July 22, 2018

The Painstaking Hunt for War Criminals in the United States

newyorker.com

The Painstaking Hunt for War Criminals in the United States

By Eric Lichtblau5:00 A.M.

20-25 minutes


 

Mike MacQueen has spent three decades tracking down war criminals who have been hiding in the United States. His job description is akin to that of a police detective.

Illustration by Brian Stauffer

A few years ago, Mike MacQueen, a historian working for the Department of Homeland Security, was at his desk combing through decades-old Bosnian military records, in search of war criminals who had eluded justice. The documents listed the names of top officers in a batallion implicated in the massacre of at least a thousand Muslim prisoners at a schoolhouse and dam in eastern Bosnia, in 1995. He noticed that the name of one Bosnian Serb officer kept showing up in the logs: Ilija Josipović.

MacQueen had turned himself into an unlikely expert on the war that unfolded in the Balkans two decades ago, mastering the Serbo-Croatian language, making two dozen trips to the region, and becoming so well schooled in the war crimes that Bosnian prosecutors had flown him over repeatedly to testify at trials. He had familiarized himself with the names of many of the key figures involved in the atrocities, but he had never come across Josipović (pronounced yoh-SIP-oh-vitch). He made a note to himself to find out what happened to the Serb officer.

MacQueen, who is sixty-eight, has spent the last three decades tracking down war criminals who have been hiding in the United States. His role, first with the Justice Department and then with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, has been to find offenders who made it into America posing as refugees. His official title is senior historian, but MacQueen's job description is more akin to that of a police detective.

 

Mike MacQueen in his office in Washington, in February, 2015. He works for the Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Unit, part of the Department of Homeland Security.

Photograph by Drew Angerer / The New York Times / Redux

His obsession with war crimes has taken him overseas to interview survivors or obtain documents from authorities in Bosnia, Croatia, and Lithuania. Sometimes, it has meant knocking on the doors of unwitting suspects in the United States. But on many days, it has meant simply sitting in his office, not far from the Capitol, and examining one document after another from some three hundred thousand pages of records about the conflict that he has gathered.

It can be tedious work, MacQueen told me. A tiny phonetic mistake in a foreign dialect can imperil a case. MacQueen's other preoccupation is building race cars. He uses the same detached precision to describe how he pieces together war-crimes cases as he does when explaining how he rebuilt an engine that blew out on his MG Midget during a recent race in West Virginia. Acts of mass killing can sound almost mundane as he recounts zeroing in on a suspected war criminal. "I guess it's the banality of investigating evil," he told me, a variation of Hannah Arendt's famous phrase.

After finding Josipović's name in the logs that day, MacQueen set out to learn what Josipović did during the war. Records listed him as an officer in an important logistics role at a time when the Bosnian-Serb Army was murdering eight thousand Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica, in what would become Europe's first genocide since the Second World War. He didn't appear to be a low-level triggerman but, rather, an officer who rose in rank and gained responsibility as the violence grew. Where Josipović lived now was unclear. MacQueen knew that someone with his record should not have been able to get into the United States. But he also knew that the immigration system in the late nineties had allowed hundreds of Bosnian wartime offenders to enter America amid a mass influx of about a hundred and twenty thousand Bosnian refugees. As a precaution, MacQueen searched for Josipović's name in ICE's databases. A hit soon came back—from Akron, Ohio. "Josipović had fallen through the cracks," MacQueen told me. He realized that one of the highest-ranking Bosnian war-crimes suspects he had ever identified had been living quietly in the United States since 2003.

Federal agents with "ICE" emblazoned on their jackets, conducting workplace raids and taking undocumented immigrants into custody, have become a notorious sight under President Trump. But investigators at a separate ICE unit, where MacQueen works, who are largely removed from the raging immigration debate, have carried out a much less visible mission during the past nine years, targeting human-rights offenders who came to America from dozens of countries.

The immigration group, officially known as the Human Rights Violators and War Crimes Unit, currently has more than a hundred and thirty-five active investigations of suspected foreign offenders now thought to be living in the United States, officials said. In April, the unit's investigation into a Liberian warlord living outside of Philadelphia, who had been implicated in murders, rapes, and enslavement in his native country in the nineties, resulted in a thirty-year prison sentence for immigration fraud and perjury—the longest criminal sentence in the team's history.

Most of MacQueen's cases have involved Bosnian Serbs, the group blamed for the bulk of the war crimes during the conflict, but his unit has also moved to jail or deport a number of Bosnian Croats and Muslims who were also accused of atrocities. He says more than fifty of the Bosnian immigrants he investigated have been forced out of the country. (Many cases have not become public, because they came in sealed immigration proceedings.) In January, after thirty years in the federal government, MacQueen officially retired, but ICE asked him to stay on for another five years as a private contractor, because his work on the Balkan front was "invaluable," Lisa Koven, the chief of ICE's human-rights law section, said.

MacQueen is determined to continue working on the investigations of the suspects he has already identified, and help prosecutors prepare to take them to court. His aim is to finish what he began and get as many war criminals as he can forced out of the country. "I don't really need the money," he said.

A native New Yorker, MacQueen comes across as soft-spoken and stoic, with a wry sense of humor, but he admits to losing his temper with suspects whom he believes are lying to him. In an angry confrontation a few years ago with a Bosnian woman in Wisconsin who concealed her involvement with a Serbian military unit, he used a vulgar sexual expression in Serbo-Croatian to show what he thought of her claims of innocence. A judge "gave me a little talking to," MacQueen said. "I have a stunning lack of sympathy for anyone with an unclean record. They can go fuck themselves."

I first interviewed MacQueen five years ago, about his earlier work in hunting Nazis. I was writing a book about the thousands of Nazi war criminals who came to America after the Second World War, and a source mentioned MacQueen's role in breaking a critical case, in 1994, when he was at the Justice Department. For years, prosecutors suspected that a Lithuanian immigrant and naturalized American citizen in Massachusetts named Aleksandras Lileikis, who had led a special police force in Vilnius during the war, was a top Nazi collaborator who ordered the roundup of Lithuanian Jews in the nineteen-forties and turned them over to the Nazis for execution. But the Justice Department couldn't prove it, and Lileikis denied any role in the massacres. "Show me something that I signed," Lileikis had dared a prosecutor who showed up at his door, in Boston, in 1983.

The case languished for a decade, until MacQueen went to Lithuania to examine dog-eared Nazi records that had become available to Americans after the fall of the Soviet Union. MacQueen scoured the Lithuanian archives for days without success. Finally, he found a canvas-bound book with the names of nearly twenty-nine hundred wartime prisoners held in Vilnius typed in Russian. (MacQueen speaks six languages, including Russian, which he brushes up on by watching "The Americans," on FX.) The logs listed hundreds of Jews, many of them children, who were jailed, turned over to the Nazis, marched to an excavation site six miles away, and methodically gunned down. In all, some sixty thousand Lithuanian Jews were massacred. In thick black ink at the bottom of an arrest order, MacQueen finally spotted the signature: Aleksandras Lileikis, chief of the special security police in Vilnius. Then he found twenty more signatures just like it.

Lileikis was ultimately stripped of his citizenship and returned to Lithuania, in 1996, where he died awaiting trial for war crimes. MacQueen considers this one of the most important achievements of his career. For years, he kept on his bulletin board in his office the Nazis' neatly typed "execution cards" for two of the Lithuanian victims—a six-year-old Jewish girl named Fruma Kaplan and her mother. Lileikis's men had jailed them after they were found hiding in a Catholic family's home. Below Fruma's name on the card was the local Nazi euphemism for what befell her and tens of thousands of others: Befehlsgemass behandelt—"treated according to orders." MacQueen rarely displays much emotion over his investigations, but he had nightmares for years over victims like Fruma. "If you have any human sensibility, it sticks," he told me.

MacQueen switched in 2004 to hunting for the perpetrators of war crimes in Bosnia. "The Nazis were all dying," he said, and a new generation of war criminals were beginning to surface in the United States. In both eras, holes in America's immigration system allowed offenders into the country based on little more than their word about what they did during the war. "We didn't learn our lesson," MacQueen said. "That the whole situation was allowed to repeat itself in Bosnia was historical amnesia."

