Russia - Ukraine Tensions

Russia Observer

28^th JANUARY 2022 

THE WEST LEAVES MUMMY'S BASEMENT

 

 

BY PATRICK ARMSTRONG

 

After years of behaving like a teenager shadow boxing in the basement of his mother's house, playing out the fantasy of knocking out Ivan Drago in the 1985 movie Rocky IV, the US and NATO find themselves confronting the reality.

SCOTT RITTER

 

Being a member of NATO used to be pretty cost-free: fun even. You had a suite in the flashy new HQ, admired your flag with all the others, gloried in your excellent values. The biggest downside was that you were expected to provide a few soldiers to participate in the latest war in some dusty place. But, you could go home after destroying Libya or Iraq or Afghanistan and forget about it. Until the refugees showed up. And Washington really did insist that you buy some of its weapons and it was harder and harder to say no. And you started getting sucked into things that weren't as much fun as you expected. But, overall, for the leaders anyway, it was an attractive deal. And most of you didn't like Russia much, having edited your own communists out of the story and forgotten what the Germans did to you.

Russia was feeble and weak, going down, and certainly no match for "the greatest alliance in history". But what happens when that teddy bear turns nasty? Blowing up countries from 20,000 feet, you had stopped paying attention. Lost wars in Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Iraq turn out to be poor preparation and the bear had been paying attention. But, you cry, NATO was supposed to protect me, not put me into greater danger!

And that is the dilemma that Moscow has been patiently preparing for you. On 17 December Moscow published two draft treaties. Here are the official English versions: Treaty between The United States of America and the Russian Federation on security guarantees and Agreement on measures to ensure the security of The Russian Federation and member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They should be read but, in essence, after reminding the USA and NATO of all the international treaties that they signed up to and ignored, they are asked to commit themselves again, in writing, in public. They must accept the principle that security is mutual. In addition the USA and Russia will not station nuclear weapons outside their territories – which will require the USA to remove some. Finally – and not negotiable – the USA and NATO must solemnly commit themselves to no more expansion. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov later explained why the drafts had been made public: "because we are aware of the West's ability to obfuscate any uncomfortable issues for them… We have serious doubts that the main thing in our proposals, namely the unconditional demand not to expand NATO to the east, will not be swept under the carpet." There is little expectation from Moscow that these demands will be taken seriously by the West. I outline my assessment of the "or else" here and again here. Others have done so elsewhere: Moscow has quite a range of options.

There were two rounds of talks in Geneva and a meeting with NATO. The US written answer was delivered on 26 January and, in Lavrov's words, did not address "the main issue" of NATO expansion and deployment of strike weapons, although there were openings on "matters of secondary importance". So here we are and we await the next step. It is, of course, quite certain that Moscow has the next step worked out and the ones after that.

Other events since December have been interesting. The CIA Director visited Kiev 17 January; the UK began supplying Ukraine with light anti-armour weapons (rather elderly as it turned out); the US is sending more and others are providing light AD systems; Canada sent some troops (mostly it seemed to help evacuate Embassy personnel); a senior German naval officer resigned after committing crimespeak; some US troops on "heightened preparedness". The biggest laugh was the evacuate-or-not dance: Canada, USA and UK, the three most enthusiastic cheerleaders for war to the last Ukrainian, are running, the EU is staying.

Other developments worth noting. On 3 January the P5 declared "We affirm that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." Iran and Russia showed close cooperation. Russian and Syrian aircraft made a joint patrol of all Syria's borders; these are to be regular occurrences. Agreements with Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua in a range of areas, including military collaboration. And China's Foreign Minister advised Washington to take Moscow's concerns seriously. Only a fool would think these were random coincidences.

There was lots of opinion, of course. Much of it stunningly idiotic. My favourite is An Aging Vladimir Putin Hopes War Can Make a Sagging Empire Rise Again. I must confess that when one sees "aging" and "sagging empire", Putin and Russia are not the first things that come to mind. But these are memorable as well: How Germany's greed for gas, and another grubby deal with Moscow, could plunge Europe into an abyss and Is Germany a Reliable American Ally? Nein: Berlin goes its own way, prizing cheap gas, car exports to China, and keeping Putin calm. A cry from mummy's basement: Why threat to Ukraine from Putin's Russia is exaggerated – Gwynne Dyer: THE geopolitical question of the moment is: how important is it to humour Russian leader Vladimir Putin? The answer is: not very. From another couch warrior: Russia May Underestimate Ukraine and NATO. And lots of threats: eighteen response scenarios; "sanctions like you've not seen before"; personal sanctions. The US State Department complains about "Disarming Disinformation" and burbles that it's "United with Ukraine". First he said "only winners" could make demands, then he complained he didn't have a seat.

But Moscow doesn't want to "invade Ukraine"; if it did it would have to pay for it. In any event, the way Ukraine's population is melting away, in another couple of decades, it will be uninhabited.

More rational thinkers exist. Scott Ritter, no couch warrior, knows that America couldn't defend Ukraine even if it wanted to. The troops Washington has put on alert may be from the storied 82^nd Airborne but they're only light infantry. NATO no longer has the heavy forces and their support in place. But Russia does. There is no credible military threat from NATO. Many understand reality: Biden's Opportunity for Peace in Eurasia; The Overstretched Superpower: Does America Have More Rivals Than It Can Handle?; Opinion: Ignore the hawks, Mr. President. You're right on Ukraine. People in RAND realise that the weapons being given Ukraine will be useless. Worse than useless, in fact, if they encourage Kiev to start something. This fictional account describes what a Russia-Ukraine war would really look like – over in a day and all with stand-off weapons, a few special forces and the local forces.

There have been some second thoughts. Washington and its allies have been booming the "Russian invasion" threat as hard as they can but Kiev is trying to to turn down the volume – it doesn't want to scare its principal backers away. No signs on 2 January, or 25 January. Delicate job this, as we see here: you have to say not now but maybe later. Now even Washington is trying to dial it down – after all, Russia has been "about to invade" for three months now.

But the real second thoughts are forming in Europe. By addressing its demands to Washington, Moscow has shown the Europeans where they fit on the tree. It's Europe that will – again – pay for Washington's conceits. Washington is always careful to exempt itself from the anti-Russia sanctions – no shortage of rocket engines or oil or titanium – but Europe can't. Amusingly, the EU is complaining to the WTO about the counter sanctions Moscow put on food which ended a profitable export market. The two favourite sanctions Washington is pushing for are stopping Nord Stream 2 and kicking Russia out of SWIFT. Neither of these will hurt the USA but they will be devastating for Europe. Killing Nord Stream will be a severe blow to German industry. And, absent SWIFT, how is Europe supposed to pay for Russian gas imports? No wonder Germany's Scholz wants a "qualified fresh start" with Russia as the Foreign Minister calls for diplomacy.

An Open Letter in Germany. France's Macron thinks the EU should start its own dialogue. Hungary's Orbán is going there for another reasons but will surely be talking about this. Croatia wants nothing to do with the adventure. Bulgaria wants out. One entertaining climbdown was the British Defence Minister's invitation to Shoygu to come to London; instead he will go to Moscow. Even Washington and London are starting to learn that the sanctions won't be off-stage after all. London has been warned there could be a big spike in energy costs and some big American companies have asked to be excepted. As for sending troops, Washington's not that "United with Ukraine". NATO won't; UK's Johnson admits no NATO country is capable of a large-scale deployment in Ukraine.

