November 18, 2006

Consider Kosovo's History (Ltr in WP by Michael Mennard

Consider Kosovo's History (Ltr in WP by Michael Mennard



 

 

Consider Kosovo's History

Saturday, November 18, 2006; Page A19


Regarding the Nov. 10 editorial "Here Comes Kosovo":

Americans don't understand or like history, which most other cultures accept and study as an invaluable source of knowledge and experience. Americans generally look at history as an unnecessary burden that can have only a negative influence on the present.

Your editorial regarding Kosovo, the very cradle of Serbia, showed such ignorance. Nowhere did it note that Kosovo has been part of Serbia since the Serbs moved to it in the sixth century, four centuries before any Albanians were heard of in the Balkans.

Moreover, the editorial said, "By incorporating Kosovo into a new constitution, Serbia's leaders staked out yet another of the reckless nationalist stands that have caused their country so much damage in the past 15 years."

Wrong. It is ignorance of historic facts displayed by The Post and other similarly inspired American publications that has caused so much damage to a small but brave nation and a loyal ally in two world wars. The Serbs do not want what belongs to others, but they will not give away what is rightfully theirs.

The United States and its citizens would react in the same way if someone suddenly decided that Southern California or New Mexico should secede just because Spanish-speaking Mexicans live there.

As for your specter of 2 million Albanians in Kosovo being enraged, they should just go back where they came from -- neighboring Albania. Most Albanians came to Kosovo during World War II or during the rule of Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, which maintained an open border with Albania, its fellow communist neighbor. Since then the incoming Albanians have systematically pushed untold numbers of Kosovo Serbs out of Kosovo.

Your editorial writers should study history to ensure more meaningful and more accurate editorials.



-- Michael Mennard

Potomac Falls






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November 16, 2006

INTEVIEW WITH DR. SRDJA TRIFKOVIC

INTEVIEW WITH DR. SRDJA TRIFKOVIC




INTEVIEW WITH DR. SRDJA TRIFKOVIC

 
KEY FEATURES OF SERBIA'S NEW CONSTITUTION:
Serbia is a state of Serbs and all citizens
Serbian territorial integrity remains inviolable
 
By Boba Borojevic
 
The adoption of the new constitution of the Republic of Serbia on November 10 was an important moment in that country's modern history. It followed the referendum held on October 27-28, which Serbia's voters supported with a simple majority vote. We asked Srdja Trifkovic to comment the significance of this event.
Dr. Trifkovic is Foreign Affairs Editor of Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture and a leading expert on U.S. foreign policy and Balkan politics . This is an edited transcript of the interview aired on "Monday's Encounter" on CKCU 93.1 FM on November 13. He points out two key elements of Serbia's new constitution, of which the first is that Serbia was defined as the nation state of the Serbian people, as well as the state of all other ethnicities within its boundaries:
 
"In other words Serbia is a country of its citizens but also it is defined as the country of the Serbs. Some people of the supposedly 'pro-Western' liberal persuasion have claimed that this was a retrograde concept, the one that was becoming obsolete in the rest of enlightened of contemporary Europe. This is simply not true, however. If you look at the newcomers to the European Union, notably the former communist countries of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, or Latvia… they all defined themselves as nation-states of those particular ethic groups, as well as countries of all citizens who live within their boundaries. Those who object to the definition of Serbia as the nation state of the Serbian people – in addition to those who inhabit it – are not well informed about the constitutional tradition and the constitutional formulations that are prevalent in today's Europe. The Preamble of the French Constitution starts with "t he French people" – not "the people of France"! Likewise, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 starts with the Spanish Nation. We could go on…  If you were to tell the French and Spaniards, liberal as they are and multicultural as they are, that their countries should be redefined so as to exclude any reference to the French or Spanish nation from Constitution, they would say that you are talking nonsense."
 
Trifkovic points out that the provision of Serbia's new constitution that received most prominence in the Western media is that confirming the inviolability of the country's territory, which explicitly includes the province of Kosovo and Metohija. He insists that there is nothing remarkable about such postulation, because each country's constitution presumes, at least implicitly, the inviolability of its sovereign territory:
 
"This is regarded as 'controversial' only by those who'd like to deny or forget that Kosovo and Metohija has belonged continuously to Serbia since the First Balkan War in 1912. Those who think that there is something contentious about such designation are effectively denying the concept of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the legacy of the international law that goes back at least to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. For the Serbs themselves this is not a contentious issue, not any more than it would be for Canada's constitution to postulate that the province of Ontario is part of Canada. In Kosovo and Metohija's case, no mechanism for separation is constitutionally allowed. What the Constitution allows for are different forms of autonomous mechanisms in line with the latest achievements of other democratic states, whether they be in the European Union or not. If you are to allow in your Constitution the possibility of secession, the possibility of amputation of your sovereign territory, then you would be indeed setting up a precedent that no other country has done anywhere, ever."
 
To claim that this reflects some 'hard-line nationalist' position is plain nonsense, Trifkovic concludes. Nevertheless, we have commentators who claim that what the Serbs say is simply irrelevant; but Trifkovic stresses that the will of the people of Serbia cannot be willfully ignored by "the international community":
 
"It is remarkable that the proponents of an independent 'Kosova' belittle Serbia's constitution and the referendum – yet at the same time they insist that Kosovo's independence has to be based on the will of Albanians living there. So, eight million Serbs can be overruled and ignored, but one and a half or two million Albanians who are supposed to want independence, on the ground of their plurality in their given locality, must be obeyed, and their views are legitimate! It is simply absurd."

There are many foreign NGOs, such as the International Crisis Group (ICG), who are dissatisfied with Serbia's Constitution and claim that the document is too nationalistic and authoritarian, and will therefore bring instability in the Balkans. Trifkvic argues that we should not give any undue weight to whatever the ICG has to say:
 
"It has been and still is primarily an anti-Serb lobby group that favors each and every Muslim cause in the Balkans – and I would include the independence of Montenegro into the list of 'Muslim causes.' The ICG has been advocating Kosovo's independence for over a decade. It was very vocal in their support of the Muslims faction in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is not interested in a peaceful resolution of this or any other dispute, it is not looking for durable and lasting solutions that would guarantee stability in a long-suffering part of Europe. It is interested in pursuing its particular political agenda. That is obvious from the posture of Martti Ahtisaari , who is not only former president of Finland, but also a former and current member of the ICG board of directors."
 
The new Serbian Constitution by itself will not impact the thinking of the great powers one way or the other; it will be the balance of forces in the wider outside world. In this context, Trifkovic thinks that the overall position for the Serbs has improved considerably in the last few months. In his view this was due primarily to the realization by the Russians that, no matter what they do vis-à-vis Kosovo, they are not likely to get the acceptance of the principle of reciprocity:
 
"They will not be allowed to treat pro-Russian enclaves, such as Ossetia, Abkhasia, Transdnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, as de facto independent entities based on Kosovo's precedent. The realization by the Russians that – even if they are cooperative on the issue of Kosovo's independence – they are not going to get anything in return, has been important in directing Moscow to a more principled stand. Another positive development is the realization in China that the model of Kosovo's independence could be used for the independence of Taiwan, or even the demand for Tibet's renewed independence, not to mention the context of the separatist movement among the Turkic-Muslim population of Northwestern China bordering the former Soviet Central Asia, the Xinjiang province."
 
