dpa: British official urges Kosovo to embrace multi-ethnicity
Reuters: Kosovo can win independence, says British diplomat
People's Daily Online: UN mission chief appeals against possible U.S. troops cut in Kosovo
Lavrov urges Kosovo, Cyprus settlements without external pressure
Beware your steps in the Balkans
Police detains three Albanian weapons bootleggers
Busek: Kosovo negotiations will lead to elections in Serbia
Stratfor: Kosovo: The Power Struggle After Rugova's Death
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On 1 February, Arbana Vidishiqiof the Kosovo subunit of RFE/RL's South Slavic and Albanian Languages Service spoke with Philip Goldberg, the U.S. Head of Office in Kosova, about the prospects for a resolution of Kosovo's status in 2006.
RFE/RL: The Contact Group issued a statement last night [31 January] calling for all possible efforts to be made to reach a settlement in the course of 2006. Do you think this is possible and what would be the risks that can jeopardize this phase?
Philip Goldberg: Clearly the United States has said that we are interested in the process moving as fast as possible, trying to reach a conclusion in the final-status discussions. That will require hard work by all sides, especially here in Prishtina. The death of [Kosovo] President [Ibrahim] Rugova of course has understandably caused a short period, we believe, in respect of his memory, from working in the negotiating team. But that will start again and it will require hard work, hard decisions, and compromise by Prishtina, Belgrade, and the active involvement of the international community. So I do believe that in 2006, as the Contact Group said, that this is possible.
RFE/RL: The statement issued by the Contact Group has been evaluated as of very high importance for Kosova. How would you comment the context of the statement?
Goldberg: I believe that any statement by the Contact Group by definition, especially at the ministerial level, is of great importance. And yet I think it again restates that we are very active in trying to reach a resolution of the final-status decision; it expresses great support for former [Finnish] President [Martti] Ahtisaari, as the [special] UN envoy [on the status talks] and his efforts. I know that Ambassador [Frank] Wisner, the US envoy who was in London, will be arriving in Prishtina later this afternoon and will make his initial consultations with the negotiating team and the political players here, both from the Albanian side and the Serb side and the non-Serb minorities. So I think the process is well under way, and the Contact Group statement supported that process. I think that is good.
RFE/RL: The official talks on status are due to begin at the end of February, with a meeting on decentralization. International negotiators have said they are ready, but according to you, how ready are Prishtina and Belgrade?
Goldberg: I can't speak about Belgrade. I'll allow my colleague [U.S.] Ambassador [to Serbia and Montenegro Michael] Polt to do that, if you are interested in the American perspective on it. What I can tell you about the Prishtina side is that there was a lot of good work that went on in the political and strategic group. A paper was developed that appears to be a very good one and a good starting point from this side. And I believe that the team will be ready to discuss those issues in late February, after the selection of a new president, after the meeting of the negotiating team that is necessary to help put them on that course to Vienna. As I mentioned, this is a mourning period now for President Rugova and that has delayed the process a couple of weeks.
RFE/RL: Do you think that the death of President Rugova can impact the political scene and the negotiating process itself as a whole?
Goldgberg: I believe that President Rugova would want this process to go forward, and his life's project was to reach a decision on Kosovo's status. We all know what he believed that status should be. But that will require hard work and compromise and will require people here to respect each other in reaching decisions. I do believe that this can be done and has to be done now, keeping in mind President Rugova's legacy, but obviously without President Rugova.
RFE/RL: After the late president passed away, many have said that Kosovo may face political crises. What do you think, is there really such an anxiety in this regard?
Goldberg: I don't believe that's the case. I think, actually what we saw over the last week, 10 days, is enormous respect, an enormous outpouring of grief over the president's loss. But I think that the political world has remained stable and now the president's political party is in the process of choosing someone for the post of president to offer at the Kosovo Assembly. So that is the normal course of events. Of course this is not an easy situation either for the LDK the Democratic League of Kosovo], the president's political party, or for Kosovo as a whole. They have only known one president. So it will be a difficult period. But I think it is an important period for Kosovo to show its maturity both politically and as a society that this is a collective effort and an issue in terms of a status decision that will effect everybody, not just one person.
RFE/RL: You have raised the issue of a consensual president. Fatmir Sejdiu from the LDK is most likely to be nominated as a candidate for Kosova's president. Does he fit the description you were referring to when you mentioned the consensual president?
