January 30, 2021

Serbian President Sends Lieutenant To Washington As Belgrade Seeks Tighter U.S. Relations

rferl.org

Serbian President Sends Lieutenant To Washington As Belgrade Seeks Tighter U.S. Relations

Todd Prince

9-11 minutes


WASHINGTON -- The massive new residence of the Serbian ambassador in the Embassy Row area of Washington is more than an upgrade for its young inhabitant and his family.

Ambassador Marko Djuric says the nearly 100-year-old, Georgian-style brick home is also a symbol of the investment the Balkan nation is making in its relationship with the United States, an important regional peace arbitrator.

A key aspect of that investment includes plans to open a trade office with consular services on the West Coast as Belgrade seeks to deepen ties with the U.S. tech industry.

Djuric told RFE/RL that Serbia will also open another consulate in a yet-to-be-determined American city -- adding to the ones it already has in Chicago and New York -- as part of a renewed outreach to its diaspora.

The ambassador will be helped in his government, business, and cultural outreach by a staff that has grown by 50 percent in the past few months.

"We came with a very ambitious agenda to increase the level of exchange between our two countries and increase the level of trust," he told RFE/RL on January 22 at the new residence, which he will use to host officials and events.

One day earlier, Washington penned an agreement with Belgrade to launch the Serbian operations of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, a state-run institution that invests in private companies operating in critical sectors of the economy and offers political-risk insurance to encourage investment.

"I'm convinced that we'll have a more solid base for closer political ties the closer we get in economic terms," Djuric said. "And this is what we want to achieve. This is the strategy."

The Serbian Chamber of Commerce, which is partnering with the embassy to open a West Coast trade office, has already taken steps to make that happen with several trade missions to the United States since 2019, including meeting officials on Capitol Hill to promote business ties. Two years ago, the chamber hired the D.C.-based lobby firm Yorktown Solutions as part of its U.S. outreach effort.

Military Cooperation

Djuric is also hoping to increase military cooperation, including Serbian companies supplying U.S. arms manufacturers with components or weapons.

Serbia inherited a strong military-industrial complex from the former Yugoslavia and sells rifles and ammunition in the U.S. retail market. The U.S. Army announced in December it had requested that a Serbian-made, wheeled howitzer participate in an international competition scheduled for early this year.

"When you're a small country it's not easy to be in the same pond with global players who are all competing for their share of this market. This is one reason why Serbia's defense industry is looking for ways to partner with the U.S. defense industry, so that we can maybe jointly engage in certain projects," said Djuric, adding he had met with officials from the Defense Department.

A potential impediment to further military cooperation between Belgrade and Washington could be notorious Serbian arms dealer Slobodan Tesic, who is believed to be involved in many of Serbia's armaments and munitions companies and has been accused of involvement in many illicit international arms deals.

Tesic -- considered one of the biggest arms dealers in the Balkans -- was blacklisted by the United States in 2017 and nine of his associates were hit with sanctions in 2019 for doing Tesic's bidding in running his material support network. Tesic has been on the United Nations travel ban for nearly a decade for his role in selling arms to Liberia.

Tesic either continues to own or control the Serbian arms companies Partizan Tech, Technoglobal, Grawit Limited, and Charso Limited, the U.S. Treasury Department said.

Working With Biden's Administration

Djuric will have his work cut out for him especially after Democrat Joe Biden, a Western Balkan hand, was elected president, analysts say.

U.S.-Serbian relations were severely strained after the breakup of Yugoslavia three decades ago, though ties have gradually improved.

The United States led a NATO air campaign against Serbian forces in 1999 to stop a deadly crackdown on its ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo. Washington then led an international campaign to recognize Kosovo's independence in 2008.

Then-U.S. Vice President Joe Biden (left) with Aleksandar Vucic in Belgrade in August 2016

Serbia's refusal to recognize its former southern region as an independent country lies at the heart of its problems with the United States and the European Union.

Belgrade's tight relations with Moscow, its growing business ties to China, the modernization of its military, and what critics say is a rolling back of democratic practices are other contentious issues in bilateral relations.

Washington and Brussels are dangling membership in international organizations, such as the EU, to entice Belgrade to change its stance on the recognition of Kosovo.

Close Confidant

Djuric, 37, took up his job in Washington in December and is one of the youngest foreign envoys to the United States. It is also his first foreign posting.

Despite his lack of a formal foreign-service experience, analysts say his appointment -- much like his new residence -- is a sign of Belgrade's desire to enhance ties with Washington.

Djuric is a close confidant of populist Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, who was elected in 2017 after serving as prime minister for several years.

Djuric was one of the first to join Vucic's Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in 2008 and currently serves as one of its vice presidents. Vucic tapped him several years ago to lead Serbian negotiations over Kosovo, putting him at times at the table with U.S. officials. He was also an informal SNS liaison to the pro-Kremlin United Russia party, the Chinese Communist Party, and Israel's ruling Likud party, analysts say.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic (left) with Marko Djuric in Belgrade (file photo)

"He is a guy who has Vucic's ear, knows him well, and I think that's a strength for any ambassador," Kyle Scott, the U.S. ambassador to Serbia from 2016 to 2019, told RFE/RL. "I can see that Vucic would want to have somebody who he has total confidence in here in Washington."

Djuric, Scott said, is very experienced in dealing with Americans.

Vuk Vuksanovic, an analyst at the Belgrade Center for Security Policy, told RFE/RL that the appointment of Djuric is "Vucic's way of sending a message to Washington that 'I am very interested in forming closer ties.'"

His appointment was followed a month later by Vucic's dismissal of two ministers with close ties to Russia, which some viewed as a doubling down on efforts to sway Western perceptions of Belgrade.

Djuric was appointed as Serbian ambassador to Washington in October, a month before the U.S. presidential election that pitted Donald Trump against Biden.

Trump was viewed in Belgrade as someone who could deliver Serbia a better deal on Kosovo than Biden, and Vucic expressed his preference for the incumbent. He also offered ample praise to the Trump administration for its efforts, led by envoy Richard Grenell, to secure the Kosovo and Serbia economic normalization agreement, which Vucic signed at the White House in September.

"Had President Trump been reelected, mending Serbia's relationship with the U.S. would have been possible without many strings attached regarding Serbia's record on democracy and human rights, its relationship to the Kremlin, or its treatment of transitional justice and war crimes committed by its government in the 1990s," Majda Ruge, a Balkan expert and senior fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told RFE/RL.

"This sort of carte blanche on many policy issues will not be available under Biden's team. Therefore, the success of Mr. Djuric's mission will depend on Serbia's willingness to tackle some of these big topics and Mr. Djuric's ability to convincingly communicate Serbia's willingness to do so," she said.

Economic Progress?

Djuric downplayed the importance of the U.S. election result on the Serbian-U.S. relationship and expressed optimism that the two countries could still make progress on bilateral ties, especially in the economic sphere.

He pointed out that Vucic met Biden twice -- in 2009 and 2016 -- when he served as vice president in Barack Obama's administration and that Serbian officials are familiar with key members of his administration.

Serbian Foreign Minister Nikola Selakovic said Vucic and Biden could meet later this year, though did not say where.

"We should try to isolate the differences as much as possible and simply bypass things that we cannot agree on now. And look at the bigger picture," said Djuric, who was one of about 1,000 people that attended Biden's inauguration on January 20.

While Kosovo is the dominant issue, Scott said Belgrade should not underestimate the importance of domestic reforms if it wants to improve relations with Washington.

Critics have accused Vucic of tightening his grip on the country, including restricting press freedoms. Biden ran on a platform of strengthening democracy around the world and highlighted his concern about a rollback in the freedoms of some European countries.

"I don't feel that [Serbia] has taken them as seriously as they could have over the last few years. They are now making a better game of talking about it, but they have got to stop talking about it and actually start doing things," Scott said.

