May 24, 2006
Balkanized, again
Balkanized, again
Mirjana Tomic International Herald Tribune
TUESDAY, MAY 23, 2006
MADRID I heard the news about Montenegro's independence in Spain, where I currently live. I felt neither joy nor sadness. My first thoughts, in fact, were of a purely practical nature: What will happen to my passport? Will it be recognized abroad?The cover of my passport still reads Yugoslavia. The country changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro several years ago, but the authorities had no money to change passports.A week ago, a policeman at the Madrid airport asked me: "Where is this passport from?" "It is from Yugoslavia," I said, "but the country changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro. In a few weeks it will have a different name." The policeman smiled. "In a few years Spain will be in the same situation," he said. "I shall be from Andalusia."The disintegration of a country implies many practical problems. The solution to these problems, those that people care about, depends on political negotiations. So far, Balkan politicians have not negotiated in good faith.What will happen to pensions, social security, properties and divided families? In my case, I do not even know who will inherit my country's (sorry, my former, former country's) embassy in Spain. Will I have to go to France or elsewhere to solve a simple issue or get a paper? Who knows if any of my Yugoslav/Serbian documents will be recognized abroad, anyway.Even the answers to some simple questions become complicated. When asked "Where are you from?" I have several answers. When speaking to Europeans, I usually say that I am from Belgrade, the city where I was born and got my education. When speaking to other people, I say that I come from the former Yugoslavia. It is too complicated to explain that the country no longer exists.In my country of birth, there were three official languages: Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian. Serbo-Croatian was spoken in four republics, each now an independent state (or about to be one): Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro. Now, each independent state has its own language, that is, Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian and Montenegrin.Slovenian and Macedonian are, in fact, different languages, but most people in all the republics spoke or understood the language previously called Serbo- Croatian. Now, when I speak with my friends from different parts of former Yugoslavia, we still communicate in the same tongue, but we each call it, "our language." That way, all misunderstanding is avoided.Professional and business people from the former Yugoslavia still meet and keep in contact. Now, however, their meetings have an international character. The favorite meeting place is Vienna. The reason is pragmatic: The Austrian capital has direct flights to all the regional capitals. There are no plane connections between Zagreb and Belgrade, for example. In addition, one can buy newspapers and magazines from the entire region at Viennese newsstands. Not so in Skopje or Sarajevo.The organizers of international conferences, as well as the various multilateral and nongovernmental organizations active in the region, usually deal with all the countries in the area. But it is no longer acceptable to say the former Yugoslavia, so a new concept has been forged: Southeastern Europe.When organizing international forums, institutions play to local sensitivities (nobody wants to be associated with the extinct country) and usually include participants from neighboring countries: Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and even Greece. Thus a new problem emerges: language barriers. People from the former Yugoslavia do not understand Romanian, Bulgarian or Albanian. So, international dialogue is held in English.In early May, I participated in an international conference of media professionals from Southeastern Europe held in Vienna. The presence of Austrian, Italian, Greek, Bulgarian, Albanian and Moldovan journalists obliged everyone to speak English during the official sessions.During coffee breaks and official dinners, however, all the journalists from former Yugoslavia stuck together, speaking Serbo-Croatian, or, rather, "our language." Even the Albanians from Kosovo preferred the former Yugoslav crowd.Journalists talked about their respective countries, asked about mutual friends and compared whose economic situation was more favorable and which country was closer to joining the European Union. Nonetheless, the aspiration to join the EU did not translate into any interest in Europe. I tried, without success, to comment on the media situation in Spain. Nobody was interested. "I live in the Balkans, not in Europe," commented a colleague from Macedonia. Mirjana Tomic, a freelance media consultant, lives in Madrid.
Copyright � 2006 The International Herald Tribune www.iht.com
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/05/23/opinion/edtomic.phpThe independence of Montenegro- the further disintegration of a country- implies many practical problems.
Claiming the Black Mountain
http://www.antiwar.com/malic/?articleid=9026
May 24, 2006
Claiming the Black Mountain
by Nebojsa Malic
Montenegro's Separatists WinAfter seven years of frustrated attempts, the separatist regime inMontenegro celebrated victory Sunday night, as it managed to drum up 55.5percent of the votes necessary to win the independence referendum. Whatwould be a landslide in any Western election was actually the narrowest ofmargins in Montenegro, as the acceptable threshold set by the Brusselsbureaucrats was 55 percent. It took weeks of pro-independence propaganda in government-monopolized media, multi-million-euro public works timed for thereferendum, shady political deals with ethnic minorities, and votershenanigans to secure that .5 percent margin between victory and defeat. And though the unionist parties are demanding a recount and complaining aboutirregularities, Milo Djukanovic and his separatists have already declaredvictory ? and more importantly, just about everyone, including Belgrade, has accepted it as fact.The outcome caused outpourings of joy at the International Crisis Group,among the Kosovo Albanians, and in the ranks of Serbophobic media. Theireagerness to celebrate the "demise of Greater Serbia" suggests that external support for Montenegrin separatism was never about Montenegro at all. Whathappens to the rocky republic next will be of little interest to itserstwhile partisans, as they continue to redraw Balkans maps to match those of 1941.Democracy in ActionIt has been said that it doesn't matter who votes as much as who counts thevotes. In Montenegro this weekend, what mattered was who counted the voters.In the run-up to the referendum, tens of thousands of "Montenegrins" living abroad were registered to vote, while hundreds of thousands who lived inSerbia were denied that right. While separatists complained that because ofthe 55 percent rule, their vote was worth only 0.82 percent of "a Serb's" (meaning a unionist's), it was people like Began Cekic, "a demolition expertfrom Brooklyn," who decided the outcome of the plebiscite.Writes Nicholas Wood of the New York Times:"Figures from the border police suggest that Montenegro's diaspora had a decisive role in passing the referendum. Some 16,000 Montenegrins fromabroad returned in the three days before the election, a number equal to 3percent of the total voter turnout."While people like Cekic, "an ethnic Albanian," flew in to support the separatists, none of the 350,000-plus Montenegrins living in Serbia wereallowed to vote. Most of them consider themselves ethnic Serbs, much asthose in Montenegro who voted against secession. But the Djukanovic regime has systematically denied Montenegro's Serb identity, establishing aseparate "Academy of sciences," a separate church, a separate language, eveninventing a separate history.Alexis de Tocqueville once warned that a democracy can easily become a mere "tyranny of the majority." The great irony of Montenegro's May 21 plebisciteis that the "majority" that won was actually an alliance of minorities ? theideological and pragmatic separatists among the Montenegrin Serbs, ethnic Albanians, Croats, and Muslims, who together outnumbered the plurality ofSerb unionists.The Gloating BeginsWhile news of Montenegro's secession generally merited a short wire reportin most American papers, the media establishment with vested interests in the "Bank of Collective Serbian Guilt" (Deliso) reacted to the outcome withebullience and gloating.The staff correspondent of New York's Newsday told his readers how Sundaynight's referendum was a defeat for "every Serb who ever yearned to expand Serbia's territory" and "a dream of a land called Greater Serbia." Insistingthat the 1990s wars were motivated by this mythical conspiracy ? somethingeven the Hague Inquisition has abandoned, due to complete inability to fabricate even halfway credible evidence ? the Newsday correspondentexplains that:"The hope of the United States, the European Union, and the internationalcommunity at large is that Serbia will accept its modest new status as a landlocked country of under 10 million people, give up its expansionist,nationalist impulses, and embrace the West."This sort of rhetoric is parroted by The Guardian's Ian Traynor, who opinedthat the loss of Montenegro, and the likely loss of Kosovo to follow, "may be just the tonic Serbia needs to divest itself of a disastrous 15 years anda nationalism that has brought nothing but grief." Continues Traynor,"[C]ertainly, the cream of Belgrade's liberal and democratic class is happy that an independent Montenegro also means, finally, an independent Serbiathat can get on with rebuilding itself."The "cream" he is referring to are people like Sonja Biserko, who told theLA Times that Montenegro's secession "marked the end of Serbia's 'imperialambitions.'" There's something incongruous about Biserko, the leadingsupporter of the Empire, talking about some supposed Serbian imperialism. In her Serbophobic crusade, she has supported the NATO bombing and advocatedthe occupation and forced "reeducation" of Serbia. That's some "humanrights" record, indeed.One of Biserko's detractors once asked the rhetorical question: How small would Serbia have to be for them to no longer consider it "imperialist" and"aggressive"? The answer he postulated, based on the Jacobin language ofBiserko and the rest of the "liberal and democratic class," was, "Never small enough."Taking a CueAlbanian separatists in the occupied province of Kosovo have cheeredSunday's results the loudest.Alex Anderson of the International Crisis Group, which has championed Montenegrin and Albanian separatism, did not hide his pleasure at theoutcome of Sunday's plebiscite, commenting that "there's an expectation ofdomino-effect" in Kosovo now."Before the end of the year, Kosovo, too, will join Montenegro as a new state, and these new countries will be an important factor for stability ofthe whole region," said the Albanian "prime minister" of Kosovo, Agim Ceku.A commentator named Dukagjin Gorani distilled the Albanian argument thus: if 650,000 residents of Montenegro have the right to independence, why wouldn'tthe 2 million Albanians in Kosovo? One could respond that Montenegro was a"republic" in the old Yugoslavia, and that according to the EU's own ruling from 1991 only "republics" had the right to self-determination andsecession, not provinces or peoples. That was certainly the argument usedagainst the separatist movements of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. But the Abramowitz Doctrine clearly rejects the application of principles tothe Balkans. Arguments rejected out of hand when they came from 2 millionSerbs are now widely recognized as valid when coming from 2 million Albanians. It's all in who does the rejecting and the recognizing, you see.AcceptanceReactions in Belgrade have been a mixture of shock, disbelief, sorrow, andsatisfaction. The expression most wire services used was "grudging acceptance." By Tuesday afternoon, Serbian President Boris Tadic ? now defacto a full head of state ? publicly announced Serbia's acceptance of theplebiscite results. It isn't quite clear whether he had the authority to do so, but the notoriously blurry lines of authority in Serbia have just becomeeven more fluid.To many in Serbia, Montenegro's separation comes as a relief, after almostnine years of incessant provocations and tension-building by the separatists. Admittedly, the sundering will abolish the costly and uselessunion government, for years almost entirely funded by Serbian taxpayers.According to the charter negotiated in 2002, Serbia will automatically succeed to all international memberships, treaties, and charters, whileMontenegro will have to start from scratch. Abolition of the Union will haveanother consequence ? the independence of Serbia from Javier Solana, the man who presided over Serbia's 1999 bombing, and who was instrumental increating the Union charter.And yet, Montenegro's departure comes as a body blow to the Serb nationalconscience. Quite the contrary from Imperial claims of "Greater Serbia," the prevailing view in Serbia itself has for decades been the Communist-inducedprovincialism, which regarded their close relatives in Croatia, Bosnia, andMacedonia as somehow different and alien. Montenegro, however, had always been regarded as more quintessentially Serb than Serbia itself. Throughoutthe 19th century, Austria-Hungary did its best to keep Serbia and Montenegroapart, finally failing in 1913. After the Great War, Montenegro was annexed by the Kingdom of Serbia, something the tactless Serbian monarch handledabout as gracefully as the creation of Yugoslavia.Even so, it was not until the Italian occupation of 1941-45 and thesubsequent Communist creation of the "People's Republic of Montenegro" that the idea emerged of a "Montenegrin" ethnic identity as distinctly separatefrom Serb. Djukanovic's brand of separatism did not appeal to freedom from"Milosevic's tyranny" or notions of regional autonomy ? it rooted itself firmly in this anti-Serb concept of Montenegrin nationality. When even theproudest Serbs go as far to deny their Serb heritage? what does it meananymore? This is the sort of question the foreign backers of Montenegrin independence wanted asked, for the explicit purpose of forcing Serbia to"accept its modest new status" and "embrace the West." (Newsday)The loss of compass in Belgrade is perhaps best described by Monday's call from Vuk Draskovic, soon-to-be-former foreign minister of the now defunctUnion, to reestablish monarchy in Serbia. While a great idea in principle,Draskovic chose to justify it as "a shortcut to full membership in EU and NATO." What's Next?The true consequences of Montenegro's separation remain to be seen. Serbiaobviously has a lot of soul-searching to do, even as it is facing enormouspressure to surrender Kosovo. In the rocky republic itself, life after secession does not look to be all milk and honey, as the separatistspromised their electorate. For years, Montenegro has lived on U.S. foreignaid, while Serbia subsidized its share of government expenses and foreign debt. Now that it can no longer be used as a leverage against Belgrade,Podgorica may find its American sugar daddy inexplicably AWOL. Moreover, itsrulers now owe favors to Croats, Albanians, and Muslims from the north ? favors they may have to repay with special privileges, maybe even territory.For years, Milo Djukanovic wanted to be president of an independent state.Now he has his wish, and may well live to regret it, as flags, marches, and hymns give way to grim realities he can no longer blame on Belgrade.
