини – чему учимо дјецу?" [14]
Ту можемо пронаћи позитивне и негативне уџбеничке примере. Наравно, на основу процене Фонда. На пример, у критици уџбеника из Српског језика и културе изражавања у Источном Сарајеву каже се: „ Већи део наведених примера односи се на имена везана за српску културу и историју, нису присутни примери из културе и традиције других конститутивних народа и не доминирају примери везани за Босну и Херцеговину: „На пример: Улица српских владара, Улица бана Лазаревића, Улица Бранка Чопића, Улица Немањина, Трг слободе, Трг жртава фашизма; Првомајска улица, Његошева улица ...На пример: Основна школа "Петар Кочић", Филозофски факултет у Бањалуци, Народна библиотека Србије, Грађевинско предузеће "Рад", Општина Требиње ..." " [15]
Занимљив је коментар на песму Алексе Шантића: „ Избор ове Шантићеве песме из целокупног песниковог стваралаштва говори о свесној намери аутора уџбеника да кроз наставу књижевности пласира идеолошку поруку, чији је примарни задатак - формирање националног бића. Песма је, с обзиром на контекст, политичка, а будући да је национално јасно одређена, и патриотска:
„МОЈА ОТАЏБИНА ....И свуда гдје је српска душа која, тамо је мени отаџбина моја, мој дом и моје рођено огњиште. ""[16]
Тако изгледа наша срећна будућност на Балкану.
Да се вратимо на крају уџбенику историје. Сем поменутих тврдњи, на неколико места аутор даје и непотребне и паушалне опаске, које су непримерене за један уџбеник историје (независно од тога да ли су исправни или не). Тако, на пример, каже да је папа Гргур сматрао да су „владари дужни да му љубе ноге".
Шта бих у закључку могао рећи о овом уџбенику? Лично, плашим се да узмем у руке уџбеник за седми и осми разред основне школе, у којима се говори о модерној српској историји. Из свега приложеног, јасно је закључити у ком се правцу креће тумачење историјских догађаја. Тужно је користити уџбенике за децу у циљу промовисања идеолошких порука и дневне политике. Несрећа је што је овај и овакав уџбеник издао Завод за уџбенике, установа која по правилу служи управо за одбрану ђака од пласирања лажи и полуистина и њиховом исправном образовању. Просто ме обузме туга када се сетим да сам се залагао за детаљну проверу садржаја уџбеника које објављују приватне издавачке куће, када овако изгледа ремек-дело Завода за уџбенике.
Имамо ли права да било шта очекујемо од других када смо сами себи највећи непријатељи? На крају, наградно питање – шта мислите, какве ће ставове о српској држави и народу имати ова деца када порасту?


[1]  http://www.nspm.rs/polemike/samomrzitelji.html

[2] Историја, Раде Михаљчић, Завод за уџбенике, Београд, 2009, стр. 27

[3] Историја, Раде Михаљчић, Завод за уџбенике, Београд, 2009, стр. 42

[4] http://www.ihtus.us/ihtus/viewtopic.php?t=490

[5] Историја, Раде Михаљчић, Завод за уџбенике, Београд, 2009, стр. 86

[6] Историја, Раде Михаљчић, Завод за уџбенике, Београд, 2009, стр. 125

[7] Историја, Раде Михаљчић, Завод за уџбенике, Београд, 2009, стр. 53

[8] Историја, Раде Михаљчић, Завод за уџбенике, Београд, 2009, стр. 53

[9] Историја, Раде Михаљчић, Завод за уџбенике, Београд, 2009, стр. 47

[10] Историја, Раде Михаљчић, Завод за уџбенике, Београд, 2009, стр. 90

[11] Историја, Раде Михаљчић, Завод за уџбенике, Београд, 2009, стр. 92

[12] Историја, Раде Михаљчић, Завод за уџбенике, Београд, 2009, стр. 117

[13] Књига о Милутину, Данко Поповић, Књижевне новине, Београд, 1986, стр. 40,41

 


Your E-mail and More On-the-Go. Get Windows Live Hotmail Free. Sign up now.

 

 

July 03, 2010

Nebojsa Malic // Pushing the Myth

 

http://grayfalcon.blogspot.com/2010/07/pushing-myth.html

Pushing the Myth

A little while ago, several Liberal MPs in the Canadian Parliament proposed a resolution declaring July 11 "Srebrenica Remembrance Day." Fortunately, Prime Minister Harper would have none of it, so the proposal was taken off the table - for now.

The resolution was not a product of altruism and sheer goodness of the Liberals' hearts, but rather an initiative mounted by the Congress of North American Bosniaks, and something called the "Institute for the Research of Genocide" (whose URL identifies them as the "Institute for Genocide").

After Mr. Harper put the kibosh on the resolution, the CNAB and the Institute raised a ruckus. Their initial protest, on June 23, included a long list of people identified as an "international team of experts" and claiming illustrious academic titles. The post with the list, however, has since been taken down from the Institute website.

Here are just some of the names from the list:

* M. Cherif Bassiouni (former UN rapporteur on the events in Bosnia, who endorsed the ridiculously inflated casualty figures and the "mass rape" hoax)
* Francis A. Boyle (international ambulance-chaser and author of the "genocide" lawsuit by the Izetbegovic government against Serbia, rejected before an actual court)
* Florence Hartmann (once spokesperson for Carla Del Ponte at the ICTY)
* Marko Attila Hoare (a world-renowned Serbophobe-cum-historian)

* Daniel Toljaga (listed as member of the Board of Directors at the Congress of North American Bosniaks, but better known as proprietor of the Srebrenica Genocide Blog)
* Dzemaludin Latic and Fatmir Alispahic, champions of militant Islam and Serbophobia considered even in Bosnia to be the lunatic fringe.Suffice to say that the list was a veritable who's who of professional victims, genocide entrepreneurs, and people who have built their careers on the myth of Bosnia. So, these folks have taken upon themselves to have the Canadian Parliament endorse their version of history by government fiat - i.e. by force, since they can't actually prove it in court. It is as if they don't believe their argument good enough to just persuade people, even though it has enjoyed almost uncontested dominance in the media for the past 15 years!

The much less organized Canadian Serbs have protested this proposal with letters. The response they got was pretty much a set of talking points reminiscent of the content found on the SGB, Hoare's blog, or the CNAB site.

The letter says that the "the genocidal nature of the particular incident at Srebrenica in the summer of 1995 has been internationally recognized." It specifically mentions the ICTY and ICJ verdicts, claiming they were "thoughtful results of fair and independent investigation and testimony."