On balance, Trifkovic concludes, the debate on the future of Kosovo will be determined by the balance of forces in the world rather than on the basis of what Serbia does or says, but it nevertheless helps, in symbolic and psychological terms, to have the will of the people expressed so unambiguously as has been done by the Serbs who have supported their country's new constitution.
=======
www.chroniclesmagaz ine.org/cgi- bin/newsviews. cgi
www.trifkovic. mysite.com


 




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November 15, 2006

Kosovo vs South Ossetia

Kosovo vs South Ossetia





Kosovo vs South Ossetia

The international community is vague about why Kosovo and South Ossetia cannot be compared, and the answers lie in geopolitics rather than principles of self-determination and international law.

Commentary by Jen Alic for ISN Security Watch (15/11/06)

In Western media offerings on South Ossetia's recent referendum for independence from Georgia there is an unwavering tone that suggests the breakaway republic either does not deserve, or should for unexamined reasons, not be granted , independence.

The opposite is true for Western media reports concerning the status of Serbia's UN-administered province of Kosovo. These reports adopt a tone that cheers for and approves of independence.

The international community has long strived for an independent Kosovo and is set to make a decision on the province's status early next year. That decision is most likely going to be independence, though conditional and gradual. At the same time, the international community opposes independence for South Ossetia, citing the unfairness of the Sunday referendum that did not include ethnic Georgians in the breakaway republic.

It has been impossible to find any arguments as to why South Ossetia should not be allowed to pursue self-determination. When questioned on this, Western officials have generally responded by saying that Kosovo and South Ossetia cannot be compared. End of story, no further explanation needed.

But perhaps they can be compared.

Neither South Ossetia nor Kosovo has ever been an independent nation, as far back in history as is rationally warranted to look. Both have at times enjoyed various levels of autonomy. Both have minorities whose rights may not be ensured and whose safety is anything but guaranteed. South Ossetia is home to 14,000 ethnic Georgians, while Kosovo is home to an estimated 120,000 Serbs, who live in fear in UN-guarded enclaves. There is no indication that either minority will be offered adequate protection or adequate rights. And conflict could result from a decision either way.

On Sunday, some 99 percent of South Ossetian voters backed independence from Georgia. The 14,000 ethnic Georgians living in a handful of villages in the breakaway republic were not allowed to vote, as registration required a Russian passport, which all Ossetians have been granted. This was unfair, as the international community has pointed out, but the ethnic Georgian vote would not have changed the outcome.

Furthering the comparison, neither Kosovo nor South Ossetia are necessarily prepared for independence, though Kosovo can expect help from its kin in neighboring Albania and the international community, while South Ossetia can expect some, though likely limited, aid from neighboring Russia. In economic terms, it is unclear how either could support their populations, however small. Industry is for all intents and purposes absent in both locales, while the majority of income is rumored to be made on the black market, largely through arms and drug smuggling.

What has been lacking throughout is an honest debate on these issues, which can easily be compared, despite vague statements to the contrary.

And the honest debate necessarily involves geopolitics.

South Ossetia is a buffer for Russia against the Western-leaning Georgia, while Georgia is a buffer for the US against Russia.

While Russia has played coy with the South Ossetia issue, refraining from recognizing its last declaration of independence in the 1990s and officially supporting Georgia's territorial integrity, it has clearly supported the separatists there. The US must do more than pay lip service to Georgia's territorial integrity, as the country moves toward NATO membership and continues to build its Western alliances.

And of course, there is energy to consider. The Caspian Basin is a place of intense competition, with the US, Russia and China all vying for a stronger foothold. In July, the US$4 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline was inaugurated. The BTC pumps Caspian Sea oil to the Turkish Mediterranean, bypassing Russia and Iran. It should supply 1 million barrels of oil per day by 2009. It passes through the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, and also runs rather close to South Ossetia.

BP, formerly British Petroleum, has a 30.1 percent stake in the pipeline. The pipeline was commissioned by a BP-led consortium that includes energy companies from the US, Norway, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Japan, France and Italy. The BTC is a key to Western energy security. Upsetting Georgia - a major player in this energy security - by allowing South Ossetia to declare independence and be internationally recognized would be risky.

As far as Kosovo is concerned, granting independence is much easier. Serbia is of no strategic value to the West, and the international community has no bones about playing with fire there, despite some low-level concerns that granting Kosovo independence could be so unpopular in Belgrade that it would see a return to power of radical forces.

Russia, for its part, would be more than happy to see Kosovo granted independence - this, despite its support for its Serb allies and Serbia's territorial integrity - if only because it would set a precedent for similar moves in South Ossetia, Abkhazia (Georgia's other breakaway republic), and Moldova's breakaway republic of Transdneistr.

So, the question here is not really whether Kosovo or South Ossetia has a right to self-determination - which is indeed a romantic notion that is easy to digest in terms of principles - but why there has been a lack of honest debate at an official level.




Jen Alic is the editor in chief of ISN Security Watch.

The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only, not the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).





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Kosovo's identity crisis

Kosovo's identity crisis



Kosovo's identity crisis



Guardian Weekly

In a referendum at the end of last month the Serbs voted in favour of a new constitution, reaffirming Belgrade's inalienable sovereignty over Kosovo. Their decision disregards the fact that the region has been under international rule since June 1999, when the Nato campaign ended Serbia's brutal repression of the Kosovar Albanian guerrillas.

"Why do the Serbs keep living in the past? Everyone knows where they ended up with their nationalist policies," says Agim Osmani. A year ago he and his wife, with their six children, bought and rebuilt a house in Caglavica, in the outskirts of Pristina, along the road to Macedonia. Previously it belonged to a Serb, now in Belgrade.

 
"We are all free to choose. There is plenty of room for everyone," adds Osmani.

In fact, along the 5km stretch between Caglavica and Pristina there is increasingly less room. In just a few years the fields have filled with Albanian-owned warehouses, filling stations and shops. Most of Osmani's neighbours are Serbs, but for how much longer? The average age of Kosovo's 130,000 Serbs is 54, compared with 28 for their 2 million Albanian neighbours.

Stamenko Kovacevic, 82, lives just behind Osmani's house, scraping by on his miserable Elektro Kosova pension. He hopes to end his days in this village of 1,500 people, all Serbs until recently. His children have left the province, which always been one of the poorest parts of the former Yugoslavia.

"Agim takes care of me, he brings me food and takes me to the doctor's," says Kovacevic. But he nevertheless voted "yes" in the referendum, "because it has always been that way".

In the distance the antiquated power station at Obilic belches poisonous smoke. Kovacevic has few illusions about the benefits of the new constitution, hurriedly drafted in Belgrade to replace the 1990 text.

Slobodan Milosevic, the former president of Serbia, was determined to end Kosovo's relative autonomy in a Yugoslav union that was already disintegrating. Fighting in Kosovo only flared up at the end of the 1990s, after Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. But unlike the former republics which have gained independence - joined by Montenegro a few months ago - the fate of the former autonomous region of Kosovo is still undecided.

Kosovo has its own president, elected parliament and government, which raises taxes in euros. It also has a civil defence corps, more akin to an army than a pioneer group. Not many young Albanians speak Serbo-Croat any longer, as was the case for the previous generation brought up in Tito's Yugoslavia. The number plates on their German saloons and Yugo bangers are all marked KS and none of them are in any doubt about their imminent independence. "Only the Serbs shut their eyes so as not to see the elephant in their sitting room," says Veton Surroi, a Kosovar writer.

Milan Ivanovic, on the other hand, is among those who reject the idea of independence. Seated on the terrace of the Dolce Vita café, in the northern quarter of the divided town of Mitrovica, in northern Kosovo, he persists in maintaining that the province "was, is and always will be Serb. Nor will any Serb leader wreck his political career by abandoning Kosovo". "What is happening at present is temporary. In the medium term Serbia will regain control of Kosovo," he adds. He does not explain how, but then the democratic process is not his cup of tea.