 

January 28, 2021

A surprise for us from the White House; "It won't take long"

b92.net

A surprise for us from the White House; "It won't take long"

6-8 minutes


Although many analysts predicted that our region would not be high on the priority scale for the new American president Joseph Biden, he surprised them.

Source: Sputnik Thursday, January 28, 2021 | 08:29

The White House has revealed that Western Balkans is among the six priorities of the new US administration. This means that Serbia must be ready for new challenges, primarily pertaining to the Kosovo issue, writes Sputnik.

As bad as it may seem that the Western Balkans are among the priorities of American foreign policy, which means reaching a comprehensive agreement between Belgrade and Pristina, the intensity of pressure on us cannot be too strong or last too long, believes Aleksandar Gajic from the Institute for European Studies.

After a telephone conversation between President Joseph Biden and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the White House announced that the Western Balkans are among the six priorities of American foreign policy. The issue of reaching an agreement between Belgrade and Pristina was found, side by side, with Afghanistan, Russia, China, Iran and Ukraine, where the American administration sees the biggest problems it would like to solve.

"The news of the conversation between Biden and Merkel on the priorities of joint action in foreign policy regarding the Western Balkans is not good for us. It speaks of their intention to put pressure on the Serbian side in a coordinated manner in order to reach a comprehensive agreement that would indirectly lead to recognition of Kosovo and Metohija as an independent state, and it joining international organizations," Gajic points out for Sputnik, who nevertheless notes that all this is not surprising for him.

Given the above mentioned priorities, the U.S. and German foreign policy consider Western Balkans as one in which it is easier to reach the goal than in other cases. It will be much harder to go with Iran, Ukraine... where they have disagreements about strategic interests, so it is understandable to put the Western Balkans on the list, he explains.

"There is a partial overlap here, but temporarily, because at some point there will be a confrontation in relation to the great powers in the UN Security Council that support Serbia's position on Kosovo and Metohija. I think that there is no essential coincidence between Germany and United States on the issue of foreign policy on the territory of the whole of Europe and even the Western Balkans. Now it is a matter of tactical coincidence to realize some interests to the detriment of Serbs, but in the long run, their interests do not coincide," said our interlocutor.

He also reminds that Merkel is withdrawing from the political scene and that the question is what kind of government will be formed after the September elections in Germany. That is why, he says, it can be expected that their unison and effort to act together will begin to weaken.

"On the other hand, I expect that Biden will also face with big problems at home in America and that he will not be able to focus on foreign policy in the Balkans with such zeal," he points out.

 

January 27, 2021

Serbia to spend €2.5 billion to aid recovery from coronavirus crisis

euractiv.com

Serbia to spend €2.5 billion to aid recovery from coronavirus crisis

EURACTIV.com with Reuters

2 minutes


Serbia plans to spend about €2.5 billion in loans and subsidies to businesses and payments to pensioners and other citizens to help them cope with the economic impact of the coronavirus, President Aleksandar Vučić said on Tuesday (26 January).

The package envisions an array of measures including payments amounting to 50% of the minimum wage to employees of micro and small enterprises and state guarantees for borrowing in commercial banks.

"We want to tremendously … bolster the private sector," Vučić told state-run RTS TV.

The state also plans to distribute €30 to every adult Serbian citizen or about 5 million people in May and November, and an additional €50 to every pensioner, Vučić said.

"There will be three (such) gifts for pensioners, and two for all adult citizens," Vučić said.

Vučić said the total public debt this year would not exceed 61% of gross domestic product (GDP).

Serbia's 2021 budget sees economic growth at 6%, following an estimated contraction of around 1% in 2020. It also sets the 2021 deficit at 3%. The International Monetary Fund sees Serbia's economy growing by 5% in 2021, after a forecast 1.5% contraction last year.

Last March, Serbia allocated €5.5 billion to help businesses and citizen cope with the crisis. Additional expenditures increased the deficit in 2020 to around 8.9%, up from the previously planned 0.3%.

In Serbia, which has a population of 7 million, 3,924 people have died from COVID-19 and 387,206 fell ill with it. The country, which has started a nationwide inoculation programme, registered a new strain of the coronavirus last week.

 

January 25, 2021

Putin, Russia, and the moral imperative of the West

blogs.lse.ac.uk

Putin, Russia, and the moral imperative of the West

Tomila Lankina

4-5 minutes


This weekend has seen protests across Russia in support of Alexei Navalny. Tomila Lankina argues that with citizens taking to the streets, western leaders and businesses should reflect on their own relationship with the country.

Imagine a world stripped of the basic elements of human decency, honesty, and honour, a world where the primordial instinct of greed, accumulation, avarice, and lust for endless power trumps any countervailing moral compasses or institutions that humanity have thought of to constrain and channel the base instincts of the primitive man.

Navalny's video of Putin's palace, watched over seventy million times, has given us a glimpse of that world – a world where vulgarity and naked gluttony of gargantuan proportions are only matched by the vast apparatus erected to defend and shelter Russia's kleptocracy against the citizen.

Western leaders have been complicit throughout in the perpetuation of the feast. They have become enablers – turning a blind eye to the visible and the not so well concealed "hidden" in plain sight edifices of theft that the Russian rich have erected, purchased, and laundered across Europe. Political leaders and the business class have been complicit by not robustly going after this corruptly acquired wealth and strangling the hydra personalised by Putin.

Over and over, Russian citizens have called upon European leaders to act and target where it hurts the most – the villas, the vineyards, the chateaux, and the insatiable greed and thirst for the formal trappings of education in elite private schools, Oxbridge, and the Ivy League. The properties especially should have been long frozen out and the feasts that they host squandering the proceeds of theft from the Russian people should have been stopped – by simply sanctioning the Putin clique out of access and ownership.

Yet, the West has remained effectively silent – concealing the inaction behind bland, banal, and rehearsed political statements that have done nothing to target what really perpetrates and enables Putin's power – the thirst of his clan for the superficial trappings of a civilised man, which only the West can seemingly give to him, his mistresses, and their children.

It is of course easy to pretend that the West is effectively immune to the baseness of greed and power revealed in Putin's Palace, paid for at the expense of Russians. Yet, recent events in America have given us a glimpse of another such instance of a base instinct unchecked by decency, respect for institutions and the law, running amok.

Western democracies are also not immune to the reach of such power in other ways – for every Novichok poisoning attempt that goes unpunished even when perpetrated on western soil, there will be others. And the insatiable thirst for prime real estate of Russia's Tzars may mean that the lovely sea-spot that is Crimea might not be one acquisition too many, and there may be others. As Navalny says so poignantly in his video, it is but a false hope that the treadmill of greed will one day be satiated and will stop. It won't.

Just as many citizens in Russia, on this weekend of mass protest, are pausing to think about what they can do to support Navalny and his cause, so too should western leaders and businesses reflect on what they can do and where they have fallen short. For far too often they have compromised their own integrity, for the simple material gain of selling yet another London property to an oligarch or acquiring a retirement sinecure on a Russian energy company board of directors, all while blandly prevaricating in political and media statements. It is never too late to redeem oneself. This is your and our chance.


Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: kremlin.ru (CC BY 4.0)


 

January 20, 2021

Serbia Filing First Lawsuits Against NATO on Behalf of 1999 Bombing Victims, Lawyer Says

sputniknews.com

Serbia Filing First Lawsuits Against NATO on Behalf of 1999 Bombing Victims, Lawyer Says

Sputnikhttps://cdn2.img.sputniknews.com/i/logo.png

4 minutes


Europe

08:40 GMT 20.01.2021Get short URL

BELGRADE (Sputnik) - Serbian victims of the 1999 NATO bombing in Yugoslavia will, for the first time in over 20 years, on Wednesday file lawsuits against the alliance for the use of depleted uranium ammunition during the airstrikes, Srdjan Aleksic, the lawyer who is leading the team of legal experts, told Sputnik.

Aleksic and his team have been putting together cases with material evidence for several years. Lawsuits against NATO as a legal entity will be filed on behalf of the victims.