We are coming to the end of the story. All those people in the West who thought they could ignore Russia's interests are starting to suspect that they don't have the leverage they thought they had. Russia is pretty sanctions-proof. It is the closest thing to an economic autarky on the planet: lots of territory, lots of raw materials, lots of water, lots of energy, all the manufacturing it needs, self-sufficient in food, well-educated people, backed up government, armed to the teeth. It's pretty impregnable and it's not run by fools. And it's very closely allied to the biggest manufacturing power and population in the world. Not an easy target at all and almost impossible to hurt without hurting yourself more.

And all this to preserve the so-called right of a country no one wants in NATO to ask to be admitted. What a principle to die for!

Time for Moscow to tighten the screws. How much will Europe and the other NATOites be prepared to pay for being in a security organisation that does nothing but get its members into disastrous wars and make them insecure?

Putin and his team can allow themselves a small smile: they've been planning this for a long time. He warned us in 2007 and here we are today.

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I can think of no better demonstration of Washington's bankruptcy than Nuland's appeal yesterday: "We are calling on Beijing to use its influence with Moscow to urge diplomacy…".

 

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brownstone.org

The Monumental Sacrifice of Novak Djokovic ⋆ Brownstone Institute

Author Stacey Rudin Stacey Rudin is an attorney and writer in New Jersey, USA READ MORE

7-9 minutes

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Defending Australian Open Champion Novak Djokovic was deported from Australia, the day before commencement of 2022 tournament play. He entered the country on a visa including a medical exemption based on recent Covid infection. Due to public outry over "special treatment," his visa was revoked upon arrival in the country, only to be reinstated by a court. It was later revoked by an immigration minister, whose decision was upheld by another court, sending Djokovic packing — potentially for three years. 

This draconian act puts Djokovic at a serious disadvantage in his Grand Slam rivalry with Rafael Nadal, who is competing in Australia this year after vocally supporting vaccines. Both champions, along with Roger Federer, currently hold 20 Grand Slam titles. Djokovic was favored to be the first to reach 21, but his decision to remain unvaccinated leaves Nadal alone with that opportunity for now. (Federer is out recovering from surgery.) 

Djokovic was technically deported for not being vaccinated, but the decision lacks even a superficial "health and safety" justification. Djokovic already had Covid twice, once in early 2020 and again in December 2021. At the time of his deportation, he had been in Australia for ten days, and tested negative. He's as healthy as a human being can be — you don't earn "GOAT' status in the difficult sport of tennis any other way. 

Further proof that Djokovic poses no disease threat to anyone is the fact that this tournament was safely played in January 2021, before vaccines were available for any player or guest. Even if Djokovic had taken the vaccine, he'd be no "safer" in terms of his ability to transmit the virus, as the 100,000 daily cases in highly-vaccinated Australia attest. 

Even the government that deported Djokovic didn't try very hard to frame its decision as the elimination of a health threat. Rather, it stated that Novak could become an "icon of free choice" if allowed to stay. Ironically, he will undoubtedly become that now that he's made the supreme sacrifice of forfeiting his chance to play in order to openly oppose mandatory vaccination. 

It's not a good look for the Covid Regime if an avowed "anti-vaxxer" dominates the sport. The world audience might start thinking about the relative health status of "unvaccinated" people, particularly since athletes have been experiencing heart trouble all over the world — several alreadyat the Australian Open practice courts. 

As it stands, Millions of Australians and others who have already taken the vaccine applaud the government's decision. They can't get the vaccine out of their bodies, so the next best thing is to make sure that everyone else has to put themselves into the same spot. 

Nevermind the precedent it sets to allow a government to force people to choose between their health and their career. Such Sophie's choices are normal these days.

The Regime would not have minded Djokovic playing in an unvaccinated state so long as he publicly expressed support for mandatory universal vaccination. He could have easily done this — a hero in Serbia, the wealthy star could have tapped any number of doctors to provide fake certification of vaccination. But that would have violated his principles. 

In 2010, an "unwell" Djokovic was collapsing at tournaments, unable to complete strenuous matches. A doctor witnessing his condition on TV got in touch with the athlete, recommending that he eliminate gluten, dairy and processed sugar from his diet. Novak thought it sounded strange but agreed to try, and it's hard to argue with his results. His 2011 season was one of the best in men's tennis history. On his new fuel, he was unstoppable. He ended the season with an unbelievable 10–1 record against Nadal and Federer, and compiled a 41-match winning streak. 

This experience changed not only the tennis player. It fundamentally changed the man, as Djokovic explains in his book "Serve to Win":

When it's not being cared for, your body will send you signals: fatigue, insomnia, cramps, flus, colds, allergies. When that happens, will you ask yourself the questions that matter? Will you answer honestly and with an open mind? 

Open-minded people radiate positive energy. Closed-minded people radiate negativity. Eastern medicine teaches you to align mind, body, and soul. If you have positive feelings in your mind — love, joy, happiness — they affect your body…But a lot of people, especially closed-minded people, are led by fear. That and anger are the most negative energies we have. What are closed-minded people afraid of? It could be many things: Fear that they are wrong, fear that someone might have a better way, fear that something has to change. Fear limits your ability to live your life.

Some people at the top feed off of negativity. The way I see it, pharmaceutical and food companies want people to feel fear. They want people to be sick. How many TV ads are for fast foods and medicines? And what's at the root of those messages? We'll make you feel better with our products. But even deeper down: We'll make you fear that you don't have enough of the things we say you need. It's crazy — even when you're completely healthy, they say you need [products] to stay that way.

Here's a pattern I'd rather embrace: good food, exercise, openness, positive energy, great results. I've been living that pattern for several years now. It works better than the alternative.

Djokovic rejects Big food, Big Ag, Big Chemical, and Big Pharma. He doesn't need them. His practices allow him to be healthy without any of their products — in fact, he's achieved an elite level of health by actively avoidingtheir products. 

There is no greater threat to the bottom line of these companies than people like Novak Djokovic. He is not scared, he is not anxious, so he can't be manipulated or sold an easy fix. He can see the path to health takes hard work, and he's willing to put it in. When they tell him that he can't be healthy without a vaccine, he laughs in their faces. They can send him packing, but they can never take away his integrity and self-worth. 

Novak Djokovic doesn't want to lie to the public, making it appear as if he agrees with The System's "path to health." If he did that, he would get to play his tournament, but he would have millions of lives on his conscience. He'd rather give up his career's crowning achievement in order to stand in truth. To send people the message: you CAN reject this tyranny. You do NOT have to comply. You can SAY NO, and you will be okay. 

It's easier for him, yes, with his millions of dollars. Healthcare workers on a middle-class salary will have a harder go of it. Military members faced with dishonorable discharge absent vaccination have it worse. But Djokovic has made it easier, at least, for everyone to publicly reject vaccination. If Novak openly rejects this vaccine, they can too, without shame. His very public deportation will hopefully get many people thinking about his approach to health, which if widely understood and adopted, will finally burn the Covid Regime to the ground — once and for all.

 

tass.com

Serbia has no plans to join NATO, president says

2 minutes

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BELGRADE, January 13. /TASS/. Belgrade has no plans to join NATO and seeks to form a strong army to defend the country, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic told national television following a meeting of the Russia-NATO Council in Brussels.

