FM Bakoyannis addresses UN general assembly

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FM Bakoyannis addresses UN general assembly

 

FM Bakoyannis addresses UN general assembly    Greek Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis addressed on Friday midnight (Greek time) the United Nations 61st General Assembly focusing on the challenges of the 21st century, the Millenium Targets, developments regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East and in Iraq and Greek policy for the Balkans, the Cyprus issue and Greek-Turkish relations. The Greek foreign minister also referred to Greece's role in the international political scene and the issue of global terrorism. "Allow me to add my heartiest congratulations to you for being the third woman in the history of the United Nations to be elected President of the General Assembly, particularly at such a critical time in world affairs. Your election is an inspiration for women everywhere struggling to achieve equality and opportunity. You illustrate the truth that, as Plato wrote 2,400 years ago, any society that does not exploit the talents of its women is wasting half its resources," Bakoyannis said.     "I wish also to congratulate and thank your predecessor, my friend and colleague, Jan Eliasson, for all he worked so hard to achieve during his term.     "While we are recognizing service to the United Nations, we would be remiss if we did not extend our appreciation to Secretary General Kofi Annan. I want to express the appreciation of my government for all his efforts to maintain and strengthen the prestige and moral authority of the Organization.     "I would also like to welcome Montenegro to the family of states, the Greek foreign minister said.     "The 21st century began with huge challenges:poverty, wars, humanitarian crises, waves of refugees, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons, human trafficking, drugs, intercommunal violence, environmental downgrading, natural disasters. What is necessary for us to confront these woes is for us to handle the deeply-rooted causes that have been developing for centuries. In order to achieve this, we must join our forces to mobilise the combined strength of our ideas, our resources and, above all, the humanity that we all share," she said.     Referring to the issue of terrorism, the Greek foreign minister said that "it has become the most pressing problem of our times, that touches all of us, regardless of religion, race or gender. We must face this major danger collectively because nobody, no matter how powerful he is, can do it unilaterally. The most effective way for us to handle terrorism at its root is to promote tolerance, mutual acceptance, mutual understanding and, above all, development, the possibility for all to have access to the necessary commodities for their life.     "The need for us to achieve the targets of the millennium within the time limits set by the heads of state and government during the summits of 2000 and 2005 is important. The targets include, of course, the crucial issue of us reaching the limit of 0.7 percent in development aid to countries facing serious economic difficulties. This target constitutes the key for us to achieve global cooperation on development and we are all determined to achieve this as soon as possible.     "On their part, the developing countries need to pursue serious economic policies and reforms that promote development and create reliable and transparent institutions. Only through concentrated collective action do we have hope of remedying the imbalances and inequalities that lie at the root of many of the conflicts preoccupying the world today. Allow me to stress at this point that we must place Africa at the centre of our efforts," Bakoyannis noted.     "The tensions in the Middle East demand equal attention. The Middle East is the region that will test the mettle of this Organization as a force for peace in the immediate future. If we fail in that test, all of us stand to pay a heavy price. During the past several months we all became witnesses to unforgettable images of suffering and destruction in this part of the world.     "The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is at the root of most problems in the region and it is obvious that it should be at the top of the list of our priorities if peace and stability are to return to the area. The Road Map offers the strategic plan for a solution based on the principle of land for peace, especially since basic elements of it are well known and generally accepted by the international community. The Road Map is in essence a performance-driven guide to a settlement based on all relevant Security Council Resolutions, including 242 and 338, the conclusions of the Madrid Conference and the Arab Summit in Beirut, and we must all make every effort to see that it is implemented.     "On Lebanon, strict implementation of Resolution 1701 provides the blueprint for resolving the basic problems that led to the recent crisis. We understand the difficulties before us, but we must push ahead resolutely because determination and tenacity are essential to tackling long-standing issues in volatile regions.     "The continued violence and instability in Iraq are a cause of great concern for all of us It is critical that every effort possible be made to bring order and unity to that troubled country. Deaths, especially of civilians, have reached terrifying levels with no end to the slaughter in sight. All who have any influence with the warring factions in Iraq must try to make them see what pain and suffering they have inflicted on their own people and what worse horrors they will unleash on their land if they continue to drift toward a devastating civil war.     "Our own region, the Balkans, was once known as ?history’s cauldron,? and we endured a century of bitter ethnic, religious and ideological conflicts up to very recent times. We are moving rapidly, however, to disown that label for the sake of our own peoples and the new Europe we are building. Some trouble spots remain, but we are trying to deal with them in a new spirit of cooperation and tolerance.     "Kosovo is one issue that still needs attention. The status talks are underway and we hope that they will produce a viable settlement that will strengthen the security and stability of the entire region. Right now this appears difficult. To overcome the impasse will require patient and careful diplomacy. Our goal in reaching a viable, long term solution should not be compromised by setting an artificial deadline.     "I deeply regret that the Cyprus problem remains unresolved. In the 32 years of the military occupation of one third of the territory of Cyprus by well over 40.000 Turkish troops, Greece has strongly supported all initiatives by the United Nations for the achievement of a comprehensive solution. We are committed to doing everything possible to achieve a just and viable solution, on the basis of the pertinent Security Council Resolutions and the EU principles and values. We strive for a bizonal, bicommunal federation, that will bring peace and prosperity on the island.     "Our goal remains an agreed solution between the two communities, without arbitration and tight timetables, which will be approved subsequently by referenda. To these efforts we are prepared to lend our wholehearted support.     "Greece’s foreign and security policy is based on the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter and especially on the peaceful settlement of disputes and of good neighborly relations.     "This basic framework is also reflected in my country’s continuing efforts to further improve relations with Turkey and to consolidate mutual understanding and cooperation. On our part, we are trying to overcome the remaining difficulties, continuing to take initiatives to widen and deepen cooperation in all fields so that the relationship with Turkey becomes a win-win situation for both countries. In this context, we are hopeful that Turkey will reciprocate for our countries to solidify good neighborly relations.     "European integration is the bright promise visible on the horizon for the entire region of South Eastern Europe, a future which will encompass greater cooperation and interaction among all the countries in the area and heal the wounds of the past century at long last.     "We live in a troubled world and the United Nations is always enmeshed in the worst of the troubles so that it sometimes seems that it is not accomplishing much. We must not forget, however, the conflicts it has resolved, the misery it has diminished, the suffering it has abated, the pain it has eased all over the world in its brief lifetime.     "Man feeds on dreams of hope, Aeschylus wrote, and for men, women and children everywhere the United Nations remains the best hope there is," Bakoyannis concluded.

"Man feeds on dreams of hope"
http://www.ana.gr/anaweb/user/showplain?maindoc=4644924&maindocimg=3940203&service=6

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Kosovo may face limited sovereignty as talks on its status remain deadlocked

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Kosovo may face limited sovereignty as talks on its status remain deadlocked

 

Kosovo may face limited sovereignty as talks on its status remain deadlocked

By Neil MacDonald in Zagreb and Guy Dinmorein Washington

Published: September 23 2006 03:00 | Last updated: September 23 2006 03:00

Attempts to reach a negotiated solution on independence for Kosovo remained deadlocked last night, leaving the troubled province's political future in the hands of divided international powers, aides to the United Nations' chief mediator said.

Martti Ahtisaari is expected to present proposals in November that Kosovo be granted sovereignty, resolving the last lingering question from the collapse of Yugoslavia.

 

But continued differences within the Contact Group of nations, which stands behind Mr Ahtisaari's mandate, could result in limited sovereignty for the 90 per cent ethnic-Albanian territory, conditional on strong international oversight for several years to come, senior western diplomats said.

The group brings together the US, Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Russia in a supporting role to the UN, which has administered Kosovo since the expulsion of Yugoslav Serb forces in 1999.

During a week of heightened ethnic tension in Kosovo, the group made clear that it would permit neither Belgrade nor Pristina "unilaterally" to block negotiations to decide the disputed territory's future status. Serbia argues that independence will lead to renewed regional instability.

