December 13, 2018

Washington Makes Jihad in Kosovo to Control Oil - Excerpt of my Bestseller Book: The Lost Hegemon

 

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Chapter Nine:

 

 

"Holy War" and Heroin

in Kosovo and the Caucasus

 

 

 

"After bombing Yugoslavia into submission, NATO then stood by and submissively allowed the KLA to murder, pillage and burn. The KLA was given a free hand to do as they wished. Almost all of the non-Albanian population was ethnically cleansed from Kosovo under the watchful eyes of 40,000 NATO troops.

—James Bissett, former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia and Albania to Canadian newspaper

 

 

 

Jihad and CIA Go to Kosovo

The actual fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina ended with the signing of the Dayton Accords in Paris on December 14, 1995 that put an end to the three-and-a-half-year long Bosnian War and opened the long-term NATO occupation of the country. NATO, and not the European Union, was in control. Bosnia-Herzegovina, once a multiethnic federal state, was established as a de facto Muslim state, in effect, a client state under control of the IMF and of NATO.

Even before the Bosnian fighting ceased, Washington had shifted its attention to Kosovo, whose Albanian ethnic population was also predominantly Muslim and which had been part of Serbia more or less since the Middle Ages. The second front was being prepared in NATO's war against Serbia. The Clinton Administration had learned around that time of vast oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Sea and wanted to secure a pipeline through the Balkans to control that oil and, above all, keep it from the Russians.[1]

 

In December 1995, the American Petroleum Institute in Washington, an organization representing the major US oil companies, had issued an estimate that the Caspian Basin, north of Afghanistan, contained "two-thirds of the world's known reserves, or 659 billion barrels."[2] The Caucasus was becoming a US strategic "area of interest," to put it mildly.

 

A retired Croatian Army Major personally told this author, in Zagreb in 2006, of a private conversation he had had in 1995, just after the abrupt end of the Bosnian war. The Croatian military man asked a senior CIA officer in Zagreb whom he knew from the Bosnian War why it was that the US was so suddenly ending the fighting in Bosnia. The CIA man replied to the effect that, at that point, Washington found it far more important to secure a permanent military base in Kosovo, from where they would be able to control the entire region, including the Middle East and the Caucasus.[3]​​​​​​​

 

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​​​​​​​The tiny mountain area of Kosovo was split from Serbia to become a huge NATO base.

 

 

The Clinton Administration's Pentagon had farmed out the training of what would come to be called the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to a US private mercenary group made up of former US Special Forces and military. According to former US Army Captain David Hackworth, retired US military officers working for the private US military contractor MPRI (Military Professional Resources Incorporated) not only trained KLA personnel, Sunni Muslim in origin, but even fought alongside them against the Yugoslav government forces.[4]

 

Former NSA official Wayne Madsen reported that what the US and Western media called the "Kosovo Liberation Army" was, in fact, a grouping of mafia clans in Kosovo who had been known drug traffickers well before working for the US. Madsen noted that covert support to the KLA was established around 1996 in the wake of the NATO Bosnia occupation as a "joint endeavor between the CIA and Germany's Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). The task to create and finance the KLA was initially given to Germany: They used German uniforms, East German weapons, and were financed in part by drug money, according to intelligence analyst John Whitley."[5]

 

In Kosovo, the Clinton Administration had no interest in backing moderates who were open to a diplomatic solution with Belgrade. The KLA leaders whom Washington chose were accused of assassinating moderate Kosovo Albanians, including some of those who agreed to the Rambouillet peace accords. According to Albanian State Television, the KLA had sentenced the democratically elected president of the Republic of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, to death in absentia. During the Rambouillet peace talks, Washington deliberately froze out Kosovo moderates in favor of the Jihadists of the KLA mafia, who were guaranteed not to go for peace.[6] Washington wanted war, and the KLA Muslims were its warriors.

 

By 1998, as the KLA matured its killing and sabotage skills under training from Pentagon contractor MPRI, the US and Germany recruited Mujahideen mercenaries from Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Bosnia, and elsewhere to train the KLA in guerrilla and diversion tactics. It was financed by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.[7] One of the leaders of an elite KLA unit during the Kosovo conflict was Mohammed al-Zawahiri, brother of Egyptian Jihadist and Afghan and Bosnia veteran Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden's lieutenant at that time.

 

From Terrorists to Heroin-Pushing "Freedom Fighters"

During the war, the KLA jihadists collaborated with the NATO troops, and they were designated by NATO as "freedom fighters."

 

In May 1999, in the midst of the NATO "humanitarian" bombing of Yugoslavia—by then reduced to only Serbia and Montenegro—The Washington Times newspaper published documentation that Clinton Administration officials were well aware that their Kosovo allies, the KLA, were trafficking in heroin. The paper reported from the documents it had obtained that

 

Drug agents in five countries, including the United States, believe the KLA has aligned itself with an extensive organized crime network centered in Albania that smuggles heroin and some cocaine to buyers throughout Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States. The documents tie members of the Albanian Mafia to a drug smuggling cartel based in Kosovo's provincial capital, Pristina. The cartel is manned by ethnic Albanians who are members of the Kosovo National Front, whose armed wing is the KLA. The documents show it is one of the most powerful heroin smuggling organizations in the world (emphasis added—F.W.E.). . . . Movement of drugs over a collection of land and sea routes from Turkey through Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia to Western Europe and elsewhere is so frequent and massive that intelligence officials have dubbed the circuit the "Balkan Route."[8]

 

The shocking report was ignored by mainstream media, as well as by the Clinton Administration.

 

In 1998, a year before the illegal NATO bombing of Yugoslavia to "prevent ethnic cleansing" of the Kosovo population by Serbia, the US State Department had even listed the KLA as an international terrorist organization, saying it had bankrolled its operations with proceeds from the international heroin trade and from loans from known Mujahideen terrorists, including Osama bin Laden. "They were terrorists in 1998 and now, because of politics, they're freedom fighters," said one top US drug official, who asked not to be identified.[9] Obviously, not all of the Washington bureaucracy was as enthusiastic about the KLA as Clinton and his inner circle were.

 

A US Government Drug Enforcement Administration report on the KLA and its heroin traffic noted at the time that a majority of heroin seized in Europe was transported over the Balkan Route. The DEA report said drug smuggling organizations composed of Kosovo's ethnic Albanians were considered "second only to Turkish gangs as the predominant heroin smugglers along the Balkan Route." Furthermore, the report noted, "Kosovo traffickers were noted for their use of violence and for their involvement in international weapons trafficking."[10]

 

Leading KLA members were trained in camps run by Osama bin Laden and his number two man, Egyptian former Muslim Brotherhood member, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The heroin that the KLA smuggled into the West came from Afghanistan, where bin Laden and the Mujahideen were still entrenched and working with Hekmatyar's heroin gang after the 1989 expulsion of the Soviets. Annually, the KLA-mafia Kosovo networks ran some $2 billion a year in heroin from Afghanistan to the West.[11] The CIA was getting multiple payoffs—first from its war in Afghanistan financed by heroin proceeds, secondly by shifting those Mujahideen fighters to the Balkans to merge with the KLA heroin distribution networks in Europe.