Yet the ICJ verdict specifically said it had not considered the Srebrenica events itself, but simply accepted the ICTY rulings at face value. To call the ICTY's verdicts "thoughtful", their investigations "independent" and the testimonies of serial perjurers "fair" - that's just rich. Let's see: their crown witness, on which the entire case hangs, is a liar. They have conducted sloppy forensic work and later destroyed much of the evidence. They refuse to show the DNA evidence, then claim it proves something that is physically impossible for DNA evidence to prove (i.e. manner of death). And that's just the tip of the iceberg! The ICTY verdicts have more holes in them than a kitchen sieve.

Another argument in the response is that others have done this - the European Parliament, the US House and Senate, and hey, even the (quisling) government of Boris Tadic in Serbia! - so why not the Canadian legislature? Well, since when did "everyone is doing it" become a valid argument? Just because some lawmakers in Europe and the US have voted with their hearts for a well-prepared piece of propaganda does not have the magical power to transform that propaganda into fact. Truth is not a matter of majority vote - or even consensus.

From the first days of the Bosnian War, the Izetbegovic regime's weapon of choice was propaganda. They aimed to win the war by getting outside forces to do the fighting for them, based on heart-rending stories of massacres, mass rape, concentration camps and genocide. One after another, those stories have been exposed as fabrications and deliberate distortions of the already horrifying reality, while the full horrors of the war were never reported, so as not to interfere with the mythical narrative. The Srebrenica "genocide" is the last lie that remains, the one myth that was built up and reinforced more than any of the others. By now, Srebrenica has become a post facto justification for everything: the ethnic cleansing of Serbs, the foreign mujahedin, the rise of Wahhabism and terrorism, the re-Islamization of Bosnia's Muslims (a goal Izetbegovic set for himself in the 1970s, mind you), the ongoing refusal of Muslim politicians to abide by the
country's Constitution, and the equally ongoing attempts to fulfill their wartime objectives politically, by overturning the Dayton Accords.

All of this rests on the foundation of a myth that what happened in July 1995 in Srebrenica was "genocide". Even though the women and children were safely evacuated. Even though the column that refused to surrender and set off across the mountains and minefields to Tuzla was a military formation. Even though the actual number of people who died on that march was never established (the "8,000" figure is equally arbitrary as the "300,000" we'd heard for a decade, before facts became impossible to ignore), and the actual evidence suggests that the number of people actually murdered (as in executed, which indeed is a war crime) is several hundred. Even though nothing was ever produced to demonstrate intent on part of the Bosnian Serbs to actually exterminate the Muslims as a people - apart from the very strong belief by the Muslims that this was the case.

Yet in a proper court of law, it doesn't matter what one believes - only what one can prove. Fully aware that the ICTY judgments are based on belief and conjecture rather than actual facts, the believers in the Srebrenica Genocide Myth are now trying to impose it by force, by getting governments to pass resolutions. Next up will probably be demands that anyone questioning their myth be prosecuted as a "holocaust denier." So, not only are theydisparaging the actual Holocaust by declaring Srebrenica a "genocide," they are also exploiting and abusing the mechanisms established so no one could strive to rehabilitate the Nazis and deny the suffering of the Jews. When you consider the fact that the ancestors of many of those Muslims actually helped the Nazis in their ghastly "Endloesung", it becomes obvious that Srebrenica is not just about the present and the future, but also aboutwhitewashing the past.

I understand why it is in the interest of the Bosnian Muslims' religious, political and propaganda leadership (and their associates, fellow-travelers and useful idiots in the West and elsewhere) to promote the Srebrenica Genocide Myth. How that would serve Canada's interests, however, is beyond me. Stephen Harper appears to have reached a similar conclusion - and for that he deserves thanks, not just of the Serbs living in Canada, but all Canadians who care about their own country.

July 02, 2010

Germany Withholds Key Documents In Karadzic Trial

 

 

Germany Withholds Key Documents In Karadzic Trial?

 

Former President of the Republic of Srpska Radovan Karadzic accused Germany of hiding the crucial documents relevant for his trial on war crimes in The Hague. Allegedly, they are to prove that some of the NATO states were conducting illegal weapons trade during the war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995, while the United Nations' arms embargo was in force.

After the German government denied it posses such documents, Karadzic addressed the German embassy in the Netherlands asking that country to make more effort in order to locate them.

In his letter to the German embassy, Karadzic also referred to the statement of the former German Telecommunications Minister Christian Schwarz-Schilling who said it was "possible that the documents have compromising information, for example, information that France or Great Britain smuggled weapons into Bosnia and Herzegovina".

Karadzic requested eight categories of documents: reports, memorandums, correspondence and reports of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) related to the weapons' deliveries to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BIH), especially to Srebrenica in 1995.

Germany is not the only country which refused Karadzic's requests. Some countries stated they couldn't meet his requirements as the evidence he asked for were military documents of confidential nature.

The former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic is indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for the war crimes during the conflict in Bosnia, including genocide and crimes against humanity against Bosnian Muslims and Croats.

Karadzic, who acts as his own lawyer, claims the West was heavily involved in the conflicts in Bosnia and the war was fostered from abroad as the Muslims were getting weapons supplies.

http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/6200816-germany-withholds-key-documents-in-karadzic-trial

 

June 30, 2010

USA Trying to Impose the Kosovo Model in Sri Lanka

USA Trying to Impose the Kosovo Model in Sri Lanka
Posted on June 29th, 2010

- Kumar Moses

USA has "strongly urged" the Sri Lankan government to make use of the "panel"(1). Now that came as a surprise to some; didn't it?  And how strange that it was appointed just a week after "fact finding missions" by four US top officials. (2) The cat is out the bag! It is no longer a secret who is behind Ban-Ki Moon's panel. It's the same old Uncle Sam trying out the same old Kosovo model. What the USA is cooking for Sri Lanka is the same concoction it cooked for Serbia-Kosovo five years ago. It was one successful concoction that worked for a change. Kosovo declared independence in 2008. Although not recognized by the UN and most countries, USA, UK, France and a few others recognize it. USA managed to create a permanent dependant satellite state in the strategically important central Europe.

Kosovo, Bosnia, etc. have given USA a reason or an excuse to deploy a large force in the all important central European region. Using US friendships in the region, American defence agencies are trying to put up a missile defence system targeting Russian ICBMs. After trying it in Poland and the Czech Republic, now the focus has moved to Romania. It is easy to guess the next move will be to the region Albania-Bosnia-Kosovo. And that will be the final resting place.

South Asia is even more strategically important and USA is trying every trick in the book to have a permanent presence in the region. Afghanistan in the long haul is too dangerous and winning hearts and minds of Afghans is not going to happen. Ethnic Albanians and Bosnians who are very closely related are elated when a visiting US official stops by. So will be the piglets of Tamil Elam when the mother swine comes around. After that it will be turned into a military post to maintain US strategic defence interests in the all important South Asian region with open doorways to the Middle East and Far East.  