Goldberg: What I meant when I used the term "consensual president" was somebody who would gain wide respect, not just within the LDK, but also in the Kosovar society, among the opposition parties. Somebody who would be able to unite people at this time. And I think that the reaction to Mr. Sejdiu, at least what I have seen in the press and among the political figures here, indicates that that is the case with him. So I believe that yes, he is among those who would fit the description of the consensual president.
RFE/RL: Mr. Goldberg, the talks on status are expected to be more concentrated on minorities issues, especially on the Serb minority. How much have the Kosovars done and what do they need to do further in this regard?
[Graffiti in Prishtina calling for no negotiation on independence (epa file photo) ]
Goldberg: The decentralization paper that I mentioned is one of the key issues that relates to the minorities and their ability to live safely, securely and with confidence in Kosovo. That is an important step. The key issue really is what does the majority, really the vast majority, probably 90 percent of the population, feel about having the minority living with them and enjoying not just full rights, but also the ability to maintain their culture, their language, their educational facilities, and the rest. These are important issues that they need to think about a lot. I think you can also see that what Kosovo and the negotiating team will have to deal with in considering all these issues, is that the international community, which has actually been in charge through the UN over the last 6 1/2 years until the final-status decision, is going to make sure that these are issues that are front in center. So it is both a part of getting the situation internally correct, because it says a lot about Kosovo's democracy that minorities will have that ability to live comfortably and securely, but also in a way Kosovo's policy toward the world, what kind of place is going to be.
RFE/RL: Many experts say the development of the economy is a precondition for a stable situation. Many are expecting that after the status definition, the issue of economy is going to be resolved. Is it realistic to expect that, and is it realistic to expect that international aid is going to be more approachable after the status is defined?
Goldberg: It is not a question of aid; it is a question of development. The question is if the World Bank and the IMF [International Monetary Fund] are able to come in and help with international funding for productive projects, such as a new electric plant for example, which as we have seen the last couple of weeks is badly needed here. If companies see certainty in the final-status outcome and decide that there is something to invest in here, whether it will be the mines or the agriculture areas that have been identified as places in the economy that can be developed, then that's what is in Kosovo's future. Aid has never developed a place alone. It can help and may be is needed here. But this isn't a question of aid. It is a question of what can Kosovo do to develop economically.
Related Stories About Kosovo:
- The Legacy Of Ibrahim Rugova
- Rugova's Death Complicates Final-Status Process
- Premier Says Independence Shouldn't Be 'Bargained For'
- U.S. Says Ethnic Albanians Must Demonstrate Good Governance
- UN Envoy Backs Launch Of Final Status Talks
- RFE/RL Speaks With UN Special Envoy Kai Eide
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Foreign Policy Research Institute
E-Notes
Who Wants a Greater Albania?
by Michael Radu
July 10, 1998
Michael Radu, a Senior Fellow at FPRI, is author of Collapse or Decay? Cuba and the East European Transitions from Communism.
CNN’s heart-wrenching images and the New York Times' strident editorials on the suffering of allegedly innocent Albanian civilians in Kosovo at the hands of the ruthless Serbs have the Clinton Administration on the same kind of meaningless rhetorical and diplomatic offensive as it was in Bosnia and Rwanda, Somalia and Haiti. And the results, as in those cases, are predictable: misguided sentimentalism, outrage, and protest; increased but covert costs for Americans; and complete disregard of the implications of bellicose statements and a diminishing foreign policy stick. The most disturbing of those implications, the Administration’s protestations to the contrary, is the inadvertent encouragement by Washington of the creation of a Greater Albania, including Kosovo and areas of Macedonia.
Kosovo, annexed by Serbia in 1912, became a highly autonomous province of the Republic of Serbia under the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia— a status it lost in 1989 as a result of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic’s machinations. Although the more developed Slovenia and Croatia had subsidized Kosovo for decades, the region remained the most backward in the former Yugoslavia. Barely larger than Delaware, Kosovo, even more than Albania itself, largely lacks natural resources. Its young, fast growing, poorly educated, and unskilled population of 2.8 million— 80% of which is ethnic Albanian, 10% Serbian/Montenegrin and the rest of various origins, mostly Gypsy— has no economy to speak of, beyond smuggling, remittances from (mostly illegal) emigrants to Western Europe and the United States, and most recently foreign aid. Simply put, Kosovo is, like Albania, the archetypal social, political and economic basket case— a Haiti in Europe.
