The Untold Story of Kosovo Negotiations

NEWS VIEWS by Srdja Trifkovic











Friday, December 15, 2006



The Untold Story of Kosovo Negotiations



Vojislav Kostunica, Serbia’s prime minister for the past three

years, has one of the most challenging jobs in the world. He

nevertheless seems at ease with that burden, and appears more

confident than while he was Yugoslavia’s last president

(2000-2003). When we met in Belgrade last week, he was as

matter-of-fact about the problems he is facing as ever; but

whereas in the past he had occasionally agonized about the

magnitude and complexity of those problems, today he treats

them as facts of life that neither intimidate nor depress him.

It may be telling that in appearance he has hardly aged over

the past decade, while in substance he has become the key

figure on Serbia’s political scene for many years to come.







The most pressing of those problems is of course Kosovo. The

United States, NATO and several leading European Union

countries have occupied one-seventh of his country’s territory

for over seven years, and the officials who run the

“international community” appear keen—for now—to detach the

southern province permanently from Serbia. Kostunica’s best

defense against the pressure to sign Kosovo away—and that

pressure keeps coming from Washington, Brussels, London and

other power centers—has been to insist on the need for any

solution to be legal, to conform to the letter and spirit of

the international law.

The law is clear: Kosovo belongs to Serbia, and its status was

reiterated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that

stopped NATO bombing in June 1999. Detaching it from Serbia

against Belgrade’s will would be an unprecedented violation of

the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Ahtisaari

and his political masters know that, of course, but like to

pretend that it is but a minor irritant. As Kostunica says,

“When we mention the need for legality, some of these

officials become exasperated, even agitated. They respond with

various comments to the effect that we should not be bound by

‘mere’ legality.”

This, Kostunica adds, reminds him of the attitude of

Yugoslavia’s late communist dictator, Marshal Tito. When

commenting on how the country’s judges should try political

cases, Tito famously advised them “not to stick to the law

like a drunk sticks to a fence.” Such attitude irritates

Kostunica—a constitutional lawyer, whose nickname in Serbia is

“the Legalist”—but it does not surprise him. “The whole

negotiating process had been designed from the outset to lead

to only one outcome: Kosovo’s independence,” says he; and the

role of the U.N. mediator, Finland’s former president Marti

Ahtisaari, was simply to choreograph that outcome.

Kostunica’s account of Ahtisaari’s bungled attempt to

“deliver” the Serbs indicates that the promoters of the

Albanian cause had selected the wrong person for the job. The

Finn came to it as a self-declared proponent of detaching

Kosovo from Serbia and an associate of the Soros-funded

International Crisis Group, a leading pro-Albanian lobby

group. Ahtisaari’s opening gambit nevertheless was to try and

assure Kostunica of his good intentions: he really wanted to

assist Serbia, he said, in ridding herself of a problem—of

Kosovo, that is; and “we” should work together on finding the

formula to make it happen smoothly and painlessly, since “we”

(men of the world, big-time players in the “international

community”) surely realize that Kosovo is lost to Serbia

anyway.

Ahtisaari’s approach may have been based on six years’ worth

of flawed advice that he and others in the “international

community” had received from Western diplomats in Belgrade and

from a small but influential clique of “pro-Western” Serbian

officials and analysts. All along their assumption had been

that Serbia would cave in yet again and agree to Kosovo’s

detachment, albeit with some meaningless fig leaf

(“conditional independence,” “international guarantees for

minority rights,” etc, etc); that Russia and China would

endorse the deal at the Security Council; and that the problem

would be taken off the agenda by the end of this year with the

admission of yet another part of ex-Yugoslavia into the

“international community.”

Observers agree that the nature of the new entity would be

clear not so much for what Kosovo would be (an international

protectorate, an EU-NATO condominium, a future province of

Greater Albania) but for what it would no longer be: part of

Serbia. As a Washingtonian insider has noted, “The UN, the EU,

the Contact Group countries, would issue the appropriate

guarantees, mainly protection for the remaining Serbs—and

everyone would know the guarantees were just new lies on top

of the old. When all the Serbs were cleared out and their holy

places destroyed, there would be expressions of regret from

Washington, Brussels, London, etc: ‘Indeed, how sad. How

unfortunate that these Serbs should have made themselves so

hated’.”

The belief that this scenario might work was reinforced by

none other than President Boris Tadic’s chief foreign policy

advisor Vuk Jeremic, one of very few Serbian enthusiasts for

John Kerry’s victory in November 2004. Mr. Jeremic (who

happens to be a Muslim on his mother’s side) came to

Washington on 18 May 2005 to testify in Congress on why Kosovo

should stay within Serbia; but in some of his off-the-record

conversations he assured his hosts that the task is really to

sugar-coat the bitter pill that Serbia will have to swallow

anyway—and to ensure that the nationalist Radical Party does

not score excessive gains in the process.

When confronted with Kostunica’s polite but firm refusal to

operate on those assumptions, Ahtisaari tried subterfuge,

suggesting tête-à-tête off-the-record conversations with

individual Serbian leaders. Aware of the potential for

intrigue and double-dealing contingent upon such arrangements,

Kostunica refused. All his meetings with Ahtisaari were

strictly official, on-the-record, minuted, and attended by

advisors. In the meantime the negotiations between Serbs and

Albanians in Vienna, supposedly mediated by Ahtisaari, failed

because they were doomed to fail. As Kostunica says, the

Albanians were led to believe that they would get independence

anyway, and therefore had no incentive to negotiate.

The biggest internal challenge for the prime minister was to

ensure coherence of the official Serbian position, between

himself, President Tadic, and foreign minister Draskovic. That

has not been easy, and may have become impossible were it not

for the remarkable unity of the country’s public opinion on

this issue, manifested in the referendum on Serbia’s

constitution last October that reiterated Kosovo’s status as

integral part of Serbia. Confronted with the strength of

popular sentiment, Kostunica’s coalition partners and

Tadic—whose Democratic Party is not in government—realized

that breaking ranks would be tantamount to political suicide.

Some of the lingering ambiguities in Belgrade’s leadership

remain, however, and became apparent only days after our

meeting when President Tadic announced that he would fight to

save Kosovo—but added that he does not believe that the fight

would be ultimately successful.

Kostunica disagrees with that assessment, and believes that

the chances of success—of a compromise that would give

self-rule to the Albanians but keep Kosovo within Serbia’s

boundaries—are better now than at any time since 1999. The

fact that Ahtisaari felt compelled to move the deadline, long

set for the end of this year, has tremendous psychological and

political significance: the surest means of denial is delay.

Many proponents of Kosovo’s independence now realize that

setting a firm deadline was a grave mistake. We are witnessing

a shift in momentum that does not work to their advantage.

The shift would not have been possible without Russia’s firm

and unambiguous commitment not to support any Security Council

resolution that is not acceptable to Serbia. We can only

speculate whether Moscow’s stand would be so solid had the

United States promised to treat Kosovo as a valid precedent

for Transdnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and

Nagorno-Karabakh; but having rejected any such possibility out

of hand, Washington has ensured that Putin has no incentive to

play ball. As for China, the danger works in the opposite

direction: had Peking supported Kosovo’s independence, it

could have facilitated the creation of a precedent that could

be and therefore would be used against it vis-à-vis Taiwan (or

even Tibet) at some future date.

Option B for the proponents of Kosovo’s independence was

stated by the province’s “prime minister,” war criminal Agim

Ceku, earlier this week: Albanians proclaim independence

regardless of the UN and invite bilateral recognition by

individual countries, most crucially the United States. The

trouble is that the Europeans hate that option, even those

(notably in London and Berlin) who are supportive of

independence. Option B cannot work unless the European Union

supports it as a whole, and within the EU so many countries

have announced their opposition—Spain, Greece, Rumania, and

Slovakia unequivocally—that it is not practicable. No

individual EU country will recognize a self-proclaimed “state”

in Kosovo unless it is an agreed policy consensually approved

in Brussels. Ceku et al may try it nevertheless, but

Washington is certain not to extend recognition that bypasses

the Security Council if that risks a rift with the Europeans:

the U.S. needs them on board to manage the mess in

Afghanistan, and for the forthcoming disengagement from Iraq.

