Whose Kosovo is it anyway?
The Serb government's restated claim over Kosovo was more a symbolic gesture than 'war talk'.
David Chandler
News from Serbia and Balkans
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Clinton's Kosovo Whopper
Accuracy in Media ^ | September 27, 2006 | Cliff Kincaid
Posted on 09/27/2006 9:38:58 PM PDT by Mount Athos
Of all the whoppers told by former President Clinton in his Chris Wallace interview, perhaps the most outrageous was his claim that he was involved in "trying to stop a genocide in Kosovo..." In fact, Clinton's bombing of the former Yugoslavia killed more people than died in this "genocide." And his policy benefited Osama bin Laden and the global Jihad.
In the year before the bombing, some 2,000 people had been killed in a civil war in Kosovo. A conservative estimate is that 6,000 were killed by U.S. and NATO bombs.
It's strange as well that Clinton complained to Wallace about the "neocons" attacking him when many of the same neocons in 1999 supported Clinton's war on Yugoslavia. The war was never approved by the U.N. or the U.S. Congress, and in fact violated the War Powers Act. The main beneficiary of the intervention was a Muslim terrorist group, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), with links to bin Laden, who had declared war on America in 1996, bombed our embassies in Africa in 1998, and would later, of course, orchestrate 9/11.
When former CIA official Michael Scheuer says that the Clinton Administration "had eight to ten chances" to kill bin Laden and "they refused to try," he is making a statement that goes far beyond acknowledging Clinton Administration incompetence or a lack of will. The fact is that Clinton had a pro-Muslim foreign policy that actually benefited bin Laden and facilitated 9/11. Most Republicans don't mention this because too many of them were duped into backing Clinton's misguided policy in Kosovo. President Bush, then a candidate, even backed U.S. military intervention there through NATO.
[...] It is noteworthy that the CIA issued a January 2000 report that essentially whitewashed the nature of the KLA and claimed it was pro-American.
(Excerpt) Read more at aim.org ...
A Separate Peace?by Doug Bandow
September 27, 2006
Most people think of Kosovo in the past tense. Democratic critics of
the Bush Administration cite Kosovo as a "good war." Allied
negotiators refer to Kosovo's final status—independence in some
form—as a foregone conclusion.
The Western alliance would prefer to forget the Kosovo war, having
become responsible for one of the largest episodes of ethnic cleansing
in the Balkans. The ninth round of U.N.-sponsored talks on Kosovo
recently ended with no agreement. Observes Albert Rohan, in charge of
the Vienna negotiations: "We're approaching a moment where by talking
alone we won't accomplish the goal. We could talk for another ten
years and not change anything."
Unfortunately, the United States and Europeans guaranteed failure by
attempting to predetermine the results. The ethnic Albanians know that
the West is desperate to get out. They have no reason to make any
concessions beyond formalistic promises to respect the Serb minority,
promises which are unlikely to be kept by them or enforced by the
allies.
The Serbian government has offered everything save independence.
After all, which Western government has cheerfully cut itself into
pieces? Czechoslovakia begins and ends the list. Belgrade has
received no reward for its concessions. Instead, Serbia is supposed to
accept prospective membership in the EU as payment for services
rendered.
Even as the U.S. and Europeans decided on independence, their
deteriorating relationship with Russia raises the possibility of
resistance by Moscow. China also has indicated disquiet at the
forcible dismemberment of Serbia. If either power vetoes an allied UN
resolution, the Balkans will become a
global problem.
>From the beginning Western officials have lived in a fantasy world.
They believed that they could maintain a multi-ethnic territory after
the war. It is no surprise, however, that the ethnic Albanians, after
using the American-supplied air force to eject the Serbian military,
saw no need to retain the Serbian population.
To the contrary, the victorious ethnic majority kicked out roughly a
quarter million Serbs, Roma, Jews, and non-Albanian Muslims. The few
remaining Serbs were regularly attacked. In March 2004 some 4000 Serbs
were displaced as rioters destroyed homes, farms, churches, and
monasteries.
While the Albanian political leadership did not publicly support the
attacks, its complicity is likely: the government is led by former
guerrilla leaders guilty of war-time atrocities. They also have been
implicated in the explosion of organized crime, including sex
trafficking.
Although Islam was never much of a factor in the past, radical Islam
appears to be on the rise, Christian converts have been threatened,
and some analysts believe that terrorists have infiltrated the Balkans
through Bosnia and Kosovo. "Sex, crime, terrorism, it's all there,"
one U.S. diplomat recently told me.
