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June 01, 2022
The Dystopian WHO Stealth Coup
May 25, 2022
Serbia Resists US-led Bullying
May 24, 2022
Serbia Resists US-led Bullying
National Assembly of Serbia. Photograph Source: Boris Dimitrov – CC BY-SA 3.0
Little more than half a year has passed since Belgrade hosted the Non-Aligned Summit on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the movement's founding, and Serbia is increasingly under fire for upholding the organization's principles.
Russia's ill-considered invasion of Ukraine has provided US imperialism with the opportunity of a lifetime, supercharging NATO and US military expansion and transforming the conflict into a proxy war. By sending arms to Ukraine and urging it on to total victory rather than a negotiated settlement, the hope in Washington is that the war can be prolonged. The expectation is that sanctions would then have enough time to bring about the collapse of Russia, which would advance the project of isolating the People's Republic of China.
Washington is in no mood to countenance neutrality, and no effort is spared to persuade or bully other nations into imposing sanctions on Russia. While the US has met with limited success in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Europe is a different matter, where only one nation maintains a neutral stance – Serbia.
Serbia voted in favor of the UN resolution deploring the Russian invasion of Ukraine and calling for the unconditional withdrawal of forces. It also supported the UN resolution on the humanitarian consequences of the war and is donating €3 million to aid Ukrainian refugees and internally displaced persons. [1]
Serbia planned, however, to abstain in the vote to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council. Before the vote was scheduled, Western officials met with Serbian Foreign Minister Nikola Selaković, warning him that Serbia faced punishment unless it joined the West in expelling Russia. Russia's Gazprom is a majority shareholder in the Petroleum Industry of Serbia. That relationship provided the EU with a decisive leverage point to get its way. Serbia is wholly dependent on Russia for its oil supply, and the earliest possible avenue for diversification is two years away if a planned pipeline from Bulgaria meets its target date. [2] It was pointed out that the EU would be meeting on the day of the UN vote to decide whether or not to allow Serbia to import Russian oil, which has to pass through EU territory. Selaković was told that unless Serbia voted against Russia, it risked a complete cutoff of its supply of crude oil. Furthermore, he was cautioned that Serbia's path to joining the EU would be blocked, and Western investments would be withdrawn. The EU's vote on Serbia's oil supply was initially scheduled for 4:00 PM on the day of the UN vote but was delayed by two hours to see how Serbia voted before the EU would make its decision. Russia made calls to Serbia, too, although no threats were made. [3] After Serbia switched its vote to comply with the EU's position, the EU granted it an exemption to import Russian oil. [4]
However, Serbia is drawing a firm line in its refusal to sanction Russia. Economic sanctions are a form of siege warfare in which collective punishment is visited upon an entire population. For Serbia to impose sanctions is to join someone else's war, an action incompatible with its non-aligned status. Serbia knows well the harm done by sanctions, based on the economic ruin it experienced when it was the target of sanctions during the 1990s. It is easy for those in the West to dismiss or ignore the reality of sanctions. No one who has lived through sanctions can do the same. As one Serbian political analyst noted, "Sanctions are an instrument of war; they are often more devastating than bombs, and Serbia is not at war with Russia." [5]
Coercive economic sanctions unilaterally imposed by states can be regarded as contravening international law in their impact on the human rights of targeted populations, including denial of food, medical care, employment, and even life itself. Sanctions are, of course, the first tool of choice for Western nations.
"People talk about choosing sides. No, we have our own side, Serbia's side," Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić asserts. "We were bombed by 19 NATO countries and sanctioned. We haven't imposed sanctions against anyone…because we don't believe sanctions change anything. You can pressure and force Serbia, but that is our genuine opinion." [6]
Aleksandar Vučić had a more personal experience with Western respect for international law when he was targeted for assassination in 1999. One night after the United States dropped three laser-guided bombs onto the home of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević in a failed attempt to murder him and his wife, [7] it next tried to kill Vučić, who was information minister at the time. Vučić received a fax from CNN inviting him to a live broadcast interview. CNN asked him to arrive for makeup at Radio Television Serbia in Belgrade at 2:00 AM sharp for a program scheduled for half an hour later. At 2:06 AM, NATO missiles pulverized the building, killing 16 people. The first missile struck the makeup room, where NATO expected Vučić to be. Luckily for Vučić, he was running behind schedule and arrived after the attack. [8]
Washington was again disappointed in its hope to see Vučić removed from the scene when he trounced his conservative opponent in this year's presidential election. That leaves US and EU officials with only their arsenal of bullying tactics. Every day, Western diplomats contact Serbian officials, relentlessly pushing their demands. According to an unnamed Serbian source, "Serbia is threatened with diplomatic channels by withdrawing all investments from Serbia, even sanctions in the banking sector, and some European countries go so far as to mention removing Serbia from the Schengen list," [9] which allows citizens visa-free entry to EU nations.
