Kosovo: The Fuse on the Balkan Powder Keg

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Stratfor

Kosovo:
The Fuse on the Balkan Powder Keg

November 16, 2007 21 55 GMT

Summary

Kosovo's expected Dec. 10 declaration of independence from Serbia is already
inspiring minor violent incidents throughout the Balkans. If tensions erupt
over the issue, the fighting is almost certain to spread beyond Kosovo and
Serbia.



Analysis



Kosovo is set to hold parliamentary and local elections Nov. 17 amid tensions
surrounding talks on the region's status and the boycott of the elections
called by the Serbs. Leading up to Kosovo's expected Dec. 10 declaration of
independence from Serbia, small sparks of violence are surfacing not only in Kosovo
and Serbia, but also in other Balkan states -- illustrating that if this powder
keg blows, the explosion will not be limited to Kosovo and Serbia.



Though the international community is completely
split on the issue of Kosovar independence -- and has been since the
region's 1999 provisional break from Serbia -- the small secessionist
government has said it will not wait any longer. Serbs consider Kosovo the
birthplace of their national identity and view Kosovar Albanians as little more
than a recent infestation, though the province's population is now more than 90
percent Albanian and less than 5 percent Serbian. The Kosovars want nothing
less than independence, and the Serbs want to give them anything but.

Kosovo had expected the West
to continue supporting what it called the inevitability
of Kosovar independence. However, that inevitability is now lost in the shuffle
of a larger
political battle between global power players such as Russia, the European
Union and the United States, and Serbia and Kosovo are left with only
uncertainty.

All sides fear this uncertainty
will turn volatile -- and possibly bloody. If an explosion of violence does
occur, it will not be contained within Serbia and Kosovo's borders; it could
destabilize the entire Balkan region. Minor incidents of violence and
instability have already
been seen in Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.



Serbia and Kosovo



Serbia and Kosovo seem to have avoided violence on the scale of that seen in
the late 1990s, mainly because the Radicals did not come to power during Serbian
elections and because Kosovar independence was continually put on the back
burner this year. This does not mean, however, that such violence can be
avoided altogether, especially as each side gets more fed up with the
situation. Small-scale violence has been seen and is not unexpected. Tensions
are high between Kosovars and Serbs and within each ethnic faction as well.



The Serbs within Kosovo do not make up enough of the population to attempt any
meaningful military operations, but there are other threats. The most obvious
-- but not the most likely -- is that Serbia could do what it did in 1999 when
it wanted to reassert full control over Kosovo: send in the army. But the
military is not in the shape it was in then. Moreover, the Serbs within Serbia
proper are too fractured; some are willing to forgo Kosovo to gain EU
membership, while others are willing to fight to the end for the small
province. That is enough to cause trouble, since only a few radicals are needed
to form paramilitary groups like those seen during the war.



There are also small Serbian terrorist groups that have been operating
periodically in Serbia and Kosovo. The best known is Tsar Lazar's Guard, which
was a joke when it first formed but has been gaining support -- and reportedly
weapons -- as Dec. 10 approaches. Serbs are not the only group reported to have
militants working for their cause; the Albanian National Army militant group
reportedly has been recruiting new members and equipment recently.



Kosovar Albanians also have been stirring unrest inside the recently
independent Montenegro. The small Albanian population in Montenegro on the
Kosovar border has already been stirred up, however; a handful of Albanians
were arrested in Ulcinj, Montenegro, and Kosovar Albanians began flooding over
the border and stormed the police station in protest.



Montenegro understands what it is like to push for independence from Serbia,
but unlike Kosovo the country is still
very divided over whether it is content with its new independence.
Approximately 40 percent still consider themselves ethnically Serbian --
especially since they share the same church and same language -- and are thus
loyal to Belgrade. Some Montenegrin Serbians have already pledged to help fight
if Kosovo gets its independence.



Macedonia



The militants in Kosovo have also been linked to Albanians crossing the border
from Macedonia. Albanians are the ethnic minority within Macedonia but hold the
majority of the northwestern part of the country. The Macedonian-Kosovar border
is mountainous and incredibly porous, leading to large border crossings that the
already weak Macedonian military cannot prevent. These Albanians and Kosovar
Albanians have been seen actively engaging in violence on both sides of the
border, proving that the wounds from the 2001 Macedonia conflict -- in which
the Albanians within the country began attacking Macedonian forces -- are still
fresh.



Internally, Macedonia has been politically unstable because of the main
Albanian party actively pushing against the government as it keeps its eyes on
Kosovo. Macedonia is trying to keep a lid on any large-scale violence because
of its aspirations to join the EU, but hostilities have broken out within
Macedonia's borders. On Nov. 7, Macedonian police killed four Albanians in an
operation called Mountain Storm on Mount Sar Planina. Macedonian police said
the Albanians were planning a major terrorist act that would destabilize both
Kosovo and Macedonia.