Despite seven years of Western occupation, Kosovo isn't ready for
autonomy, let alone independence. Joseph Grieboski of the Institute on
Religion and Public Policy warns:
"the present record of rule of law, protection of the rights of
religious and ethnic minorities, and the return/resettlement of
internally displaced people by the Provisional Authority of Kosovo—all
of which are indispensable for democratic governance—have been gravely
unsatisfactory."
There's no easy solution. The majority ethnic Albanian community,
understandably, does not want to live under Belgrade. Just as
understandably, the minority Serbs (and Roma) do want to live under
Albanian rule. The Serbs who currently dominate the northern city of
Mitrovica, near the rest of Serbia, likely would forcibly resist
control by Pristina. None of Kosovo's neighbors, except Albania,
desires the UN to forcibly redraw Serbia's borders.
Thus, a dramatic international train wreck beckons. The West decides
on independence for Kosovo. Serbia refuses to agree, and the
pro-Western coalition is replaced by a government dominated by the
nationalist/populist Serbian Radical Party. The EU ends any membership
hopes for Belgrade. Russia vetoes a UN resolution granting
independence.
The United States and Europeans move ahead without UN approval.
Individual assaults on Kosovo's Serbs increase. Those in Mitrovica
refuse to acquiesce to Albanian rule and are forcibly repressed by
Pristina. Thousands more refugees flood into Serbia, which prepares to
intervene. The West threatens war on behalf of the Albanian majority
even as the latter finishes the job of ethnically cleansing Kosovo.
Allied officials talk about protecting democracy.
Although the worst case might not occur, there is no best case. To
reach an acceptable compromise, allied officials need to return to the
so-called reality-based community.
First, final status negotiations should be negotiations. The ethnic
Albanians should understand that intransigence does not guarantee
victory.
Second, multi-culturalism is not a worthwhile objective. One proposal,
disliked by Washington, is to leave Mitrovica with Belgrade while
granting Kosovo independence. This may or may not be a good idea, but
Western officials pushing to partition Serbia cannot object to it in
principle.
Third, independence will not magically transform Kosovo into a model
of Western civility. To the contrary, independence will reduce allied
leverage. If the ethnic Albanian majority tolerates human rights
abuses when it has yet to win independence, how likely is it to act
differently once it is granted independence?
Fourth, conditional independence would be equivalent to full
independence. Allied governments will not return should Kosovo violate
its commitments.
Fifth, it is easy to carve up other people's countries. Serbia has
been routinely denounced for opposing proposals to detach Kosovo,
rather like blaming a rape victim for resisting her attacker. The
Serbs, no less than the ethnic Albanians, are entitled to defend their
perceived interests.
Sixth, Belgrade should be integrated into Europe even if it refuses to
validate the latest iteration of a flawed allied policy. Attempting to
blackmail Belgrade will generate long-term hostility and is likely to
fail.
For some time the received wisdom was that Kosovo would be granted
independence, despite Serbia's opposition. However, unease with this
prospect is appropriately growing. The impending impasse in the Vienna
talks makes it imperative that the West insist upon negotiations that
really mean negotiations, rather than unconditional surrender by
Belgrade.
Doug Bandow is a member of the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign
Policy and the author of the forthcoming Foreign Follies: America's
New Global Empire (Xulon Press). A former special assistant to
President Ronald Reagan, he is a member of the Advisory Board of the
American Council for Kosovo.
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=12308
Serbian News Network - SNN
news@antic.org
http://www.antic.org/
25.9.2006 at 11:03
The Serbian government said on Sunday that Martti Ahtisaari, the Finnish UN mediator in talks over the future of Kosovo, clearly harboured sympathies for the Albanian separatist cause.
"It would be more honest of (Martti) Ahtisaari if he stepped down instead of seeing him openly, in front of the whole world, fall in line behind the Albanian separatists," Agence France-Presse quoted Srdjan Djuric, a Serbian government spokesman, as saying on Sunday.
"We are entitled to ask ourselves whether or not Mr Ahtisaari will organise, as his mandate stipulates, serious negotiations over the future of the province," he told Serbian news agency Tanjug.
Mr Ahtisaari was president of Finland in 1994-2000.