 

KLA fighters were ruthless. Even Human Rights Watch, a Washington NGO backing Kosovo and the KLA, documented that "The KLA was responsible for serious abuses. . . including abductions and murders of Serbs and ethnic Albanians considered collaborators with the state. . . attacks on Serbs, Roma, and other non-Albanians, as well as ethnic Albanian political rivals. . . widespread and systematic burning and looting of homes belonging to Serbs, Roma, and other minorities and the destruction of Orthodox churches and monasteries."[12]

 

In short, the US knew exactly who they were backing with the KLA. James Bissett, Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia and Albania, wrote in 2001 that, "as early as 1998, the Central Intelligence Agency assisted by the British Special Air Service were arming and training Kosovo Liberation Army members in Albania to foment armed rebellion in Kosovo. . . . The hope was that with Kosovo in flames NATO could intervene."[13] And intervene it did, massively violating both its own NATO Charter and the United Nations Charter in the process. Clinton "democracy" made its own rules of international law, which reduced to the age old adage "might makes right."

 

Ethnic Cleansing, but of Serbs . . .

With the jihadist-trained Muslim KLA fighters training their sights on Serb targets for assassination, the US was hoping to provoke Milosevic's army into a major response in order to justify a new NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. In February 1996, the KLA, ready to test its new terror skills given by the Saudi Mujahideen and US advisers, made a series of attacks against police stations and Yugoslav government officers in Kosovo, then part of Yugoslavia.

 

Agim Ҫeku, the military commander of the KLA, was a veteran of the Krajina Croatian ethnic cleansing, which drove an estimated 350,000 ethnic Serbs from their homes into predominantly Serb parts of Yugoslavia. The same Pentagon contractor, MPRI, who trained Ҫeku's KLA, had trained the Croatian Army for what was called Operation Storm and Strike.[14] The Pentagon and CIA role in the KLA operation was massive.

 

Image

The KLA Jihadist Mafiosi (UҪK in Albanian) got a logo befitting a Habsburg Austro-Hungarian monarch.

 

 

The US-directed KLA kidnapping of Serb Yugoslav security forces resulted in a significant increase in Yugoslav government casualties. That, in turn, led to the hoped-for major Yugoslavian reprisals. By early March 1996, these terror and counterterror operations led Serb inhabitants of numerous Kosovo villages to flee to other villages, cities, or the hills for refuge from KLA brutality. The "KLA provocations, as personally witnessed in ambushes of security patrols which inflicted fatal and other casualties, were clear violations of the previous October's agreement [and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1199]," noted Roland Keith, then a field office director of the OSCE's Kosovo Verification Mission.[15]

 

A report from the US Committee for Refugees spoke of, "Kosovo Liberation Army. . . attacks aimed at trying to 'cleanse' Kosovo of its ethnic Serb population." The UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 55,000 refugees, most Kosovo Serbs, had fled their Kosovo homes to Montenegro and Central Serbia. "Over 90 mixed villages in Kosovo have now been emptied of Serb inhabitants and other Serbs continue leaving, either to be displaced in other parts of Kosovo or fleeing into central Serbia." The NATO North Atlantic Council stated that KLA was "the main initiator of the violence" and that it had "launched what appears to be a deliberate campaign of provocation."[16]

By 1998, the KLA escalated its attacks on Belgrade Serb government officials in Kosovo. By that time, the KLA had a mere 500 trained fighters. Then as the USA, Germany, and Great Britain sent arms shipments and provided training to the KLA, they built it up into a major guerrilla army, with as many as 30,000 members at the peak.[17]

 

German intelligence, in coordination with Washington, played a major role in building the KLA into a fighting force. In 1996, the British weekly The European carried an article by a French expert stating, "German civil and military intelligence services have been involved in training and equipping the rebels with the aim of cementing German influence in the Balkan area. . .The birth of the KLA in 1996 coincided with the appointment of Hansjoerg Geiger as the new head of the BND (German secret service). . .The BND men were in charge of selecting recruits for the KLA command structure from the 500,000 Kosovars in Albania."[18]

 

The US and German intervention using the KLA Jihadists turned a small conflict into a major crisis. As a pretext, NATO relied on the crisis it itself had created in order to justify waging a war of aggression against Yugoslavia.

 

By 1999, the Clinton Administration was ready to push a reluctant NATO to launch what would be only the second air strike in NATO history, the first being that in Bosnia-Herzegovina four years earlier. The 1999 NATO strikes were done in violation of the UN Charter, of the UN Security Council wishes, and of the NATO Charter itself that only permits military action in event of a strike against a NATO member country.

 

Using the invented pretext that Milosevic's Serb Army was engaging in massive ethnic cleansing of Kosovo Albanian Muslims and that they threatened a "humanitarian catastrophe," President Bill Clinton ordered air strikes against civilian as well as government targets across Serbia in what it called Operation Noble Anvil, with no regard to the UN or to other uneasy NATO members. Nothing about that anvil was noble.

 

Astonishing to many, Clinton's near-unilateral decision to bomb Belgrade, a decision that had earlier been strongly opposed by the Helmut Kohl government in Germany, found support from a newly elected "Red-Green" coalition in Germany of Social Democrat Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Green Party Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. Fischer, remarkably to those who knew German party politics, had managed to arm-twist his traditionally anti-war Green party into backing the illegal NATO bombing, giving Clinton a badly needed NATO foreign ally.[19]

 

Clinton brazenly lied to the American people, claiming that the events of the Serbs in Kosovo were comparable to the Holocaust. CNN reported, "Accusing Serbia of 'ethnic cleansing' in Kosovo similar to the genocide of Jews in World War II, an impassioned President Clinton sought Tuesday to rally public support for his decision to send US forces into combat against Yugoslavia, a prospect that seemed increasingly likely with the breakdown of a diplomatic peace effort."[20]

 

Clinton's State Department claimed Serbian troops had committed genocide. In May 1996, US Defense Secretary William S. Cohen suggested that there might be up to 100,000 Albanian fatalities. However, five months after the end of NATO bombing, only 2,108 bodies were ever found—tragic but hardly genocide in terms of a theater of war.[21]

 

The US-led bombing strikes lasted from March 24, 1999, to June 10, 1999. Belgrade was devastated including with bombs containing radioactive depleted uranium. On the understanding that the United Nations would enforce order in Kosovo were Milosevic to remove Yugoslav troops, Milosevic withdrew, and the decade long war in Yugoslavia ended.