But observers suspect that Russia and China, fearful of secession disputes within their own borders, may resist formal independence for Kosovo in the UN Security Council, which will be required to ratify any proposal.

Diplomats in Washington also see the Bush administration responding to the concerns raised by Russia and Serbia and reassessing their position on Kosovo.

Serbia's parliament in an emotional session last week decided to name Kosovo as an "integral part" of the country in a new constitution, which Vojislav Kostinica, the prime minister, aims to complete before elections early next year.

But Joachim Ruecker, chief UN administrator for Kosovo, advised the UN Security Council last week that delaying the outcome of the Vienna talks would only prolong tensions.

American and many European officials have tacitly supported "imposed independence", assuming continued international involvement will help protect Serbs and other minorities.

But four bombing incidents during the past eight days have raised the spectre of deadly clashes again in the province.

Nato-led peacekeepers have increased their patrols and checkpoints around Kosovo.

The 16,000-strong Nato-led Kosovo force also provides road escorts to the Serb minority, whose members attract blame for "ethnic cleansing" by Yugoslav Serb forces until the Nato intervention seven years ago.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006

FT.com - World, Europe9/22/2006 11:00:00 PM

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Kosovo: The power of compromise

 

Kosovo: The power
of compromise

 

 By 

Aleksandar Mitic, TFF Associate

 

September 21, 2006

A Serbian journalist and TFF Associate argues that only a genuine compromise over Kosovo's future status can guarantee stability.
A true, balanced, and negotiated compromise on Kosovo's future status would swing the pendulum of Balkan stability towards the European path.

A manipulated, one-sided, and imposed decision would, however, open a Pandora's box of secessionist movements in the world and release the ghosts of a nationalist past in the Balkans.
As we approach the beginning of talks on the future status of the Kosovo province, it becomes crucial to grasp the full complexity of the Kosovo status issue.
There has been an attempt in the last year and a half to close down international debate before the status talks had even begun by suggesting that only independence is a viable solution for Kosovo.
The truth is, the issue of Kosovo's status is dependent on so many historical, legal, political, religious, economic, and demographic elements that it deserves, at the very least, a wide international debate on possible solutions and their implications.
To argue thus that only one solution is possible is not only flawed reasoning, but a dangerous and explosive recipe for future frustration, tension, and conflict.
There has also been an attempt to refocus and spin the talks in the direction of Kosovo's independence, from those who say that these are not really talks on the future status but rather on the terms of Kosovo's future independence to those who argue that the negotiations should be only about the position of the Kosovo Serbs in an independent Kosovo.
Some also argued that the talks will be about finding a way to impose independence upon Belgrade. While there are a few officials who have, often privately rather than publicly, indicated their preference for such approaches, it must be said that these are completely contrary to international law.

RISKY BUSINESS

The aim of the talks on Kosovo's future status is to finally provide a fair, stable, long-term solution for this crisis region. The majority Kosovo Albanians must get a maximum of opportunity and real means to manage their future without feeling threatened, but also without endangering the welfare of Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians. The interests of Serbia, of which Kosovo is a part, the stability of the Balkans, and the worldwide impact of these negotiations are also crucial factors which must be taken into account.
Within the principles of international law and the preset recommendations of the international community's informal "Contact Group" - no return to the pre-1999 Milosevic-era situation, no joining of neighboring states, no partition - a number of possible solutions for the future status of Kosovo deserve to be examined.
There is also a number of pre-conditions for successful talks that must be met: artificial deadlines such as end of 2006 must not be used to the detriment of a sound solution; and the outcome should be an agreed, negotiated compromise, not an imposed, one-sided decision.
The breaching of international law and the creation of worldwide precedents should be avoided for the sake of regional and world security.
In this regard, it is of paramount importance that double standards must not be allowed to win over universal standards.
To claim that the Kosovo situation features "unique" characteristics and that its independence would not represent a precedent for triggering other crises elsewhere in the world is unlikely to convince everyone in the international community.
What is it that makes Kosovo so unique? Ten years of institutional discrimination? Several thousand victims of a conflict between a repressive state security force and a separatist guerilla force? A majority ethnic group actively seeking independence? But the very same characteristics are shared by dozens of similar regions around the world. If every such case is seen as unique, international law becomes irrelevant.
Independence for Kosovo would indeed be a risky, unilaterally-imposed and ultimately wrong solution. Why would one side get it all, the other one lose all? Why reward seven years of Albanian violence in post-war Kosovo? Why break up Serbia, the most ethnically diverse country in the Western Balkans and create a second ethnic-Albanian state on one part of its territory? Where is the logic of European integration in this pursuit of Balkanization of the Balkans?

 

A BLUFFER'S GUIDE TO INDEPENDENCE

Bluffs and spin must not be used as arguments. To say, for example, that Serbia already lost Kosovo in 1999 is only an interpretation and does not stand in any single international document, let alone in the UN Security Council resolution 1244 that ended the conflict.

In the resolution, "self-governing" is mentioned three times, "self-government" four times, "self-administration" once, "substantial autonomy" three times, whereas neither "self-determination" nor "independence" are mentioned at all. Did NATO intervene in 1999 to protect human rights or to provide the basis for secession? If Kosovo was lost to Serbia in 1999, why did it not obtain independence then?

As far as the so-called moral argument that it is the violence of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic which lost Kosovo for Serbia, the Kosovo Albanians should be least inclined to favor it since their massive and systematic violence and repression of the Serb community in the last seven post-war years has taken all the "moral credit" out of their hands.

The same goes for the often heard assertion that Serbia should choose between Kosovo and the European Union. In fact, under the EU Thessaloniki agenda on the Western Balkans, Serbia has a clear European perspective and as the Western Balkans' largest country, it certainly won't remain a black hole inside the EU. To suggest that Serbia should give up a large part of its territory - which has been the cradle of its civilization, culture, and religion for nine centuries now - for the sake of possibly entering a supranational integration process two or three years earlier does not make much sense. No international or domestic campaign aimed at convincing Serbian public opinion on this one would succeed.

One of the most common arguments for the independence of Kosovo is that if the ethnic Albanians do not get what they want, they will stage mass violence against the Serbs, other non-Albanians, and the international troops. The argument points to the massive riots in March 2004 as a warning of what could happen if ethnic Albanian desires are not satisfied. But is the world really so afraid of such threats that it does not dare stand up to them? NATO seems ready to call this bluff. The Alliance's Secretary-General has warned on several occasions that violence as means of promoting political objectives in the status talks would this time be met with a robust response from 17,000 NATO troops in the province. Indeed, threats of violence must not be legitimized nor used as arguments.

Finally, it is most worrying to suggest that some sort of "conditional independence" should be the outcome of the status talks. This empty formula is even presented by some as a compromise solution, because ethnic Albanians will have to wait a few more years for independence and give up on the idea of Greater Albania. Many of its backers suggest "conditional independence" means that Kosovo will be granted independence in phases, provided the majority ethnic Albanians finally start respecting the human rights of the Serbs and other non-Albanians. But this option is an insult to negotiators and 21st-century human-rights standards. If Belgrade is resolutely opposed to immediate independence, why would it accept independence two or three years from now? If even the most basic standards of human rights are not respected under international supervision, why should we expect that they would be in a conditionally independent Kosovo? And doesn't the "conditional independence" concept introduce a new kind of trade-off: respect for human rights in exchange for territory?

COMPROMISE: A WIN-WIN SOLUTION

Looking at the situation realistically and fairly, the most sustainable and just solution for the future status of the province lies between the standard type of autonomy, which ethnic Albanians now reject, and independence, which clashes with international law and is unacceptable for the Serbs in general and Serbia as a state.
A solution that would provide for a maximum of autonomy for Kosovo within the borders of Serbia could satisfy all the legitimate demands, including the Kosovo Albanians' demand to be self-governing, and it can protect the interests of non-Albanians in Kosovo and the interests of Serbia as a state. Such a solution would also comply with the principle of the inviolability of international borders.
Kosovo would enjoy full legislative, executive, and judicial capacity, a limited external representation - in particular regarding its full direct access to the international financial institutions - and most importantly, normalized relations with Serbia.
On the other hand, Serbia still has many positive things to offer Kosovo, including a strong push in its macroeconomic revival, a common market for goods, an integrated energy, electricity and infrastructure network, access to its health and education systems, a common fight against organized crime, and a joint contribution to regional stability and European integration.
At the same time, an autonomous Kosovo would still need to improve its treatment of the Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians. A wide-scale decentralization including a horizontal linkage of Serbian municipalities, which would benefit from the education, social, and health system of central Serbia, is a precondition for the survival of Kosovo Serbs, as suggested by UN special envoy Kai Eide.