What is the Strategic Importance of a South Asian Island?

Diego Garcia saw one of the most despicable acts of genocide perpetrated by two superpowers. However, they found out that it is too far "from the action". Action includes military action currently underway and proposed action. Currently Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan have been set alight for no reason. Iran may be the next.

Proposed military action includes interfering in the Taiwan and Tibet regions of China, India, Indonesia, etc. Why is the region so important for these superpowers?

Economic power in the world is shifting it to the Asian region. China and India will be the first and third economic powers in time to come. This is a challenge to the traditional economic powerhouses. Even in traditional economic powerhouses, people of Indian and Chinese origin are increasing their hold.

Apart from economic power, there is military power. Defence expenditure is rapidly increasing in this region which means the emergence of powerful nations capable of taking on traditional superpowers. Traditional superpowers want to nip it in the bud.

Over 50% of the world population live in this region. It makes it strategically important for superpowers. Bombarding them with propaganda, winning their support or at least not antagonising them to the global exploitation process and making use of them to counter themselves are some of the "uses" of this population.

Further, world's largest Islam population is in Indonesia while the second, third and fourth largest Islam populations are in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. In other words, the region has close to 50% of the world Islam population too. Most Islamic fundamentalists to cause calamities for western superpowers originated from this part of the world. Therefore, it pays to keep a close watch over them.

The large Tamil Diaspora in western countries makes matters even easier to create a puppet nation in the North-East of Sri Lanka. Tapping into the Tamil Diaspora to have inroads into the region is another advantage.

These are some of the very powerful reasons why traditional western superpowers are eyeing the region. To their misfortune, they cannot establish military bases in the region. Then the only option is to create a puppet nation that will have no option than to house a large military base even if it means the same fate as Diego Garcia. At the very least the puppet nation will agree to allow Americans the use of it's territory, continental waters and the exclusive economic zone for their military work.

The Kosovo Model at Work in Sri Lanka

Following the brutal war in former Yugoslavia, NATO troops occupied the area. The conflict ended and Bosnia-Herzegovina gained freedom. However, things didn't end here for the Americans. They wanted more. That was how Kosovo was separated a decade after the conflict ceased. At first a bogus reconciliation process was initiated by the USA. Strangely, it was more about keeping people separated based on ethnicity than integration. (3) Occupying US troops made it difficult for Serbia to carry out any integration with Kosovo (Kosovo was and still is a part of Serbia according to Serbia and most countries). It is this same twisted reconciliation model the US follows on Lanka.

Interestingly, Tamil groups in the USA highlighted the need for a two state "reconciliation" model. (4)

The puppet nation needs to do basic land and resource management in its territory. This aspect has been taken over by USAID projects. (5) Under the guise of sustainability, a series of workshops have been carried out in Kosovo and Sri Lanka to "empower" persons from the respective regions. Many concerned Sri Lankans highlighted the dubiousness of the project. (6)

However, unlike in Kosovo, USA cannot deploy troops. This deficiency is overcome by compelling Sri Lanka to devolve power to the regions, especially to the North-East region. In doing so, USA seeks the support of other regional nations like Bosnia and France in the case of Kosovo and India in the case of Lanka. For the time being, the US strategy perfectly aligns with the Indian strategy on the North-East. The next step is to establish the infrastructure for independent diplomatic missions. As in Kosovo (Pristina) before independence (7), USA plans to establish a separate "American Corner" in Jaffna.

Subjugating leaders, both political and military, to give up on the targeted territory is the next step. In the case of Kosovo, war crimes trials commenced as there were genuine war crimes. Yet, apart from an obvious connection to Bosnia, Kosovo was not connected. But by subjugating Serbia over it's war crimes committed mainly in Bosnia, US planners managed to keep Serbia silent. In the case of Sri Lanka, there are not even genuine allegations of war crimes but the US insists on investigations. It is for the same thing – to subjugate Sri Lanka so that there will be little resistance to the separation of the North-East.

Ban-Ki-Moon played a unique role in the Kosovo affair. (8) He used his position to quell any tensions that was arising from the incident. However, the Kosovo project was appropriately retaliated just eight months later in a spectacular display of military might by Russia, which made the Americans speechless. Pro-Russian South Ossetia and Abkhazia gained independence from pro-US Georgia following a short war. Given their resources, size and access to the strategic Black Sea means there is the clear winner and a loser from the whole episode. Although it was a unique case, Ban-Ki-Moon has once again become the cat's paw. When the UN Security Council rejected interference, Americans by-passed it using Ban-Ki-Moon who comes from pro-US South Korea to appoint a highly ambiguous panel. While Moon claims that it is to advise him, US contradicts his claims by saying that it is to investigate Sri Lanka. This bias shows the need to appoint the UN General Secretary from a nation that is not aligned to any of the superpowers.

In short, most groundwork in the second Kosovo project has been already commenced.

It all Adds Up

During the last stages of the war, USA offered its military assistance to Sri Lanka but was refused. In the immediate aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, US troops landed on the island fearing the repetition of what happened in Aceh, Indonesia. Following extensive tsunami destruction, Aceh rebels were quickly overpowered by the Indonesian troops, forcing them to give up. This is what the American troops wanted to avoid. After it was clear it would not happen, they left. There was no real aid they brought in as it was a sham operation! (9)

In 2009, USA issued a possible war crimes report and wanted Lanka to answer to the claims. Why did the US and not any other nation initiate this? However, following a series of other developments, the matter was shed.

Blake – the US ambassador to Colombo repeatedly acted in very hostile manner. This was something unseen from all previous US ambassadors. He tried every trick to halt the war to save the tiger administration. Although Chilcott – the British High Commissioner – too followed a similar approach, he didn't interfere as much as Blake did. Blake was very popular before his ugly manoeuvre. Why?

After more blames and absurd allegations, Hilary Clinton declared in April 2010 the recommencing of US-SL joint military exercises. (10) These were done weeks ahead of a planned Russian military drill in the region. (11)

Although seem unrelated, all these add up in the scheme of things.

How to Overcome this Threat?

This got to be overcome by friendly means. The problem got to be fixed not in the arena of SL-US relations but in frustrating the Tamil Elam separatism project. If a separate nation or any other autonomous entity cannot be created in North-East, the US, etc. plan collapses. Sure, they will try other means and other countries but this particular threat will disappear if Lanka acts with diligence. Rapid and increased militarisation of the North is key to addressing the issue. Large, permanent security forces bases should be erected in the North. Land and police powers should not be given to any regional administrative body. Paramilitaries must continue to carry weapons. In essence, nothing significant should be allowed to function in the north without the sanction of security forces.