/STT/
© Copyright STT 2006
Send feedback on this item to: STT
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Martti Ahtisaari: Honoring and Commemorating Finland's Nazi SS Troops
These are the Finnish Nazi SS troops which Martti Ahtisaari planned to honor and commemorate in 1999. The fifth photograph from the top shows SS-Obergruppenführer Felix Steiner, one of Adolf Hitler's favorite commanders, inspecting the Finnish Volunteer SS-Battalion "Nordost" on May 23, 1943 with SS-Obersturmbannführers Hans Collani (left), the commander of the battalion, and Finnish Liaison Officer Kalervo Kurkiala (second from left), and Finnish Major Erkki Kokko. Steiner was the commander of the 5th SS Volunteer Division "Wiking", to which the Finnish Nazi SS Battalion "Nordost" was attached. The Wiking SS Division committed numerous massacres during World War II. He commanded the 11th SS Panzer Army during the last weeks of the war in 1945 when Adolf Hitler tasked him with defending Berlin from the advancing Russian forces. Steiner commanded the SS Regiment Deutschland before the formation of Wiking. This is the photo link:
http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/quarters/2130/disbandation.htm
A Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA) news dispatch from 1999 on Martti Ahtisaari's plan to honor Finland's Nazi SS troops, "Finnish Jews Upset over Commemoration", Helsinki, Friday, May 28, 1999:
The Balkans conflicts of the 1990s saw a massive revival and resurgence of US and Western media propaganda and infowar techniques. The "new" advocacy journalists recalled the "yellow journalism" of William Randolph Hearst, who helped induce the US to engage in the imperialistic or colonial war in Cuba in 1898, the Spanish-American War. This marked the emergence of the US as an expansionist global imperial and colonial power, like Britain, France, Spain, and Germany had been. Hearst was credited with manufacturing or "furnishing" the war in Cuba.
Frederic Remington, his correspondent in Cuba, reported that nothing was happening in Cuba, that all was quiet. He told Hearst that there would be no war. In a famous dispatch back to Remington, Hearst told Remington to stay: "You furnish the pictures and I'll furnish the war."
This was the same policy pursued in Kosovo. US correspondent Anna Husarska admitted that this was the policy. She explained and detailed the strategy in this article:
http://diac.cpsr.org/cgi-bin/diac02/pattern.cgi/public?pattern_id=349
Anna Husarska said: For a decade, Albanians living in Kosovo have complained about their lack of an independent state, "yet they don't do anything about it. No grafitti, no signs, no demonstrations."
While Kosovar Albanians profess pacifism, Anna Husarska explained, that should not prevent them from waging literary activism. "Ultimately, the passivity of this movement made it impossible for journalists to cover the problem because nothing was happening."
That, indeed, was the problem. Nothing was happening. The Albanians were not killing Kosovo Serb civilians and were not murdering Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Albanian policemen. "Nothing was happening" in Kosovo. Husarska was convinced that pacifism and peaceful change were useless, not even Albanians wanted to create a Greater Albania, an "independent Kosova". Like William Randolph Hearst, who developed "advocacy journalism", Husarska understood that war was needed, that NATO bombs were needed, that US "humanitarian intervention" was needed. But first, the Albanians had to start burning down Serbian Orthodox Churches and killing Serbian policemen and civilians in Kosovo. How else do you manufacture or "furnish" a war?
Before Hearst, John L. O'Sullivan perfected the use of the media to advance political and military agendas. O'Sullivan was a journalist who propounded the concept of "manifest destiny" to advocate the US annexation of Texas and the Oregon territory in 1845, territory that did not belong to the US. He developed the subtle symbiosis of the media and the military and political sector working in tandem before Hearst and Husarska. He believed that the US had a "divine mandate" from "Providence" to expand and take over territory "in defence of humanity" and to spread the concept of the "universality of freedom and equality". President George W. Bush's globalist universal crusade to spread "democracy" and "freedom" owes more to O'Sullivan's manifest destiny than it does to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin or Leon Trotsky. It is home-grown, Made in the U.S.A.
What is remarkable is that Husarska reveals that the Kosovo conflict is actually about separatism and secession, about creating an "independent state" by means of force and violence. Internationally recognized borders were no longer respected. Secession and separatism were now promoted by Husarska and the ICG as valid and legitimate. Secession and separatism were the exact same things the Bosnian Serbs and Krajina Serbs were seeking. There was an obvious double-standard and inconsistent approach. Husarska and the ICG decided what separatist movements were valid and legitimate and which were not. Naturally, proxies, clients, and surrogates were the separatists and secessionists they suppported and backed and advocated for. We can get your "independent state" for you.