Western officials dispense with diplomatic niceties when delivering their threats. "You cannot understand the scale of the rudeness of those who threaten this country," Vučić observed, "and the bottom line is that they want to break Serbia's freedom spirit and ability to make decisions on its own." [10]
Last month, in talks characterized as "difficult," a delegation of US senators visited Belgrade in a failed attempt to persuade Serbia to impose sanctions on Russia. The senators also complained about Serbia's purchase of a Chinese FK-3 surface-to-air defense system.[11] If the US expected this high-powered delegation to bend Serbia to its will, it was sorely disappointed.
Talk is not the only means of bullying available to the West. Air Serbia is the only European airline company with active routes to Russia, a fact that has not gone unnoticed. Over two days in a row last month, NATO warplanes closely followed Air Serbia flights coming from Moscow, the second of which tracked the airliner inside Russian airspace. It was a clear attempt at intimidation, prompting Vučić to announce that his government would "request information from NATO to see who was trying to be the smart guy and with what fighter planes they were endangering civil aviation and civilians on a flight…" [12]
Most of Serbia's trade is with European nations, so it aspires to join the EU. During the decade that it has been a candidate, Serbia has been asked to clear one hurdle after another as it chases a moving target. The main sticking point is the insistence by EU and US officials on Serbia agreeing to the independence of Kosovo, its province that was ripped away through NATO violence. No politician in Serbia could be elected as president who would agree to the violation of the nation's territorial integrity, and that creates an insurmountable impasse on advancing to EU membership. "As sweetly as you are now talking about the territorial integrity of [Bosnia-Herzegovina] and Ukraine," Vučić recently responded to an unsympathetic German reporter, "why didn't you say so in 1999 about Serbia? When it comes to territorial integrity, I would ask you to step into our shoes. In 1999, no one was interested in Serbia's territorial integrity."[13]
Despite the challenges in attaining EU membership, Vučić argues that economic factors necessitate that "our strategic path is the path to Europe," and Serbia has no alternative. [14] How that goal can be achieved in the face of Western intransigence is another question. For many in Serbia, weary of Western threats and overweening demands, the concept of joining the EU is beginning to curdle. Unrelenting demands, pressure, and blackmail have taken a toll, and for the first time, a poll of Serbian citizens showed a majority are opposed to membership. [15]
Certainly, Interior Minister Aleksandar Vulin, founder of the Movement of Socialists, a coalition partner with Vučić's Serbian Progressive Party, has started to sour on EU membership. Vulin regards the demand for sanctions as a clear signal "that the EU does not want Serbia" and adds, "They measure our love for Europe with hatred of Russia…I don't want to hate anyone." [16] Vulin believes that for Western leaders, "it is more important for Russia to be defeated than to achieve peace in Ukraine." Serbia, he says, does not want to play that game. "The countries that bombed us, I would not say that they have the moral right to ask us to join their own policy." [17]
It is also apparent that the benefits of EU membership do not apply equally to all, as Zoran Milanović, president of neighboring Croatia, pointed out recently regarding his nation's place in the union. "We give a lot. We win a little bit. Some things cross all borders, how they treat us and small nations." [18]
Serbia's strong economic relationships with China and Russia have long rankled Western leaders, who have never ceased trying to disrupt them. However, it is not in Serbia's interests to bend to US and EU dictates. Russian and especially Chinese firms have played an instrumental role in Serbia's ambitious infrastructure improvement project. Furthermore, China and Russia offer the most robust support Serbia can rely on in the United Nations to counter US attempts to formalize its violent theft of the province of Kosovo.
Western officials are unrelenting in demanding that Serbia consent to Kosovo's independence. Last year, US President Joe Biden sent an insulting "congratulatory" message to Vučić on Serbia's Statehood Day holiday. Biden encouraged Vučić to "take the hard steps" toward EU membership, including "instituting necessary reforms" and "mutual recognition" with Kosovo. [19] Earlier this month, with the support of Western officials, the province of Kosovo applied for membership in the Council of Europe. [20] It also announced its goal of joining NATO. [21]Serbian intelligence services also learned that "two large countries" – it is not hard to guess which – are actively providing "serious logistical support" to Kosovo to compel more countries to recognize its independence. [22]
Responding to these provocative developments, Vučić remarked, "It is clear that key western countries are running this game," and that Serbia would oppose them peacefully and diplomatically but with "no surrender." The problem, he added, "is that everyone thinks they have the right to create Serbia's policies" and that "they have the right to order how Serbia will behave." [23]