"We are filing lawsuits on Wednesday in courts in the cities of Belgrade, Novi Sad, Kragujevac, Nis and Vranje. We are talking about the highest courts, to which we will file five lawsuits. The victims are natural persons — deceased and sick soldiers and police officers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who were in Kosovo in 1999. At the first stage, we want them to be identical cases, as in the Italian military", Aleksic said.

© AFP 2020 / ANDREJ ISAKOVIC

A man walks past the building of former federal military headquarters in Belgrade on March 24, 2010, destroyed during the 1999 NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia.

As was the case with Western European servicemen who received high radiation doses while serving in NATO near radioactive ammunition and at the places of their use, the lawyer seeks to win compensation for each of the Serbian victims in the amount of at least 300,000 euros ($364,508). Aleksic is assisted by the Italian lawyer Angelo Fiore Tartaglia, who has successfully represented the interests of the Italian military.

"He has 181 court rulings, which have already entered into force in Europe. He will be a member of my legal expert team. We have more than 3,000 pages of materials, including verdicts, expert opinions, materials of a special Italian government commission. We have collected enough evidence", Aleksic noted.

The next step after the Higher Court in Belgrade admits the lawsuits would be to send a formal notification to the NATO headquarters within six months. The alliance, on its part, will have to respond within 30 days.

NATO airstrikes continued from 24 March to 10 June 1999. The exact number of victims of the airstrikes is unknown. The Serbian authorities say that about 2,500 people, including 89 children, were killed and about 12,500 people were injured in the bombings. According to various sources, the material damage is assessed at between $30 billion and $100 billion.

© AFP 2020 / SERBIAN TV

Still from Serbian TV from April 4, 1999 showing a bridge over the Danube in Novi Sad, northern Serbia, some 70 km (40 miles) north of Belgrade, which was destroyed a day earlier by NATO warplanes.

The military operation was conducted without the approval of the UN Security Council and on the basis of the Western countries' allegations that the Yugoslavian authorities had carried out ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and provoked a humanitarian catastrophe there.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic has said that the use of depleted uranium weapons during the NATO operation is behind the increase in the number of cancer patients in the Balkan nation. Moreover, Belgrade said it established a special commission to investigate the consequences of the 1999 NATO bombings for the environment and health of the Serbs.

 

November 24, 2020

Timothy Less: Under Biden, the US will push for a ‘EU-goslavia’

opendemocracy.net

Under Biden, the US will push for a 'EU-goslavia'

Timothy Less

14-17 minutes


Joe Biden makes a foreign policy speech in New York, January 2020

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Sonia Moskowitz/PA. All rights reserved.

What matters in international politics is not what a leader wants to do but what that leader must do to uphold their country's core national interests. Understanding this is key to understanding the impact of Joe Biden's victory in the US presidential election on American policy towards the Balkans.

There can be little doubt that the incoming Biden Administration would like to cancel the last four years of American policy, characterised by a rapprochement with Serbia and a bullying of the Kosovo Albanians, a flexible attitude to borders and an apparent disregard for the reputations of US diplomats who crafted the current settlement in the region. Biden's recent assertion that Serbia must recognise Kosovo within its existing borders, his courting of Albanian and Bosnian voters in the US and his recent recalling of the 1995 Bosnian Serb massacre in Srebrenica – as well as his liking for multilateral government and desire to restore values to American foreign policy – all point to a revival of the pre-Donald Trump approach.

As the region continues to stagnate, some nostalgists are already anticipating a more muscular American policy, involving a pushback against the Serbs and their dreams of a new territorial settlement, a drive to strengthen democracy and the rule of law and a renewed attempt at Euro-Atlantic integration. However, such thinking ignores the new strategic reality in the region. For various reasons, the process of European integration has broken down: the United Kingdom, formerly the EU's main proponent of enlargement, has left the EU; France and other western European countries, which now call the shots, are reluctant to enlarge the EU into the Balkans; and the region itself has struggled to meet the EU's onerous conditions for entry while simultaneously trying to resolve primary questions about statehood, identity and territory.

Meanwhile, Serbia has restored its position as the foremost state in the Balkans following the emergence of a strong leader who ended the chaos of the 2000s, and a period of structural reform which has harnessed Serbia's inherent advantages as the region's largest economy and natural centre of gravity. Serbia has also engaged in some shrewd diplomatic manoeuvering that has allowed it to leverage the support of various non-western powers which want a presence in the Balkans – Russia to buffer itself against western expansionism, China for economic reasons and Turkey as part of its bid for great power status.

That has strengthened Serbia's position in relation to the US, since Belgrade can simultaneously determine how influential these powers are in the Balkans and lean on their influence to push for an advantageous resolution of the Kosovo question. If President Biden wants to stay true to the long-standing American goal of establishing some kind of durable settlement in the Balkans that allows its internal development and external integration with the West – and thereby ceases to be a problem the US has to solve – he must work within the parameters of this new reality – not the one that existed four years ago and even less the reality that existed in the 1990s when Biden formed his views about the Balkans.

One break and two continuities

This has various implications. One is that, once the Biden Administration has done its analysis of the situation, it will come to the same overarching conclusion as its predecessor: that Washington must engage in the Balkans in order to shore up its creaking settlement, and that failure to do so effectively delegates the fate of the region to its great power rivals.

Another implication is that, if the Biden Administration reverts to the pre-Trump policy, it will fail. Putting too much pressure on the Serbs will strengthen the position of Russia and China, as well as preclude a resolution of Kosovo and risk a precipitous bid for independence by the Bosnian Serb entity, Republika Srpska. A push for EU membership will come up against resistance from France and others. And a drive for greater democracy will alienate the local politicians on which the US depends.

A drive for greater democracy will alienate the local politicians on which the US depends.

Accordingly, as the Trump Administration discovered, if the US is to achieve its geopolitical goals in Bosnia, it must find some alternative to the failing policy of EU membership, park the issue of democratisation and collaborate with Serbia which, in some measure, can state its terms.

So, does this new strategic reality imply a continuation of the Trump-era policy in the Balkans, with its tolerance of land swaps and apparent indifference to liberal ideals, such as multiethnicity and the civil state? Not exactly. If the change in US leadership makes one difference to American policy towards the Balkans, it will be a renewed insistence on the territorial integrity of the region. Biden, who saw first-hand the horrors of the Bosnian war in the 1990s, will object on principle to any breakup of Bosnia, and will rule out any outcome in Kosovo that makes this more likely.

However, it also does not imply a repudiation of the Trump-era approach, since Biden will be faced with the same strategic reality as his predecessor, while pursuing the same strategic goal: to unblock the development and westward integration of the Balkan region, in a relatively light-touch way. That implies a continuation of two key elements of the Trump Administration's approach. One is the drive to resolve the political disputes that stand in the way of this goal, in reverse order of difficulty.

This began with the neutralising of Russia in Montenegro and its integration with NATO and the ousting of Nikola Gruevski's government and subsequent resolution of the "name" dispute between Skopje and Athens, allowing North Macedonia to follow Montenegro into NATO. The US then turned its attention to Kosovo's status. At the end of the process lies Bosnia and the vexed question of constitutional reform. This effort will not end since Washington's strategic imperatives mean Biden must continue where the Trump Administration left off.

The other element of the Trump-era approach that Biden will have to preserve is the push to establish some kind of regional economic zone in the Western Balkans, manifest in American support for the so-called mini-Schengen' comprising Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia. This has various attractions for the US. The promotion of cross-border trade and commerce can potentially stimulate the regional economy, taking the edge off simmering ethnic tensions and stemming the outflow of the middle classes on which any transition to democracy and prosperity depends.

At the same time, the downgrading of disputed international borders that currently divide nations such as the Serbs and Albanians can allow for some form of national reunification in a way that accords with the Biden Administration's opposition to moving existing borders. Put another way, a regional economic zone offers some of the strategic benefits of EU membership in the absence of any realistic chance of more Balkan states joining the union.