On July 11, 1995, Srebrenica, a predominantly Muslim enclave in eastern Bosnia that had been declared a United Nations protected safe area, fell to Bosnian Serb forces after U.N. and NATO forces did little to save it. Thousands of Bosnian Muslim men were bused to schools, warehouses, and other buildings that served as makeshift prisons. In the nearby village of Petkovci, soldiers from the 6th Infantry Battalion of the Bosnian Serb Army's Zvornick Brigade herded more than a thousand Muslim men into hot, crowded classrooms. With no food or water, some prisoners "became so thirsty they resorted to drinking their own urine," according to the U.N.'s International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Shouting "Long live Serbia, Srebrenica is Serbian," the soldiers shot some prisoners to death outside the school on July 15th, the tribunal found, then took the rest to a nearby dam and executed them, burying them in mass graves.

Relatives pray during a funeral ceremony in July, 2014, for victims from Srebrenica whose remains were exhumed from a mass grave.

Photograph by Samir Yordamovic / Anadolu Agency / Getty

All told, the U.N. tribunal has implicated the 6th Infantry Battalion in the murders of more than a thousand Muslims from Srebrenica, at the school and elsewhere. Using Bosnian documents and U.S. government records, MacQueen managed to identify a handful of immigrants in Las Vegas, Phoenix, and elsewhere who served in the notorious unit. In 2014, he began focussing on Josipović. "I just kept finding more and more stuff on this guy," he told me. The other 6th Battalion members he had found living in the United States were lower-level soldiers, but the logs placed Josipović several rungs above them, with a rank of company commander and the role of the chief logistics officer for the battalion in mid-1995. Piecing together Bosnian Serb Army personnel records from 1992 to 1995, he was able to track Josipović's whereabouts in those years, his promotions in rank, and, most important, his senior role at the 6th Battalion headquarters in July, 1995, in Petkovci, at the time of the killings of the Muslims from Srebrenica. There were no eyewitness accounts of Josipović's role, but MacQueen found documents that showed he had significant responsibility for a range of operations, including summoning the trucks needed to shuttle prisoners to the execution site and dispatching personnel to clean up the blood and waste from the school. Josipović "was a key functionary without whom mass-murder operations could not be carried out," MacQueen told me. A former prosecutor in Bosnia, speaking on condition of anonymity, described Josipović as a "medium to big fish" in the Petkovci operation.

In 2003, Josipović settled in the United States. On the surface, his life looked like that of many other Bosnian refugees. He was married, with three children. He spoke spotty English, but held a steady factory job. He had a house and a mortgage in a blue-collar area of Akron near a local diner. He'd received a few traffic tickets but had no major run-ins with the law.

In 2012, Bosnian officials asked the U.S. government to interview Josipović, because they thought he might have information that could help in their investigation into the 6th Battalion's top commander, Ostoja Stanišić. F.B.I. agents questioned Josipović in Akron—not as a suspect but as a possible witness. He told them that he hadn't served in the battalion and knew nothing about the commander. Two years later, MacQueen began his own investigation and learned about the F.B.I. interview. He was frustrated to read in the F.B.I.'s report just how easily Josipović had evaded scrutiny. Josipović "blew smoke" and "Bureau agents wrote it all down," MacQueen said. The F.B.I. declined to comment on the case.

In September, 2014, MacQueen obtained a search warrant and, accompanied by four immigration agents, knocked on Josipović's door. After the visitors showed Josipović their credentials, Josipović became agitated, but he agreed to answer some questions, MacQueen told me. The conversation started civilly, in English, but he began cursing in Serbo-Bosnian as questions turned to the war.

Josipović again denied serving in the military. MacQueen brought out the records showing Josipović's name, rank, and identification number. "How do you square what you're telling me with this?" he recalled asking. Josipović got his eyeglasses and began reading. He declared the records a forgery. "I don't know who made this document," MacQueen recalled him saying. It had been authenticated, MacQueen told him. Josipović's story shifted. He had served in the 6th Battalion, he admitted, but he wasn't in Pekovci. He had "granted himself leave," he said, and was visiting relatives across the river in Serbia. MacQueen didn't believe him. The bloodletting at Petkovci involved the entire unit, and Josipović's name was in the officer staffing logs. MacQueen finally left, convinced that Josipović had been lying to American officials for more than a decade.

A military roster for the 6th Battalion of the Bosnian Serb Army's Zvornik Brigade, from July, 1995, lists the name of Ilija Josipovic. War crimes investigators say members of the unit massacred more than a thousand Muslims from Srebrenica on July 15, 1995.

For two years, Josipović's case was stalled owing to a backlog of immigration cases. Photos that Josipović posted on Facebook during that time show him smiling, his graying hair cropped short, as he posed with his children at a family wedding and at a graduation ceremony for his daughter with balloons in hand. Early last year, things changed. Federal prosecutors in Ohio charged Josipović with immigration fraud, and, three weeks later, just days after his sixtieth birthday, he walked into the federal courthouse in Akron. He had decided to plead guilty, which meant near-certain deportation. His wife, who came from Bosnia with him, had died of cancer two months earlier, and he was eager to take a deal rather than face more serious war-crimes charges. "I figured it was the easiest route to go," he told the judge through a translator, before admitting he had concealed his military service in the Bosnian Serb Army. Prosecutors wanted the sure thing, as well. "This was someone we wanted to get out of the United States as soon as possible," Jason Katz, the federal prosecutor who brought the case with MacQueen's help, told me.

A deportation order came three months later. The U.S. Attorney's Office in Cleveland put out a short press release, picked up by a few media outlets in Ohio, that said Josipović was being deported "for failing to disclose his involvement in a military unit engaged in war crimes in the former Yugoslavia." The statement made no mention of his role as a ranking officer in the 6th Battalion or the unit's involvement in the Srebrenica massacre.

ICE agents put Josipović on a plane back to Bosnia last summer. Boro Josipović, his thirty-one-year-old son, told me that it was "heartbreaking" for him and his two sisters, who all remained in Ohio, to see their father deported after fourteen years in America. His father had no real choice but to conceal his military service from U.S. immigration officials in his application papers, Boro maintained, or he and his wife and three children would never have been let into the country. "He just basically wanted to provide a better life for his family," Boro said. "It was a civil war. From what I knew, he was just a regular officer."

Josipović has been living with a cousin in Zvornik since his deportation, Boro said. I asked to speak to the elder Josipović, but Boro declined several requests to put me in touch with him directly and said his father was uninterested in being interviewed. His health has not been good, Boro told me, and "he doesn't feel like talking about it." Asked whether he thought his father was involved in war crimes, Boro Josipović said he did not really know. He has heard accounts of the Srebrenica killings, he said, ''but there's so many different stories. I really don't know what happened. God only knows.''

Bosnian authorities had told MacQueen that they would consider prosecuting Josipović on war-crimes charges. MacQueen was hopeful but not confident. Over the years, he had seen many suspects—both Nazis and Bosnians—escape the punishment he thought they deserved, and human-rights advocates have long complained of uneven justice for Balkan war criminals. The U.N. war-crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which closed last December, after twenty-four years, brought charges against a hundred and sixty-one higher-level offenders, including former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević, who died while on trial; the Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladić, the so-called Butcher of Bosnia, who oversaw the Srebrenica massacres; and the Bosnian Croat general Slobodan Praljak, who killed himself in court last year by drinking a vial of poison seconds after his sentence was affirmed.

But justice has been more erratic in the cases that have been brought before the Bosnian state court. MacQueen testified as an expert in state court in the joint trial of Stanišić, the 6th Battalion commander, and his top deputy, Marko Milošević (no relation to Slobodan), for crimes of genocide in the killings at the school in Petkovci and nearby dam. Stanišić was found guilty and imprisoned, but his deputy was acquitted because of what the court called a lack of evidence.

Trying accused war criminals remains politically contentious in Bosnia two decades after the conflict. The Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik has called for a referendum to reject the authority of the state court, saying it is biased against Serbs. The state court has an enormous backlog and hopes to resolve five hundred and fifty war-crimes cases involving more than forty-five hundred perpetrators by 2023. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which monitors war-crimes trials in Bosnia, has observed a dramatic decrease in conviction rates in the state court in the past few years. A 2016 report by the group found that "many potential witnesses have died or emigrated" and acknowledged that it would be impossible to try every perpetrator: "Innumerable crimes were committed by innumerable people. Available resources render it impossible to prosecute all those who committed crimes."

In the case of Josipović, a Bosnian prosecutor "reviewed the available evidence" and "issued an order not to initiate an investigation," Boris Grubešić, a spokesman for the Bosnian state prosecutor's office, told me. That will stand, he said, "unless we find some additional and sufficient evidence."