When asked why Serbia was obtaining weapons when it could join the alliance, Vucic said: "We will not join NATO." "They have the right to obtain weapons because they are NATO members, while we - a free neutral nation - cannot defend ourselves? What is it that you don't like? We only purchase defensive weapons, not offensive ones," the Serbian president pointed out, adding that Belgrade would never allow military operations against the Serbian people.

Russia supplies equipment to Serbia as part of military aid. Moscow earlier provided Belgrade with 30 T-72MS tanks, 30 BRDM-2MS armored vehicles and the Kornet anti-tank missile systems. Serbia is also expected to purchase Russia's advanced Pantsir-S1M system. Russia delivered four Mil Mi-35M helicopters, six Mikoyan MiG-29 fighters, ten BRDM-2 vehicles, three Mil Mi-17V-5 helicopters and the Pantsir-S1 systems to Serbia between 2018 and February 2020 as part of military aid.

 

spectator.com.au

Hating on Novak has become a national sport | The Spectator Australia

Flat White Hating on Novak has become a national sport James Macpherson

6-7 minutes

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The whole country is hating on Novak Djokovic right now because he had the courage to do what most of us did not – stand up for himself.

Novak's principled stance has only served to highlight the fact that millions of Australians have allowed themselves to be abused for the past two years. And no one wants to admit that.

It is far easier to demonise a Serbian millionaire who took a stand than it is to agree that we have been bullied into submission by politicians and health bureaucrats.

How else to explain the unhinged reaction to the world Number One tennis player being allowed to defend his Australian Open title? And how else to understand the glee with which his subsequent visa rejection was greeted?

When news broke earlier this week that Novak was going to be allowed to play in Australia, a Victorian journalist tweeted: 'If we still have crowds at the Australian Open by the time it starts, it's the duty of every Australian to boo Novak relentlessly between sets. Shit is absolutely f***ed.'

Urging 14,000 people under the Rod Laver Arena roof to exhale in unison to protest an airborne virus is the kind of dumb you can only be when you're smack bang in the middle of a rabid mob.

Not to be outdone, a prominent Melbourne journalist tweeted that the Australian Open was 'a tournament fans were scared to come to in the first place and won't want to attend now'.

Really? People were scared that the medically cleared Grand Slam winner might walk onto a fenced-off court, cough during a rally, and infect everyone in the stadium with the plague? Get a grip. He's a tennis player, not the Grim Reaper.

No one seriously believes Novak is a health risk. And no one seriously believes that kicking him out of the country is protecting Australians.

Australia recorded more than 60,000 Covid cases in the past 24 hours. It's not like Novak – someone who is perfectly healthy and who has natural immunity from having beaten the virus earlier – was going to ruin Melbourne's (mythical) Covid-Zero utopia.

Novak's crime was to have insisted that a person's medical information should be private – something we all believed as recently as 2018.

He then successfully argued his case before an independent panel of six doctors as well as the Victorian Health Department. As a result, he was cleared to ply his trade as a free man, with a clean bill of health.

You see the problem here, don't you? Novak kept his medical history private while we all agreed to flash our medical history to a stranger in exchange for the right to enter Kmart.

Novak fought for and won the right to earn a living on his own terms while we all consented to making a series of unending injections a condition of being able to earn a livelihood.

Damn!

Novak probably wouldn't have agreed to a 9pm curfew. He probably wouldn't have forbidden his children from visiting playgrounds. And he probably wouldn't have missed out on precious time with family because an unelected, unrepresentative bureaucrat said 'science'. Novak probably would have stood up to all that nonsense. And how we hate him for it!

We have to hate him… If Novak is not the devil, then we are all fools – fools for acquiescing to increasingly nonsensical demands and fools for agreeing to endlessly shifting Covid goal posts.

Novak's Australian Open entry did not mean that we had all been played by politicians. It was Novak who was the problem – not the tyrannical rules to which we so meekly submitted. Rules that made us so angry because Novak refused to be enslaved beside us. It wasn't fair. Why should Novak resist when we had not?

He should be booed. He should be boycotted. He should get sick with Covid!

At least, that's what some people seriously suggested, whilst claiming they were concerned about 'public health', of course.

On and on it went. Vitriol heaped upon disdain, piled upon contempt.

The Project's Peter Helliar tweeted: 'Margaret Court relieved she won't be the most unpopular person at Rod Laver Arena this year.'

Leaving aside the fact that using the story of Novak's medical exemption as an excuse to kick a 79-year-old woman did Helliar no favours, how do we explain Helliar's assertion that Novak – who has harmed no one and who has broken no law – is suddenly the most reviled person in the country?

'Rules are rules,' Prime Minister Scott Morrison insisted, when announcing to the baying Twitter mob that Novak's visa had been cancelled.

Most of us just thought it was good of the Prime Minister to finally turn up for something… But I digress.

'Our strong border policies have been critical to Australia having one of the lowest death rates in the world from Covid, we are continuing to be vigilant,' he said.

Vigilant in what? Protecting a Covid-ravaged populace from a healthy man with natural immunity?

One suspects it might have more to do with the fact there is an election coming up and it suits to have an unpopular foreigner upon whom to focus community anger.

Novak's real crime was to have stood up for himself and, in so doing, exposed our cowardice.

Don't think of Novak as a tennis player who got special privileges. He did not.

And don't think of Novak as a selfish athlete who is disrespecting Australia. He is not.

Think of Novak as a mirror in whom we saw an unflattering reflection of ourselves. Our first response was to smash the mirror. Then we cheered that the mirror was to be marched onto a plane and sent back to where it had come from.

But there is no escaping what we have seen of ourselves – or the bad luck that's sure to come with breaking that mirror.

You can follow James on Twitter. You can order his new book Notes from Woketopia here.

Got something to add? Join the discussion and comment below.

https://www.spectator.com.au/2022/01/hating-on-novak-has-become-a-national-sport/

newstatesman.com

The paradoxes of Novak Djokovic

By Jonathan Liew

8-10 minutes

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Photo by Justin Setterfield/Getty Images

A small crowd had gathered outside the Park Hotel in Melbourne. Long past midnight, under cover of darkness, they lit candles and sang songs. They waved Serbian flags and held aloft banners bearing the name and image of their chosen one. Was this some sort of sinister religious cult? A moonlight vigil in memory of a murdered political dissident? Or simply excitable tennis fans trying to get a view of their favourite player?

In reality, it was a mixture of all three. As it turned out, Novak Djokovic was not dead. He was not even really being incarcerated. Unlike many of the internees at the makeshift immigration detainment centre in Carlton – refugees and asylum seekers being held in squalid conditions, often for years, while their cases were processed – the world No 1 men's tennis player was free to leave and get on a first-class flight back home whenever he wanted.

His only crime, if you could even call it that, was to attempt to enter Fortress Australia in 2022 without a vaccination certificate or a valid medical exemption. In the meantime, expensive lawyers were arguing his case. A fast-tracked court hearing on Monday 10 January will determine whether he can stay in the country and compete in the Australian Open, where he is favourite to break the all-time men's record of 21 Grand Slam titles.

None of which seemed to provide much comfort to Djokovic's outraged fans or family, who continued to demand the release of their idol in what you have to call slightly melodramatic terms. "Jesus was crucified, and he endured, he is still alive among us," Djokovic's father Srdan said. "They are trying to crucify Novak in the same way, to underestimate him, to throw him to his knees, to do everything to him."