 

By then, Washington had what it wanted: Kosovo as a new US military bastion in the Balkans, a de facto defeated Serbian resistance to the US Balkanization, and the destruction of the Yugoslav Third Way guided economy model.

 

Aftermath in Kosovo

Two years after the war, James Bissett, former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia and Albania, wrote,

 

After bombing Yugoslavia into submission, NATO then stood by and submissively allowed the KLA to murder, pillage and burn. The KLA was given a free hand to do as they wished. Almost all of the non-Albanian population was ethnically cleansed from Kosovo under the watchful eyes of 40,000 NATO troops. Moreover, in defiance of United Nations resolution 1244 which brought an end to the fighting, NATO adamantly refused to disarm the KLA fighters. Instead, NATO converted this ragtag band of terrorists into the Kosovo Protection Force—allegedly to maintain peace and order in Kosovo.[22]

 

 

The former leaders of the KLA, now calling themselves the Government of Kosovo, also thrived in their old heroin smuggling, with clear support of the CIA and US Government, which had arranged for the KLA leaders to take over political control of a new Kosovo government. In 2000, Mother Jones magazine reported that after the NATO bombing in support of the KLA, Afghan heroin, much of it distributed by Kosovar Albanians, now accounted for almost 20 percent of the heroin seized in America—nearly double the percentage four years earlier. In Europe, the estimate was "Kosovo Albanians control 40% of Europe's heroin."[23]

 

"Jihadistan"

The outcome of the war also left the Saudi-backed al-Qaeda's jihadists far more strongly entrenched in the Balkans than they ever had been. In the words of Profesr John Schindler, Bosnia, "the most pro-Western society in the umma [Muslim world] was converted into a Jihadistan through domestic deceit, violent conflict, and misguided international intervention."[24]

 

Saudi Arabia, a major financier of the Mujahideen in the Balkans, began a major effort building mosques in former Yugoslavia, some 150 new glossy mosques all over tiny Bosnia and now in Kosovo, to spread the strict fanatical Saudi Wahabist Islam in a region where Muslims had been, by tradition, moderate and peaceful. In Sarajevo, the capitol of Bosnia, they built a grandiose $30 million King Fahd mosque. Saudi mosques, which began appearing all over Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, were complete with Saudi fanatical Wahhabite Imams who preached the fundamentalist Jihad ideology. As a US-backed Prime Minister, Hashim Thaҫi encouraged the Saudi connection, especially Saudi money.[25]

 

Image

Kosovo warlord Hashim Thaҫi in Saudi Arabia to meet King Abdullah to solicit money.

 

More than a decade after the war ended, Kosovo journalists found a Saudi-based Wahhabi group exercising alarming financial influence over the highest Kosovo Islamic leadership. Kosovo's chief Muslim cleric, Naim Ternava, was accused of accepting backing from Wahhabi elements in Saudi Arabia.

The Kosovar investigative journalists showed that Ternava's religious administration approved payments for local mosques by Al Waqf Al Islami (AWAI—The Islamic Foundation), based in Jeddah.[26] Saudi Arabia was one of the first countries, in addition to the United States, to recognize the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, run by mafia gangster boss Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi, the former political leader of the KLA.

 

After the war, Kosovo unemployment was running at a depression level of 45 percent. It was ripe for being bought or so fundamentalist Saudis reckoned. "What I saw during the past 10 years was a strong infiltration of Saudi money," said Flaka Surroi, owner of Kosovo's independent Koha Media. "They brought in the mosques, they brought in their dogma and ideology at the same time. They identified the poorest people in the communities, they offered them a steady salary every month just so they take over the ideology and start wearing the veil."[27]

 

KLA Foxes Guard the Henhouse

In elections in Kosovo in 2007, Thaçi declared his party victor despite the fact that only 45 percent turned out to vote and that his party got of that only 34 percent of the vote, meaning he had de facto a mere 15 percent popular support. It had been agreed with Washington beforehand that he would take over. Democracy was not as important to the US in Kosovo as was power. NATO had already slated the KLA "provisional government" (PGK) to run civilian state institutions. Following NATO's military occupation of Kosovo, the KLA took over municipal governments and public services, including schools and hospitals.

 

With the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops and police, the KLA immediately took control of Kosovo's police stations, something tantamount to asking Al Capone's men to take charge of the Chicago police during Prohibition. Under the formal authority of the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had the task of training and installing a 4,000-strong police force with a mandate to "protect civilians" under the jurisdiction of the KLA-controlled "Ministry of Public Order." The KLA-controlled police force was also responsible for the massacres of civilians organized in the immediate wake of NATO's military occupation of Kosovo.[28]​​​​​​​

 

Image

 President of the US George W. Bush shakes hands with Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu (center) and Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi (left) during a meeting in the White House on July 21, 2008, after Kosovo declared independence.

 

Washington de facto installed the former KLA as the government of Kosovo with Thaçi as its "boss." Thaçi became the leader of the so-called "Democratic Party of Kosovo" and Prime Minister of Kosovo after January 2008.

 

The KLA's former military head, Agim Çeku, became Prime Minister of Kosovo after the war. The move caused some controversy in Serbia, where he was regarded as a war criminal for his role leading the Croatian Army in "Operation Storm," the ethnic cleansing of the Serb villages in Croatia.

 

On February 17, 2008, without any public discussion or legal basis, Thaçi declared Kosovo independent from Serbia, over the objections not only of Russia and Serbia but of many other EU states. Thaçi then became Prime Minister of the newly independent "state." Soon, Thaçi began regular trips as Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosovo to Saudi Arabia, one of the first nations to recognize the Kosovo rump state, in order to cash in on Saudi petrodollars. Thaçi and the Saudis became "soul brothers," and the fanatical Wahhabite ideology began to spread to Kosovo as a result.[29]

 

Some people outside Kosovo were not entirely comfortable with Thaçi. A report to the Council of Europe issued in December 2010 stated that Hashim Thaçi was the leader of the "Drenica Group" in charge of trafficking human organs taken from Serbian prisoners, as well as heroin and arms. Washington paid no mind. Thaçi was their man in Kosovo.[30]

 

Washington's argument for extending NATO eastward had advanced significantly in the process of the Yugoslav war. Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic became prospective NATO partners, something inconceivable just five years earlier.