Free for now from the threat of prosecution, Josipović has been trying to find work in Zvornik, without success, Boro said. Father and son talk on Skype when they can. MacQueen had heard nothing about Josipović for months after his deportation and didn't know about Bosnia's decision not to initiate an investigation. He expressed disappointment but was not altogether surprised. MacQueen's main goal—getting Josipović deported—was accomplished. "We got done what we could do," he said. "He'll never be coming back."

Valerie Hopkins contributed reporting to this article.

Video

The Haunting Cries of Immigrant Children

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July 09, 2018

With Serbia and Kosovo both vying for EU membership, the question remains: who won the war?

independent.co.uk

With Serbia and Kosovo both vying for EU membership, the question remains: who won the war?

Robert Fisk Belgrade

57-72 minutes


Who won the war? There are a few ruins left from the Nato bombing of 1998, and outside the parliament building in Belgrade – of "Serbian democracy", more later – there is a long banner containing photographs of the Serbs who were killed in Kosovo two decades ago. Men, women children, civilians, soldiers and, of course, the occasional war criminal or two, or three.

Nato were not exactly surgery clean in its airstrikes, and the "UCK terrorists" (Kosovar Muslim militia) killed civilians. A point to be remembered here: the mass dead of Kosovo itself (from both mass murders by Serbs and promiscuous airstrikes by Nato) have no place on this record of suffering.

So it was a relief to see that Aleksandar Vucic, former sympathiser of Saddam Hussein, and Hashem Thaci, former "terrorist" chieftain in Kosovo, could meet in the EU's offices in Brussels last month as presidents of their respective countries to be told that a legally binding agreement between them was "key for their respective European paths [sic] and essential for sustainable regional stability".

Will Vucic hold a referendum for Serbs "so that the people can decide"? But how can he ask that when he said just over a week ago that "there is nothing good about Kosovo that we can get and offer to the people; just trouble and hard things…"

It sounded like blood, sweat and tears in reverse. The referendum, in EU terms, sounds even worse. Didn't Serbia hold a rather bloody referendum 20 years ago when it decided to fight for Kosovo – and for a rather dotty dictator called Slobodan Milosevic? And after a UK referendum on leaving the EU, who wants a referendum on a bloodbath to get into the EU?

 

July 08, 2018

Serbia recovers from ‘cultural genocide’

theartnewspaper.com

Serbia recovers from 'cultural genocide'

Simon Hewitt

4-5 minutes


The Museum of Contemporary Art Belgrade reopened last October after a $6.8m renovation Relja Ivanic

Museum-goers are used to institutions closing for a year or three in pursuit of ambitious modernisations, but the fate of Serbia's top two museums takes some beating. The National Museum, which is due to reopen in Belgrade on 28 June, last welcomed visitors in 2003. The city's Museum of Contemporary Art, which reopened last October, had been closed since 2007.

This dual hiatus was described by the artist and critic Vladimir Bogdanovic in 2012 as "a cultural genocide against the Serbs". In 2015, the Serbian government erected a digital clock on the façade of the National Museum, ticking down the seconds until its planned reopening the following year. The deadline came and went; so did the clock.

Zoran Eric, the chief curator of the Museum of Contemporary Art, says the "lack of political will to deal with culture or cultural institutions" was finally broken by Ivan Tasovac, the former head of the Belgrade Philharmonic, who "persuaded the political establishment that the reconstruction of the two museums was a priority" during his stint as culture minister from 2013 to 2016.

Founded in 1844, the National Museum has occupied a neo-Renaissance former bank on Belgrade's central square, Trg Republike, since 1952. Its RSD824m ($8.2m) refurbishment has increased the exhibition space to 5,000 sq. m by covering the courtyard and converting the basement into galleries.

The works will allow the museum to show more of its 400,000-strong collection, which ranges from prehistoric times to the 20th century. It is rich in antiquities from the Stobi and Trebenista archaeological sites in Macedonia (former Yugoslavia), numismatics and Medieval art, including icons, frescos and the illuminated 12th-century Miroslav Gospel.

"A lack of political will to deal with culture was finally broken"

The fine art department holds 16,000 paintings, drawings and prints, plus 900 sculptures. Its chief strength is Modern art, especially French, with works by Corot, the Impressionists, Gauguin and Matisse, as well as Van Gogh, Kandinsky and Picasso. Many of these were acquired by the Oxford-

educated Prince Paul, the Regent of Yugoslavia from 1934 to 1941. More than 500 pieces come from the collection of Erich Slomovic, a close associate of the legendary French art dealer Ambroise Vollard. Bernard Berenson and Joseph Duveen also donated works to the museum.

When the distinctive post-war building of the Museum of Contemporary Art reopened after a RSD680m ($6.8m) revamp last October, admission was free for the first ten days. Nearly 50,000 visitors poured in, with queues extending for more than 300 yards across its newly landscaped park. The museum could have made a small fortune by selling drinks but it has no café and little incentive to open one, since most of its income goes to the state.

Paying visitor numbers have since dropped to around 170 a day (a standard adult ticket costs RSD300, around $3). "Considering the overall interest of the Serbian public in contemporary art, the current figures are very good—and much higher than before we closed," Eric says. "Our role is to educate the public."

The new Sequences display charts Serbian and Yugoslav art from the early 20th century to the present. A modular design allows sections to be changed or removed depending on the size of temporary exhibitions. A retrospective for the Serbian conceptualist Ilija Soskic is due to open this October. The Serbian government, meanwhile, is expecting 500,000 visitors to come to the mega-exhibition on Belgrade native Marina Abramovic, planned for September 2019.

"The reopening of the museum is a boost for the city's contemporary art scene," says the local art dealer Ksenija Samardzija, although she acknowledges that the market has some way to catch up. "Serbia still has very few art collectors."

 

July 06, 2018

Diplomats in shock, amnesty for war crimes

kossev.info

Diplomats in shock, amnesty for war crimes

KoSSev

5-6 minutes


Talks on normalisation of relations in Brussels (illustration)

Amnesty for war crimes could be part of what is announced to be the „final agreement" between the negotiating teams of Belgrade and Pristina, or Kosovo and Serbia, Koha Ditore daily reported today while citing „very credible diplomatic sources." As a result, the Special Court will be dismantled. Diplomats are in shock, Koha also stated.

„Some international diplomats were shocked upon hearing of an amnesty for war crimes in Kosovo might be included in the final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia. Very credible diplomatic sources told Koha Ditore that officials in Pristina heard of such a proposal and that there was a level of readiness among the negotiators to do so, both in Kosovo and Serbia,"the Pristina-based newspaper reported.

Such an amnesty is considered „valid for both parties involved in the Kosovo war", and as a result, the Special Court will be thus dismantled.

Koha claims that the Kosovo Presidency has indirectly confirmed that an amnesty might be possible. The government and the ruling parties refused to comment, while the opposition reacted against it.

„New State and Modern Statesman", the lack of the issue in public, previous international warnings

The issue of the Special Court has been vanishing from the public eye for several months now. During that time, Kosovo President Hashim Thaci, who was the subject of frequent speculations that he could be the subject of  an indictment, has presented his book „New State, Modern Statesman" throughout diplomatic circles, and across European capitals.

„In the biography by British authors, Kosovo president and former guerrilla leader Hashim Thaci is portrayed as a superstar. In Pristina, it is believed that the positive image campaign is connected with the fear of war crimes charges," the newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung wrote after  promoting the book at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna.

„He could be charged with war crimes by the International Criminal Court in Hague. Thaci, who always denied these allegations, has allegedly signed contracts worth millions of euros in recent years with lobby firms and law firms in the US and England. Now the fifty-year-old, with a slicked-back hair and a smile, is shining on the cover of a freshly printed book. Equally flattering is the title: 'New State, Modern Statesman'"- the same newspaper outlined.

The Kosovo Special War Crimes Court has been officially ready for operation since the 5th of July last year. However, there is still no official public information if the first indictments can be issued. During the last year and earlier this year, there were several high-profile international visits to Kosovo and a series of harsh statements of concern due to obstruction against the court operating; also, clear warnings of the consequences if the obstruction continues, including concerns from the State Department.

Meanwhile, judges held their plenary session in May. In March, former prosecutor, David Swendiman, delivered a speech in a crowded room of the Leiden University, „reflecting on the time spent in the role of a specialized prosecutor and the challenges that arise," sending a message that the court has „analyzed and reviewed about 700,000 pages of data, 70,000 documents, about 6,000 related items – videos, photos, transcripts and other materials collected during the investigation to date." Jack Smith was appointed as the new prosecutor,the list of defense counsels was expanded, and Italian Pietro Spera was appointed as Ombudsperson for the Specialist Chambers.