Recently, G7 foreign ministers quickly followed up on the pressure campaign by issuing a statement calling upon Serbia to impose sanctions on Russia and "normalize" relations with Kosovo. [24] "G7 leaders hammered on the immutability of Ukrainian borders and urged Belgrade to join them unconditionally," Vučić observed, "even though those same countries in Serbia rudely violated the principle of border immutability two decades ago and robbed us of part of our territory." [25]
Serbia's stance has been consistent. "Our only principled position," announced Serbian Prime Minister Ana Brnabić, "is that we are against sanctions on Russia, as well as that we respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine and consider it wrong to violate that integrity." [26]
Washington is not so consistent, treating international law as a menu, where an item may be chosen or ignored according to taste. Ukrainian territory is regarded as sacrosanct, whereas the US backed the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and currently campaigns for Serbian and international recognition for its theft of the province of Kosovo. Similarly, it is ramping up efforts to promote Taiwan's separation from China and encourage separatist tendencies on the mainland. The hypocrisy can be hard to stomach. "My guts turn when I hear of principles and respect for territorial integrity," Vučić complained. "They ask us to respect someone's integrity, and what about ours?" [27] Concerning the unceasing pressure on Serbia to recognize Kosovo, Vučić commented, "As they say, Ukraine will not give up its integrity at any cost, and then you demand that from Serbia. For Serbia to give up its integrity, it can only happen with a gun to the forehead." [28]
It is now Washington's moment. The United States believes it can capitalize on the conflict in Ukraine to more thoroughly impose its will on other nations and compel obedience in furtherance of geopolitical domination. Serbia, situated in Europe, is in a particularly vulnerable position. The population of Serbia is nearly united in opposing sanctions on Russia, with the percentage in support measuring in a single digit. An even lower number favors EU membership at the cost of recognizing Kosovo.[29] Yet, the EU sets those as the two primary conditions Serbia must meet for it to be welcomed into the union. Western punishment for Serbia's independence is already taking a toll, according to Vučić: "The price we pay is huge; we essentially have no access to the capital market." [30]
In the weeks and months ahead, Serbia can expect to be confronted by escalating threats and blackmail. Vučić vows that although his government will "try to preserve peace and the future of Serbia," it will not be easy. "I have never seen or dreamed of experiencing this in my life," he said. "I have never seen such pressure. We face hysteria, and no one wants to hear, let alone listen. Unprecedented hysteria; diplomacy no longer exists." [31] Western arrogance is not going to dissipate. It is in the DNA of imperialism. As a small nation, can Serbia maintain its sovereignty and independence and hold out against the combined might of the West? And what punishment will it have to take?
Notes.
[1] "Brnabic: Serbia to Donate 3 Mln Euros to Ukraine," Tanjug, May 5, 2022.
[2] "Србија Даје Помоћ Од Три Милиона Евра: За помоћ деци и расељенима унутар и ван Украјине," Večernje Novosti, May 5, 2022.
[3] "Вучић о гласању у УН: Првобитна одлука била је да будемо уздржани," Politika, April 7, 2022.
Milenković, D., "Четири Претње Пре Гласања: Како су западне дипломате притискале нашу земљу да би је натерале да подржи резолуцију против Русије, Večernje Novosti, April 9, 2022.
[4] Србија ће бити изузета из ЕУ санкција на нафту и гас, Politika, April 8, 2022.
[5] Katić, Nebojša, "Србија и политика санкција," Politika, April 23, 2022.
[6] Dunai, Martin, "Serbia's President Aleksandar Vucic Rejects Sanctions on Russia," Financial Times, April 21, 2022.
[7] "Serbs See Pre-dawn Strike on Milosevic Villa as an Attack on Yugoslav History," Irish Times, April 23, 1999.
[8] Robert Fisk, "Taken in by the NATO Line," The Independent (London), July 7, 1999.
[9] "Can Serbia Survive the War in Ukraine? What the West is Threatening Us With?" B92, March 2, 2022.
[10] Александар Вучић за РТС: Незамисливе размере безобразлука оних који прете Србији, биће много тешко, Radio Television Serbia, April 7, 2022.
[11] "US Urges Serbia to Join Sanctions Against its Ally Russia," Associated Press, April 19, 2022.
"Вучић: Србиjа плаћа велику цену због неувођења санкциjа Русиjи," Tanjug, April 21, 2022.
[12] "НАТО ловац пратио лет 'Ер Србије' у руском ваздушном простору," Politika, April 7, 2022.
"NATO Warplanes Follow Air Serbia Jet Flying from Russia," Tanjug, April 8, 2022.
[13] "Покажите Мало Поштовања Према Земљи у Којој Је Убијено 82 Деце!Овако је Вучић одговорио на провокативно питање новинара Дојче велеа!," Večernje Novosti, May 5, 2022.
[14] "Вучић Поручио Грађанима: 'Огромни су притисци на нашу земљу, наставићемо да се боримо'," Večernje Novosti, May 6, 2022.
[15] Katy Dartford and AP, "For First Time, a Majority of Serbs Are Against Joining the EU – Poll," Euronews, April 22, 2022.
[16] http://www.mup.gov.rs/wps/portal/sr/aktuelno/aktivnosti/03c82eeb-80b9-4650-8ad4-18d2383d72dd
[17] Sideris, Spiros, "Minister: Those Who Bombed Serbia Cannot Ask it to Join Russia Sanctions," Euractiv, May 6, 2022.
[18] Jurica Kerbler, "Милановић у Вуковару: Нисам ултранационалиста, желим мир између Срба и Хрвата," Večernje Novosti, May 6, 2022.