May 24, 2006
Claiming the Black Mountain
by Nebojsa Malic
Montenegro's Separatists WinAfter seven years of frustrated attempts, the separatist regime inMontenegro celebrated victory Sunday night, as it managed to drum up 55.5percent of the votes necessary to win the independence referendum. Whatwould be a landslide in any Western election was actually the narrowest ofmargins in Montenegro, as the acceptable threshold set by the Brusselsbureaucrats was 55 percent. It took weeks of pro-independence propaganda in government-monopolized media, multi-million-euro public works timed for thereferendum, shady political deals with ethnic minorities, and votershenanigans to secure that .5 percent margin between victory and defeat. And though the unionist parties are demanding a recount and complaining aboutirregularities, Milo Djukanovic and his separatists have already declaredvictory ? and more importantly, just about everyone, including Belgrade, has accepted it as fact.The outcome caused outpourings of joy at the International Crisis Group,among the Kosovo Albanians, and in the ranks of Serbophobic media. Theireagerness to celebrate the "demise of Greater Serbia" suggests that external support for Montenegrin separatism was never about Montenegro at all. Whathappens to the rocky republic next will be of little interest to itserstwhile partisans, as they continue to redraw Balkans maps to match those of 1941.Democracy in ActionIt has been said that it doesn't matter who votes as much as who counts thevotes. In Montenegro this weekend, what mattered was who counted the voters.In the run-up to the referendum, tens of thousands of "Montenegrins" living abroad were registered to vote, while hundreds of thousands who lived inSerbia were denied that right. While separatists complained that because ofthe 55 percent rule, their vote was worth only 0.82 percent of "a Serb's" (meaning a unionist's), it was people like Began Cekic, "a demolition expertfrom Brooklyn," who decided the outcome of the plebiscite.Writes Nicholas Wood of the New York Times:"Figures from the border police suggest that Montenegro's diaspora had a decisive role in passing the referendum. Some 16,000 Montenegrins fromabroad returned in the three days before the election, a number equal to 3percent of the total voter turnout."While people like Cekic, "an ethnic Albanian," flew in to support the separatists, none of the 350,000-plus Montenegrins living in Serbia wereallowed to vote. Most of them consider themselves ethnic Serbs, much asthose in Montenegro who voted against secession. But the Djukanovic regime has systematically denied Montenegro's Serb identity, establishing aseparate "Academy of sciences," a separate church, a separate language, eveninventing a separate history.Alexis de Tocqueville once warned that a democracy can easily become a mere "tyranny of the majority." The great irony of Montenegro's May 21 plebisciteis that the "majority" that won was actually an alliance of minorities ? theideological and pragmatic separatists among the Montenegrin Serbs, ethnic Albanians, Croats, and Muslims, who together outnumbered the plurality ofSerb unionists.The Gloating BeginsWhile news of Montenegro's secession generally merited a short wire reportin most American papers, the media establishment with vested interests in the "Bank of Collective Serbian Guilt" (Deliso) reacted to the outcome withebullience and gloating.The staff correspondent of New York's Newsday told his readers how Sundaynight's referendum was a defeat for "every Serb who ever yearned to expand Serbia's territory" and "a dream of a land called Greater Serbia." Insistingthat the 1990s wars were motivated by this mythical conspiracy ? somethingeven the Hague Inquisition has abandoned, due to complete inability to fabricate even halfway credible evidence ? the Newsday correspondentexplains that:"The hope of the United States, the European Union, and the internationalcommunity at large is that Serbia will accept its modest new status as a landlocked country of under 10 million people, give up its expansionist,nationalist impulses, and embrace the West."This sort of rhetoric is parroted by The Guardian's Ian Traynor, who opinedthat the loss of Montenegro, and the likely loss of Kosovo to follow, "may be just the tonic Serbia needs to divest itself of a disastrous 15 years anda nationalism that has brought nothing but grief." Continues Traynor,"[C]ertainly, the cream of Belgrade's liberal and democratic class is happy that an independent Montenegro also means, finally, an independent Serbiathat can get on with rebuilding itself."The "cream" he is referring to are people like Sonja Biserko, who told theLA Times that Montenegro's secession "marked the end of Serbia's 'imperialambitions.'" There's something incongruous about Biserko, the leadingsupporter of the Empire, talking about some supposed Serbian imperialism. In her Serbophobic crusade, she has supported the NATO bombing and advocatedthe occupation and forced "reeducation" of Serbia. That's some "humanrights" record, indeed.One of Biserko's detractors once asked the rhetorical question: How small would Serbia have to be for them to no longer consider it "imperialist" and"aggressive"? The answer he postulated, based on the Jacobin language ofBiserko and the rest of the "liberal and democratic class," was, "Never small enough."Taking a CueAlbanian separatists in the occupied province of Kosovo have cheeredSunday's results the loudest.Alex Anderson of the International Crisis Group, which has championed Montenegrin and Albanian separatism, did not hide his pleasure at theoutcome of Sunday's plebiscite, commenting that "there's an expectation ofdomino-effect" in Kosovo now."Before the end of the year, Kosovo, too, will join Montenegro as a new state, and these new countries will be an important factor for stability ofthe whole region," said the Albanian "prime minister" of Kosovo, Agim Ceku.A commentator named Dukagjin Gorani distilled the Albanian argument thus: if 650,000 residents of Montenegro have the right to independence, why wouldn'tthe 2 million Albanians in Kosovo? One could respond that Montenegro was a"republic" in the old Yugoslavia, and that according to the EU's own ruling from 1991 only "republics" had the right to self-determination andsecession, not provinces or peoples. That was certainly the argument usedagainst the separatist movements of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. But the Abramowitz Doctrine clearly rejects the application of principles tothe Balkans. Arguments rejected out of hand when they came from 2 millionSerbs are now widely recognized as valid when coming from 2 million Albanians. It's all in who does the rejecting and the recognizing, you see.AcceptanceReactions in Belgrade have been a mixture of shock, disbelief, sorrow, andsatisfaction. The expression most wire services used was "grudging acceptance." By Tuesday afternoon, Serbian President Boris Tadic ? now defacto a full head of state ? publicly announced Serbia's acceptance of theplebiscite results. It isn't quite clear whether he had the authority to do so, but the notoriously blurry lines of authority in Serbia have just becomeeven more fluid.To many in Serbia, Montenegro's separation comes as a relief, after almostnine years of incessant provocations and tension-building by the separatists. Admittedly, the sundering will abolish the costly and uselessunion government, for years almost entirely funded by Serbian taxpayers.According to the charter negotiated in 2002, Serbia will automatically succeed to all international memberships, treaties, and charters, whileMontenegro will have to start from scratch. Abolition of the Union will haveanother consequence ? the independence of Serbia from Javier Solana, the man who presided over Serbia's 1999 bombing, and who was instrumental increating the Union charter.And yet, Montenegro's departure comes as a body blow to the Serb nationalconscience. Quite the contrary from Imperial claims of "Greater Serbia," the prevailing view in Serbia itself has for decades been the Communist-inducedprovincialism, which regarded their close relatives in Croatia, Bosnia, andMacedonia as somehow different and alien. Montenegro, however, had always been regarded as more quintessentially Serb than Serbia itself. Throughoutthe 19th century, Austria-Hungary did its best to keep Serbia and Montenegroapart, finally failing in 1913. After the Great War, Montenegro was annexed by the Kingdom of Serbia, something the tactless Serbian monarch handledabout as gracefully as the creation of Yugoslavia.Even so, it was not until the Italian occupation of 1941-45 and thesubsequent Communist creation of the "People's Republic of Montenegro" that the idea emerged of a "Montenegrin" ethnic identity as distinctly separatefrom Serb. Djukanovic's brand of separatism did not appeal to freedom from"Milosevic's tyranny" or notions of regional autonomy ? it rooted itself firmly in this anti-Serb concept of Montenegrin nationality. When even theproudest Serbs go as far to deny their Serb heritage? what does it meananymore? This is the sort of question the foreign backers of Montenegrin independence wanted asked, for the explicit purpose of forcing Serbia to"accept its modest new status" and "embrace the West." (Newsday)The loss of compass in Belgrade is perhaps best described by Monday's call from Vuk Draskovic, soon-to-be-former foreign minister of the now defunctUnion, to reestablish monarchy in Serbia. While a great idea in principle,Draskovic chose to justify it as "a shortcut to full membership in EU and NATO." What's Next?The true consequences of Montenegro's separation remain to be seen. Serbiaobviously has a lot of soul-searching to do, even as it is facing enormouspressure to surrender Kosovo. In the rocky republic itself, life after secession does not look to be all milk and honey, as the separatistspromised their electorate. For years, Montenegro has lived on U.S. foreignaid, while Serbia subsidized its share of government expenses and foreign debt. Now that it can no longer be used as a leverage against Belgrade,Podgorica may find its American sugar daddy inexplicably AWOL. Moreover, itsrulers now owe favors to Croats, Albanians, and Muslims from the north ? favors they may have to repay with special privileges, maybe even territory.For years, Milo Djukanovic wanted to be president of an independent state.Now he has his wish, and may well live to regret it, as flags, marches, and hymns give way to grim realities he can no longer blame on Belgrade.