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This horizontal linkage is not a model for partition and conflict but, on the contrary, a model for integration and survival, as these municipalities would be fully integrated in the autonomous Kosovo system run from Pristina, while keeping some political links with Belgrade.
Considering all this, an autonomy for the Kosovo Serbs within a maximum autonomy for Kosovo inside Serbia appears as the most reasonable and viable long-term solution.

A WIN-WIN SOLUTION

More than anything, it is a win-win solution. The Kosovo Albanians would finally get the means to manage their future and so will the Kosovo Serbs; Serbia would not have its borders changed and its historical and religious cradle amputated; Macedonia and Bosnia will receive guarantees that border changes in the Balkans are no longer tolerated; the EU would obtain regional stability and be able fully to take charge of its European perspective; the United States would be able to disengage its troops without losing its diplomatic leverage in both Pristina and Belgrade; Russia, China, India, and many other countries in the world would appreciate not having to deal with a dangerous secessionist precedent; the UN will see a major crisis issue resolved peacefully and with full respect for international law.
It is time to respect international law; it is time to find a long-term solution for Kosovo; it is high time to be patient, fair, sound, and consistent.
It is time for a successful compromise for the first time in Kosovo's long history.

Aleksandar Mitic is a Brussels-based journalist and one of the authors of the CD-ROM and Internet project Kosovo 2006: The Making of a Compromise.

http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/2006/Mitic_KosovoCompromise.html

Bombings ahead of Kosovo's likely independence

 

Bombings ahead of Kosovo’s likely independence

By WILLIAM J. KOLE
   

GNJILANE, Serbia (AP) - At a dusty market in the centre of this eastern
Kosovo town, Serbs and Albanians haggle good-naturedly over the prices of
their onions and tomatoes.

It's one of the few places in the province where people on both sides of the
ethnic divide live together and get along - and that makes the yellow police
tape and bomb crater a few blocks away seem even more ominous.

As Kosovo enters the final phase of UN-brokered talks that many believe will
give it independence from Serbia, recurrent explosions are rattling nerves
and raising troubling questions about what lies in store for a region trying
to put atrocities and animosities behind it.

"I am afraid," said Aziz Kryeziu, a 46-year-old ethnic Albanian who lives in
normally tranquil Gnjilane. "Afraid for all the innocent people who might
get hurt."

Over the past week, there have been four bombings, the worst of which
wounded four Serbs in a western town. Authorities said they think some of
the blasts may have been a settling of scores between rival politicians or
mobsters.

But parliament speaker Kole Berisha insists the violence is a deliberate
attempt to destabilize Kosovo at a delicate stage in its drive for
statehood.

"The closer we come to a decision, the risks and threats are higher for
sure," Prime Minister Agim Ceku conceded this week in an interview with The
Associated Press.

On Friday, chief UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari will brief the Security Council
on the lack of progress in UN-brokered talks that began in February to
determine the province's future status.

UN officials say the talks have done all they can to ensure the beleaguered
Serb minority will be protected and have a greater voice in an independent
Kosovo. Sometime this autumn, Ahtisaari will give the council his idea of
what a future Kosovo should look like, and a UN resolution paving the way
for independence is expected by the end of the year.

"This is a sensitive process with a lot at stake for a lot of people,"
Steven Schook, Kosovo's deputy UN administrator, told the AP. "But I believe
we must have a change in status and a new status as soon as possible. We
anticipate and hope it will be soon - this year."

Ethnic Albanians - Muslims who make up 90 per cent of Kosovo's two million
people - have sought independence for decades. In the late 1990s, their
quest to break free prompted the late Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to
launch a brutal crackdown that killed 10,000 people and made refugees of
thousands more.

Orthodox Serbs are willing to grant Kosovo broad autonomy, but see it as the
heart of their ancient homeland and want it to remain a part of Serbian
territory. Their leaders worry about the safety of Kosovo's 100,000 Serbs,
many of whom don't dare leave their small, scattered enclaves. After the
1998-99 war, 200,000 Serbs fled fearing reprisal attacks, and relatively few
have returned.

Serb unease is evident even in Gnjilane, considered a model for the kind of
peaceful, multiethnic republic Ceku hopes to govern.

Jadranka, a Serb woman so fearful she refused to give her last name, said
she pretends not to hear when Albanians occasionally taunt her with shouts
of "Go to Serbia!"

"It's a very scary situation for us," she said. "It's not a life when you're
afraid to go out."

With 16,000 NATO-led peacekeepers still patrolling the province, armed
conflict is highly unlikely. But the chances of more violence like the March
2004 riots that killed 19 people and displaced thousands "are unfortunately
rather high," warned Alex Anderson, Kosovo project director for the
International Crisis Group, a conflict prevention centre.

Although Ceku insists Belgrade will never invade, a Serbia still sullen over
Montenegro's independence earlier this year has made thinly veiled threats
that it might not let Kosovo go.

This past weekend, Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica insisted Kosovo
must remain a "historic and integral" part of Serbia, and ultranationlist
firebrand Tomislav Nikolic urged the army to go on standby. A rare military
parade drove home their point.

"There's a sense of pressures building up behind the dam. A lot of violence
could be unleashed once the status issue is resolved," Anderson said. "At
best, we're going to have a very grumpy Serbia refusing to recognize Kosovo.
To Serbs, the idea of Albanians running anything is absurd and grotesque."


http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/2006/09/21/1873775-ap.html

Republika Srpska has the same right as the Kosovo Albanians

 

Bosnian Serbs Renew Nationalist Rhetoric in Run-up to Election
By Barry Wood Belgrade 17 September 2006

Bosnia-Herzegovina holds parliamentary elections on October 1, and a rise in nationalist rhetoric has drawn concern from the European Union. In Serbia, observers have noted nationalist sentiment being voiced by Bosnian Serb politicians.

Recent suggestions by the prime minister of the Bosnian Serb Republic, Milorad Dodik, that Bosnian Serbs do not see their future as part of Bosnia-Herzegovina has raised concern in the West, which is pushing for a strong central government.

Since the end of the war in 1995, Bosnia-Herzegovina has been comprised of two entities, a Serb Republic and a Muslim-Croat federation.

In Bosnia's divisive election campaign, some Muslim, or Bosniak politicians have suggested the Bosnian Serb republic could not exist indefinitely, because they say it was established on the basis of genocide.

Leaders in Serbia have not injected themselves into the Bosnian election campaign.

Moderate nationalist Dodik has surprised some by calling for Bosnian Serbs to be able to vote in elections in neighboring Serbia. Bosnian Croats already have dual citizenship and are permitted to vote in Croatia.

Seska Stanojlovic is foreign editor of the news weekly, Vreme, in Belgrade.

She says, for Serbs, the situation in Bosnia is directly linked to what is likely to happen in Kosovo, the Albanian majority U.N.-administered province that is seeking independence from Serbia.

Stanojlovic believes that, if Kosovo is put on a path to independence, Serbian leaders could join in calling for a referendum among Serbs in Bosnia, an idea that has been floated by Dodik.

"They think this is the right moment to publicly say that Republika Srpska has the same right as the Kosovo Albanians have now," said Seska Stanojlovic.

Other analysts say Serbia has set itself on a course to join the European Union and western institutions, and opposes Bosnian Serb secession. Serbia is under pressure to turn over Bosnian Serb war crimes suspect Ratko Mladic to the war crimes tribunal in The Hague.