[19] https://www.predsednik.rs/en/press-center/press-releases/congratulations-of-the-president-of-the-united-states-of-america-on-the-serbian-statehood-day
[20] Cvetkovic, Sandra and Baliu, Doruntina, "Kosovo Applies for Council of Europe in Move Sure to Anger Serbia," Radio Free Europe, May 12, 2022.
[21] "Kosovo PM Albin Kurti Expresses Willingness to Join NATO and European Union," First Channel News, May 18, 2022.
[22] "Четири државе повукле признање КиМ, две велике земље помажу Приштини," Politika, May 13, 2022.
[23] "Нема повлачења пред уценама и ултиматумима," Politika, May 13, 2022.
[24] https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/-/2531266
[25] D. Milinković, "Три Срамне Уцене Г7 Пред Србијом: Отели нам Косово, а траже да поштујемо украјинске границе," Večernje Novosti, May 16, 2022.
[26] Brnabic: The Main Task is to Preserve Peace and Stability in the Region," Telegraf, April 20, 2022.
[27] https://vucic.rs/Vesti/Najnovije/a49913-Vucic-Svi-zajedno-moramo-da-radimo-na-istoj-politici-vucic.rs.html
[28] "Vučić for RV Prva: 'I Won't Give Territorial Integrity of Serbia at Any Cost, Period," B92, May 15, 2022.
[29] "Више од 80 одсто грађана Србије против санкција Русији и уласка у НАТО," Politika, May 20, 2022.
[30] "Vučić for RV Prva: 'I Won't Give Territorial Integrity of Serbia at Any Cost, Period," B92, May 15, 2022.
[31] "Вучић Са Патријархом: Притисци ће бити све већи, ја ово никада нисам видео – наше је да сачувамо мир," Večernje Novosti, May 18, 2022.
"Vučić with the Patriarch: 'Unprecedented Hysteria, Diplomacy No Longer Exists," B92, May 18, 2022.
May 17, 2022
Serbia’s Decoupling From Russia?
Serbia's Decoupling From Russia
BY
6-7 minutes
erbia seems to be preparing to distance itself from Russia. The Balkan nation has still not joined anti-Russian sanctions, although Belgrade's recent moves suggest that the country could soon officially "pick a side" in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.
Ever since Russia launched the invasion of Ukraine, Serbia has been attempting to maintain its neutral stance regarding a war that has already brought many changes to the existing global order. The southeastern European country has condemned Russia's actions, although it refused to impose sanctions on Moscow. In other words, Belgrade has been trying to balance its aspirations to join the European Union with its close political and energy ties to the Kremlin.
Now that Russia has been isolated and its positions in the international arena significantly weakened, Serbia likely cannot continue doing business as usual with its nominal strategic partner. Politically, Belgrade can still count on Russia's support regarding Kosovo – a territory that unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in 2008, and has been recognized as an independent state by most Western countries - although not by four EU member states: Greece, Cyprus, Spain and Slovakia. However, according to Serbian Aleksandar Vucic, for Belgrade things have changed for the worse after Russian leader Vladimir Putin used the Kosovo precedent to justify Russia's recognition of the Donetsk People's Republic and Lugansk People's Republic.
During his meeting with the United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on April 26, the Russian President said that in 2014, when Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine, the people of Crimea had "acted in practically the same way as the people living in Kosovo - they made a decision on independence." Talking about Kosovo's unilaterally declared independence, Putin stressed that the Donbas republics can enjoy the same right without permission from Ukraine's central government and declare their sovereignty "since the precedent has been created."
In response to Putin's statements, several pro-government tabloids in Serbia published front pages with highly critical headlines about the Russian leader, claiming that he "stabbed a knife into Serbia's back". Even President Vucic seems to have changed his rhetoric regarding Putin.
"We are now in a problem because the West will call on Serbia to head quickly toward recognizing Kosovo so that they can tell Putin that the Donbas and Kosovo are not about the same issue", Vucic stressed.
It is therefore unsurprising that German Chancellor Olaf Scholz openly said that recognition of Kosovo – something that Germany did a long time ago – will be part of the future agreement between Belgrade and Pristina. In the mid-term, the West will likely pressure Serbia to recognize Kosovo, and also to join anti-Russian sanctions. The Balkan nation, completely surrounded by NATO and EU members, does not seem to have much room for political maneuvers.
Quite aware of such a difficult position, Serbian authorities have already hinted that the country will de facto be on the Western side in a new Cold War geopolitical battle against Russia. Even though Serbia declared military neutrality in 2007, Croatian media reported that Belgrade allowed railroad transport of non-combat military equipment for Ukraine to cross Serbian territory. The train reportedly entered Croatia from Hungary on April 23, and then continued through Serbia to Romania. Such an action, however, did not raise concerns in Moscow, although some reports suggest that Serbia also supplied weapons to Ukraine.