 

The Bosnian War of 1992–1995 was the crucible for growing a Global Islamic Jihad movement, one which the CIA and Pentagon covertly backed through Saudi Arabia and other proxies, in order to advance their agenda in the post-Cold War world.

 

Thousands of tons of bombs later, and after an estimated $40 billion of destruction to the economy and infrastructure of Serbia, the Pentagon began the construction of one of the largest US military bases anywhere in the world: Camp Bond Steel near Gnjilane in southeast Kosovo. It was a vast fortress housing up to 7,000 soldiers, an airfield, and a state-of-the-art telecommunications center that gave the United States a commanding and clearly permanent military presence in the strategic Balkans within air reach of the increasingly strategic Caspian Sea.

 

In June 1999, no sooner was the bombing of Serbia over than the US government announced it was funding a feasibility study for an AMBO pipeline by a US-registered Albanian Macedonian Bulgarian Oil Corporation (AMBO). The project was backed by the US government. Washington proposed to run it from the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas via the Republic of Macedonia to the Albanian Adriatic port of Vlorë. The 912-kilometer pipeline was to bypass the Turkish Straits, as well as Russia, in transportation of Caspian oil to the West.

 

CIA's Jihadists secure US oil control

The next step in Washington's new Eurasian strategy was to make certain the oil in the Caspian and Caucasus regions belonged to the Anglo-American oil majors and not the Russians, as during the Cold War.

 

Referring to imposition of NATO control over Serbia and Kosovo a senior US government official Joseph Grandmaison declared, "The prospect that the US government would guarantee security in the region and also provide financial guarantees, now makes it (AMBO) a much more attractive proposition." The AMBO engineering feasibility study had been undertaken by Halliburton Corporation's Brown & Root when Dick Cheney was head of Halliburton.[31]

 

With Camp Bond Steel as a firm base in the Balkans after the Yugoslav wars, Washington and their Jihadists turned their attention to Russia and the former states of the Soviet Union with predominant Muslim populations. Chechnya, a significantly Muslim part of Russia through which a vital Russian oil pipeline from the Caspian oil fields ran, became the next target of Washington's Jihad network as the US moved in to control the vast oilfields of Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, two former Soviet states.[32]

 

 

As the Bosnian and Kosovo wars were being wound down by NATO, US intelligence services found another target for their Mujahideen Holy Warriors—the Caucasus, the mountainous area of the former Soviet Union bordering Turkey, Iran, and, now, the newly-proclaimed Russian Federation.

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Image

When the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991, the US deployed Mujahideen to grab the vast oil assets of Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea in the Caucasus.

 

 

During the Clinton Administration in the mid-to-late 1990s, geophysical tests by Halliburton and the major US and British oil companies confirmed vast untapped oil and gas reserves in the Caspian Basin in the Caspian Sea between Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, and Turkmenistan. Less than a decade before, the reserves had all been a part of the Soviet Union. No more. US and British major oil companies—Amoco and BP—immediately moved in to fill the vacuum.

 

Western geophysical estimates by Halliburton, Dick Cheney's firm, and others put the possible oil reserves of the Caspian Basin at around 200 billion barrels of oil, comparable to a new Saudi Arabia, as well as natural gas reserves estimated by the US Department of Energy to be comparable to those of North America.[33] The market value of the combined oil and gas resources at the then oil and gas prices of around $20 a barrel was estimated at $5 trillion. The Clinton Administration shifted focus from Russia to the states of the Caspian.[34]

 

In 1995, the US-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce was created to lobby the Clinton Administration for a strong US intervention into the Caspian Sea region, including the Caucasus. The Chamber was no collection of lightweights. It included some of the most influential figures in Washington, including then CEO of Halliburton Corp. Dick Cheney, the man later to drive the George W. Bush Administration into the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Chamber was chaired by former Secretary of State and Texas power broker James Baker III. It included such Washington influential people as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, and General Brent Scowcroft. They were power brokers no US President could ignore lightly. Soon, Clinton's focus turned from Yugoslavia and the Balkans to the Caucasus and a new war for control of oil and gas in the Caspian Basin.

 

The Caucasus Pipeline War

In 1998, just as he was preparing to bomb Kosovo, Clinton appointed two key people to develop a US energy strategy for the Caucasus and Caspian: Richard Morningstar and Morningstar's old college pal, Matt Bryza.

 

From 1997 to 1998, Bryza was advisor to Ambassador Richard Morningstar, coordinating US efforts in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Morningstar was appointed by the Clinton administration as the Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy in 1998, where he was one of the chief architects of US Caspian strategic energy plans. The idea was to develop pipelines independent of Russia from the Caspian Sea through the South Caucasus to Europe.

 

Morningstar and Bryza played a key role in bringing to life the main project of the US-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce: to build what came to be known as the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, "the world's most political pipeline," bringing Baku oil from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey and the Mediterranean. Both had intimate ties to Dick Cheney and to Richard Perle, an Assistant Defense Secretary under Reagan, and an early backer as of using Mujahideen Jihadists to attack the Soviets in Afghanistan.[35]

 

To prepare the political stage for a US-British-controlled oil pipeline in the backyard of Russia required some help. The CIA and Pentagon turned to their recent Mujahideen allies, who had done so well for them in Bosnia and Kosovo.[36]

 

Osama bin Laden, who had been orchestrating Washington's growing Global Jihad from his US-approved safe haven in Khartoum in Muslim Brotherhood-controlled Sudan, began in 1995 turning his attention and his Mujahideen cadre to a sensitive, largely Muslim part of the Russian Federation in the Caucasus—Chechnya.[37]

 

Chechnya had traditionally been a predominantly Sufi Muslim society, where religion was private and personal not political and evangelical. The infiltration of the US-sponsored Mujahideen operatives linked to Osama bin Laden from the early 1990s transformed the character of the Chechen resistance movement, spreading al-Qaeda's hardline Wahhabite Islamist ideology. US intelligence ties had been established in the early 1990s in Azerbaijan under General Richard Secord's Mega Oil operation. From there, Mujahideen activities had quickly extended into Dagestan and Chechnya, turning Baku into a shipping point for Afghan heroin to the Chechen Mujahideen mafia.[38]

 

The only existing oil pipeline from Baku in the Caspian was Russian, and it ran through Chechnya's capital, Grozny. It was a 100,000 barrel/day pipeline from the Soviet era that took Azeri oil north via Machatschkala, the capital of Russia's Dagestan province, and across 146 kilometers of Chechen territory to the Black Sea Russian port of Novorossiysk. The pipeline was a major competition and obstacle to the alternative route of Bryza and Morningstar and the British and US oil majors.[39]

 

Bin Laden brought in an old Jihad crony, Ibn al-Khattab, to become the Commander, or Emir, of Jihadist Mujahideen in Chechnya together with Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev.