Back in the secular world, an arcane dispute over visa requirements for a tennis tournament had somehow escalated into a full-blown diplomatic incident. The Serbian president Aleksandar Vucic was unstinting in his criticism of the Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, accusing him of a "political witch-hunt". Angry crowds gathered in Belgrade. Australia's ambassador to Serbia was summoned to the foreign ministry to explain himself.

How did we reach this point? On the face of things, Djokovic's plight was entirely of his own making. Although he has never publicly disclosed his vaccination status, he has made fairly unambiguous anti-vaccine comments in the past, and strongly opposed regulations requiring players to get vaccinated in order to compete. As Rafael Nadal, one of his rivals, put it: "If you are vaccinated, you can play. He made his own decisions."

But as ever with Djokovic, there were complicating factors. For one thing, the player had been assured by tournament organisers and the Victoria authorities that he was free to travel, having been granted a vaccine exemption on medical grounds (believed to be a recent Covid infection). Yet on arrival at Melbourne airport, amid growing public outcry, Australian border staff and Morrison took a different view. Djokovic was held and questioned at the airport for several hours. Finally he was denied entry and moved to the Park, which according to TripAdvisor is 105th out of 170 hotels in Melbourne.

Clearly the whole thing had been handled abominably from bottom to top, with a strong suspicion that Morrison was using Djokovic's case to boost his own political standing. In any case, for a player who has long harboured an acute persecution complex, a sense that the world is against him, there was plenty of fresh fuel here: more obstacles to be surmounted, more enemies to be fought, an adversity that would only strengthen his resolve. This has in many ways been the theme of Djokovic's career, a trophy-laden dominance that still identifies itself as a kind of guerrilla resistance.

There is a word in Serbian culture – inat – which is often translated as defiance, resilience, pride or stubbornness, but really has no equivalent in English. In fact there is an innate paradox to inat, one that incorporates both refusal and resignation, satisfaction and dissatisfaction, self-awareness and self-delusion all at once. Inat is the state of simultaneously accepting one's fate while also resolving to fight it. Inat is choosing with relish to do the thing that is forbidden, taking strength from one's moment of greatest weakness, growing in direct proportion to the animosity one encounters.

In the case of Djokovic, it invariably involves taking the path of most resistance, a belief that victory without struggle is no sort of victory at all. On the court he has finally overhauled the great Nadal and Roger Federer with a game based on immaculate defence, on counter-punching, on absorbing an opponent's power and throwing it back in their face. Off the court he seems to harbour a desperate need to be liked, even as his actions – angry outbursts against officials, a spiky relationship with the media, disagreements with rival players, his anti-vaccine stance – seem fated to antagonise.

I crave your love, and so I will make it impossible for you to love me. This is the enigma of Djokovic: his mantra, motivation and the source of his power. Perhaps this helps to explain why Djokovic seems to inspire such fanatical devotion in a small core of believers, even as the wider world disdains him. Perhaps, too, it explains why the world's best tennis player is currently being confined in a four-star hotel room while his rivals prepare and practise. Why not just get jabbed? Why not just go home? But that would in many ways be to miss the point of inat. As Djokovic appeared at the window to salute the supporters who had gathered to serenade him, you couldn't help feeling they were all getting exactly what they wanted.

 

What’s Behind the Arms Buildup in the Balkans

warontherocks.com

What's Behind the Arms Buildup in the Balkans - War on the Rocks

Vuk Vuksanovic and Marija Ignjatijevic

15-19 minutes

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No one wants a Balkans arms race, even if it's a "mini" one. Last May, when Croatia bought a dozen used Rafale fighter jets for $1.2 billion, the Associated Press described it as part of a "mini arms race" with Serbia. In October, the Economist reported on Serbia's "weapons shopping spree" and $1.4 billion-a-year military budget under the headline "A Balkans arms race."

In this case, the analysis might be off, but the concern is warranted. While Serbia and Croatia are indeed rapidly building up their respective arsenals, describing this as a simple arms race misunderstands the dynamic at play. In modernizing outdated military hardware left over from the Yugoslav era, Belgrade and Zagreb are not driven by strategic competition or fears of conflict with one another. Rather, elites in both countries are using the process of buying new weapons to advance broader foreign policy goals and, most importantly, improve their domestic political standing. The prospect of war is not realistic, but using arms procurement as an opportunity for saber-rattling can nonetheless destabilize the region.

Toys for the Serbian and Croatian Militaries

Over the past six years, Serbian and Croatian leaders have happily fed the narrative of an arms race as they engaged in a series of high-profile weapons purchases. The good news is that actual procurement has sometimes lagged behind the rhetoric, and, to date, neither side has exceeded the arms control provisions of the Dayton agreement.

Discussion of a regional arms race began in 2015 when Croatia asked the United States to donate 16 Lockheed Martin-produced M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System armed with ballistic missiles. Incumbent Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, then prime minister, responded by announcing: "Either they will have to change their mind, or we will have to find an answer to that." Serbia quickly started looking to Russia for an answer. During a January 2016 visit to Belgrade, Russia's Deputy Prime Minister raised expectations by giving a model of the Russian S-300 missile defense system as a gift to Vučić. Over the course of the following year, tensions rose when the Croatian government cited Serbia's military buildup as possible grounds for reinstituting conscription.

In the end, however, Croatia did not receive U.S. rocket launchers and Serbia did not receive Russian S-300s. Despite the heated rhetoric, both countries faced financial constraints, and the great powers they were courting did not prove as forthcoming as they'd hoped.

Belgrade and Zagreb nevertheless persevered in their pursuit of new weapons, spending billions on defense deals over the last several years. In 2017 Serbia's largest defense contractor, Yugoimport-SDPR, developed a Šumadija tactical missile with a range of over 280 kilometers. To increase its air policing capabilities, Serbia received MIG-29 fighter jets from Russia and Belarus in 2021. Through a mix of sales and donations Russia also provided Belgrade Mi-35 and Mi-17 military transport helicopters, T-72MS tanks, BRDM-2MS armored reconnaissance vehicles, and a rapid-fire Pantsir S1 anti-aircraft missile system.

Serbia has not been picky whether it was getting hardware from Western or non-Western powers. It plans to buy about 30 military helicopters in the next two years, some from the European multinational Airbus and some from Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant, a subsidiary of Russian Helicopters company. After agreeing to buy the French surface-to-air missile system Mistral, Belgrade is now eyeing the purchase of the Chinese FK-3 anti-aircraft rocket and Israel's SPIKE LR2 anti-armor missiles. Further, Serbia's acquisition of six Chinese CH-92A drones, along with the accompanying technology transfers, has allowed it to become the largest drone operator in the Balkans.

Croatia, of course, has kept pace. In 2015 and 2016, Zagreb acquired 12 Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzers from Germany and 16 Kiowa Warrior helicopters from the United States. It subsequently received AGM-114 Hellfire missiles from Lockheed Martin and, in late 2020, signed a deal for the modernization of 76 Bradley Fighting vehicles alongside associated machine guns and missiles.

Still, as arms control experts have noted, these purchases have yet to exceed internationally agreed restrictions. Article IV of Annex 1B of the Dayton Peace Agreement has been the bedrock of arms control in the Western Balkans since 1995, first under the auspice of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, then, since 2015, by agreement between the signatory states  of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. In the five categories of weaponry covered by Article IV — battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters — both Serbia and Croatia are still within the mandated limits.