Montenegrin Independence
From: Dragan Rakic
Subject: RE: Montenegrin Independence
The, now, former member of the Serbian and Montenegrin Union, Montenegro became the newest European state two days ago, by expressing its will on the referendum for independence.
The international observers stated that the vote was regular and that some 83% of voters were present at the poles. But there is something that disturbs that "regularity", which seemed to be perfect. The Montenegrin Prime minister Mr. Milo Djukanovic who organized the vote, invited "all the Montenegrins
from all around the World to come to vote". That is what happened. People from USA, UK, Germany and other continents were interviewed at some European TV channels, and to those who understand the language it was quite strange to hear instead of Serbian, the Albanian language. One might come to conclusion that Albanians came to vote for the independence. It would not be that important if one knows that the Montenegrins living in Serbia were not allowed to vote at this referendum. Knowing that Montenegrins make some 30% of the Serbian population, one could ask what could have happened if they voted. In the other hand, Mr. Djukanovic, the Montenegrin Prime minister, expressed his worries about what would become 30 % of them after the independence is declared. With a little tour of " humanitarian problem", " The non respect of minorities" etc, he may easily create the situation we knew in Bosnia or in Kosovo. Nevertheless it should be noted that he did not allow the Montenegrins from Serbia to vote.
Is it regular or not � ?
Dragan RAKIC
Strasbourg
France
Question: After all, the Albanians outnumber Serbs in Kosovo (largely through illegal crossing of Albanians into Kosovo from Albania but only make up 19% of Serbia as a whole. When legal and illegal Mexicans -- while still a minority in the United states as a whole -- become the "majority in California, Arizona or Texas, which is fast approach if the President's non-admitted amnesty bill goes through, will their "majority" be able to vote for separation from the United States without the vote opened to all America?" This is what the Serbs are facing.
Stella
MONTENEGRO - ANOTHER GERMAN PUPPET STATE? Report by the German Journalists of www.german-foreign-policy.com 19/5/06Translated by Edward Spalton 20/5/06 forhttp://www.freenations.freeuk.com/gc-61.html
Germany calling
http://www.balkanpeace.org/rs/archive/july00/rs57.shtml
Decline of The West, Playing the Montenegro Card by George Szamuely Playing the Montenegro Card
"It looks like NATO will soon be renewing its war against Serbia. Montenegro will provide the justification. NATO is playing the same game in Montenegro that it played in Kosovo."
http://www.balkanpeace.org/rs/archive/apr01/rs141.shtml
Chronicles Online, April 25, 2001Montenegro Elections: Djukanovic�s crushing defeat Srdja Trifkovic
He [Milo Djukanovic] is Milosevic�s disciple, his creation. He may parade as a democrat now, but his instincts have always been authoritarian and remain so today." The leading daily newspaper, Pobjeda, is controlled by the government and accordingly looks and reads like a party organ from the pre-1989 Eastern Europe. The second-largest circulation daily, Vijesti, and the leading weekly, Monitor, while theoretically "independent," are both outspoken in their support of separatism and effectively pro-government. They enjoy lavish financial support from the National Endowment for Democracy and from George Soros , among others.
Subject: RE: Montenegrin Independence
The, now, former member of the Serbian and Montenegrin Union, Montenegro became the newest European state two days ago, by expressing its will on the referendum for independence.
The international observers stated that the vote was regular and that some 83% of voters were present at the poles. But there is something that disturbs that "regularity", which seemed to be perfect. The Montenegrin Prime minister Mr. Milo Djukanovic who organized the vote, invited "all the Montenegrins
from all around the World to come to vote". That is what happened. People from USA, UK, Germany and other continents were interviewed at some European TV channels, and to those who understand the language it was quite strange to hear instead of Serbian, the Albanian language. One might come to conclusion that Albanians came to vote for the independence. It would not be that important if one knows that the Montenegrins living in Serbia were not allowed to vote at this referendum. Knowing that Montenegrins make some 30% of the Serbian population, one could ask what could have happened if they voted. In the other hand, Mr. Djukanovic, the Montenegrin Prime minister, expressed his worries about what would become 30 % of them after the independence is declared. With a little tour of " humanitarian problem", " The non respect of minorities" etc, he may easily create the situation we knew in Bosnia or in Kosovo. Nevertheless it should be noted that he did not allow the Montenegrins from Serbia to vote.
Is it regular or not � ?
Dragan RAKIC
Strasbourg
France
Question: After all, the Albanians outnumber Serbs in Kosovo (largely through illegal crossing of Albanians into Kosovo from Albania but only make up 19% of Serbia as a whole. When legal and illegal Mexicans -- while still a minority in the United states as a whole -- become the "majority in California, Arizona or Texas, which is fast approach if the President's non-admitted amnesty bill goes through, will their "majority" be able to vote for separation from the United States without the vote opened to all America?" This is what the Serbs are facing.
Stella
MONTENEGRO - ANOTHER GERMAN PUPPET STATE? Report by the German Journalists of www.german-foreign-policy.com 19/5/06Translated by Edward Spalton 20/5/06 forhttp://www.freenations.freeuk.com/gc-61.html
Germany calling
http://www.balkanpeace.org/rs/archive/july00/rs57.shtml
Decline of The West, Playing the Montenegro Card by George Szamuely Playing the Montenegro Card
"It looks like NATO will soon be renewing its war against Serbia. Montenegro will provide the justification. NATO is playing the same game in Montenegro that it played in Kosovo."
http://www.balkanpeace.org/rs/archive/apr01/rs141.shtml
Chronicles Online, April 25, 2001Montenegro Elections: Djukanovic�s crushing defeat Srdja Trifkovic
He [Milo Djukanovic] is Milosevic�s disciple, his creation. He may parade as a democrat now, but his instincts have always been authoritarian and remain so today." The leading daily newspaper, Pobjeda, is controlled by the government and accordingly looks and reads like a party organ from the pre-1989 Eastern Europe. The second-largest circulation daily, Vijesti, and the leading weekly, Monitor, while theoretically "independent," are both outspoken in their support of separatism and effectively pro-government. They enjoy lavish financial support from the National Endowment for Democracy and from George Soros , among others.
Jared Israel's Response to Shlomo Avineri's "Next - independence for Kosovo"
Jared Israel's (www.tenc.net) Letter to the Jerusalem Post Respondingto Shlomo Avineri's "Next - independence for Kosovo"Avineri Embraces Germany's Dream: A Splintered Balkans It is remarkable to see Prof. Avineri call for empathy for the Serbseven as he repeats every anti-Serb falsehood. Is this black humor?Examples:First, there is no "Bosnian" ethnic group. Bosnia includes: descendents of Serbs who survived Jasenovac, Croatia's Nazi deathcamp; Slavic Muslims; and Croats. The Slavic Muslims are mainly Serbswho converted to Islam under Ottoman rule/coercion. They areindistinguishable from Orthodox Slavs ('Bosnian Serbs') except by religion. The 'Bosnian ethnic group' is a propaganda creation, tohide reality: Alija Izetbegovic's drive for "Bosnian nationhood" wasreally a drive to create an Islamist-dominated outpost in thatterritory, which required defeating Serbian and pro-Yugoslav Muslimresistance.Second, Yugoslavia did not break up during World War II due to Serbianhegemony. That was the line of Hitler's favorites, the Croatian Ustashi, who created the Nazi-propped 'Independent State of Croatia.'Yugoslavia broke up due to a massive Nazi invasion after Serbianofficers overthrew the government, which had made a deal with Hitler.The subsequent resistance - overwhelmingly Serbs - fought the armies of Nazi Germany and its ally, the Ustashi-run Independent State ofCroatia. The Ustashi were motivated by fanatical Catholicism,antisemitism, and Serbophobia, and they mobilized Muslim fanatics, whosigned up for the Waffen SS organized by the Mufti of Jerusalem. In Kosovo, the predecessors of today's Kosovo Liberation Army warmlywelcomed the Italian Fascists, and helped deport almost all Kosovo'sJews to Nazi death camps.The Comintern's 'Serbian-nationalism-is-the-great-problem' line, embraced by Tito in part because it was a politically correct way ofappealing to Croatian anti-Serb racism, helped make possibleYugoslavia's post-war failure to campaign seriously against theanti-Serb racism that underlay Ustashi Croatia's mass slaughter of Serbs � they butchered about 750,000 Serbs alongside most Jews.Prior to the late-1980s launch of the US-German campaign to, onceagain, destroy Yugoslavia, the media widely reported that in Kosovo amass-based Albanian racist movement was conducting a war of terror against Serbs. Those racists, heir to the WWII Kosovo AlbanianFascists, wanted to resurrect the Fascists' Greater Albania. In 1999NATO went to war for these born-again Nazis, who would dominate any'independent' Kosovo. Such a statelet would be a springboard for attacks on Macedonia and Greece, aiming to annex parts of thosecountries to Kosovo and Albania, thus resurrecting Greater Albania.This violent splintering of the Balkans is the dream of German foreignpolicy which, for a hundred years, has advocated "Serbia must die," because Serbia, with its passionate opposition to foreign domination,has always been the driving force uniting Balkan peoples into a statecapable of resisting Germany. Thus "Serbia must die" has been the racist battle-cry of the German drive of preventing the creation ofand then destroying Yugoslavia. (The Comintern's old line that"Serbian hegemony is the problem" is in essence a polite rephrasing of the German slogan.) An independent Kosovo, acting as a base for anation-destroying campaign to create a Greater Albania, would be agiant step closer to realizing this German dream, grotesquely embracedby Mr. Avineri, of a Yugoslavia broken into increasingly tiny parts, helpless to resist German hegemony.
Jared Israel
Newton Mass
www.tenc.net
Jared Israel
Newton Mass
www.tenc.net
Never mind the Balkans
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,1781039,00.html
The Guardian Tuesday May 23, 2006
Comment is free
Never mind the Balkans
Montenegro had more independence as part of Yugoslavia than it will as an
EU-Nato protectorate
Neil Clark
'Montenegro votes for independence", the headlines declared at the result of the
referendum in the Balkan republic. But is independence really what lies in
store? My dictionary has independence as: "completely self-governing; not
subject to or showing the influence of others". By this definition, independence
is not what they will be getting.