International efforts to strengthen Bosnia's weak central government came close to success earlier this year, as political parties in both entities endorsed a plan advanced by leading politicians with the assistance of U.S. diplomats. That plan narrowly failed to win parliamentary endorsement, and has now been set back by the divisive electoral campaign.

Stability in both Kosovo and Bosnia is provided by international peacekeepers. In Bosnia NATO has already handed over security responsibilities to a European Union-led force. A larger NATO-led force is in Kosovo, whose status will be discussed this week at the United Nations in New York.

http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-09-17-voa31.cfm

James Bissett // THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE

http://www.deltax.net/bissett/a-consequences1.htm

THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE (part 1)

1. INTRODUCTION
Last month I appeared as a witness at the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia. During the questioning by the defendant, former
President Slobodan Milosevic, he asked me to quote excerpts from an article
I had written in 2000 entitled, New Diplomacy, Old Agenda. One of the
excerpts read as follows:

"The U.S. led attack on Yugoslavia was designed to improve President
Clinton's public image and restore credibility to NATO, whose existence
since the end of the cold war was in jeopardy. This was the real agenda of
the NATO war. In terms of Balkan history it is an old agenda. Traditionally
western intervention in
the Balkans has proven to be disastrous. From the Congress of Berlin to both
world wars, the western powers have intervened in the Balkans for their own
selfish policy objectives. These aims have had little relevance to the
issues affecting the peoples of the Balkan countries. What was true of the
past has proven true again in Kosovo."



The events that have taken place in Kosovo since I wrote that article have
only served to reinforce the truth of what was then written. Western policy
since the end of the illegal bombing of Yugoslavia has been a total failure.
The massive ethnic cleansing of the non-Albanian population, the reign of
terror against those few Serbs who have remained, the rampant burning and
blasting of Christian churches, the refusal to disarm the Kosovo Liberation
Army, the acceptance of widespread drug and human trafficking in the
so-called UN protectorate stand as evidence against the NATO and United
Nations authorities. These are hard facts. They stand as testimony to failure.



Unfortunately, the Serbian tragedy is not yet over. Sometime this year a
decision will be announced about Kosovo independence. I say announced
because there is some evidence suggesting the decision has already been made
to tear away that integral part of Serbia and to grant Kosovo independent
status. The Economist magazine of 18- 24 February 2006 reported that John
Sawers the political director of the British Foreign Office told a group of
Serbs in Kosovo earlier in the month that the Contact Group had already
decided on independence for Kosovo. Since the talks between Serbia and
representatives of the Kosovo Albanians are being undertaken under the
auspices of the Contact Group Mr. Sawers words are not to be taken lightly



There are other indications that independence is already a foregone
conclusion. The Contact Group Guiding Principles announced in November 2005
stated, among other things, that there could be no return of Kosovo to the
pre-1999 situation. This is an ambiguous statement but since prior to 1999
Kosovo was an integral part of Serbia this guiding principle could be
interpreted to mean that Kosovo will no longer remain part of Serbia. Other
remarks by senior United States officials have made it clear that the option
of independence for Kosovo is open for discussion. These are ominous signals
that the guarantees set out in UN Resolution 1244 reaffirming the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia as set out in the
Helsinki Final Act may be ignored or conveniently overlooked as have other
parts of the resolution.



The influential International Crisis Group has not been hesitant in setting
out its views on the issue of independence. It has made its recommendations
abundantly clear in a report dated February 17, 2006 entitled Kosovo: The
Challenge of Transition. That report recommends that, "The international
community and in particular the UN Special Envoy charged with resolving the
status process, Martii Ahtisaari, must accordingly prepare for the
possibility of imposing an independence package for Kosovo, however
diplomatically painful that may be in the short term" There is no concern
expressed by the Contact Group or UN officials that because Martii Ahtisaari
is a prominent member of the ICG that this report would appear to place him
in a conflict of interest position. There is further reason to suspect his
impartiality as a mediator since Der Spiegel magazine has reported that Mr.
Ahtisaari has said that Kosovo is headed for independence.

There may least be some comfort that the ICG seems to have dropped the idea
it once advocated that the discussions include the possibility of adjusting
Kosovo's northern border to include the Presevo valley. However, if the ICG
has dropped the idea of incorporating part of southern Serbia into a new and
independent state of Kosovo the Albanians in southern Serbia have not. Three
ethnic Albanian municipalities in southern Serbia have passed resolutions
calling for political and territorial autonomy and the withdrawal of Serbian
security forces from the area.

The demands of the Albanians in southern Serbia underline the dangers
inherent in the violation of the territorial integrity of states even if it
is carried out under the aegis of supposedly responsible international
agencies like the Contact Group and is sanctioned by the European Union.
Should a decision be taken to grant independence to Kosovo a precedent will
have been established that will pose a serious threat to the very structure
of world peace and security. The stakes here are high and any decision on
Kosovo independence will have implications that go far beyond the
geographical confines of the Balkans



2. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
The territorial integrity of states is an old principle that is generally
acknowledged to have been firmly established by the Peace of Westphalia in
1648 which declared that outside interference in a state's internal affair
was illegitimate. Through the years the principle of territorial integrity
has not diminished. It is still considered one of the most basic principles
of international law and continues to be a major instrument for the
prevention of armed conflict between states.



Article 2[4] of the United Nations Charter includes territorial integrity as
one of the principles that prohibits the threat or use of force in the
resolution of international disputes. Territorial integrity is included in
the Declaration of Principles of International Law concerning friendly
relations among states. The United Nations Charter regards it as one of the
paramount elements included in the concept of sovereign equality.



The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 reinforced the principle of territorial
integrity and went further by including a section on the inviolability of
frontiers. It is hoped that members of the Contact Group and the UN Special
Envoy are familiar with the wording of these two sections of the Act. They
read as follows:



SECTION III: INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS

The participating states regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as
well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore will refrain now
and in future from assaulting these frontiers.
Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure
and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.

SECTION IV: TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF STATES

The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of
the participating States.
Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the
territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any
participating State, and in particular from any such action constituting a
threat or use of force.
The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's
territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect
measures of force in contravention of international  law, or the object of
acquisition by means of such  measures or the threat of them. No such
occupation or acquisition will be regarded as legal.

 These are fundamental principles. They form an integral part of the
framework of international law. They are designed to be a guarantee of
international security and mutual respect among nations. They are to have
universal application and cannot be put aside because of special
circumstances or when they prove embarrassing or inconvenient.
Their message is simple and clear. Borders can only be changed by agreement
between states.

THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE (part 2)

3. PRESSURE ON SERBIA
Unfortunately we have seen in the case of Kosovo in 1999 and more recently
with the invasion of Iraq that the countries of NATO and the United States
are prepared to violate international law when they consider it in their
interests to do so. Furthermore the NATO countries are able to use their
economic and political power as leverage to force smaller countries to
comply with their demands. The promise of membership in the new Europe can
be an offer difficult to refuse even when acceptance means a humiliating
loss of self respect if not the loss of territory as well.

In June 2005 the European Council set out the criteria to be met by any
decision on the final status for Kosovo. The solution according to the
Council had to be fully compatible with European values and norms, comply
with international legal instruments and obligations and the United Nations
Charter and contribute to realizing the European prospects of Kosovo and the
region. However the Council also stressed that any agreement must ensure
that Kosovo does not return to the pre-March, 1999 situation.

What the European Council seems to be saying is that any decision about
Kosovo must be legal but since it can't be legal without Serbia's consent
the Council holds out the possibility of admittance to the European
Community in exchange. If Serbia gives up Kosovo its reward will be eventual
acceptance into the European Community. The European Council describes this
as a satisfactory solution. Others might describe it as blackmail. In any
event what is clear is that both the United States and the European
Community want a solution to what they interpret as an intractable and
festering problem in the heart of Europe. The Europeans may be fussier about
the legalities than are the Americans but the final outcome desired is the same

If Serbia is willing to accept this deal then there are the usual promises
that the new Kosovo would be multi-ethnic, would respect human and minority
rights, would guarantee the safe return of the evicted population, that the
Christian religious sites would be safeguarded and that crime, corruption
and terror would be eliminated. All of the guarantees sound good. The
problem is all of them have been promised before and expressed in United
Nations resolution 1244. We know how faithfully the guarantees in that
resolution have been enforced in Kosovo during the past seven years.