Not Quite an Arms Race

In theory, Croatia and Serbia could use their new weaponry in a future Balkan conflict. Some U.S. analysts noted that Serbia could deploy Šumadija missiles against its neighbors if they took part in another NATO campaign against Belgrade. The drones acquired by Serbia would also be powerful instruments in a hypothetical battle in Kosovo or Bosnia. If the status quo were to break down in Bosnia, the resulting fighting would inevitably suck in both Serbia and Croatia, who might then have occasion to employ their new arsenals. Croatian howitzers and attack helicopters would be effective in the low-land Serbo-Croatian border, while Israeli SPIKE missiles would be a potential equalizer for Serbia. But despite this, Bosnia has been largely absent from the rhetoric surrounding re-armament in both Belgrade and Zagreb.

More importantly, launching a new conflict in the Balkans makes no political or military sense. Indeed, there is no realistic goal that Croatia or Serbia could hope to achieve by attacking one other. It has become almost impossible to control territories inhabited by a hostile population, even for the most powerful militaries. Since 1995, neither the Croatian minority in Serbia nor the Serbian minority in Croatia is large enough to serve as the foundation for separatist ambitions.

What's more, Croatia has been a member of NATO since 2009. A Serbian attack on Croatia would activate the collective defense clause within Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, prompting NATO's response against Belgrade. Similarly, NATO still has 3,600 troops in Kosovo as part of the Kosovo Force, ensuring that the Serbo-Albanian dispute over Kosovo will not be resolved militarily.

It would also be folly for Croatia to launch an offensive. The fear of being bogged down in the face of a partisan insurgency played a role in NATO's 1999 decision not to send ground troops against Serbia. If that threat was enough to deter NATO, it is enough to deter Croatia. Equally important is the fact that NATO-Serbian relations are much different now than in 1999. While Serbia does not seek NATO membership, it is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace program, and its Individual Partnership Action Plan represents the highest level of cooperation a non-member state has with the alliance.

Moreover, waging war has become expensive for local capitals. That is why Croatia replaced its conscription military service with a professional army in 2008, and Serbia did the same in 2011. The budget deficit has been a growing concern in Croatia in recent years, impeding defense planning. The Serbian military is experiencing a constant loss of its professional cadre. The region as a whole is lagging behind in socio-economic terms and experiencing a demographic decline. That not only deprives the local leaders of the money and manpower to fight a prolonged war, but it also limits the spoils that any country could hope to achieve through victory.

Arms Procurement in Service of Foreign Policy

So, if they are not preparing for a war, why are Belgrade and Zagreb buying so many weapons? Both countries are conducting overdue military modernization while using the process to achieve other goals. In the realm of foreign policy, Serbia and Croatia are both trying to position themselves amidst growing security anxieties in Eastern Europe and worsening tensions between Russia and the West.

So long as the West perceives Russia as a threat, Serbia has an opportunity to play Russia and the West against each other. In this balancing act, its arms buildup is both an end and a means. Serbia wants to be able to buy weapons from all sides. It also hopes that having a formidable military will enhance its leverage on all sides as well. Military cooperation with Russia is a way for Serbia to increase its bargaining power with the West on outstanding issues like the Kosovo dispute. Serbia knows that the unprovoked use of military force in theaters like Bosnia or Kosovo would attract Western hostility and intervention. However, Belgrade still believes that with more weaponry at its disposal it can do better at the negotiating table.

Croatia, in turn, has used the same regional dynamics to raise its standing in the West. As one of newest members of both NATO and the European Union, Zagreb has tried to portray itself as a Western bulwark in a dangerous region, facing down Russian meddling and an unpredictable Serbia. Croatia's National Security Strategy of 2017 does not mention Serbia, but it refers to the country's "Southeastern neighbourhood" as "a source of potential challenges." Defense modernization serves to promote Croatia as the anchor of regional stability. It also helps Croatia uphold NATO's target of 2 percent defense spending. Indeed, Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković has stated that purchasing Rafale jets from France takes Croatia's defense spending beyond NATO's threshold.

A Lack of Transparency

The arms race narrative also feeds, and feeds off of, a lack of defense sector transparency. Over the past five years there has been a noticeable decline in the transparency of Serbia's defense sector, particularly in finances and procurement. During this period a number of bad practices have been legalized. For instance, legal amendments have allowed the government to declare whole categories of data confidential under the guise of protecting national security. One of the categories marked confidential in 2016 was human resources management. Hence, the Serbian public cannot find official records about personnel in the defense system, and least of all, personnel drain.  Sensationalist reporting on weapons and military modernization goes hand in with preventing the public from learning about military personnel leaving the service on account of unsatisfactory conditions. Were this information more readily available, it would shatter the image of a competent government taking good care of the army, one of the most respected national institutions.

The lack of transparency in defense procurement also drives perceptions of an arms race. Military  spending is exempt from Serbia's Law on Public Procurement. This means that the Serbian Ministry of Defense does not report on confidential procurement, or even provide a lump sum of the total money spent. Nor does it publish whether, when, or with whom confidential procurement contracts are signed. Even in 2019, when legislation on public procurement was amended to align with European standards, the range of national security exemptions was broadened. Unlike in Croatia, long-term planning documents are not disclosed to the public. Hence, there is no way to determine whether the government's spending is keeping up with its own strategic planning. Instead government officials announce sales when it suits them. In 2018, the president even said he would "surprise'' citizens and soldiers with a new arms purchase.

Croatian non-transparency also benefits from the rhetoric of an arms race. As a NATO member, Croatia's finance and procurement transparency level is higher than Serbia's. Up to a point. To reach NATO's spending threshold, for example, Croatia pulled a bookkeeping trick by including war veteran pensions in its military expenditure. For the government in Zagreb, anti-Serbian rhetoric also helped suppress debate over its latest fighter jet purchase on supposed national security grounds. Throughout 2020, the Croatian public was kept out of loop as the government negotiated with potential bidders, raising suspicions about the competence of the Croatian negotiators. When the deal to purchase Rafale jets from France was announced, local media raised questions about the sudden jump in price and asked whether Croatia has the logistical capabilities to make effective use of these jets. The government hopes that tough talk toward Serbia can ensure these awkward questions will be overlooked.

The Dangers of Domestic Politics

To date, the arms race narrative has worked well for leaders in both Zagreb and Belgrade. When sensationalist reporting about arms sales is combined with military exercises and moves like reintroducing conscription, it triggers escalating rhetoric on all sides. Political leaders and the media are all too proficient in stirring the tensions and scoring populist points in order to avoid accountability for their own records. Inflammatory nationalist rhetoric is a tried and tested recipe in the region for mobilizing voters and divertubg attention from corruption and economic problems.

Not suprisingly, the "arms race" narrative has typically peaked during pre-election periods. Both Serbia and Croatia had parliamentary elections in 2016, the year the narrative first took hold. Ahead of the 2017 presidential elections in Serbia, front pages were full of reports about the arrival of MIG-29 jets from Russia. Headlines announced that "Putin will defend Serbia with weaponry" and "The Serbian Army will roar when the new MIGs arrive."

A return to the armed hostilities of the 1990s is highly unlikely, but the current process is still alarming. It is dangerous because it further poisons the already distrustful relationships between regional states. Moreover, it perpetuates the poor state of local governance. So long as spitting in the direction of your neighbors is a more appealing option than discussing policy, the region will be plagued by economic problems and poor public services. War is unlikely, but bullets do not have to be fired for the damage to be inflicted.