In conclusion, the untold news is that Kosovo will not become

independent. The New York Times, the Washington Post and the

rest of the Western “mainstream” will go on huffing and

puffing and pretending otherwise, but there is not much they

can do: Kostunica will not be duped, Serbia will not cave in,

Russia will not relent, and the Albanians will not give up on

what they had been promised by those who had never had the

right to make the promise in the first place. They threaten

renewed violence, but the threat only serves to reinforce the

argument that they should not be allowed to get away with it.

As Russia’s ambassador to the U.N. told his Western colleagues

last Wednesday, “you may be willing to give in to Albanian

blackmail, but we are not.”

As Kostunica says, once the reality sinks in we’ll finally

have some real negotiations. We do not know what the end

result will be, but that is in the nature of all genuine

negotiations: their outcome is unknown. Ahtisaari has failed,

and his supporters are getting very nervous. As Misha Glenny

confided to the former U.S. ambassador in Belgrade William

Montgomery on December 7, “I am seriously worried about the

Kosovo situation . . . entre nous, I am very disappointed with

Martti’s performance.”

Good. Very, very good.

/The Balkans/Kosovo | print | permanent link | writebacks (0)









Srdja Trifkovic is the

foreign-affairs editor of

Chronicles: A Magazine

of American Culture and

director of The Rockford

Institute's Center for

International Affairs.

Click here to find out when

Dr. Trifkovic is scheduled

to appear on radio or television.



Advanced Search

GO TO COLUMNS

Columns Autodidact Booklog Pat Buchanan

Chronicles Chronicles Extra! Cultural

Revolutions FilmLog Thomas Fleming International

David Hartman William Murchison Scott P. Richert

Paul Craig Roberts Srdja Trifkovic Chilton

Williamson Clyde Wilson



More Articles

The Untold Story of Kosovo Negotiations

Fri, 15 Dec 2006 10:14:00 GMT



Pope in Turkey: A Reluctant State Guest

Fri, 01 Dec 2006 19:54:00 GMT



The Price of Modernity: A Letter From Dublin

Wed, 22 Nov 2006 15:45:00 GMT



Rumsfeld’s Long Overdue Departure

Thu, 09 Nov 2006 15:23:00 GMT



A Troubling Verdict

Tue, 07 Nov 2006 22:10:00 GMT



Fighting Jihad at Home

Thu, 19 Oct 2006 16:16:00 GMT



A New Architecture in the Pacific North East

Fri, 13 Oct 2006 20:45:00 GMT



Comrade Kim’s Nukes, Uncle Sam’s Opportunity

Tue, 10 Oct 2006 02:18:00 GMT



Kosovo and the “Global War on Terrorism”

Wed, 04 Oct 2006 15:55:00 GMT



Pope Benedict and the Meaning of Words

Tue, 26 Sep 2006 17:52:00 GMT



An End-Timer on the East River: The Hidden Message of

Ahmadinejad’s U.N. Speech

Fri, 22 Sep 2006 15:26:00 GMT



Farewell to a Good European: Oriana Fallaci (1929

2006)

Fri, 15 Sep 2006 22:49:00 GMT



A Grim Anniversary

Mon, 11 Sep 2006 18:21:00 GMT



CAIR at ORD: Vampires Inside the Bloodbank

Tue, 05 Sep 2006 13:51:00 GMT



Sir Alfred Sherman: Witness to a Century

Wed, 30 Aug 2006 16:37:00 GMT



Iran Rejects Nuclear Terms

Wed, 23 Aug 2006 22:46:00 GMT



Syria: The Weak Link in the Iran-Hezbollah Axis

Mon, 21 Aug 2006 20:42:00 GMT



A Flawed Resolution That Resolves Nothing

Wed, 16 Aug 2006 01:30:00 GMT



Britain’s Jihadist Fifth Column

Fri, 11 Aug 2006 20:42:00 GMT



Lebanon: Déjà Vu All Over Again

Wed, 26 Jul 2006 19:52:00 GMT



North Korea: The Problem, The Solution

Fri, 07 Jul 2006 18:47:00 GMT



We Can’t Solve the Problem, But We Can Maintain It

Thu, 29 Jun 2006 23:10:00 GMT



The “Peace Process” Is Dead

Thu, 22 Jun 2006 00:57:00 GMT



Nick Griffin’s Long March

Mon, 12 Jun 2006 13:44:00 GMT



Olmert, Abbas, and Prospects for Peace

Tue, 30 May 2006 18:42:00 GMT



New Martyrs of the East and Coming Trials in the West

Fri, 19 May 2006 14:13:00 GMT



Kosovo: The Plot Thickens

Fri, 12 May 2006 21:04:00 GMT



Al-Maliki’s Unenviable Task

Fri, 05 May 2006 21:48:00 GMT



Bin Laden Puts All Americans On Notice

Thu, 27 Apr 2006 13:45:00 GMT



Rumsfeld, the Wounded Survivor

Fri, 21 Apr 2006 13:55:00 GMT











Get the Score on Islam!



Purchase Dr. Trifkovic's Books



Defeating Jihad: How the War on Terror May Yet Be Won,

In Spite of Ourselves



The Sword of the Prophet:

Islam—History, Theology,

Impact on the World





Peace in the Promised Land:

A Realist Scenario

(edited by Srdja Trifkovic)







Support This Website

Make a tax-deductible donation













Copyright 2006, www.ChroniclesMagazine.org

powered by performancing firefox

U.S.-Russia tug-of-war

Fate of Serbia's breakaway region of Kosovo sparks U.S.-Russia tug-of-war
The Associated Press
Wednesday, December 6, 2006

The United States and Russia are engaged in a diplomatic tug-of-war over the breakaway region of Kosovo, which is awaiting a final U.N. recommendation on whether it will become an independent nation or remain part of Serbia.
Washington supports conditional independence for Kosovo and wants to set a timetable. Moscow, Serbia's traditional ally, is against establishing a schedule and says a solution must be found that satisfies both sides.
"We've long taken the position that now being seven years since war ended in Kosovo in 1999, it's time to give people of Kosovo a certain sense of their future," U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns said this week on the sidelines of a conference of the 56-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
The situation is complicated by the fact that the Kremlin has signaled that if Kosovo were granted independence, Russia would regard that as a precedent for Moscow-backed separatist movements in former Soviet republics — a position rejected by Washington.
Moscow has cultivated strong ties with two rebel Georgian provinces, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, that broke away from the central government in wars in the early 1990s and with Moldova's separatist province of Trans-Dniester. It has stopped short of recognizing them, but has hinted that their independence drive also should be honored.
Washington claims that Kosovo is a unique case and that any solution imposed by the United Nations there cannot be replicated elsewhere.
Kosovo has been a U.N. protectorate since 1999, when NATO drove Serbian forces out of the mainly Albanian inhabited province to prevent a campaign of ethnic cleansing.
A U.N. envoy is due to deliver a final recommendation early next year on whether the province should gain independence or remain a self-governing part of Serbia.
Ethnic Albanians, who comprise 90 percent of Kosovo's 2 million people, are demanding independence, but Serbia insists that it must remain a self-governing part of Serbia.
Washington expects the upcoming U.N. ruling, prepared by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, to result in conditional independence for Kosovo despite Serbia's objections.
Burns insisted this week that because of Kosovo's status as a ward of the United Nations it could not be compared to breakaway regions that are unrecognized by the international community.
"The United States expects that after (the Jan. 21 parliamentary elections in Serbia), President Ahtisaari would put forward his plan for final status of Kosovo," he said. "We then anticipate that the U.N. Security Council would be asked to pass resolution concerning final status of Kosovo."
"We would want that to happen very quickly: let's say a month or so following Serb elections in late January," Burns said.
But Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov immediately rejected that proposal. Moscow wields veto power in the Security Council, and Russia's ambassador in Belgrade indicated on Monday that it may use it to prevent Kosovo's independence.
"The solution could be only a negotiated solution and I do not see how the Security Council could associate itself with any idea, which would mean imposing decision to one of the parties," Lavrov said.
Another complication is the long-established principle of the territorial inviolability of all nations. Analysts have noted that a breakup of Serbia could even have repercussions on far-flung countries such as Indonesia, whose provinces of Papua and Aceh are seeking the right of self-determination.
Slovenia's Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel, who chaired the OSCE meeting in Brussels, said Kosovo is a special case because there is an "unbridgeable rift" between Serbia and Kosovo's Albanians.
"It is a universal principle to respect territorial integrity of all nations," Rupel told The Associated Press. "But the problem of Serbia and Kosovo is very delicate (because) there can be no agreement between them."
___ http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/12/06/europe/EU_GEN_OSCE_US_Russia_Kosovo.php
Associated Press writer Maria Danilova contributed to this story from Moscow.
Copyright © 2006 The International Herald Tribune www.iht.com

