October 08, 2007

Kosovo: toward the end of the experiment?
















Kosovo: toward the end of the experiment?




Global Research, September 25, 2007




What is going to happen in Kosovo?


The official spokesmen, the experts have been wrong
so many times in the last many months that they have achieved,
paradoxically, a positive result: normal people have lost any remaining
confidence in their credibility.


The once omnipotent Marti Ahtisaari had put his hand
on the fire proclaiming the unstoppable “independence” of the province.
He lost that hand. Washington political and diplomatic leaders from
George Bush on down had spoken in the curt language characteristic of
the “sole superpower” that the Olympus had taken a decision and minor
gods (such as those lingering around the UN Palace) had to accept the
fait accompli or else.


The European gnomes from London to Berlin to Paris,
like the cat in Pinocchio kept repeating the last words of the US fox
explaining to the naïf Balkan natives the unchangeable and
unchallengeable nature of the decision taken by the supreme powers:
“It’s a done deal, see? Nobody can change the decision.”


Instead, it was all but a done deal! Ahtisaari has
been forced to abandon the stage where he tried to play the part of the
hero in an historic drama. On the contrary, rotten eggs, tomatoes, and
cat calls have put an end to a pathetic farce of corruption and shame.


Still, no “done deal”.


It was the moment, then, to deploy the local
messengers of Olympus. The “experts” dutifully obliged writing in
newspapers and enjoying the sound of their voice on TV: there is
nothing anybody can do., Kosovo will be “independent.” Is there the
risk that this will become a precedent that destroys some basic tenets
of international law? So what? The antiquated discussion on what is
right and what is wrong has been abandoned long ago. It is a new world
now. For our own good, the rule now is Might Makes Right.


Still, no “done deal”.


Then the threat arrived: If you people do not accept
what has been decided for you then there will be an explosion of
violence. The UCK – remember the UCK – could reemerge bigger and
bloodier than ever. The Albanians could start mass violence if they do
not get what they want. And you Macedonians, do you remember how things
started in Tanusevci after the Kosovo war of ’99? Things can start
again, and who will defend you then? Better you push for an immediate
and unconditional implementation of the decisions. This threat was
accompanied by the sub-threat of the partition of Macedonia if the
“independence” of Kosovo was not realized according to the decisions.
If, for example, an area of Kosovo was to be administered by the
Serbian population.


And still, no “done deal”.


On the contrary, Serbia, that had been democratized
and westernized, now seems not be even interested in the offer of
membership in NATO and European Union that once were the idols in front
of which all the former so-called eastern European countries would
genuflect and pray. Now, the Serbian leaders are challenging the
decision taken in Washington. They are closing ranks with Russia and
are openly accusing Washington of establishing, not an independent and
democratic regime in Kosovo, but … a NATO puppet state. The revelation
of the secret everybody knew but no official leader dared to say began
with Aleksandar Simic, an adviser to Serbia’s Prime Minister Kostunica:
“it can be concluded that the implementation of Ahtisaari’s plan would
call for Bondsteel to practically be the capital city of an independent
Kosovo.” Of course, Camp Bondsteel, is the enormous US military basis
whose construction started when Kosovo and Serbia were still smoking
from the 1999 bombing (i.e., the blueprint must have been ready before
the Kosovo war).


The Macedonian public knows very well how strategic
is the position of Bondsteel in the context of the transportation
corridors and pipelines running north-south and east-west in the
Balkans. Few can believe that such a gigantic base would be built only
for a temporary operation and then, the sovereignty would be given to
the independent Kosovo government. Before going to Moscow to discuss
the Kosovo issue, the Serbian Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic
urged Washington to give up "the project of creating a satellite, army
barrack, state on foreign territory.” The "creation of the NATO state"
was the real goal of NATO's 1999 air war against Serbia over Kosovo."
And the spokesman of Kostunica, Branislav Ristivojevic insisted in his
nationalist rhetoric: "We won't give up Kosovo, nor one inch of Serbian
territory, for any kind of international integration process, whether
it's NATO, the European Union or anything else… Kosovo's real capital
would be Camp Bondsteel.”


Behind Serbia, the Russia of Vladimir Putin stands
firm with its warning of using its veto power in the UN if the issue of
independence is put to vote. China, one of the five permanent members
of the UN Security Council is reportedly ready to do the same. The US,
that fought its most ferocious war (1861-65) to stop the secession of
the southern states, tried to threaten a unilateral recognition of
Kosovo’s “independence.” It soon had to back down and deny it ever did
so. Meanwhile, Russia is stating every day in more clear terms its
opposition to any unilateral declaration of independence, and the more
the US and the Euro-bureaucrats call for respect of the decision, the
more a subtle but increasing split is becoming visible in Europe.
Officials in several European capitals are expressing their opposition
to the hard line on independence while in publish the dissent is taking
the form of the research of a not-better-defined compromise.


Why is the Sole Superpower not able to impose a
“done deal”? Why does the normalized Serbia talk back to Washington and
say publicly what was supposed to be discussed only in private? And
more in general: how come that until now the Anglo American strategy
ended up winning all the games and now it is shooting more and more
blanks?


End of the Hegemony


The answer to this question is the solution to the
present Kosovo paradox. The Kosovo situation is not the consequence of
local factors, just as it was not local factors that produced the main
wars and strategic cataclysms in the Balkans since before WWI. The main
cause was the clash of several empires fighting for supremacy in that
geo-strategically crucial area, often manipulating local population to
fight each other, and always determined to keep the area divided,
“balkanized”.


After the fall of the end of the Soviet Union, there
was only one cowboy left with a big gun in the global saloon: the
Anglo-American pistolero. No matter how short sighted, wild, and
brainless, the lone gunman started and won all the fights he felt like
provoking. The international institutions set up as compensation
chambers among the international powers (read U.N.) came to resemble
more and more the impotent drunk sheriff of old western movies. The
Anglo-American gunman created new justification for his undisputed
hegemony. A vast and unbridled propaganda machine could transform
overnight an old tool (e.g. Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden) into the
personified evil, perfect to justify a war with any means and no
legalistic restrictions. All the other unarmed cowboys would fall on
each other in the attempt to propitiate the gunman.


All over the globe, and in Europe and in the Balkans
in particular, several semi-demential experiments were set up with the
declared purpose to reshape the map of the world. Countries were to be
dismembered, ethnic and religious groups incited to fight each other,
powerful imperial bases placed as control centers in the most strategic
areas (such as Camp Bondsteel), no obstacle, even a potential one could
have been allowed to survive. Every too strong a country was to be cut
into pieces, defanged and boxed into a “defensive alliance” (NATO)
dominated by Washington and London.


In the crucial area of the Balkans it was not
difficult to find ethnic, religious, cultural differences to be
manipulated. After the first moment of euphoria in which the victorious
US forces brought democracy and freedom to the oppressed people taking
over the historical mission from the impotent Europeans, the “oppressed
peoples” began to realize that they had been given neither freedom, nor
democracy. Rather, they had been boxed in to an unstable situation in
which the future was always more dangerous and scary than the present.


The Kosovo war, for example, was followed by the
surfacing of the UCK Mafioso-terrorist structure that had acted as a
paramilitary force in the army of Wesley Clark and Madeleine Albright.
The post-war became more dangerous that the pre-war. The UCK took over
Kosovo and pushed away any moderate force. At this point Kosovo is a
mixture of military power mostly emanating from Bondsteel and a
mafia-like economy that includes every sort of criminal and illegal
activity one could find in a penal code. As always, a mafia structure
is contagious, the corruptive power of huge sums of money rapidly
accumulated in the hands of the top criminals is infecting broader and
broader areas. The booming opium production in the liberated
Afghanistan is distributed in the form of heroin by the Albania or
Kosovo mafia. Misery, instability, oppression presented as freedom,
pending threats of future violence and wars is the daily reality.


This has been the result of the great experiment
organized by Washington and London. Like in the old horror movies when
the mad scientist conducts his atrocious experiments, Kosovo
“independence” was just a necessary step toward a greater horror.
However, something strange happened. The guinea pigs refused to follow
the script and begin to rebel. No independence. The power of the mad
scientist is called into question. The experiment is stopped.


The Shanghai Cooperation Organization


The reason that the independence scenario has been
blocked for the moment at least, is not due to a moral rebellion -- to
the fact that what has been imposed is repulsive and criminal. The very
large majority in Macedonia and many other countries knew how wrong and
immoral the scenario was. Various unharmed prophets repeated things
that were well known. This, however, did not stop the criminality. What
stopped it was the creation of a counter power, the arrival in the
global saloon of another armed cowboy.