Serbia and Croatia have every right to modernize their outdated arsenals, particularly in light of technological transformation that is changing the global security landscape. However, they should do it in less toxic fashion. Perhaps in time politicians in both countries will come to perceive how hawkish rhetoric has actually undermined their international prestige. Or perhaps a new generation of more mature leaders will eventually emerge.

When this happens, both capitals should begin reducing tensions through consultations and confidence-building measures. In doing so, they can rely on the extant regional arms control regime, emboided by Article IV of Annex 1B of the Dayton Peace Agreement. They can also develop a billateral system of consultations between their military staffs to reduce security anxieties. More importantly, they can abandon the rhetoric of an arms race. Defense and national security should be left out of domestic politics in the Balkans where historical wounds have been slow to heal.

Vuk Vuksanovic is a senior researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy and an associate of LSE IDEAS, a foreign policy think tank at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He received his Ph.D. in international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has published widely on modern foreign and security policy issues.

Marija Ignjatijevic is a researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Her field of expertise covers defense policy, international military cooperation, parliamentary oversight of the armed forces, and the violent extremism in the Western Balkans. This piece is derived from the analysis they co-authored for the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.

Image: U.S. Army (Photo by 1st Lt. Caroline Pirchner)

 

spiked-online.com

Russia does not want a war in Ukraine

Mary Dejevsky

13-17 minutes

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Over the past month the drum beat of a new war in the east of Europe has grown ever louder. So loud, in fact, that US president Joe Biden and Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, felt the need to hold a virtual summit on Tuesday this week. The stated aim from the Russian side was to try to clear the air and, from the US side, to stall what it had presented as Russian preparations to invade Ukraine.

The outcome, as spun by the US, included loud threats of new Western sanctions and embargoes should Russia take a step across the Ukraine border. As spun by Russia, the summit allowed for new discussions, which was in turn spun by some advocates for Ukraine as potentially jeopardising its independence.

What seems not to have been resolved in those two hours of talks, however, is the original question: is Russia mobilising to invade Ukraine? (For the New Cold Warriors, this would be the second invasion, the first being Moscow's 2014 annexation of Crimea and its ill-defined support for anti-Kiev rebels in eastern Ukraine.) And if Russia is not planning to invade, then what is going on?

The problem, as so often, is that the very same elements that can be cited as evidence of Russia's aggressive intent, in terms of troop deployment and rhetoric, can also be viewed as reactive – that is, defensive. Yet the idea that Putin might be trying to reinforce Russia's national security against what he might see as a Western threat – taking the form, say, of the NATO-backed land-grab for Ukraine – is almost never entertained. Yet consider which side has made the running here.

This latest West-Russia stand-off would appear to date from a hawkish Pentagon briefing on 10 November, which coincided with a visit to Washington by the Ukrainian foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, and the signing of a US-Ukraine strategic partnership agreement. Both the Pentagon and the US secretary of state referred to 'unusual troop movements' near Russia's border with Ukraine, a figure of 100,000 troops was mentioned, and the supposed threat received blanket coverage in the US media.

The UK picked up the war cry. In a series of valedictory speeches and interviews in mid November, the outgoing UK chief of defence staff, General Sir Nick Carter, commanded headlines, warning of a Russian threat that had been a leitmotif of his three-year tenure at the top of the UK's military establishment. Then came a veritable festival of Cold Warriordom in the shape of the NATO foreign ministers' meeting on 30 November, held in the Latvian capital, Riga.

Here, NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg was on unusually eloquent form in defence of Ukraine's independence and sovereign states' right to choose their allies. Stoltenberg also harked back to a decade-old NATO-Russia quarrel about spheres of influence. In a rare nod to his native country, he noted that Norway had never called for any sphere of influence despite its border with Russia, therefore Russia didn't need any buffer against NATO either. (A glimpse at the map might show the short length of Norway's Arctic border with Russia and the huge buffer afforded by neutral Sweden and Finland, but that's another matter.)

At the same time as the Riga meeting, an inimitable contribution to the general climate of peace and friendship was made by the UK's new foreign secretary, Liz Truss, who posed, helmeted, in a tank while visiting a British troop unit in Estonia. It was not her fault that the pictures were seen less as a warning to Russia than a Thatcher tribute act – and, as such, as an unsubtle hint about Truss's future ambitions.

Nor was this the end. From here the torch of invasion-alarm was passed to Germany where, following hot on the heels of Angela Merkel's military farewell after 16 years as chancellor, the popular Bild published an enormous 'exclusive' on 4 December, complete with an elaborate map, headed: 'This is how Putin could annihilate Ukraine.' It set out the supposed positions of Russian troops (inside Russia) and detailed a Russian plan for a three-phase attack sometime in the New Year. In this piece the estimated number of Russian troops deployed 'near' the border with Ukraine was upped from 100,000 to a 'potential' 175,000 – a number instantly promoted and repeated, unqualified, across the Western media.

It might now be worth considering some peculiarities about the way this whole Russian-invasion scenario has been put about and how it has been magnified into a threat not just to Ukraine, but also to the EU and to the West as a whole.

First, we have been here before. Back in mid April, it was confidently reported that 100,000 Russian troops were mustering near the border with Ukraine – except that quite soon it transpired that they weren't. Most were at their barracks at least 200 kilometres away. Russia's fervent denials that anything was afoot were dismissed, but there was no advance and, in time, the accusations melted away.

Seven months later, in November, the same number of Russian troops had supposedly been spotted, split between Ukraine's eastern border – in the Donbass – and its northern border. Why was the number suddenly upped to 175,000? Was it because US spy satellites – whose grainy pictures periodically pop up as supporting evidence – really showed this? Or was it perhaps because some Western military experts had argued that a 100,000-strong force was way too small to pacify Ukraine, so the numbers had to look more convincing?

Which leads on to Russia's supposed objective. A favourite Western theory has long been that Putin wants not just to return Ukraine to Russia's sphere of influence – he also wants to rebuild the Soviet Union, restore the Russian Empire, or at the very least to create a new Russia-led federation with Ukraine and Belarus.

Regardless of the presumed end point, however, many Russia-watchers in the West view the current military impasse affecting a small part of Ukraine as generally satisfactory to Moscow. It leaves the Donbass as a familiar 'frozen' conflict in which Russia retains enough leverage to exert influence, with minimal costs in terms of troops, weapons and risk.

So why would Russia even think of invading? And if it did, would it be a full invasion to take Kiev and bring all of Ukraine back into Russia's strategic fold, or an occupation of just the mainly Russian-speaking Donbass? Or is Russia just sabre-rattling in the hope of somehow forcing the Kiev government and / or its Western backers to the negotiating table? There has been no clarity whatsoever on this score.

Quite simply, an invasion, and a winter invasion at that, makes no sense. The last thing Russia wants or needs is more territory. It can be argued that there was a strategic imperative for Moscow to annex Crimea – to secure its warm-water base at Sevastopol and its hinterland, which it saw as possibly falling into NATO hands. There is no such imperative to take the Donbass; it would be an unstable drain on Russia's resources for the foreseeable future. Russia's prime need is for a stable border region.