Allies on board

Crucially, the Biden Administration will see that the EU, to which it delegated responsibility for upholding the American settlement in the Balkans in the 2000s, is also pushing the idea of a regional economic zone, having ruled out all the alternatives.

At an early stage, the Europeans rejected the option of redrawing borders and establishing nation states which had the virtue of solving the underlying source of conflict in the Balkans but ran the risk of generating the very conflicts they wanted to avoid.

The Europeans also had no interest in maintaining the Balkans as an international protectorate, the situation they inherited after various American military interventions. It was expensive to maintain, involving large standing armies, and ran contrary to their stated belief in democratic self-governance.

The Europeans also rejected the option of the immediate integration of the Balkans into the EU in their raw, unreformed state which could have overcome the problem of mismatched borders at a stroke, but risked destabilising the EU itself.

This led the Europeans to embark on a conditions-based process of integration that seemingly offered the possibility of transforming the region into a set of prosperous liberal democracies ahead of their eventual incorporation into the EU. However, after fifteen years of trying, this policy has proven unworkable.

In consequence, the EU has begun to pursue the only remaining option, the establishment of some kind of regional entity, affiliated to the EU and currently pursued under the auspices of the Berlin Process. This took a significant step forward last week with an agreement by Balkan states to establish a common market, and the European Commission's unveiling of a nine billion-euro Economic and Investment Plan intended to promote the region's 'connectivity'.

A regional economic zone was always the preferred position of France and sometimes also Germany, which saw it as a chance for the EU to play the leading role in the Balkans without the risk of bringing the region into the Europeans' own house.

In the 2000s, France yielded to pressure from Britain for enlargement at a time when the EU was strong and confident, and Serbia was too weak, shambolic and untrustworthy to play the leadership role that a regional economic zone implied. However, with the UK gone and Serbia rehabilitated, France can now push this position while avoiding an argument with those EU members that still advocate enlargement and would like to see the creation of an economic zone as a stepping-stone towards this ultimate goal. That provides an opportunity for the US, not only because the EU is willing to sponsor the region's economic integration, relieving the US of that obligation, but because a regional economic zone binds the Balkans to the EU, thereby keeping Russia and others at bay.

The Biden Administration will also see that Serbia supports an economic union, since this can consolidate its leading position in the Balkans and draw the region's other states, including Kosovo, Bosnia and Montenegro, all with large Serbian minorities, back into Serbia's orbit. That initiative also took a step forward last week with the signing of a travel agreement between its three members and an invitation to Kosovo to join the mini-Schengen zone.

The support of the region's core state does not only meet the minimum condition for the viability of any economic zone. A project that gives Serbia a leadership position in the Balkans may be enough to persuade Belgrade to recognise Kosovo's independence without insisting on its partition – and downgrade its relations with Russia, Turkey and China.

The Biden Administration will also hope that the changed circumstances, including a more open border between Serbia and Republika Srpska, makes the problem of Bosnia easier to solve. Some in the Biden Administration will chafe at the idea of rewarding Serbia in this way, but political realities on the ground will leave it with little other option.

Crucially, Biden's team will also see that most of the region's other states also support the initiative, increasing its viability. Albania views an economic zone as a means to expand its market potential and draw closer to the Albanian diaspora in the region. An economic zone offers North Macedonia a safe haven from threats to its existence by Greece and Bulgaria. Meanwhile, the new government in Montenegro can use the economic zone to restore the country's traditional links with Serbia.

The holdouts will be those groups that fought a war to be free of Belgrade's influence, especially the Bosniaks who have resisted Bosnia's inclusion in the mini-Schengen and will complain that a regional economic zone endangers Bosnia's independence.

That will constitute an obstacle for the Biden Administration: but the key consideration for the new president will be the American interest in establishing some kind of regional order that is reasonably viable, rather than who precisely gains or loses in this arrangement and will look for a way to overcome these objections, as the Trump Administration did towards Kosovo, which it ordered to join the mini-Schengen in return for support in securing Kosovo's recognition from Serbia.

A return to history

By running with this policy, the Biden Administration will not only pick up where Trump left off but will revive the strategy of the great powers in the twentieth century as they deliberated what to do with the disparate collection of nations which emerged from the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and then repeatedly fought each other to establish nation states.

The determination made after the First World War, and again at the end of World War Two, was that the stability of the region depended on gathering up the various peoples into a larger, internally borderless entity under the overall stewardship of Belgrade, the capital of the region's largest nation and its natural political centre. A hundred years on, this strategic logic has not changed.

A regional economic zone that recognises the demise of the policy of EU enlargement and consolidates Serbia's leading position will not be Biden's preferred outcome in the Balkans; nor is it guaranteed to work.

But the realities of power on the ground, the American interest in developing the Balkans economically, its wish to preserve the existing territorial settlement, its need to keep out great power rivals by anchoring the Balkans to the EU – and its desire to achieve all this in the easiest possible way – will force the United States' hand.

So, my bet for a Biden Administration is a push for a new multiethnic entity, closely aligned to the EU, which incorporates the six states of the Western Balkans and has its headquarters in Belgrade.

That will not exactly be a new Yugoslavia, which was a product of its time; but the facts on the ground will compel Biden to return to the logic of the recent past and push for the creation of its 21st century incarnation – a new EUgoslavia.

 

November 23, 2020

Belgrade's Biden conundrum: How US-Serbian relations will shape up post-Trump

euronews.com

Belgrade's Biden conundrum: How US-Serbian relations will shape up post-Trump ǀ View

Vuk Vuksanovic Researcher and think tank associate

6-8 minutes


Many in Europe were happy that Joe Biden triumphed over Donald Trump in the 2020 US presidential elections in November, as evident from the congratulatory messages. Among numerous leaders congratulating Biden was Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić, who wrote on Twitter: "I wish you wisdom and resoluteness to face current challenges for the benefit of America and the rest of the world. I hope we will continue the good cooperation we had with Trump with you as well, and I am grateful for that".

However, this message clearly shows that for Vučić and Serbia, Biden's win brings challenges, as Vučić was among those in Eastern Europe who hoped for Trump's re-election.

It was not the first time that Vučić bet on the wrong horse. In 2016, Vučić endorsed Hillary Clinton against Donald Trump. So, why Trump this time? First, Serbs remember Biden as an ardent advocate of military interventions against the Serbs during wars in both Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s. Secondly, given Biden's political biography, Trump was perceived as someone from whom Serbia could secure a less painful resolution of the Kosovo dispute, one that Vučić hoped he could sell to the people at home without committing political suicide.

Ultimately, Vučić also saw an opportunity in Trump to establish a partnership with the US, which was something that Belgrade had tried to do but failed to do so for decades. In September 2020, after Serbia and Kosovo signed an economic normalisation agreement in the Oval Office brokered by Trump, Vučić told the Serbian media that the White House doors finally opened for the Serbs after being reserved solely for Albanians and other Serbian adversaries from Yugoslav Wars.

However, with Biden now in charge, Serbian leadership faces new challenges. The first challenge concerns Kosovo. Some expect that Biden in his more transatlantic outlook will coordinate US Balkan policy with the EU, including its most influential country, Germany. For Vučić, the nightmare is having Germany and the US jointly pressuring him to recognise Kosovo, without any face-saving settlement that can be sold to the Serbian voters. The second problem involves China. Over the past years, the Chinese presence in the Balkans has increased, and Belgrade has boosted its ties with Beijing. It will become increasingly difficult for Serbia to balance between the US and China in light of the growing rivalry between the two powers.

China would have been a problem for Serbia in its relations with the US, even if Trump had been re-elected. The negative attitudes towards China are becoming something of a bipartisan consensus in the US. In September, the Trump administration also made a push against the presence of the Chinese tech giant Huawei in Serbia. The domestic environment in Serbia also complicates things. In yet unpublished public opinion research conducted by myself and colleagues from the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 13 per cent of respondents perceived the US as the greatest enemy of Serbia, behind Croatia and Albania.