Kosovo fears prompt US and UK to back deeper Serbia ties

Kosovo fears prompt US and UK to back deeper Serbia ties

By Daniel Dombey in Rigaand Neil MacDonald in Sarajevo

Published: November 30 2006 02:00 | Last updated: November 30 2006 02:00

The
US, the UK and the Netherlands yesterday staged a dramatic U-turn on
Serbia, endorsing plans for deeper Nato ties with Belgrade amid fears
that a coming dispute over Kosovo could spin out of control.

Washington,
London and The Hague had previously blocked calls for Belgrade to join
Nato's Partnership for Peace - a programme that has in the past brought
some countries closer to membership. They insisted that Serbia first
needed to make progress on hunting down Ratko Mladic, the indicted war
criminal widely blamed for the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in which
thousands of Bosnian Muslims died.

But
at a Nato summit in Riga, US and UK diplomats accepted the arguments
made by most other Nato member states that Belgrade needed a positive
signal if it was not to be estranged from the west.

Diplomats
said that Nato made its move to bolster pro-western parties in Serbia's
January elections. They added that it could also soften the blow
Belgrade is set to receive next year when many countries are expected
to recognise the indepen-dence of Kosovo, the break-away province that
was at the heart of Nato's 1999 war with Serbia.

"I have long
been of the opinion that this was the right way to go," said Jaap de
Hoop Scheffer, Nato secretary-general, referring to the decision to
give Serbia partnership. Tacitly acknowledging the dispute within Nato,
he added: "It was not so easy."

The neighbouring countries of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro were also welcomed into the Nato
partnership for peace, while Croatia was given a strong signal that it
would be admitted in 2008.

Carla del Ponte, chief prosecutor at
The Hague tribunal, said the decisionappeared to reward Serbia for
non-cooperation in the hunt for Mr Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, the
former Bosnian Serb leader. "We were not consulted," spokesman Anton
Nikiforov, said.

Vojislav Kostunica, Serbia's nationalist-leaning
prime minister, claimed that closer association with Nato, which leads
an international peacekeeping force in Kosovo, would help Serbia hold
on to at least nominal sovereignty over the province.

"The
entrance of Serbia into the partnership for peace is a very important
and encouraging fact at a moment when we are struggling to keep the
integrity of Serbia," Mr Kostunica said, according to the official
Tanjug news agency. His government says it would accept the maximum
possible autonomy for Kosovo, but not independence with a seat in the
UN.

The European Union has separately halted negotiations on an
association agreement with Serbia - widely considered a waystation to
EU membership - because of Belgrade's failure to do more on handing
over Mr Mladic to the inter-national criminal tribunal in The Hague.

Nato
said it expected Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia to co-operate with
prosecutors and would monitor closely to ensure this happens.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/ad054048-8017-11db-a3be-0000779e2340.html

powered by performancing firefox

What About Clinton and Kosovo?

What About Clinton and Kosovo? Get Over 'Bush Lied' Nonsense

by Larry Elder

Posted Dec 01, 2006

The White House -- finally -- began pushing back against irresponsible
charges that Bush "lied" to the American people in making the case for
war.



The
garrulous Sen. Ted Kennedy, D-Mass., made many "Bush lied" accusations:
"There was no imminent threat. This was made up in Texas, announced in
January [2003] to the Republican leadership that war was going to take
place and was going to be good politically. This whole thing was a
fraud." And Kennedy later intoned on the Senate floor, "Before the war,
week after week after week after week, we were told lie after lie after
lie after lie."



Sen. John Kerry, D-Mass., said, " . . . [T]he
administration intentionally misled the country into war." Anti-war
protester Cindy Sheehan, speaking to the president in a TV ad, said,
"You were wrong about the weapons of mass destruction. You were wrong
about the link between Iraq and al-Qaeda. You lied to us, and because
of your lies, my son died."



Question: If Bush "lied," did former President Clinton "lie" about Kosovo?



Clinton,
in a March 24, 1999, Oval Office broadcast, explained his military
action in Kosovo: "We act to prevent a wider war, to defuse a powder
keg at the heart of Europe, that has exploded twice before in this
century with catastrophic results. . . . By acting now, we are
upholding our values, protecting our interests and advancing the cause
of peace.



. . . Ending this tragedy is a moral imperative. It
is also important to America's national interests. . . . Do our
interests in Kosovo justify the dangers to our armed forces? . . . I am
convinced that the dangers of acting are far outweighed by the dangers
of not acting -- dangerous to defenseless people and to our national
interests. . . . I have a responsibility as president to deal with
problems such as this before they do permanent harm to our national
interests. America has a responsibility to stand with our allies when
they are trying to save innocent lives and preserve peace, freedom and
stability in Europe. That is what we are doing in Kosovo."



The
former president called Kosovo a humanitarian crisis. The New York
Times, on April 19, 1999, wrote: "In San Francisco on Thursday,
President Clinton said that the Serbs had displaced 'over a million
Kosovars' and had killed and raped 'thousands upon thousands of them.'
From interviews that journalists and relief workers have conducted with
scores of refugees from Kosovo, there is no reason to doubt him. But at
this point it is also impossible to prove that he is correct."



Actor/activist
Mike Farrell, who opposes the Iraq War, nevertheless supported military
action in Kosovo, stating, "I am in favor of an intervention. . . . I
was in Rwanda shortly after the slaughter there. I was infuriated then
-- and am now -- that the international community did not step in. . .
. I know that the escalation of violence and violations of human rights
in Kosovo have been going on for some time. . . . I reluctantly find
myself supporting the notion that something needed to be done and that
it is appropriate for us to act, and if this is the only way, so be
it."



But what about Clinton's assertion of the displacement of
"over a million Kosovars"? According to USA Today on July 1, 1999,
"Many of the figures used by the Clinton administration and NATO to
describe the wartime plight of Albanians in Kosovo now appear greatly
exaggerated as allied forces take control of the province. . . .
Instead of 100,000 ethnic Albanian men feared murdered by rampaging
Serbs, officials now estimate that about 10,000 were killed."



But is the 10,000 number accurate?



The
Orange County Register, in a Nov. 22, 1999, editorial, said, "Months
after the bombing has ceased, United Nations and European Union
investigations have bolstered what critics had argued: NATO's estimates
of Serbian genocide against the Kosovars were greatly overblown. Many
observers now think the inflated numbers simply were part of the
U.S.-led propaganda effort to build support for the war.



" . . .
The latest evidence suggests that fewer than 3,000 Kosovars were
murdered -- horrifying, yes, but not many more than the number of Serbs
who were killed by NATO bombing attacks on Yugoslavia, roughly
estimated between 3,000 and 5,000 soldiers and civilians."



Does
this mean that Clinton "lied, people died"? The intelligence turned out
to be wrong, very wrong. Something like this always warrants a serious
examination of intelligence failures. But intelligence failures, bad
intelligence or failing to properly analyze the intelligence is a far
cry from accusing a commander in chief of deliberately and
intentionally misleading the American people.



Can we, perhaps, now drop the "Bush lied" nonsense, and pursue the business of winning the war against Islamo-fascism? Perhaps?