Besides providing open support to the war-torn nation, the West also seems to expect Serbia to reduce its energy ties with Moscow. Russia's energy giant Gazprom and its subsidiary Gazpromneft own 56.15% of the Petroleum Industry of Serbia (NIS), and that is something that has become a headache for the Balkan country. Although Vucic said that Belgrade will not nationalize NIS, Serbian authorities seem to be looking for a way to diminish Russian influence in the nation's energy sector.
"We have to defend energy stability at all costs, even at the cost of changing the ownership structure of NIS. We would not be taking anything away from anyone, but we have to take care of ourselves," said Zorana Mihajlovic, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Mining and Energy, pointing out that "the war in Ukraine has changed and is yet to change Serbia".
According to reports, the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR) is interested in buying out NIS' controlling stake, and has been in contact with both Gazprom and the government of Serbia. Such a purchase seems realistic, given that Serbia is already building the gas interconnector with neighboring Bulgaria, which would connect the two countries to Azerbaijan's gas producers. The interconnector, which is expected to be completed by October 2023, will also enable Serbia and other countries from the region to access various sources of gas through the Southern Gas Corridor and the liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal near Alexandroupolis, Greece. In other words, they will try to achieve diversification from Russian gas.
The problem, however, is that it is still highly uncertain whether gas from Azerbaijan can completely replace Russian energy, at least in the short-term. In 2023, Azerbaijan is expected to supply European countries with 11 billion cubic meters of natural gas, which cannot satisfy European needs, given that presently the EU imports 169 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia.
Serbia, for its part, due to its geographical position, will almost certainly share Europe's energy and political fate, whatever it may be.
April 28, 2022
The Moskva Riddle | The Vineyard of the Saker
The Moskva Riddle | The Vineyard of the Saker
amarynth
6-8 minutes
Get ready: something lethally "asymmetrical" may be about to pop up
By Pepe Escobar, posted with the author's permission and widely cross-posted
Neither NATO nor Russia is telling us what really happened with the Moskva, the legendary admiral ship of the Black Sea fleet.
NATO because in theory, they know. Moscow, for its part, made it clear they are not saying anything until they can be sure what happened.
One thing is certain. If the Russian Ministry of Defense finds out that NATO did it, they will let loose all the dogs from Hell on NATO, as in "asymmetrical, lethal and fast".
On Moskva's location: it was positioned near one of 3 drilling rigs, used for monitoring a whole sector of the Black Sea with hydrophones and NEVA-BS radar, the most westward one, BK-2 Odessa, approximately 66 km northeast from Snake Island. The whole thing was integrated in the regional monitoring systems. As in everything, literally, was monitored: ships, low flying targets, smaller echoes, even the bobbing head of an unsuspecting swimmer.
So there was a quite slim chance that anything – not to mention subsonic Neptune missiles and Bayraktar drones – could have slipped through this aerial net.
So what could have possibly happened?
It could have been some kind of underwater drone, released either from some sneaky sub, or by a SBS team, coming from the western coast, with a stopover at Snake Island. Then that drone somehow managed to drill itself through the Moskva's hull from below – and exploded its payload inside.
What follows comes from a top source in Brussels: serious, trustworthy, proven record spanning nearly two decades. Yet he may be just spreading disinformation. Or bragging. Or that may be rock solid intel.
Before we start, we should point out it's hard to believe the Neptune/Bayraktar fairytale angle. After all, as we've seen, the Russian fleet had established a multidimensional surveillance/defense layer in the direction of Odessa.
The Moskva was near Odessa, closer to Romania. A year ago, the source maintains, a new phased array locator was installed on it: the illumination range is 500 km. According to the standard Ukrainian narrative, first the Moskva was hit by a drone, and the locators and antennas were smashed. The Moskva was half blind.
Then – according to the Ukrainian narrative – they launched two Neptune cruise missiles from the shore. Guidance was carried out by NATO's Orion, which was hanging over Romania. The missiles zoomed in on the ship with the homing heads turned off, so that the radiation beam would not be detected.
So we have guidance by NATO's Orion, transmitting the exact coordinates, leading to two hits, and subsequent detonation of ammunition (that's the part acknowledged by the Russian Ministry of Defense).
A strategic hit
The Moskva was on combat duty 100-120 km away from Odessa – controlling the airspace within a radius of 250-300 km. So in fact it was ensuring the overlap of the southern half of Moldova, the space from Izmail to Odessa and part of Romania (including the port of Constanta).
Its positioning could not be more strategic. Moskva was interfering with NATO's covert transfer of military aircraft (helicopters and fighter jets) from Romania to Ukraine. It was being watched 24/7. NATO air reconnaissance was totally on it.
As the Moskva "killer", NATO may have not chosen the Neptune, as spread by Ukrainian propaganda; the source points to the fifth-generation NSM PKR (Naval Strike Missile, with a range of 185 km, developed by Norway and the Americans.)
He describes the NSM as "able to reach the target along a programmed route thanks to the GPS-adjusted INS, independently find the target by flying up to it at an altitude of 3-5 meters. When reaching the target, the NSM maneuvers and deploys electronic interference. A highly sensitive thermal imager is used as a homing system, which independently determines the most vulnerable places of the target ship."