Dr Ivanovic runs the local hospital and chairs the Serb National Council. A radical, with closely cropped hair and a steely gaze, he forecasts more violence: "It's inevitable. The only unknown quantity is its scale. As Serbs we could never accept Kosovo's independence. We will block the roads in the north and stop the Albanians coming here. If need be we'll organise our own referendum to ratify our independence, inside Kosovo. On the other hand, if Kosovo is not granted its independence, the Albanians will be angry because the international community promised it six year ago."

He recalls the rioting in March 2004 and the violence that claimed a dozen lives. Albanian extremists attacked isolated Serb homes and burned Orthodox churches, prompting villagers from around Mitrovica to take refuge in the town. The international community is terrified a similar uprising might engulf the whole of Kosovo - either spontaneously or stirred up by one of the opposing forces.

"We will defend ourselves against any attacks," warns Ivanovic, who has rejected any moves since 1999 that might bridge the gap between the two communities. Here in Mitrovica the health service, schools and university are all an integral part of the Serb system and completely dependent on Belgrade.

"Our politicians are heading for disaster," says Milos, a Serb studying philosophy at the local university. "They adopt an extremist line because they are paid by Belgrade. If things go wrong, they have a fallback solution, but I don't. My future is here," he adds, lowering his voice to express views shared by a silent minority.

Most of the customers at the Dolce Vita are bulky skinheads who claim to be the "guardians of the bridge", a reference to the bridge across the Ibar river that separates the Albanian districts, to the south, from their Serb counterparts, to the north. There has been no communication between the two sides since Nato forces arrived in June 1999.

Milos does not much like the idea of an independent Kosovo. He says: "We have lost touch with our Albanian neighbours, but if we can have reasonable security and autonomy, then perhaps we can live together. I certainly do not fancy the sort of security the 'guardians of the bridge' are offering."

"Fortunately there is little fighting between the two communities now," says Romuald Pilchard, a political adviser to the commander of the KFOR international force deployed since 1999. The presence of 16,000 foreign troops and the setting up of a local police force have helped keep the peace. But other factors are also at work. "Now that they have almost achieved their goal of independence, the Kosovar Albanians are playing it safe. They have nothing to gain from upsetting negotiations on final status," says a European diplomat. "But there is a limit to their patience, and the politicians say it is increasingly hard to keep control of the more unruly elements," he adds. Many think the outburst of violence in 2004 was in fact salutary because it reminded the international community that Kosovo still existed.

During a visit to Paris last month the Kosovar prime minister, Agim Ceku, underlined his people's "concern" at the delay to negotiations. "People are fed up. They get the impression nothing is happening, whereas the situation is dramatic," says Nehad Islami, a moderate Albanian writer. "Almost half the population is unemployed and the others are living below the poverty line. They may blow their top at any time," warns Avni Zogani, of the Cohu! (Wake up!) organisation, which is trying to raise civic awareness among Kosovars.

Albanian politicians are keen to keep things calm but they lack the necessary credibility. "Most of them are corrupt and the political parties all have links of some sort with organised crime, which has infiltrated most official bodies," says Zogani.

He adds: "The public sector is more of a welfare operation, doing favours for specific groups, with 70,000 officials. That is three times more than in Slovenia for a comparable population. Added to which the UN Mission in Kosovo [known as Unmik] people turn a blind eye. They have already packed their bags and do not want any problems. We are increasingly fed up with our politicians but also with the international agencies."

"The only solution is independence, but it is like a lover you've been waiting for too long: part of the charm has gone," says Linda Gusia, a professor of sociology at Pristina University. "Daily life absorbs all our energy. We have no time to think of anything else. We realise that not having an international status is part of the problem, but we also know it will not solve all our woes, as if by magic, particularly the power cuts in the winter."

With a salary of only €150 a month, she has to do several jobs to feed her family. She says: "I feel humiliated at not being able to provide for my children, at not having a passport or being able to buy books on the net, because Kosovo is not a state. It isn't even Kosovo here, it's Unmikistan, and we're trapped."

www.lemonde.fr

http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianweekly/story/0,,1948467,00.html




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November 14, 2006

N. Malic: The [diplomatic] battle for Kosovo not over yet

[ From Antiwar.com ]


November 9, 2006
The Battle for Kosovo

by Nebojsa Malic

[Adapted from remarks given before the Njegos Endowment for Serbian Studies, Columbia University, New York, Nov. 3.]

Not Decided Yet

If one were to be informed strictly by the mainstream media in the English-speaking world, it would be very hard to harbor any doubts about the future status of Kosovo. The occupied Serbian province though, of course, never referred to as such, but always as a region with a 90 percent Albanian majority is expected to declare independence within months, if not weeks, with the full support of Washington, London, and Brussels.

Could it be, however, that these tireless tirades about the "inevitability"
of Kosovo's separation are an effort to counter the fact that it is by no means inevitable, perhaps not even as likely as it would have been several years ago?

Albanian arguments for secession are well known: majority of the population, a claim to self-determination, allegations of Serb repression, atrocities, "ethnic cleansing," etc. Most of this is fiction, the rest quite irrelevant.
There is only one real argument, that of force. NATO's
1999 intervention and the subsequent occupation of Kosovo have created a "reality on the ground." But since the civilized world still hesitates to endorse naked aggression, the case for "Kosova" is dressed in humanitarian clothing and the rhetoric of "liberation."

Logic favors the Serb arguments, though. If the borders of the Yugoslav republics were declared sacrosanct in an effort to deny the Serbs west of the Drina their right of self-determination in the 1990s, then Serbia's borders ought to be sacrosanct, too, no matter how loudly the KLA complains or how violent it gets. ICG founder Morton Abramowitz dismisses this as "Serbs seeking perfect reasoning," but there's nothing perfect about it. It is simple logic, unlike the completely irrational "logic" of the Empire, which proclaims one rule today and a completely different one tomorrow to suit its own caprices. As Doug Bandow once remarked, the only rule in the Balkans seems to be "the Serbs always lose."

For what it's worth, then, the law is firmly on Belgrade's side as well; no other country in the world has been forced to give up a part of its territory to a separatist minority, especially not through illegal occupation as a result of illegal aggression. It took the post-Milosevic leadership in Belgrade five years to understand this basic concept, but they appear to have lined up behind it to the best of their ability.

This is why the Contact Group an abomination resurrected from the ashes of Europe's dark past has organized the "negotiations" on Kosovo's status as a way to pressure Serbia to voluntarily surrender its occupied territory. In the words of one commentator, it is an offer to declare rape consensual.

Power and Control

What happened in 1998 and 1999 was not a result of Albanian lobbying. It came about as a result of joint policy by imperialists in America and Europe who saw Serbia as an obstacle to their control of "Southeastern Europe."
Albanians were used as a weapon against Serbia. This is why Kosovo did not become independent in 1999, and has not become independent yet.

The 1999 war was more than just a distraction from Clinton's sexcapades; other people were involved as well. Many principals of NATO's endeavor are still around, or have been promoted. Take for example Javier Solana, then secretary-general of NATO, now the de facto foreign minister of the EU.
More to the point, the worldviewimposed by NATO in 1999 the asserted "right" of those with military power to attack anyone, anywhere, on a fabricated pretext, in direct violation of international law, conventions, and treaties is dominant today.