---

Copyright © 2006 HUMAN EVENTS. All Rights Reserved



http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?print=yes />

powered by performancing firefox

Ltr in Response to Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie

---

Ltr in Response to Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie

Unpublished

 

From Globe and Mail:   http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/RTGAM.20061122.wmackenzie22/BNStory/Afghanistan/home

_________________________________________________________________________________________________

 

"The bombing of an ally of two world wars by NATO was a disgraceful abuse of power." 

 

Globe and Mail

 

Letter to the editor(s)

 

24 November 2006

 

In his 22 November 2006 article, "Go big, go bold, and get it done," retired Major General Lewis MacKenzie made a convincing case for increased support by NATO nations for the mission in Afghanistan.  He contrasted the lack of significant support by some NATO members to the unity shown in the NATO operation in Bosnia/Kosovo.  However, because his focus was clearly on the Afghanistan mission, he did not elaborated on why, in 1999, he "was an outspoken critic of NATO's ill-conceived bombing campaign against Serbia/Kosovo."  Basically, NATO military operations in Afghanistan met the requirement of Article 5 of the NATO Charter; Bosnia/Kosovo did not.

 

The 19-member nations which comprise 900 million members, bombed tiny Yugoslavia, with a population of 10 million in violation of the NATO Charter.  In the event that anyone doesn't remember, NATO was the agreement between member nations that should one nation be threatened or attacked by the Soviet Union, the other nations would go to their defense.  I know of no NATO nation, nor any nation that Yugoslavia attacked, or even threatened.

 

With the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO needed a new mission, and what better mission than the Serbs of Yugoslavia?  Instead of NATO's mission for defense, it assumed the mantra of an offensive force by unjustly bombing a sovereign nation back to the stone age.

 

The bombing of an ally of two world wars by NATO was a disgraceful abuse of power.

 

Colonel George Jatras, USAF (Ret)

USA

---

Brought to you by Attensa for Outlook (download it here)

Bitterness, Irony, and Hope

Bitterness, Irony, and Hope

by Nebojsa Malic

Bosnia, Year 11 Eleven years since the Dayton Accords were finalized at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, Bosnia-Herzegovina is not at peace. Though military operations stopped in 1995, hostility among the country's ethnic communities – Muslims, Serbs and Croats – has not diminished much. Politics turned out to be the continuation of war by other means. Six weeks after general elections in October brought to power Serbs determined to preserve their autonomy and Muslims determined to destroy it, and divided the Croats, the country has a new presidency and one chamber of the parliament, but a new cabinet (Council of Ministers) still has to be appointed. The outgoing PM, Adnan Terzic, chose to end his tenure with a denunciation of the country's Serbs to the UN General Assembly. Local authorities throughout the Muslim-Croat Federation are also slow to emerge, and when they do it is usually at the expense of constitutional requirements for ethnic representation. Corruption is endemic and widespread, while a crushing value-added tax, levied even on charitable donations, is bleeding the fledgling economy dry. Few things are left unsullied by politics. But when humanity does assert itself, it shines so much brighter against the oppressive drudgery of statism. A Functioning Government By Nov. 10, the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) had convened its new parliament. All the seats set aside for Muslims and Croats under a constitutional quota system were filled. The only exception was the position of deputy speaker, since the largest Muslim party refused to nominate a candidate. (The party is Haris Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia, which advocates the destruction of the RS.) The new president of RS took office as well, and since Milorad Dodik remained prime minister, his cabinet will likely undergo only minor changes. On the other hand, in the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there was a chronic deficit of Serbs and Croats in Muslim-majority areas. According to the Sarajevo daily Oslobodjenje, three Serb seats in cantonal parliaments were left vacant (out of 17), and the House of Nations in the Federation parliament had only 12 out of 19. On Nov. 15, a report in Oslobodjenje about the innumerable difficulties in setting up the new governments in the Federation actually used the phrase "a better system of government" to describe the RS arrangement. This is unprecedented. For, while it's obvious to everyone that the Federation is a cumbersome, dysfunctional, wasteful, and prohibitive arrangement, Muslims and Croats persist in blaming the RS for Bosnia's troubles, and demanding centralization as a way to resolve inefficiencies of government. The outgoing PM of the joint government, Adnan Terzic, did just that at the UN General Assembly, earning a tongue-lashing from Dodik, who called him an "ordinary fool." When he appeared as a guest in a news program on Nov. 13, Terzic proved Dodik right, by rambling incoherently and using "logic" that would embarrass kindergartners. Conspiracy Theories On Nov. 20, members of the new national parliament were sworn in: 28 from the Federation, 14 from the RS. The session was adjourned almost immediately, as there had been no agreement on electing the speaker or the Council of Ministers. One of the MPs is Sefer Halilovic, retired general and wartime chief of staff for the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, established by the Izetbegovic regime in 1992. Before that, Halilovic was the military commander of the Patriotic League, a Muslim militia organization supporting Izetbegovic's drive for independence. As part of a series of interviews conducted with high-ranking ARBH officers, shown on Federal TV for the past month, Halilovic has spoken in detail about his role in the early days of the war, including disagreements with Izetbegovic and people around him. Not surprisingly, he credits the Patriotic League with a key role in "defense from genocidal aggression from Serbia," while accusing Izetbegovic's party cronies of "betraying the Bosniak people." Halilovic's tale, pitting him and a faction of the Bosnian Muslim "patriots" against both the "genocidal Serbian aggressors" and "back-stabbing traitors" in the SDA party, is falling on fertile ground among the Bosnian Muslims. Persistent cronyism, corruption, venality, and incompetence have soured many on the SDA, but Izetbegovic's historical and political framework of the Bosnian conflict – as a war of Serbian aggression and genocide against the peaceful, defenseless Muslims, which the West observed but did not intervene until much too late – remains absolutely dominant among them. As a result, in today's Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslims overwhelmingly believe the Dayton agreement shortchanged them and "rewarded genocide," demanding its revision and establishment of a centralized state in which they would be dominant (on account of their plurality). This idea is as unacceptable to Serbs and Croats today as it was in 1992, and attempts to impose it can only lead to renewed bloodshed. By nurturing the fiction about "back-stabbing and betrayal," Sefer Halilovic is basically laying the groundwork for more young Bosnian Muslims to become "shaheed," as most of the 28,000 soldiers who died in the last war are labeled. Consider just this quote: "There is no Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina today, unfortunately. Bosniaks are in one big Srebrenica … only 25 percent of Bosnian territory. The rest is practically Serbia and Croatia." (from the November 12 show) Givers and Takers Many soldiers that Halilovic and his successors sent in human waves into a hail of shot and shell stayed alive, but at a great cost. Tens of thousands of people in Bosnia today are missing limbs because of shrapnel injuries or land mines. Some of them defy that disability by playing Paralympic sports – such as the men of Spid, a Sarajevo-based sitting volleyball club. The men of Spid have traveled to tournaments in ordinary buses they chartered; because most buses in Bosnia still lack wheelchair-accessible technology, this involves a fair bit of discomfort. Earlier this year, the club received a donation from the EU: two handicap-accessible vans. Unfortunately, Bosnia's legislation demands that they pay the import tariffs and VAT for the donation, for a total cost of some 14,000 Bosnian marks (KM) – almost $10,000. The club does not have that kind of money. The 17 percent VAT established this year, as part of centralization reforms, was supposed to provide funds for social welfare programs. One should ask the men of Spid how that has turned out. Humanity Prevails Mostar, the capital of Herzegovina, got its name from an old Ottoman bridge spanning the churning waters of the river Neretva. During the war, its Serbs were expelled, while Muslims and Croats battled over the city, reducing large portions of it to rubble. The Old Bridge, destroyed by Croat artillery, was restored in 2004. But the city remains divided into Muslim and Croat halves, separated by an invisible wall of hatred. One resident of Mostar, a young man named Sanel Hrnic, was badly injured earlier this year in a car crash. He is no longer comatose but needs therapy soon if he is to regain higher brain functions. His parents can't afford the treatment. Sanel is Muslim. His plight drew the attention of Nada Zovko, who owns a small business. She launched a campaign "Today we work for Sanel": on Nov. 21, every participating business in Mostar would donate one day's worth of proceeds to Sanel's therapy fund. Zovko is a Croat.

http://www.antiwar.com/malic/?articleid=10057

powered by performancing firefox

Go big, go bold, and get it done - Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie

---

Go big, go bold, and get it done - Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie

 

"A few months after the negotiated end to the bombing, my branding as an opponent to NATO's intervention got me invited to a debate in the U.S. with General Wesley Clark, the NATO commander in charge of the campaign, regarding the wisdom of NATO's actions."