However, this is not going to achieve anything permanent. Change of government certainly changes defence priorities. To ensure continued military presence, large agricultural and industrial colonization schemes must be carried out adjoining army camps. Since security will be an ongoing issue, camps will have to stay here despite politicians' whims and fancies. In addition to huge economic development, increase in food production, reduction in unemployment and ease of landlessness, these colonization schemes would bring, they can supply army camps with agricultural produce saving billions of rupees every year. These new settlements should be provided with schools, hospitals, electricity, access roads, entertainment facilities, libraries, sport facilities, etc. The Gam Udawa scheme must be revived to create new villages in the North reawakening the past glory in the region.  

Most defence forces' personnel don't own land despite winning 1,000,000 hectares of land for the country from terrorist occupation! Building large housing projects adjoining army camps in conjunction with colonization schemes will provide not only housing but also a better work-life balance to forces personnel and less travelling. These are essential requirements to keep troop morale high and manage defence expenditure at a sustainable level.

Colonization frustrates the Tamil Elam project. Trincomlaee and Ampara districts are good examples. Decades ago racist political parties won in these districts but thanks to large scale colonization schemes such as Gal Oya, Senanayake Samudra, etc. ethnic composition has changed for the better. Tamil racist political parties including ACTC, ITAK, TULF, TNA, etc. promote separatism and racism making it difficult for ethnic integration. Making them less powerful is the surest way to weaken the Tamil Elam project. Today national political parties win these two districts and communal parties lose. In short, the "ethnic problem" has been sorted in these districts. When communal parties are not powerful, it helps people to resolve their problems.

References

(1). http://www.colombopage.com/archive_10A/Jun25_1277450687CH.php

(2). http://www.asiantribune.com/news/2010/06/20/samantha-power-genocide-chick-sri-lanka-%E2%80%93-latest-attempt-us

(3). http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9015.doc.htm

(4). http://www.tamilsforobama.com/Tamils.asp

(5). http://srilanka.usaid.gov/press_detail.php?press_id=42

(6). http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2010/02/28/is-anyone-watching-usaid/

(7). http://kosovo-americancorners.net/  

(8). http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25659&Cr=Kosovo&Cr1

(9). http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers13/paper1213.html

(10). http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=31554

(11). http://www.brahmand.com/news/Russia-sends-Moskva-missile-cruiser-to-Indian-Ocean/3607/1/14.html

http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2010/06/29/usa-trying-to-impose-the-kosovo-model-in-sri-lanka/

June 28, 2010

Bosnia: Suspected Islamist bombing 'the beginning' say experts

Bosnia: Suspected Islamist bombing 'the beginning' say experts

 

Sarajevo and Belgrade, 28 June (AKI) – Sunday's bloody bombing of a police station in Bosnia in a suspected radical Islamist attack is only the beginning of a wave of violence in Bosnia, terrorism experts said on Monday.

Police have arrested at least five people over the attack in the central town of Bugojno, in which one person was killed and six wounded.

Among those arrested was Haris Causevic, who admitted planting the explosive device near a police station in the town 75 kilometres northwest of the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo.

Causevic is believed to be a member of the fundamentalist Islamic Wahabi Islamist movement. Benevolence towards Wahabism by Bosnian authorities have allowed it to radicalise supporters and plot violence, according to Galijasevic and other terrorism experts.

Local politicians have for too long treated Wahabi groups propagating violent Islam with excessive tolerance, Bosnian terrorism expert Dzevad Galijasevic, told Adnkronos International (AKI).

"This (attack) was to be expected and it is just the beginning," Galijasevic, who is a Muslim, told AKI.

"Bosnia has a very stormy period ahead," he warned.

Galijasevic said about five percent of Bosnia's 1.5 million Muslims had been indoctrinated by Wahabi ideology, but the number of their supporters may be about 12 per cent of the population.

Though Wahabism is considered a radical religious movement in Bosnia, Wahabis are playing a central role in terrorist activities in the Musim-majority country, according to Galijasevic.

"Their activities have nothing to do with religion," he said.

There had been scores of murders and terrorist activities in Bosnia, but local authorities have played these down as "isolated incidents and ordinary crime," Galijasevic said.

"Bosnia-Herzegovina simply isn't ready to explicitly call it terrorism, although western intelligence agencies are pefectly aware of what's going on," he stated.

Galijasevic claimed radical Islam had a strong supporter in wartime Bosnian Muslim president Alija Izetbegovic and current Muslim member of the joint state presidency Haris Silajdzic, who condemned Sunday's bombing as an attack on the state.

Galijasevic heads a non-governmental southeast European counter-terrorist organisation with Serbian expert on terrorism Darko Trifunovic and a Croatian Domagoj Margetic.

They have frequently warned that Bosnia has become a European hotbed of radical Islam and Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist activities.

Trifunovic agreed that most of Bosnian Muslim leaders have ignored the activities of radical Islamists and played down their terrorist activities.

"We have been highlighting this problem for years, but no one paid attention," he told AKI.

Attacks such as the one in Bugojno were the "logical consequence" of ignoring the security threat posed by Wahabism, he said.

"I'm afraid this is not the end," Trifunovic said.

http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=3.1.607685816

Police actions questioned following G20 weekend

Police actions questioned following G20 weekend

Watch: See all Videos in the Player

Photos

Riot police push against a crowd during a street demonstration on the closing day of the G20 Summit in Toronto, Sunday, June 27, 2010. (AP / Carolyn Kaster)

View Larger Image

   

CTV.ca News Staff

Date: Mon. Jun. 28 2010 1:35 PM ET

As Toronto begins cleaning up after a weekend of G20-related violence, questions are being raised about the actions of police.

On Saturday, the Integrated Security Unit was criticized for allowing the "Black Bloc" anarchists to run amok on Queen West and Yonge St, destroying property and torching police cars.

But on Sunday, police cracked down hard on protesters, including what some have described as lawful protests.

One video on YouTube shows police, dressed in riot gear, charging a group of protesters who were singing 'O Canada' and were seemingly non-threatening.

Jason MacDonald submitted a video to MyNews.CTV.ca, in which he alleges he was hit by a riot shield in the face, cutting his forehead. The video shows blood streaming down the left side of his face from a cut above his eye.

Minutes later he is tackled to the ground and arrested.

The video was taken at the standoff at the Queen and Spadina intersection, which has drawn intense criticism for coordinating off both protesters and anyone else caught in the crossfire.

Mayor David Miller has defended the actions of police, saying they had an extraordinarily difficult task.

"I think compared to similar events around the world, our police did a remarkably good job and people should be starting from that perspective," he told Canada AM Monday morning.