This new counter power, this bizarre Machiavellian
prince, took the form a of an alliance between Russia and China, the
two final victims of the worldwide balkanization plans. China and
Russia started a series of meetings seven years ago creating a
progressively more institutionalized organization that includes also
four other Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. The last meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) took place in the middle of August in Kyrgyz Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
The official observer countries included India, Pakistan, Iran and
Mongolia.


A total of ten presidents of member and candidate
countries were present. Many others sent observers and asked to be
considered for membership. The novelty this year was that the SCO also
became a military alliance -- Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) -- and Vladimir Putin and the Chinese President Hu Jintao
presided over substantial military maneuvers, “Peace Mission 2007,”
with mostly Russian and Chinese troops that intended to demonstrate
that local countries are going to defend and patrol” their strategic
space, without need of US or NATO. Reportedly, the US asked to
participate as observers. But their request was rejected. At the end of
the first ever military maneuver of this kind, Putin announced: “I have
decided that Russia's strategic aviation will resume patrols on a
permanent basis. At midnight today, August 17, 14 strategic missile
carriers, support and refueling aircraft took off from seven air force
bases in different parts of the Russian Federation and began a patrol
involving a total of 20 aircraft. As from today, such patrols will be
carried out on a regular basis. These patrols are strategic in nature."


The US and European media were not able to come out
with a clear line on the Shanghai group. Political and military
spokesmen were at a loss to quantify what had just happened. Someone
called it, the NATO of the East. Others called it a new Warsaw Pact.
But such definitions are, both at the same time limitative, and
overblown. The new alliance is just making the first steps and it is
not comparable to either NATO or the defunct Warsaw Pact. At the same
time, the implication of such an alliance (with many countries formally
allied with the US knocking insistently at the door of the new
organization to be accepted.


First of all, it is remarkable that China and Russia
concluded such a substantial alliance. The traditional mistrust between
the two countries is well known. Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon were
able in the 70’s to play the China Card against the Soviet Union
playing on that mistrust. It was the beginning of the end for the
Soviet empire. Recently an insider observed that the Shanghai Group was
exactly what Kissinger and Nixon did everything to prevent. And yet,
the crazy Anglo-American cow boy succeeded in forcing Moscow and
Beijing to overcome any disagreement and conclude a solid alliance.
More solid than the wild mixture known as NATO.


The new alliance is not an ideological entity. Its
raison d’etre is, first and foremost, the necessity to defend oneself
from the unchained and irrational hubris of the present Anglo-American
elites. The Russian elite indeed tried to become “capitalist.” To
accept privatizations and rock& roll, free market and McDonald’s.
We know how the Yeltsin adventure ended up: a bankrupt country, taken
over by corruption and organized crime and ready, in the opinion of
geopolitico supremo, Zbigniew Brzezinski, to be partitioned into
several chunks and used as a producer of raw materials controlled by
Western companies. China was to end up in the same way. The Russian
elite does not have any doubt, at this point, that the Anglo-American
elite does not hate communism, it hates Russia. A similar way of
thinking dominates in Beijing. This is why no matter which threats will
be unchained against the new alliance, Russia and China will not
surrender. They have already done that and they know that they would be
smashed. No diplomatic magic can change that.


A superficial observer could conclude that the
China-Russia alliance corresponds to a simplistic East versus West
scenario. Accustomed to the reductionist formulas of the dominating
propaganda, a geographic location becomes an ideology and a philosophy.
In fact, there are plenty of leaders, factions, institutions in the
West that are looking with great hope to the new counter-power.
Anything but the destructive irrationality of the crazy cowboy. The
more, for example, Putin confronts his strategic rivals, and the more
the so-called Atlantic solidarity shows cracks and breaks.


The question of Kosovo made the point clear. Just
few weeks ago Europe was aligned and obedient. Now, after Moscow
repeated that unconditional independence is not going to be accepted,
we see different opinions and dissent, both in private and publicly.
What can Washington do? The fait accompli of unilateral recognition? It
would lose even more allies. Military means? A campaign of boycott and
propaganda against Putin the “dictator”? Already tried; and it doesn’t
really work. It doesn’t work because now, contrary to 1999, there is a
real force capable of defending itself on several fronts: diplomatic,
political, propagandistic, and military. This is going to decide what
will happen in Kosovo. Even the option of unchaining violence through
UCK and other mercenary forces is not a totally practicable option.
Special operations such as non-orthodox warfare can only work if there
are none capable or willing to react. by denouncing. When there is an
institutional entity with intelligence and media capabilities, a
special operation could easily become a liability because it can be
publicly revealed and its controllers unmasked. This is the objective
limit in the use of terrorist cut out. It could lead to its controllers.


Even if some form of independence is accorded to
Pristina, it will not be the end of a process; it will be the beginning
of a new confrontation because there is an independent power able and
willing to challenge the fait accompli.


To be noted that the only Asian country totally
aligned with the Anglo-American elites, Japan, has recently dropped its
anti-China line and called publicly through its new Prime Minister for
closer relations with Beijing.


China’s Nuclear Option


Indeed the clash between the former Sole Superpower
and the new emerging Russian-Chinese alliance does not concern only the
political and military aspect. Actually the most important front is the
economic and financial one. The Anglo-American elite took a decision
long ago to de-industrialize their countries, use cheap (or slave)
labor from Third World countries, mostly China, and thus stop paying
normal wages to their countrymen. In the immediate term this meant
gigantic profits. China was producing goods for almost nothing. But in
so doing, the genial economists achieved two things; first, they all
but destroyed their qualified labor, and second, they gave to China the
goose that that lays the golden eggs, i.e. their productive apparatus.


The masochistic geniality of these financial experts
contemplated also the idea of issuing an infinite number of US Treasury
Bonds that could finance an increasing mountain of debts. Who would buy
it? Well, mostly the Chinese. So, in a sort of vicious circle, the
Chinese labor would do most of the work from which US companies would
extract a large profit. The money accumulated by the Chinese would then
go to finance further US debt.


This system, presented here in a simplified form,
could work while the dollar system could impose itself with the
political and military strength controlled by Washington. There is only
one Achilles heel in all of this. If China, or all the other countries
that have huge reserves in US treasury bonds and dollars (Russia, Saudi
Arabia, European Countries, and every rich producer of oil and raw
materials including Venezuela and Iran) decide one day to dump them,
then the whole genial scheme that allowed them to become rich without
working, would collapse.


This, however, was not even considered a
possibility. The military power of the US was without comparison and
anybody who could even remotely challenge it would be smashed. Besides,
there was a grand strategic design that would put the whole world under
their direct control. Once the Soviet Union had been dismantled, it was
time to smash the most populous and doggedly cohesive developing
countries, the Muslim countries. It was called the Clash of
Civilizations. Then, once the last vestige of independence in those
countries was canceled and there was no obstacle to full looting of oil
and other materials, it was the moment to start the long march to take
over Russian and China. The countries would have been partitioned,
balkanized and then used as a reserve of raw material and semi-slave
labor.


The Balkan strategy with the enlargement of NATO was
only part of a new Operation Barbarossa to encircle, isolate and then
take over Russia. No raw materials were to be exported from Russia
independently, without the mediation of an Anglo-American company. This
made Kosovo and Macedonia, -- points of transit for transportation
corridors and pipelines -- crucial locations.


Even if the continental European countries do not
know it or try not to see it, they were the last stage in this deranged
grand design.


All of this depended on the ability to prevent the
establishment of even a limited form of independent power. But the
clumsy strategists relied mostly on computer and formal logic,
forgetting history and culture. In 1999, it was the NATO/US victory in
Kosovo that triggered deep changes inside the Russian leadership that
had concluded that Washington could not be trusted. The result was the
rapid eclipse of Yeltsin and the emerging of the unknown Putin who took
over Russia with the mission of re establishing its independent power
with every means. But already during the last phase of the Kosovo war,
the Russian military had taken over the Pristina airport. Their
determination, even at that low point gave a healthy scare to the
British General Michael Jackson who refused the order given by the
American general in charge, Wesley Clark, to stop the Russians with the
words: "I'm not going to start the third world war for you,"


Eight years later, the danger highlighted by the
British general, is possibly more real than it has even been during the
whole cold war. China and Russia (and possibly silent partners in high
places in Europe and elsewhere) have put together an unrefined but
effective military power and are expanding it as fast as they can. It
is a desperate race in which they think they cannot surrender. The
military dimension, again, is only a part of the game. The financial
side of this war is even more important.