High expectations

The process of the founding of the court followed the report by former Council of Europe Special Rapporteur Dick Marty, who linked the KLA leaders, including, as it was speculated in the public, Hashim Thaci, with serious crimes in Kosovo and organ trafficking. It also followed an investigation by the special prosecutor of the EU Special Investigative Task Force for crimes in Kosovo since 1999, Clint Williamson. Nevertheless, in 2014, Williamson claimed that his team did not find evidence to initiate an indictment for organ trafficking, saying that the findings in the report of the EU Special Investigative Task Force, which was formed after Dick Marty's report, „fully match". This team also found „unquestionable evidence against certain KLA leaders".

For more details on the Special Court and the founding process, see our thematic page „Special Court for Kosovo".

Comments

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Preuzimanje i objavljivanje tekstova sa portala KoSSev nije dozvoljeno bez navođenja izvora. Hvala na poštovanju etike novinarske profesije.

 

June 29, 2018

At the Brussels Summit, NATO Faces a Crucial Test

nationalinterest.org

At the Brussels Summit, NATO Faces a Crucial Test

NATO needs a frank discussion among the allies about Russia.

by Nikolas K. Gvosdev

2 minutes


Furthermore, the United States has, despite Trump's preferences, been leaning towards a more confrontational approach that tries to isolate Russia and put pressure on the Kremlin. The matter is complicated because the United States is not willing to trade cooperation on Russia for consideration on other issues of concern to other European allies. It would have been challenging to convince Germany to abandon the Nordstream-2 pipeline project or for France to get its energy companies to pull out of key Russian projects—certainly President Barack Obama had no such luck! But the chance that countries like France and Germany will be more willing to part company with Washington over Russia policy has increased with recent American decisions. These have included Trump's imposition of tariffs on European allies who are now deemed to be national economic security risks and the withdrawal of the U.S. from the Iran nuclear deal. Moreover, America's withdrawal from the agreement threatens that U.S. secondary sanctions will be imposed on European companies doing business with Tehran.

The risk is that a contentious NATO summit gives the appearance of major fractures in Euro-Atlantic solidarity right before Trump sits down with Putin in Vienna. It may also shape the tenor of French President Emmanuel Macron's "historic dialogue" with Russia in a way that suggests that daylight is opening up in the positions of NATO allies vis-à-vis Russia. Such an outcome would not serve Western security interests.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is a contributing editor to the National Interest. The views expressed here are his own.

Image: Reuters. 

 

June 26, 2018

Islamic Migratory Onslaught in the Balkans

chroniclesmagazine.org

Islamic Migratory Onslaught in the Balkans

11-13 minutes


By:Srdja Trifkovic | June 25, 2018

 

On June 20 Serbia's foreign minister Ivica Dacic made an interesting remark in connection with the ongoing political and territorial dispute over the status of Kosovo. We are witnessing a new reflection of the desire to create the "green transverse" in the Balkans, which is a "dangerous fantasy" motivated by ambitious Islamic extremism. "This is nothing new," Dacic went on, "this is an aspiration which has been present for centuries.

The Green Transverse (aka "Green Corridor," Zelena transverzala, Grüne Transversale, Dorsale verde) is a key geopolitical concept which denotes the long-term goal of Islamist activists, both in the Balkans and in the wider Muslim world, to create a geographically contiguous chain of majority-Muslim or Muslim-dominated polities that will extend from Turkey in the southeast to the northwestern-most point of Bosnia (a mere hundred miles as the crow flies from Austria's southeastern border). Over the past quarter-century it has resulted in the strengthening of traditionally Muslim communities in the Balkans, expanding the geographic area of their demographic dominance and enhancing their Islamic character.

Political, cultural, religious and demographic trends among Muslim communities in the Balkans demonstrate that the Green Corridor is taking shape, either deliberately or spontaneously. Nevertheless, many Western academic experts and media commentators have been dismissive of any suggestion that a long-term Islamic geopolitical design exists in the Balkans, let alone that it is being deliberately and systematically pursued. Yet far from being a paranoid concept with "Islamophobic" overtones, its most authoritative analysts have been institutions and experts with no ethnic or confessional axe to grind in the Balkan scene.

During the Bosnian war in the 1990's the late Sir Alfred Sherman, former advisor to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and co-founder of The Lord Byron Foundation, warned that the Muslims' objective was "to create a 'Green Corridor' from Bosnia through the Sanjak to Kosovo." Western powers are "in effect fostering this Islamistan," Sherman warned, while "Washington is actively helping the Muslim forces."

A decade later, the same theme was echoed by Col. Shaul Shay of BESA Center at Bar-Ilan University. Writing in 2008, he noted that "the Balkans serve as a forefront on European soil for Islamic terror organizations, which exploit this area to promote their activities in Western Europe, and other focal points worldwide." His verdict regarding the Green Corridor is disquieting: "The establishment of an independent Islamic territory including Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania . . . is one of the most prominent achievements of Islam since the siege of Vienna in 1683. Islamic penetration into Europe through the Balkans is one of the main achievements of Islam in the twentieth century."

John Schindler, former professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College and National Security Agency analyst, concurs. Writing in 2008, he pointed out that the Balkans provide the missing piece in the puzzle of al-Qa'ida's transformation from an isolated fighting force into a lethal global threat. Radical Islam played a key role in the Yugoslav conflict, Schindler says: like Afghanistan in the 1980s, Bosnia in the 1990s became a training ground for the mujahidin, leading to blowback of epic proportions. "Jihadist Networks in the Balkans" was also the theme of the October 2008 issue of the prominent Italian geopolitical review Limes, and the subject was revisited in February of this year. Overall, the Green Corridor reflects precisely Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations; he treated the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a paradigmatic case of the "fault-line wars" between Islam and the rest.


The trouble with the Serbian foreign minister's statement is that the Green Transverse is not and cannot be described as "fantasy." Quite the contrary, its long-term objectives are currently fueled by a new wave of overwhelmingly Muslim migrants from the Greater Middle East and by the manifest desire of the European Union—especially Germany—to resettle them along the Union's southeastern borders, which effectively means in Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the Viennese daily Die Presse (June 14), Serbia will also be the destination of those asylum seekers whose applications are rejected in the EU and who are subsequently deported. That Serbia whould become the "end station" for migrants has been a constant theme of the German-language media for over a year.

The problem is that 11 years ago the government of Serbia signed a readmission treaty with the European Union, which states that migrants whose asylum applications are rejected in the Union will be sent to "the last safe country" on their journey in which they were registered—which is Serbia. This was a grossly irresponsible act of treason by the pro-EU quasi-elite in Belgrade. It is now clear that various Eurocrats in Brussels intend to turn the country into a giant depository for unwanted migrants, instead of sending them back to their countries of origin. The European Commission spokeswoman Natasha Berto thus declared back in September 2015 that since the EU has a readmission agreement with Serbia, persons arriving in the EU without the right to remain there would be sent back to the last pre-EU country of transit. In 2016, the Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner Nils Muiznieks reiterated the intention of EU member states to send unsuccessful asylum seekers to Serbia.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina the situation is further complicated by the desire of the Muslim leaders in this tri-national quasistate to facilitate the influx and permanent settlement of their coreligionists from the Middle East and North Africa. They hope to change the ethnic and confessional balance in their favor and to the detriment of Serbs and Croats, who between them still have a simple majority in the chronically unstable former Yugoslav republic. For the Sarajevo government's minister for human rights Semiha Borovac, a Muslim, the only issue is not how to protect borders, but how to help migrants "in accordance with the EU Action Plan." Her attitude is perfectly in line with the position of the Bosnian Muslims' wartime leader Alija Izetbegovic that "Islam contains the principle of ummet, the tendency to unite all Muslims into a single community—a spiritual, cultural and political community . . . It is a natural function of the Islamic order to gather all Muslims and Muslim communities throughout the world into one."

At the same time, the Christian communities all over the Balkans are in a steep, long-term demographic decline. Fertility rate is below replacement level in every majority-Christian country in the region. The Muslims, by contrast, have the highest birth rates in Europe, with the Albanians topping the chart. On current form it is likely that Muslims will reach a simple majority, both in Bosnia and in the Balkans as a whole, within a decade at most.