The destruction of Yugoslavia was partly engineered certainly encouraged by imperialist politicians in Europe and America, as a way to claim more power, escape the confines of international law, and flex their newfound imperial muscle. In 1990, a German who dared envision the Bundeswehr occupying a portion of Serbia following the Luftwaffe bombing of Belgrade would have been arrested on charges of glorifying the Nazi past. Yet both of those things came to pass and were praised as "progress." Today, the German military is girding for more foreign intervention, without a word of protest.

In 1991, Americans wanted a "peace dividend" from four decades of gearing up for war with the Soviet Union. What they got was a "benevolent global hegemony" that seeks to insert American money, troops, and bombs into every corner of the globe that a handful of policymakers in Washington believes crucial to ongoing American world supremacy.

If rumors about Ahtisaari's proposal are true, the Empire is trying to establish a Bosnia-style arrangement in Kosovo, which would give Albanians independence on paper but make them a dependency of the EU in fact. As said here before, this sort of "solution" is the worst of all worlds; the Albanians would continue to blame everyone else for the barbaric state of their society and economy (for which they have only themselves to blame), taking that anger out on the few remaining Serbs who will be cut off from Serbia and trapped in "diversity reservations" much as they are now and the transient imperial bureaucrats, who will cower in their compounds much as they do now and issue statements about how democracy and human rights in "multi-ethnic" Kosovo are doing just fine, thank you very much. This isn't about Serbs or Albanians; it's about power and control.

Soul of a Nation

Kosovo is much more than 15 percent of modern Serbia's territory, or a depository of mineral wealth, as some materialistic analysts dub it. It is the birthplace of Serb ethnic identity. Every nation has its own "creation myth." Americans celebrate their own every 4th of July: the Declaration of Independence, George Washington and the Continental Army, the Boston Tea Party For Serbs, it is a hot summer day in 1389 when their quarrelsome nobles rallied to offer battle to the invading Turks. Perhaps the actions of Prince Lazar and his nobles were not so pure as the oral tradition made them out to be but they nonetheless inspired such a tradition, and ensured that a spirit of liberty and honor persevered for the next 400 years under the cruel Ottoman yoke. This tradition infuriates the modern "liberals" and "democrats," who true to their Communist roots fear and despise religion, deny objective morality, and wallow in relativist drivel. It is not a coincidence that the loudest and most obnoxious Serb-haters in Serbia itself are formerly privileged members of the Old Regime and their young protgs.

The Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, Imperial or Nazi Germany, the Comintern, or the American Hegemony: every force that saw Serbia as a threat throughout its modern history has sought to deprive the Serbs of Kosovo in some way, recognizing its value to the Serb identity sometimes more than the Serbs themselves.

A Matter of Values

On Oct. 29, Serbian voters narrowly approved a new constitution, which asserts in the preamble that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbian territory. The constitution is far from ideal; it is too long, too cumbersome, too vague, and suffers from political correctness and welfare-statist nonsense. And it alone will not preserve Kosovo, nor make Serbia a better country. The American Constitution was written over two centuries ago, and is still one of the best in the world yet the U.S government has bent it out of shape for decades. Had any of the Founding Fathers imagined the modern federal bureaucracy and the taxation it requires to stay afloat, they would have surely chosen to remain English.
If it does not embody the values and beliefs of the population that created it, a constitution is nothing more than a scrap of paper. It is the values and beliefs or lack thereof that matter.

If Serbs truly value Kosovo, they have to assert not just sovereignty over the territory, but also a desire to live there. Otherwise, what is the point of keeping it in the first place? The biggest advantage the Albanians have in claiming Kosovo is that they want it. They also want other parts of Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Greece, but they can't even dream about any of that without Kosovo.

Liberty is a big part of Serb tradition. And property rights are inseparable from liberty. According to land registers, vast portions of the province are the outright property of the Orthodox Church (the name Metohija means "church land," after all). Yet how can Serbia claim Kosovo on that basis, while refusing to restore the property rights of the Church at home, or those of people whose possessions were seized by the Communists in 1945?

Not Theirs to Give

Struggling to rediscover their identity, culture, and tradition after decades of Communism, the Serbs need to decide whether to rebuild it on the already existing foundation of Kosovo, or choose something else altogether.
One alternative being offered is "Euro-Atlantic integrations,"
democracy, and human rights a worldview appealing greatly to the residues of Communist thinking.

A Serb poet commented last year: "If Kosovo is not ours, why are they asking us to give it up? If it is theirs, why are they taking it by force?
And if they can take it by force, why they are so circumspect about it?"

The Empire is pushing hard for the ruling circles in Belgrade to give up Kosovo, declare the rape of 1999 consensual, and abandon claims to law and principle in favor of temporary expedience. It is not a trade; the Empire is not offering anything. To take Kosovo, the Empire needs Serbia's consent.
Much as some people in Belgrade would be happy to oblige, that consent is not theirs to give.

The battle for Kosovo is not over yet.



Serbian News Network - SNN

news@antic.org

http://www.antic.org/

November 13, 2006

Ltr in response to "Kosovo cannot wait." Financial Times

Ltr in response to "Kosovo cannot wait." Financial Times



 
The Financial Times
 
Letter to the Editor(s)
 
13 November 2006
 
Regarding "Kosovo cannot wait," of 13 November, it never ceases to amaze me how generous other people are with other people's sovereign property, considering today that there are more practicing Muslims in Britain than there are practicing Anglicans, where British banks no longer give piggy banks as gifts for fear of offending the Muslim community, or where Muslims have openly declared, "We will replace the Bible with the Koran!" and where signs were carried in front of British Parliament saying, "Islam.  Our religion today; your religion tomorrow!
 
It may not be too long before Britain will have the same problem as there exists in Kosovo between Muslims and Christians and where today Kosovo is a region dominated by Muslim war criminals engaged in sex slavery, prostitution, murder, kidnapping and drugs. 
 
I wonder how generous the advice from The Financial Times will be when (not "if") the Muslim population outnumbers Britain's Christian citizens upon their demand for either autonomy or independence.
 
Be careful what you wish for.  You just may get it!
 
Stella L. Jatras
USA
****************************************************************

The following is from today’s Financial Times.

Kosovo cannot wait              http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3ba4939a-72bb-11db-a5f5-0000779e2340.html

Published: November 13 2006 02:00 | Last updated: November 13 2006 02:00

The international deadline set for the settlement of the Kosovo question - the last big territorial issue left by the collapse of Yugoslavia - is starting to slide. On Friday, Martti Ahtisaari, the United Nations' Kosovo talks envoy, postponed the announcement of his settlement proposals until 2007, abandoning plans to act before the year-end.

While a few weeks' delay is tolerable, any longer postponement could undermine hopes of a peaceful settlement and of a brighter future for one of Europe's most troubled regions.

Kosovo's majority ethnic Albanians want independence for a province that has been UN-ruled since 1999, when Nato troops forced out Slobodan Milosevic, former Serb leader. But Kosovo remains legally a part of Serbia - and Serbs insist it must remain so.

Mr Ahtisaari is expected to propose conditional independence in which Kosovo wins limited de facto sovereignty minus the full trappings of statehood. But even this will be too much for most Serbs. So he has delayed his announcement until after Serbian elections on January 21 - for fear that his plans would fuel extremist support.

Moderate Serb leaders are playing for time. Their tactics are not utterly hopeless. Russia, Belgrade's old ally, is pursuing more assertive foreign policies in every quarter - Kosovo is no exception. Moscow has signalled it sees the Ahtisaari plan as only a draft. With the US favouring early independence, the real bargaining is yet to come.