 

Go to link to read comments (however, it is still early - you need to check back later)  Stella

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 < http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1743184/posts > 

 

Free Republic Home · Browse · Search

Pings · Mail

News/Activism Topics · Post Article

---

Skip to comments.

Go big, go bold, and get it done
Globe and Mail (Canada) ^ | November 22, 2006 | Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie

Posted on 11/23/2006 2:29:31 PM PST by Doctor13

Tip-toeing won't work. We need another 30,000 NATO troops to protect Afghans while they get their country on its feet.

In 1999, I was an outspoken critic of NATO's ill-conceived bombing campaign against Serbia/Kosovo. For anyone playing close attention to the events leading up to the campaign, it was pretty obvious that the independence- seeking Kosovo Liberation Army - which, according to the CIA, was a terrorist organization - and its retained U.S.-based, public-relations support had played the West like a Stradivarius. This culminated with NATO volunteering to be the KLA's air force.

A few months after the negotiated end to the bombing, my branding as an opponent to NATO's intervention got me invited to a debate in the U.S. with General Wesley Clark, the NATO commander in charge of the campaign, regarding the wisdom of NATO's actions.

Following the debate, Gen. Clark shared a story that still resonates today regarding our mission in Afghanistan. He recalled that mid-way through the bombing campaign, he was exchanging small talk with Greece's ambassador to NATO. Gen. Clark opined to the ambassador, "This must be quite difficult for you, as I understand there is a good deal of controversy in your country regarding our bombing of Serbia." Without hesitation, the ambassador replied, "No, Gen. Clarke, there is no controversy. We are all against the bombing!" He could have gone on to say (unnecessary, considering his audience): "But we are a member of NATO and that means you can rely on us even if we don't agree with the mission."

Fast forward to today and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's first operation involving combat inside or outside of Europe. No one has rewritten Article 5 of NATO's Charter since April 4, 1949. It still reads, in part: "The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force ..."

Article 5 was invoked by NATO's leadership following the attacks of 9/11, and as required by the same article, the decision to use armed force was reported to and endorsed by the United Nation's Security Council. NATO now finds itself fighting a major counterinsurgency campaign in three of the 34 Afghanistan provinces, one of which, Kandahar, is the responsibility of our Canadian battle group. With an area half the size of Nova Scotia, an all-too-modest number of Canadian troops are not just trying to keep the lid on the insurgency, they are trying to defeat it.

To make matters worse, they have a porous border with Pakistan staring them in the face. Replacements for Taliban killed in Afghanistan don't even need to sneak across the border through the mountain passes. They drive across in the backs of trucks with their kit in broad daylight.

General David Richards, commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, expressed his dismay with the resources at his disposal shortly after taking command in August. He quite rightly indicated he had no reserve capacity to exploit or secure successes on the battlefield and requested an additional 2,500 NATO troops be provided at the earliest opportunity.

As someone who has watched each and every UN mission since the end of the Cold War - in Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor etc. - stumble, and in all too many cases, fail due to overly optimistic best-case scenarios and subsequent undermanning and underbudgeting of the UN force, followed by hesitant and inadequate reinforcement as the mission became mired, I am surprised Gen. Richard's request was so modest. Perhaps he hoped that once the reinforcement flow was kick started, it could be increased. Other than Poland, no NATO member raised its hand to help in any significant way. On the contrary, some nations ignored the example mentioned above that was set by Greece and treated the requirements of Article 5 as if they were multiple choice. Select what you feel like, ignore the rest.

"Sure, we will come to Afghanistan but don't ask us to leave our comfortable [and safe] firm base after the sun goes down."

Or, "Sure, our troops will be there shoulder to shoulder with the rest of you, just don't ask us to participate in any combat actions!"

Mind you, at least the countries that insist on the so-called caveats are actually in Afghanistan, which is more than you can say for the NATO leaders with at least three-quarters of a billion troops at their disposal who refuse to respond to the Alliance's pleas for help while troops from across the Atlantic Ocean and English Channel bear the brunt of a fight with inadequate resources.

In my opinion, based on a recent visit to Afghanistan and too many years operating with chronically undermanned UN forces, Gen. Richards does not need 2,500 more soldiers. He needs to double his force with 30,000 more front-line troops. Adequate headquarters are already on the ground to look after a massive infusion of combat power "outside the wire." If we want to protect the local Afghans while they reconstruct their country and create their army and local and national police forces, we can't tip-toe toward a solution.

The time has come to be bold. With NATO's future hanging in the balance, fence-sitting NATO partners have to be convinced, coerced, intimidated to live up to their end of the contract they signed when they joined during more peaceful times. Failure to do so will signal the end of a 57-year-old alliance that failed when faced with its first real test in the field.

Retired major-general Lewis MacKenzie was the first commander of UN peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo.

Letters@globeandmail.com

---

Brought to you by Attensa for Outlook (download it here)

Kosovo is dysfunctional cesspool

Kosovo is dysfunctional cesspool



Kosovo is dysfunctional cesspool


Your Nov. 8 editorial, "Same old Serbia," lacked clarity regarding what's really going on in what used to be Yugoslavia.

Perhaps when discussing Bosnia-Herzegovina, the concern should not be as much about the political divisions there but focus more on the fact that for the past 10 years Bosnia has become fertile territory for global jihadists. One has to look no further than the machinations of the Clinton administration to know how that came to be. This information is readily available on the Internet.

The editorial mentioned that the United Nations "wants to unload Kosovo to the EU." But why does the U.N. want to unload Kosovo? Because anyone who has paid any attention can plainly see that Kosovo post-1999, and the U.S.-led "humanitarian" bombing and takeover, is a dysfunctional cesspool of organized crime, murder, and mayhem, and a fellow with a murky track record is its so-called prime minister.

Since 1999, more than 150 ancient Christian holy places have been desecrated, severely damaged, and, in most cases, completely destroyed by marauding bands of intolerant Albanian Muslims. Simultaneously, hundreds of new mosques are being built, many of them carrying plaques acknowledging funding from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates.

Interestingly, this registers nary a blip on the West's radar screen. Could it be that the U.S. and its UN/NATO allies have made such a mess in Kosovo that the less said in that regard the better? And then they have the audacity to recommend Kosovo's independence.

Your editorial took the easy road by blaming Serbia for the problems in the region. The blame rests closer to home.

LIZ MILANOVICH
Edmonton, Alberta

<http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20061113/OPINION03/61112003>

--------------------------------------------------------------

Article published Wednesday, November 8, 2006

Same old Serbia


RECENT developments in Serbia, the Serbian part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo continue to stand as barriers to Serbia's joining the European Union and reaping for its people the economic benefits of that partnership.

Two votes last month highlighted the problem. The first, general elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina Oct. 1, including the election of the Serb, Muslim, and Croat presidents who together make up the country's presidency, showed continued loyalty on the part of the three groups to nationalist, separatist representatives.

The Serb president, Nebojsa Radmanovic, and his party oppose the abolition of the political divisions incorporated in the 1995 Dayton peace accords that ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is generally considered that the EU would be reluctant to move toward membership for Bosnia-Herzegovina with the current divisions intact.

The second vote was an Oct. 29 referendum on Serbia's new constitution, which includes an assertion that Kosovo is an "integral part of Serbia." The referendum was approved by 96 percent of the voters.

The problem is that the United Nations, which has governed Kosovo since 1999, wants to unload it to the EU by the end of the year. The United States currently has 1,000 troops in Kosovo.