Given the painful recent history between Serbia with the US, this is a relatively low figure, indicating that pro-Trump narrative projected by the Serbian elite had some effect. However, now that a new US president will be in the White House, and one that is not popular in Serbia, that figure will almost certainly increase. It would be domestically risky for Vučić to reverse his policies on either Kosovo or relations with the likes of China if the public perceives him doing so as a result of pressure from an unpopular US President.

What options does President Vučić have at his disposal in managing Belgrade's relationship with Washington under these new challenging circumstances? The first option will be to rely on the personality factor. Vučić already has a history with Biden. The two leaders met twice from the time when Vučić was the Serbian prime minister, and Biden was US Vice-President in the Obama administration, first in Washington in 2015 and then in Belgrade in 2016.

Indeed, Vučić is choosing his words carefully. "I have never uttered a bad word about Biden. I know him better than Trump. Three days ago, I said Biden was likely to win, but I think it would be better for Serbia if Trump had won," Vučić told the Serbian media.

Second, Vučić and the Serbian government will probably rely on their blossoming partnership with Israel. To get closer to Trump, Serbia agreed to move its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, and Vučić has also built ties with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Israel lobby organisation in the US. Some believe that Serbia will give up on the embassy move now that the Trump is gone. However, Belgrade will probably use Israel and its lobby in the US to gain access and to alleviate any potential political pressure from the new administration.

The third option, Belgrade can also bide time in the hope that for Biden, Europe and the Balkans will not be priorities as he will be governing a divided country and he will be consumed with countering China. Here is the tricky part for Vučić: the US will increasingly take note of Serbia when the Chinese factor is present. On the day when Biden's victory was confirmed, Vučić said that Serbia is proud of being China's best friend in Europe.

Finally, if faced with firm US pressure on Kosovo, Vučić will try and reinvigorate his partnership with Russia to get diplomatic protection on that issue. Not a pleasant task as a partnership with Russia has been on a downward spiral and Putin did not like Vučić's pivot towards Trump.

Now that Trump is out of the picture, Serbia will not be able to complete its pivot towards the US and sever its partnerships with Russia and China, as it has to wait to see what stance the new US leadership will take on Kosovo. One thing is sure; it is not easy being Aleksandar Vučić these days.

  • Vuk Vuksanovic is a PhD researcher in international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), an associate of LSE IDEAS, LSE's foreign policy think tank, and a researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)

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November 17, 2020

Majority of Serbians opposed to NATO membership

Majority of Serbians opposed to NATO membership

Author:

Beta

Izvor: Shutterstock

The Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CeSID) said that three fourths of the population of Serbia are opposed to NATO membership.

CeSID official Ivo Colovic told a Belgrade NATO Week conference that just 14 percent of the 800 people polled have a positive attitude towards cooperation with the Alliance.  

He said that half the polled said that they favor membership in the European Union, adding that the people who are opposed to EU membership are aged 18-29 and over the age of 60.

 

November 10, 2020

A Silver Lining in the Election Debacle

chroniclesmagazine.org

A Silver Lining in the Election Debacle

By Srdja Trifkovic

4-5 minutes


Image Credit: 

[Image from Flickr-Gage Skidmore, CC BY-SA 2.0, cropped and resized]

In the eyes of much of the world the United States is now reduced to the status of a banana republic.

The sordid spectacle of the past week—with the Democratic Party machine, the mainstream media, and social media barons forming a joint criminal enterprise to steal the presidential election—is reminiscent of similar ploys in the post-Communist world, only cruder. Not even Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko's election officials would produce boxes in the middle of the night with 100,000-plusvotes for their boss and exactly zero for the opposition. Unlike several wards in Milwaukee and Detroit, not even the regime in Pyongyang tallies more votes for the Beloved Leader Kim Jong Un than there are North Koreans on the roll.

Biden is now the media-appointed "winner." Trump will not concede but sue. Violence may break out, this time on both sides of the national abyss. Regardless of the final outcome, the legitimacy of the winner will have been fatally eroded, at home and abroad. If Biden prevails, even his power-holding sympathizers in Paris, Berlin, Brussels, and Ottawa will know the score. There will be no knowing smiles and furtive winks in their war rooms or on their media channels, but they will know.

There is a silver lining, though. America's attempt to dominate the world, its hubristic ravings of "We are America, we are the indispensable nation" will be a thing of the past. Similar countless droning about the "benevolent global hegemony" or even "the leader of the international community" will no longer be taken seriously. 

The U.S. Empire was born when the Spanish-American War began with the explosion of the Maine in 1898. It finally died in November 2020. The rationale behind the insane quest for global hegemony always rested on lies and self-serving pretenses. Any attempt to reinvent the project after this year's election debacle is doomed to fail. From now on, "America, the Light to the World" will sound as convincing as Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels's claim that Wunderwaffen (revolutionary superweapons) would change the course of the war, or Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's 1957 pledge to overtake the U.S.

Even if this blue coup succeeds, its protagonists will find it hard to continue pretending that U.S. foreign policy is devoted to promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights. It doesn't really confront tyranny and evil, nor does it make the world a better place in the image of the exceptional nation. As European news commentators—themselves familiar with color-coded revolutions—are noting, it is ironic that Americans have less difficulty in installing a president in foreign countries than legitimately electing one in their own.

The U.S. Empire has always been a flawed project, inimical to the American interest, to the spirit of the Old Republic, and to the natural global order based on the balance-of-power system. Nevertheless, it provided the foundation for international discourse.

The phenomenon of Western civilizational weakness—seen in its demographic crisis and ongoing immigrant invasion, which are both geopolitical and cultural threats of the highest order—requires a new global paradigm. Undoubtedly the world needs order. Not an order based on U.S. dominance, but an order based on a multinational balance-of-power system.

It is possible that America's deepening domestic crisis, which is about to culminate, makes the emergence of such order more probable. If so, then at least there is a hint of silver lining on the dark horizon.

Srdja Trifkovic

Dr. Srdja Trifkovic, Foreign Affairs Editor of Chronicles, is the author of The Sword of the Prophet and Defeating Jihad.

 

November 07, 2020

Trumpism Lives On!

buchanan.org

Trumpism Lives On!

November 6, 2020 Patrick J. Buchanan

5-7 minutes


The American electorate failed to perform its designated role in the establishment's morality play. Indeed, Democrats ended Tuesday night terrified that America had again turned its back on them and preferred Trump to the leaders and agenda they had put forth.

Donald Trump may end up losing the 2020 election in the Electoral College, but he won the campaign that ended on Nov. 3.

Democrats had been talking of a "sweep," a "blowout," a "blue wave" washing the Republicans out of power, capturing the Senate, and bringing in an enlarged Democratic majority in Nancy Pelosi's House.

They visualized the ouster of Trump in a defeat so massive and humiliating that it would serve as an eternal repudiation of the man. And, most intoxicating of all, they believed they would be seen by history as the angels of America's deliverance.

It was not to be.

The American electorate failed to perform its designated role in the establishment's morality play. Indeed, Democrats ended Tuesday night terrified that America had again turned its back on them and preferred Trump to the leaders and agenda they had put forth.

By the campaign's end, Democrats were freezing the ball and running out the clock.

Consider the immense burdens candidate Trump had to carry.

Early in his reelection year, the nation was struck by the worst pandemic in a hundred years that, by Election Day, would kill nearly a quarter of a million Americans and cause an economic collapse to rival the Great Depression.

Trump had to endure daily the near-universal hatred and hostility of the nation's academic, media and cultural elites. How hostile is this city to President Trump?

He lost D.C.'s three electoral votes by a margin of 20-1.

Yet, even so burdened, Trump won 3 million more votes in 2020 than he had in 2016, and, as of midnight on Election Day, he seemed headed for victory in the Electoral College.