Later, in a news conference the mayor said he regretted that some innocent people "got caught up" in the arrests and blamed the arrests on police having to deal with "Black Bloc" tactics.

Miller said that there is civilian oversight of the police, and there is a proper channel for complaints.

Toronto police spokesperson Tim Burrows told CTV News Channel that the police will review their actions and will be even harder on themselves than the public or media.

"The biggest lesson is still to come . . . we don't want blind criticism or deaf praise, we need to learn from and be constructive about what happened," he said. "In the end the greatest criticism we will have, is from ourselves."

Swift police action

Police appeared to lower their tolerance to protests Sunday after watching four of their squad cars burn Saturday.

At one point Sunday, police and protesters were engaged in a tense and bizarre four-hour standoff at a busy intersection in the city's core, when a large contingent of police boxed in a group of about 200 people in heavy rain.

Police moved in and picked out certain protesters and arrested them. Then, just before 9:45 p.m. local time, police let the remaining crowd go free.

Talking to reporters late Sunday night, Toronto Police Staff Superintendent Jeff McGuire was pressed to explain why police had barricaded people for so long in the rain. McGuire responded: "We're not perfect in everything we do, but our interest was in the safety of the citizens of Toronto."

He added that police were trying to prevent the kind of violence caused by Black Bloc tactics the day before, and found weapons in the area.

"I don't know the specific weapons. I've been advised that some weapons were found along the route as the officers were forming around this group," he said.

Earlier Sunday, there was a tense standoff at a temporary detention centre where hundreds of people arrested during the protests were held.

A riot squad used rubber bullets and blank rifle shots to drive back about 100 demonstrators at the seemingly peaceful sit-in outside the detention centre. Police then apprehended an alleged member of an anarchist protest group.

Eventually, police made a deal with the crowd, telling them they would release some of those arrested if the crowd moved off a busy street. The deal appeared to work and the crowd stepped back.

Police also raided a building on the University of Toronto campus Sunday and arrested at least 70 people -- not believed to be students. A spokesperson for the Integrated Security Unit said officers found a cache of "street-type weaponry" such as bricks and fuels.

Journalists among arrested

There are also questions being raised about the number of journalists who were arrested while covering the G20 protests. At least one journalist is reported to have been struck by police during his arrest.

Jesse Rosenfeld, a Canadian activist freelance journalist, was on assignment for The Guardian when he was arrested Saturday night.

Steve Paikin, host of the Agenda on TVO, witnessed the arrest and reported that Rosenfeld was punched in the stomach and then elbowed in the back when he was doubled over.

Two Reuters photographers were arrested Sunday night while covering a protest near Queen West and Spadina, despite wearing prominent media badges.

They were released without charges.

Two National Post photographers, Brett Gundlock and Colin O'Connor, were arrested Saturday while attempting to photograph police clashing with protesters.

They spent about 24 hours in custody and were both charged with obstruct peace officer and unlawful assembly.

A CTV producer was also arrested and released without charge on the weekend.

Toronto police chief Bill Blair told CTV News Channel that reporters would be arrested if they did not disperse with the protesters they were covering.

"We asked the innocent to leave three times and they chose not, and if a tourist, or even a reporter, chooses to remain in that crowd . . . then they had to deal with the consequences of being detained," he said.

No win situation

Security expert Alan Bell says there's no way police could have won the public relations battle of securing this summit, since they were condemned for not doing enough Saturday, then slammed for coming down too hard on Sunday.

"The big problem we have is that police are going to be damned if they do, damned if they don't," he told Canada AM.

He says it seems the protesters were methodical in their actions, trying to create distractions in certain pockets of the downtown so that other demonstrators could move in on the inner security perimeter around the summit site. The job of the 10,000 law enforcement officers brought in from around the country was to attempt to thwart that, he says.

"Trying to move so many police around different areas while maintaining the integrity of the security zone was very difficult. And I think they learned quite a lot from the Saturday interaction. Then on Sunday, they got it right. They went out there and prevented these things from happening," said Bell.

"They got criticized for that as well, but I don't know what people expected them to do."

Please Add Comments( 74 )

http://www.ctv.ca/CTVNews/TopStories/20100628/journalists-arrested-100628/

June 25, 2010

Srdja Trifkovic: "Greater Romania" Redux

 

http://www.balkanstudies.org/articles/greater-romania-redux-problem-prospects-ukraines-response

http://www.aminuk.org/index.php?idmenu=12&idsubmenu=167&language=en - English
http://www.aminuk.org/index.php?idmenu=112&idsubmenu=168&language=ru - Russian

http://www.aminuk.org/index.php?idmenu=112&idsubmenu=168&language=ua - Ukrainian

 

ROMANIAN ASPIRATIONS EAST OF THE PRUT:

THE PROBLEM, THE PROSPECTS, KIEV'S RESPONSE

Srdja Trifkovic

 

As presented ат AIU Roundtable in Kyiv, June 17, 2010

 

Ukraine faces sustained security challenges from its southwestern neighbor Romania. Those challenges reflect a remarkable continuity of Romania's geopolitical objectives, regardless of the nature of its domestic regime. They require carefully calibrated policy responses from Kiev. This fact was blurred by the visceral Russophobia of Ukraine's previous government, to the detriment of both parties. It is now finally possible to look at the challenges Ukraine faces on its southwestern borders through the realist prism, and to consider specific counter-measures that are proportionate to the challenge, feasible, and useful.

 

THE PARADIGM – The notion of interests and the policies that they engender are defined by the ideological framework in which they are embedded.  Both the old Soviet notion of the "fraternal community" and the current notion of "European integration" are derived from neo-Marxist utopianism. Both hold that Man is improvable and that permanent peace within a stable, supra-nationally controlled system is the attainable order of things. Both believe in their ability to make the international system as they wanted it to be, rather than dealing with it as it is.

 

It is realism that, unlike either utopian school, places national interest, pragmatically defined and quantifiable, at the basis of international affairs. It accepts the reality of a world where might is often right, rivalry the norm, and the immutable constants of history, culture, and geopolitics outweigh propositional slogans emanating from Moscow (before 1989) or from Brussels (today).

 

From the realist vantage point, it is evident that Romania's cultural narratives, national objectives and state interests – as articulated by its political elite ever since the Congress of Berlin (with the exception of two decades following World War II) – make that country Ukraine's most adversarial and potentially most dangerous neighbor.

 

THE CHALLENGE – At this time, four key elements of the Romanian elite consensus directly affect Ukraine:

 

1.      Romanians are civilizationally an outpost of "the West" amidst the Slav-Magyar sea, and in the 21st century they remain Europe's "last bastion before the immense, vague and unsettling space left behind in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union."[1]

2.      Moldovans east of the Prut speak the Romanian language and are Romanians; therefore, they should be incorporated into Romania, on the basis of the right to self-determination.