Husarska let slip that the Kosovo crisis was about creating an "independent state". The problem was: How do you "furnish" or manufacture a war that would create an "independent Kosova". This is a Freudian slip. But, in fact, Husarska has no intention of concealing her motives and agenda. The mask comes down. There is nothing about "humanitarian intervention" or "genocide" or "human rights" now. Nothing about "repression" and "oppression". The goal was an ethnically pure, ethnically cleansed, "independent Kosova". That was always the real reason all along. She is a news reporter and she worked for the International Crisis Group (ICG), whose Chairman Emeritus Martti Ahtisaari planned to honor and commemorate Finland's Nazi SS troops in 1999 when he was the President of Finland. How can you be a news correspondent and a member of a quasi-government and quasi-corporate militant, advocacy "think tank"? Isn't there a blatant conflict of interest that is both unethical and unprofessional? The bias and prejudice and hidden agenda are obvious.
"Nothing was happening" in Kosovo. That soon changed. Husarska and the ICG then stepped in with an example of how the free media and the free press work in the "free world". Of course, we have all seen this before. William Randolph Hearst led the way in 1898. The "Kosova independence" campaign is not a spontaneous or natural phenomenon. It was manufactured or "furnished" from without and is not an indigenous movement. It is a totally manufactured and "furnished" movement with its origins outside of Kosovo. The 1878 League of Prizren genesis of the Greater Albania ideology requires a foreign sponsor to succeed, whether the outside sponsor is fascist Italy under Benito Mussolini or Nazi Germany under Adolf Hitler or Habsburg Austria-Hungary under Emperor Franz Joseph or Ottoman Turkey under Sultan Abdul Hamid II. The Greater Albania ideology is not new and does not change. Only the outside, foreign sponsor changes. The only issue is that of outside, foreign sponsorship. Who is pulling the strings in this absurd puppet show?
Can Bosnia's Peace Survive?
BY ANDREW PURVIS | BANJA LUKA
As Bosnian Serb politicians go, Milorad Dodik was considered one of the good guys. The former businessman took over the job of Prime Minister of the Bosnian Serb Republic in Banja Luka shortly after the end of the Bosnian war in 1995, helping to purge the local government of cronies of the wartime leader Radovan Karadzic. He battled corruption and helped international investigators send indicted war criminals to the Hague. But these days, Dodik sounds like a changed man.
In the past two months he has questioned the underlying agreement that ended the war, attacked Muslim politicians for "consorting" with war criminals and asserted that his Serb-dominated Republic may try to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina and ultimately join Serbia. Meanwhile, Bosnian Muslim leaders in Sarajevo are matching him word for word: Haris Silajdzic, a former Bosnian Muslim Prime Minister, and another erstwhile moderate, told Time that the boundaries imposed at the end of the war should be erased because "they are not natural. They are based on genocide."
Between them, the two former moderates have cranked up the heat for Bosnia's upcoming general elections, scheduled for Oct. 1, to a level not seen since the war ended, alarming international officials who oversee the country and ordinary citizens who fear a return to violence. "These men are feeding off each other. They are not real nationalists, but they are using it to get elected. This is our catastrophe," says Senad Pecanin, editor of the Sarajevo weekly Dani. The concern is all the more urgent because Silajdzic and Dodik, if current public opinion polls are borne out, could be the first postwar Bosnian political leaders to wield significant political power; the group of Western countries that has overseen Bosnia since 1995 is scheduled to scale back its authority next year, and although it will hand over duties to the E.U., the scope of those duties may be sharply reduced.
"There is a lot of fear," Bosnia's High Representative Christian Schwarz-Schilling told Time recently in Sarajevo. "People remember the same rhetoric from the early 1990s. And that ended in war. There is risk of it going too far." While he and other diplomats say a return to war is unlikely, Pecanin is less sanguine: for the first time since the war, he said, "I am afraid for the peace here."
The tensions are rooted in the Dayton peace accords, named for the Ohio town where they were hammered out in 1995. To silence the guns, the agreement created two separate ethnically based "entities," the Muslim-Croat Federation, which comprises 51% of the country, and the Serb Republic, the majority Serb area that makes up the rest.
More than a decade on, these areas still have the appearance of separate countries. They have their own Prime Ministers and parliaments; their own languages, religions and mobile-phone networks. Although the army was finally unified under one command last year, the Serb Republic is crucially resisting efforts to centralize the police force.
And any visitor can attest that they feel like two different countries. Cross the border into the Serb Republic from the Muslim-Croat Federation and Latin script road signs give way to Cyrillic, mosques to Serbian Orthodox churches. Locals prefer Serbian beer and loza, a grape brandy, and the only flags visible, even on official government buildings, are Serbia's red, blue and white rather than Bosnia's official blue and yellow. "We've got everything here," said Predrag Andelic, 50, over a cigarette and a bottle of beer. He's a war veteran from near the city of Prijedor, site of internment camps that saw the deaths of thousands of Muslims, Roma and Croats. He and his neighbors don't trust Muslim leaders in Sarajevo. "We would like to share with the Muslims but they do not want to share with us," says one friend. "They want to take over."