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Image

 Osama bin Laden was brought into contact with Chechen Islamic Jihadist Ibn al Khattab (above) to start the US-backed Chechen war against Moscow after 1995.

 

 

Ibn al-Khattab had been born in Saudi Arabia and had fought with bin Laden's Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s, as well as in the US-steered war in Bosnia.[40] The Saudi government gave significant financial support to Ibn al-Khattab's Chechen Jihad against Moscow, and to his organization called the Islamic International Brigade, in coordination with Washington. His Islamic International Brigade in the Caucasus consisted of an estimated 1,500 Jihadists recruited from Chechnya, Dagestan, Arabs, Turks, and other foreign Muslims.

Saudi sheikhs declared the Chechen resistance a legitimate Jihad, or Holy War, and private Saudi donors sent money to Khattab and his Chechen colleagues. Mujahideen wounded in Chechnya were sent to Saudi Arabia for medical treatment. Former US FBI agent Ali Soufan stated that "the United States had been on the side of Muslims in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya."[41] In fact, they had financed, transported, and armed them.

 

The CIA airlifted the Afghan-based Mujahideen into the Caucasus, where they were smuggled across the Georgian border into Chechnya. Another main Chechen Jihadist terror training base was in NATO-member country Turkey. At the time, Saudi intelligence and the CIA were in intimate collaboration regarding the use of Mujahideen and Osama bin Laden's Holy Warrior terrorists.[42]

 

In 1991, the leaders of Central Asia were approached by major US and British oil companies during ongoing negotiations between Kazakhstan and the US oil company Chevron. George H.W. Bush, by then US President, actively backed the plans of US oil companies to exploit and, above all, control the resources of the Caspian region, as well as to build a pipeline not controlled by Moscow that could bring the oil and gas production to the West.[43]

 

In that same year, 1991, Richard Secord, Heinie Aderholt, and Ed Dearborn—veterans of US covert intelligence operations in Laos and, later, of Oliver North's illegal guns-for-drugs operations with the Nicaraguan Contras—came to Baku under the cover of an oil company named MEGA Oil. George H.W. Bush backed the idea of a project to build a US-controlled oil pipeline stretching from Azerbaijan across the Caucasus to Turkey.

 

MEGA never found oil, but its airlifts of Mujahideen into the Caucasus to create terror and chaos along the route of the Russian oil pipeline in Chechnya and Dagestan helped to bring Azerbaijan and its oil firmly into the US sphere with the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline from Baku through Georgia to Ceyhan in Turkey.[44]

 

MEGA operatives in Azerbaijan engaged in military training. They reportedly passed "brown bags filled with cash" to members of the Azeri government and, above all, set up an airline based on the model of Air America, which soon was picking up hundreds of Mujahideen mercenaries in Afghanistan and flying them secretly into the Caucasus.

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Image

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Mujahideen warlord, controlling Afghan heroin traffic in 1988 with CIA Deputy Director Richard Kerr.

 

 

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who at that time was still allied with bin Laden, recruited Afghan mercenaries to fight against Russia and its Armenian allies in Azerbaijan and Chechnya. Hekmatyar, naturally, used the new Caucasus link to flood Western countries with his Afghan heroin, all with full US knowledge. The heroin went through Baku into Chechnya, Russia, on to Europe and even North America.[45]

 

Demonizing Putin

At the same time the CIA and Pentagon were pouring Jihadists into Russia's Chechnya, they set up a propaganda arm in Washington to make the case for Chechen independence from the "brutal" Russian occupation. It was run as part of a US intelligence organization named Freedom House and was called the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya (ACPC).

 

Its members were some of the bloodiest war hawks in the United States of the time: Richard Perle, a notorious neoconservative who was a Pentagon adviser; Elliott Abrams of Iran-Contra scandal fame; Kenneth Adelman, former US ambassador to the UN, who egged on the 2003 invasion of Iraq by predicting it would be "a cakewalk"; Frank Gaffney of the neoconservative militarist Centre for Security Policy; Bruce Jackson, former US military intelligence officer and one-time vice-president of Lockheed Martin, now president of the US Committee on NATO; and James Woolsey, former CIA director.[46]

In short, the peace they advocated was Russian surrender.

 

The ACPC launched a highly successful international media campaign to demonize Russia. With a war-weary Russian population increasingly against a new military war in Chechnya after the Afghan debacle, Boris Yeltsin's government declared a ceasefire with the Chechens in 1996 and signed a peace treaty a year later in 1997.

 

Russian military deaths were estimated to be as high as 14,000. Chechen militants killed as many as 15,000. Some 100,000 civilians were killed, with possibly over 200,000 injured and more than 500,000 people displaced by the new US-instigated war. The Russian Baku oil pipeline route was off the table, just as Washington wanted. The way was clear for BP and ExxonMobil to go ahead with their risky alternative route through Georgia.

 

By that time Washington had begun to develop a new strategy in addition to using the predominantly Arab Jihadists of Osama bin Laden and the Mujahideen.

 

Senior CIA Islam experts began to turn to Turkey, also, like Saudi Arabia, a Sunni Muslim country but with one advantage over the Arabs: the Turkish Ottoman Empire had stretched originally as far as China and across Central Asia. Washington began to actively build a Turk option for waging Jihad across Central Asia and, ultimately, to China in order to control Eurasia. A barely educated, reclusive Turkish Imam named Fethullah Gülen would be their vehicle.

 

 

 

 

 

Endnotes:


 

 

 


[1] F. William Engdahl, op. cit.

 

[2] American Petroleum Institute, December, 1995, Caspian Sea Said to Contain Two Thirds of Worlds Known Oil Reserves, accessed in http://www.historycommons.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_911_timeline&startpos=700#amidlate90sturkishfronts.

 

[3] Conversation of the author in Croatia in 2006 with "Major A.," a senior Croatian officer involved in procurement of weapons for the Croatian Army in the early 1990s.

 

[4] Peter Dale Scott, The US Al Qaeda Alliance: Bosnia, Kosovo and Now Libya. Washington's On-Going Collusion with Terrorists, Global Research, July 29, 2011, accessed in http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-us-al-qaeda-alliance-bosnia-kosovo-and-now-libya-washington-s-on-going-collusion-with-terrorists.

 

[5] Wayne Madsen, US and Germany Trained and Developed the KLA, The Progressive, August, 1999, accessed in http://www.projectcensored.org/22-us-and-germany-trained-and-developed-the-kla/.

 

[6] Wayne Madsen, The US Connections To The KLA, 18 September, 2012, accessed in http://serbianfbreporter.wordpress.com/2012/09/18/the-u-s-connections-to-the-kla/.