Giving the energy and effort he put into his campaign — a dozen rallies in the last three days — and the enthusiastic response from the huge crowds, Trump has much to be proud of.

Trump may lose the presidency, but Trumpism was not rejected.

Nor was it repudiated by the people if, by Trumpism, one means "America First" nationalism, securing our borders, using tariffs to bring back our manufacturing base, bidding goodbye to globalism, staying out of unnecessary wars and swearing off ideological crusades.

And if Joe Biden becomes our 46th president, the tenure of office of this visibly frail and enfeebled leader is likely to be among the more abbreviated in American history, and bereft of high achievement.

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For Democrats appear to have lost seats in Nancy Pelosi's House, and, instead of sweeping to power in the Senate to make Chuck Schumer the new majority leader, Senate Democrats appear to have gained only a single seat. As of now, Sen. Mitch McConnell is set to be the gatekeeper to any passage of the Biden-Harris and Sanders-AOC agendas.

Good luck getting something enacted that Mitch McConnell doesn't like.

As of today, the 2020 election has restored to Senate Republicans veto power over any and all administration legislation, be it liberal, progressive or socialist. This election may have made McConnell the most powerful congressional leader since Lyndon Johnson.

With McConnell leading a GOP majority, Democrats would be unable to end the filibuster or pack the Supreme Court, and the GOP majority would have the power to kill the Biden tax plan, "Medicare for All" and the "Green New Deal." There will be no statehood and two senators for Puerto Rico or D.C., and no reparations for slavery. Mayors and governors seeking blue state bailouts to avoid defaulting on overdue debts will need McConnell's blessing.

In times past, there was often comity between the parties, or at least an attempt at comity. In mid-August of 1974, after he took office, President Gerald Ford went before Congress to declare: "I do not want a honeymoon with you. I want a good marriage."

It was not to be. And in the ideological divide and poisoned politics of this city, there is little likelihood of compromise — or even civility.

Biden faces other troubles, too.

The worst of the COVID-19 crisis, in terms of cases, hospitalizations and deaths, may be ahead of us. And Democrats will not be able to blame Trump indefinitely. And if their answer is, as Joe Biden has at times indicated, a national "shutdown," a Biden honeymoon is unlikely to last.

Bottom line: Joe Biden is not going to be the "transformational" president of his imagining. Nor is he going to be the "most progressive president since Roosevelt" as some Democrats have been promising.

And the reasons are obvious.

FDR had massive Democratic majorities in both Houses of Congress throughout the 1930s. And he won the presidency in 1932 by capturing 57% of the vote and 42 of the 48 states of the Union. In 1936, he carried 46 of 48 states, losing only Maine and Vermont.

Biden has no such mandate and no such power base, and he lacks the natural gifts of FDR. Sorry, but there is no new "Era of Good Feelings" in store for America. To the contrary.

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October 30, 2020

Washington Could Force Kosovo Recognition Onto Greece And Other EU States

greekcitytimes.com

Washington Could Force Kosovo Recognition Onto Greece And Other EU States - Greek City Times

Paul Antonopoulos

5-6 minutes


The U.S. intends to force Serbia not to oppose Kosovo's entry into international institutions, thus imposing Belgrade to indirectly recognize the breakaway province's independence. In this way, the five EU members that have not yet recognized Kosovo's independence would be discouraged from continuing this policy.

It is in the hope of U.S. Ambassador to Kosovo, Philip S. Kosnett, that Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Romania and Slovakia will change their position on Kosovo's independence if relations between Belgrade and Pristina improve. Kosnett then compared the Kosovo issue to other disputes in the Balkans and the wider region that the U.S. has mediated in.

Kosovo recognition.

"Who would have thought that North Macedonia and Greece would reach an agreement on the name, but it did happen. People thought the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain or Sudan couldn't have relations with Israel, but it did happen," he said.

However, these are not good examples given by the American ambassador. The sovereignty of North Macedonian territory was not disputed by Greece, but rather the name of the state was. The name dispute cannot be equated with a situation where the U.S. is backing an entity trying to secede 15% of Serbian territory. Also, the three Arab states do not have their sovereignty questioned by Israel. No matter how historical the issues over Israel and the Macedonian question may be, they cannot be put on the same level as Kosovo.

Kosnett's statement, given to Dukagjin Television, was addressed to Albanians who are accustomed to unconditional American support and is characteristic of Washington's policy towards Serbia. Since the Brussels Agreement in 2013, Pristina expected the U.S. would make the five EU countries recognize Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence.

The 2013 Brussel Agreement, negotiated between former Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dačić and his Kosovo Albanian counterpart Hashim Thaçi, and mediated by former EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, effectively opened a path for Belgrade and Pristina to normalize their relations since the provinces illegal declaration of independence in 2008.

However, the ambassador expresses a position that is consistent with Washington's anti-Serb policy. This shows that the ultimate goal is to force Serbia to indirectly recognize the breakaway province through a comprehensive agreement and allowing it to become a member of international organizations. European countries that do not recognize Kosovo's independence would be discouraged to continue this policy. The position of the five EU member states that do not recognize its independence becomes irrelevant if Belgrade continues to allow incentives that further legitimize the Pristina government.

It is unsurprising that this attitude is being actualized on the eve of the 2020 American presidential elections. This indicates that the State Department hopes that it will become official American policy again. Although we cannot know with absolute certainty of this notion, it is indicative that Kosnett is speaking in that direction. It shows that there are strong impulses within the State Department which believes that the entire dispute and the relations between Belgrade and Pristina can be resolved by forcing Serbia to accept Kosovo's independence.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić meeting with Donald Trump in the White House earlier this year.

There is a disproportion in Kosnett's statement between what the American ambassador would like to happen and the actual reality. Some of the EU countries would not recognize Kosovo even if Serbia reached an agreement to implicitly recognize the existence of an independent state in its own territory. But countries that do not have an immediate problem with their own territorial integrity would find themselves in an awkward position to defend their non-recognition if Belgrade is opening up to it.

Greece and Cyprus would probably not recognize Kosovo's independence so long as Turkey continues occupying northern Cyprus. Spain too is dealing with several separatist movements, including in Catalonia, Basque and Galicia, and will also unlikely change their position on Kosovo. However, if Belgrade allows the breakaway province to be admitted into international organizations, there is a possibility that Romania and Slovakia could be open to recognizing the separatist province's independence.

It all depends on the position of Belgrade, its strength to resist pressure and to find a long-term solution in negotiations with Pristina with the help of international mediators and within the bounds of international law. The possibly of Belgrade recognizing Kosovo would undo three years of diplomatic manoeuvring that has resulted in 20 countries withdrawing their recognition for the separatist province. As of today, 98 out of 193 countries recognize Kosovo's independence after the withdrawal of the 20 countries. None-the-less, pressure is beginning to mount against Belgrade, and if it capitulates, the very few remaining EU countries that do not recognize Kosovo may begin doing so.

 

October 25, 2020

Biden's Appeal To Bosnian Muslim And Albanian Voters Is Aimed Against Serbia And Russia

greekcitytimes.com

Biden's Appeal To Bosnian Muslim And Albanian Voters Is Aimed Against Serbia And Russia - Greek City Times

Paul Antonopoulos

6-8 minutes


U.S. Democrat Presidential Candidate Joe Biden has been on a whirlwind campaign in an attempt to defeat President Donald Trump in next month's election. Published policy papers has shown Biden's strong support for Greece, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Albania and Kosovo as he seeks to win over millions of diaspora votes.

The candidate has taken a very strong anti-Turkey position in his bid to win over Armenian and Greek diaspora voters at a time when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan makes daily threats of war against Greece and is directly sponsoring, arming and facilitating the Azerbaijani invasion of Artsakh, or more commonly known as Nagorno-Karabakh.

However, away from Greece and into the heart of the Balkans, Biden is also appealing to the greatest enablers of Turkish expansionism into the region – BiH, Albania and Kosovo.