This month's election campaign has opened up a sharp new divide between Bosnia's leaders over the future of the two entities. Silajdzic, the leading Bosnian Muslim prime ministerial candidate, says he would like to see them dismantled in "a year or two." He explains: "A minority of 23.8% [Serbs] can block the whole country. We should be a citizen-based, and not an ethnically-based, country." He favors what he calls a new "dialogue" with all sides about how to eliminate the old borders and establish a centralized government in Sarajevo, but critics fear he means a Muslim-dominated state in which ethnic Serbs and Croats would lose their collective rights.
Serb leaders insist that the entities, and hence their Serb-dominated statelet, are sacrosanct. "We will fight" attempts to dismantle the current system, Dodik told a Serbian news agency earlier this month. Speaking to Time, the Serb Republic's President, Dragan Cavic, struck a more conciliatory note. He said the idea of a referendum calling for the secession of the Serb Republic was "crazy, suicide," but added that dissolving the entity's borders unilaterally would lead to "a crisis that I cannot imagine." He warned: "Enough blood has been spilled."
Until the past few months, senior politicians were barely able to talk about redrawing Bosnia's borders. The Office of the High Representative for Bosnia (ohr) was endowed by the U.N. with extraordinary executive powers to keep the peace in postwar Bosnia, and it used them regularly to make sure that local politicians toed the line. Dozens of judges and other bureaucrats were sacked and hundreds of politicians barred from office for breaking the rules and threatening the peaceful development of a multiethnic country. But now the U.S. and other Western countries plan to hand over responsibility for Bosnia to a European Union representative, possibly with strictly limited powers, by next July. Schwarz-Schilling, who succeeded Britain's Paddy Ashdown in the office earlier this year, has already adopted a more cautious approach than his predecessors. Bosnia's politicians need to "face the consequences of their own mistakes," he explained to Time, noting that a final call on whether or not the E.U. will wield executive powers will only be made early next year. "The decision will be whether to stick with the plan of disbanding the ohr, or to rethink," said Schwarz-Schilling.
The prospect of a weaker international presence is disturbing to many. Emsuda Mujagic, 54, is a Muslim woman who was driven from her home near Prijedor in the Serb Republic in 1992. Her village was torched and 48 family members, she says, were murdered in camps. She was able to escape and returned a few years ago, thanks mainly to the presence of foreign troops and the international community. Now she says, "I don't think it's a good idea for the ohr to leave. I am afraid. The politicians will just have a free hand to build up people's fears and fan ethnic intolerance."
Moreover, the region is already undergoing a kind of realignment. Neighboring Montenegro won independence from Serbia in late Spring, and contentious talks are under way to grant autonomy to ethnic Albanians in Kosovo — where Serbs are an embattled minority — by as early as next year. Serb politicians in Belgrade and in Bosnia warn that an "imposed" solution in Kosovo could inflame Serbs across the region. Of course, it's possible that the current round of nationalist posturing by moderate politicians is mere populist vote-getting. But too many with memories of recent history are unwilling to rely on that.
With reporting by Dejan Anastasijevic/Sarajevo
http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/printout/0,13155,1538599,00.html
MEETING BETWEEN BISHOP ARTEMIJE
AND PAT ROBERTSON
On the first day of his visit to the USA His Grace Artemije, Bishop of Raka and Prizren, together with other members of his delegation, consisting of Prof. Miroljub Jevti?, Mr. Dragan Veli? and Protos Simeon, Abbot of the Monastery of Banjska, visited Mr. Pat Robertson, Protestant pastor and Christian activist, who is closely involved in social, political and spiritual happenings in America today. Pat Robertson is well-known in the entire United States of America for his speeches, lectures, commentaries and answers to various questions which define American culture and civilization of this day.
Through the exceptionally powerful TV network CBN he exxerts a very great influence on tens of millions of Americans who closely follow his opinions and positions on various issues and who, being closely involved in politics, are in a position to impact a significant segment of American administration.