3.      Not only the Republic of Moldova, but also Ukrainian territories to its south and north (Bukovina), annexed by the USSR in 1940, should be "returned" to Romania based on its legal rights ("undoing the fruits of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact"). Last January President Traian Basescu declared in Kishinev that he would not sign a Border Treaty with Moldova: "I will never sign what Hitler with Stalin have signed. I will never confirm that Romania's border passes on Prut River. There may be discussions about a contract, an agreement concerning the border regime, but there is no way I can discuss an agreement based on which I will confirm that the border passes from here to there."[2]

4.      In any event, Bucharest has a valid title to the territories of pre-1940 Romania mare on the basis of its historic rights. In May 2010 President Basescu thus stated: "If Kiev has pretensions concerning the return of Transdniestria to Ukraine, then officials there should not forget about the return to Chisinau of Southern Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, territories which the former Ukrainian SSR received after the Second World War."[3]

 

HISTORICAL LEGACY – Before 1878, the "Danubian principalities" of Wallachia and Moldavia (united in 1859) looked upon the Russian Empire as an essential source of external support in their emancipation from the Ottoman Empire. The United Principalities took part in the siege of Plevna, but their hopes of enlargement along the Black Sea were soon dashed. Russia took back Bessarabia (lost after the Crimean War) and awarded southern Dobruja to its then favorite, Bulgaria.

 

The effect on the political class of the newly established Romanian state ("undeserving of statehood" as it was, according to Bismarck) was both immediate and decisive:

·         The early-19th-century national-romantic myth of the Romanians as linguistic and cultural heirs to Rome morphed into the nationalist ideology of Romania as an outpost of the Western civilization amidst the supposedly inferior ocean of Slavs and Magyars.

·         The irredentist aspiration to Bessarabia and resentment of Russia outweighed the bitterness over the Magyar treatment of the Romanian minority in Transylvania, drawing Romania to the Central Powers in the three decades preceding World War I.

 

Romanian nationalism, freshly minted, weak and insecure, thus came to rest on two pillars, and the equation has not changed in essence for almost a century and a half:

·         Audacious territorial aspirations, primarily directed eastwards, and

·         Antagonism to "the Other," divided equally between Budapest and St. Petersburg.

 

The collapse of Austria-Hungary and imperial Russia made possible the creation of the Greater Romania (1918-1940), by crook more than by hook. East of the Prut, however, Bucharest proved singularly unequal to the task of nation building. Bessarabia remained unintegrated socially, undeveloped economically, resentful politically; most of its Moldovan-speaking plurality remained reluctant to embrace a "Romanian" identity.

 

The disasters of 1940 – the loss of northern Transylvania to Horthy, southern Dobruja to Boris and Bessarabia to Stalin, without a shot being fired – were to be alleviated by Hitler's gift of Bukovina and an insanely expanded "Transnistria" all the way to the Bug, comprising a fifth of Ukraine, as a reward for Romania's participation in the Barbarossa. Ethnic cleansing started right away, justified by an openly racist attitude of Romania that treated Jews and Slavs as equally sub-human.[4] The hasty switch of allegiance came in August 1944, however, enabling Romania to avoid facing squarely the demons of its recent past. They are still with us today.

 

PLUS ÇA CHANGE… – A radical change in the composition of Romania's political class took place under communism. Its core consensus and nationalist agenda have not changed, however. In 1991 Romania rushed to be the first country to recognize the newly-independent Republic of Moldova. The government of Ion Iliescu, Nicolae Ceausescu's neo-communist successor, saw its independence as a step towards its reunification with Romania. It hailed the event with a rousing statement that could have been counter-signed by Marshal Antonescu:

 

"The proclamation of an independent Romanian state in the territories annexed by force following the secret agreements of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact represents a decisive step toward the peaceful elimination of that pact's unfortunate consequences directed against the rights and interests of the Romanian people."

 

During the Transdnistrian conflict, Romania sent a contingent of volunteers and military advisers to fight alongside Moldovan forces, and supplied them with weapons. When Moldova started having second thoughts about the union, however, the reaction in Bucharest was acerbic. On April 14, 1994, the Romanian Parliament adopted a declaration of protest against the decision of the Moldovan Parliament to join the CIS. The protest contained an audacious blend of nationalist claims based on ethno-linguistic, historic, and late-19th-century "civilizational" arguments:

 

"The vote of the Parliament in Chişinău regrettably reconfirms the criminal [Ribbentrop-Molotov] pact and irresponsibly cancels the right of the Romanian nation to live within the integrity of its historical and spiritual space. [...] Through the geographical position, culture, history and traditions, the natural place of our brothers from across the Prut is, undoubtedly, together with us, in the great family of the European nations, and by no means in a Eurasian structure." [emphasis added]

 

Sixteen years later, in May 2010, President Traian Basescu used the same terms of reference in his aggressive reaction to the claim that Presidents Medvedev and Yanukovich had reached a secret understanding on the future of Moldova and Transdnistria:

 

"Moscow and now Kyiv are trying to create on the territory that, at the end of World War II should have been returned to Romania, a pseudo-federation of three political-legal pseudo-subjects. But we will do everything to oppose the Russian-Ukrainian plan for the amputation of Bessarabia."

 

Back in January 2006, Basescu declared that "the minimal policy of Romania is for the unification of the Romanian nation to take place within the EU." Note the phrase minimal policy, implying the existence of a maximal policy that goes way beyond unification with Moldova. Its reality is apparent in the decision to grant Romanian citizenship to all residents of the territories belonging to the pre-1940 Greater Romania and their descendants up to the third generation – including the denizens of Bukovina and southern Bessarabia.[5]

 

UKRAINIAN RESPONSE – The policies and stated positions of Bucharest represent an open challenge to Ukraine as a state and a threat to its core interests. The response to that challenge has been muted and indecisive thus far. Its articulation in realist terms should be a priority for the decision makers in Kiev.

 

To start with, Ukraine should overcome the previous government's propensity to embrace the Euro-integrative discourse, which inhibited asserting its interests in a reasonable, clear and unambiguous manner. Ukraine's reluctance to do so over the years has created the expectation in Bucharest that it can get away with a dual-track policy of pursuing its revisionist-nationalist agenda, and at the same time pretending to be Ukraine's special friend and advocate within the EU. With "friends" like Basescu, Ukraine needs no detractors.