China gave a demonstration of it. After having been
pressured by US to continue its role of playing sewer system for US
debts and after having been asked to sacrifice its economy and risk
financial destabilization by buying the worthless sub-prime mortgage,
the Chinese went for the “nuclear option”. If the US insists in
destabilizing our financial system, the academician He Fang stated,
Beijing “could be forced to sell the dollar... which may lead to a mass
depreciation of the dollar. Another official, Xia Bin, declared that
the huge Chinese reserves in dollars and treasury bonds could be used
as “bargaining chips.”


The pressures on China stopped for a while, while a
campaign on the danger of Chinese produced toys was launched in the US
media. However, in the US stock market the Dow Jones index went down
after the statements. The US monetary authorities were forced to go for
a policy of low interest rates that will provoke a growing inflation.
When the worthless sub prime mortgage collapsed, Beijing announced
proudly that they had disinvested from that sector. The threat this
time had not worked. An immense self created weak flank, the growing
mountain of treasury bonds and dollars that can be dumped at time, has
become a reality of the ongoing war.


Global Research Articles by Umberto Pascali


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October 06, 2007

Kosovo - Tug-of-war over the province endures

Spotlight: Kosovo - Tug-of-war over the province endures

By Neil MacDonald

Published: October 5 2007 18:46 | Last updated: October 5 2007 18:46

Another
round of negotiations is to be held on Sunday on the future status of
Kosovo – the second direct meeting between Serbian and separatist
Kosovar leaders mediated by European Union, US and Russian envoys.

Expectations
appear lower than ever that the two sides can find a compromise over
the mostly ethnic Albanian breakaway province, severed from Serbia
after 78 days of Nato air bombardment in 1999 and governed since then
by a United Nations interim mission.

This
partly vindicates Belgrade’s diplomatic strategy: keep the EU divided
and count on Russia to block any pro-independence resolutions at the
United Nations Security Council.

But it has also left Serbia in
suspended animation, unable to move forward with confidence on measures
to integrate with the EU. Other sticking points include the capture of
fugitive war crimes suspects.

Although EU diplomats have mostly
avoided describing Kosovo’s independence as a trade-off for being
accepted into the bloc, most people in Serbia see it that way.

So
the courting of Russia by Voijislav Kostunica, the nationalist-leaning
prime minister, has raised fears among Serbs about the direction their
country is taking. Most of them see integration with the EU as their
best bet to revive a promising economy that has yet to recover from the
break-up of Yugoslavia and wars of the 1990s.

However,
brinkmanship with Brussels means the risk – however slight – of turning
away from the western world for the long term. Talk of “isolation”
stirs memories of hyperinflation, electricity shortages and
international economic sanctions.

Kosovo was the heartland of the
medieval Serb domain until population shifts left ethnic Albanians with
the upper hand. Would defending it be worth sacrificing EU integration?
Most Serbs say no although their ambivalence is evident, too.

According
to a poll taken early last month by an independent monitoring
organisation, 41 per cent of citizens in Serbia, excluding Kosovo, say
that keeping the province is more important than entering the EU. Yet
this attitude of resistance is down from 47 per cent in June, says the
Belgrade-based Centre for Free Elections and Democracy.

The same polls show a majority – 65 per cent last month – favouring EU membership. Only 26 per cent would join Nato.

Petar
Markovic, a car park attendant in central Belgrade, says Kosovo’s fate
would be “whatever the west decides”. The 1999 aerial assaults were
“unjustified, but Serbia is now weak”, and the loss of 15 per cent of
its territory has to be lived with. “Diplomacy is not working. They
could sit for five years and nothing would change.”

Only a few
citizens – 10 per cent, down from 12 per cent in June – say they would
support “some kind of military action” to thwart unilateral secession
moves, while 22 per cent would be ready for “financial consequences”.

“Serbia
should keep Kosovo whatever the price. It belongs to us and we should
fight for it,” a vendor selling red peppers at the city’s largest
open-air market says – over the objections of his wife. The two say
they came from Leskovac, one of the cities in southern Serbia with
numerous displaced Kosovo Serbs.

Most Belgraders never visited Kosovo, even before the war.

Milorad
Markus, a coin collector perusing the antique stalls, says politicians
were using the lost province to manipulate voters. “For the past 10 or
15 years, politicians have only been buying time in order to stay in
power.”

But for many citizens, choosing between Kosovo and the EU
is painful. “I honestly don’t know,” says Ana Jovanovic, a textile
vendor. “This is our territory, our history, our motherland.”

The
manager of Kosovski Cevap, a Kosovo Serb-owned downtown meat grill, was
more optimistic that the government’s plodding legalistic strategy
could win out in the end.

“Serbia needs to avoid isolation and also keep Kosovo,” Goran Jovanovic says.

“We
should do everything in our power to prevent its being taken away –
though we shouldn’t enter armed conflict. We should use all
opportunities in the UN and existing international law framework.”

Others
would rather be decisive. Petar Lukic, manager of a currency exchange
shop, says of the economically burdensome province: “We shouldn’t keep
it. Ninety per cent ethnic Albanians – that’s too much. As far as I’m
concerned, they can take it tomorrow. I’m for the EU.”

Rajko
Radosavlijevic, a market vendor from the Roma ethnic minority, agrees.
“We’ve solved Kosovo already. Now the EU should send us some money.”



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September 27, 2007

Kosovo's future..The waiting game



Kosovo's future



The waiting
game



Sep 27th 2007

From The Economist print edition



European Union decisions will be
crucial to the future of Kosovo—and Serbia



THIS week Serbs and Kosovo Albanians (Kosovars) are meeting
in New York to discuss the future of Kosovo—or so diplomats would have everyone
believe. In fact, the two sides are simply restating their well-known
positions. The Kosovars want independence; the Serbs say they cannot have it.
Since the parties cannot agree, diplomats on all sides have merely been
pretending that genuine negotiations are taking place.



There is a debate about Kosovo. But it is not between Serbs
and Kosovars, nor even between Russians and Americans. Rather it is within the
European Union. What EU countries decide will matter not just for the 2m
inhabitants of Kosovo, 90% of whom are ethnic Albanians. It will also affect
the credibility of the EU's nascent foreign policy.



On the map, Kosovo is Serbia's southern province. But since
the end of the war in 1999 it has been under United Nations jurisdiction. Serbs
in Kosovo live in heavily protected enclaves or in a compact patch abutting
Serbia proper. The Kosovars have long demanded independence. Serbia has
promised to grant Kosovo almost unlimited autonomy short of independence, but
given its history the Kosovars are not interested.



In March, Martti Ahtisaari, a former Finnish president, gave
the UN a plan for “supervised independence”, after 14 rounds of mostly
fruitless negotiations. But Russia said it would veto a Security Council
resolution backing this. In desperation, fresh talks were initiated. On
December 10th the Russian, American and EU ambassadors overseeing these
fictitious negotiations will report back. Western diplomats (and Kosovars) say
that will be the end of the game; the Russians (and Serbs) say it will not be.





Given the Russian stance, and statements by the Americans
that they will recognise Kosovo if it declares independence after December
10th, neither party has an incentive to take the process seriously. It is what
the Europeans do that matters. America does not want to be the only big power
to recognise an independent Kosovo. Britain and France would like to, and they
do not like what they see as Russian interference in an internal European
matter. But they also want to maintain EU unity.



So the spotlight will shift to Berlin. If Germany recognises
Kosovo's independence, Italy and most (but not all) other EU countries will
probably follow. Serbia would then be at a fork in the road. The prime
minister, Vojislav Kostunica, is mounting shrill attacks on NATO and the West.
Ministers from his party have also been saying that, if European countries
recognise an independent Kosovo, Serbia will no longer seek to join the EU.



If Serbia ends its EU bid, it will head into isolation, and
may drag all of the western Balkans with it. Yet Kosovo will not wait placidly
forever: this week a bomb in Pristina killed two people. Faced with unpalatable
choices, it will be no surprise if the diplomats, or their political masters,
find another reason for delay when December 10th comes



http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9867262





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September 19, 2007

Pride and prejudice as Serbs look to Europe



September 20, 2007



Pride and
prejudice as Serbs look to Europe



Vuk Jeremic, the Foreign Minister of
Serbia, confirms that the status of Kosovo remains the biggest hurdle to EU
entry





Bronwen Maddox



“I personally agree that there is no Plan B,” Vuk Jeremic,
the Serbian Foreign Minister, said. “There is only one bright future for the
Balkans, and that is within Europe.”