If Biden wins next month's presidential elections, there will be no sudden changes in America's foreign policy, besides perhaps a stronger position against Erdoğan compared to Trump's "bromance" with the Turkish president.

To empower U.S. positioning in the Balkans, Biden wants to resurrect policies from the 1990's that resulted in poverty, ethnic cleansing and war in the region.

In a letter to the Bosnian Muslim diaspora in the U.S., entitled "Joe Biden's vision for America's relationship with Bosnia and Herzegovina," the Democrat said he is "a proven friend of Bosnia and Herzegovina – from the country's darkest days of war and genocide to the continued struggle for stability and justice."

Biden's letter highlighted that as senator he was a key player "to stop [Serbian leader] Slobodan Milosevic's brutal campaign of genocide." It also highlighted that "Biden knows that for Bosnia and Herzegovina to succeed, it will need the steadfast support of the United States" and that as president he will convene "European Union partners and NATO allies to jointly develop a strategy for anchoring the Western Balkans in Euro-Atlantic institutions."

Most interestingly, in the letter, the presidential candidate notes that "Unfortunately, under President Trump, U.S. influence in the region has faded as the administration has cast the European Union as a strategic adversary and questioned the value of the NATO alliance." It has been well established that Trump has taken a greater disinterest in Balkan issues compared to his predecessors.

In another letter entitled "Joe Biden's Vision for U.S. Relations with Albania and Kosova," the presidential candidate said that he "is a long-time friend of Albania and Kosova and the Albanian-American community. As President, he will continue to support Albania's security, and democratic and economic development in the region. Biden understands the important role played by NATO and the threats to the region posed by Russia."

It is clear from his addresses to the Bosnian Muslim and Albanian diaspora communities in the U.S. that a Biden administration will play a more active role in the Balkans to contain Russian influence in the region by pressurizing Serbia.

If Biden defeats Trump, new pressure will be created against the Serbian dominated entity, the Republika Srpska. The Republika Srpska is one of the two entities comprising of BiH, with the other being the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina which comprises mostly of Bosnian Muslims and Croats.

Biden's policies indicate that the Serbs will be pressured into accepting NATO and into accepting Sarajevo as the centralized political center for BiH, thus taking away even more liberties and autonomy from the Republika Srpska.

Effectively, if Biden is successful in the upcoming elections, what the Bosnian Muslims want could be achieved – the complete integration of BiH into the Euro-Atlantic agenda by being absorbed into NATO and the EU, thus eliminating most of Russia's influence in the region.

The fact that nearly 25 years has passed since the signing of the Dayton Agreement, which formulated the two-entity system of BiH, without settling deep seeded problems in the untenable system, is a testament to the failure of the U.S. experiment in the Balkans.

Biden's strong backing for further integrating the Balkans into NATO and the European Union will certainly affect the Serbian electorate in America, who were not strong supporters of Trump either.  This will likely steer Serbian-Americans into voting for Trump, however, their community is smaller than the Albanian and Bosnian Muslim diaspora in the U.S.

Although such letters may flatter the Albanian and Bosnian Muslim diaspora, two important factors remain – it is more than likely Biden will not be elected, and, will his policy ambitions come to fruition?

Although the U.S.-led NATO was highly successful in dismantling Yugoslavia in the 1990's, the geopolitical situation is vastly different today. Russia in the 1990's, led by the famously incompetent Boris Yeltsin, was a shadow of the previous Soviet Union.

It is highly unlikely that Russia would be willing to military intervene in any future conflicts in the Balkans, but it will certainly be a lot more proactive diplomatically and materially in the Balkans then what it was after the fall of the Soviet Union.

What Biden also does not acknowledge is that within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the second entity comprising of BiH, there are strained relations between the co-ruling Bosnian Muslims and Croats. Whereas they were once allied against the Serbs, the Croats are now demanding more autonomy that the Bosnian Muslims are unwilling to give.

Meanwhile, there are greater numbers of countries withdrawing their recognition of Kosovo's independence. Washington's second experiment in the Balkans, Kosovo, again finds itself problematic as it has become a European hub for drug trafficking, human trafficking and organ harvesting.

Assuming a Biden victory, his hopes of turning the Balkans completely into a bastion of Euro-Atlantic dominance devoid of Russian influence will unlikely come to fruition. Although the Democrat may give rhetoric on the success of the BiH and Kosovo experiments, both are failed states with little economic, infrastructural or developmental prospects for the future.

However, perhaps this is exactly how Biden wants these entities to be – volatile points that could explode at any moment and put Serbia under pressure.

greekcitytimes.com

October 15, 2020

Serbia finally recognizes Kosovo border by staffing Common Border Crossing Point at Merdare

gazetaexpress.com

Serbia finally recognizes Kosovo border by staffing Common Border Crossing Point at Merdare - Gazeta Express

English Gazeta Express 14/10/2020 18:18

3 minutes


Serbia finally recognizes Kosovo border by staffing Common Border Crossing Point at Merdare

14/10/2020 18:18

It took Serbia nine years to finally implement the Integrated Border Management deal in full by operationalizing the Merdare Common Border Crossing Point. Functionalization of the border crossing was part of the accord between Kosovo and Serbia on economic normalization signed at the White House on September 4.

Back in 2011 Pristina and Belgrade signed the Agreement on Integrated Border Management (IBM) as part of the EU-facilitated dialogue with parties agreeing to build permanent border crossings between the two countries enabling authorities of both countries work under one roof.

When the agreement was signed Kosovo side claimed that with the IBM Agreement Serbia has accepted Kosovo's Independence, whereas Serbian side insisted that the IBM does not mean recognition of Kosovo and continued referring to the border crossings as administrative lines.

Although the Common Border Point facility at Merdare financed by the EU was finalized last year, Serbian side refused to use the new facility with the Serbian police and customs still working in temporarily facilities. But Serbian side finally agreed to move its staff at the new facilities. The move was welcomed by the US Government and President Donald Trump's special envoy on Dialogue, Richard Grenell. "Big move. Thanks to President Donald Trump, Serbia makes Merdare border crossing operational," Grenell wrote on Twitter. Ambassador Grenell was retweeting a statement of the US Ambassador to Belgrade, Anthoney Godfrey who on Tuesday called Serbia's move as great news. "By staffing Merdare, Serbia will help grow regional trade and commerce, which is at the heart of the September 4 agreements signed at the White House. This is an important step forward for prosperity and stability" Godfrey wrote. Also, a spokesperson of the US State Department Wednesday applauded the move.

The Kosovo Police told Gazeta Express that its police and customs officers have staffed the new facility long time ago. "The Kosovo Police have already moved to the new facility and are carrying out their duties in accordance with the law," a police spokesperson said. Work on the first permanent crossing point between Kosovo and Serbia, financed by the EU, started in 2017, but Serbian side has continuously refused to staff the common crossing point. /GazetaExpress/

 

October 05, 2020

It is time to prosecute Julian’s persecutors – The Belmarsh Tribunal

It is time to prosecute Julian's persecutors – The Belmarsh Tribunal

DiEM25 English Julian Assange PROGRESSIVE INTERNATIONAL Talks Video 2730 Views 0 comment 04/10/2020

This is the time to change tack. We have spent too long defending an innocent man for leaking power's guilty secrets. We have protested too long against their right to destroy Julian's body so as to silence his voice. We have pleaded for too long for them to stop torturing a man who dared reveal to us crimes our governments are perpetrating , on our behalf, behind our backs. We have spent too long warning the good people out there who can't be bothered that first they came for Assange, then they will come for others that reveal their dirty secrets, and that eventually there will be no one to defend them – no one to defend those who, today, can't be bothered about Julian. We have used too much energy trying to impress journalists who fail so spectacularly to support Julian today that, in so failing, they are jeopardising their own profession, they are neutering themselves, they are allowing themselves to be added to the hit list, that they are consenting to their own emasculation.

ENOUGH!