Quite apart from the devastating effect on the declining Christian communities in the Balkans, this process also has major security implications for the Western world. Already two decades ago a classified State Department report warned that the Muslim-controlled parts of Bosnia had become a safe haven for Islamic terrorism. The core of Bin Laden's Balkan network consisted of the veterans of El Moujahed brigade of the Bosnian-Muslim army from the 1990's, distinguished by their spectacular cruelty. They went on to perpetrate murder and mayhem all over the world. They planned the Millennium Plot, the bombing of the Al Khobar building in Riyadh, and attacks on U.S. military installations in Germany. Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, who planned the 9/11 attacks, was a veteran of the Bosnian jihad, as were two of the hijackers. As Jane's Intelligence Review concluded in 2006, "The current threat of terrorism in Bosnia and Herzegovina comes from a younger, post-war generation of militant Islamists, radicalized by US actions in Iraq and Afghanistan."

There is a growing gap between the reality of Islam in the Balkans and Western mainstream narrative about the allegedly moderate and tolerant "Balkan Islam." The problem of the Green Corridor will not be resolved without critical reexamination of Western policies as well as Western illusions. That problem has morphed over the past quarter-century into a demographic, social and political reality. As Professor Raphael Israeli warned over a decade ago, "[W]hile the Muslims have established a continuity which drives a wedge within Christian Central Europe, the West is looking with indifference at that evolving situation which they hope will create a docile, Turkish-like Islam . . . It is doubtful whether these hopes will be fulfilled."

Western policies in Southeast Europe have had the effect, either by design or by default, to favor the aspirations of various supposedly pro-Western Muslim communities in the Balkans along the geographic line extending from Turkey north-westwards towards Central Europe. In Washington, that policy was based to a large extent on the expectation that satisfying Islamists' ambitions in a secondary theater would improve the U.S. standing in the Muslim world as a whole.

The policy had never yielded any dividends, but repeated failure has only prompted its advocates to redouble their efforts. Former U.S. Under-Secretary of State Nicholas Burns thus declared on February 18, 2008, a day after Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence: "Kosovo is going to be a vastly majority Muslim state, given the fact that 92 to 94 percent of their population is Muslim, and we think it is a very positive step that this Muslim state, Muslim majority state, has been created today." If it is intrinsically "a very positive step" for the U.S. that a "vastly Muslim state" is created on European soil that had been cleansed of non-Muslims with American assistance, then it should be expected that Washington will be equally supportive of any new Islamistan in the Green Corridor-affected area.

Far from providing a model of pro-Western "moderate Islam," majority-Muslim areas of the Balkans have become the breeding ground for thousands of young, fanatical Islamists. Their dedication is honed in thousands of foreign-financed mosques and Islamic centers. If Western policy in the Balkans was not meant to facilitate the Green Corridor, it needs to be explained why its effects have coincided with the objectives of those same Islamists who threaten Western interests, and—in Europe—the very survival of traditionally Christian nations. They will have to foot the immediate bill for such folly and malice, and it has been paid already by Kosovo's disappearing Serbs; but long-term costs of the expansion of the Green Corridor will haunt both America and Europe for decades to come. 

[Image: By Chatham House (Ivica Dacic, Prime Minister of Serbia) [CC BY 2.0]]

 

June 19, 2018

Vucic wonders if Albanians would like piece of Hungary, too

b92.net

Vucic wonders if Albanians would like piece of Hungary, too - PoliticsEnglish

7-9 minutes


"An exchange of territory with Kosovo" is out of the question, according to Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, who spoke on Tuesday.

Source: Tanjug Tuesday, June 19, 2018 | 14:39

 

(Tanjug, file)

Vucic made this comment after Kosovo president's adviser Rexhep Hoti said on Monday that "a partition of Kosovo is not on the agenda - but if it was then Kosovo should take Sandzak (informal term for Serbia's southwestern region) and a part of southern Serbia."

Vucic reacted to this by asking ironically whether Pristina wanted Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban to also "give them Kecskemet (a town in central Hungary)."

"Have they considered Vojvodina at all, Belgrade - Sumadija, that goes without saying... let's ask Orban if he'll give them Kecskemet... what can I say to that, of course I'm joking," the president replied to reporters.

He then warned that there is "the need among a part of Albanians" to form the so-called Green (Muslim) Transversal - "and the north of Kosovo lies in its path: between southern (Kosovska) Mitrovica, Vucitrn, Srbica, on the other side, Ribaric, Novi Pazar and the central part of Serbia, Raska."

"That's why the territory of northern Kosovo bothers them so much," said Vucic, adding that he "cannot always comment on that, because somebody could misunderstand."

"And when I speak about their 'hunger' to occupy the north of Kosovo I always have all these arguments, both Gazivode and Valac, for that need of theirs to maintain that line which they've always insisted on, and no politician can hide it any longer - even if it's no longer about the Albanian question," said Vucic.

"That is what we have seen, what we know and what we feel. And it is something that will not happen," he said.

Asked what would happen if Albanians were to "storm" the north of Kosovo and Metohija, the president replied by saying that he had "posed this question publicly, but received no answer."

All the same, he stressed, it was his job "to do everything to preserve peace, secure stability and guarantee safety to our people in Kosovo and Metohija."

Vucic said that "for the most part we have managed to do that so far, despite numerous organized incidents - because there are no accidental incidents with them."

"Those are fairy-tales, they do that on command and always have, but it still hasn't taken on dramatic proportions - it isn't of small and insignificant proportions either, but it isn't dramatic," he said.

Vucic added that the reason for this was "us managing to conduct a responsible and smart policy."

 

June 17, 2018

Macedonia seeks new direction with name change

ft.com

Macedonia seeks new direction with name change

Valerie Hopkins in Skopje June 15, 2018

6-8 minutes


It is just one word — North. But when Macedonia's prime minister told his Greek counterpart this week that he had agreed to add the adjective to his country's name, it lifted hopes of ending a Balkan conflict that has dragged on for almost three decades.

For 27 years Greece has held Macedonia in geopolitical limbo, refusing to entertain the idea of its northern neighbour joining organisations such as Nato and the EU under a name Athens said should belong only to its own northern province — the historical realm of Alexander the Great.

Now, after international mediation, a new era is at hand. But the deal, which the countries' prime ministers hope to sign at a border ceremony on Sunday, must still be ratified in both nations.

"We are resolving a two-and-a-half decades' long dispute, in order to take the country out of isolation," Zoran Zaev, the Macedonian premier, said in an address to the nation this week, announcing the country's new name.

Proponents say that settling on the Republic of North Macedonia allows Athens to protect its ancient past while assuring Skopje, and Macedonia's 2.1m people, of a viable future and opening the door to Nato and the EU. The compromise concedes Greece's primary demand — a geographic qualifier that its neighbour must use internally and externally — while confirming a unique Macedonian identity and language, a crucial demand of Skopje.

"It was a Solomon's compromise that we all needed," said Dimitri, in Skopje this week. "We have no claim to Greece's Hellenic history anyway, we are Slavs," he said, referring to a point in the deal that distinguishes his country's Slavic language and culture from the Hellenic culture of Alexander the Great and his father, Phillip II of Macedon.

But that view is far from uniform. "We do not accept any changes to Macedonia's name. It is non-negotiable," said Vladimir Kavadarkov, a retired lawyer, at a makeshift protest camp facing Macedonia's parliament in Skopje.

"Traitors!" said a pink banner left over from a protest on Wednesday by more than 1,000 opponents of the name deal.

For Mr Kavadarkov, the agreement represents the latest in a long series of capitulations to "destroy Macedonian self-confidence, dignity, sovereignty and identity". The protest camp was festooned with the flag Macedonia used for four years in the 1990s until Athens imposed a trade embargo, saying the star it depicted was a Greek symbol.

© AFP

Gjorge Ivanov, Macedonian president, has threatened to veto Mr Zaev's deal, though parliament could override his objection. Macedonia also needs to change its constitution in parliament — where Mr Zaev may struggle to secure the two-thirds required for amendments — and gain approval in a national referendum.

Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, also faces opposition to a deal, including a confidence vote this weekend.

When Mr Zaev came to power last year an important aim was to overcome Greece's perennial veto and open the way to join the EU, which recommended Macedonia for candidate status in 2005. His government hopes that if the EU and Nato quickly open accession talks it will help it to win a referendum on the name deals.

"While this is an opportunity for Macedonia . . . it is also an opportunity for the EU and Nato, to show that this kind of behaviour can lead to progress and development," Radmila Sekerinska, Macedonia's defence minister, told the Financial Times.