There are risks in imposing an early settlement. Belgrade could stir up Kosovo's Serbs, break transport links and - just possibly - provoke violence. But it must see that only the Serb-majority zone in northern Kosovo could possibly benefit. Serb communities in the south would face total isolation, or worse.

However, the dangers of international inaction are greater. Delay poisons Kosovo by preventing ethnic Albanians taking responsibility for their future and hampers economic development, as few companies will invest in a stateless zone. And, worst of all, it risks provoking renewed violence from frustrated ethnic Albanians.

An early settlement would give maximum political benefit to moderate ethnic Albanian leaders, creating the best environment for them to deal in future with Kosovo's Serbs and with Belgrade.

The likely settlement would also, rightly, impose tough conditions on Kosovo, including the presence of foreign troops and of a European Union supervisory mission. Local Serbs would have a lot of autonomy under decentralisation plans. Kosovo would be forbidden from merging with next-door Albania or the ethnic Albanian region of Macedonia. There must be no talk of Greater Albania.

Belgrade must be wooed with pledges of more solid EU ties. The Union faces huge challenges in the region. It must show it is still ready to shoulder the burden. The former Yugoslavia is too close to home to ignore.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006




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November 11, 2006

Kosovo: False calm before the real storm?

Kosovo: False calm before the real storm?



Kosovo: False calm before the real storm?

By M. Bozinovich

In the immediate aftermath of the successful referendum in Serbia on its new constitution, the EU foreign Minister Javier Solana congratulated Belgrade on referendum's orderly conduct and suggested that it is an important step in aligning Serbian legal structure with that of the European Union whose membership Serbia covets. In Washington, likewise, there was an approval of the referendum, while both, the EU and US stressed that the Kosovo status process must go on and Serbia is obligated to accept the results of the negotiating process.

Solana's and Washington's favorable reaction to the Serbian constitutional referendum was immediately objected by Albania, Kosovo Albanians and the International Crisis Group.

Albania blasted the Serbian constitutional referendum as "unacceptable" because it complicates the diplomatic negotiation on Kosovo at a time when, presumably, the UN Security Council is suppose to vote on amputating Kosovo from Serbia, and Serbia, finally got itself a constitution that major powers recognize and will have to consider what it says for any decision making process.

Albanian President Alfred Moisiu then raised the specter of violence with a claim that in case the Serbian referendum complicated the decision on Kosovo and precludes its independence then such "postponement of the decision on the final status of Kosovo will activate the extremist forces in the two countries." The countries Moisiu was referring to that will turn violent and extremist is Albania and Kosovo.

Kosovo Albanians dutifully dismissed the referendum as "not deserving a comment" so that by keeping their silence, Kosovo Albanians endorsed Moisiu's threat of violence and thus escalated their hostility against Serbia with whom Kosovo shares the longest border in case it ever becomes independent.

The International Crisis Group, however, sought to produce, at least some, civilized evidence for this forlorn dud and join the ethnic Albanian political body in malevolent attacks of spite on the Serbian state. In it's media release titled Serbia's Constitutional Referendum: A Question Of Validity, the Group sought to delegitimize Serbian referendum by making claims that it has witnesses that saw mass voter fraud although the only authoritativeness of that press release may be the appearance of a colon in the title that imitates serious analysis.

So says the Group: "Witnesses and videotape evidence indicate that many voters were permitted not only to vote without providing photographic identification," writes the Group and adds that "entire referendum process was deliberately skewed in advance by the authorities."

That ethnic Albanian political leadership is, indeed, seriously upset by the Western endorsement of the new Serbian constitution was expressed by ICG’s Belgrade director, James Lyon, who roared in his blog on the web site of B92 with a Stalinist parody of the Serbian referendum.

Anywho…

Land-for-protection offer

The EU appears less alarmed by the ethnic Albanian threats of violence then Washington.

"The issue of the future status of Kosovo is a different matter that is being dealt with by [UN envoy] Martti Ahtisaari," said European Commission spokeswoman Krisztina Nagy and left the matter at that.

Washington, however, was quick to send its envoy Frank Wisner to Kosovo while some "unnamed" diplomats told the Kosovo Albanian newspaper Ekspres that UN is prepared to take away Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo but was not willing to grant full independence.

"Although the draft solution on the status of Kosovo, presented to the Contact Group by the mediator in the negotiations Martti Ahtisaari, does not contain the term independence, it provides for authorizations that could lead to conditional independence", wrote the daily citing some unnamed source who may have spoken in order to lay some ground work in advance of Frank Wisner's discussion with Kosovo Albanians.

Nevertheless, this is a significant development because it is the first time that, supposedly a Washington-based, unnamed source has altogether sidelined independence, unconditional and conditional, from the negotiating table.

In the past, this "unnamed" source close to the Contact Group was first promising an unconditional independence, then a "precisely worded" Security Council Resolution that will recognize Kosovo independence once some 13 criteria are met by Albanians, then rumors floated of a supervised independence and now the independence is sidelined altogether and replaced by administered sovereignty.

The point here is that there is a gradual and sustained reduction in the levels of independence that the Contact Group is offering to Kosovo Albanians and that for every reduction in the independence offer we have an escalation of independence rhetoric in the media in order to compensate for the anger the reduction may cause to the ethnic Albanian political leaders.

Exhausting All Independence Options

It then emerges that the deadline that Washington is chasing may be more for military reasons then for any practical matters of diplomacy that sound logic dictates.

"You need only three people, one landmine, one flag and a press communique to have an incident," says Macedonian Foreign Minister Antonio Milososki after talks with EU officials. Then he added that it is always best to take difficult decisions in the Balkans in winter before the snows melt and fighters can take to the mountains.

Since the Serbian army is mostly a mechanized mobile force that prefers to stay away from mountains, it follows that whatever the tough decision Contact Group makes, that decision will trigger Kosovo Albanian military reaction against the NATO troops on the ground.

It is perhaps this forward diplomatic knowledge of the effects of the actual decision that prompted NATO to sign military withdrawal rights through Serbia last year while using media to raise Kosovo Albanian expectations through the heavens not that they will ever be delivered but in order to tranquilize and perhaps set the most extremist elements of the Kosovo Albanian leadership in power and for a dramatic fall.

It is unlikely that the 1,100 US military personnel will institute the fall because they are there to stay. Recent beating of an American serviceman by Kosovo Albanians in a gas station demonstrates the precariousness of these troops that are afraid to even retaliate for that brutal beating although many know the names of these Kosovo Albanian drug-military gangsters that did the beating.

Before and if any military action breaks out in Kosovo, Washington appears to be engaged in a demonstration to the Kosovo Albanian leadership that it is willing to explore all diplomatic venues and thus exhaust all independence options. Given that independence is taken off the table, Washington has delinked sovereignty from independence and is publicly peddling that mantra.

Promising that he will press on the issue of an administered sovereignty with Belgrade, Wisner probably asked Kosovo Albanians in his recent visit for some additional token bargain that he could offer once he arrives in Belgrade.

According to a UPI report, once in Belgrade, Wisner said that in an independent Kosovo minority Serbs will be the best protected national group in the Balkans although, a wise diplomat that Wisner is, he should have known how ridiculous this "land-for-protection" offer sounds.

Wisner then proceeded to real business of reminding Serbia that status decision is near, a code word for urging Belgrade to quickly ratify the constitution because the idea of writing a new Serbian constitution suddenly became a paramount issue in Serbian politics only after Serbian President Tadic's visit to Washington in early October.