But between Serbia and membership of the European Union lies
the hurdle of Kosovo, so far insurmountable, and others in the form of indicted
war criminals sought by The Hague tribunal.



Mr Jeremic told The Times yesterday that Serbia “is
suffering a cooling of public support for the idea of Europe”. He added: “I am
afraid that if things go wrong, if it is not handled well regarding the future
status of Kosovo, then there will be a dominant majority within Serbia that
will say, ‘This is not fair, it is humiliating, they [the EU] don’t want us. To
hell with it’.”



That is his best card. Mr Jeremic, of the Democratic Party,
part of the pro-European coalition that won a parliamentary majority in
January, cautioned that if Serbia is not given more hope by the EU, and an
acceptable deal on Kosovo, then it will turn its back on Europe.



The risk it runs is that other countries will not rate this
threat highly enough to agree to its demands. The least controversial of these
are the requests for signs of encouragement from the EU. In London this week,
Mr Jeremic asked Britain, “as a strong supporter of EU enlargement in the
Balkans”, to loosen visa restrictions, which are lengthy “and at times
humiliating”.



Only a quarter of Serbs who had voted for pro-European
parties had been able to travel to EU countries, he said. Serbia “has a lot of
people with means who would like to travel”, he said. “For a long time, we were
the most advanced, sophisticated”, and Serbs find it humiliating to see “Croats
and Romanians travelling without visas” when they cannot.



Pride and humiliation are words that thread through the
entire discussion; they lie at the heart of Serbia’s position on Kosovo. Mr
Jeremic took part in talks yesterday with the “troika” of the US, the EU and
Russia, before meetings with Kosovo representatives next week in the margins of
the United Nations General Assembly.



Kosovo, which Serbia regards as its province, and to which
it attaches huge historical romance, has been under UN administration since
1999, when Nato drove out Serb forces, accusing them of atrocities against the
ethnic Albanians who make up 90 per cent of the population. Serbia has fiercely
resisted that majority’s calls for independence.



The troika must report to Ban Ki Moon, the UN
Secretary-General, by December 10. If there has been no progress, Mr Ban will
have to decide whether to forge ahead with the plan of Martii Ahtisaari, the UN
envoy, for “supervised independence”, although this might prompt a veto from
Russia, a staunch Serb ally. Serbia has offered to grant autonomy but not
sovereign independence.



Mr Jeremic said that it was unhelpful to speculate how
Serbia might react if Kosovo unilaterally declared independence but dismissed
the suggestion that it might take military action. “We will not use force, we
will not contribute to the instability” of the Balkans, he said. But he added:
“It is only if Belgrade and Pristina agree that we will have peace.”



He argued that Scotland could afford to toy with separation
from the UK and that Belgium could split into two because they were at peace,
but that in the Balkans, “where we are still struggling to stabilise”,
indulging the nationalistic instincts of minorities was too dangerous.



If Serbia were within the EU, he added, then “borders have a
different meaning and can be discussed”, although he refused to clarify what
this might mean for Kosovo. He concluded: “I really hope that early in the next
decade Serbia will be part of the EU.”



But the question is whether Serbs are prepared to sacrifice
a European future to preserve their pride. Mr Jeremic’s warning is that many
would do just that. The EU, and the UN, have to decide how much that would
matter.



http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2489762.ece





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September 18, 2007

Serbia lashes out at NATO



Serbia lashes out at NATO



Serbia veers away from NATO using hard-hitting rhetoric and accusations,
with the prime minister saying the country could not join hands with an
alliance that bombed its territory.



Tuesday, September 18, 2007



By Igor Jovanovic







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Eight years after NATO bombed Serbia in order to halt
clashes between Serbia and ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and force Serbian
security forces out of the province, Serbian nationalists in Belgrade and NATO
are once again at loggerheads.

And as Belgrade slowly moves away from NATO, most analysts here say Serbia
is setting down a dangerous road toward isolation.



Meanwhile, the piercing rhetoric of certain Serbian ministers directed
against NATO threatens to cause serious conflicts within the ruling coalition
in Belgrade.



The exchange of accusations on the Belgrade-NATO front started with a series
of statements by ministers from Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica's
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS). They accused the US and NATO of trying to
create "the first NATO state in the world" on the territory of the
southern Serbian province by advocating independence for Kosovo.



According to the Serbian ministers, the foundations for that state lay in UN
special envoy Martti Ahtisaari's plan, which foresees no civil control over
NATO troops in Kosovo.



In early February, after nearly a year of fruitless negotiations between
Belgrade and Pristina on the status of Kosovo, Ahtisaari unveiled a plan that
envisages internationally supervised independence for Kosovo.



Ahtisaari proposed a phased transition to independence, initially supervised
by an EU bureaucrat and protected by NATO forces, which currently has 17,000
soldiers there.



The plan was backed by the Washington and Pristina and rejected by Belgrade
and Moscow. Because of threats of a Russian veto, it was impossible to pass the
resolution on Kosovo in the UN Security Council, and the negotiations were turned
over to the Contact Group for Kosovo, which appointed three mediators for new
talks between Belgrade and Pristina.



The so-called troika is to submit a report on the new negotiations to the UN
secretary general by 10 December.



Joining the enemy?


Both NATO and the US have brushed off the accusations from Belgrade.



James Appathurai, spokesman for the NATO secretary-general, expressed
"concern and disappointment over certain comments that have been coming
from Serbia lately." Appathurai said that statements about the creation of
a NATO state in Kosovo were "nonsense" and "neither welcome nor
constructive."



Kostunica's party responded by saying it was against Serbia joining NATO.
The party's new program, unveiled in early September, says that Serbia should
become a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace program (PfP), but not of the
alliance itself.



In a recent party briefing, Kostunica said he opposed Serbia's NATO
membership and that the country should stay militarily neutral, stressing that
such a move was in the interest of the state.



"How can Serbia join the military alliance which first bombed us, then,
bypassing the UN Security Council, sent its military forces to Kosovo, and
threatens to recognize Kosovo's unilateral independence?" the prime
minister asked.



The party also proposed to have Serbia's potential membership in any
military alliance checked in a referendum.



Furthermore, Kostunica's party warned of the "danger" of Kosovo
Albanians declaring independence unilaterally after 10 December, and of that
independence being recognized by the US.



As a potential countermeasure, the DSS proposed to its ruling coalition
partners the adopt of a decision in the Serbian Parliament that Serbia could
join NATO.



According to the latest public opinion polls, some 50 percent of citizens
oppose NATO membership, 32 percent support it, while 15 percent have no stance.
At the same time, some 70 percent favor EU membership.



Bad blood


Back in 1999, Serbian authorities, led by Slobodan Milosevic, sued 17 NATO
member countries for the bombing of military and civilian targets in Serbia and
Montenegro. However, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where the suit
was filed in December 2004, dismissed the case arguing that it did not have
jurisdiction over the matter, as Serbia was not a UN member at the time, and
was only recognized one year later.



Belgrade accused NATO member countries of violating Serbian sovereignty and
breaking international obligations since the strikes were not authorized by a
UN Security Council resolution.



Human Rights Watch estimates that between March and June 1999 some 500
civilians were killed as a result of the NATO bombing campaign.



Most Belgrade analysts described the actions by certain Belgrade government
officials as hasty and potentially harmful for Serbia.



Belgrade analyst Zoran Dragisic told ISN Security Watch that such damage was
"suicidal" and "would cost Serbia dearly in all areas."



Military analyst Aleksandar Radic echoed those sentiments. He told ISN
Security Watch that Serbian was wandering along a dangerous divisive path.



"This is a very serious and long-term issue that will reflect on
Serbia's reality in the years when the Kosovo problem is solved," he said.
Radic warned that if Serbia pushed NATO away, given that the alliance offered
guarantees for security in Kosovo, it would not have the moral right to call
for the protection of Kosovo Serbs.



Cozying up to Russia


But plenty of analysts disagree with this assessment.