Casting a dark and foreboding shadow over the Kosovo talks is the reality
that if the incentive of joining the new Europe does not work and Serbia
refuses to consent to the loss of its Kosovo territory then punishment
rather than incentives can be used. Serbia has already had its grim share of
what this can entail. Loss of IMF and World Bank loans, discouragement of
Western investment, ostracism from international institutions, threats from
the International Criminal Tribunal of more indictments, manipulation of
elections and a host of other penalties designed to force conformity to the
will of the United States led NATO powers.

 Nevertheless it would be a mistake for the United States and the Europeans
to assume that the decision about Kosovo independence will solve all the
problems in the Balkans. Kosovo independence is a Pandora's Box and once
opened there is every likelihood of further Albanian demands in the region.
Furthermore as the United Nations special envoy, Kai Eide has reported,
Kosovo is simply not ready for independence. Quite apart from its
questionable economic viability, its record of ethnic cleansing, violence
and intolerance of minorities should disqualify it from becoming an
independent country. Wide spread crime and corruption and its dominance of
the European drug trade give sufficient evidence by any standard that it is
not ready to join the ranks of independent states.

 A further mistake is to believe that a decision to grant Kosovo
independence will not become a precedent or that it will not be seen as an
example for others who might be striving for self determination. There have
been statements from US officials suggesting that Kosovo is unique and
therefore cannot be used as a precedent. This is wishful thinking and it is
dangerous thinking. A decision to grant Kosovo independence will have far
reaching implications. It will serve as an example and encouragement to
other independent movements around the world. It could become a symbol and
template for secessionists everywhere.

 4. A PRECEDENT FOR RUSSIA ?
Not withstanding the attempts by US officials to pretend that independence
for Kosovo would not be a precedent, the President of Russia, Vladimir
Putin, on January 30, 2006 declared that the decision on Kosovo if it is to
be considered legal should be of a "universal nature" and applicable to post
ÄÅ¼Ë Soviet territory. The Russian President based his statement on the fact
that, UN Resolution 1244 has affirmed that Kosovo is an integral part of
Serbia. He added that, "Our starting point is that United Nations Security
Council's decisions are not of a decorative nature, do not depend on the
political circumstances, but are adopted in order to be fulfilled."

President Putin was referring to the unrecognized regions of the former
Soviet Union that desire independence: Abkhasia that broke away from Georgia
in 1992 and successfully defeated Georgian military attempts to prevent
secession. It has not been recognized as an independent state. South Ossetia
declared its independence from Georgia in 1991 following armed conflict with
Georgian troops but its independence has not been recognized. Transnistria
declared unilateral independence from Moldova in 1991 and with the
assistance of Russian and Ukrainian troops resisted attempts by Moldova to
prevent secession. Its independence has not been recognized.

In response to President Putin's intervention in the Kosovo process the U.S.
Deputy Secretary of State for European Affairs, Rosemary di Carlo has stated
that the Kosovo situation and the region itself is a unique phenomenon and
that the Kosovo model would not apply to the unrecognized regions of the
former Soviet Union. She also pointed out there were no UN resolutions
relating to them. What she did not say of course was that the UN resolution
relating to Kosovo explicitly reaffirmed it as part of Serbia.

 It is difficult to say if President Putin's remarks are a warning that
Russia, as a member of the Contact Group, will insist that the criteria and
standards used to decide on Kosovo independence will have universal
application and especially to the unrecognized regions of the former Soviet
Union. If it is a warning is it to be taken seriously? Or, is it simply a
move designed to be used by Russia as a future bargaining chip in
negotiations with the Western powers? Previous experience has shown it is
unlikely Russia will risk openly defying the United States and Europe over
the issue of Kosovo independence. At any rate this remains to be seen.
Whatever the motives, however, President Putin's intervention serves to
highlight the reality that, despite protests to the contrary, a decision to
grant independence to Kosovo will stand as a precedent.

 5. A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT
There are currently 191 member states of the United Nations but an estimated
five thousand ethnic groups scattered across the globe. Many of these ethnic
groups are desirous of attaining statehood and becoming members of the
United Nations. Many have much stronger claims for independence than does
Kosovo. The Kurds for example number close to thirty million people and have
maintained a distinctive culture for three thousand years despite being
dispersed in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. They were promised a separate
state by the allies after world war one but this promise was thwarted by the
Turkish dominance of the region under Kemal Ataturk. The leaders of the
Kurdish independence movement will not overlook what happens in Kosovo. The
American insistence on maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq at the
expense of the Kurdish wish for independence will ring hollow to the Kurds
of north eastern Iraq.

 Taiwan with its prosperous economy and high standard of living has enjoyed
de facto independence since being expelled from the United Nations in 1971
and yet it has not been recognized by the international community as an
independent state. Tibet, Chechnya, Nagorno- Karabakh , Tamil Eelam,
Kashmir, the Philippines, Thailand, - the list is a long one. In Western
Europe itself there are serious demands for independence from Basques,
Corsicans, and Montenegrins.

 THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE (part 3)

In the case of Montenegro it shares the same language, religion, history,
culture and ethnicity as the Serbs. There is not the slightest reason why
this tiny country of 600,000 inhabitants whose leader is alleged to be
involved in criminal activities should be granted independence apart from
the fact the President once enjoyed the favor of the United States.

 Yet according to a report in the influential Herald Tribune the European
Community is suggesting that Montenegro can secede if fifty percent of the
eligible voters cast their ballots and if fifty five percent of those choose
independence. In effect this means that Montenegro can attain independence
with less than 30 percent of the voters supporting it. Can anyone imagine
that Javier Solana the EC foreign Minister would advocate a similar deal
being offered the Basque separatists?

There are over three million Hungarians living outside of Hungary in the
neighboring countries of Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine. Many of
these would like once again be governed by Hungary. Already there has been a
resurgence of Hungarian nationalism in the Serbian province of Vojvodina.
This is not surprising, if Kosovo warrants independence why not Vojvodina?
The Serbs and Croats in Bosnia - Herzegovina despite every encouragement
from Paddy Ashdown the UN High Representative are not yet resolved to the
idea that this artificially created Protectorate is viable. Many among them
would favor joining their fellow countrymen in Serbia or Croatia and
independence for Kosovo will add strength to these desires.

Among the conditions laid down by the Contact Group and supported by the
European Council for any decision about Kosovo is that there is to be no
change in current borders, no union with another country or part of another
country and that Kosovo must not constitute a military threat to its
neighbors. These conditions are of course as a result of legitimate concerns
that an independent Kosovo might well be the first step in the realization
of the dream of a greater Albania in the Balkans. No change in borders means
no joining up with Albania and no linking up with the Albanians in southern
Serbia or Macedonia. There are solid reasons for theses concerns. The
military incursions of the KLA into southern Serbia and Macedonia in 2001
provided strong evidence that an independent Kosovo could well lead to
irredentist ideas among the Albanian populations in the Balkan states.

 Conditions laid down during talks on the status of Kosovo are one thing but
the enforcement of such conditions after a decision has been made is
another. Under the watch full eyes of thousands of NATO and United Nations
troops the Albanians in Kosovo have since the withdrawal of Serbian forces
acted in a barbarous fashion towards the non-Albanian population, have
carried on with drug smuggling and other criminal activities and have
conducted military operations across their borders. Is there any doubt that
should Kosovo achieve independence these activities will be even more
difficult to control? The borders between Albania and Macedonia already, in
effect, are open borders and are likely to become invisible after independence.