The most important political and economic decisions, which will affect the
everyday lives of citizens in the republic, will not be made in its capital,
Podgorica, but in Brussels, Geneva and Washington and the boardrooms of the
multinational companies which now dominate the country's economy.
It is ironic that EU and WTO membership has been most enthusiastically supported
by the prime minister, Milo Djukanovic, and the pro-independence faction - for
it's hard to think of an easier way for a small country to lose national
independence than by surrendering control of trade and economic policy to
unelected bureaucrats miles away.
Nato membership, which Montenegro is also expected to pursue enthusiastically,
has similar consequences: the commanders of Montenegro's new army and navy will
have to get used to taking orders from those who planned the 78-day bombing of
Yugoslavia in 1999.
Then there is the role of the IMF and the World Bank. These two unelected bodies
have, with the EU, sought to impose Thatcherite neo-liberal solutions on
Serbia-Montenegro, ever since the fall of Yugoslavia's Socialist-led government
in 2000. Thousands of socially owned enterprises have already been privatised,
but the west is still not satisfied - the IMF has made further economic help
dependent on Belgrade selling off the valuable NIS oil company.
Montenegro's tiny economy is even more dominated by foreign capital than
Serbia's, with the privatisation process having started much earlier. The
selling off of nationally owned assets will have serious implications for the
country's future economic viability and even with the tourist potential of its
attractive coastline, it is difficult to see how Montenegro can afford to pay
its way, without further surrender to western financial institutions. In doing
so, it will be following the path of its neighbours.
For all the novelties of statehood, the brutal truth is that today's
"independent" Balkan republics had, if anything, more independence when they
were autonomous republics inside the Yugoslav Federation. In place of one
militarily strong, internationally respected, non-aligned nation, there now
exists a number of weak, economically unviable EU/IMF/Nato protectorates.
The dismantling of Yugoslavia, with its alternative economic and social model,
has suited western capitalism fine. But for the people of the region, the
benefits have been harder to discern. Little wonder then that nostalgia for
Tito's Yugoslavia is on the rise. The website "Titoville" has received over 1m
visitors and in Rakovice, a suburb of Sarajevo, an anti-nationalist Serb named
Jezdimir Milosevic (no relation) has proclaimed "The Republic of Titoslavia", a
state "without territory, without international recognition, destined to live in
the hearts of its citizens". Passports are available for EUR10.
Over 65 years ago, on the eve of the attack on Yugoslavia by the Axis powers,
the Serbian jurist Slobodan Jovanovic argued that a single, south Slav state was
the best way the people of the Balkans could guarantee their independence and
protection. It still is - and that logic seems likely to make itself felt in the
years to come. When the victory parades are over, the only real difference
Sunday's narrow vote will make is that Montenegro will be able enter Eurovision.
www.neilclark66.blogspot.com
neilclark6@hotmail.com
Guardian Unlimited � Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006.
The Guardian Tuesday May 23, 2006
Comment is free
Never mind the Balkans
Montenegro had more independence as part of Yugoslavia than it will as an
EU-Nato protectorate
Neil Clark
'Montenegro votes for independence", the headlines declared at the result of the
referendum in the Balkan republic. But is independence really what lies in
store? My dictionary has independence as: "completely self-governing; not
subject to or showing the influence of others". By this definition, independence
is not what they will be getting.
The most important political and economic decisions, which will affect the
everyday lives of citizens in the republic, will not be made in its capital,
Podgorica, but in Brussels, Geneva and Washington and the boardrooms of the
multinational companies which now dominate the country's economy.
It is ironic that EU and WTO membership has been most enthusiastically supported
by the prime minister, Milo Djukanovic, and the pro-independence faction - for
it's hard to think of an easier way for a small country to lose national
independence than by surrendering control of trade and economic policy to
unelected bureaucrats miles away.
Nato membership, which Montenegro is also expected to pursue enthusiastically,
has similar consequences: the commanders of Montenegro's new army and navy will
have to get used to taking orders from those who planned the 78-day bombing of
Yugoslavia in 1999.
Then there is the role of the IMF and the World Bank. These two unelected bodies
have, with the EU, sought to impose Thatcherite neo-liberal solutions on
Serbia-Montenegro, ever since the fall of Yugoslavia's Socialist-led government
in 2000. Thousands of socially owned enterprises have already been privatised,
but the west is still not satisfied - the IMF has made further economic help
dependent on Belgrade selling off the valuable NIS oil company.
Montenegro's tiny economy is even more dominated by foreign capital than
Serbia's, with the privatisation process having started much earlier. The
selling off of nationally owned assets will have serious implications for the
country's future economic viability and even with the tourist potential of its
attractive coastline, it is difficult to see how Montenegro can afford to pay
its way, without further surrender to western financial institutions. In doing
so, it will be following the path of its neighbours.
For all the novelties of statehood, the brutal truth is that today's
"independent" Balkan republics had, if anything, more independence when they
were autonomous republics inside the Yugoslav Federation. In place of one
militarily strong, internationally respected, non-aligned nation, there now
exists a number of weak, economically unviable EU/IMF/Nato protectorates.
The dismantling of Yugoslavia, with its alternative economic and social model,
has suited western capitalism fine. But for the people of the region, the
benefits have been harder to discern. Little wonder then that nostalgia for
Tito's Yugoslavia is on the rise. The website "Titoville" has received over 1m
visitors and in Rakovice, a suburb of Sarajevo, an anti-nationalist Serb named
Jezdimir Milosevic (no relation) has proclaimed "The Republic of Titoslavia", a
state "without territory, without international recognition, destined to live in
the hearts of its citizens". Passports are available for EUR10.
Over 65 years ago, on the eve of the attack on Yugoslavia by the Axis powers,
the Serbian jurist Slobodan Jovanovic argued that a single, south Slav state was
the best way the people of the Balkans could guarantee their independence and
protection. It still is - and that logic seems likely to make itself felt in the
years to come. When the victory parades are over, the only real difference
Sunday's narrow vote will make is that Montenegro will be able enter Eurovision.
www.neilclark66.blogspot.com
neilclark6@hotmail.com
Guardian Unlimited � Guardian Newspapers Limited 2006.
May 17, 2006
Kosovo anti-Christian violence continues
SRNA: Albanians growing more nervous
http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2006/May_16/16.html
WND: Kosovo anti-Christian violence continues
http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2006/May_16/18.html
RTS: Raskovic-Ivic asks Petersen to rescind UNMIK decision
http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2006/May_16/14.html
EU envoy says necessary to continue technical talks on Kosovo
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/17/content_4555494.htm"
It is obvious that the process of Kosovo becoming independent has already gone very far"
http://www.b92.net/english/news/index.php?&nav_category=19&nav_id=34924&order=priority&style=headlines
Danke Deutschlandhttp://english.pravda.ru/news/world/16-05-2006/80385-Serbia-0
Kosovo status should be solved through essential autonomy and preservation of existing borders
http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest.php?id=23462
http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2006/May_16/16.html
WND: Kosovo anti-Christian violence continues
http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2006/May_16/18.html
RTS: Raskovic-Ivic asks Petersen to rescind UNMIK decision
http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2006/May_16/14.html
EU envoy says necessary to continue technical talks on Kosovo
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-05/17/content_4555494.htm"
It is obvious that the process of Kosovo becoming independent has already gone very far"
http://www.b92.net/english/news/index.php?&nav_category=19&nav_id=34924&order=priority&style=headlines
Danke Deutschlandhttp://english.pravda.ru/news/world/16-05-2006/80385-Serbia-0
Kosovo status should be solved through essential autonomy and preservation of existing borders
http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/vesti/vest.php?id=23462
Interview - Scott Taylor on the Balkans
http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2006/May_16/4.html
Interview - Scott Taylor on the Balkans (pt. 2)
www.espritdecorps.ca
May 16, 2006
This article first appeared in the April 2006 issue of the "Canadian-Macedonian News" in Toronto
CMN: A number of events have transpired since our last interview and I believe there is a need to understand what is happening with regards to Balkan politics. Agim Cheku was elected Prime Minister in Kosovo, and we know who Agim Cheku is, Milosevic died a short time later which affected the political climate in Serbia and the Albanian foreign minister made comments regarding Kosovo becoming independent. What next: the creation of Illyrida in western Macedonia? What is your opinion on all this? Are the Balkans boiling over again?
Scott Taylor: It's a very dangerous time right now in the Balkans especially when you've got Agim Cheku accepted by the West and praised as good for the future of Kosovo. Some from the West admit, kind of on the edges, that there may be some issues with Cheku, some critics may accuse him of war crimes but those of us who have followed his career very well know he is guilty of wrongdoing in Meduk and in the shelling of Knin. Cheku did things as a Croatian officer that are fully documented and recorded particularly by Canadians. These things are known to NATO and to the UN yet he was never brought to justice.
This is something which flies in the face of the whole Milosevic thing where we jump to the conclusion of his guilt. He was indicted, brought to the Hague, all the things that he was accused of, now that he is dead, simply presumes that he is guilty of everything and it's a tremendous effort on the part of the West to put all the blame for all that happened into his casket. They're trying to bury all of the responsibility with Milosevic to say we can move forward. You can't do that. You can't now build the future of an independent Kosova, as they say, on a guy like Agim Cheku who is a murderous thug. I mean this guy is a real war criminal not someone removed in an office like Milosevic might have been, making policy. He was on the ground in command of his troops. He actually got wounded in action at Meduc because his guys were there. He was right on the ground. This is a war criminal and the West knows it yet is willing to turn a blind eye to keep the Albanians on side.
The fact that the Albanian government is now saying the border will not be recognized is a very dangerous situation. It is something which anywhere else in the world would be sparking all kinds of controversy. Any country saying anything about a border that's not being recognized is almost a declaration of an undeclared war. This is pushing the future of Kosovo further towards the flame. It's like a barrel of gunpowder being pushed further towards the flame and of course all eyes are on Iraq and Afghanistan. The Balkans is a backwater right now, everyone's trying to put it behind them, trying to convince themselves that this was a victory, this was a success story. We're seven years into the occupation of Kosovo by NATO. They've not stopped the violence; they've not solved the problems. We've seen the violence spread into Macedonia and it will again. I mean all these names being raised, the fact that western Macedonia is now on the target list. They're [Albanians] not hiding their intentions, the fact that the West is blindly ignoring them is a dangerous sign because I don't think Macedonians can accept the situation the way it is. Also, what is going to happen to the Serbs in Kosovo; what is there for them to accept an independent Kosovo under the rule of an indicted war criminal?
CMN: Interpol has been looking for Cheku for some years now, because of his war crimes, trying to negotiate with him in Vienna, Austria, Serbia and with the Kosovo delegation. What's going to happen with these negotiations now that Cheku is a Prime Minister? Do you think that they should refuse to negotiate with him?