It is a great pity and a mistake on the part of our administration that people like Pat Robertson have not been identified as factors capable of helping us change the unjustly negative image of Serbia and the Serbian people which, unfortunately, is still prevalent in the public opinion of the world. This brings us to the question of inertia and indiffierence of several administrations, which have in recent times been at the helm of our state and which have failed to identify and understand the value of lobby activitiesso necessary in the world of great powers today. For decades now, unsparing of money or effort, the Croats, the Muslims and the Albanians have been actively and assiduously engaged in this matter, and the results of their work are evident and are always to our detriment.
Well acquainted with the current situation and fully aware of global dimensions of the danger which radical Islam represents, bent as it is on establishing its power in all not yet islamized parts of the world, Pat Robertson easily recognized the elements of jihad and the Wahhabi ideology in the activities of Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija. He is also aware of the negative consequences which the independence of Kosovo and Metohija will bring in its wake.
In a very precise analysis of the situation, Bishop Artemije drew the attention of Pat Robertson to the fact that a growing number of representatives of American administration and public at large agree with this conclusion. The one remaining unassailable bastion is the State Department which is, at the same time, the chief architect of the US policy concerning Kosovo and Metohija. The Statement Department has retained Clintons approach to resolving the problem of Kosovo and Metohija, as well as Clintons neo-liberal personnel structure. The persistent refusal on the part of the State Department to confront seriously the terrorist character of the Albanian administration in Kosovo and Metohija, and even of a large part of the Albanian population, among whom the radical Wahhabi elements are on the rise, can further jeopardize the safety of Europe and even America through the strengthening of the so-called White Al Qaeda, whose members are recruited from among European-born Muslims. White Muslims are already engaged in acts of terrorism in and ...
After hearing detailed descriptions of the destruction of Christian civilization and ethnic cleansing of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, concluding that that Islam is a terrible curse, a scourge which has afflicted this world, Pat Robertson exclaimed: We unleashed this curse upon the world!. He add that it was absolutely scandalous that we should permit the establishment of an Islamic state in Kosovo and Metohija by robbing a sovereign state of part of its territory, with the aid of American money to boot.
After the conversation with Pat Robertson, Bishop Artemije, and Jim Jatras, representative of VENABLE, the firm engaged to conduct lobby activities on behalf of the Serbs in Kosovo and Metohija, were interviewed by CBN. CBN intends to visit Kosovo and Metohija as well as by the end of this year and to make a comparative analysis of radical Islamic activities in these two areas. Pat Robertson has personally undertaken to correct the prevalent false image of Albanian Muslims in Kosovo and Metohija and to recruit forces to fight against the continuing destruction of Christianity in this area which has been Christian for so many centuries.
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Published: September 23 2006 03:00 | Last updated: September 23 2006 03:00
Attempts to reach a negotiated solution on independence for Kosovo remained deadlocked last night, leaving the troubled province's political future in the hands of divided international powers, aides to the United Nations' chief mediator said.
Martti Ahtisaari is expected to present proposals in November that Kosovo be granted sovereignty, resolving the last lingering question from the collapse of Yugoslavia.
But continued differences within the Contact Group of nations, which stands behind Mr Ahtisaari's mandate, could result in limited sovereignty for the 90 per cent ethnic-Albanian territory, conditional on strong international oversight for several years to come, senior western diplomats said.
The group brings together the US, Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Russia in a supporting role to the UN, which has administered Kosovo since the expulsion of Yugoslav Serb forces in 1999.
During a week of heightened ethnic tension in Kosovo, the group made clear that it would permit neither Belgrade nor Pristina "unilaterally" to block negotiations to decide the disputed territory's future status. Serbia argues that independence will lead to renewed regional instability.
But observers suspect that Russia and China, fearful of secession disputes within their own borders, may resist formal independence for Kosovo in the UN Security Council, which will be required to ratify any proposal.
Diplomats in Washington also see the Bush administration responding to the concerns raised by Russia and Serbia and reassessing their position on Kosovo.
Serbia's parliament in an emotional session last week decided to name Kosovo as an "integral part" of the country in a new constitution, which Vojislav Kostinica, the prime minister, aims to complete before elections early next year.
But Joachim Ruecker, chief UN administrator for Kosovo, advised the UN Security Council last week that delaying the outcome of the Vienna talks would only prolong tensions.
American and many European officials have tacitly supported "imposed independence", assuming continued international involvement will help protect Serbs and other minorities.
But four bombing incidents during the past eight days have raised the spectre of deadly clashes again in the province.
Nato-led peacekeepers have increased their patrols and checkpoints around Kosovo.