A solution would involve granting Kosovo independence, or some form of self-government, perhaps with continued international oversight. The new arrangement would be dominated by the 90 percent of the people who are Albanian, but the rights of the Serbs, who account for less than 10 percent, will need to be guaranteed.

Serbian resistance to change in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, in addition to its refusal to turn over two prominent former Bosnian Serb leaders to international authorities for trial, continues to be a barrier to Serbia's progress toward adherence to the EU as well.

Serbia can be respected for its independence, but its approach to the problems of the region does not seem to be in its people's best interests.

Kosovo independence would be ‘nightmare’ for Serbia

FT.com / World / Europe - Kosovo independence would be ‘nightmare’ for Serbia

Kosovo independence would be ‘nightmare’ for Serbia





By Tom Burgis in Brussels





Published: November 23 2006 14:06



| Last updated: November 23 2006 14:06





Independence for Kosovo would visit a “nightmare” on Serbia’s government by bolstering supporters of the late dictator Slobadan Milosevic, the country’s foreign minister has warned.

Vuk Draskovic said the centre-right administration could be outflanked by nationalists if the final status of the province is imposed on Belgrade by the international community.

“I am very afraid of the consequences of an imposed solution,” Mr Draskovic told the Financial Times in an interview. “It will strengthen the hands of the [ultra-nationalist] Radicals. This is my nightmare.” There was already pressure to cut ties with any state that recognises an independent Kosovo, he said.

Kosovo has been a ward of the United Nations since Nato troops drove Serb forces from the Albanian-dominated province in 1999. Martti Ahtisaari, the UN’s special envoy to Kosovo, has delayed making his recommendations on the province’s future until early next year after Belgrade called snap elections for January. In October, Serbs voted to adopt a new constitution describing Kosovo as an “intergral part” of the nation.

Mr Draskovic said there remained time to find a compromise solution that would see Kosovo gain full autonomy but remain within Serbian territory without the right to join Nato or the UN.

However, the Contact Group of nations marshalling negotiations has promised a solution “acceptable to the people of Kosovo”. One Western diplomat said that “any Belgrade proposal offering autonomy is unlikely to fulfil that”.

Belgrade argues that allowing the 2m Kosovans - among them 100,000 Serbs - to secede would set a precedent. “An imposed solution will have to respect the right to self-determination of Kosovans,” Mr Draskovic said. “But what happens when the next day the Serbs in Bosnia say: ‘We also want to use that right’?” Separatists in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Taiwan might follow suit, he added.

In a meeting with Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Nato secretary general, in Brussels on Wednesday, Mr Draskovic will demand unconditional Serbian entry to a Partnership for Peace cooperation agreement. A pact with the treaty body could hasten the arrest of former Bosnian Serb army chief Ratko Mladic by demonstrating to his supporters that “they have lost the battle for the future”, Mr Draskovic said. However, Nato has made Serbian compliance with the tribunal a precondition of partnership.

The European Union has frozen talks with Belgrade on an accession agreement, widely seen as a waystation to membership, while Mr Mladic - wanted by the UN’s war crimes tribunal for the 1995 Srebrenica massacre - remains at large.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006

"FT" and "Financial Times" are trademarks of the Financial Times. Privacy policy | Terms
© Copyright The Financial Times Ltd 2006.

powered by performancing firefox

Homo Balkanus

---

Homo Balkanus

Homo Balkanus
Sam Vaknin, Ph.D. - 11/22/2006
Written: August 18, 1999

Could have been written today

How does one respond to a torrent of belligerent correspondence from Balkanians arguing against the belligerence of Balkanians asserted by one in one's articles? Were it not sad, it surely would have been farcical. Only yesterday (August 17th, 1999 - five months after the Kosovo conflict) Macedonian papers argued fiercely, vehemently and threateningly against an apparently innocuous remark by Albania's Prime Minister. He said that all Albanians, wherever they are, should share the same curriculum of studies. A preparatory step on the way to a Greater Albania perhaps? In this region of opaque mirrors and "magla" (fog) it is possible. And what is possible surely IS.

I do not believe in the future of this part of the world only because I know its history too well. every psychologist will tell you that past violent behaviour is the best predictor of future recidivism. Homo Balkanus is lifted straight off the rustling pages of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) IV-TR (2000) - the bible of the psychiatric profession - when it defines the Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

Narcissism is a result of stunted growth and of childhood abuse. It is a reactive pattern, the indelible traces of an effort to survive against all odds, against bestial repression and all-pervasive decay. Brutally suppressed by the Turks for hundreds of years and then by communism in some countries and by cruel, capricious banana republic regimes in others - Homo Balkanus has grown to be a full fledged narcissist.

The nation state structure and ideology enthusiastically adopted by Homo Balkanus in the wake of the collapse of the rotten Ottoman edifice - has proven to be a costly mistake. Tribal village societies are not fit for the consumption of abstract models of political organization. This is as true in Africa as it is in the Balkans. The first allegiance of Homo Balkanus is to his family, his clan, his village. Local patriotism was never really supplanted by patriotism. Homo Balkanus shares an Ottoman unconscious with his co-regionists. The "authorities" were and are always perceived to be a brutal, menacing and unpredictable presence, a natural power, to be resisted by the equal employment of cunning and corruption. Turkish habits die hard. The natives find it difficult not to bribe their way through their own officialdom, to pay taxes, not to litter, to volunteer, in short: to be citizens, rather than occupants or inhabitants. Their passive-aggressive instincts are intact and on auto pilot.

The Balkanian experiment with nation states has visited only misery and carnage upon the heads of its perpetrators. Borders tracked convulsively the movements of half-nomad populations. This instability of boundaries led to ethnic cleansing, to numerous international congresses, to fitful wars. In an effort to justify a distinct existence and identity, thousands of "scholars" embarked on herculean efforts of inventing histories for their newly emergent nations. Inevitably, these histories conflicted and led to yet more bloodshed. A land fertilized by blood produces harvests of bloated corpses.

In the Balkans people fight for their very own identity. They aspire to purity, albeit racial, and to boundaries, albeit of the abstract kind. It is, perhaps, the kernel of this Greek tragedy: that real people are sacrificing real people on the altar of the abstract. It is a battle of tastes, a clash of preferences, an armageddon of opinions, judgements, lessons. Armies are still moved by ancient events, by symbols, by fiery speeches, by abstract, diffuse notions. It is a land devoid of its present, where the past and future reign supreme. No syllogism, no logic, no theory can referee that which cannot be decided but by the compelling thrust of the sword. "We versus They" - they, the aliens. Threatened by the otherness of others, Homo Balkanus succumbs to the protection of the collective. A dual track: an individualist against the authorities - a mindless robot against all others, the foreigners, the strangers, the occupiers. The violent acting out of this schizophrenia is often referred to as "the history of the Balkans".

This spastic nature was further exacerbated by the egregious behaviour of the superpowers. Unfortunately possessed of strategic import, the Balkan was ravaged by geopolitics. Turks and Bulgarians and Hungarians and Austrians and Russians and Britons and Germans and Communists and the warplanes of NATO - the apocalyptic horsemen in the mountains and rivers and valleys and sunsets of this otherworldly, tortured piece of land. Raped by its protectors, impregnated by the demon seeds of global interests and their ruthless pursuit - the Balkan was transformed into a horror chamber of amputated, zombie nations, a veritable hellish scene. Many a Pomeranian grenadier bequeathed their bones to the Balkans but Pomeranian grenadiers came and went while the people of the Balkan languished.

Thus, it was not difficult to foster a "We" against every "They" (or imagined "They"). A crossroads of faultlines, a confluence of tectonic clashes - the Balkan always obliged.

Religion came handy in this trade of hate. Orthodox Serbs fought Muslim Serbs in Bosnia (the latter were forced to convert by the Turks hundreds of years ago). Catholic Croats fought Orthodox Serbs. And Bulgarians (a Turkic tribe) expelled the Turks in 1989, having compelled them to change their Muslim names to Bulgarian sounding ones in 1984.