Scott Taylor: They should refuse. Canada should make its objection clear regarding Cheku as a choice of Prime Minister. He's the Prime Minister elect, he's not been sworn in as far as I know at this point but Canada played a key role in documenting his war crimes both in the Meduc and in Knin during Operation Storm, as a Croatian officer. He's an Albanian Kosovar.
In 1995 he was the artillery commander who shelled Knin. He was the Croatian artillery commander. Very few people understand that as an Albanian Kosovar he was committing war crimes wearing a Croatian uniform. So there's a dual guilt. The Croatian army has some responsibility but he as an individual, as an Albanian serving in Croatian uniform, has to be accountable at some point. He ordered those killings. Now he's serving potentially as the Prime Minister of a country. What message does that send to the Serbs in Kosovo? They know what he did. I mean he fought for the Croatians not because he loved Croatia but because he hates Serbs. That was why he killed those people, that is why the US MPRI groomed him, trained him and then when you look back on this they were grooming him in '93 to eventually become the commander in "99. So who is behind all of this? That's what's protecting him now is that he didn't act alone. He's the puppet, not the puppeteer. So the puppeteer is still saying that this guy is okay we'll accept him. That's the problem, we need to look at who is behind Agim Cheku, not just Agim Cheku. Who's been grooming him, taking him, positioning him? Who created Frankenstein's monster? We see the monster, that's Cheku. Who is the doctor that created him?
CMN: Who is the doctor?
Scott Taylor: The Americans. The MPRI, this Pentagon training cadre brought him, selected him from day one, saw in him the potential not just to serve as a Croatian. As soon as it blew up in Croatia he took off his Croatian epaulettes and became head of the Kosovo Liberation Army with NATO's blessing. The timing was all so orchestrated. It was planned and when you look at it as forensic looking back on how things developed it's very clear that even Kosovo in '98 '99 was planned as early as '93. It was all stepping stones and Cheku was one of the characters being manipulated. A brutal war criminal was being manipulated to get where he is now. But the fact that they still won't hold him accountable is because he knows who created him and if there is ever to be a trial of Agim Cheku at the Hague, in his own defense he's going to of course bring in all the evidence as to who really was behind all this in the Balkans.
CMN: So basically, is that why he never went to the Hague?
Scott Taylor: If he goes to the Hague he can bring some very key people with him and that's the problem. And that's why everyone is accepting him as the Prime Minister despite all the evidence that exists on what he did, collected by Canadian soldiers, horrific crimes. Yet he's being distanced from that, accepted as a political leader as a figurehead for the new Kosova.
CMN: Were you surprised when you heard that Agim Cheku was the new Prime Minister of Kosovo?
Scott Taylor: I still can't believe he is still serving as the head of the TMK, the Kosovo Protection Corps. I can't believe every day that goes by that he's not indicted for what he did. It's a crime and then to find out that he's moving up and going to become a world leader.
CMN: For you it was shocking news...
Scott Taylor: Yes it's incremental in its shock. The fact that he's not been brought to justice is one shock and then the fact that they're going to ignore that and move him to another level, it's unbelievable when everybody, Louise Arbour, Madeleine Albright, these people know what he did. It's not been hidden from them but they never indicted him. He by his very existence and his promotion, every time he gets put up it makes the Hague tribunal that much more of a joke. It's just incredible that they would turn a blind eye to what he did and allow him to proceed up. He wasn't a President or a Prime Minister. He started off as a very junior Colonel in the Croatian Army committing atrocities. Then they trained him again and he became a General and committed bigger atrocities. Then he became the commander of the KLA, committed more atrocities. He released his commanders to fight in Macedonia, connected with the TMK. All of that he is responsible for. All of that, the quest for a greater Albania. I don't think Agim Cheku has ever been on the sidelines.
They held the Prizren meeting in 2001 or 2002 about the future of Albanian speaking people in the region of the Balkans, inside Kosovo, and NATO protected them. The meeting was held there and Cheku went to that. Rugova did not go. I mean politically it was seen as unwise, he didn't go but Cheku did. So this man, his nationalism, at least he's honest about that. He's not hiding this. He's not a hypocrite. For that I respect him because he's never played under false colours. NATO, the international community, the Hague: all of them turn a blind eye to what he's done. It's like rubbing it in their face. He's never denied what he is, never pretended to be anything but a man in a quest of, if military means are necessary, a Greater Albania.
CMN: You were just recently in the Balkans. What was the reason for your visit and when did you come back?
Scott Taylor: I was giving a speech at the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. I was a part of a conference to scientifically prove that Kosovo belongs to Serbia. There were a number of international delegates, mostly of course Serbian. For me I'm not an academic, my contribution to the whole thing was my eyewitness accounts. So I took the opportunity to drive down to Kosovo, made a quick trip and met some refugees, spoke to UN police, spoke to NATO soldiers and stayed at a monastery in Grachanica. There was a ceremony, a memorial of the second anniversary of the 17th March pogrom against the Serbs. I attended this and then I drove back and brought a report of what I had just done, to the conference. So again seeing people who have been displaced now for two years since the pogrom, some have been displaced for seven years, but this last wave of people displaced from '04 are still living in absolute squalor, unseen by the world. We saw the conditions that they lived in. They're forgotten by the Serbian government and by the world. They're just tucked away unable to return to their houses, living in Mitrovica basically as pawns in this game.
It's something which most of these politicians that are making the decisions in Kosovo or for the future of Kosovo don't ever see; the real lives that are being affected. They lost their age old family farm and now they're living in some tiny office with all these people with no privacy, eating donated food which is the basic minimum, just beans. They are simply existing, waiting for something to happen but knowing that it never will. They're in limbo.
CMN: Were you there when Milosevic died?
Scott Taylor: I got back from Kosovo in time for Milosevic's funeral.
CMN: Did you attend the funeral?
Scott Taylor: I went to the Belgrade memorial. There were 80,000 people out there in front of the Parliament buildings. Seeing how the international media was playing it you could almost predict how it was going to go. They portrayed it as a rejuvenation of Serbian nationalism, as a celebration of a war criminal etc. The Western media has already proclaimed guilt not just on Milosevic but on all the Serbian people. And that again extends to Macedonians because they're Slavs, ergo if oppressing Albanians is bad then the Macedonians are equally guilty of it.
So you've got to look at the way it's being played out. Just the whole international media's take, you could pull back and see it through that prism. It wasn't good. I mean they were seeing the crowds out there and the statements that were being made about how the West was doing this to us and then the belief that Milosevic was poisoned etc: most of it being portrayed with some sort of derision by the Western media. And yet if you look at the facts it's not outlandish that the Hague killed him. I mean those that were there, James Bisset, other witnesses that were at the same conference, many of us that were at the conference were ready to testify at the Hague.
CMN: Did you see any familiar faces from here?
Scott Taylor: James Bisset was there.
CMN: Former Canadian Ambassador to Yugoslavia...
Scott Taylor: And he had met Slobodan Milosevic as the President when he was Ambassador. He met him again as a prisoner in the Hague and he testified just days before he died. He was aware, because you get to meet Milosevic when you go to these things, of his health conditions, of his concerns. He knew that he wanted to go to Moscow because he didn't trust the Hague doctors. They'd found this anti leprosy drug in his body that frightened him because he knew that he wasn't taking that drug. He had never taken that drug. He didn't know where that came from and of course he was concerned. His visit to Moscow was denied and subsequently he was found dead. There were other witnesses. There were Americans and others at the conference who again had agreed to testify, were about to and knew that there was still a lot of fight in Milosevic. He wasn't "suicidal" as they claimed. He had a whole bunch more points he was going to make. If I testified, Agim Cheku would have been first and foremost, the main thrust of my testimony was to take it from Kosovo back to Croatia and focus on this individual. That was what I was to bring to the tribunal. Now we won't get the chance.
CMN: It looks like the tribunal has nothing to do anymore.
Scott Taylor: Well they're going to keep trying other Serbian Generals. There are other trials going on and I've been asked as a potential witness for other Generals. I'll go if I can. There's some talk being floated by those witnesses who didn't testify, maybe they can set up some sort of parallel tribunal to at least put it somewhere on the record what we've been prepared to testify.
CMN: It looks like the tribunal in the Hague was solely created for certain people; Serbs and Macedonians.
Scott Taylor: I think it's a historical precedent that anytime there is a war like this that the victor establishes the guilt of the vanquished. So in this case the Serbs have to be guilty of everything and Milosevic in particular. Now it's all buried in his casket and the Western media again was very complicit in going along with that. It was stunning to see how everything that was ever done in the Balkans, unquestioned. Christine Amanpour was unbelievable, reiterating things that were said and since then have been disproved; death camps and all making it look like the Holocaust. I mean the guy had tuberculosis, all this has been disproved, all of it resurfaced untouched and was put back out for the general consumption. I've likened it to all of us who know better, have built a sand castle of trying to get the truth, checking on things in Srebrenica, Rachak, exposing all the lies and deception etc.
We were making headway, we were building up the sandcastle and then after Milosevic's death this flood came and swamped everything. And the average person now is probably even more anti-Serb, anti-Milosevic. He was equivalent to Stalin, Hitler whatever. I mean when you know the circumstances it wasn't like that. The Serbian people didn't like Milosevic for different reasons, because he caved in not because he stood firm. To have such a huge disconnect between reality and Western media is very discouraging to see that again. I should point out that the CBC that was on the ground did not want, they were advised by an American journalist, that James Bisset was there and available for comment and they declined. Bisset who knew Milosevic as a president, as a prisoner and spoke to him just days before he died and testified was not considered a primary source. If he's not who is? They had their own agenda and it all came back very, very distressing and discouraging for me.
CMN: Regarding Macedonia. The Albanian minister of foreign affairs just recently said that if Kosovo is divided into an Albanian and a Serbian sector then Illyrida may be the next step.
Scott Taylor: I think that statement is another indicator that the idea of a greater Albania is alive and well. They want south Serbia and they want Preshevo.
The Macedonian Government is basically whistling past the graveyard as we say. They're trying to bolster their own spirits when they know better. I'm sure they're frightened by that statement. The fact that the international community didn't react to it and doesn't understand its importance, is kind of frightening and it indicates that they want Kosovo finished. They don't care what it takes, they want it somehow solved and all over with.
CMN: They want an independent state?
Scott Taylor: It's the final solution. The comments that the media and I were getting from people, from American soldiers and from a Lieutenant Colonel who had just arrived from Texas and who spent all these months training and getting indoctrinated is that the sooner they have a resolution the better for the future. Then they can all start to build together no matter what happens in Kosovo, no matter whether it's independent as long, as it's solid then they can all stop their fighting and work together. This is some Utopian belief that the minute it becomes Kosova and the Serbs realize there's no going back, the ones living in the enclaves will somehow emerge into a rainbow world.