The 16,000-strong Nato-led Kosovo force also provides road escorts to the Serb minority, whose members attract blame for "ethnic cleansing" by Yugoslav Serb forces until the Nato intervention seven years ago.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006
Kosovo: The power
of compromise
By
Aleksandar Mitic, TFF Associate
September 21, 2006
A Serbian journalist and TFF Associate argues that only a genuine compromise over Kosovo's future status can guarantee stability.
A true, balanced, and negotiated compromise on Kosovo's future status would swing the pendulum of Balkan stability towards the European path.
A manipulated, one-sided, and imposed decision would, however, open a Pandora's box of secessionist movements in the world and release the ghosts of a nationalist past in the Balkans.
As we approach the beginning of talks on the future status of the Kosovo province, it becomes crucial to grasp the full complexity of the Kosovo status issue.
There has been an attempt in the last year and a half to close down international debate before the status talks had even begun by suggesting that only independence is a viable solution for Kosovo.
The truth is, the issue of Kosovo's status is dependent on so many historical, legal, political, religious, economic, and demographic elements that it deserves, at the very least, a wide international debate on possible solutions and their implications.
To argue thus that only one solution is possible is not only flawed reasoning, but a dangerous and explosive recipe for future frustration, tension, and conflict.
There has also been an attempt to refocus and spin the talks in the direction of Kosovo's independence, from those who say that these are not really talks on the future status but rather on the terms of Kosovo's future independence to those who argue that the negotiations should be only about the position of the Kosovo Serbs in an independent Kosovo.
Some also argued that the talks will be about finding a way to impose independence upon Belgrade. While there are a few officials who have, often privately rather than publicly, indicated their preference for such approaches, it must be said that these are completely contrary to international law.
RISKY BUSINESS
The aim of the talks on Kosovo's future status is to finally provide a fair, stable, long-term solution for this crisis region. The majority Kosovo Albanians must get a maximum of opportunity and real means to manage their future without feeling threatened, but also without endangering the welfare of Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians. The interests of Serbia, of which Kosovo is a part, the stability of the Balkans, and the worldwide impact of these negotiations are also crucial factors which must be taken into account.
Within the principles of international law and the preset recommendations of the international community's informal "Contact Group" - no return to the pre-1999 Milosevic-era situation, no joining of neighboring states, no partition - a number of possible solutions for the future status of Kosovo deserve to be examined.
There is also a number of pre-conditions for successful talks that must be met: artificial deadlines such as end of 2006 must not be used to the detriment of a sound solution; and the outcome should be an agreed, negotiated compromise, not an imposed, one-sided decision.
The breaching of international law and the creation of worldwide precedents should be avoided for the sake of regional and world security.
In this regard, it is of paramount importance that double standards must not be allowed to win over universal standards.
To claim that the Kosovo situation features "unique" characteristics and that its independence would not represent a precedent for triggering other crises elsewhere in the world is unlikely to convince everyone in the international community.
What is it that makes Kosovo so unique? Ten years of institutional discrimination? Several thousand victims of a conflict between a repressive state security force and a separatist guerilla force? A majority ethnic group actively seeking independence? But the very same characteristics are shared by dozens of similar regions around the world. If every such case is seen as unique, international law becomes irrelevant.
Independence for Kosovo would indeed be a risky, unilaterally-imposed and ultimately wrong solution. Why would one side get it all, the other one lose all? Why reward seven years of Albanian violence in post-war Kosovo? Why break up Serbia, the most ethnically diverse country in the Western Balkans and create a second ethnic-Albanian state on one part of its territory? Where is the logic of European integration in this pursuit of Balkanization of the Balkans?
A BLUFFER'S GUIDE TO INDEPENDENCEBluffs and spin must not be used as arguments. To say, for example, that Serbia already lost Kosovo in 1999 is only an interpretation and does not stand in any single international document, let alone in the UN Security Council resolution 1244 that ended the conflict.
In the resolution, "self-governing" is mentioned three times, "self-government" four times, "self-administration" once, "substantial autonomy" three times, whereas neither "self-determination" nor "independence" are mentioned at all. Did NATO intervene in 1999 to protect human rights or to provide the basis for secession? If Kosovo was lost to Serbia in 1999, why did it not obtain independence then?
As far as the so-called moral argument that it is the violence of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic which lost Kosovo for Serbia, the Kosovo Albanians should be least inclined to favor it since their massive and systematic violence and repression of the Serb community in the last seven post-war years has taken all the "moral credit" out of their hands.