Analyst Slobodan Antonic, in his column in the Belgrade daily Politika,
said the US and EU were pushing Serbia away, and that certain countries were
trying to strip Serbia of a portion of the territory it considered its cradle
(Kosovo) and expected Belgrade to take it calmly. According to him, this pushes
Serbia toward Russia, but also jeopardizes democracy in the country.



Former US ambassador to Belgrade William Montgomery points out the nature of
the association between Serbia and Russia. In an article written for Belgrade's
B92 website, Montgomery said that the DSS' rhetoric reflected Russian
President Vladimir Putin's vision of the world. Russia, by demonstrating its
strength, aimed to create an alliance of states that had just one thing in
common - disliking the US, he wrote.



But economic interests are also becoming a link between Moscow and Belgrade.
Serbia is facing the privatization of large state-controlled companies, in
which the Russians are very interested. Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska
talked with Kostunica before the calling of the tender for a copper mine in the
Serbian town of Bor, in which Deripaska's company is also taking part.



Russian air carrier Aeroflot representatives visited Kostunica prior to the
beginning of the sale of Serbian air carrier JAT Airways, while Lukoil is
mentioned as one of the potential buyers of the Serbian oil company NIS. But
the Russians have not invested much money in Serbia so far. The leading
investors are precisely members of NATO - Norway and the US.



Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently said that Moscow would not
haggle over the US anti-missile shield in Europe and the status of Kosovo.
Georgian Foreign Minister Gela Bezhuashvili also tackled the possible reasons
for Russia's interest in Kosovo, telling the German media that the recognition
of an independent Kosovo outside of the UN could destabilize the entire
Caucasus.



The Georgian foreign minister said Russia would then "probably
recognize the Georgian province of Abkhazia," which would also be "a
precedent for the separatist groups in the Russian part of northern
Caucasus."



The Russian envoy in the troika for Kosovo, Aleksandr Botsan-Kharchenko,
echoed this sentiment, saying that the Kosovo case could create a dangerous
precedent. "Of course, that precedent can be used in other regions as
well, where there are so-called frozen conflicts," Kharchenko told Russian
news agency Interfax.



Internal rifts


Kostunica's strong policy on NATO has also led to rifts between the Serbian
ruling coalition partners, where nationalist and radicals are against NATO
membership while moderate parties believe that membership is in the state's
interest.



The prime minister's DSS, the opposition Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), formerly led by the late Milosevic, oppose
NATO membership, while the Democratic Party (DS), G17 Plus and Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) support alliance membership.



The strongest member of the coalition, formed in May, Serbian President
Boris Tadic’s Democratic Party, did not miss the opportunity to point out that
its priorities were both EU and Euro-Atlantic integrations.



"[…] Serbia's strategic goal is for its army to be an active
participant in Euro-Atlantic integration and the Partnership for Peace, and to
be honored and respected among its friends and allies," the president said
at an army ceremony in Belgrade on 15 September.



Democratic Party whip Nada Kolundzija said that in resolving the Kosovo
issue Serbia should count on as many countries as possible, not make enemies.
She urged all Serbian parties to refrain from using the problem of Kosovo to
forward their own interests.



Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic, Tadic's close associate, also reacted
by warning the government that the anti-NATO rhetoric coming from certain
members of the DSS had caused concern among Serbia's partners and the EU.



"Even countries with whom Serbia has traditionally had good relations
have indicated concern over Belgrade's new foreign policy course," Jeremic
told B92.



The head of the European Commission's delegation in Belgrade, Josep
Lloveras, warns that the problems in Belgrade-NATO relations could affect
Serbia's European integration, adding that although these processes are
separate, they are nonetheless related.



Referring to Serbia's "anti-NATO rhetoric," Lloveras said in a
statement that "Serbia will decide by herself on her future relations with
NATO. But both processes should be regarded as coherent, or rather,
complementary."



After all that, the DSS proposed the postponement of the presidential and
local elections, which are to be called in 2007, for the period after the
resolution of Kosovo's status. Tadic's Democrats interpreted this as a heavy
blow, because they planned to make Tadic their candidate in the election.



They believe Tadic stands a much greater chance of victory against the SRS
candidate before the end of the year and the resolving of the Kosovo issue. The
entire matter brings the most benefit to the ultranationalist radicals, the
single strongest party in Serbia.



With bickering within the ruling bloc and the resolving of Kosovo's status,
time in Serbia is on the radicals' side.





Igor Jovanovic is a Belgrade-based correspondent for ISN Security Watch,
where this article was published.



http://www.speroforum.com/site/article.asp?idarticle=11060





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September 16, 2007

Kosovo: “Thinking Outside Of The Box”



Kosovo: “Thinking Outside
Of The Box”
Author: Wes Johnson, author of Balkan Inferno: Betrayal, War 15 September 2007 - Issue : 747



A front page photo in the
International Herald Tribune a few weeks ago of the blackened and twisted
remains of an automobile blown up by the Basque terrorist ETA outside a police
barracks in Spain was yet another reminder of the danger to peace and stability
posed by various liberation movements that use violence to advance their cause.



By Wes Johnson



Only a few years ago both the Irish
IRA and the French Corsicans were making their demands at the point of a gun –
and sticks of dynamite. Today, we can add the Chechens; Turkish Kurds;
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabagh; Abkhazians and Ossetians in Georgia and the
Turks of northern Cyprus to the clamor for separatism and independence. And
that is only in Europe. Consider Africa from the Western Sahara over to the
Horn. In the Middle East, we have Palestinians divided amongst them-selves and
an Iraq that may split up. In Asia, Tamils in Sri Lanka; Tibetans; and Kashmiri
and Philippine Moslems. There are dozens of such movements and organisations
around the world – some with legitimate grievances, some not. Why then is
independence for Kosovo considered to be so very urgent – mainly by the
Albanians themselves in this tiny impoverished Balkan back- water and their
powerful US supporters in Washington?



The International Crisis Group (ICG)
has issued yet another report urging independence – even without the
agreement of the UN Security Council. It calls Kosovo “a ticking time bomb in
the EU’s backyard.” This so-called independent think-tank has pushed this issue
for years, always issuing dire warnings should the Albanians not get their way.
Former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the architect of NATO’s 1999
bombing campaign, has often led the pack backed by Rand Corporation Director
James Dobbins. It is striking how former senior US officials dominate the ICG:
Thomas Pickering, Morton Abramowitz, Kenneth Adelman, Steven Solarz, Wesley
Clark, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carla Hills, and Swanee Hunt. Leslie Gelb of the
Council on Foreign Relations is there as well – and others. Former ICG country
director Edward Joseph has called for US “brinkmanship” over Kosovo in order to
block Russian influence. It was an unwelcome return to Cold War rhetoric, a
blind unwillingness to accept the fact that others may see Kosovo differently
from Washington.



Given ICG efforts to undermine and
prejudge the outcome of the ongoing round of talks between the Kosovo Albanians
and Belgrade in advance, the EU’s representative to the Contact Group, Wolfgang
Ischinger, has urged both sides to “think outside of the box” – to even
consider partition if both sides want it. Previously the Contact Group had
considered such talk taboo. However, if one is to really “think outside of the
box”, then one might well imagine that Belgrade may want to table other issues
– which might promote flexibility and encourage them to consider trade-offs.
Among these might be a “green light” for the Srpska Republic to leave an
obviously dysfunctional Bosnia-Herzegovina to join their brethren across the
Drina River in Serbia; an agreed autonomy for the Krajina Serbs of Croatia, as
set out in previous UN-brokered negotiations; and finally a “dual autonomy” for
Kosovo that would give the Serbs and Albanians their own symbols, schools,
religious institutions, police, and local governing bodies. Each community
could have its own banks; and both could have tariff-free trade and other
services with Serbia and Albania respectively. Kosovo could enjoy
representation in inter-national organisations, as others do, but not full
sovereignty. As with being pregnant, there is no half way house to
“independence”. A second Albanian state in the Balkans is not needed – nor is
it desirable, as it would set a very unfortunate precedent internationally.

____________



Wes Johnson is the author of Balkan
Inferno: Betrayal, War, and Intervention 1990-2005, Enigma Books, New York, NY,
2007.



http://www.neurope.eu/articles/77689.php





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September 15, 2007

Give up Kosovo to join EU: Not as enticing to Serbia as West thinks



Give up Kosovo to join EU: Not as
enticing to Serbia as West thinks





Friday, September 14, 2007





BELGRADE: Eight years after it was hit by NATO airstrikes,
the former Yugoslav Defense Ministry still lies in ruins, a reminder of what
the Serbs consider unwarranted aggression by the West in the war over the
Serbian province of Kosovo.