As the showdown on the decision on Kosovo status rapidly approaches the Security Council table, Washington and the British are also refining their promises to Kosovo Albanians arguing that, despite Russian and Chinese promises to veto independence, the Security Council will allow other states to recognize Kosovo Albanian independence.

“The Security Council would issue a mandate for a mission led by the European Union and invite individual countries to recognize Kosovo,” says said Anthony C. Welch of Britain, the coordinator of a review of Kosovo’s future security needs commissioned by the United Nations.

In other words, Kosovo Albanians are no longer promised any independence and, based on the track record of broken promises, a sane Kosovo Albanian politician now in power should not believe anything that the West is saying.

Instead of independence then, Washington and London are telling Kosovo Albanians that the Security Council will veto independence, that the EU will come in to rule Kosovo and perhaps, if they are good pets, individual countries may recognize them.

Will there be criteria for recognition? If so what is it? Is there a time line and if so what is it? Kosovo Albanians have no answer to any of these concrete questions yet they are blindly believing anything that Washington and the British promise to them.

According to a Reuters report, Agim Ceku expressed this blind trust in Western powers to grant Kosovo independence by the end of 2006.

“We trust the international community to drive this process through to the correct conclusion," Ceku said in a speech at Chatham House, the foreign policy think-tank, after meeting the British government on final status talks.

According to another unnamed senior European diplomat in the Kosovo capital Pristina the Security Council will offer Kosovo Albanians a solution proposal that only appears to have characters of independence but in reality, Kosovo Albanians will not get it.

“He doesn't mention independence but Ahtisaari is describing the criteria which characterise an independent country,’ the unnamed one said.

As a result of a Security Council deadlock, no independence but only promises, Kosovo Albanians would unilaterally declare independence and thus instigate a crisis with Serbia.

At that point, the Resolution 1244 would be suspended because it would be replaced with another. The language of the resolution that replaces the 1244 will dictate what happens after Kosovo Albanians unilaterally declare independence.
http://www.serbianna.com/columns/mb/052.shtml


                                   Serbian News Network - SNN

                                        news@antic.org

                                    http://www.antic.org/




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WT EDITORIAL "HERE COMES KOSOVO"






WT EDITORIAL "HERE COMES KOSOVO"




FYi: This is my comment on the  subject editorial I sent to the WP.  I am sure they will  not print it, but I am confident that some of their honchos will read it,....I hope with some thought....   

 '''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' 

TO:  Editor, Editorial Page
     The Washington Post

SUBJECT:  EDITORIAL "HERE COMES KOSOVO"  (11/10/06)


     It is generally known and accepted that most Americans do not know, understand or like history, which most other cultures accept and study as an invaluable source of knowledge and experience. "Mater studiorum," the old Romans used to call it.

     Less informed Americans, on the other hand, look at history as an unnecessary burden that can only have a negative influence on the present state of affairs. That is best reflected in the saying, "You are history," which is usually directed at someone who has little to say or is possibly  too closely associated with the past.

     The Washington Post editorial, "Here Comes Kosovo" (11/10/06) is a perfect example of willful ignorance with respect to the Serbian province of Kosovo, the very cradle of the Serbian nation. Nowhere does the editorial note that Kosovo, which means in Serbian, the field of black birds, has been a part of Serbia, ever since the Serbs moved to it in the sixth century, four centuries before any Albanians  were heard of in the Balkans,

     Moreover, the editorial says that "By incorporating Kosovo into a new constitution, Serbia's leaders staked out yet another of the reckless nationalist stands that have caused their country so much  damage in the past 115 years." Wrong again! It is the malevolent ignorance of historic facts, so grossly displayed by The Washington Post and other similarly inspired American publications that has caused so much damage to a small but brave nation and a loyal ally in two world wars. The Serbs do not want what belongs to others, but they will not give away what is rightfully  theirs.

     I am fully confident that the US and its citizens will react in the same way if someone suddenly decides that Southern California and/or New Mexico should secede just because there are more Spanish speaking Mexicans living there.

     The "2 million enraged Albanians" in Kosovo, need to control their "meltdown" or just go where they came from, the neighboring Republic of Albania. Most Albanians came to Kosovo during World War II. with the help of the Albanian  volunteer SS Division Skenderbeg, and during Marshall Tito's rule of Yugoslavia that maintained an open border with Albania as a show close wartime relationship between Yugoslavia's communist leader Tito and Albania's communist leader Enver Hoxha. Ever since then the incoming Albanians have systematically  ethnically cleansed Kosovo of untold numbers of Kosovo Serbs.

     The Washington Post editorial writers should study history. That would assure, at least, more meaningful and more accurate editorials

                         Michael Mennard, Ph.D.
                             20804 Noble Terrace #312
                               Potomac Falls, VA 20165
                              tel. 703/450-0789
                            e-mail:  mmennard@aol.com   
 
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Here Comes Kosovo

A decision to make the Serb province independent is near. Will Serbia and Russia obstruct it?

Friday, November 10, 2006; Page A30

THE SERBIAN parliament formally adopted a new national constitution on Wednesday, following its narrow approval by voters in a referendum last month. The document was a necessary replacement of the previous charter, which was adopted during the rule of nationalist warlord Slobodan Milosevic. But it may have won acceptance only because it included a preamble that would have warmed Mr. Milosevic's heart: a declaration that the province of Kosovo, which Serbia in effect lost seven years ago, is an "integral" and "inalienable" part of the country.

In fact, the United Nations, which has governed Kosovo since NATO freed it from Mr. Milosevic's brutal ethnic cleansing campaign, is due to decide the province's future by year-end -- though a decision may be delayed until after a Serbian election scheduled for late January. Serb leaders know what a U.N. mediator will recommend and what all Western governments will support: independence for the territory, perhaps with transitional conditions. Kosovo is populated overwhelmingly by ethnic Albanians; after the ethnic war Mr. Milosevic initiated, there is no chance the province can be returned to Serbian sovereignty. By incorporating a claim to Kosovo into a new constitution, Serbia's leaders staked out yet another of the reckless nationalist stands that have caused their country so much damage in the past 15 years.

They also set the stage for some difficult and potentially dangerous diplomacy between the Bush administration and Russia over the next two months -- negotiations that could settle or destabilize the Balkans and the equally volatile Caucasus region on Russia's southern border. Russia, Serbia's long-standing ally, is the largest potential obstacle to consensus in the U.N. Security Council on a Kosovo solution. Though he knows that independence for Kosovo is inevitable, Russian President Vladimir Putin is hinting that he may support Serbia's obstructionism. He may hope to extract favors from President Bush in exchange for his eventual cooperation -- such as U.S. acquiescence to Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization.

Or Mr. Putin may try to use Kosovo to trigger a showdown with his Caucasus neighbor, Georgia, which has infuriated him by embracing liberal democracy and seeking integration into Western institutions such as NATO. Mr. Putin has said that Kosovo's independence could be a precedent for Moscow-sponsored breakaway regions in Eurasia, including two rebel provinces of Georgia. If Western governments recognize Kosovo's independence, Mr. Putin could respond by recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This could easily trigger a war that would draw in Russian troops; meanwhile, Moscow's position could encourage Serbs in Kosovo and Bosnia to set up splinter states.

Moscow is no doubt hoping that as the Bush administration contemplates this scenario, as well as its continuing need for Russian help in stopping Iran's nuclear program, it will be bluffed into postponing any decision on Kosovo or will abandon its support of Georgia's democracy and NATO aspirations. Either would be a serious mistake. Putting off Kosovo's independence would only enrage the province's 2 million Albanians and trigger the Balkan meltdown that the West hopes to avoid. It would also encourage Mr. Putin's growing tendency to use threats -- whether of energy-supply interruptions or violence -- to get his way with the West.