 

[7] Wayne Madsen, US and Germany Trained . . . , op. cit.

 

[8] Jerry Seper, KLA Finances Fight with Heroin Sales: Terror Group Is Linked to Crime Network, The Washington Times (Washington, DC), May 3, 1999, accessed in http://www.sarantakos.com/kosovo/ks18kla.html.

 

[9] Ibid.

 

[10] Ibid.

 

[11] Peter Dale Scott, op. cit.

 

[12] Human Rights Watch, Under Orders: War Comes in Kosovo, accessed in http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/kosovo/undword.htm.

 

[13] James Bissett, WE CREATED A MONSTER, Toronto Star, July 31, 2001, accessed in

http://web.archive.org/web/20080510052014/http:/www.deltax.net/bissett/a-monster.htm.

 

[14] Wayne Madsen, op. cit.

 

[15] Roland Keith, Failure of Diplomacy, Returning OSCE Human Rights Monitor Offers A View From the Ground in Kosovo, The Democrat, May 1999.

 

[16] Cited in Kosovo Liberation Army, accessed in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kosovo_Liberation_Army.

 

[17] Gregory Elich, War Criminals Real and Imagined, Centre for Research on Globalisation, globalresearch.ca, 18 November 2001, accessed in http://globalresearch.ca/articles/ELI111A.html.

 

[18] Roger Fallgot, How Germany Backed KLA, The European, 21–27 September 2008, pp. 21–27.

 

[19] In an interesting note that is difficult to verify, this author was told by a very reliable source inside the higher levels of the German SPD socialist party of Schroeder that, shortly before the October 1998 German elections that replaced Kohl with a Schroeder-Fischer coalition, the two were called to the Clinton White House for a private discussion of the upcoming German elections. Reportedly, Clinton offered substantial support in money and other things to ensure the victory of Schroeder-Fischer on the quid pro quo proviso, among others, that a Schroeder government backed the US in Kosovo. In the event, Fischer brought his Green party behind the NATO bombing and Schroeder sent German troops to Kosovo.

 

[20] Stephen Erlanger, Early Count Hints at Fewer Kosovo Deaths, The New York Times, November 11, 1999, p. A6.

 

[21] Ibid.

 

[22] James Bissett, op. cit.

 

[23] Peter Klebnikov, Heroin Heroes, Mother Jones, January/February 2000. Clinton, at the same time, mounted a vigorous campaign against Colombian heroin, conveniently increasing the demand for Afghan heroin.

 

[24] John Schindler, Unholy Terror: Bosnia, Al-Qa'ida, and the Rise of Global Jihad, Zenith Press, 2007, p. 324.

 

[25] Sylvia Poggioli, Radical Islam Uses Balkan Poor To Wield Influence, NPR, October 25, 2010, accessed in http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130801242.

 

[26] Stephen Schwartz, How Radical Islam Infiltrates Kosovo, August 30, 2012, Weekly Standard, accessed in http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/how-radical-islam-infiltrates-kosovo_651173.html.

 

[27] Sylvia Poggioli, op. cit.

 

[28] Michel Chossudovsky, "Kosovo 'Freedom Fighters' Financed by Organized Crime," Covert Action Quarterly, Spring-Summer 1999 accessed in http://www.projectcensored.org/22-us-and-germany-trained-and-developed-the-kla/.

 

[29] Roberta Fedele, Kosovo courts Saudi investments, Saudi Gazette, June 17, 2012, accessed in http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentid=20120617127191.

 

[30] Paul Lawis, Kosovo PM is head of human organ and arms ring Council of Europe reports, London Guardian, 14 December, 2010.

 

[31] F. William Engdahl, op. cit. p. 241.

 

32 Wayne Madsen, Washington's «Civil Society» and CIA Financing of Chechen and Other Caucasus Regional Terrorists, Strategic Culture Foundation, 29 April, 2013, accessed in http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2013/04/29/washington-civil-society-cia-financing-chechen-other-regional-terrorists.html.

 

[33] Fiona Hill and Regine Spector, The Caspian Basin and Asian Energy Markets, The Brookings Institution, Washington, September 2001, accessed in http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2001/09/globaleconomics-hill.

 

[34] Joe Barnes, Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central Asia and the Caucasus—National Interests in the Caspian Basin, James Baker III Institute for Public Policy, April, 1998, accessed in http://bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/95010710/u-s-interests-in-the-caspian-basin-getting-beyond-the-hype.pdf.

 

[35] Sibel Edmonds, Obama Appoints a Not-Too-Long-Ago-Hatched Neocon Larva, 27 July, 2010, accessed in

http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2010/07/27/obama-appoints-a-not-too-long-ago-hatched-neocon-larva/.

 

[36] Ibid.

 

[37] Peter Dale Scott, The Falsified War on Terror . . . , op. cit.

 

[38] Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, Our terrorists, New Internationalist, October 1, 2009, accessed in http://newint.org/features/2009/10/01/blowback-extended-version/#sthash.uCpcnKXP.dpuf.

 

[39] Thomas I. Steinberg, Warum Tschetschenien?, Junge Welt, Berlin, September 25, 2004, accessed in http://www.steinbergrecherche.com/tschetschenien.htm.

 

[40] Wikipedia, Ibn al Khattab, accessed in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ibn_al-Khattab.

 

[41] Peter Dale Scott, The Falsified War . . . , op. cit.

 

[42] Sibel Edmonds, US NATO Chechen Militia Joint Operations Base, Boiling Frogs Post, November 22, 2011, accessed in http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2011/11/22/bfp-exclusive-us-nato-chechen-militia-joint-operations-base/.

 

[43] Peter Dale Scott, USA and Al Qaeda Relations . . . , op. cit.

 

[44] Ibid.

 

[45] Ibid.

 

[46] Sibel Edmonds, US NATO Chechyn . . . , op. cit.

 

 

 

 

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Strasse der Republik 17
Wiesbaden Hessen 65203
GERMANY


December 09, 2018

U.S. ambassador on KSF, borders, Serb community, economy...

kossev.info

U.S. ambassador on KSF, borders, Serb community, economy... - KoSSev

KoSSev -

18-22 minutes


Foto: RTK

Ambassador Kosnett, welcome.

Thank you. It is a great honor and privilege to return to Kosovo as the Ambassador of the United States.

First of all, let me express our condolences to you upon the passing of President George H. W. Bush.

Thank you for that Xhevdet. I had the privilege of meeting President Bush only once, many years ago, and I feel the same way that everyone in my country does. He was a great leader, a man of honor who has earned his place in history, and I know that he was also a great friend of Kosovo.