And this highlights another peculiarity. From the start, this whole Russia-invasion story, from April this year onwards, has been entirely in one direction – from the US, and then moving eastward across Europe. Ukraine itself, and its leaders, no strangers to alarmism, have maintained an almost surreal calm. When President Volodymyr Zelensky mentioned Russian troop movements for the first time this November, he noted the information had been passed on by US intelligence. No changes in Russia's troop dispensations or in supplies to the rebels seem to have been registered by Ukraine's own – always active, alert and at times inventive – secret services.

 

Russia also took the accusations with more equanimity than it sometimes does – which, of course, invites the West to conclude that US intelligence has got Moscow bang to rights. But its messages in recent weeks have also been unusually clear. It has denied any aggressive intent, blaming the West for trying to incite tensions. It has stated that a sovereign country has the right to move forces within its borders (which it does). But it has also, and crucially, said in no uncertain terms that for Ukraine to join NATO would, for Russia, constitute a 'red line'. All this should leave no doubt that Moscow is in reactive, not proactive, mode.

Logic might also dictate that if anyone has a motive to launch a new military action now, it would be the Kiev government, freshly equipped with military equipment from the UK and the US. After seven years of intermittent fighting, it could finally judge – or have been persuaded – that force is the only way to reclaim the rebel regions in the east. Indeed, that it could be now or never.

Look again not just at the recent Western statements of support for Ukraine and the sabre-rattling against Russia that accompanies them, but also to Western actions over recent months. There are the defence agreements with Ukraine on the part of the US and the UK, the multiple NATO land and sea manoeuvres, including in western Ukraine and the Black Sea, and the current dispositions of NATO forces (including, officially for training purposes, at bases inside Ukraine and, officially for advisory purposes, actually inside Ukraine's defence ministry). Then there are the recent US weapons supplies, including Javelin missiles, the Turkish supplies of drones, and an agreement with the UK on building warships. If you are sitting in Moscow, Ukraine starts to look very much like a NATO Trojan horse.

Is it so unreasonable to ask who is threatening whom here? Who is on offence – and who on defence? Anyone who notes Russian troop movements, within however many kilometres from Ukraine, should also look to the west of Ukraine, where NATO forces have been stationed since the alliance was enlarged to include most of the former Warsaw Pact and Yugoslav states (with Ukraine and the flaky Belarus constituting the only buffers).

From Moscow's perspective, it is a travesty of recent history for NATO, with the US, the UK and former Eastern bloc states holding the megaphones, to denounce Russia as an expansionist power. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 aside, Russia has been contracting for the past 30 years, including the past 11 years under Putin.

From NATO troop movements Russia might also divine other reasons for the West's war-talk than an invasion threat to Ukraine. Could the alarms sounded first in Washington provide cover for a Western-backed attempt to 'change the facts on the ground'? Could Russia perhaps be tricked into a move that it would see as defensive and NATO would present as aggression? Remember that incident last summer with the British warship in the Black Sea.

In my view, and it is only my view, Russia might not be averse to a deal that would bring peace to the Donbass and leave it in Ukraine. But it would aim to secure guarantees for the Russian-speaking population (as the UK tried to do for British nationals in Hong Kong before the return to China and would doubtless try to secure for Brits in Northern Ireland in the event of Irish unification). Russia would be far less amenable to the Donbass being reincorporated into Ukraine by force, still less with Western help. It would see that – probably rightly – both as a humiliation and as presaging instability for years to come.

The bigger context is the current state of US-Russia relations. The speed with which this week's summit was arranged hints at a lot going on behind the scenes. Ukraine does not like it, but hardly for the first time its future is tied up in a bigger game. It is one of the last pieces in the chess game that has been in progress since the end of the Cold War and the Soviet collapse.

Russia would dearly like a pan-European security agreement that would enshrine a US commitment to no further NATO expansion. This combines an old idea dating back to Gorbachev with Russia's newly articulated 'red line' over Ukraine, and the West has ruled both elements out.

But could Biden and Putin, who both face re-election in 2024, be looking for a legacy agreement that would set Western-Russia relations on a new course? If so, it is no wonder that both sides are posturing to maximise their advantage. As the invasion-talk shows, however, posturing is a risky business, not least because there are real people and a real country, Ukraine, in the middle.

Mary Dejevsky is a writer and broadcaster. She was Moscow correspondent for The Times between 1988 and 1992. She has also been a correspondent from Paris, Washington and China.

 

All pictures by: Getty.

To enquire about republishing spiked's content, a right to reply or to request a correction, please contact the managing editor, Viv Regan.

 

Vuk Vuksanovic: Russia's gas gift to Serbia comes with strings attached

Russia's gas gift to Serbia comes with strings attached | View

Comments

Updated: 04/12/2021 - 18:29

By Vuk Vuksanovic

 

Opinions expressed in View articles are solely those of the authors.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić had a very unpleasant task when he met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Sochi last week to plea for a lower price for Russian gas.

Indeed, before travelling to Russia, President Vučić had told the Serbian press that he would "ask and beg."

In the end, Putin fulfilled the request of his Serbian guest, meaning the Serbian president will have one less problem to worry about ahead of the April 2022 Serbian general election.

However, the question remains as to whether there will be a price to be paid.

Serbia's gas supply on the line

Why was this an unpleasant task for Vučić? Serbia is completely dependent on Russia for its gas supplies.

In 2008, Russia acquired majority shares in NIS, Serbia's national oil and gas company. The sale was made below market price, in return for Russia's protection at the UN level on Kosovo and the promise that Moscow would construct the now-defunct South Stream pipeline over Serbian territory. The opening of the Turkstream pipeline in 2021 confirmed the reality of energy dependence.

However, in light of the ongoing energy crisis in Europe, Serbia now fears high Russian gas prices.

In 2022, Serbia is poised to undergo presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as elections in the capital, Belgrade.

Cars roll on a highway in the morning in Belgrade, Serbia, on Friday, Oct. 29Darko Vojinovic/AP

President Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) are almost certain to win. But both still face the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and the economy, which must not experience a major downturn until after they consolidate power.

The Serbian leadership needs to show that despite the pandemic, the economy is still growing. That was the primary reason why the government enthusiastically embraced Chinese financing, despite the ensuing degradation of environmental and labour standards.

The UAE is also useful as a source of cash and an instrument of domestic promotion. However, the high gas price would complicate things.

The first reason for Vučić's concern was more immediate: the start of the cold season. High gas prices lead to higher costs for heating, electricity and groceries: all the things voters observe in the run-up to elections. In mid-November, high food and energy prices pushed the inflation rate to 6.6 per cent.

Serbian pro-government daily Večernje novosti, despite being known for uncritical and hyperbolic praise of Serbian leadership and Serbo-Russian ties, gave an accurate overview of Serbia's concern ahead of the Putin-Vučić meeting.

Serbian gas consumption has doubled compared to previous years. Serbia has been paying Russia $270 (€239) per 1,000 cubic meters because, since the Soviet days, Serbia bought Russian gas based on a system whereby 100 per cent of the pricing is derived from the oil formula.

In light of the energy crisis, Russia's state-owned energy corporation Gazprom proposed that price be determined 30 per cent by oil formula, 70 per cent by spot market prices, which would see Serbia newly charged $790 (€698) per 1,000 cubic meters.

This is too much for the Serbian leadership. So too is the alternative proposal, whereby the price would be determined 70 per cent by oil formula and 30 per cent by spot market prices: all in all, $510 (€451) per 1,000 cubic meters.