                                 



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November 10, 2006

The Battle for Kosovo

The Battle for Kosovo



 
AntiWar.com
November 9, 2006
 
The Battle for Kosovo
by Nebojsa Malic

[Adapted from remarks given before the Njegos Endowment for Serbian Studies, Columbia University, New York, Nov. 3.]

Not Decided Yet

If one were to be informed strictly by the mainstream media in the English-speaking world, it would be very hard to harbor any doubts about the future status of Kosovo. The occupied Serbian province – though, of course, never referred to as such, but always as a region with a 90 percent Albanian majority – is expected to declare independence within months, if not weeks, with the full support of Washington, London, and Brussels.

Could it be, however, that these tireless tirades about the "inevitability" of Kosovo's separation are an effort to counter the fact that it is by no means inevitable, perhaps not even as likely as it would have been several years ago?

Albanian arguments for secession are well known: majority of the population, a claim to self-determination, allegations of Serb repression, atrocities, "ethnic cleansing," etc. Most of this is fiction, the rest quite irrelevant. There is only one real argument, that of force. NATO's 1999 intervention and the subsequent occupation of Kosovo have created a "reality on the ground." But since the civilized world still hesitates to endorse naked aggression, the case for "Kosova" is dressed in humanitarian clothing and the rhetoric of "liberation."

Logic favors the Serb arguments, though. If the borders of the Yugoslav republics were declared sacrosanct in an effort to deny the Serbs west of the Drina their right of self-determination in the 1990s, then Serbia's borders ought to be sacrosanct, too, no matter how loudly the KLA complains or how violent it gets. ICG founder Morton Abramowitz dismisses this as "Serbs seeking perfect reasoning," but there's nothing perfect about it. It is simple logic, unlike the completely irrational "logic" of the Empire, which proclaims one rule today and a completely different one tomorrow to suit its own caprices. As Doug Bandow once remarked, the only rule in the Balkans seems to be "the Serbs always lose."

For what it's worth, then, the law is firmly on Belgrade's side as well; no other country in the world has been forced to give up a part of its territory to a separatist minority, especially not through illegal occupation as a result of illegal aggression. It took the post-Milosevic leadership in Belgrade five years to understand this basic concept, but they appear to have lined up behind it to the best of their ability.

This is why the Contact Group – an abomination resurrected from the ashes of Europe's dark past – has organized the "negotiations" on Kosovo's status as a way to pressure Serbia to voluntarily surrender its occupied territory. In the words of one commentator, it is an offer to declare rape consensual.

Power and Control

What happened in 1998 and 1999 was not a result of Albanian lobbying. It came about as a result of joint policy by imperialists in America and Europe who saw Serbia as an obstacle to their control of "Southeastern Europe." Albanians were used as a weapon against Serbia. This is why Kosovo did not become independent in 1999, and has not become independent yet.

The 1999 war was more than just a distraction from Clinton's sexcapades; other people were involved as well. Many principals of NATO's endeavor are still around, or have been promoted. Take for example Javier Solana, then secretary-general of NATO, now the de facto foreign minister of the EU. More to the point, the worldview imposed by NATO in 1999 – the asserted "right" of those with military power to attack anyone, anywhere, on a fabricated pretext, in direct violation of international law, conventions, and treaties – is dominant today.

The destruction of Yugoslavia was partly engineered – certainly encouraged – by imperialist politicians in Europe and America, as a way to claim more power, escape the confines of international law, and flex their newfound imperial muscle. In 1990, a German who dared envision the Bundeswehr occupying a portion of Serbia following the Luftwaffe bombing of Belgrade would have been arrested on charges of glorifying the Nazi past. Yet both of those things came to pass and were praised as "progress." Today, the German military is girding for more foreign intervention, without a word of protest.

In 1991, Americans wanted a "peace dividend" from four decades of gearing up for war with the Soviet Union. What they got was a "benevolent global hegemony" that seeks to insert American money, troops, and bombs into every corner of the globe that a handful of policymakers in Washington believes crucial to ongoing American world supremacy.

If rumors about Ahtisaari's proposal are true, the Empire is trying to establish a Bosnia-style arrangement in Kosovo, which would give Albanians independence on paper but make them a dependency of the EU in fact. As said here before, this sort of "solution" is the worst of all worlds; the Albanians would continue to blame everyone else for the barbaric state of their society and economy (for which they have only themselves to blame), taking that anger out on the few remaining Serbs – who will be cut off from Serbia and trapped in "diversity reservations" much as they are now – and the transient imperial bureaucrats, who will cower in their compounds much as they do now and issue statements about how democracy and human rights in "multi-ethnic" Kosovo are doing just fine, thank you very much. This isn't about Serbs or Albanians; it's about power and control.

Soul of a Nation

Kosovo is much more than 15 percent of modern Serbia's territory, or a depository of mineral wealth, as some materialistic analysts dub it. It is the birthplace of Serb ethnic identity. Every nation has its own "creation myth." Americans celebrate their own every 4th of July: the Declaration of Independence, George Washington and the Continental Army, the Boston Tea Party… For Serbs, it is a hot summer day in 1389 when their quarrelsome nobles rallied to offer battle to the invading Turks. Perhaps the actions of Prince Lazar and his nobles were not so pure as the oral tradition made them out to be – but they nonetheless inspired such a tradition, and ensured that a spirit of liberty and honor persevered for the next 400 years under the cruel Ottoman yoke. This tradition infuriates the modern "liberals" and "democrats," who – true to their Communist roots – fear and despise religion, deny objective morality, and wallow in relativist drivel. It is not a coincidence that the loudest and most obnoxious Serb-haters in Serbia itself are formerly privileged members of the Old Regime and their young protégés.

The Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, Imperial or Nazi Germany, the Comintern, or the American Hegemony: every force that saw Serbia as a threat throughout its modern history has sought to deprive the Serbs of Kosovo in some way, recognizing its value to the Serb identity – sometimes more than the Serbs themselves.

A Matter of Values

On Oct. 29, Serbian voters narrowly approved a new constitution, which asserts in the preamble that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbian territory. The constitution is far from ideal; it is too long, too cumbersome, too vague, and suffers from political correctness and welfare-statist nonsense. And it alone will not preserve Kosovo, nor make Serbia a better country. The American Constitution was written over two centuries ago, and is still one of the best in the world – yet the U.S government has bent it out of shape for decades. Had any of the Founding Fathers imagined the modern federal bureaucracy and the taxation it requires to stay afloat, they would have surely chosen to remain English. If it does not embody the values and beliefs of the population that created it, a constitution is nothing more than a scrap of paper. It is the values and beliefs – or lack thereof – that matter.

If Serbs truly value Kosovo, they have to assert not just sovereignty over the territory, but also a desire to live there. Otherwise, what is the point of keeping it in the first place? The biggest advantage the Albanians have in claiming Kosovo is that they want it. They also want other parts of Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Greece, but they can't even dream about any of that without Kosovo.

Liberty is a big part of Serb tradition. And property rights are inseparable from liberty. According to land registers, vast portions of the province are the outright property of the Orthodox Church (the name Metohija means "church land," after all). Yet how can Serbia claim Kosovo on that basis, while refusing to restore the property rights of the Church at home, or those of people whose possessions were seized by the Communists in 1945?

Not Theirs to Give

Struggling to rediscover their identity, culture, and tradition after decades of Communism, the Serbs need to decide whether to rebuild it on the already existing foundation of Kosovo, or choose something else altogether. One alternative being offered is "Euro-Atlantic integrations," democracy, and human rights – a worldview appealing greatly to the residues of Communist thinking.