The same goes for the often heard assertion that Serbia should choose between Kosovo and the European Union. In fact, under the EU Thessaloniki agenda on the Western Balkans, Serbia has a clear European perspective and as the Western Balkans' largest country, it certainly won't remain a black hole inside the EU. To suggest that Serbia should give up a large part of its territory - which has been the cradle of its civilization, culture, and religion for nine centuries now - for the sake of possibly entering a supranational integration process two or three years earlier does not make much sense. No international or domestic campaign aimed at convincing Serbian public opinion on this one would succeed.
One of the most common arguments for the independence of Kosovo is that if the ethnic Albanians do not get what they want, they will stage mass violence against the Serbs, other non-Albanians, and the international troops. The argument points to the massive riots in March 2004 as a warning of what could happen if ethnic Albanian desires are not satisfied. But is the world really so afraid of such threats that it does not dare stand up to them? NATO seems ready to call this bluff. The Alliance's Secretary-General has warned on several occasions that violence as means of promoting political objectives in the status talks would this time be met with a robust response from 17,000 NATO troops in the province. Indeed, threats of violence must not be legitimized nor used as arguments.
Finally, it is most worrying to suggest that some sort of "conditional independence" should be the outcome of the status talks. This empty formula is even presented by some as a compromise solution, because ethnic Albanians will have to wait a few more years for independence and give up on the idea of Greater Albania. Many of its backers suggest "conditional independence" means that Kosovo will be granted independence in phases, provided the majority ethnic Albanians finally start respecting the human rights of the Serbs and other non-Albanians. But this option is an insult to negotiators and 21st-century human-rights standards. If Belgrade is resolutely opposed to immediate independence, why would it accept independence two or three years from now? If even the most basic standards of human rights are not respected under international supervision, why should we expect that they would be in a conditionally independent Kosovo? And doesn't the "conditional independence" concept introduce a new kind of trade-off: respect for human rights in exchange for territory?
COMPROMISE: A WIN-WIN SOLUTION
Looking at the situation realistically and fairly, the most sustainable and just solution for the future status of the province lies between the standard type of autonomy, which ethnic Albanians now reject, and independence, which clashes with international law and is unacceptable for the Serbs in general and Serbia as a state.
A solution that would provide for a maximum of autonomy for Kosovo within the borders of Serbia could satisfy all the legitimate demands, including the Kosovo Albanians' demand to be self-governing, and it can protect the interests of non-Albanians in Kosovo and the interests of Serbia as a state. Such a solution would also comply with the principle of the inviolability of international borders.
Kosovo would enjoy full legislative, executive, and judicial capacity, a limited external representation - in particular regarding its full direct access to the international financial institutions - and most importantly, normalized relations with Serbia.
On the other hand, Serbia still has many positive things to offer Kosovo, including a strong push in its macroeconomic revival, a common market for goods, an integrated energy, electricity and infrastructure network, access to its health and education systems, a common fight against organized crime, and a joint contribution to regional stability and European integration.
At the same time, an autonomous Kosovo would still need to improve its treatment of the Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians. A wide-scale decentralization including a horizontal linkage of Serbian municipalities, which would benefit from the education, social, and health system of central Serbia, is a precondition for the survival of Kosovo Serbs, as suggested by UN special envoy Kai Eide.
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This horizontal linkage is not a model for partition and conflict but, on the contrary, a model for integration and survival, as these municipalities would be fully integrated in the autonomous Kosovo system run from Pristina, while keeping some political links with Belgrade.
Considering all this, an autonomy for the Kosovo Serbs within a maximum autonomy for Kosovo inside Serbia appears as the most reasonable and viable long-term solution.
A WIN-WIN SOLUTION
More than anything, it is a win-win solution. The Kosovo Albanians would finally get the means to manage their future and so will the Kosovo Serbs; Serbia would not have its borders changed and its historical and religious cradle amputated; Macedonia and Bosnia will receive guarantees that border changes in the Balkans are no longer tolerated; the EU would obtain regional stability and be able fully to take charge of its European perspective; the United States would be able to disengage its troops without losing its diplomatic leverage in both Pristina and Belgrade; Russia, China, India, and many other countries in the world would appreciate not having to deal with a dangerous secessionist precedent; the UN will see a major crisis issue resolved peacefully and with full respect for international law.
It is time to respect international law; it is time to find a long-term solution for Kosovo; it is high time to be patient, fair, sound, and consistent.
It is time for a successful compromise for the first time in Kosovo's long history.Aleksandar Mitic is a Brussels-based journalist and one of the authors of the CD-ROM and Internet project Kosovo 2006: The Making of a Compromise.
http://www.transnational.org/forum/meet/2006/Mitic_KosovoCompromise.html