Not such an easy task

The Serbian head of state was hoping to secure a new arrangement, in which Serbia would be buying three billion cubic meters of Russian natural gas annually for ten years.

Pro-government media in Serbia flaunted the notion that Vučić could secure a fairer Russian gas price than countries like Germany, Belarus and Armenia had.

The difference was that Germany is a major customer of Russian gas, with a long-term supply contract, and Belarus and Armenia are Russia's allies in the post-Soviet space.

More importantly, while Serbia insisted the focus would be on gas supply, Russia's presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that the two leaders would be discussing bilateral ties, with energy being just one of the issues that would be addressed.

Why is this important? For the past year, Serbia did a slight re-pivot towards Russia due to the election of Joe Biden in the US. However, 2020 was a very bad year for Serbo-Russian ties. Putin did not forget that.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic speak during their meeting in SochiMikhail Klimentyev/Sputnik via AP

What happened in 2020? Putin did not like the idea that Vučić was trying to resolve the Kosovo dispute with Donald Trump's assistance, which would mean Moscow would lose one of its last assets in the Balkans, and Belgrade's shifting towards Washington.

To curry favour with the West, pro-government tabloids in Serbia blamed pro-Russian players for instigating violent anti-lockdown protests in the summer of 2020.

Trilateral military drills with Russia and Belarus were also cancelled. In the meantime, China replaced Russia as Serbia's primary non-Western partner.

Putin did not forget how Vučić tried to trick him when he thought he would get a better bargain from the West. The meeting was almost certainly used to discipline Vučić.

Nevertheless, Vučić got what he wanted. After the meeting, it was announced that the gas price for Serbia would remain at $270 and the amount of delivered gas would increase for the next six months.

No one knows what will happen after those six months end. But Vučić got a gift from Putin for the heating season -- and for the elections. Vučić can also promote himself to his constituents as a skillful leader who enjoys the friendship of brotherly Russia.

A Serbian flag is seen on a gas pipe on the first section of the Gazprom South Stream natural gas pipeline, 80km north of BelgradeDarko Vojinovic/AP

What were the concessions offered?

It should be presumed, though, that Putin's gift comes with strings attached.

On that same day, news started circulating that Russia's state nuclear construction company Rosatom could be constructing a nuclear power plant in Serbia, although Serbian experts don't believe Serbia has the necessary expertise or resources for such an enterprise.

Russian companies are also set to get the job of constructing the Belgrade urban and suburban railway system.

Most importantly, there are talks that Serbia might be getting Kornet anti-tank missile systems from Russia: a dangerous scenario since in late 2019, Serbia, in fear of US sanctions, gave up on purchasing Russian weaponry.

It remains to be seen whether these transactions will be completed, and indeed whether any other favours that Vučić promised to Putin will be uncovered later in the game. After all, there's no such thing as a free lunch.

Vuk Vuksanovic is a researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) and an associate of LSE IDEAS, a foreign policy think-tank of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He got his PhD in international relations at the LSE. He has published widely on modern foreign and security policy issues.

https://www.euronews.com/2021/12/04/russia-s-gas-gift-to-serbia-comes-with-strings-attached-view

b92.net

When U.S. official defends Serbia in the middle of Croatia

5-7 minutes

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US Special Envoy for the Balkans Gabriel Escobar responded to the Croatian president, who said that Serbia has no sincere desire to become a member of the EU.

Source: Tanjug Friday, November 26, 2021 | 09:07

EPA-EFE/FEHIM DEMIR

In an interview with the Croatian agency, Escobar said that Serbia "historically, culturally and economically belongs to Europe" and that most of its citizens believe that their future is in that alliance. He also reminded Milanovic that Serbia stated EU membership as its strategic goal and that it was already connected with that alliance.

"I think that process has already come a long way," Escobar said.

In his opinion, Serbia should be faster in that process, but he pointed out that less progress, partially aggravated by the pandemic, was still achieved. "In terms of foreign policy alignment with the EU, Serbia has been better this year than it has been for a long time," Escobar said, citing a European mechanism that measures overlaps in foreign policy decisions, according to which to the extent of two-thirds, Serbia has harmonized its foreign policy with the EU.

What about Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Escobar also assessed that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have an outstanding ethnic issue, but a problem of systemic corruption. He also said that he was more worried about demographic and economic difficulties in BiH than ethnic issues.

He emphasized that the structure with three constituent peoples remains the foundation of American policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. "Political consensus can be reached through limited reforms, not by changing the structure of Dayton," Escobar said, adding that the United States is currently working with BiH political actors to change the election law to satisfy all three peoples in the federation.

He stated that he dislikes talking about sanctions because, as he said, "he does not want the region to get the impression that the United States is engaged in it primarily through sanctions. Sanctions do exist, but they will not be targeted at the Republika Srpska and the Federation or their citizens, but at corrupt individuals", stressed Escobar. He added that the Serbian member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as he said," is not the only, but the most current problem" in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 

b92.net

Russia will support the independence of Republika Srpska under one condition

7-8 minutes

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Russian Ambassador to BiH, Igor Kalabukhov, says he sees no problem in Milorad Dodik's idea of an independent Republika Srpska within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Source: Beta Thursday, November 11, 2021 | 16:45

Foto: Shutterstok/smith371

Russian Ambassador to BiH, Igor Kalabukhov, said that the condition for it should be the result of dialogue between all parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Kalabukhov stated that it is a matter of politicians, democratic decisions, and that Russia will support it if "it is realized in dialogue".

Russian ambassador told the BiH Public Service (BHRT) that he advocates the principle of resolving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina through dialogue, all decisions must be made through dialogue, in communication between the entities, which must decide how to find the best way out of the current situation.

Kalabukhov further stated that the Russian position is that there is no High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because the procedure for appointing Christian Schmidt to that position has not been followed. He reminded that the decision on the appointment of the German diplomat was made by the ambassadors of the member states of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council in BiH (PIC) without consensus and without the consent of the High Representative in the UN Security Council.

"As a guarantor of the Dayton Agreement, we are a member of the PIC, but we do not work in the OHR while Christian Schmidt is there. We do not support any official contacts with Schmidt," Kalabukhov said. He also assessed that Valentin Inzko's decision to impose a law banning genocide denial, which he passed as the High Representative at the very end of his mandate, was "subjective and unbalanced".

"It would be best if that decision was in the BiH institutions, during the debate, during the dialogue. This dialogue is being conducted. Of course, not everyone may know about this dialogue, but it is being discussed in diplomatic circles. It is a term which, due to political repercussions, must be very balanced and very sensitive", Russian ambassador said.

Kalabukhov pointed out that he "does not see a problem in the fact that the Republika Srpska repealed the decision of the High Representative, although Inzko made that decision in accordance with his powers", adding that it was a matter for the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska.

"We didn't want to blame the whole nation"

According to him, in 2015, Russia did not support the Resolution on Srebrenica in the UN Security Council, which was prepared by Great Britain, because, as he stated, the draft was unbalanced and blamed the entire nation.

Kalabukhov also said that the decisions of the Hague Tribunal are also questionable for Russia. "When we were at the beginning of this story for the establishment of this court, we said that we see its work as an instrument of reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, that did not happen. We think that what was done there did not lead to reconciliation and tolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that is why our position in relation to these decisions and all the tragic events is known", he pointed out.

According to him, Russia's diplomacy is trying to balance everything concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they are trying to "balance the whole position of the international factor".