Race was useful in the agitated effort to prevail. Albanians are of Illyrian origin. The Greeks regard the Macedonians as upstart Slavs. The Bulgarians regard the Macedonians as rebel Bulgarians. The Macedonian regard the Bulgarians as Tartars (that is, Barbarian and Turkish). The Slovenes and the Croats and, yes, the Hungarians claim not to belong in this cauldron of seething, venomous emotions.

And culture was used abundantly in the Balkan conflicts. Where was the Cyrillic alphabet invented (Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria) and by whom (Greeks, Macedonians, Bulgarians). Are some nations mere inventions? (the Bulgarians say this about the Macedonians). Are some languages one and the same? Minorities are either cleansed or denied out of existence. The Greek still claim that there are no minorities in Greece, only Greeks with different religions. The Bulgars in Greece used to be "Bulgarophone Greeks". The Balkan is the eternal hunting grounds of oxymorons, tautologies and logical fallacies.

It is here that intellectuals usually step in (see my article: "The Poets and the Eclipse"). But the Balkan has no intelligentsia in the Russian or even American sense. It has no one to buck the trend, to play the non conforming, to rattle, to provoke, to call upon one's conscience. It does not have this channel to (other) ideas and view called "intellectuals". It is this last point which makes me the most pessimistic. The Balkan is a body without a brain.

http://www.globalpolitician.com/articledes.asp?ID=2320&cid=3&sid=10

 

Sam Vaknin, Ph.D. is the author of Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited and After the Rain - How the West Lost the East. He served as a columnist for Central Europe Review, PopMatters, Bellaonline, and eBookWeb, a United Press International (UPI) Senior Business Correspondent, and the editor of mental health and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory and Suite101.

Until recently, he served as the Economic Advisor to the Government of Macedonia. Sam Vaknin's Web site is at http://samvak.tripod.com

You can download 22 of his free ebooks in our bookstore

---

Brought to you by Attensa for Outlook (download it here)

Kosovo Serbs: Humanitarian catastrophe

 Kosovo Serbs: Humanitarian catastrophe

Kosovo Serbs: Humanitarian catastrophe 19 November 2006 | 10:47 | Source: Beta

 

KOSOVSKA MITROVICA -- Kosovo Serb representatives Marko Jakšić and Milan Ivanović say there is a “humanitarian catastrophe” in Kosovo today.

In a press conference called in reaction to power cuts that lasted for hours and to what he called vandalism toward Telekom’s equipment in Kosovo, Jakšić said that UNMIK chief Joachim Ruecker was acting like “a Kosovo government member, rather than a high UNMIK official”.

“He [Ruecker] is one of those who authored the looting privatization and the economic discrimination against Serbs and Serb-owned companies, and is charged with driving everything that even reminds of Serbs and the Serb state away from Kosovo“, Jakšić said.

In his words, “out of 190 privatized companies in Kosovo not a single one is owned by a Serb, which means that the property belonging to one nation is taken and given to another”.

Jakšić said that beside the physical violence and persecution that the Serbs suffer at the hands of the Albanians, UNMIK is undertaking “torture on the economic level”, and called on Ruecker to “stop jeopardizing Serb interests making the lives of Serbs impossible.”

Serb National Council (SNV) president Milan Ivanović said that the situation in the province has deteriorated and dubbed it a humanitarian catastrophe.

Ivanović said the Montenegrin opposition leaders would be visiting Kosovo on Monday, as well as that he expected them to, after being acquainted with the situation in Kosovo, “support the only just solution, Kosovo’s future as a part of Serbia”.

 

http://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics-article.php?yyyy=2006&mm=11&dd=19&nav_category=93&nav_id=38071

---

Brought to you by Attensa for Outlook (download it here)

Consider Kosovo's History (Ltr in WP by Michael Mennard

Consider Kosovo's History (Ltr in WP by Michael Mennard

 

 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/17/AR2006111701577.html?nav=rss_opinion/columns

Consider Kosovo's History

Saturday, November 18, 2006; Page A19

Regarding the Nov. 10 editorial "Here Comes Kosovo":

Americans don't understand or like history, which most other cultures accept and study as an invaluable source of knowledge and experience. Americans generally look at history as an unnecessary burden that can have only a negative influence on the present.

Your editorial regarding Kosovo, the very cradle of Serbia, showed such ignorance. Nowhere did it note that Kosovo has been part of Serbia since the Serbs moved to it in the sixth century, four centuries before any Albanians were heard of in the Balkans.

Moreover, the editorial said, "By incorporating Kosovo into a new constitution, Serbia's leaders staked out yet another of the reckless nationalist stands that have caused their country so much damage in the past 15 years."

Wrong. It is ignorance of historic facts displayed by The Post and other similarly inspired American publications that has caused so much damage to a small but brave nation and a loyal ally in two world wars. The Serbs do not want what belongs to others, but they will not give away what is rightfully theirs.

The United States and its citizens would react in the same way if someone suddenly decided that Southern California or New Mexico should secede just because Spanish-speaking Mexicans live there.

As for your specter of 2 million Albanians in Kosovo being enraged, they should just go back where they came from -- neighboring Albania. Most Albanians came to Kosovo during World War II or during the rule of Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, which maintained an open border with Albania, its fellow communist neighbor. Since then the incoming Albanians have systematically pushed untold numbers of Kosovo Serbs out of Kosovo.

Your editorial writers should study history to ensure more meaningful and more accurate editorials.

-- Michael Mennard

Potomac Falls

---

Brought to you by Attensa for Outlook (download it here)

INTEVIEW WITH DR. SRDJA TRIFKOVIC

INTEVIEW WITH DR. SRDJA TRIFKOVIC

 

KEY FEATURES OF SERBIA'S NEW CONSTITUTION:

Serbia is a state of Serbs and all citizens

Serbian territorial integrity remains inviolable

 

By Boba Borojevic

 

The adoption of the new constitution of the Republic of Serbia on November 10 was an important moment in that country's modern history. It followed the referendum held on October 27-28, which Serbia's voters supported with a simple majority vote. We asked Srdja Trifkovic to comment the significance of this event.

Dr. Trifkovic is Foreign Affairs Editor of Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture and a leading expert on U.S. foreign policy and Balkan politics . This is an edited transcript of the interview aired on "Monday's Encounter" on CKCU 93.1 FM on November 13. He points out two key elements of Serbia's new constitution, of which the first is that Serbia was defined as the nation state of the Serbian people, as well as the state of all other ethnicities within its boundaries:

 

"In other words Serbia is a country of its citizens but also it is defined as the country of the Serbs. Some people of the supposedly 'pro-Western' liberal persuasion have claimed that this was a retrograde concept, the one that was becoming obsolete in the rest of enlightened of contemporary Europe. This is simply not true, however. If you look at the newcomers to the European Union, notably the former communist countries of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, or Latvia… they all defined themselves as nation-states of those particular ethic groups, as well as countries of all citizens who live within their boundaries. Those who object to the definition of Serbia as the nation state of the Serbian people – in addition to those who inhabit it – are not well informed about the constitutional tradition and the constitutional formulations that are prevalent in today's Europe. The Preamble of the French Constitution starts with "t he French people" – not "the people of France"! Likewise, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 starts with the Spanish Nation. We could go on…  If you were to tell the French and Spaniards, liberal as they are and multicultural as they are, that their countries should be redefined so as to exclude any reference to the French or Spanish nation from Constitution, they would say that you are talking nonsense."

 

Trifkovic points out that the provision of Serbia's new constitution that received most prominence in the Western media is that confirming the inviolability of the country's territory, which explicitly includes the province of Kosovo and Metohija. He insists that there is nothing remarkable about such postulation, because each country's constitution presumes, at least implicitly, the inviolability of its sovereign territory:

 

"This is regarded as 'controversial' only by those who'd like to deny or forget that Kosovo and Metohija has belonged continuously to Serbia since the First Balkan War in 1912. Those who think that there is something contentious about such designation are effectively denying the concept of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the legacy of the international law that goes back at least to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. For the Serbs themselves this is not a contentious issue, not any more than it would be for Canada's constitution to postulate that the province of Ontario is part of Canada. In Kosovo and Metohija's case, no mechanism for separation is constitutionally allowed. What the Constitution allows for are different forms of autonomous mechanisms in line with the latest achievements of other democratic states, whether they be in the European Union or not. If you are to allow in your Constitution the possibility of secession, the possibility of amputation of your sovereign territory, then you would be indeed setting up a precedent that no other country has done anywhere, ever."