Another serious implication of an independent Kosovo relates to the
possibility that the new entity could become a haven for Islamist
extremists. There have already been concerns expressed by Western security
experts about the infiltration of Islamist extremists in Bosnia many of whom
remained there after the end of hostilities. There have also been reports of
mujahideen fighters supporting the KLA against Serbian security forces and
that al Qaeda has established bases in Kosovo and Albania. Whatever the
truth of these reports it is reasonable to suppose that an independent
Kosovo would be ideally suitable for the establishment of al Qaeda
operations and a fertile ground for Islamist extremism.

 The United States and the EC have expressed concern about the danger to
international security caused by the existence of so called "failed states."
Failed states are defined as those countries whose governments have weakened
to the point where they that they can no longer provide adequate public
services, physical security or economic livelihood to their inhabitants.
They become attractive to terrorist organizations as safe havens and as
staging grounds for attacks on other targets.

 The United States National Security Strategy emphasizes the problem by
declaring: "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are
by failing ones, poverty, weak institutions and corruption can make weak
states vulnerable to terrorist net works." If, as it seems evident, Kosovo
meets all of the characteristics of a failed state the determined rush of
the United States and the European Community to grant it independence will
prove to be a grave policy error and will inevitably have a negative effect
on Balkan stability.

7. CONCLUSION
After the end of the cold war and the emergence of the United States as the
most powerful military force the world has ever known there was a brief
period, as the twentieth century was drawing to an end, to hope that the
world would experience a "Pax Americana." A benevolent and democratic
America in full support of the ideals expressed in the United Nations
Charter would ensure peace and order throughout the world. The threat of
global extinction and the horrors of widespread bloodshed and violence would
be ended.

 This dream was shattered by the United States led bombing of Yugoslavia in
the spring of 1999 which was done in violation of the UN Charter and
contrary to international law Despite trying to justify the bombing as a
humanitarian intervention to stop alleged genocide and ethnic cleansing in
Kosovo it was apparent the real reason was to demonstrate the value of NATO
as an organization and of continuing United States dominance in Europe. It
was a critical turning point because it signaled the willingness of the
United States to use military force to resolve international disputes and to
intervene wherever and whenever it so desired.

 Subsequent events have shown that the United States has not abandoned this
policy. The invasion of Iraq without United Nations authority is the most
striking example of the US determination to act unilaterally. There will
always be an attempt to gain support for these actions either through the
use of NATO or by persuading the European Community or the newly emerging
states of Central and Eastern Europe to get on side. The reality is,
however, that the most powerful nation in the world is not willing to abide
by the norms of international law or to conform to the principles laid down
by the United Nations Charter.

 United States policy in the Balkans has been dysfunctional since March 1992
when their Ambassador, Warren Zimmerman, persuaded Izetbegovic the Islamist
leader of the Bosnian Muslims to withdraw his signature to the Lisbon
Agreement. This decision which led to US acceptance of the results of an
illegal referendum and recognition of the first Muslim state in Europe
triggered civil war in Bosnia and led directly to the death and destruction
that followed. In the following years US decisions have proven to be equally
disastrous for the region.
The United States subversion of the Vance-Owen plan and the following
Vance-Stoltenberg agreement prolonged the war in Bosnia unnecessarily. The
violation of the United Nations arms embargo and the decision to permit
several thousand mujihadeen fighters into Bosnia and to provide them with
modern military equipment was also a decision bound to have "blow back"
implications damaging not only to the region but also to the ongoing US war
against terrorism.

The decision of the United States government to support the cause of the
terrorist KLA in its armed rebellion to secede from Yugoslavia is another
example of US policy making gone wrong. There is evidence that the KLA
military incursions into southern Serbia and later in Macedonia were backed
by American agents. Their current policy supporting independence for Kosovo
is but another chapter in an unfolding series of strategic errors. More
seriously it reveals an indifference to the concept of sovereignty and of
respect for the rule of law that is not in keeping with the principles laid
down by the founding fathers of that great nation.

United States policy in the Balkans has been characterized by cynicism,
duplicity and short term tactical gain. By backing Islamist aims in the
region and supporting terrorist groups in Kosovo there might be the
immediate advantage of establishing a large military base in Kosovo or
appeasing further Albanian demands by advocating independence for Kosovo but
in the long term it will backfire.

 For centuries past Serbia, as one of the largest country in the Balkans
and situated on the strategically important crossroads between Europe and
the Near-East, was proud of its well earned reputation as the "guardian of
the gate." A democratic Serbia can be a powerful ally to democratic and free
countries everywhere. In these perilous days when even the United States
with all of its awesome military might can be terribly damaged by a handful
of fanatical Islamist terrorists it would seem only prudent and in the
national interest of Americans and of Europeans to reverse their ongoing
policy of humiliating this key Balkan nation and find a solution to the
Kosovo problem that falls short of independence.
             ****
Mr. James Bissett is former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and
Albania and chairman of the Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies. He can
be reached by e-mail: bissett@deltax.net

Kosovo: Mission Accomplished?

 

Kosovo: Mission Accomplished?

Condi shakes hands with yet another unsavory ally

Posted on Friday, September 15, 2006. By Ken Silverstein and Sebastian Sosman.

Sources

Any visitor to the Balkans knows that to sit down for coffee or throat-rasping rakia with a person from any ethnicity in the region is to risk a not so quick, uninterruptible, vitriolic five-hundred-year history lesson so skewed that it doesn’t deserve the name of history . . . real history just about ceased to exist within Albanian and Serbian discourse. It has largely been replaced by monologues of myth and prejudice. It is now a weapon of survival.

So wrote Matthew McAllester in Beyond the Mountains of the Damned, a recounting of the late-1990s bloodshed in Kosovo. While Balkan history has lately lost its vogue in Washington, this is a good time for some brushing up. And since the conventional wisdom is so relentlessly romantic about the valiant Kosovars struggling against Serb oppression, I'll present here a side of the story that is rarely heard.

Seven years ago, an American-led NATO campaign drove Serbia out of Kosovo, which has since enjoyed semi-autonomy. Now the United Nations wants to broker an agreement over Kosovo's status. Independence for the majority-Albanian province seems to be the preferred position of most European governments and of the Bush Administration, though U.S. officials insist that no decision has been made.

The administration's tilt was evident last June, when Agim Ceku, who carries the title of Kosovar prime minister and who seeks to gain full independence from Serbia, made a quiet visit to Washingtonâ€â€so quiet that it was almost entirely unreported at the time. Ceku met with Condoleezza Rice, joining the growing list of thugs and crooks welcomed to town by the secretary of state.

Who is Ceku? As a brigadier general in the Croatian Army, he commanded Croat forces in the 1993 Medak offensive, in which the “Croatian Army perpetrated abuses against Serbian civilians and conducted a ‘scorched earth’ policy,” according to Human Rights Watch. In August 1995, Ceku was the organizational force behind “Operation Storm.” In the course of that campaign, which the New York Times described as “the largest single ‘ethnic cleansing’ of the war,” more than 100,000 Serbs were driven from the Krajina region of Croatia

Ceku, who is a Kosovar Albanian, took command of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1999. He is widely credited with transforming it into a guerrilla group, and for drawing NATO into direct conflict with Serbia. After the war, the KLA morphed into the Kosovo Protection Force, still commanded by Ceku. This is a sort of first-responder outfit but any future army for an independent Kosovo would clearly be drawn from the ranks of the KPC.  A leaked UN report, written in 2000 but not released (probably because it was too embarrassing) found that members of the Corps were involved in murder, torture, illegal detention, and extortion of local businesses.

The late writer Michael Kelly said at the time that former KLA leaders had formed a “criminal mobocracy” and “joined forces with former Serb paramilitary gangsters to establish themselves in drug peddling and prostitution.” Meanwhile, Kelly wrote, an “ongoing campaign to ethnically cleanse Kosovo of all but Kosovar Albanians” had forced more than 100,000 Serbs and other non-Albanians to flee the province; about 400 Serbs have been murdered, and many of those who remain live under constant, heavy guard.

Periodic violence has erupted in the succeeding years. Two years ago, anti-Serb riots across Kosovoâ€â€which occurred despite the presence of NATO and UN forces on the groundâ€â€left 19 Serbs dead and hundreds injured and displaced.