She said the deal would make Macedonia the first country in the region without a dispute with its neighbours.

Mr Zaev has taken a radically different tack to previous governments, in particular that of Nikola Gruevski, the former premier who led the country for a decade until 2016. After Greece blocked Macedonia from joining Nato under its provisional name "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia", Mr Gruevski retaliated with a grandiose campaign of "antiquisation" — putting up statues and neoclassical buildings to defy Athens by staking Skopje's shared claim to ancient Macedonian history.

Ekrem Neziri: 'It is the same for us whether it is Macedonia, North Macedonia, or anything else'

Without the carrot of joining Nato and the EU, Mr Gruevski ushered in a period of cronyism and democratic backsliding that Brussels eventually labelled "state capture".

Macedonia, which narrowly avoided a civil war in 2001 after ethnic Albanian insurgents demanded greater rights, remains deeply polarised. Mr Zaev's promise to increase Albanian language rights has inflamed ethnic Macedonian nationalists. Mr Ivanov vetoed a law to increase the use of Albanian.

Nikola Poposki, a member of the opposition VMRO-DPMNE, who served as Macedonia's previous foreign minister, said rifts would widen if the name deal — which he called a "100-0" win for Greece — were adopted.

Ethnic Albanians, who make up a quarter of the population, have largely kept quiet on the name issue. "It is the same for us whether it is Macedonia, North Macedonia, or anything else, as long as we have jobs, can live our lives, and live without hate," said Ekrem Neziri, an ethnic Albanian selling rugs in Skopje's sprawling Ottoman-era bazaar.

Mr Poposki said Mr Zaev's pursuit of a name deal had deflected attention from the weak economy, which grew just 0.1 per cent in the first quarter of 2018.

Yet others say the previous regime's refusal to compromise held their country back for too long.

For Vladimir Kavadarkov, right, the agreement represents the latest in a long series of capitulations to destroy Macedonian dignity

"It's ridiculous that people are still worried about things from millennia ago while our kids sit here in poorly equipped schools receiving a bad education because of some name," said Dunja Ivanova, a book seller.

Ms Sekerinska said much of the deal's fate now lay in EU hands.

"As long as the EU is strict but fair, we don't mind," she said. "But if the EU is strict but unfair, it undermines not only the leverage of enlargement, it undermines to a certain extent stability in the Balkans . . . If [people] see that in spite of courageous leadership nothing changes, and the EU remains a fortress, then only nationalistic and populistic forces will gain strength."

 

June 15, 2018

About 60 foreign services are active in Serbia, says expert

b92.net

About 60 foreign services are active in Serbia, says expert - PoliticsEnglish

6-8 minutes


Serbia is targeted by intelligence services of some 60 countries, which plan subversive acts, fake news, and disturbance of the public.

Source: Tanjug Friday, June 15, 2018 | 10:31

 

(Getty Images, file, illustration purposes)

This is according to professor Milan Mijalkovski, former dean at the Faculty of Security, who told the daily Politika that "everything that is happening in Serbia can also be observed through some internal reason, but should be brought into context of foreign factors' interests."

According to him, the situation in Serbia and the region should be viewed as a system of communicating vessels. Mijalkovski pointed out to the sharp clash in this region of the geopolitical interests of the world's biggest powers - the United States, Russia and China, Turkey as a regional powers, but also the transnational factor ignored by many - the Islamists.

Then there's the "aggressive posture" of the West, above all the EU, in terms of Kosovo and Metohija, he continued.

Based on his experience and long-term monitoring of the situation, Mijalkovski said that Serbia is being "investigated" by intelligence services of about 60 countries.

"Bearing in mind that they have been doing this for almost three decades, it means they have created such positions, such influential agency in Serbia that is ready, trained, educated to perform diverse subversive activities, starting with pressure groups, launching all kinds of fake news, disturbing the public. Their capabilities are respectable and they are constantly strengthened by various activities, primarily secret, but also public," he said.

Asked what the main goal is, Mijalkovski replied that they want to force Serbia to recognize as soon as possible the fake state of Kosovo. "As resistance toward such a goal grows, it's to be expected that they will amplify various types of pressure. I think that is how we should look at the current security situation and perspectives," Mijalkovski said.

 

June 12, 2018

Moscow could be more involved over Kosovo, Ambassador says

kossev.info

Moscow could be more involved over Kosovo, Ambassador says

N1

2 minutes


 

Russia's Ambassador to Serbia thinks that Moscow could get more involved in finding a solution to the Kosovo problem. 

In an opinion piece for Belgrade daily Politika, Ambassador Alexander Chepurin said Russia could get "even more deeply involved" if proposals to that effect are made.

"Belgrade is facing ultimate pressure from traditional Serb haters," the Ambassador wrote adding that Moscow will stay on Belgrade's side.

"Our view remains unchanged – we will support the decision which Serbia and the Serb people find acceptable. We are starting with the fact that the legal basis for an agreement is the UN Security Council resolution," Chepurin said.

Commenting what he called unjustified comparisons of Kosovo to Crimea, the Ambassador said these are "two completely different stories". "The Crimea question is definitively closed. Crimea is Russia, Kosovo is Serbia. That is not just a slogan, that is the legal reality which has to be respected," Chepurin said.

N1

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Preuzimanje i objavljivanje tekstova sa portala KoSSev nije dozvoljeno bez navođenja izvora. Hvala na poštovanju etike novinarske profesije.

 

June 11, 2018

The Economist: The Difficulties of Exchanging Territory in the Balkans

novinite.com

The Economist: The Difficulties of Exchanging Territory in the Balkans - Novinite.com

4-5 minutes


TEN years ago Kosovo declared independence from Serbia. Its Albanians, who make up the majority of the population, have been celebrating. But its Serbs, most of whom live in enclaves, have not. Serbia does not recognise Kosovo, which used to be its southern province, and Kosovo Serbs still consider themselves citizens of Serbia. The situation is typical of the Balkans, where borders are, frankly, a mess. So there are Serbs living in Kosovo and in Bosnia-Hercegovina, where they have their own republic (the Republika Srpska), Albanians and Bosniaks (Muslims) living in Serbia, and Greeks living in Albania. Recently the Serbian authorities proposed a discussion about an exchange of territory with their Kosovo Albanian counterparts. Is this a sensible idea?

In 1923 Greece and Turkey agreed to exchange some 2m people. Mostly Greek-speaking Christian Orthodox citizens of Turkey were sent to Greece, and Muslims from Greece were sent to Turkey. It was a brutal relocation, but, note its defenders, Greece and Turkey have not fought a war since. The only place where Greeks and Turks have fought is Cyprus, where their populations remained mixed. This has inspired nationalists in the western Balkans. Between 1918 and the late 1950s, many Muslims were encouraged to leave Yugoslavia for Turkey. But at the time of Yugoslavia's collapse in the 1990s it still contained a thorough mix of peoples. Leaders in those Yugoslav wars saw ethnic cleansing as the best way to create new nation-states unpeopled by troublesome minorities. By 1995 historically Serb-populated regions of Croatia were empty and hundreds of thousands of Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks had similarly been turfed out of their homes in Bosnia. But the countries that emerged from the implosion did not neatly encircle Serbs, Albanians, Croats and so on. Myriad Serbs may have fled Kosovo after its war, but some 120,000 remain. 

The Serbian authorities want to discuss taking Kosovo's northern part, with Albanian-inhabited regions of Serbia moving to Kosovo in exchange. Proponents of such "map-tidying" say that multi-ethnic states have failed in the Balkans. But they ignore the fact that, once governments start down this path, the process has no obvious end and pays no heed to the human rights of everyone involved. If Kosovo and Serbia begin serious talks about a redrawing of their borders, the impact on Balkan communities apart from those in the affected parts of Kosovo and Serbia could be profound. Bosnian Serb leaders would hold a referendum on the future of the Republika Srpska; Bosnian Croats would follow suit; and Bosniaks would then fight to prevent the dismemberment of their shared country. Over the border Serbia would clamp down on Bosniak nationalists in Sandzak who dream of incorporating that region into a Greater Bosnia. Meanwhile Albanians in western Macedonia and Montenegro would demand to join a Greater Albania. Proponents of that idea would also like to incorporate parts of northern Greece, whereas Greek nationalists would demand part of southern Albania.