A great supporter to Kosovo too. Thank you. Ambassador, Kosovo has changed since you have worked here in 2003. At this point where Kosovo stands, it had huge support from the US. Do you think that Kosovo could still count on U.S. policy?

Absolutely. The United States has considered Kosovo to be a great success story. We have said that it's a success story for the United States, but most importantly it's a success story for the people of Kosovo. I can tell you that in the months I spent in Washington preparing for this assignment, I met with many people in the government, in Congress, as well as outside the government, and I think America's commitment to Kosovo's future is unshakeable. In fact, I would say, that it is an area where there is complete consensus between Republicans and Democrats—between the government, the administration and the Congress. Everybody feels that Kosovo is a very close friend of the United States and we are deeply committed to supporting Kosovo.

Ambassador, in what fields will your commitment be focused with your mandate in Kosovo?

There are a lot of issues where the Embassy will continue to work very closely with our Kosovo friends. Economic security is critical in foreign investment and job creation. We are also focused on rule of law and countering corruption, which remains a very high priority for us. Then there is the issue of security. Security has many meanings and many aspects. Certainly, at the top of the agenda is supporting the efforts of leaders in Kosovo and in Serbia to find a way forward on the Dialogue, to achieve a mutually beneficial solution that will help both governments' prosperity and security in the future. Also in terms of security, we continue to work very closely with Kosovo on counter-terrorism, countering violent extremism—a range of security related issues.

How up, Ambassador, is Kosovo ranked in U.S. foreign affairs today?

It is a very high priority. In fact, I would say that the current administration in Washington is more interested in supporting, not just Kosovo but also progress in the Balkan region, than I have seen in many years. This is an administration that looks at longstanding problems and says: we need to shake things up—we need to find a way forward.

Ambassador, Kosovo is facing new challenges now, as we said, mostly with relations with Serbia. There have been discussions between two states in Brussels. Not much progress, sometimes with the tensions as we are talking now. These days they are probably facing the lowest point of their relations, since after the start of dialogue. The Government of Kosovo decided to come to a decision that Serbian goods must pay 100% of taxes in order to enter Kosovo. What is your opinion when it comes to this decision?

This would be a good time for me to remind your viewers that I have been back in Kosovo for less than a week, so at this point I want to listen to lots of people and get their input before I start making a lot of big declarations. Having said that, I do believe, and my government believes, that this is a critical moment in the Dialogue process. That it is important for Kosovo and Serbia to approach this process in a spirit of cooperation. I understand the challenges of that—I know the country's history, but in a spirit of cooperation and creativity to find a way forward. When we speak of the Dialogue in Washington, we're talking about a comprehensive discussion of all the issues that have separated the two countries for many years. What we need to see is a process that ends with agreement that benefits both countries.

We all negotiate in our daily lives. We negotiate with our families, with our neighbors, business people negotiate: it is not only governments and diplomats that negotiate. But one thing that I think that is critical to a successful negotiation is that it has to be beneficial to both parties so that both parties have an incentive to fulfill their obligations, to maintain the agreement, to move forward. Any agreement between Kosovo and Serbia needs to be durable, it needs to be sustainable, and it needs to, again, to benefit both countries.  I think sometimes people enter into negotiations in the spirit that, I am going to win this negotiation—I'm going to defeat the other side. When you do that, it is really, very hard to have the sort of trust that is necessary to see that a negotiation is successfully implemented. Last point there, when we speak about the implementation of agreements, the United States is deeply focused on the future of Kosovo, but also on stability in the entire Balkan region. We have every reason to want to stay by your side to make sure that if governments make commitments, they abide by them. We are not just going to applaud while a piece of paper is signed and then move on to the next crisis.

The government of Kosovo took this measure Mr. Ambassador, as I said, after the failure of entering Interpol, but they also say it is a reflection of Serbia's ongoing obstructions towards Pristina, and because of Belgrade not respecting the earlier signed agreements.

I think that both governments have taken steps to show that they have levers—that they have tools they can use against the other side. Both governments have shown that we can be tough—we can stand up for ourselves. Frankly, what I'd rather see, not a competition to see who can be toughest, but a competition to see who can be most creative and most forward-looking in trying to find a way forward. I think it is very common in negotiations to hit obstacles, to reach a difficult stage, and then the two parties will retreat to their corners and think about what to do next. I know that some people are concerned that the Dialogue process is at a tough stage—this is pretty normal in negotiations. You go forward, you take a step back, you go forward again. I do think it is important that the negotiating strategy and negotiating position of Kosovo reflect a wide range of political opinion and a wide range of popular opinion. In that regard, and I am sure we'll come back to this, the United States thinks it's important that every voice in Kosovo is heard. That members of all communities, all political parties, women as well as men, have a stake in the future of the country and feel that their voice is heard and respected.

Lately in Kosovo there have been words, Ambassador, about the possible final agreement between Pristina and Belgrade. In one side we have President's commitment to reach the final agreement with Serbia with possible, as he says, border correction. In the other hand political opposition that strongly disagree about anything that has to do with the border. The Dialogue with Serbia seems like it is stopped for now, as we said, or there is tension.  How do you think they could find a political will to continue discussions? Do you think that a future agreement between these two countries might also touch the border issue?

I think some people have the misunderstanding that the United States has been pressing for a shift to the border or an exchange of territory. As my superiors in Washington have tried to make clear: what we are interested in is an agreement that is negotiated in good faith by the two sides.  The United State does not have any preconceptions about what a comprehensive Dialogue agreement might entail. It might be that the two sides decide – honestly in good faith – to make an adjustment to the border. They may very well decide not to, and believe me, I understand the depth of concern, the historical reasons why adjusting the border is very complicated. And again, I want to emphasize, my government is not pushing for that. We do not necessarily see that as a key to the dialogue. I think that a great deal of discussion of the Dialogue has focused on that. I think discussion of the border is only one aspect of the wide range of discussion that has to take place between the two countries. It has also has to touch on economic cooperation, security, culture, education, justice, very much justice – the wide range of issues that the two governments need to speak about, and it is important not to fixate on only one aspect of the problem.

Just to clarify this, Ambassador. There had also been voices, as we said, about a territorial exchange between two parts. Will this be acceptable for the United State, if the two countries decide to do that?

So, we have tried to make clear that we do not have any preconceptions. We are not saying that certain issues should not be discussed and we are not saying that certain outcomes are required. Serbia and Kosovo are the negotiating partners. These are two sovereign, independent nations. We are always going to support Kosovo. By support Kosovo, I do not mean that we are going to blindly agree to any idea that comes out of the government in Pristina. But, we are going to support Kosovo in the effort to establish peace, prosperity, justice in the country and in the region. We do not see those goals as contradictory to a broader goal – wanting the same things for other countries in the region. I think it is important to emphasize that we are standing by to support the parties to come to a sustainable, mutually beneficial conclusion, but we are not writing the script.