In recent years, Ceku has made public statements to the international community about guaranteeing the rights of Kosovar minorities, but many suspect that he remains a hard-nosed, thuggish Balkan commander whose constituent base remains dangerously nationalistic. Two months after meeting with Rice, Ceku paid a jailhouse visit to Selim Krasniqi , a KLA general who had just been convicted by an international tribunal of war crimes committed in 1998. “Kosovo,” Ceku remarked afterwards, “needs more men like Krasniqi.”

Ceku's visit and the Bush Administration's general pro-Kosovo tilt reinforces what Balkanists have maintained since the early 1990s, namely that the United States is not an evenhanded player. Instead, it has sought to shine a bright light on Serb atrocitiesâ€â€of which there have been many and which should be condemnedâ€â€while applying different standards to Bosnian, Croat, and Kosovar Albanian thuggery. The White House subscribes to the same theories of history that can be heard in those Balkan cafesâ€â€theories that remain largely ungrounded in reality.

* * *

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This is Kosovo: Mission Accomplished? by Ken Silverstein and Sebastian Sosman, published Friday, September 15, 2006. It is part of Washington Babylon, which is part of Harpers.org.

Written By
Silverstein, Ken
Sosman, Sebastian

Permanent URL
http://harpers.org/sb-kosovo-mis-1158344060.html

My letter published in ODYSSEY

For many of you, this is repeated information. But to the readers of ODYSSEY, a very influential Greek magazine, it is new. Just wanted you to know that my letter had been published and that is what is important. Stella

**********************************************************************************************************************************************************************************************

ODYSSEY

 

Letters

 

September/October 2006, Page 9

 

John Sitilides and Sarah K. Norman are correct when they state that "U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns has been the leading architect of Kosovo policy in the Bush Administration." [The Kosovo Connection, May/June 2006].   What should have been added, however, is Mr. Burns' anti-Serb animosity that was evident when he was spokesman for the Clinton administration.

 

A critical question is whether "a democratic referendum" for independence will be open only to the residents of Kosovo which are over ninety percent Kosovo Albanian, or will it be opened to all of Serbia since Kosovo is still a province of Serbia.  If the case is the latter, then Kosovo Albanians make up only nineteen percent of the country.  It is interesting to note that Albanians became the majority in Kosovo primarily after Communist dictator Josip Broz Tito, in his hatred for the Orthodox Christian Serbs, encouraged the illegal crossing of Muslim Albanians into Christian Kosovo. 

 

The roots of this crisis in Kosovo can be traced back to the breakup of Yugoslavia and the formation of Bosnia.  The tragedy is that all of the suffering, bloodshed, and deaths in the Balkans might never have happened if it had not been for the meddling of our Department of State.  In what is known as The 1992 Lisbon Agreement, the three Bosnian leaders representing the Croats, Muslims and Serbs, endorsed a proposal that the republic be a confederation divided into three ethnic regions, similar to the "Benelux in the Balkans" proposal by Dr. Achilles Skordas.  It was then that our American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Mr. Warren Zimmermann, advised Mr. Izetbegovic, who representing the Muslim party of Bosnia, that "if he didn't like it, why sign it?"  Although the Lisbon Agreement was the best opportunity to achieve peace, it failed primarily due to the misguided, ill-advised advice given to the Bosnian president by our state department official that encouraged Mr. Izetbegovic not to sign the agreement which he had originally accepted in Lisbon, a decision which made the war inevitable. 

 

While the Clinton administration was supporting the Bosnian government of Alija Izetbegovic, the  embassy in Vienna issued a passport to Osama bin Laden which enabled him to visit Bosnia and Kosovo on four different occasions. As a result many Kosovo Liberation Army fighters were trained in bin Laden's terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. 

 

Former UNPROFOR Commander, Canadian Maj. Gen (Ret.) Lewis MacKenzie said it best: "The Kosovo-Albanians have played us like a Stradivarius. We have subsidized and indirectly supported their violent campaign for an ethnically pure and independent Kosovo.We have never blamed them for being the perpetrators of the violence in the early '90s and we continue to portray them as the designated victim today in spite of evidence to the contrary. When they achieve independence with the help of our tax dollars combined with those of bin Laden and al-Qaeda, just consider the message of encouragement this sends to other terrorist-supported independence movements around the world."

 

After 9/11, President Bush said that we would do whatever it takes to defend our country, yet we denied the Serbs the right to defend themselves against the same enemy we are fighting today.  One thing is evident.  If Kosovo Albanians achieve independence, Serbian culture, language and religion will be eradicated. Furthermore the consequences of an independent Kosovo may well result in another mini-Afghanistan, which is certainly not in the best interest of the United States nor of Europe.

 

Stella L. Jatras, Camp Hill, PA

The U.S. Contribution to the Afghan-Kosovo Drug Traffic.

A Meta-Group Managing Drugs, Violence, and the State

The U.S. Contribution to the Afghan-Kosovo Drug Traffic. / Part XI

Peter Dale Scott - Reportedly Far West was founded in 1998; and Surikov and Saidov were already directors when they attended the Beaulieu meeting in July 1999. I believe that this meeting discussed the Russian presence in Kosovo, and the imminent increase in the flow of Afghan drugs through Kosovo.

That this flow is huge has been attested to by many observers. Russian sources estimate that from 1991 to 2003 the same group shipped to Western Europe up to 300 tons of heroin and sold it to wholesale buyers of Kosovo Albanian nationality. In the same period they sold up to 60 tons of heroin to Azeri and Roma (gypsy) wholesalers in the Volga and the Urals Federal Districts of Russia. The group’s total receipts for heroin in 1991-2003 are estimated to be $5 billion. (1)

The chief narco-baron of the group is said to be Vladimir Filin, the head of Far West. Like Surikov, Filin has been known to share his knowledge of drug-trafficking with the public. (2) And grounds have been alleged to suspect that his contacts with the CIA through drug-trafficking date back to Afghanistan in the 1980s.

The informed Indian observer B. Raman charged in 2002 that

the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the USA, which encouraged these heroin barons during the Afghan war of the 1980s in order to spread heroin-addiction amongst the Soviet troops, is now using them in its search for bin Laden and other surviving leaders of the Al Qaeda, by taking advantage of their local knowledge and contacts. (3)

The narco-barons selected by the CIA, according to Raman, were “Haji Ayub Afridi, the Pakistani narcotics baron, who was a prized operative of the CIA in the 1980s,†Haji Abdul Qadeer, Haji Mohammed Zaman and Hazrat Ali. (4)

Philip Smucker, a journalist for the Christian Science Monitor, has confirmed that in 2001 the drug trafficker Haji Mohammed Zaman (once “at the top of the heroin trade in Jalalabadâ€) was recruited in Dijon, France for the anti-Taliban cause, by “British and American officials.†(5) And the Asian Times corroborates Raman’s claim that Zaman’s long-time Pakistani drug-trafficking partner, Haji Ayub Afridi, was also released from a Pakistani jail at this time. (6)

If Raman is correct, the CIA not only blessed but directed the 1980s flow of drugs from Afridi, Zaman, and Abdul Qadeer into the hands of Soviet officers like Vladimir Filin and Aleksei Likhvintsev. It would appear that corruption was being used as a political tool to weaken and subvert the Soviet Union.

Although the United States may have used known traffickers like Zaman and Qadir to regain access to Afghanistan, its stated ultimate goal, and the one assumed by the mainstream media, was to reimpose its own kind of order. Whether the country is Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Colombia, or Kosovo, America’s national interest is said to be to install and then protect pipelines. And pipelines require peace and security.

The prime geostrategic interest of the drug traffic in Afghanistan and elsewhere was precisely to prevent peace and security from happening. (7) It is true that the international illicit drug industry, like the international oil industry, is polymorphous and flexible, relying on diversified sources and markets for its products in order to maintain its global dominance. But for the global drug traffic to prosper, there must always be key growing areas where there is ongoing violence, and state order does not prevail.