Although Kosovo is now largely Albanian, it did not have such a large majority prior to 1912. The high Albanian Muslim fertility rate, in addition to Serbian emigration, helped create the present situation. Nonetheless, Serbian and Montenegrin history, sentiments and geopolitical considerations are all strong reasons as to why Kosovo should remain part of Yugoslavia. Indeed, the religious and cultural roots of medieval Serbian nationhood are to be found in today’s Kosovo: the first Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate at Pec, the great monasteries of Decani and Gracanica, and most importantly, the location of the 1389 lost battle of Kosovo, the source of Serbia’s national mythology.
It is easy to dismiss such emotional attachments as irrelevant or obsolete, just because they come from the Balkans, that motherlode of historic delusions; but it is also dangerous to dismiss Serbian motivations, which are truly nationalistic and involve Serbia’s most revered institution— the Orthodox Church. Not surprisingly, the Belgrade Patriarchate is at the forefront of Serbian and Montenegrin sentiments on Kosovo. Nor are Serbian and Montenegrin fears of the implications of Kosovo irredentism all emotion — an independent Muslim Albanian Kosovo, or a Greater Albania, would probably provoke secessionist pressures in the Sandjak of Novi Pazaar, the largely Muslim area linking Bosnia and Kosovo— enough to bring relatively liberal Montenegro back into the arms of conservative and nationalist Serbia. Then there is the little matter of international law, which recognizes Kosovo as an integral part of Yugoslavia, as do all world governments, including the United States.
On the other side of the ledger are the Albanians, whether the “moderate” followers of Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo or those of the increasingly active and violent Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)— and they all share the same objective— independence as a first step toward joining Albania. The Rugova forces use an increasingly sophisticated public relations campaign, including ubiquitous English language banners during their made-for-TV marches in the capital of Prishtina. The KLA is more direct: it threatens the moderates and, more ominously, it uses civilians as propaganda tools. Its money, arms and ideas come from (mostly illegal) Albanian emigres in Western Europe and the United States, its leaders seem to be former Stalinist followers of the Enver Hoxha regime, and its ideology is a hodgepodge of totalitarianism, ultranationalism, and contempt for the West and its values.
Indeed, from the murky images coming from Kosovo through the double screens of Serbian censorship and Western media emotionalism, it appears that the KLA has selected a risky but so far successful strategy. On the one hand it engages in a hopeless static “defense” of villages against superior Serbian forces, resulting in heavy civilian casualties, and on the other it counts on the usual Serbian brutality to make sure that those casualties are widely known (and exaggerated) abroad — in other words creating victims today for the glory of tomorrow— and for provoking a NATO military intervention. And the glory of tomorrow, for the KLA and Rugova alike, is a Greater Albania, which would include large parts of Macedonia (another fragile and largely fictitious Balkan state with its 600,000 irredentist Albanians) as well. Indeed, the U.S. position only encourages the Kosovo Albanians as well as the violent operators of the KLA to pursue their maximalist goal.
Albania proper can best be described as a Balkan Somalia. Its Western-installed regime, led by the barely reformed ex- Stalinist Fatos Nano, hangs on to the capital by a thread. Smugglers, criminals and local clans, in effect, control most of the country. In fact, foreign aid and smuggling— of drugs, emigrants, weapons and anything else — are Albania’s economy. An Albania almost double the size of today’s would not only intensify the clan conflicts and corruption that have already destroyed the state, but also magnify mass emigration to Italy, provoke further "humanitarian crises,” and require more and more foreign aid. Who needs it? Who needs a Greater Albania? And who will pick up the inevitable bill to keep it afloat?
Officially, the Clinton Administration recognizes that Kosovo is, and should remain part of Serbia/Yugoslavia, and has even declared the KLA a terrorist organization. On the other hand, it makes no secret of its sympathy for Rugova, and for the Albanian government whose weakness and duplicity allow the KLA to exist. More seriously, it threatens the Serbs with dire consequences if they defend their territorial integrity, as they have every right to do. Washington demands the withdrawal of Serbian police from Kosovo, protests the mining of the border with Albania, and forces Belgrade into negotiations with Rugova. Symbolically, during his recent trip to the area, Richard C. Holbrooke, the Administration’s factotum in the Balkans, did not even see fit to meet with Serbian religious leaders in Kosovo— as if they are not a party to the conflict.
How do these attitudes combine with the provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Accords, forbidding territorial changes by force? Seeking a “peaceful solution” in Kosovo may sound good, but the Administration cannot have it both ways— professing respect for recognized borders while at the same time supporting committed irredentists and condemning the state that tries to protect its borders. If Washington has decided that Kosovo should be independent, then it should explain that decision; if not, it should act accordingly.