One irony behind the mooted exchange is that most Kosovo Serbs actually live in enclaves in the south of Kosovo. So the agreement would not leave them living in Serbia, and they would probably have to leave their homes or else be driven out. But Serbian officials may be less concerned about their countrymen than about taking steps towards recognising Kosovo—and thus making their own hoped-for accession to the European Union (EU) easier. It may not concern them that an exchange of territories in the western Balkans could have huge ramifications. Hungarian nationalists, after all, remain unreconciled to the loss of Transylvania to Romania, and Romanian nationalists would like to redraw their borders to take in Moldova. There is a reason that "Balkanisation" has a bad name. As in the EU at large, lessening the relevance of national borders would seem wiser than redrawing them and, in the words of one senior EU official, "opening the gates to hell".

 

April 24, 2018

Fake Democracy: The CIA and their NGOs Target China and Yugoslavia in the 1990s

Fake Democracy:The CIA and their NGOs Target China and Yugoslavia in the 1990s


Published time: 19 April, 2018

Failed CIA attempt to bring down the Communist state apparatus in China; George H.W. Bush's involvements in China; US influences Chinese economic policy; 1989 student pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square; Albert Einstein Institute; Gene Sharp's From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation; non-violence as a weapon of warfare; Soros' Fund for the Reform and Opening of China; Western media report Tiananmen massacres; fake news about a fake massacre; Operation Yellowbird; US considers independent Europe a threat; US strategy for war in the heart of Europe; controlled oil crises create unsustainable Yugoslav IMF debt; 1991 US Foreign Operations Appropriations Act; US funding of fascist organizations; Milosevic tries to prevent break-up of Yugoslavia; Izetbegovic reneges on Lisbon Treaty; Mujahideen terror-war model brought into minority Muslim Bosnia-Herzegovina; Yugoslavia civil war revives the role of NATO in Europe; Nasr Oric; Srebrenica massacre; Operation Deliberate Force against Serbia; Clinton's 79-day bombing of Belgrade; Milosevic taken down by Otpor!; Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo ... To read / listen further, click here

 

April 14, 2018

Limited US action against Syria suggests conflict unlikely to escalate

theguardian.com

Limited US action against Syria suggests conflict unlikely to escalate | World news

Ewen MacAskill

7-9 minutes


The US-led operation against Syria, which included contributions from the UK and France, was a modest one, limited to a short, sharp attack against targets alleged to be linked to chemical weapons.

It is intended as a one-off, with no further strikes planned unless the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad, conducts chemical attacks in the future.

There had been speculation in advance of the attack that there was a risk it could lead to world war three. It was far from that.

The operation involved more weapons than the strike the US conducted unilaterally against a Syrian airbase last year. On that occasion, 20 Syrian planes were destroyed, estimated at 20% of the Syrian air force. The US fired 59 Tomahawk cruise missiles in that attack: no planes were used, to minimise the risk of American losses.

What you need to know about the Syria strikes – video report

The attack in the early hours of Saturday morning involved almost twice as many, 110 missiles. That is not a major escalation. There were only three targets, including a research and scientific institute on the outskirts of Damascus and a storage space west of Homs, alleged to have been used to store precursors, which was hit by the RAF.

The main overall aim, apart from sending a message to Assad to desist from chemical weapons attacks, was to keep as far away as possible from Russian and Iranian positions, to avoid widening the conflict by directly drawing in Russia or Iran.

In spite of Russian rhetoric during the week of potential retaliation in the event of the attack, in reality Russia is far short of the military strength it enjoyed as part of the Soviet Union, with Moscow as anxious as Washington to avoid conflict. In almost every area other than nuclear weapons, Russia is heavily outnumbered in terms of defence spending and equipment compared with the US.

The US spends about $550bn annually on defence compared with Russia's $70bn. To take just one indicator, Russia has one ageing aircraft carrier while the US has 20.

To help avoid conflict, the US warned the Russians in advance that the attack was coming and the air corridors that would be used, but not the targets.

'A strong deterrent': Trump announces strikes on Syria – video

The US aim in Syria, as Donald Trump indicated before the Douma attack, is to leave Syria as soon as the US judges Islamic State to have been totally defeated. The attack does not change that. It was not used to attempt regime change. Assad's presidential palace, exposed on a high hill above Damascus, was left off the target list.

Assad could well be relatively happy with the outcome and the impact on him may be even less than the US raid last year. Most of his air force, as well as helicopters allegedly used to deliver the chemical weapons, remains intact.

The US, British and French escaped unscathed. There was a risk from the relatively sophisticated air defence system that Russia has or even from the more antiquated Syrian ones. An Israeli plane crashed in February, which the Syrians claimed they had downed. The RAF had four Tornados in action, but at no point did they enter Syrian air space, instead flying close to the the RAF Akrotiri base in Cyprus, and firing the Storm Shadow missiles, which have a range of about 300 miles.

Another potential risk that failed to materialise was that an attack on chemical weapons might spread the poison, engulfing Syrian military personnel and civilians. Chemical weapons inspectors suggested such an outcome was unlikely, as a missile would blow up chemical weapons.

The other risk was for a miscalculation that led to high civilian casualties. Although the US and UK military insist missiles are more precise and intelligence better, mistakes happen. In the 1991 Iraq war, the al-Amiriyah bomb shelter in Baghdad was hit killing more than 400 civilians, and there was the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999.

Amateur footage shows missiles falling over Damascus as airstrikes begin – video

To try to avoid Russian or Iranian or civilian casualties, the US, British and French planners opted for targets they believed were far enough away to avoid such an outcome.

Trump contributed to the hysteria that the world was on the verge of WWIII with his tweet: "Russia vows to shoot down any and all missiles fired at Syria. Get ready Russia, because they will be coming, nice and new and "smart!"

In spite of rhetoric on the Russian side to match Trump's hysteria, claiming they would shoot down incoming missiles and retaliate against US and other targets, they settled only for monitoring the incoming missiles and did not attempt to shoot them down.

Moscow could respond, as it has threatened, by upgrading Syria's air defence systems, which could worry Israel. And they could yet retaliate in some other region or by using deniable hybrid warfare, such as a cyber-attack. But equally, looking to showcase the upcoming World Cup, they might opt for a period of calm.

The UN secretary general, António Guterres, had warned just hours before the raid that the cold war was back with a vengeance, potentially more dangerous because the old mechanisms for managing conflict seemed to have disappeared.

But, as the night demonstrated, the mechanisms are still in place, still intact and worked as they were meant to. The US was in communication with the Russians. And the Russians did not retaliate.

In the end, this raid was about as modest a one as the US-led coalition could mount, more symbolic than anything else.

 

In Third World War Now Going On, ‘Russia has No Allies,’

windowoneurasia2.blogspot.ca

Window on Eurasia -- New Series: In Third World War Now Going On, 'Russia has No Allies,' Venediktov Says

3 minutes


Paul Goble

            Staunton, April 14 – A third world war has been going on since at least NATO's bombing of Belgrade in 1999 and Russia's intervention in Georgia in 2008, Aleksey Venediktov says. But it is a very different war than those in the past, one where the participants are not trying to seize territory but rather secure influence over other states.

            In this conflict, which may go from cold to hot, the editor of  Ekho Moskvy tells Kazan's Business Gazeta in an interview portions of which were posted online today, "Russia has no allies" and thus can depend on no one but itself as events both planned and unplanned unfold (business-gazeta.ru/article/378902).

            This war or more hopefully conflict "really is a world wide one; it is simply that certain players like China are not very visible, but they are taking an active part in it."  The goal in this conflict is different than that in the past: earlier states sought to gain territory; now, however, they are seeking not the territorial re-division of the world but rather one of influence.

            Putin, Venediktov continues, constantly refers to the need to return to the Yalta-Potsdam system in which "every great power has its own sphere of influence."  But Ronald Reagan in 1987 made clear that there would never be a Yalta-type system again. That has remained US policy.

            But the important thing for Moscow to remember is that "in this war, Russia does not have any allies," the Ekho Moskvy editor says.  "Putin," he continues, "is an extraordinarily careful individual … Therefore, I think, if he were to sense the chance of a shift of the war into a hot phase, he would take measures," knowing the capacities of the Western allies and China.

            The danger of escalation even to a nuclear exchange nonetheless exists because of the possibilities of accidents. When the militaries of various countries are in one place, their commanders may respond "without waiting for a call from Moscow or Washington or Jerusalem or Damascus" and then things can go wrong.