As a direct consequence of hitting the Moskva, NATO managed to reopen an air corridor for the transfer of aircraft to the airfields of Chernivtsi, Transcarpathian and Ivano-Frankivsk regions.
In parallel, after the destruction of the Moskva, the Black Sea Fleet, according to the source, "no longer seems to have a ship equipped with a long-range anti-aircraft missile system". Of course a three-band radar Sky-M system remains in play in Crimea, capable of tracking all air targets at a range of up to 600 km. One wonders whether this is enough for all Russian purposes.
So what do we really have here? Fantasy or reality? There was only one way to know.
I ran the info past the inestimable Andrei Martyanov, who knew the Moskva "as Slava in 1981 when she was afloat in the Northern Bay of Sevastopol and my class which was at first summer practice on board of old cruiser Dzerzhinsky was given an extensive introduction to her. So, she was an old lady and it is too bad that she had to finish her long life this way and at this time."
Martyanov, once again, was the consummate professional, stressing no one, at this stage, really knows what happened. But he made some crucial points: "Per NSM (if we accept this version), even with its Low Observability and GPS guidance under normal (that is sea up to state 5-6) and normal radio-permeability, even the Moskva's old frigate radar would have seen those missiles in distances of tens of kilometers, somewhere between 15-20 for sure. NSM, as any NATO anti-shipping missile, are subsonic, with their velocity roughly 300 meters per second. That leaves, even in a 15 kilometer range, 45 seconds to detect track and develop a firing solution for whatever 'on duty' AD complex. More than enough reaction time."
Martyanov also stresses, "it is impossible to hide the external impact of the anti-shipping missile – one will immediately know what hit the ship. Moreover, to hit and sink such a target as the Moskva one has to launch a salvo and not only two missiles, likely 3-4 at least. In this case, Russia would know who attacked Moskva. Does NATO know? I am positive this event has NATO written all over it, if it is not an internal sabotage which absolutely cannot be excluded at this stage. I am sure if Nebo was operational it would have seen the salvo."
Which brings us to the inevitable clincher: "If NATO was involved, I am sure we will see some retaliation, after all, as I am on record all the time, US bases in Middle East and elsewhere are nothing more than fat prestigious targets."
So get ready: something lethally "asymmetrical" may be about to pop up.
http://thesaker.is/the-moskva-riddle/
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April 17, 2022
Alexander Vucic’s victory: What is next for Serbia?
Alexander Vucic's victory: What is next for Serbia?
TRTWorld
6-8 minutes
It was like choosing the lesser of two evils for many Serbians.
On April 3, the incumbent Serbian President Alexander Vucic succeeded in winning almost 60 percent of the votes in the presidential election. Remaining in power for another five years means he must deal with the region's burning issues.
Once a member of the ultra-nationalist Radical Party, in 2008, Vucic founded the Serbian Progressive Party, a conservative and pro-European party. Then, Vucic, step by step, climbed the ladders of power. He took office as minister of defence, deputy premier, prime minister and president.
He cemented his victory in the early April vote count by winning two million votes from 6.5 million registered Serbian voters.
A leader or faute de mieux?
After the election victory declaration, Vucic thanked his voters for making him "the Serb (after Nikola Pasic) who has been in power in Serbia for the longest time." But what lies behind his success?
Speaking to TRT World's "Across the Balkans," Vuk Vuksanovic, a Senior Researcher at Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, explained Vucic's success by emphasising two main factors: First, he is a formidable person, and his party has a tremendous and well-mobilised influence on the media, state institutions, and national security setup. Second, the frailty of the opposition did not offer a better alternative.
According to Vuksanovic, many Serbians are upset by the post-Milosevic economic and political transition. Some consider the opposition as part of that disappointment. The result is a tactical vote, which means people did not vote for Vucic because they liked him but because, from their perspective, he represents the lesser evil.
Moscow vs Brussels
The Russian assault on Ukraine influenced the election campaign considerably. Vucic used this fact to his benefit. His main slogan was crafted accordingly.
With "Peace and Stability," he promised economic growth and infrastructure development. He echoed his desire not to get the country entangled in the conflict. On the other hand, his opponent Zdravko Ponos, blamed him for building unity with "fear of war… abusing events in Ukraine."
As Vuksanovic emphasises, Vucic benefited from the conflict. The image of an experienced politician who could lead the troubled country in these dark times overshadowed the opposition.
In the same tone as his slogan, on the election night, Vucic emphasised the importance of having good relationships in the region and pursuing the European, alongside preserving "ties with its traditional friends." Serbia supported two United Nations resolutions condemning Russia's military assault. Moreover, Belgrade still refuses to be part of the sanctions imposed on Moscow.