By manifesting sympathy for the Albanians and threatening Serbia/Yugoslavia with military intervention for using force in Kosovo, the Clinton Administration (like the Bush administration before it) is making impossible negotiations that might lead to the only solution, if there is one, to the Kosovo problem: the region’s autonomy within Serbia/Yugoslavia— i.e., a return to the 1974 old Yugoslav status quo. That would mean forcing Rugova, before KLA completely destroys his political support, to accept a return to the pre-1989 situation. The same should be required from Belgrade. The alternative is more bloody, useless insurgency by Afghan Muslim ideological veterans, Islamic mercenaries, and fanatical volunteers seeking the creation of a Greater Albania, opposed by a brutal, well- armed, and zealous Serbian and Montenegrin state supported by the masses.
The Congress of the United States has the responsibility to ask questions and to compel the Clinton Administration to answer for its decision to push the Serbians into an unacceptable concession of territory to an ethnic group totally incapable of ruling itself, either alone or with its even less prepared brethren across the mountains in Albania and Macedonia. Meanwhile, Americans should be prepared for a protracted diet of selective CNN images of Serbian atrocities against Albanian “innocents” with no corresponding images of Albanian terrorism, no analysis of the implications of a possible KLA victory, and no analysis of the Serbian motivation for resistance.
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Aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaw those Serbians
Sitnews
February 06, 2006
VIEWPOINTS
By Iliya Pavlovich
In view of today's conflicts in Kosovo, where Albanian (drug trafficking, prostitution, white slavery funded operations) violence against a Serbian minority is tantamount of danger of being an extinct nation, we make more fuss about the endangered whales, seals, flowers and minerals, and much less about a rarely valuable contributor to our own humanity.
My son was born at St. Vincent's hospital in downtown NYC, Manhattan, Greenwich Village - so by all standards he's an American.
I am not. I was born is Belgrade, Serbia, but being a self-appointed American (by choice) I gave myself many of the "American rights"- (probably various delusions, that I am still trying to decipher).
In my early views on America as a country and a culture (word culture used in a most generous sense), I saw it fit to endow my son with his European heritage, as I was strongly convinced that the greatness of America is derived from the "frontier spirit" that can be found even among more recent immigrants (like myself). It was that "frontier spirit" that always gave you more power, more resilience, more impetus to try new things - and that is why America has produced the most Nobel Prize winners on Earth (probably another one of my partially accurate delusions - but maybe it's not).
Let me try to translate the following into English. This a quote from M. Danojlic's book "Personal things" published 2001:
"Kada se samo setim u sta sam sve verovao, koga sam sve uzimao ozbiljno, sta mi se sve cinilo jasno kao sunce ... Ne, ne odricem se svojih zabluda, naprotiv, samo ih idioti nemaju, i jedino ih podlaci ne priznaju. One su sustastvena iskustva naseg postojanja. Do konacnih i nepomerljivih istina ionako se nikad necemo probiti. Ostaje nam dostojanstveno i posteno suocavanje sa nasim ogranicenjima, posrtanjima i protivrecnostima." (Milovan Danojlic)
translation: "When I only think of all the things I believed in, all the people I took seriously, and it all appeared very clear to me No, no, I'm not reversing my delusions, to the contrary, only idiots can have no delusions, and only the crooked ones will not admit to ever having them. Our delusions are integral parts of our existence. To ever arrive at permanent and final accuracy/truth is most impossible so all we have left is our own weaknesses, our own limitations, our own existence and contradictions with daily stuttering in pursuit of [wider truths]."
We are all entitled to all sorts of delusions and they should be guarded and dear to us. Without those delusions we'd be paralyzed in some small Balkan war laden country with God-only-knows what type of tyrant for president. It is our permanent and mature views that have grown out of uncovering those delusions so it's quite good to have them and work with them, never to entirely suppress them. In the following few paragraphs (and images), I shall offer you two widely opposed views on the same people (Serbians), you can choose which delusion to keep, and which to reject.
Here is a rather simplistic (and possibly partially delusional) view on some Serbians that is vastly unknown (even in Serbia).
Let me give you a visual presentation what my son view when he watches me. Here is the image that my son described to me. My nickname often being "buzdovan" - the large wooden bat with nails as pictured below. Now in all truth, I am 6'4" and one of the shortest guys among my Serbian friends (strangely enough most are 6'5", 6'6" and over) - so we do look like giants and his vision is understood (he is now about 6'4" himself).