Right. Ambassador, people are getting tired of this situation. Prolonged discussions seem to never end. How long do you think that this situation should continue for?

I would be reluctant to suggest any sort of timeline or deadline for the discussion, but I do think that time is of the essence, that it is important to move forward as quickly as possible, and frankly, that's because – as I said earlier – my government is really focused on making progress in the region now. You have our full attention, our full support. It is a great opportunity and I don't think that anybody, either side, or the people of either country has anything to gain by delaying a process of negotiation. I think that the time to do anything is usually right now.

Kosovo's government and population seem also to be frustrated from the EU stand towards Pristina. They have been promised visa liberalization and now, suddenly, the EU, as we saw, is not prepared for such a decision. Do you think that this has increased tensions in Kosovo? Young population that cannot move freely like others in Europe.

I do think that the frustration over the current status of visa liberalization is an indication that people of Kosovo want to strengthen their ties to the West. That is where they see their future. We certainly support that, we agree with that. We think that closer ties between Kosovo and the European Union is something that is very much in the interest of the United States, as well as the people of Kosovo. I have been struck in the short time I have been back by the amazing young people that I'm meeting. People with education, with skills, with a very broad European and global perspective who have an enormous amount to contribute to their own country and to the world. They want to be able to do that here, but also in other countries. I suspect that the more that young people in Kosovo are able to travel, to study, to work in other countries, and then in many cases to come back to Kosovo to contribute here – that will be wonderful for the country. I am not going to get into what is the right timing for visa liberalization and so on, but I am encouraged that people in this country look to the West and look to the European Union.

What is your opinion about Kosovo Serbs? Let's talk about them a little, as we talked about Kosovo and Serbia relations. We also have Serbian population, in Kosovo.  They seem to be a part, every time, of Kosovo's government, but they are always influenced by Belgrade. Do you think this help Kosovo's Serb to build their future here, in Kosovo?

I think it is important for everyone in the country – every community in the country to feel that it is their country and that they have a future here and that their voices are heard and they're role is respected. You know, America like Kosovo is a very diverse country. We have people from all religions, different ethnic groups, different races and a very complicated history, as people know. We do not have all the answers for how people should live in a multi-ethnic society. I think we have gotten better at asking the questions – at honestly talking about our history and understanding its necessary to examine a country's history, in order to move forward into the future. And, in that regard I'd like to say that I think that it is important that all of the members of all of the minority groups feel that they have a voice and that they are equal participants in the country. That is an area where I look forward to making friends and hearing perspectives from all communities.

Do you thing that they should look more towards Pristina rather than Belgrade so that this way they might feel that this is their country?

I think this is kind of circular. The more comfortable people feel, the more they feel like their voice matters, like this truly is their country, the less they might take their cues from outside.

Kosovo's institutions are preparing to give to KSF – a hot topic, these days –a functional army mandate. Does Washington support this step?

Washington has consistently supported the development of the KSF and the development of the KSF into Armed Forces. The United States has invested a lot of money; we have spent time on training; we've done exchanges between KSF and U.S. military. We think that the KSF's evolution into Kosovo Armed Forces is a positive step and that it is only natural for Kosovo as a sovereign, independent country to have a self-defense capability. Also, Kosovo's leaders have talked about how the Kosovo Armed Forces could participate in peace-keeping operations overseas. That Kosovo has reached the point where instead of only being a consumer of international security that it can contribute to it. This is all welcome. Now, it is long process. I know that people – some people in neighboring countries have fixated on a certain date that is coming up very soon and have expressed concerns that the evolution of the KSF into the Armed Forces could have negative implications for security. What I will say about that is: this is a process that will take many years. That Kosovo has every reason, every right to have a self–defense capability. The most important point I want to leave you with is if there are people who genuinely believe that Kosovo's Police, Security Forces, Armed Forces—with any label—pose a threat to regional security, I think that's another indicator of the importance of Dialogue. I think that it is important for people in both countries to understand the perspective of the other side. Because when you are not communicating, all sorts of fears will rise to the surface and people always fear what they do not understand.

Do you agree that Kosovo government can pass the law on 14th – let's say they mentioned the date of December – about the transforming the KSF into Army? It takes time as they say, it's going to take 10 years for the proper Army to be formed.

That's exactly the point, Xhevdet. Whether they pass this law or change the patches on their shoulders of the personnel on a certain date, is not the most important thing. What's important is that it'll be a long, sustainable process and, moreover, that as the Armed Forces are established – which again, is a long process—that it be multiethnic. It is important for members of the Serb community and other communities to participate in a big way in the Armed Forces as they have in the KSF and in the Police. Because, this is an experience that we've had in my country, that it's important for the people in the community to see that the people in uniform represent them and not just some outside force.

How can economic relations between Kosovo and U.S. improve?  Do you think that Kosovo can be a suitable place for U.S. investments, for companies to invest in? Did you ever think if you could contribute in this field?

I think that encouraging American investment is a very high priority for the U.S. Embassy and for the U.S. Government. We have seen some small-scale investment already.  It is been very important. You see these American food franchises around the country now and you say: ok, that is great, people enjoy that, I enjoy it. It is fairly small-scale, but American businesses watch to see what the food franchises are doing because, the food franchises are famous for doing very careful research on a country before they enter a market. When companies see – oh, Domino's, famous Famiglia, Kentucky are in Kosovo, that moves Kosovo closer to the top in their planning. That is important. We support the Counter Global proposal for a new power plant, which, we think, will have enormous benefits, not just for the environment, but also for economic stability and development.

Let me put it this way: when we speak of the different areas where our countries cooperate; when we speak of regional stability; when we speak of rule of law and anti-corruption; when we speak of economic development, these different areas are all closely intertwined.  American companies want to see legal system where everybody is treated equally. American companies want to know that if they get into dispute with a local partner, for example, that they would be treated fairly. American companies spend a lot of attention on looking at what we call risk analysis. They look at the regional stability and they are sometimes reluctant to invest in a country where they see ethnic tensions, or tensions between the country and its neighbors. I am completely confident that as Kosovo and Serbia improve relations; move towards normalization; recognition; towards respectful, neighborly relations; as Kosovo continues not just to pass laws on anti-corruption which is important and which I applaud, but is able to implement them fairly and consistently—then American companies and other companies will see Kosovo as an increasingly attractive location to invest.

Ambassador Kosnett, thank you very much for being with us.

It's my great pleasure. It's good to be back.

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