The Bush Administration’s policies cannot be characterized as reflecting the national goals of peace and security, as outlined above. On the contrary, its shocking underfunding of Afghanistan’s recovery, like its complex and destabilizing interventions in Georgia, suggest that it too, as much as the drug traffic, hopes to utilize instability – as a pretext for maintaining U.S. bases.

America now faces in Afghanistan, what Russia faces in Chechnya, a conflict which is favorable to drug trafficking but increasingly deleterious to orderly reconstruction. (8) Meanwhile elements profiting from the flow of Afghan drugs continue to grow stronger and more dangerous.

Footnotes
1: www.compromat.ru/main/zuganov/surikov2.htm.

2: Alexander Nagorny "Narcobarons from the CIA and MI-6" Pravda-info 2004.09.13

3: B. Raman, “Assassination of Haji Abdul Qadeer in Kabul,†South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 489,

4: Raman, “Assassination of Haji Abdul Qadeer in Kabul.â€

5: Philip Smucker, Al Qaeda’s Great Escape: The Military and the Media on Terror’s Trail (Washington: Brassey’s, 2004), 9. This decision by British and American officials (the latter almost certainly CIA) may have contributed to bin Laden’s escape from Tora Bora in December 2001. Cf. CNN, 12/29/01.

6: "US turns to drug baron to rally support," Asia Times Online, 12/4/01; Peter Dale Scott, “Pre-1990 Drug Networks Being Restored Under New Coalition?â€

7: Thus Shamil Basaev, who controls the Abkazian drug traffic, and his lieutenant Khattab, are famous among Russians and Chechens alike as “the incorrigibles†who want only “endless war†(Murphy, Wolves of Islam, 136, 165).

8:The Iraq War is also beneficial to the drug traffic. See the following story from the Balochistan Post, quoting the London Independent: “"BAGHDAD: The city, which had never seen heroin, a deadly addictive drug, until March 2003, is now flooded with narcotics including heroin. According to a report published by London’s The Independent newspaper, the citizens of Baghdad complained that the drugs like heroin and cocaine were being peddled on the streets of the Iraqi metropolis. Some reports suggest that the drug and arms trafficking is patronized by the CIA to finance its covert operations worldwide."


Part I: History and the Political Requirements of the Global Drug Traffic
Part II: The Meta-Group, West, and East
Part III: The Meta-Group, BCCI, and Adnan Khashoggi
Part IV: Dunlop’s Account of the Beaulieu Meeting’s Purpose: The “Russian 9/11†in 1999
Part V: Dunlop’s Redactions of His Source Yasenev
Part VI: The Khashoggi Villa Meeting, Kosovo, and the “Pristina Dashâ€
Part VII: The Role of Anton Surikov: The Dunlop and Yasenev Versions
Part VIII: Saidov, Surikov, Muslim Insurrectionism, and Drug Trafficking
Part IX: Allegations of Drug-Trafficking and Far West Ltd.
Part X: Far West Ltd, Halliburton, Diligence LLC, New Bridge, and Neil Bush

Peter Dale Scott, a former Canadian diplomat and English Professor at the University of California, Berkeley, is a poet, writer, and researcher.

The U.S. Contribution to the Afghan-Kosovo Drug Traffic. / Part XI
http://oraclesyndicate.twoday.net/stories/2639366/

Bosnia: Former Muslim President Was Paid By Al Qaeda

 

http://www.westernresistance.com/blog/archives/002917.html

: Reports of Muslim-Extreme Right Antisemitic Alliance| Sudan: While Islamists Behead Journalist, National Tensions Rise ?

September 08, 2006

Bosnia: Former Muslim President Was Paid By Al Qaeda

When Alija Izetbegovic (pictured) died and was buried on the 22nd October 2003, only hours beforethe funeral the United Nations war crimes tribunal in the Hague had confirmed that he had been under investigation.

Izetbegovic had governed Bosnia-Hercegovina as President from 1990 onwards, and had seen the start of the civil war begin under his rule in 1992. He signed the Clinton-brokered Dayton Agreement in 1995 which effectively ended the conflict. He continued as vice president until 2000. Though he had a knack of persuading Western leaders that he was a benign character, the reality seems far removed from the image of a benevolent Muslim "grandfather".

Today, AKIreports that a Sarajevo-based weekly newspaper, Slobodna Bosna(Free Bosnia) has stated that Izetbegovic received money from the Saudi businessman Yassin al-Khadi (Yassin al Qadi). On October 12, 2001, Yassin al-Kadi was listed by the US government as a specially designated global terrorist for his support of al-Qaeda.

Al-Kadi's assets in Bosnia-Hercegovina were frozen in October 2001, at the request of the nation's Banking Agency. He had shares in the Vakufska Bank but these too were frozen, on the advice of the US.

In 1996, the report from Slobodna Bosnaalleges, Izetbegovic received $195,000. The information on this transaction came from a British bank while al-Kadi's charity Mufavak was being investigated. In 2002 this charity was banned, but began operating again in Bosnia under the name "Blessed Relief". Mufavak had gathered $15 to 20 million from various sources, and at least $3 million had gone to Al Qaeda.

But the claims of Al Qaeda and Islamist involvement on the part of Izetbegovic go much deeper. In 1992, he invited in the Mujahideen from Saudi Arabia, who went on a spree of murder and decapitation. The government is now trying to revoke the citizenships of 1,500 of these, as was reported by AKI this week.

In 1970, Izetbegovic wrote "The Islamic Declaration: A Program for the Islamization of Muslims and the Muslim Peoples", which was disseminated clandestinely amongst Muslims, but was not officially published until 1990 when the communist system which had been led by Tito collapsed.

This document has been used by his opponents to validate their claims that he was at heart an Islamist. The invitation of the Mujahideen (shown below, marching through Zenica) to add jihadism to the volatile ethnic situation escalated the strong feelings in the region. According to Pogledi: "The mujahedin were "incorporated and subordinated" within the structure of the 7th Muslim Brigade when it was formed on November 19, 1992 . On August 13, 1993, the mujahedeen were organized in the "El Mujahed" unit. The Bosnian Muslim military command put this unit in the 3rd Corps area of operations and subordinated it to the command of that Corps."

But the claims of Al Qaeda involvement go directly to Izetbegovic's door. Terrorism expert Evan Kohlmann wrote a book, Al Qaeda in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network, in which he details the involvement of Saudi Mujahideen in Bosnia and the rise of Al Qaeda.

Robert Spencer in JihadWatchquotes from this book:

Using the Bosnian war as their cover, Afghan-trained Islamic militants loyal to Osama bin Laden convened in the Balkans in 1992 to establish a European domestic terrorist infrastructure in order to plot their violent strikes against the United States. As the West and the United Nations looked on with disapproval, the fanatic foreign 'mujahideen', or holy warriors, wreaked havoc across southern Europe, taking particular aim at UN peacekeepers and even openly fighting with Bosnian Muslims at times. Middle Eastern religious and charitable organizations, largely based in and funded from the Arabian Gulf, were responsible for bankrolling this effort, and providing travel documentation for would-be mujahideen recruits.... many of the cell members - responsible for some of the most notorious terrorist attacks of the past decade - spent their formative years waging jihad in the unlikely Muslim land of Bosnia."

Slobodan Milosevic is widely regarded as a Serbian monster, but while he was on trial in the Hague, a British journalist Eve-Ann Prentice was giving evidence. She told the court in February that she had been scheduled to meet Alija Izetbegovic in November 1994. She said that while she and a journalist from Der Spiegel waited in a foyer for their interviews with the Bosnian leader, they saw Osama bin Laden being escorted into Izetbegovic's office. Judge Robinson cut short her testimony and declared it "irrelevant".

A damning critique of Izetbegovic and his Al Qaeda connections, written from a Serbian perspective, can be found in Serbianna, and more can be found in an articlefrom the Toronto-based Centre for Peace in the Balkans. A highly critical biography of Izetbegovic, by Vojin Joksimovich, can be found HERE.