A Serb poet commented last year: "If Kosovo is not ours, why are they asking us to give it up? If it is theirs, why are they taking it by force? And if they can take it by force, why they are so circumspect about it?"

The Empire is pushing hard for the ruling circles in Belgrade to give up Kosovo, declare the rape of 1999 consensual, and abandon claims to law and principle in favor of temporary expedience. It is not a trade; the Empire is not offering anything. To take Kosovo, the Empire needs Serbia's consent. Much as some people in Belgrade would be happy to oblige, that consent is not theirs to give.

The battle for Kosovo is not over yet.






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Kosovo: Bulgaria, Macedonia and Montenegro have betrayed Serbia

Kosovo: Bulgaria, Macedonia and Montenegro have betrayed Serbia



Kosovo: Bulgaria, Macedonia and Montenegro have betrayed Serbia

Read it in Russian

In the last months, the head of the interim government of Kosovo Agim Ceku have visited a number of countries to enlist their support for Kosovo's independence. He visited the US and the UK, Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia. Ceku's visits have not gone unnoticed: the world community is very much interested in what status Kosovo will get and in what stance the UN SC and Contact Group members and Balkan states have on the matter. Special attention was given to Ceku's Nov 3 visit to Montenegro, who quite recently voted to secede from Serbia.

In Montenegro Ceku met with the prime minister, the speaker of the parliament, the FM, and all of them treated him as the head of the government of a state. Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic said that the key topic of his talk with Ceku was not the status of Kosovo but the future of the region and good neighbor relations between Montenegro and Kosovo. Ignoring the fact that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbia, Djukanovic stressed that, despite its status, Kosovo is Montenegro's neighbor and so, the sides should be interested in being good neighbors.

Djukanovic and Ceku exchanged their views of how to eliminate structural restrictions to the liberalization of the energy and other markets in the Balkans and how to attract big investors in the region. They also stressed the need to open new border crossings for bringing closer the business interests of Montenegro and Kosovo and discussed ways to strengthen border control and to jointly fight organized crime. Djukanovic said that Montenegrin and Kosovan government delegations would meet to discuss the return of Kosovan refugees in Montenegro.

Concerning the status of Kosovo, Djukanovic said that Montenegro is interested in the urgent resolution of this problem – under the agreement between Belgrade and Pristina and with the consent of the world community – and is ready to support any decision to be passed by the world community. Ceku used his visit to state once again that the provision of Kosovo with independence is the only permanent decision. He once more expressed conviction that this decision will be made by the end of this year.

During his visit to Montenegro, Ceku also met with the leaders of the Albanian parties in Montenegro and with the heads of the Albanian community of Ulcinj, a municipality where Albanians constitute over 70% of the population. Ceku said that the Albanian community in Montenegro has always been constructive: it has never posed a threat to the country's interests but, on the contrary, has actively protected them. Ceku commended the Albanian community for their active role in the current processes in Montenegro and expressed hope that "the Montenegrin Government will respond positively by guaranteeing the exercise of the rights of Albanians in Montenegro."

It is not clear what rights Ceku meant, but it is known well that the Montenegrin Albanians want autonomy and hope that Kosovo's independence will help them in the matter. Some people believe that the Montenegrin authorities invited Ceku to Montenegro with a view to improve their relations with the local Albanian minority after the Sept 2006 arrest of Albanian extremists from the Movement for the Rights of Albanians in Montenegro. On Nov 6, Montenegrin Public Prosecutor Vesna Medenica said that this group, together with the fighters from the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army, were plotting terrorist acts in the territory of Montenegro.

The visit of Ceku has received a very negative response from the opposition parties of Montenegro, who said that it was "a scandal that will cause grave political consequences" and "an attempt to stab in the back the Serbian leaders and all Serbs in the Balkans." The Socialist People's Party of Montenegro said that the invitation of Ceku, "the well-known representative of the Kosovan extremists," was an act of open support for those forces who want to separate Kosovo and Metohija from Serbia. "The visit of Ceku, who is suspected of having committed military crimes against Serbs, Montenegrins and other non-Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija, looked especially provocative as it took place right after the adoption of the Constitution of Serbia and exactly at the moment when the world community is trying to solve the problem of Kosovo and Metohija in line with the UN Charter and UN SC Resolution 1244."

The Democratic Serbian Party said that "now that Serbia is taking active diplomatic steps to keep Kosovo from secession and the problem of the status of this southern Serbian region is entering the final stage, the invitation of Ceku to visit Montenegro was a non-diplomatic act" and can be interpreted as an interference in the internal affairs of another state. The Socialist People's Party of Montenegro said that "by inviting Ceku, Djukanovic and his regime have openly taken the side of the Albanian extremists in Kosovo and Metohija," while the People's Party of Montenegro said that "by so doing they have shown support for the Ceku separatist regime" and that "Montenegro's independence gained with the decisive support of Albanians was just the first step towards the possible secession of Kosovo and Metohija from Serbia." The party urged all opposition parties to initiate a special parliamentary session for considering "the Montenegrin authorities' open support for the Albanian separatists in Kosovo."

They in Serbia have strongly criticized the invitation of Ceku to Montenegro. Serbian President Boris Tadic said that it was "an unacceptable and unnecessary gesture" by Djukanovic now that the sides are negotiating the future status of Kosovo. They in the Serbian Government said that Kosovo is an inalienable part of Serbia rather than "a neighbor state for Montenegro" as the Montenegrin officials said. Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica warned the Montenegrin Government that they "should respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia in line with the UN Charter and the international law. Otherwise, they will be responsible for possible serious consequences in Serbian-Montenegrin relations."

The G-17+ party said that the position of the Montenegrin authorities does not contribute to the development of good neighbor relations between Serbia and Montenegro and must be condemned, while the secretary general of the Serbian Radical Party Aleksandar Vucic said that it was "the most shameful act in the history of Montenegro" and "the Montenegrin authorities just returned the favor done to them during the referendum [on Montenegro's independence]." The Socialist Party of Serbia demanded that the Serbian authorities show tough reaction to this "anti-Serbian gesture" of the Montenegrin leadership. The Blitz daily (Belgrade) said that "Djukanovic may go into history as the person who restored Montenegro's independence but he is also the person who spoiled Montenegro's relations with Serbia — the first and most natural ally."

Djukanovic and Montenegrin Foreign Minister Vlahovic denied the charges and said that the talks with Ceku have not spoiled Montenegro's relations with Serbia, who remains the country's key partner, and were not aimed at influencing the talks for Kosovo's future status.

In their turn, the Kosovan authorities have blamed Serbia for interfering in the policies of its neighbors. The spokeswoman of the Kosovan Government Ujlpijana Ljama said that Serbia should accept the new reality in the Balkans. However, some forces in Kosovo think otherwise. The Serbian Vece believes that the decision of the Montenegrin authorities to officially receive Ceku has deeply hurt the Serbs and the Montenegrins in Kosovo. However, this step was not unexpected as Djukanovic is deeply in debt to the Albanian community for his stay in power all these years.

After his visit to Montenegro, Ceku continued his tour: he visited Albania, on Nov 6 he went to Slovakia, where local officials told him that the decision on Kosovo's status requires absolute consensus and that the Kosovan authorities should refrain from one-sided steps. And now Ceku is planning to go to Moscow and is waiting for the Russians' response to his wish to visit Russia for explaining the stance of the Kosovan leadership…

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