 

ROMANIA'S WEAKNESSES: Kiev's response to the challenge should take account of the fundamental weakness of Romania's position, both internally and externally:

 

1.      Romania does not enjoy a carte blanche from Brussels, or from any major West European capital, for its irredentist-revisionist policy. In fact, its status within the EU – low to start with – has been further eroded, albeit indirectly, by the Greek financial crisis. Key European countries are more impatient than ever with their poor relations along the periphery of the Union. They have no time for their special pleading, and do not care one way or another for whose flag flies over Kishinev or Tiraspol. They will not hesitate to express their lack of support for Romania's designs if asked to state their preferences. The reason Romania has been able to pretend that it enjoys the support of "Europe" in its aspirations has been Ukraine's reluctance to force the issue and test that proposition.

2.      Romania does not enjoy the support of the Obama administration either for its irredentist-revisionist designs. Admittedly, Bucharest gets private encouragement for such ambitions from various neoconservative "analysts" who still pursue a Russophobic, NATO-for-ever agenda, yet those people represent nobody but themselves. They may pretend to have official connections and influence, and their Romanian hosts may be lured into believing it. Ukraine can and should call their bluff, in view of Yanukovich's high stock in Washington after his visit last spring.

3.      Romania is no longer able to count on the Orange animosity to Russia as the welcome focus of Ukraine's external priorities. To the contrary, Ukraine is now able to discuss and coordinate its policies with Moscow, since their interests in the region are "objectively" identical. This is particularly significant in view of the growing special relationship between Russia and Germany, manifested in the opening of the North Stream pipeline: Europe's overall indifference to the rekindling of regional tension is strengthened by Moscow's ability to exert influence in Berlin on any specific issues it deems worthy of attention.

4.      Romania cannot count on clear support for its agenda in Moldova – not even for what Basescu calls the "minimal policy" of unification. The Unionists may be ascendant right now, but the opposition to "the reunion with the Romanian motherland" remains strong.[6] The support is largely pragmatic (i.e. EU membership and associated presumed benefits) rather than emotional and cultural, which makes it soft and volatile.

  1. Within Romania itself, there is no real consensus on the irredentist objectives of the political elite. Ordinary Romanians are too preoccupied with the daily struggle of making ends meet in what is officially the poorest EU member-country (per capita GDP). Polls indicate that barely one-half of the population supports a union with Moldova and a third rejects it.[7] Among those supporting the union, it is worthy of note that a half would be willing to give up Transdnistria. The cost of the project is broadly suspected of exceeding (in relative terms, of course) FRG's cost of integrating GDR. Anecdotal evidence also indicates a sense of cultural detachment from the trans-Prut Moldovans, who are perceived as less than diligent and generally "primitive."
  2. Romania's aspiration to "regional leadership" – a theme that had inexplicably resonated in Kiev for years until last January – is entirely bogus, and it is the source of actual or potential friction with Warsaw and Budapest. "Leadership" presumes the qualities of legitimacy and cultural, political or economic power that underpin the leader's willingly accepted benevolent authority. On no account can Romania aspire to such a lofty position. In the words of a Bucharest-based Western diplomat, "it needs to be led, rather than lead."
  3. Romania has ambiguous relations, at best, with all of her neighbors, and tense with two. (a) The new Fidesz government is Hungary takes an active interest in the status of Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries, and it advocates autonomy for the Hungarians of Transylvania, which the authorities in Bucharest say they will not accept. (b) In eastern Serbia, the Romanian government is actively promoting the "awakening" of the Vlachs, traditionally well integrated, and the unprecedented establishment of parallel ecclesiastical structures of the Romanian Orthodox Church.
  4. Romania has no military option a la Saakashvili, being within NATO and having no green light from any quarter for an act of reckless adventurism.[8] Far from giving it the muscle for assertiveness, EU and NATO membership create salutary constraints in the behavior of Bucharest and provide affected third parties (in this case Ukraine and Russia) with the means of exerting indirect influence, and – if needed – pressure.

 

Ukraine should assert its interests with five low-cost, low-risk policy moves:

  1. Ukrainian law does not recognize dual citizenship, but it should be augmented by the prospect of the loss of Ukrainian citizenship by permanent residents of Ukraine who accept the citizenship of another country. This would not affect the Ukrainians e.g. in Toronto who take the citizenship of Canada, but it would quite properly affect those living in Chernivtsi or Izmail who take the citizenship of Romania and thus implicitly accept the validity of its continuing claim to the pre-1940 Romania mare.
  2. Ukraine should intensify its relations with the new Hungarian government, with which it shares common interest in denying Romania any special or privileged position in the context of regional cooperation and Euro-integration. Budapest has already signaled its interest in a new chapter in its relations with both Ukraine and Moldova.[9]
  3. Ukraine should increase the awareness of Romania's problematic positions and policies by indirectly supporting and promoting events, research and publications – primarily in Western Europe and North America – conducive to its views on regional stability.
  4. Ukraine should indicate to its West European interlocutors that it needs no third parties as its pleaders in the process of drawing closer to the EU. There will be no eastward expansion of the Union anyway; Romania nevertheless should be disabused of its pretensions to be Ukraine's self-appointed chaperone in Brussels.
  5. Ukraine should proceed with the Bystroye project, and indicate that it would treat any attempt to dig a counter-canal upstream as an overtly hostile act.

 

The challenge Ukraine faces from Romania is not going to fade away because it is based on the cultural, strategic and geopolitical realities that are relatively constant. That challenge can and should be met more forcefully than before, and recognizing its existence would be the necessary first step. The source of the challenge is relatively weak and vulnerable. With its size, resources, and comparative advantages, Ukraine has nothing to fear in tackling it responsibly but firmly.



[1] Lucian Boia. Romania: Borderland of Europe. London: Reaktion Books, 2001, p. 308.

[3] "Do Medvedev and Yanukovych plan to sign a 'secret protocol' on Transdniester?" <http://www.kyivpost.com/news/opinion/op_ed/detail/67633/print/ >

[4] "Sugary and incorporeal humanism is inappropriate in this situation," Marshal Antonescu told his soldiers on July 8, 1941. "The Jews should be forced to leave Bessarabia and Bukovina, and Ukrainian people must leave the country too [emphasis added]. I don't care if the world calls us barbarians. You can use machine-guns if necessary. Let me tell you, the law does not exist. So, let's give up all the formalities and use this complete freedom."

[5] It would be unthinkable for, say, Germany to start distributing its passports to the inhabitants of the lands that used to be known as Silesia, Pomerania, or East Prussia.

[6] A poll conducted by IRI in Moldova in November 2008 showed that 29% of the population would support a union with Romania, while 61% would reject it.

[7] In a survey conducted by the Social Studies Group (May 13-20, 2010), 80% of respondents said that Romania was heading in the wrong direction, while only 8.3 percent held the opposite view. Asked about the priority the Government should have, job creation came first (50.5 percent), followed by the fight against corruption (12.5%), pay and  pension rises (18%), etc. Only 6 percent included "constitutional revision" among the priorities.