            According to Venediktov, the forces of both Russia and the Western allies "have received orders to avoid any clash. But I am concerned because an accident is possible," one that was like the downing of a Russian plane by Turkey. If something like that happened again, then there is "a high degree of probability" that it could "lead to an escalation, political at a minimum."

 

April 10, 2018

In a New Cold War With Russia, Balkans Become a Testing Ground

nytimes.com

In a New Cold War With Russia, Balkans Become a Testing Ground

Steven Erlanger

11-14 minutes


 

A view of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After years of neglect, the European Union is again turning its attention again to the Western Balkans. Andrew Testa for The New York Times

SARAJEVO, Bosnia and Herzegovina — Cradle of the First World War, the Balkans have been a flash point, a place where empires, ethnicities and religions abut and contest. Now, analysts warn, the region is becoming a battleground in what feels like a new Cold War.

Russia, they say, is expanding its influence and magnifying ethnic tensions in countries that hope to join the European Union. Its involvement has already spurred Brussels to revive dormant aims for enlargement. It is also prompting fresh attention from Washington about security risks to NATO members.

After the concerted Western response to the poisoning in Britain of a former Russian spy and his daughter, expelling around 150 Russian diplomats and intelligence officers, "the Balkans become even more important," said Mark Galeotti, a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations in Prague.

"Russia is looking for ways to retaliate that are asymmetric and provide Moscow opportunities," he said.

In a new paper for the European Council on Foreign Relations, Mr. Galeotti says that "Russia looks to the Balkans as a battlefield in its 'political war,' " seeking "to create distractions and potential bargaining chips with the European Union."

Charles A. Kupchan, who was Europe director of the National Security Council under President Barack Obama, said that "the Russians are taking advantage of the last part of Western Europe that remains politically dysfunctional."

The situation bears distant echoes of Ukraine, where Russia originally agreed that Kiev could join the European Union — though not NATO — and then changed its mind, leading to the revolution that prompted Moscow to annex Crimea and foment secession in eastern Ukraine.

In the Balkans, the competition with Russia has the potential to sow fresh instability in a region still emerging from the vicious war of 1992-95 that broke apart the former Yugoslavia.

In Sarajevo, many of the scars of the war have been erased. The former Holiday Inn, once a nearly windowless shelter for reporters near Snipers' Alley during the Bosnia war, is restored and busy. The neo-Moorish City Hall, a monument to multiculturalism that was shelled and burned, has been burnished to a high standard.

Yet Bosnia and Herzegovina, the broken country patched together in 1995 at the end of the war, remains a fragile construct, riven by corruption, weak leadership, and ethnic and nationalist strains among communities — a metaphor for the Balkans.

 

Greeks demonstrating in Athens in February over neighboring Macedonia's use of that name. Valerie Gache/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images

It is one of several key entry points that Russia is seeking to exploit, Mr. Kupchan said, as the leader of the Serb semiautonomous region known as Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, continues to press for an independence referendum. The others include Macedonia, where relations between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Slavs remain tense, and between Kosovo and Serbia.

Wary of Russian meddling, the European Union is holding out a renewed prospect of membership to Bosnia and to the other five nations of the Western Balkans — Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo — in return for fundamental structural reform.

The skepticism among these countries about Brussels is deep, however. Many doubt the sincerity of a European Union that is turning more inward, more populist, more wary about migration and more cautious, after Romania and Bulgaria, about taking in nations before they are ready for membership.

No one believes any of these countries is yet ready to join. But the urgency for reform fell away as the goal receded.

Four years ago, the head of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, said there would be no more quick enlargement of the bloc, sending the process into somnolence.

It has been, as the Macedonian foreign minister, Nikola Dimitrov, often says, like "being locked in a waiting room with no exit."

"Juncker made a mistake to say that he was not interested in enlargement," said Carl Bildt, a former Swedish foreign minister and United Nations special envoy to the Balkans. "The E.U. took its eye off the ball for several years, with detrimental effects."

But with Britain leaving the bloc and Russia playing on the fissures of the region, the European Union has now laid out a relatively detailed plan for the Balkans.

It has even gone on record to say that if all goes well, Serbia and Montenegro, the only two countries now engaged in an accession process and hence the front-runners, could join by 2025.

The bloc's strategy for the Western Balkans, published in February, laid out six initiatives: rule of law; security and migration; socio-economic development; transport and energy connectivity; digital agenda; and "reconciliation and good neighborly relations."

 

In Bosnia, the leader of the Serb autonomous region known as Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, continues to press for an independence referendum. Laura Boushnak for The New York Times

Bulgaria, the current president of the bloc, will hold a special Balkans summit meeting in May; the Balkans are on the agenda for the European Council in June; and the British will be hosts of a Western Balkans summit meeting in July, just before NATO has its own meeting in Brussels.

"It is time to finish the work of 1989," said Johannes Hahn, the European Union commissioner in charge of enlargement. "We have set 2025 as an indicative date for Serbia and Montenegro, which is realistic but also very ambitious."

Mr. Bildt said tartly: "Whether this is realistic or not remains to be seen."

Many think it is too ambitious, given that the bloc insists that all these countries settle their numerous, passionate border disputes. There are also serious internal problems, the bloc's report acknowledged.

"Today the countries show clear elements of state capture, including links with organized crime and corruption at all levels of government and administration, as well as a strong entanglement of public and private interests," it said.

There is strong evidence of "extensive political interference in and control of the media" and lack of independence in the judiciary, it noted.

Add to that uncompetitive economies and the flight of young people looking for better jobs, and prospects seem dim.

But now the Americans are suddenly more interested, too. Renewed Washington concern "stems in part from concerns about expanded Russian influence," said A. Ross Johnson, noting that Congress now demands that the Defense Department provide "an assessment of security cooperation between each Western Balkan country and the Russian Federation."

Russia has made it clear that it considers new NATO expansion to the Western Balkans as unacceptable, and Moscow was implicated in a strange coup attempt in Montenegro in 2016 before that country joined NATO.

Russia is trying to establish itself in the region, both with government and business, so that when these countries do finally enter the European Union, "they will bring Russian influence with them," Mr. Galeotti said.

The strategy is similar to what China and Russia are doing with Greece and Cyprus, widely considered places where Russian money can be laundered into euros.

 

The river Ibar divides the Albanian and Serbian areas in Mitrovica, Kosovo. Andrew Testa for The New York Times

Russia is also deeply engaged in local language media, both with Kremlin-owned websites like Sputnik and with bots that harp on local grievances.

Mr. Bildt points in particular to Russian investment in critical Serbian infrastructure, like energy. Though Russian investment pales compared with that of the European Union countries, Serbia has a natural affinity to its Russian Orthodox brethren and remembers Russian support during the Kosovo war.

"Is the E.U. sensitive enough to what is happening in Serbia?" Mr. Galeotti asked.

He thinks not. "E.U. policy has generally been to support whatever keeps the Western Balkans quiet," Mr. Galeotti said. "It's deeply dangerous and creates the perfect environment for Moscow to play its games."

Brussels, he and others say, should put more weight behind both the carrots and the sticks — offering genuine incentives for institutional reform and accession, and genuine sanctions if not.

A former senior United States official called the region a new Cold War battlefield, and said that Brussels was too rigid with the ways it tries to keep people on the good behavior track, while the money is not as connected as it should be to reform goals.

The official, who asked for anonymity to preserve influence in the region, said that the countries reformed only when Brussels and Washington worked together to push leaders hard to break old habits of corruption, state capture, a politicized judiciary and Russian shell companies trying to take over key infrastructure and media.

But Europe is not eager to import more problems. "The argument is that only by taking in the Balkan states are we assured to strengthen stability," said Norbert Rӧttgen, the chairman of the German Bundestag's foreign affairs committee. "But is that true?"

"If we import fragile states into the E.U., we import fragility," he added. "If we compromise on conditions, we let in fragile countries open to foreign influences, so we have to be tough on the entry requirements."

The irony of history, Mr. Bildt mused, is that had Yugoslavia remained together, it almost surely would have been in the European Union by now, having been well ahead in 1990 of current members Romania and Bulgaria.

"If the wars of dissolution hadn't happened, all of this area would have been an E.U. member," he said. "The Balkans have always lived best when integrated into a wider framework, as necessary today as in the past, and the one available today is the European Union."

Mr. Kupchan remains an optimist. "We know where this story will ultimately end, with all the former Yugoslav states integrated into the European Union," he said. "But when?"

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/world/europe/european-union-balkans.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Feurope&action=click&contentCollection=europe®ion=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectionfront

 

 

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