Within this colossal image it is hard to see what I determined is a very deeply embedded feeling of justice, democracy, charity and kindness - and they all seem totally incompatible with the images I offered here. Let me give you three small chapters (literature, based on eyewitness accounts, published as fiction):
1. During the Winter of 1915 as the Austro-Hungarian forces (mainly composed of Bosnians, Croats, Checks, Slovaks and other Slavic people in light blue uniforms) were advancing through the North Eastern Serbia (Valjevo, Sabac, Macva region), the peasants came out of their homes and gave the passing occupiers prunes, bread, apples, milk or whatever the little food they had. They spoke a common language and it was later established that the conquering army didn't look like the victorious army of the mighty empire, but rather a the scared common-folk grouped by force of conscription and threatened by the Austrian and German officer staff to go to battle. Serbian villagers had this rarest of human qualities (mercy, charity, forgiveness) called MILOSRDJE, for which there isn't even an adequate word in most languages with a few exceptions (Greek: ELEOS, Hebrew: Gemuilt Chasidim)
2. During the retreat of the Serbian Army (Summer of 1916), a Serbian sentinel surprised a Bulgarian (opponent-enemy) soldier who was taking a rare bath in the nearby river. It turned out that the Bulgarian was a sergeant, while the sentinel was only a private. The two languages are somewhat close and it is very easy for them to understand one another (especially in those times when there were no such new words as: cell-phone, TV-set; download, upload, Internet, etc.). The Bulgarian tells the captor: Batko (brother in Bulgarian) I am wounded and I was trying to wash my wound, how far are you taking me? I may not be able to walk any long distance. The Serbian sentinel puts his captive on the back of his horse and walks him a good 11km (7.5 miles) to Serbian headquarters. As the strange party is arriving the young sentinel sees one of the lead commanders of the Serbian Army, General Stepa Stepanovic (later duke - Vojvoda), pacing in front of his log cabin that served as the staff quarters. A day later the young sentinel is summoned to the General's quarters. He is terrified that he will be reprimanded for having given the captured enemy his horse while he walked on foot. To his amazement the General listened patiently while the private was explaining that the Bulgarian sergeant was wounded and could not walk, so in his view there was no need to further torture the one who is already suffering. The General congratulated the soldier and blessed him with words: "may you and yours be prolific and populous so that the face of our nation is always saved by people like yourself, it is an honor for anybody to be your prisoner, as it is an honor to be your commander"
It took the private a few days to fully understand how did he ever earn such praise as in his view he did the only decent thing he could do and barely had any choice in the matter.
3. From the book "Personal things" from Milovan Danojlic published 2001 same type of events that he recalls in his youth (1944 and 1945) chapter "Nasi i njihovi" (translated as Ours and theirs) page 14 in loose translation:
"Before the communist partisans were consolidating their power in the aftermath of WW2, the Chetniks ruled some villages in Serbia proper and their rule was obeyed. As the most villages had members in both armies that were often opposed to one another as well as to German occupiers, the villagers never knew which side to turn to. At an earlier point in the war the village mayor was close to the author's (Danojlic's) father, who was pro-Chetnik and often had advance notices when the chetnik-troikas would be coming to town, usually in pursuit of their prime enemy (the other Serbians who joined the communist lead partisans). Danojlic states that he was often sent on a clandestine mission by his father with words: "Go to so-and-so, and tell them to hide tonight and tomorrow, while "ours" are here. To the common villager "ours" were closer but "theirs" were not immediately discarded and belittled. Danojlic continues:
"A warning to the non-compliants or "theirs", of the impending doom, to be perpetrated by "ours" was, to me, one of the highest forms of tolerance and a deeply rooted democratic principles. Opposing views were tolerated, even understood and guarded, so that even utopian communism was (as bad as it was) watched after and protected in spite of the prevalent opposing beliefs. The communists in those days were thought of as pro-Russians, hotheads, idealists who keep preaching topics of the impossible justice and unattainable freedoms with non-balanced equality. There are stories that should be told, regardless of veracity and fact-finding."
IN CONCLUSION: The present day Serbia (in spite of my son's imagery) is not some God-forsaken country of mountain goats and giants with medieval torture systems, but a simple group of good-natured people who are probably the closest to the American view on democracy in countless ways. So much was the Clinton implemented NATO bombing of Serbia received as a shock by these peaceful people (true even in the most peaceful people there will be criminals, tyrants and similar bad apples) - but if the society overall is endowed with such strong Christian values and endless generosity, Clinton should have thought twice about his legacy which will stay forever besmirched by those thoughtless acts.
Iliya Pavlovich,
Deerfield Beach, FL - USA
About: Iliya Pavlovich, PhD, sociology, culture, Europe, international relations and a frequent commentator at Baltimore Independent Media Center.