 

To claim that this reflects some 'hard-line nationalist' position is plain nonsense, Trifkovic concludes. Nevertheless, we have commentators who claim that what the Serbs say is simply irrelevant; but Trifkovic stresses that the will of the people of Serbia cannot be willfully ignored by "the international community":

 

"It is remarkable that the proponents of an independent 'Kosova' belittle Serbia's constitution and the referendum – yet at the same time they insist that Kosovo's independence has to be based on the will of Albanians living there. So, eight million Serbs can be overruled and ignored, but one and a half or two million Albanians who are supposed to want independence, on the ground of their plurality in their given locality, must be obeyed, and their views are legitimate! It is simply absurd."

There are many foreign NGOs, such as the International Crisis Group (ICG), who are dissatisfied with Serbia's Constitution and claim that the document is too nationalistic and authoritarian, and will therefore bring instability in the Balkans. Trifkvic argues that we should not give any undue weight to whatever the ICG has to say:

 

"It has been and still is primarily an anti-Serb lobby group that favors each and every Muslim cause in the Balkans – and I would include the independence of Montenegro into the list of 'Muslim causes.' The ICG has been advocating Kosovo's independence for over a decade. It was very vocal in their support of the Muslims faction in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is not interested in a peaceful resolution of this or any other dispute, it is not looking for durable and lasting solutions that would guarantee stability in a long-suffering part of Europe. It is interested in pursuing its particular political agenda. That is obvious from the posture of Martti Ahtisaari , who is not only former president of Finland, but also a former and current member of the ICG board of directors."

 

The new Serbian Constitution by itself will not impact the thinking of the great powers one way or the other; it will be the balance of forces in the wider outside world. In this context, Trifkovic thinks that the overall position for the Serbs has improved considerably in the last few months. In his view this was due primarily to the realization by the Russians that, no matter what they do vis-à-vis Kosovo, they are not likely to get the acceptance of the principle of reciprocity:

 

"They will not be allowed to treat pro-Russian enclaves, such as Ossetia, Abkhasia, Transdnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, as de facto independent entities based on Kosovo's precedent. The realization by the Russians that – even if they are cooperative on the issue of Kosovo's independence – they are not going to get anything in return, has been important in directing Moscow to a more principled stand. Another positive development is the realization in China that the model of Kosovo's independence could be used for the independence of Taiwan, or even the demand for Tibet's renewed independence, not to mention the context of the separatist movement among the Turkic-Muslim population of Northwestern China bordering the former Soviet Central Asia, the Xinjiang province."

 

On balance, Trifkovic concludes, the debate on the future of Kosovo will be determined by the balance of forces in the world rather than on the basis of what Serbia does or says, but it nevertheless helps, in symbolic and psychological terms, to have the will of the people expressed so unambiguously as has been done by the Serbs who have supported their country's new constitution.

=======

http://serbianna.com/columns/borojevic/

www.chroniclesmagaz ine.org/cgi- bin/newsviews. cgi
www.trifkovic. mysite.com

Slobodanka Borojevic
E-Mail:  ckcuboba@yahoo.ca  
http://serbianna.com/columns/borojevic/

 

---

Brought to you by Attensa for Outlook (download it here)

Kosovo vs South Ossetia

Kosovo vs South Ossetia

The international community is vague about why Kosovo and South Ossetia cannot be compared, and the answers lie in geopolitics rather than principles of self-determination and international law.

Commentary by Jen Alic for ISN Security Watch (15/11/06)

In Western media offerings on South Ossetia's recent referendum for independence from Georgia there is an unwavering tone that suggests the breakaway republic either does not deserve, or should for unexamined reasons, not be granted , independence.

The opposite is true for Western media reports concerning the status of Serbia's UN-administered province of Kosovo. These reports adopt a tone that cheers for and approves of independence.

The international community has long strived for an independent Kosovo and is set to make a decision on the province's status early next year. That decision is most likely going to be independence, though conditional and gradual. At the same time, the international community opposes independence for South Ossetia, citing the unfairness of the Sunday referendum that did not include ethnic Georgians in the breakaway republic.

It has been impossible to find any arguments as to why South Ossetia should not be allowed to pursue self-determination. When questioned on this, Western officials have generally responded by saying that Kosovo and South Ossetia cannot be compared. End of story, no further explanation needed.

But perhaps they can be compared.

Neither South Ossetia nor Kosovo has ever been an independent nation, as far back in history as is rationally warranted to look. Both have at times enjoyed various levels of autonomy. Both have minorities whose rights may not be ensured and whose safety is anything but guaranteed. South Ossetia is home to 14,000 ethnic Georgians, while Kosovo is home to an estimated 120,000 Serbs, who live in fear in UN-guarded enclaves. There is no indication that either minority will be offered adequate protection or adequate rights. And conflict could result from a decision either way.

On Sunday, some 99 percent of South Ossetian voters backed independence from Georgia. The 14,000 ethnic Georgians living in a handful of villages in the breakaway republic were not allowed to vote, as registration required a Russian passport, which all Ossetians have been granted. This was unfair, as the international community has pointed out, but the ethnic Georgian vote would not have changed the outcome.

Furthering the comparison, neither Kosovo nor South Ossetia are necessarily prepared for independence, though Kosovo can expect help from its kin in neighboring Albania and the international community, while South Ossetia can expect some, though likely limited, aid from neighboring Russia. In economic terms, it is unclear how either could support their populations, however small. Industry is for all intents and purposes absent in both locales, while the majority of income is rumored to be made on the black market, largely through arms and drug smuggling.

What has been lacking throughout is an honest debate on these issues, which can easily be compared, despite vague statements to the contrary.

And the honest debate necessarily involves geopolitics.

South Ossetia is a buffer for Russia against the Western-leaning Georgia, while Georgia is a buffer for the US against Russia.

While Russia has played coy with the South Ossetia issue, refraining from recognizing its last declaration of independence in the 1990s and officially supporting Georgia's territorial integrity, it has clearly supported the separatists there. The US must do more than pay lip service to Georgia's territorial integrity, as the country moves toward NATO membership and continues to build its Western alliances.

And of course, there is energy to consider. The Caspian Basin is a place of intense competition, with the US, Russia and China all vying for a stronger foothold. In July, the US$4 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline was inaugurated. The BTC pumps Caspian Sea oil to the Turkish Mediterranean, bypassing Russia and Iran. It should supply 1 million barrels of oil per day by 2009. It passes through the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, and also runs rather close to South Ossetia.

BP, formerly British Petroleum, has a 30.1 percent stake in the pipeline. The pipeline was commissioned by a BP-led consortium that includes energy companies from the US, Norway, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Japan, France and Italy. The BTC is a key to Western energy security. Upsetting Georgia - a major player in this energy security - by allowing South Ossetia to declare independence and be internationally recognized would be risky.

As far as Kosovo is concerned, granting independence is much easier. Serbia is of no strategic value to the West, and the international community has no bones about playing with fire there, despite some low-level concerns that granting Kosovo independence could be so unpopular in Belgrade that it would see a return to power of radical forces.

Russia, for its part, would be more than happy to see Kosovo granted independence - this, despite its support for its Serb allies and Serbia's territorial integrity - if only because it would set a precedent for similar moves in South Ossetia, Abkhazia (Georgia's other breakaway republic), and Moldova's breakaway republic of Transdneistr.

So, the question here is not really whether Kosovo or South Ossetia has a right to self-determination - which is indeed a romantic notion that is easy to digest in terms of principles - but why there has been a lack of honest debate at an official level.

---

Jen Alic is the editor in chief of ISN Security Watch.

The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only, not the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).

Romancing the Independence
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=16920

---

Brought to you by Attensa for Outlook (download it here)