Their anger is flaring up again as Western governments, particularly the
United States, speak of recognizing Kosovo this year as an independent state.
The West says that in the absence of reconciliation, doing so would help
stabilize the region by officially separating the Serbs from the ethnic
Albanians who are the majority population of Kosovo.



Serbian politicians, even pro-Western ones, say that they worry that a
recognition of Kosovo would introduce a new era of Serbian isolation and
hostility toward the West - leaving Europe with little sway here.



Since the war ended in 1999, Europe has tried to integrate Serbia into NATO
and the European Union. And as a regional power, Serbia expected an easy
pathway into Europe, especially since many of its neighbors have joined the
union.



But Europe has also demanded that Serbs make a fresh start by chasing down
important war crimes suspects wanted at the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
in The Hague. Serbia has complied only fitfully.



If Western countries do recognize Kosovo, then "we do not need the
European Union," Velimir Ilic, Serbia's minister for infrastructure and a
key political ally of the Serbian prime minister, said in an interview.
"It means they are not our friends."



He added: "It is a tough choice, but Serbia has its pride and its
integrity."



Ilic, who has a reputation as a populist politician, is the only senior
government politician to issue such a statement. But others agree that a
nationalist backlash would chill relations with the West.



A widespread recognition of Kosovo "could lead to a chain of events
with unforeseen consequences, including the loss of Serbia's European
perspective," Leon Koen, the former head of Serbia's negotiating team on
the province, wrote in the newspaper Dnevnik.



And Serbia's senior diplomat for European integration predicted that
whatever support there is among Serbs for arresting war crimes suspects and
sending them to The Hague would vanish if Kosovo was recognized.



"I can't see how anybody would be ready to support cooperation"
with the tribunal, said Milica Delevic, a reformist who is Serbia's assistant
foreign minister responsible for relations with the EU. "We will be in
trouble."



Western governments are determined to resolve Kosovo's future to stabilize
the province and calm the ethnic Albanians who make up more than 90 percent of the
population and who largely clamor for independence. The United States has
spoken openly of recognizing Kosovo and is pushing the Europeans to settle on a
policy.



But the Europeans have painted themselves into a corner, having pushed for a
deal at the United Nations Security Council that Russia has blocked.



That leaves Europe divided just as it is trying to display a strong foreign
policy.



Kosovo has been administered by the United Nations since 1999, after a NATO
bombing campaign to oust Serbian forces who had committed widespread atrocities
against ethnic Albanians.



The wartime Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, was defeated in
elections in 2000 and turned over to the war crimes tribunal in The Hague,
where he died while his trial was under way. Yugoslavia continued its
devolution, with Montenegro finally claiming independence from Serbia in May of
2006.



Meanwhile, Serbia has made faltering progress toward membership of both the
EU and NATO. It hopes to complete formal agreements on closer ties with the EU
this year.



Last year, Serbia became a member of the NATO partnership for peace program,
one step short of full membership in the alliance.



Senior members of Serbia's pro-Western Democratic Party - including
President Boris Tadic and Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic - have reassured Western
allies that Belgrade remains committed to membership in Euro-Atlantic
institutions regardless of what happens in Kosovo.



But signs of a break with the West are emerging, and officials close to
Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica are advocating a closer relationship with
Russia, the ally that so far has forestalled attempts in the Security Council
to grant Kosovo independence.



Political analysts said that conservative newspapers and state-owned media
have promoted more-favorable views of Russia and of President Vladimir Putin in
particular.



At the same time, conservatives within Kostunica's circle are questioning
the value of ties with NATO.



"We want cooperation but not full membership," said Dusan
Prorokovic, Serbia's state secretary for Kosovo and a senior member of
Kostunica's Serbian Democratic party, adding that most Serbs have never
forgiven the alliance for its entry into the war and 78-day bombing campaign.
"Personally, I cannot forget that."



Two senior government ministers have accused NATO of trying to make Kosovo a
state for its own purposes.



In fact, public support for NATO has never been high, and skepticism of the
European Union has increased as negotiations drag on, according to opinion poll
professionals.



Support for EU membership fell to 53 percent in August, according to the
Strategic Marketing agency.



"The debate is being steered in a direction that makes strategy toward
NATO membership and the European Union very difficult," said Delevic, the
assistant foreign minister responsible for relations with the EU.



European Union officials, meanwhile, insist that a compromise between ethnic
Albanians and Serbs is possible.



Whatever the outcome, officials in Brussels argue that Serbia's long-term
interests lie with the West.



"I don't think Serbs want to be part of the Russian Federation. They
see their future in the European Union," Cristina Gallach, a spokeswoman
for Javier Solana, the EU chief foreign policy representative, said in a
telephone interview.



But as the decision time for Kosovo looms, regional analysts said that the
nationalists who dominate Serbia's Parliament control events in the country.



"People in Brussels presume that every country in Europe is dying to
get into the European Union," said James Lyon, Belgrade director of the
International Crisis Group, a policy research group with offices throughout the
Balkans.



But if Kosovo splits off, Lyon said in a telephone interview, Europe's
leverage over Serbia will evaporate, along with its ability to promote reform.



"What do you do with a country that doesn't want EU membership?"
he asked.










Notes:



http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/09/14/europe/serbia.php





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September 14, 2007

Serbs oppose recognition of Kosovo independence



Serbs oppose
recognition of Kosovo independence



Relationship with Europe colored by
war over province



By Nicholas Wood, New York Times News Service | September
14, 2007



BELGRADE, Serbia - Eight years after it was hit by NATO
airstrikes, the former Yugoslav Defense Ministry still lies in ruins on
Boulevard Knez Milosa, a reminder of what the Serbs consider unwarranted
aggression by the West in the war over the Serb province of Kosovo.



Their anger is flaring up again as Western governments,
particularly the United States, speak of recognizing Kosovo this year as an
independent state. The governments say that in the absence of reconciliation,
doing so would help stabilize the region by officially separating the Serbs
from the Albanians who are the majority population of Kosovo.



Serbian politicians, even pro-Western ones, said they worry
that a recognition of Kosovo would introduce a new era of Serbian isolation and
hostility toward the West - leaving Europe with little sway here.



Since the war ended, in 1999, Europe has tried to integrate
Serbia into NATO and the European Union. And as a regional power, Serbia
expected an easy pathway into Europe, especially since many of its neighbors
have joined the union.



But Europe has also demanded that Serbs make a fresh start
by chasing down important war crimes suspects wanted at the tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia in the Hague. Serbia has complied only fitfully.



If Western countries do recognize Kosovo, then "we do
not need the European Union," Velimir Ilic, Serbia's minister for
infrastructure and a key political ally of the Serbian prime minister, said in
an interview. "It means they are not our friends."



He added: "It is a tough choice, but Serbia has its
pride and its integrity."



Ilic, who has a reputation as populist politician, is the
only senior government politician to issue such a statement. But others agree
that a nationalist backlash would chill relations with the West.



A widespread recognition of Kosovo "could lead to a
chain of events with unforeseen consequences, including the loss of Serbia's
European perspective," Leon Koen, the former head of Serbia's negotiating
team on Kosovo, wrote in the daily Dnevnik.



And Serbia's senior diplomat for European integration
predicted that whatever support there is among Serbs for arresting war crimes
suspects and sending them to the Hague would vanish if Kosovo were recognized.



"I can't see how anybody would be ready to support
cooperation" with the tribunal, said Milica Delevic, a reformist who is
Serbia's assistant foreign minister responsible for relations with the European
Union. "We will be in trouble."



Western governments are determined to resolve Kosovo's
future to stabilize the province and calm the ethnic Albanians who make up more
than 90 percent of the population and who largely clamor for independence. The
United States has spoken openly of recognizing Kosovo and is pushing the
Europeans to settle on a policy.



But the Europeans have painted themselves in a corner,
having pushed for a deal at the Security Council that Russia has blocked. That
leaves Europe divided just as it is trying to display a strong foreign policy.



Kosovo has been administered by the United Nations since
1999, after a NATO bombing campaign there to oust Serbia forces who had
committed widespread atrocities against ethnic Albanians.



The wartime Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic, was
defeated in elections in 2000 and turned over to the war crimes tribunal in the
Hague, where he died while his trial was under way. Yugoslavia continued its
devolution, with Montenegro finally claiming independence from Serbia in May of
last year.