CMN: They probably want a border with Bulgaria. This is what they were striving for during the Second World War.
Scott Taylor: The map that they have, Greater Albania so by saying that this is still on the table we saw the fighting in 2001 it's a reality. They're stirring up trouble and it won't be so easily resolved. Even if they give Kosovo, Kosova its independence they will still want more. That's what we're hearing. Under existing boundaries, altered boundaries they're looking at pieces of land anywhere that there's a majority of ethnic Albanians, they want to include that in a greater Albania. So the border with Serbia would need to be redrawn even if it's not in the immediate plan. They will not accept things the way they are in the short term or in the long term.
CMN: Macedonian President Crvenkovski wants the border between Kosovo and Macedonia resolved before the "Kosova issue" is resolved. Any comments?
Scott Taylor: It's one of the rare sensible statements I've heard from a Macedonian government official. It makes a lot of sense and that needs to be reinforced by the international community if that's agreed to, whatever the border happens to be. I think they need to call in international monitors for that because of course still as Macedonians you need to protect your own borders. But in this case I think given the declarations made in the Kosovo Parliament they won't recognize certain borders. It needs to be declared, determined, made final and then it becomes inviolate. They have to bring in international monitors to make sure that this will not change. Then whatever happens inside Kosovo, it happens inside Kosovo, but it remains outside of Macedonia.
Liljana Ristova
Risto Stefov
May 15, 2006
Milosevic�s Death In The Propaganda System
By Edward S. Herman and David Peterson
[Published in Z Magazine (May, 2006), in a slightly abridged version and without footnotes. Posted here in full with the kind permission of the authors.]
The March 11 death of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in his prison cell in The Hague was greeted by Western political circles and media alike with an outpouring of venom that reflected the demon role assigned to him in the myth-making of the past 15 years. Milosevic was a "monster," a "sociopath," and a "war criminal who wrecked southeastern Europe in the latter part of the 20th century," former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and a chief architect of Clinton era policy toward the region, Richard Holbrooke, told the Cable News Network the very first morning. "Milosevic started four wars. He lost them all. The biggest of them all was the one in Bosnia, where over 300,000 people died, two-and-a-half million homeless. And we bombed him in August and September of 1995. We should have done this much earlier."[1] During this and the ten days following his death terms such as "Butcher of the Balkans" and "Butcher of Belgrade" were used dozens and perhaps hundreds of times in the U.S. media alone (and widely used abroad as well).[2]
CONTINUED: http://www.electricpolitics.com/2006/05/milosevics_death_in_the_propag.html
[Published in Z Magazine (May, 2006), in a slightly abridged version and without footnotes. Posted here in full with the kind permission of the authors.]
The March 11 death of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in his prison cell in The Hague was greeted by Western political circles and media alike with an outpouring of venom that reflected the demon role assigned to him in the myth-making of the past 15 years. Milosevic was a "monster," a "sociopath," and a "war criminal who wrecked southeastern Europe in the latter part of the 20th century," former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and a chief architect of Clinton era policy toward the region, Richard Holbrooke, told the Cable News Network the very first morning. "Milosevic started four wars. He lost them all. The biggest of them all was the one in Bosnia, where over 300,000 people died, two-and-a-half million homeless. And we bombed him in August and September of 1995. We should have done this much earlier."[1] During this and the ten days following his death terms such as "Butcher of the Balkans" and "Butcher of Belgrade" were used dozens and perhaps hundreds of times in the U.S. media alone (and widely used abroad as well).[2]
CONTINUED: http://www.electricpolitics.com/2006/05/milosevics_death_in_the_propag.html
May 13, 2006
Tactics for More Balkan Mischief
AntiWar.com
| May 13, 2006 |
| Tactics for More Balkan Mischief The West's media machine swings into high gear over Kosovo |
| by Christopher Deliso |
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| When it comes to the Balkans, there are some interventionist truths that will never die. Take the 1999 war in Kosovo. In starting it, former President Bill Clinton failed to seek congressional approval in bombing Yugoslavia. The bombing also went on without UN approval. And NATO violated its own self-defensive charter in attacking a country that threatened none of its members. In short, the war was illegal in every respect. Operationally, NATO enlisted a group (the Kosovo Liberation Army) that had until very recently before been classified a terrorist organization, its funding derived partially from organized crime, its numbers bolstered by Islamist fanatics. The war effort also meant turning a blind eye to the machinations of people like Florin Krasniqi, an Albanian who snuck into the U.S. illegally and then proceeded to make illegal shipments of arms to Kosovo. (In 2004, this double felon chipped in at a fundraiser for John Kerry.) Tactically, the U.S. also enlisted groups like the OSCE to fabricate stories of an alleged Serbian massacre of Albanians at Racak, something subsequently discredited in an official forensics report. German intelligence pitched in with a bogus report of an alleged "Operation Horseshoe," Milosevic's supposed diabolical plan to ethnically cleanse Kosovo's almost 2 million Albanians. The lies spouted by the Clinton administration included such canards as 100,000 Albanian dead (postwar tallies put the numbers killed on both sides at around 4,000). The propaganda was assisted by the military's working relationship with CNN and the network's Christiane Amanpour, the wife of then-State Department spokesman James Rubin. Media-government complicity does not get any more intimate than that. Most unforgivably, NATO won its war not through military valor but through bombing civilian targets in Serbia, including hospitals, schools, bridges, and refineries – thus creating toxic, cancerous clouds that in effect made America guilty of using weapons of mass destruction. Vicious cluster bombs that maimed and killed civilians were also used, and, worst of all, copious amounts of depleted uranium were dropped over Kosovo – thus providing the Kosovar Albanians NATO had allegedly been there to protect with a generation of cancer and birth defects. Indeed, NATO's own soldiers have already suffered this fate, one the U.S. knew about full well in light of the "Gulf War Syndrome" of the first Gulf War less than a decade earlier. And so, NATO's war was illegal and immoral in every way. The subsequent UN occupation of Kosovo has proved to be a colossal failure. Over 200,000 minority members were expelled by Albanians, and those that remain often do not enjoy basic human rights. The UN has not stopped but actually encouraged ethnic cleansing. The remaining Serbs in Kosovo live in constant fear and still come under regular attacks and intimidation from Albanians, whose militant leadership has been coddled and promoted to positions of high political power by the UN – regardless of their indictments for war crimes – even as the West continues its hypocritical demands for Serbia to export war crimes suspects to the Hague. Meanwhile, the UN continues to allow Islamic terrorist groups to set up shop in Kosovo, and has promoted a one-sided clash of civilizations in which over 150 churches have been destroyed or damaged and over 200 Arab-funded mosques have risen in their place. UN staffers, from the lowest to highest levels, have also been implicated in everything from white-collar corruption to human trafficking and murder while at the same time contributing – after seven years of administration – shoddy infrastructure and sporadic electricity and water. Ladies and gentlemen, it does not get much more disgusting than this. The Final Drama These irrefutable truths constitute the tip of the iceberg. But this overwhelming mass of evidence, this enormity of collective karma, if you will, needs to be mentioned so that the reader can understand just why the West is being forced to such hysterics in the media to defend its own indefensible policies and the disastrous fruits of its intervention in Kosovo. The best offense is a strong defense, and so the West attempts to divert attention from its own failures by sending the public down false trails. This could be called the Serbian smokescreen. Now that endgame is near and Kosovo's final status is being negotiated in Vienna by a bevy of foreign diplomats and lobbyists, the West is employing a tried and tested policy of distracting the world from the very real illegalities, failures, and hypocrisies of its actions in Kosovo, by shifting the blame for everything that ever went wrong to Serbia, and especially to the late Slobodan Milosevic, who after all can no longer defend himself. A Fortuitous Pattern of Events The great lengths the interventionists have been going to – through the usual diplomatic broadsides, media bombardments, and damning think-tank pronouncements – attest to the scope of the effort necessary to conceal the facts of their complete failure in Kosovo. Perhaps through a brief recap of media focus on the region since January it will become clear how the stage is being set for both further violence and the self-exoneration of those who caused it. As the year began and Kosovo's final status talks loomed, several wonderful coincidences occurred that served to marginalize Serbia's position and enhance that of the militant Albanian wing in the Kosovar leadership. All this suited the Western powers just fine, and was in fact driven by them. The remarkably rapid succession of events guaranteed that mass media coverage of Kosovo would be focused, not on the West's many failures, but on satisfying Albanian wishes at the expense of the still-demonized Serbs. Rugova's Demise to the Mladic Media Frenzy First, on Jan. 22, came the long-anticipated death of Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova. Rugova was the veteran, relatively pacifist Albanian politician who had long represented a stabilizing presence in comparison to the militant wing, people like Ramush Haradinaj, Agim Ceku, and Hashim Thaci. For this orientation he was allegedly supported by the British and opposed by the Americans in the first elections following the UN occupation, in October 2000. When Rugova died of lung cancer, an American plan that had been decided "long in advance" (according to UN sources) was realized. It involved replacing the weak prime minister, Bajram Kosumi, with war hero Agim Ceku – though it was necessary to have this alleged war criminal's name removed first from the Interpol list. In the interests of Albanian "unity," Rugova the peacenik was given the burial of a "martyr," in a ceremony reserved for the "war heroes" of the KLA – ironically, a group which he had often opposed at his own risk. Such is the grip of militant Albanian nationalism, which their leaders cannot escape even in death. Media coverage in January and February was thus devoted to the past greatness of Rugova and the future promise of Ceku, with little attention given to the latter's murderous record. Then, the last week of February saw a dramatic development that kept the media from addressing this topic: an inexplicable, rumor-fed media feeding frenzy allegedly begun in Sarajevo, which saw the pundits breathlessly speculating that war crimes suspect Ratko Mladic was on the verge of capture. The effect of this "bombshell" (in the end, it turned out to be another dead end) was to proliferate the number of news articles and editorials demanding the fugitive's capture, and in general denigrating the Serbs, taking the reader back to the Bosnian war of the 1990s and the alleged genocide at Srebrenica of 1995. And then, just a few days later – wouldn't you know it? – the encore arrived with massive coverage of the Bosnian government's genocide lawsuit against Serbia in the World Court, first announced in 1993. However, as Nebojsa Malic pointed out, this is not correct: "[T]his isn't a 'Bosnian' lawsuit, but a private undertaking of the Bosnian Muslim ruling party (SDA), from a time when it claimed itself to be the only legitimate government of the country. Bosnia's Serbs and Croats are adamantly against it and have denied it government approval and funding." Nevertheless, the bogus suit resulted in an outpouring of editorials worldwide condemning the Serbs, and thus requisitioning scarce newspaper column space that might have been used on the current sordid reality. At the same time, Kosovo status negotiations that had been postponed by the death of Rugova began. With the negative press already snowballing, Serbia entered the process in a decidedly bad light; as usual, issues pertinent to Kosovo and what has resulted there after seven years of disastrous UN occupation were ignored. It was clear that Serbia was, through a complicit media, being tried in the court of moral opinion over matters that had nothing to do with the real events on the ground. This trend