In an earlier speech, he said that Belgard continues on its European path, but "Serbia will not rush into enmity because someone else asks to." Speaking to TRT World, Srdjan Majstorovic, Chairman of the Board of European Policy Centre (CEP) and member of the Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group (BIEPAG), explained that these elections will have an important impact on Serbia's relations with the EU. The country started accession negotiations in 2014; however, issues like democracy and problematic relations with its neighbours brought the process to a standstill. With Belgrade's indecisive approach to Ukraine, its EU process is questioned again.
Right after the elections, Vucic emphasised that Serbia would continue on the same path; keep the policy of military neutrality and stay away from any military alliance.
For the first time since 1999, Kosovo Serbs weren't allowed to have open polling stations. The Kosovo government decided not to allow its citizens to vote in its neighbours' elections. With no polling stations opened, thousands of Kosovo Serbs crossed the border with their cars and buses to vote in Serbia. Majstorovic says this situation will have long-term consequences. The nationalist narratives on both sides will rise, and these elections will shadow future talks' tone and atmosphere.
Parliamentary elections
Vucic's Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) won the Parliamentary election conducted on the same day. SNS's 43.5 percent was followed by United for Victory of Serbia with 12.9. The Socialist Party of Serbia, which is the SNS's partner party, won 11.6 per cent. The green-left Moramo got 4.4 per cent, and the right-wing NADA, Oathkeepers and Dveri also passed the threshold.
The current picture portrays a sliding to the right, which could create a serious issue for Vucic's EU policy. The president's party did not have the majority needed to form a government and will need partners: probably the SPS or right-wing parties. On the other hand, Moramo entered the Parliament for the first time. Their green agenda helped people mobilise and protest against the exploitation of natural minerals last year.
Majstorovic suggests that the formation of the new government would take until late summer. In this way, Vucic will be able to buy time, measure the public's opinion, oversee internal and external factors, and avoid having a net stance on the Russia-Ukraine crisis.
Vuksanovic points out that Vucic's role depends on the trade-offs at a regional level. If he is perceived as a balancer for the region, he probably will accept this role. However, if there is a chance of getting a domestic rating, he will use the nationalist's card.
As the only Balkan country president that does not impose sanctions on Russia, Vucic will have to balance appeasing Mother Russia and pleasing Brussels. This approach will affect Vucic's domestic policy and the region's delicate balance of power.
April 10, 2022
Orban And Vucic (And Tito) – OpEd
Orban And Vucic (And Tito) – OpEd
TransConflict
9-12 minutes
By David B. Kanin*
The poor performance of Russia's military has galvanized a Western alliance that appeared disoriented and divided in the wake of the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Breathless rhetoric has called Putin's war "suicidal," [1] questioned his sanity, and speculated as to how he can find an off-ramp. Meanwhile, a bloodied but stolid Russia adjusts its sights and prepares to bludgeon eastern and southern Ukraine before returning to re-assault the country's capital and the West. Russia has lost the first six weeks of the war but shows no sign of giving up on eventual victory, no matter how ugly its strategic and operational performance. If Moscow is to lose this war it will have to suffer much more serious setbacks than have been evident so far.
Ukraine's ferocious resistance has led some Western pundits to wax enthusiastic about a supposed revival of the liberal world's hegemony. On March 17 I attended a Zoomfest organized by an American Balkans watcher who invited a number of analysts and academics from the region to comment on the impact of the war on their countries and the Balkans as a whole. Before he let any of them speak the American laid out a series of triumphalist slides declaring the victory of democracy, defeat of autocracy, robustness of nation building, and retreat of populism. (He went on for a long time and then put pressure on each of his many guests to cut their presentations short – those speakers presented more sober views of the situation).
The organizer alleged that Russia's failure marked the end of the line for Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic's policy of balancing his relations with Russia and the West. Vucic, the argument goes, will have to choose between falling in line with US and EU support for Ukraine or lash himself and Serbia to a losing Russian war effort. Similarly, Western media assessments have labeled Vucic as a Putin ally and linked him with Hungarian strongman Victor Orban. Such simplistic categorizations underestimate the subtlety and durability of these leaders' policies. They also ignore the existence of nationalist and anti-war sentiment in Hungary and nationalist and pro-Russian feeling among Vucic's constituents. And, by the way, the slant of this analysis overstates the attachment of each of these figures to Putin.
It should be remembered that non-alignment is far from a new concept in southeastern Europe. Josip Broz (Tito) confounded expectations when he survived his split with Stalin and Stalin himself but also managed to keep Washington and NATO at arms -length even as he accepted economic and financial assistance from the West. Tito was proud of his role as a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement and the memory of this stance continues to resonate in Serbia. Non-alignment helped orient a rickety structure that survived Tito's death for a decade. The collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe did not cause the collapse of Yugoslavia, but the end of non-alignment's relevance in wake of the events of 1989-91 removed one prop on which the Yugoslav identity and sense of purpose had rested.
Hungary, a former member of the Warsaw Pact and now in both the EU and NATO, never has been non-aligned. Nevertheless, Orban's politics and security policies have morphed a bit like those of Bosnian Serb strongman Milorad Dodik. Previous posturing as a young pro-Western democrat gave way to enthusiastic embrace of populism and friendlier relations with Russia.