Meanwhile, Serbia has made faltering progress toward
membership of both the European Union and NATO.http://cache.boston.com/bonzai-fba/File-Based_Image_Resource/dingbat_story_end_icon.gif



© Copyright 2007 Globe Newspaper
Company.





http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2007/09/14/serbs_oppose_recognition_of_kosovo_independence/





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The Kosovo error

The Kosovo error




For wrong
reasons, Russia has imposed its will in the Security Council and has
been granted a deferment in the decision of the United Nations. The
advantage of the gained time would be essential to reframe the question
of Kosovo in accordance with the necessities and sensitivities of the
present time. Ahtisaari is not the solution.




(Javier Ruperez, Ambassador of Spain to the UN, ABC)

Friday, September 14, 2007



NATO
took military action in Kosovo from March 23 to June 10, 1999, during
78 days that seemed interminable. It was the first time in its history
the Alliance triggered a military action. It was also the first time
that it did so in a geographic space other than the one originally
described in the Treaty of Washington, which was limited to the
territory of its member states. The undertaken combat operation was not
strictly a defensive action, but it was directed against a sovereign
state, member of the United Nations, and it was conducted without
authorization from the Security Council.

The military action was
basically airborne, registering a total of 38,000 flights, of which
10,484 were bombing raids. The targets were at first of military order
and concentrated against the Yugoslav armed forces, but as the
resistance grew stronger than expected, the bombings started to target
civilian infrastructures, that were damaged seriously, and civil
victims were euphemistically described as "collateral damages". Among
them, one can remember the bombing of the seat of the Chinese Embassy
in Belgrade, which originated a bitter diplomatic conflict.

The
conduct of the conflict was not devoid of tensions within the Alliance,
but a part of the Alliance decided to go through and act within
difficult conditions and in spite of them, with the conviction that the
actions of Slobodan Milosevic, practicing a brutal policy of ethnic
cleaning against the majority population of Albanian origin, led to a
human catastrophe that was necessary to avoid whatever the cost.

The
operation was settled with a clear military and political success for
NATO. The allied Governments knew to maintain the cohesion until the
end of the process and the existing dissidences in the respective
public opinion or the opposition from Russia to the intervention never
reached significant level. NATO knew to wage the war and knew to do it
well.

Before, during and after the conflict the spokesmen of the
Alliance and of its members made an effort in stressing that the goal
of the combat operations was to prevent the annihilation of a human
group, support the return to the stability in the Balkans, but never to
favor the independence of Kosovo.

In fact the guarantee of the
territorial integrity of Yugoslavia constituted the best, in fact the
only argument that the allies had in front in Belgrade: the war was not
made to alter its borders.

The very day NATO ended its combat
operations, on June 11, 1999, the Security Council in its Resolution
1244 stated that the political solution to the crisis of Kosovo must
consider, among other ends, the respect "to the sovereignty principles
and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia".

The
same Resolution had reaffirmed the respect of "all the States members
to the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia... in the terms of the Final Act of Helsinki".
In that sense the Council echoed the declaration on Kosovo a few weeks
earlier, on May 6, which had been signed by the ministers of Foreign
Affairs of the countries members of the G-8 (the United States, Canada,
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan). According to these
documents, the future of Kosovo had to be found within the framework of
a "substantial autonomy" of the Yugoslav Federation - which is today,
after the independence of Montenegro -- reduced to Serbia.

What
the UN is proposing right now, based on the proposal by former Finnish
president Martti Ahtisaari, is purely and simply the independence of
Kosovo. Unless there is vigorous reaction of the international
community, Kosovo will indeed become independent in a not-so-distant
future. This is not what the NATO airplanes fought for. This was not
the aim which the Security Council set up after the "humanitarian
intervention".

In fact, the Ahtisaari report, surely without
premeditation, endorses the policy against which the allied military
action took place in the first place, but this time with the changing
elements of the equation: before, it was a fight to save Albanians from
Serbs, and today the priority is given to Albanians, even at the cost
of vanishing of the few Serbs who still populate the territory. And the
offered reason is none other than the establishment of a failure: it is
difficult to imagine the coexistence between Serbs and Albanians. That
was already known before the beginning of the war.

The fact
that eight years of intensive international presence (UN, NATO, EU) in
the territory have passed since only to conclude that the only solution
consists of violating some of the most elementary principles of
international law, enshrined in the UN Charter, is certainly
discouraging.

In the history of Kosovo, no one was completely
innocent. The nationalistic fervor which the Serbs felt towards the old
lost battlefield was always absurd and potentially bloody, the
treatment towards the Albanian population was criminal, and the
attempts of the post-Milosevic Serbia were not enough to face the
gravity of the problem.

The Albanians take a large part of the
blame because they used their numerical advantage to lead the same
policy as the Serbs - they form armed terrorist groups, they absolutely
exclude all those who are different, they satanize the adversary.

The
reasons why Russia - the only permanent member of the Security Council
which opposed the Ahtisaari plan - took the Serbian side are also
wrong: this is not about a parochial national-cultural-religious
solidarity, but about the opportunity to create in the post-Yugoslav
Balkans a democratic coexistence and respect for racial, religious and
cultural differences. Western countries have themselves been stuck in
the policy aimed at punishing the Serbs.

But an independent
Kosovo not only harms the principle of international law that demands
respect to the territorial integrity of the States. It grants wings,
from the peak of the international community, to all the separatist
irredentisms. It means the creation of a society without shades,
composed exclusively of those of the same color, same language, same
race or same religion. It creates inevitably a new regional
instability, that will finish affecting in a serious way all the
neighbors. And it constitutes clearly a gigantic one step back in all
the efforts of the humanity to construct communities of citizens
different and free, able to coexist pacifically in spite of their
differences.

For wrong reasons, Russia has imposed its will in
the Security Council and has been granted a deferment in the decision
of the United Nations. The advantage of the gained time would be
essential to reframe the question of Kosovo in accordance with the
necessities and sensitivities of the present time. Ahtisaari is not the
solution.

(translation from Spanish by the KosovoCompromise Staff)

http://www.abc.es/20070913/opinion-la-tercera/error-kosovo_200709130258.html



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September 08, 2007

Inside Track: Kosovo at the Crossroads



Inside Track: Kosovo at the Crossroads



by Steven E. Meyer



09.05.2007



Arguably, the future of Kosovo is now at its most important juncture since
the crisis in 1999. For the past eight years almost nothing has been
accomplished to resolve the Kosovo issue. By and large, the fault for this can
be laid at the doors of the major Western powers. Their lack of imagination,
innovation and creativity in attempting to resolve the problem has been the
major impediment. Western efforts have been arbitrary and capricious, blind to
the realities on the ground and offering solutions that serve their own interests
rather than those of the people in Serbia and Kosovo.



At the same time, Belgrade and Pristina have mostly talked past each other
in anger, when they talked at all. But, for the most part they waited for the
major powers to provide answers and assumed no concrete, meaningful initiative
of their own. As a result, Kosovo has joined the long list of dangerous “frozen
conflicts” and if positive action—action that can be “owned” by Belgrade and
Pristina—is not taken soon the Kosovo issue will become “unfrozen” through
violence.



But, all of that is about to change. Since the Kosovo issue has been moved
out of the United Nations and to the Contact Group, there is a genuine
opportunity for Belgrade and Pristina to agree on a compromise settlement. But
the window of opportunity will not be open long before violence flares again
and the conflict “re-freezes”—as it certainly will if Pristina declares
independence unilaterally. To take advantage of the opportunity, however, it is
necessary for both Belgrade and Pristina to recognize six hard realities—some
of which are unpalatable to one side or the other.



Six Realities



First, the Ahtisaari Plan is dead and, despite calls by some UN members and
political commentators to resurrect parts of it, this is very unlikely to
happen. Events have moved well beyond Ahtisaari’s proposal to create a series
of ethnically stove-piped communities in Kosovo. At its heart, the Ahtissari
plan was an attempt primarily by the United States, the UK, France and Germany
to force a settlement on both Serbs and Albanians that avoided ground reality
and served the interests of those countries much more than the interests of
those who live in the region. The collapse of the Ahtisaari Plan means that, if
there is to be any hope of a permanent settlement, the United States and its
West European allies will have to include the Serbs and Albanians as true
partners in meaningful negotiations.