If we are truly in the business of allowing unalloyed truth to prevail, to have the final word, we must make the transition from defending Julian, from warning against the dire consequences of his extradition for him, for us, for the world, from explaining to the apathetic that their apathy equals their powerlessness, to turning the tables on the criminals that are behind his persecution.

We must turn the current court case into a trial of those who ordered young soldiers to kill civilians, to maim and to murder journalists, to shroud whole communities in tears and in pain.

We must turn Julian's prosecutors into defendants and allow the grandest of juries out there, a well-informed Demos, to pass fair judgment on them

This is not hard to do: Thanks to Wikileaks, the evidence is at out fingertips, at everyone's disposal.

Is this not why the guilty are demanding Julian's extradition? Is this not why the murderers are plotting to entomb Julian in a supermax coffin for 175 years?

Friends, we can do it!

If Dimitrov in his trial, that took place in Nazi Germany itself, could turn the tables against Goring and Goebbels, surely, we can turn the current court case into a trial of the military-industrial-national-security complex. Noting that even the Nazi courts gave Dimitrov greater opportunity to speak in his defence than Julian has inside his glass box, we can nevertheless use what is left of liberal democracy's instruments to take the fight to his accusers with a Glorious, a Magnificent, a Righteous, a Collective WE ACCUSE YOU!

For this reason, I salute the Belmarsh Tribunal. I salute today's event. I salute all of you who are part of it either as speakers or as active observers. Above all, I salute Julian – for having sacrificed so much so that we can ACCUSE THOSE WHO TRULY DESERVE TO BE ACCUSED, as is our duty.

https://www.yanisvaroufakis.eu/2020/10/04/it-is-time-to-prosecute-julians-persecutors-the-belmarsh-tribunal/

 

September 25, 2020

Serbia’s 5G deal with Washington: The art of muddling through

 

 

ecfr.eu

Serbia's 5G deal with Washington: The art of muddling through

Majda Ruge, Stefan Vladisavljev

8-10 minutes


There is no obvious reason why Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic would turn his back on a relationship with China from which he draws a great deal of political capital.

The long list of commitments signed by the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo at the White House on 4 September includes several pledges that are related not to the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina but to the wider geopolitical interests of the Trump administration. One is a commitment by both parties to prohibit the use of 5G equipment from "untrusted vendors", or to remove such equipment if it is already in place. While there is no direct reference to China or Huawei in this clause, they were clearly Washington's target, as it used the Serbia-Kosovo negotiations to continue its long-running campaign against the company in Europe.

The 5G clause immediately created speculation about the impact of the agreement on Serbia's relationship with China. (This is not an issue with Kosovo, as China's non-recognition of the country means that they barely have a relationship.) While it would be premature to talk about a Serbian pivot away from Huawei (let alone China), the 5G story allows for an interesting thought exercise in mapping out what would happen if Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic was serious about keeping his promises to Washington.

If this was the case, Serbia's policy on 5G would provide him with an easy way to demonstrate his commitment. This is because Vucic's political party, Srpska napredna stranka (SNS), fully controls the parliament – and will fully control the government, once it forms. There are two ways for Serbia to meet its 5G pledge to the US. One is to follow the path taken by Estonia, Poland, and Romania, which – alongside the Czech Republic and Slovenia – signed individual Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with the United States committing to exclude high-risk vendors from the construction of its 5G networks. Estonia, Poland, and Romania have already started translating these agreements into domestic legislation, placing legal restrictions on these vendors in 5G infrastructure. Given SNS's absolute control over Serbia's parliament, he could quickly pass legislation that prevented high-risk vendors from supplying the country's two private telecoms operators.

It would require even less effort to stop Huawei from supplying state-owned company Telecom Serbia. By virtue of state ownership, the government can rewrite Telecom Serbia's list of suppliers through direct preferential procurement and thereby exclude Huawei. This approach is at the core of Vietnam's future strategy for rolling out 5G. Unofficially, the Serbian government had taken the opposite approach: there is an informal understanding between Belgrade and Beijing that Huawei will be the main partner of Telecom Serbia for the installation of 5G infrastructure. And, just as importantly, Telecom Serbia and Huawei signed in 2017 a strategic agreement for the ongoing installation of fixed broadband infrastructure.

While it would be premature to talk about a Serbian pivot away from Huawei (let alone China), the 5G story allows for an interesting thought exercise in mapping out what would happen if Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic was serious about keeping his promises to Washington.

Finally, given that its relationship with Serbia covers a dense set of mutually beneficial relations, one could even imagine China tolerating Serbia's decision to allow, say, Ericsson (rather than Huawei) to build Serbian 5G infrastructure. As Huawei's facial recognition cameras are not part of the agreement signed in Washington, the relevant contract between the Serbian Ministry of Interior and Huawei will likely remain in place – and these devices may proliferate in Serbia as the country sinks deeper into a one-party system.

There are plenty of reasons to believe that Serbian government will not act soon to replace existing Huawei equipment or exclude the company from future 5G bids, particularly given that it has sufficient leeway to ignore the provision. Even wealthier countries in the EU have chosen not to rip out and replace this infrastructure, due to the cost of doing so. Instead, they have committed to phasing it out. Key components in radio access networks have an average lifespan of around five years, meaning they need to be regularly replaced in any case. The United Kingdom, for instance, has committed to phasing Huawei equipment out by 2027.

Vucic's intentions are reflected in a change in the agreement between its first draft and the signed document: the deletion of a clause that set a five-year deadline for removing 5G equipment from untrusted vendors. This suggests that the Serbian side does not want to be bound by specific deadlines and is instead buying time to see what will happen with the deal.

Furthermore, while the lack of a direct reference to Huawei as an untrusted vendor leaves room for interpretation, so do the MoUs signed between the US and five EU member states, none of which refer to the firm by name. In the end, domestic interests and external incentives will determine whether governments translate such agreements into concrete steps.

Unsurprisingly, the three countries that are most advanced in implementing their MoUs – Estonia, Poland, and Romania – perceive Russia as a threat, are members of NATO, and feel dependent on US security guarantees. This is not the case for Serbia, which has traditionally nurtured friendly relations with Russia and a public discourse of criticising NATO due to its bombing of Serbia in 1999. Therefore, it is unsurprising that, just a few days after returning to Belgrade, members of the Serbian delegation stated that the 5G provision had nothing to do with Huawei per se.

Finally, the Serbian president will not willingly turn his back on a relationship from which he draws a great deal of political capital, and which he has skilfully used to build the image of a leader who turns both westwards and eastwards: negotiating with the United States and the European Union while courting China and Russia as powerful allies. Chinese investments allow the president to portray himself as the mover and shaker behind employment and infrastructure projects in Serbia. And China is one of the rare subjects on which the Serbian political opposition sides with the president.

Therefore, the key question is: what is the incentive structure that will make Serbia take the 5G commitment seriously? At the moment, it is non-existent. For all the talk about the importance of getting the US involved to push the negotiations forward, the current US administration does not have a great deal of leverage in Serbia, in contrast to Kosovo. Exercising effective leverage in Serbia requires a carefully thought-out strategy based on familiarity with key actors and their preferences –and implemented in coordination with the Europeans. Furthermore, in the absence of a consensus among key EU member states on a common 5G policy, the incentive structure to persuade Serbia to move away from its commitments to Huawei will remain weak. Until there is a transatlantic consensus and a joint strategy are in place, the Serbian side will delay decisions and muddle through. 

Judging by the sloppiness with which the Washington agreements were put together in the first place, it is safe to assume that there will not be substantial follow-up from Washington prior to the election. And, should Joe Biden become president, Vucic may be caught out. One can expect a Biden administration to be more thorough and strategic in pushing Huawei out of the EU, and in coordinating more effectively with America's European allies to make this happen.

Stefan Vladisavljev is a Programme Coordinator at the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence.

Read more on: Wider Europe, Western Balkans

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. This commentary, like all publications of the European Council on Foreign Relations, represents only the views of its authors.