Vucic came to his neutrality from a very different direction, starting out as a nationalist associated with Vojislav Seselj but becoming a pragmatic, skillful politician able to establish good relations with Angela Merkel as well as Putin. Orban and Vucic achieved their latest victories in elections on the same day (April 3). In both cases, the system was skewed in the incumbent's favor but there is little doubt these leaders' opponents did not have the popular support needed to force regime change.
- Ukraine's cause clearly did not move the needle in either case; it is important to stress that, like Vucic , the Serbian opposition refrained from supporting Western sanctions against Russia.
Going forward, there is no reason either of these newly reelected men needs to abandon their strategies. The EU is punishing Orban by threatening to withhold funds related to disputes preexisting and unrelated to Ukraine. This issue also failed to help his electoral opponents and likely has been discounted in Budapest. Orban's offer to host peace talks includes invitations to France and Germany as well as Russia and Ukraine but not the US and so plays to Moscow's goal of splitting NATO and marginalizing European security. The fact Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz continue to make futile phone calls to Putin suggests their interest in proving the EU is more than a marginal security actor might tempt them to accept what Putin would try to mold into a replay of the 1938 Munich agreement.
Vucic also can be relatively comfortable in his stance on the war. The fact there exists no credible path to EU membership for Serbia or the other Balkan non-members removes much of the leverage the Eurocrats would like to believe they have in Belgrade and other Balkan capitals. The well-trod argument that the West's outrage at Putin's invasion of Ukraine is hypocritical in the context of its bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999 still carries much weight with the Serbian public. Vucic likely will keep as low a profile as possible as the conflict evolves – there is no reason for him to compete with Orban and Turkish President Recip Tayyip Erdogan for pride of place as potential mediator.
The emerging war crimes horror around Bucha and other towns in Ukraine recently evacuated by Russian troops so far does not seem to be changing this dynamic. The war coincides with the 30th anniversary of the beginning of the war in Bosnia. BBC and other Western media have paid attention to this history and have reminded audiences of the Srebrenica genocide and other atrocities. Some have raised the trajectory of the war crimes trials after the Bosnian and Kosovo crises as cautionary tales relevant to possible criminal charges against Putin and Russian miscreants operating in Ukraine. So far, there does not appear to be an appetite to force Dodik out or to demand that Serbia act toward Ukraine differently than some believe it acted in Bosnia and Kosovo.
China is its own stool
In my view, it is nonsense to suggest China somehow faces great dilemmas about the war in Ukraine or that Beijing is missing a chance to prove it is a responsible actor in an international system that benefits it. China is properly looking out for its interests in an international system it is in the process of changing to suit those interests. The idea that China's integration in the global economy will or should lead it to cooperate with Western "partners" is one of the silliest fantasies emerging from the West's enthusiasm over the Putin-inspired renewal of its sense of supremacy. The current situation has its dangers but overall works to China's benefit. The other two superpowers are at each other's throats in a conflict Beijing can stay out of. China's economy will suffer some pain, but nothing unmanageable.
Meanwhile, China will benefit from what is becoming Putin's Mussolini moment. Well into the 1930s, Italy was the senior partner in the relationship with Nazi Germany – in 1936 Mussolini mobilized troops at the Austrian border to deter Hitler from trying to impose Anschluss. Within a short time that relationship reversed as Mussolini's Italy floundered and then collapsed.
Now, Putin's miscalculation in Ukraine and the imposition of Western sanctions much broader, deeper and – I believe – longer lasting than Moscow expected is making Russia increasingly dependent on Chinese economic support. For now, China probably will be judicious in how it uses this growing leverage over junior partner Russia because both countries share the primary goal of bringing down the US and the declining Western-dominated order. Nevertheless, Moscow and Beijing are engaged in what over time will become an increasingly competitive tussle for influence in Central and South Asia. A similar dynamic eventually will emerge elsewhere, including in the Balkans. Orban and specially Vucic will be able to look to Beijing as an alternative partner to both Russia and the West.
China's rise is beyond the scope of the war in Ukraine and out of the control of Western powers and their fictional "international community." However, NATO and the EU can do a lot to nurture their residual credibility if they make sure it is the Russian stool that collapses under the feet of Orban Vucic and not their own. It is not overstating the case to insist that Western strategic credibility depends on enabling Ukraine to win its war. So far, all the West is doing is helping Kyiv not immediately lose. Part of Putin's calculus in risking this invasion was the certainty that the West would not fight. Now, a bloodied Russia has as its goal an outcome in the field and/or at the negotiating table in which the West loses without firing a shot. This goal is attainable and, if attained, will strengthen Russian influence in places where its influence remains significant – in the Balkans that includes Bulgaria, North Macedonia, the Republika Srpska, and Montenegro as well as Serbia and Hungary.
*David B. Kanin is an adjunct professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins University and a former senior intelligence analyst for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Footnote:
- For example, Nina Khrushcheva in an interview on MSNBC on April 6, 2022.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of TransConflict.