Second, U.S. influence has diminished. Although Washington may try to
restore some of its clout in the full Contact Group, the comments of the EU and
Russian representatives on the troika that visited Kosovo recently have
effectively undercut the American position. Several times during the Troika’s
“fact finding trip”, EU representative Ischinger and Russian representative
Botsan-Kharchenko said that “nothing is impossible” and that everything is “on
the table.” This is a positive development. The evolving position of the EU and
Russia easily could lead to a “negotiating period” longer than the additional
120 days allotted by the UN Security Council. If so, Washington might be
tempted to unilaterally “recognize” an independent Kosovo. But, this would be a
very risky move because it could cause serious strains with European “allies”
and put the United States at odds with the widely accepted view (especially in
the EU) that the construction and recognition of new states requires the
approval of the United Nations. In the wake of the debacle in Iraq, Washington
cannot be seen to be so dismissive of international law and procedures.



Third, officially Belgrade and Pristina remained locked in a nasty,
dangerous zero-sum game that, if it is not broken, almost certainly will hasten
violence. All levels of power in the Albanian community insist that independence
of Kosovo—within its current boundaries—is the only course acceptable and that
Pristina will not back away from this position. By the same token, Belgrade
says that the only acceptable solution is for Kosovo to remain within Serbia,
albeit with considerable autonomy. Indeed, the new Serbian Constitution
stipulates that Kosovo is a Serbian province. At the same time, there is a
glimmer of hope in Belgrade because some officials have begun to suggest that
perhaps they might be willing to back away from this hard line.



Fourth, multi-ethnicity is dead in Kosovo. By and large, survey research as
well as anecdotal information indicates that most Serbs and Albanians do not
want to live together in the same society or to be governed by a government
controlled by the other ethnic group. At times multi-ethnic states have
“worked” in Europe and at times they have not. But the general trend—despite
some notable exceptions—over the past century has been for states in Europe to
be controlled by a single ethnic or cultural group. The point was well
demonstrated after World War I with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian,
German and Ottoman Empires, and since the end of the Cold War by the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. It would be
ideal perhaps if ethnicity were not a determining factor in the construction of
political communities in the Balkans today. But, it is a reality despite the
wishful thinking of well-meaning but naive Western policy makers.



Fifth, a surge of new violence in and around Kosovo likely will lead to
renewed outside military intervention. The major powers of Western Europe and
the U.S. almost certainly will not allow the Western Balkans to spin out of
control again. Although this will not lead to a “permanent NATO” base in Kosovo
as some in Serbia have argued, it almost certainly will lead to a stronger
Western military presence in the province that could last for several years.
Although the Europeans likely would shoulder the bulk of any new military
undertaking, it is also possible that there would be some limited number of
additional U.S. forces deployed to Camp Bondsteel. The introduction of more
troops to Kosovo would be designed primarily to separate warring Serbs and
Albanians, but it also likely would set back efforts to find a permanent
political and security solution.



Sixth, in the final analysis, the Kosovo issue is primarily about ethnic,
territorial sovereignty. It has been erroneously argued—mostly by officials and
scholars from outside the region—that territorial sovereignty is passé. As
their argument goes: The entire region someday will (hopefully) be part of the
European Union and, when it is, traditional state or territorial sovereignty
will be far less important. Moreover, they argue, focusing on such a
traditional conception of sovereignty will only delay the accession of the
countries in the Western Balkans to the EU. Sadly, this reasoning misses the
fundamental point. With the establishment of the EU and the end of a thousand
years of violent nationalism based on state sovereignty, traditional state
sovereignty has become much less of an issue in Northern and Western Europe.
But the Western Balkans is in a different place. There, issues of state
sovereignty have not been worked out and they need to be resolved before the
countries of that area can hope to move to a different understanding of
sovereignty. Moreover, most people in the Western Balkans understand that EU
membership and, especially, the full benefits of that membership still are a long
way off—if it happens at all—and they are going to have to rely on national
prerogatives and regional associations for many years to come.



A Way Forward



If these six realities are deemed accurate and accepted by the political
leadership in Serbia and Kosovo, and it is possible for them to bargain in good
faith and come to agreement on four basic points they could—in time—construct a
permanent settlement on the future of Kosovo.



First, both sides need to accept the fact that a negotiated partition, with
attendant border adjustments, can provide the basis for an equitable—not
perfect—division of territory. Although partition has been discussed throughout
Serbia by officials and scholars, it has not been sanctioned officially in
Belgrade. The Albanian side adamantly has rejected any consideration of
partition, but Pristina needs to reconsider this position or risk violence and
the unilateral declaration of independence by Serbs north of the Ibar River.



Logically, partition—and a new border—would be established along the Ibar
River, with the northern part remaining with Serbia and the southern part
becoming an independent Albanian state. This is no one’s first choice, but it
can work if Belgrade and Pristina accept the rationale of ethnic territoriality
and the right of the other side to territorial sovereignty. There is not now
and there never has been anything sacred about borders—especially in Europe (as
well as the United States). Borders have changed in Europe for 2000 years for a
variety of reasons and the spate of border changes throughout Central Europe
and the former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War demonstrates that the
configuration of states can change peacefully—if there is the political will to
do so.



Second, partition and border changes alone will not be enough. Certainly, it
will be necessary to get past a period of painful adjustment, including some
violence by “rejectionists” on both sides. Moreover, there are many Serb holy
and historic sites and Serbs south of the Ibar and some Albanians north of the
river. As part of any negotiated settlement that accepts partition, the United
States, Russia and the EU, perhaps through the UN, need to guarantee the safety
of the sites, Serb access to them and the minority populations in both ethnic communities
that chose to remain on the “wrong side” of the border—to include sanctions
against the governments that do not protect their minorities from harm or
discrimination. For those Serbs and Albanians who cannot remain where they are
now and chose to leave, the UN needs to establish a substantial fund to
relocate them to other political communities.



Third, an innovative settlement needs to go even further to consider a
broader realignment in the Western Balkans. Specifically, the most likely
candidate is the Republika Srpska. There is little doubt that most the leaders
and citizens of the RS do not want to be part of Bosnia and, if they had their
way, they would have left Bosnia many years ago, either to become independent
or part of Serbia. There also is little doubt that Bosnia is a “forced”
state—one that was arbitrarily willed into existence by the United States and
the major powers of Western Europe and has “failed” to live up to its patrons’
hopes and expectations.



Consequently, Banja Luka and Belgrade should have the right to discuss
whether the RS and Serbia should be linked and under what circumstances, so
long as those circumstances are validated in a democratic vote by the people of
the RS. Although this same logic could be applied to the relationship of the
Presevo Valley with an independent Kosovo, it cannot be stretched to apply to
western Macedonia, where the Ohrid Agreement, has—at least for now—“settled”
the ethnic issue, or to Sandjak or Vojvodina, where there is no major
agitation for independence from Serbia.



Finally, once the political and security underpinnings of an agreement have
been reached, negotiations should begin immediately between Belgrade and
Pristina on economic cooperation. Despite some encouraging economic news in
Serbia, most important indicators in Kosovo and Serbia proper are not good,
especially with respect to unemployment, per capita income, foreign debt and
trade. Consequently, irrespective of whether a political and security
settlement can be reached, a poor regional economy almost certainly would sow
the seeds of new instability in Kosovo, Serbia and beyond.



The key to economic growth and prosperity is multilayered. First, it would
be necessary for Belgrade and Pristina to identify specific areas that need
serious attention and genuine potential and agree on a bipartisan plan of
development (for example, hydroelectric power in Kosovo, the Trepca mines along
the border between Serbia and Kosovo, and agricultural programs in southern
Serbia and Kosovo). Once Belgrade and Pristina have identified likely areas of
economic cooperation, then—and only then—it would be possible to approach the
EU for technical and financial support. Although the Stability Pact for
Southeastern Europe (established in 1999) has been a relatively weak instrument
thus far, it is possible that Working Table 2 on economic development could
provide a useful vehicle to establish productive programs between Serbia and
Kosovo.



Steven E. Meyer is professor of National Security Studies in the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces at the National Defense University in Washington,
DC. The views expressed here are those of the author alone.



http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=15444



Other Articles by Steven E. Meyer:



http://www.nationalinterest.org/images/Transparent.gif



03.30.07



The Risks of an
Imposed Settlement



The Kosovo issue is far from resolved, and acceptance and
imposition of the Settlement Plan by the Security Council could lead to renewed
violence and instability, and have repercussions far beyond the Western
Balkans.




















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