[8] Romania has negligible support within either the EU or NATO for courting Saakashvili, and Basescu's advocacy of Georgia's doomed NATO bid is unlikely to give a boost to his stock in the West.

[9] "The main objective of the conservative Hungarian government is the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in the East – which includes cooperation with Ukraine and Moldova – in order to separate Hungary's situation from the issues in Southern Europe." EurActiv.com, June 8, 2010.

June 24, 2010

Karadzic Questions Credibility of Witness

Karadzic Questions Credibility of Witness

| 23 June 2010 | Nidzara Ahmetasevic
 

On the last day of his cross-examination of General John Wilson, Radovan Karadzic questioned the credibility of the prosecution witness.

Karadzic, the wartime leader of the Bosnian Serbs who is on trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, ICTY, posed a number of questions that the witness could not answer.

General Wilson was not certain who the minister of defence in Bosnia and Herzegovina was in 1992, and he was unsure about some parts of Sarajevo and about the way the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was organised in the city.

"Mr Karadzic, from my position I was not obliged to know everything, but to know how to find information that was needed, and that was my job. I did not know everything about every incident that happened, and it is true that many things were unclear, in gray areas in that conflict and it was impossible to attribute everything that was going on," the witness said.

General John Wilson was a liaison officer in the UN monitoring peace-keeping mission in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina from for 10 months during 1991 and 1992. Later on, in 1993, he worked as a military adviser in the negotiating team headed by special envoys of the international community Cyrus Vance, Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg.  

After seven hours of questioning over a three day period the cross-examination of General Wilson is over.

During his cross-examination Karadzic was warned by the trial chamber several times about the way he asked questions and made statements. He has also been warned about his cross-examination method during previous cross-examinations.

The prosecution will call a protected witness for the next hearing on June 28.

After that, the next witness will be Momcilo Mandic, a former close associate of Karadzic and the minister of justice in his government in 1992 and chief of the Office of Republika Srpska in Belgrade. Before the war Mandic was assistant minister of the interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

While Karadzic was in hiding after the war, Mandic was suspected to be a part of the ring that was helping him and as a result in 2003 he was banned from travelling to the EU. Karadzic was arrested in Belgrade in 2008, while the ban on Mandic is still valid.

However, the Tribunal issued an order for safe conduct for Mandic during the period he will be in The Hague as a witness. The statute of the ICTY asks for cooperation from all the states "in the investigation and prosecution of the persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law" and to comply with orders issued by the Tribunal.

According to the order, safe conduct for Mandic is guaranteed from June 25 to July 3 on his travel from Serbia, where he now lives, to the Netherlands, meaning that "he cannot be arrested, detained, prosecuted or subject to any other restriction, whether physical or legal, of his personal liberty".

Karadzic demanded that the ICTY order the lifting of the ban for Mandic completely, but the request was denied with the explanation that the Tribunal does not have the power to interfere in questions of EU policy.

In 2010, Mandic was acquitted of war crimes charges by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Copyrights ©  Balkan Investigative Reporting Network.

 

http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/main/news/28977/

June 22, 2010

EU confuses Serbian leaders who confuse Serbian people

 

http://waz.euobserver.com/887/30334
 
EU confuses Serbian leaders who confuse Serbian people

ZELJKO PANTELIC
Today @ 09:33 CET


Serbian politicians often get contradictory messages from EU member states as well as officials and ambassadors in Belgrade about Serbia's European integration and the possibility of reopening discussions on Kosovo's status. Consequently, Serbia's public is baffled.
Top Serbian officials and some government-friendly NGO representatives often release information in the Serbian media on these subjects, asking journalists to quote them as sources from the EU, Brussels or international diplomatic circles.
The average Serbian news consumer can easily become confused by the divergence of messages in a single week.
One day he is told that Serbia is winning the diplomatic battle for Kosovo and progressing very well towards EU accession. The next day's headlines read that Kosovo independence is irreversible and that Serbia cannot enter the EU without recognising Kosovo's statehood. A day later the news may be that Serbia is far from EU integration because the EU is tired of enlargement, and that Serbia is learning lessons from Cyprus on how to join the Union without recognising Kosovo.
On day four the story could be that the diplomatic fight for Kosovo is very difficult because Pristina is backed by the most powerful countries in the world, and that Serbia is well prepared for EU integration, but its bid is being blocked by Germany and the Netherlands, for no clear reasons.
A day later again headlines foresee an imminent reopening of Kosovo status negotiations after the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, and that Serbia's EU application will be passed to the European Commission at the next meeting of EU foreign ministers. On day six the news is that Belgrade-Pristina negotiations may only concern technical issues, not the status of Kosovo, and that the EU has adopted a gradual approach towards European integration, meaning no big steps on Serbia's European agenda in the near future.
After the last foreign ministers meeting in Luxembourg, Italian minister Franco Frattini said the Serbian application for membership had not been passed to the Commission because his German colleague first needed an opinion from parliament.
A German diplomat, meanwhile, said it was not just Germany but that a big majority of EU members opposed the passing of Serbia's application "because most EU member states apply the step-by-step approach in their enlargement policy."
Ambassadors to Belgrade from some member states also release confusing statements. Unlike in EU countries, where few people know the names of ambassadors from other member states, or from Russia and the US, foreign diplomats in Serbia are like pop stars. They are interviewed by newspapers or appear on national television on a daily basis. Some of them insist there is no link between the Kosovo issue and Serbia's European integration. Others assert the opposite. Some EU ambassadors even contradict themselves, saying completely different things in the course of just a few days.
"If Spanish foreign minister Miguel Angel Moratinos says, as he did at the last Council of ministers, that Serbia is very constructive on the Kosovo issue and the participation of Kosovo in regional co-operation, we can just imagine what he said to his Serbian colleague," a participant in the last meeting of EU foreign ministers told WAZ.EUobserver on the condition of anonymity.
"It is quite understandable that Serbia's top officials are more eager to believe what Moratinos tells them, than to listen to the warnings of [French foreign minister] Kouchner, [German foreign minister] Westerwelle or [British foreign minister] Hague. We are not able to speak with one voice to Belgrade and that is why Kosovo is becoming a frozen issue and Serbia is going to be very slow on the European path," the contact continued.
An EU diplomat said there is a high risk the Union blocks both Serbia and Kosovo's European integration.
"I am afraid leaders in Belgrade and Pristina do not understand that if they want to move ahead on the European path, it is not important how many countries support you, but whether there is consensus in the EU or not. In other words, you need all EU countries on your side. To stop you or to slow you down, just one member state is sufficient," the diplomat noted.
Back to front page