would be dramatically increased in the days to come with two high-profile deaths. The Death of Milosevic Milan Babic, one-time president of the short-lived Republic of Serbian Krajina in Croatia, was the first to go. He died in his cell at the Hague on March 5, allegedly having committed suicide. However, the fact that he had been described beforehand as being in good spirits and eager to provide further testimony against Serb war crimes suspects made the death somewhat suspicious. A source with close ties to the Hague told me that there was "much more" to the story than suicide, and that it would "dangerous for one's health to dig too deep into the affair." Six days later, the Hague's highest-value prisoner, Slobodan Milosevic, also died suddenly in his jail cell. The effect of his passing was like a seismic shift that could have toppled the Hague's entire flimsy edifice – thus necessitating a massive media campaign to uphold the sanctity of this illegal and now potentially homicidal institution. Despite the testimony of many people close to Milosevic, who all stated that he was in good spirits and determined to see his trial through to the end, top prosecutor Carla Del Ponte and the tribunal's many media backers started floating rumors that Milosevic had been playing with his medication in order to get the treatment in Russia he had been demanding. Del Ponte even went so far as to speculate that Milosevic committed suicide. Of course, no one took too seriously Milosevic's own alarm at finding he had been given strange drugs for months, and no one cared that he was demonstrably very ill. His death at that precise moment was without a doubt the greatest gift the Tribunal could have received; for it meant that they would never have to issue an official verdict – one that probably would have fallen far, far short of their vicious expectations. It also meant that Milosevic never got the opportunity to call certain high-ranking Western officials to the witness stand. This would have been a lose-lose proposition for the Hague: an appearance by Western officials involved with the Bosnia and Kosovo wars would have potentially disastrous and embarrassing consequences for the prosecution as well as the Official Truth of the wars; but were they to refuse to appear, the trial would be robbed of any shred of legitimacy it might have had. Milosevic's death was thus played up to the hilt in the media to cement his public image as a Class-A dictator, regardless of the facts. A flood of editorials damning the "Butcher of the Balkans" appeared in newspapers worldwide, digging up disproved statistics and interventionist blowhards such as Richard Holbrooke to make the case that Milosevic – and Milosevic alone – was responsible for everything that has gone wrong in the Balkans over the past 15 years. And so in the space of a week, with one untimely death, the entire history of the modern Balkans was carved in stone, never to be challenged again. Finally, the fact that over 100,000 people turned out to mourn his death in Serbia, at a protest rally where crowds cheered for the Radical and Socialist parties, was just icing on the cake; it was the final damning proof that the Serbs were little more than a nation of bloodthirsty supporters of war criminals. Needless to say, the media obsession with Milosevic succeeded in keeping developments in Kosovo out of the headlines yet again at a very crucial moment. And so the question of whether the UN had acted wisely in promoting Ceku, a suspected Albanian war criminal, to the top job there would not be brought up. Ongoing attacks against the Serbian minority in Kosovo, or the plight of their refugees were also to be ignored, as they had always been, in one way or another. The important trend of Albanian rioters targeting the UN administration violently in Kosovo was also glossed over. In short, never was there a more useful and fortunate death for the West than that of Slobodan Milosevic. Of course, foul play cannot be proved – primarily because the powers-that-be were never interested in proving it, and because when Milosevic's supporters and the Russian government raised the issue they were dismissed in the media as biased propagandists. Yet considering the many benefits that his death has had for the Hague, the diplomats, the media, and their cumulative legacy, as well as the opportunities it provided for covering up the UN's failure in Kosovo and paving the way for it to become an independent, ethnically clean Albanian country, one has to admit that the motive was there. These suspicions were not allayed by an eyebrow-raising recent comment from ICG President Gareth Evans, a former Australian foreign minister whose ambitions of succeeding then-UN Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali led his countrymen to lampoon him by the name Gareth-Gareth Evans. In another oration/fundraising speech for a lobby group whose moral credit is very heavily deposited in the bank of Collective Serbian Guilt, Evans came out of nowhere with a completely unprovoked disclaimer regarding Milosevic: "[N]o one can be blamed for his death in custody before it [the trial] was complete." Well that settles that! April: On to Montenegro, and More Looming Catastrophe on the Horizon In April, media attention turned to the referendum for independence in Montenegro that will come on May 21. Yet having been contextualized in advance by the lobbyists, nobody asked the right questions about the referendum and its aftermath. The reasons why the tiny republic of 690,000 would benefit from independence were not really given; the media chose to echo the views of smuggler-in-chief Milo Djukanovic, the only Balkan leader still empowered after 15 years, an autocratic part-time cigarette salesman who really just seeks to expand his personal fiefdom through independence. The president in Podgorica has continually made the disingenuous argument that Serbia is a heavy weight around the neck of Montenegrins yearning to breath free, and that the Serbian legacy of alleged war crimes and Belgrade's failure to catch war criminals is holding the republic back from its "European" course. Ironically, however, if Mladic and Karadzic are anywhere to be found, the mountains of Montenegro are a much more likely place to look than the Serbian plain. Indeed, in a BBC report of Feb. 21 the allegation is repeated again: "[M]ost recent intelligence reports put Mr. Karadzic living in the remote mountains of northwest Montenegro, not far from his home town of Niksic." So why is all the international pressure to catch him levied against Belgrade, and not Podgorica? Why, if Mr. Djukanovic wants to enjoy all the rights and privileges of a sovereign state, is he not obliged to take international responsibilities? It is simply because by not catching the fugitives, he can continue to blame Serbia for holding Montenegro back. Indeed, now that EU accession talks have been stalled by the failure to catch the fugitives, the cynical truth becomes obvious: "[S]lowing down EU partnership talks would be strengthening the cause of Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic." Harsh Realities The Balkans is full of ethnic stereotypes. Sometimes they are supported by events. I recall a few years ago when a farm owner put an ad in the paper asking for 500 grape-pickers. He only got one call – and the caller had dialed the wrong number. It would be harsh to say that Montenegrins are naturally lazy, but it is a fact that there are little economic opportunities for the country save tourism, which is not going to be enough. Montenegro depends on Serbia for trade and benefits from Serbian health care and (until recently) military power. This last is the major reason why an independent Montenegro will not be long for this life. After having led the push for Montenegrin independence, the EU, in another schizophrenic and hapless act of opaque interventionism, has demanded a voter turnout rate – 50 percent – for the May referendum to be valid, a number even higher than is required in EU states. A 55 percent majority of this number will be required for the EU to give its bureaucratic blessings to the winner. With voters divided fairly evenly, it is still possible the referendum will fail. And so Djukanovic is courting, at his own peril, the ethnic vote of Bosniak Muslims and Albanians, who comprise roughly 20 percent of the population. 19th Century Scenarios for a 21st Century World There are several scenarios arising from this morass. Should the referendum succeed, the Muslim bloc will seek to cash in its political capital by bringing up all sorts of old bellyaches and demands. The Montenegrin side will not be eager to appease them. Muted charges of racism and ethnic oppression will become a roar, with the eager assistance of the Albanian-American lobby, and a boiling point will be reached for separatists already keen to break away. Without the help of the Serbian army, it will be Macedonian redux – another war against a helpless state begun by an Albanian paramilitary force commanded from Kosovo and the diaspora. And Montenegro will be partitioned. Should the referendum be defeated outright, simmering resentment will bubble along until it is either held again or independence is gained through violence. At which point the aforementioned Muslim bloc will make the same claims, war will follow, and Montenegro will be partitioned. Finally, should the referendum be narrowly defeated, some interventionists conjecture, the EU will call for a "union of independent states" as some sort of consolation. Although the article doesn't say so, such an unwieldy grouping would elevate the Sanjak Muslim area straddling the Serb-Montenegrin border to autonomous status and could even include Kosovo, or at least the Serbian part in the north. It could even include all of Kosovo as well. Otherwise, to avoid a war Kosovo will be given to Albania. If this seems just so 19th century, that is because it is. The secessionist genie has been deliberately let out of the bottle by Western powers in order to accelerate their economic colonization of the region. So much money has been made, so many intellectually fraudulent careers have been enabled, and so much potential economic competition to the West has been eliminated by the breakup of Yugoslavia. Of course, the West can't be blamed for all of the causes that led up to this disintegration, but they also could have stopped it, had they really been interested to do so. But that would have been self-defeating. It is obvious to the point of boredom: failed intervention has the Balkans headed ineluctably for further war, which is good news for German bankers and the American arms industry, among others. As a friend of mine with long experience of American administrations and secret services recently quipped, "This [Western political interference] has nothing to do with the people in Serbia, Kosovo, Albania. This has everything to do with the industry that supplies to wars." The only hope the world has when its masters are so bent on evil is an independent and fearless media, willing to get to the heart of the matter and to bring the hypocrisies, lies, and hidden motives of the powers-that-be to light. Sadly, this is still not the case today. The last few months in the Balkans have shown, yet again, that an obsequious media devoted to its powerful political patrons in the West has continued to disgrace itself by asking all the wrong questions, setting out from all the wrong precedents, thus arriving at all the wrong conclusions. In its wake it has left a sound and fury signifying nothing – nothing positive, anyway. |
The Plot Thickens
http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/cgi-bin/newsviews.cgi/The%20Balkans/Kosovo/Kosovo_The_Plot_Thi.html?seemore=y
12 May 2006
Kosovo: The Plot Thickens
by Srdja Trifkovic
For a long time the proponents of Kosovo's independence have acted as if the game was up, that all that remained was for the "international community" to settle on the formula for independence-and for Serbia to sign on the dotted line under pressure. Until recently, many old Balkan hands in the world's capitals that matter expected that by the end of 2006 it would be all over. There are recent signs, however, that "it" won't be over that soon, and that the outcome is by no means preordained.
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It did not look that way when the United Nations abandoned its own policy of "standards before status" last fall. The achievment of "standards"-measured in terms of non-Albanians' personal security and the return of non-Albanian refugees, which number a quarter of a million-only required a pretense of ethnic and religious tolerance on part of the Kosovo Albanians, but they refused to offer even that much. In addition, the political leadership in the province passed into the hands of three notorious war criminals with jihad-terrorist and organized crime connections, Agim Ceku, Ramush Haradinaj, and Hashim Thaci.
The negotiations in Vienna opened in late February, but they have not been going well and are doomed to fail: the province's Albanians will settle for nothing less than independence, and that is the only issue on which Belgrade will not budge. Serbia entered the talks in spite of the fact that the UN envoy presiding over them is Martti Ahtisaari, the former president of Finland who was instrumental in deceiving the Milosevic government into surrendering Kosovo to NATO in 1999, and who has since served on the Board of the International Crisis Group (ICG), together with Wesley Clark, Morton Abramowitz, and other notorious pro-Albanian interventionists.
Over the past week, however, there have been signs of significant counter-movement. Articles critical of the proposed independence scenario have started appearing with surprising regularity. In a Baltimore Sun op-ed on May 10, Christopher Deliso reminded us that "[a]verting a humanitarian catastrophe was NATO's stated justification for bombing Serbia" but then came "ethnic cleansing of more than 200,000 Serbs and other minorities by Albanian militants." "Behind their façade of optimism, Western leaders negotiating Kosovo's future status are panicking," Deliso says. If Kosovo becomes independent, the remaining Serbs will flee-and the UN already dismayed them by making Agim Ceku, "a man who once terrorized them, prime minister":
Such privileged treatment reveals the fatal flaw of the U.N. mission. Canadian police Detective Stu Kellock, who headed the U.N. Regional Serious Crimes Unit in 2000 and 2001, says investigations implicating Albanian politicians or their associates were routinely blocked. The orders came directly from Washington, London and Brussels. Mr. Ceku and Mr. Haradinaj control Kosovo's militant factions and are considered heroes by Albanians. An anxious United Nations continually has sought to stay on their good side through appeasement.
Alarmingly, Deliso concludes, the West has no Plan B for ensuring Balkan peace:
In early 1999, Kosovo was a brutal but contained local conflict, relegated to villages. Botched Western intervention has made it a potential precedent for multiregional warfare.
A day earlier, on May 9, Admiral James "Ace" Lyons warned in the Washington Times that "the drug, sex slave, weapons, money-laundering, and other illicit trades" are flourishing in Kosovo, but none of this should come as any surprise:
Even in 1999, when the Clinton administration decided to take military action in support of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), there were numerous and credible intelligence and news reports of the KLA's criminal and terrorist inclinations. Predictably, KLA veterans found even more opportunity to ply their illicit trades when, ostensibly demobilized, they were recruited by the UN into Kosovo's police, civil administration, and quasi-military 'Kosovo Protection Corps.' The foxes were asked to guard the chicken coop-another U.N. fiasco.
If Kosovo becomes independent, Adm. Lyons concludes, even the minimal interference in the Kosovo-based gangs' operations will be removed:
A criminal state not seen since the defunct Taliban regime in Afghanistan will be set up with easy proximity to the rest of Europe. Such an outcome would make a mockery of some of the United States' most important global security priorities. While the international community desires some sort of "closure" to the ongoing mess in Kosovo (and this is understandable), it is hard to think of a supposed solution worse than independence. Seven years after the 1999 war, this is one Clinton legacy that demands urgent reconsideration.
The name of the former commander of America's Pacific Fleet was noted, only days earlier, on the list of distinguished writers, policy analysts, diplomats, clerics, and military men who have joined the Board of Advisors of the newly-launched American Council for Kosovo, a Washington-based nonprofit organization "dedicated to promoting a better American understanding of the Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija and of the critical American stake in the province's future." The Council's stated mission is to "generate a heightened American awareness that an independent Kosovo-forcibly and illegally detached from Serbia, as is now being contemplated by the international community-would be harmful to U.S. national interests and to European and global security."
Seven years after the 1999 war, the Council's introductory statement goes on, criminal and jihad terrorist elements of the supposedly disbanded "Kosovo Liberation Army" dominate the province's administration and maintain a reign of terror over Kosovo's still-dwindling Christian Serb population. Churches and monasteries that have not already been desecrated, blown up, or burned by mobs of Muslim Albanians exist under tenuous protection from NATO. And yet,
Incredibly, elements of the international community-including some sectors of the U.S. government and important voices in Congress-have accepted the idea that the only 'solution' for Kosovo is to detach it formally from Serbia and to make it an independent state. This would mean officially handing power to the criminal and jihad terrorist KLA leadership, who would then be empowered as a 'sovereign' government. The terrorist and organized crime menace emanating from Kosovo would increase. The last Christian Serb elements (and all other non-Albanians, such as the Roma) would be eradicated. Kosovo independence also would violate every principle of the international system by forcibly and illegally detaching Kosovo from a recognized state, Serbia, to which the government of that country justifiably insists it will not agree.
But how does an organization created so late in the day intend to go about it? One of the officers of the American Council for Kosovo is an occasional "Chronicles" contributor, James Jatras, who says that the task of educating the American public and policymakers of the inadvisability of the inertial course of supporting Kosovo's independence is by no means impossible:
When the Vienna talks inevitably stall, the 'gameplan' is for the Western powers to announce the 'solution' they have already decided upon. Aside from the futility of their trying to assuage global Islamic sensibilities by such a course, detaching Kosovo from Serbia without her consent breaks every principle of international law. Sir Thomas More famously quipped about giving the devil himself benefit of law-and Serbia is no devil, but Ceku, Haradinaj, and Thaci are indeed the devil. The simple fact it that they are terrorists and criminals. Whatever the bona fides of the late Mr. Rugova, the mask is off.
Despite the pretense of "guarantees" for Serbs, Roma, etc. (there are no Jews left, and even Catholic Albanians are almost gone), their fate in a future "KosovA" is clear: there is none. The American Council for Kosovo-and the lobbying and public relations actitivites working in parallel with it-are predicated on the belief that it is necessary to break this issue out of the Balkan policy specialist ghetto where it currently residesThe Council will seek to focus on Kosovo the concerns of a broader range of opinion with respect to jihad terrorism, persecution of Christians in Muslim-dominated areas, anti-drug, anti-slavery, etc. Even this early into the effort, says Jatras,
I am sensing that people here are surprising ready to rethink Kosovo if the issue is framed right. I am confident that a change of course can and will be effected as this unfolds. The absurdity and immorality of cold-bloodedly consigning tens of thousands of people to extinction-not by inaction (Darfur) but by a 'positive' decision of 'democratic' governments of mainly Christian countries-ostensibly because of a man who's been out of power for six years and is dead anyway, is inescapable.
The Council's twin themes are jihad terrorism and crime. Its position is that the United States must not support detaching Kosovo from Serbia to create an independent Muslim Albanian state because doing so would lead to the elimination of the remaining Christian Serb population, strengthen global jihad terrorism and organized crime, and fatally undermine the rule of law in international affairs. Not only would this be bad for Serbia (which is not a primary American concern), it would be bad for the United States, which should be our concern.
The American Council for Kosovo is "an American effort," its founders say. While it is undertaken on behalf of the Serbian National Council of Kosovo and Metohija, it will seek to show why the current drift of policy is harmful to American interests. They vehemently deny that it is too late in the day to reverse what is often described as an irreversible process:
It absolutely is not too late! In fact, the false sense of inevitability is one of the means by which the pro-independence lobby hopes to stampede western policy (and even Russian policy) into a bad outcome, and even to box Belgrade into accepting the unacceptable. The Serbian government must remain unyielding on this matter. Any number of reasonable arrangements are possible-but only if Kosovo remains within Serbia. Any number of Muslims live inside majority non-Muslim countries which, with no exception I can think of, better protect their interests than is the case of any Christian minority in any Muslim country. Muslim Albanians in Kosovo are being offered anything and everything they could possibly want (and indeed, had enjoyed even before launching their initially political, and then terrorist, efforts for independence), showing that what is at issue is not how they will live as human beings but whether they will wield state power-in effect, to have the 'right' to persecute and eradicate, as their behavior has shown.
What ultimately lies behind the Kosovo Albanian movement is violence, they warn: "give us what we want, or there will be trouble. (And if you do-even more trouble!" At the same time, many voices in the West suggest that we should give the jihadists what they want, or there will be violence. That would be self-defeating: among the many jihads in the world-Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Kashmir, southern Philippines, etc.-appeasing the jihad has never worked. Moreover, Jatras adds, if the international community, especially the United States, try to appease the jihadists in Kosovo, that would only whet the appetite of the terrorists for new victories. It would establish the principle that once a militant Muslim minority resorts to violence in a majority non-Muslim country, they are "entitled" to detach the area where they are concentrated and create a new state where they can persecute and uproot the non-Muslims.
Jatras also rejects suggestions that Russia may agree to Kosovo's independence because it stands to gain by invoking that precedent for its own purposes in S. Ossetia, Abkhasia, Transdnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and other unrecognized ethnic statelets in the former Soviet Unin. There had been suggestions of that sort from Moscow, but that notion seems to be weakening:
My sense is that Moscow's willingness to go along with independence in the UNSC and the Contract Group is falling fast. Also, as we thrown sand into the pro-independence machinery here in Washington, I hope that will also add to Moscow's reluctance to go along. Certainly, not long ago, some in the Putin administration had suggested that if Kosovo is detached from Serbia, the same principle should apply to places Russia cares about. Moscow's gambit as least had the virtue of unapologetic self-interest: if we look the other way at your bit of larceny, we'll expect you to return the favor. But as becoming ever more evident to Moscow, the favor wouldn't be returned, as western capitals have made very clear. Kosovo, they say, is 'unique.' Indeed it is. It would be hard to find another example of a place where governments professing the war on international terrorism as their first priority are helping a Muslim terrorist movement with a strong jihadist element to detach what is universally recognized as a part of another sovereign state and consigning the remaining Christian element to extinction. Indeed, if we're looking for Kosovo to become a 'universal' precedent with application to Russia, a more plausible future candidate would be Chechnya.
It appears that Moscow has realized that it could never expect any credit from its western partners on breakaway regions of other former Soviet republics. Even the prospect of a Russian union with Belarus-a recognized sovereign state, presumably entitled to do what it wants-will remain on the verboten list. Finally, given the kind of anti-Russian rhetoric coming out of Washington these days, there is no reason for Mr. Putin to offer any favors.
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In conclusion, it is worth remembering that the U.S. policy in the Balkans is not cast in stone. The dominant modalities of the "resolution" in Kosovo have acquired an explicitly Clintonesque flavor only in the second half of 2005, most notably with the return of Nicholas Burns to the center stage. Never a paragon of original thought or principled consistency, his nominal boss Dr. Rice has internalized the views of Mr. Burns, and other Albright proteges like him, on what needs to be done on Kosovo and Bosnia. She has come to favor a Balkan strategy that is hardly different from that advocated by candidate John Kerry in 2004, but that strategy has never been subjected to serious scrutiny within an Administration that has far bigger fish to fry further east. As recent developments indicate, not all is lost. On Kosovo in particular, things are not nearly as bleak for the opponents of independence as that strain of the "international community" embodied in the ICG and Mr. Burns wants them to believe, or as the decision-makers in Belgrade are often cajoled into believing.
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Copyright 2005, www.ChroniclesMagazine.org
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