Bosnia-Herzegovina



Bosnia-Herzegovina
could be a flashpoint in the struggle over Kosovo. Bosnia-Herzegovina is split
between two autonomous regions -- the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Republika Srpska (the Serb Republic) -- and three ethnic groups: Muslim
Bosniaks, Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs. In short, the country does not
have a comfortable ethnic, social, historic or political mixture. The U.N.
administrative presence is the only thing keeping relative peace and general
unity in the country.



However, control is being transferred from the United Nations to the European
Union -- something many radical Serbs within the country are not happy with
because it means the loss of Russia's voice in Bosnia's future (Russia is on
the U.N. Security Council and supports the Orthodox Serbs). The Muslims within the
country do not want EU supervision, claiming the Union is not friendly to
Muslims. Republika Srpska has criticized the transfer, since they pledge their
loyalty to their brother Serbs next door and to their more numerous Orthodox
brothers in Russia.



The Muslim Bosniaks and Serbs -- with the Croats in flux -- are keeping the
country from moving toward any political unity or a real constitution. But with
Kosovo in play, the Serbs from Republika Srpska are threatening to declare
their own independence. It is no secret that the majority of Serbs within
Republika Srpska want Serbia proper to annex their region, though many Serbs in
Serbia proper look upon them as radicals or country bumpkins. Serbs in
Republika Srpska could become very problematic if they either split from
Bosnia-Herzegovina or decide to flood across the border to fight with their
fellow Serbs. NATO -- which commands the European forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina
-- is rumored to have a contingency plan to sweep into Republika Srpska if
either of these events happens, taking the government buildings and media
outlets and blocking the main roads into Serbia.



The Threat of Greater -- and Spreading -- Violence



Contagion effects of Balkan violence are well known; they were seen both in the
early 20th century and in the 1990s, and the recent outbursts are following the
same pattern. Since EU and NATO forces are present, there have been no large
wars declared by the states themselves. But if the region does ignite, Western
forces could face many problems. First, those forces are a mere shadow of what
they were during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s -- during which it took four
years to get the region generally under control. European and U.S. forces are
deployed only in the non-Serbian section of Bosnia-Herzegovina and within
Kosovo, not throughout the region. Furthermore, NATO and the United States are
bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq and trying to juggle threats larger than
the Balkans -- namely Iran and Russia.



To put it plainly, the West is not paying much attention to the Balkans other
than as a bargaining chip with other global players such as Russia. But with or
without the world watching, the actors in the Balkans are ready to move.

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Kosovo's contested future

Kosovo's contested future

Paul
Hockenos

The international community is due to deliver its verdict on the future
status of Kosovo on 10 December 2007. But the interests of the international
actors deciding the disputed territory's fate is part of the problem, says Paul
Hockenos.

16 - 11 - 2007

It can be exasperating to hear people from the Balkans blame “foreign powers”
with hidden agendas and geopolitical ambitions for their troubles, as if they
themselves bear no responsibility for their fortunes. But it would be easier to
refute this counterproductive thinking if it hadn’t so often been the case over
history - and is the case today, particularly when it comes to Kosovo. The
problem of determining the “final status” of a province that is still legally
part of Serbia but whose population is 90% ethnic Albanian was always going to
be difficult. What makes it even harder is that international policy toward the
disputed territory is being driven by the interests of external actors rather
than those of the people of Kosovo, including the Kosovar Serbs. The main obstacle to a settlement is that
these powers - the United Nations, the European Union member-states, the United
States, and Russia - are themselves deeply divided, for reasons that have
little to do with Kosovo itself.

The current eleventh-hour talks follow a year of United Nations-sponsored
negotiations headed by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, which came
exasperatingly close to a reasonable conclusion but ran aground in the UN
Security Council, upon the threat of a Russian veto. The ongoing diplomacy, led
by a “troika” of Russian, United States, and European Union envoys, is likely
to get no further. Yet, a bitter irony not lost on the province’s increasingly
resentful people: there is a general consensus in the international community
that independence for the Kosovar Albanians is both inevitable and, ultimately,
the best option (among many unappealing options) for everyone involved - even for
Serbia. But the trick is how to get there; and on this almost no one agrees.



The road's end



The United Nations, after eight years of running Kosovo as a protectorate,
urgently wants to pack up and leave, regardless of Kosovo’s status. The UN
mission in Kosovo (Unmik) derives its authority from the Security Council,
which stipulated that an interim UN mission administer a broadly autonomous
Kosovo, and that the territory remain part of Serbia. Future talks would
determine a “final status” for Kosovo thus relieving the UN of its watch. The
UN was never meant to stay in Kosovo forever, point out UN officials, the way
it got stuck in Cyprus for thirty-odd years.

Since June 1999, the UN has run one of the most expensive, worst
administered missions of the many around the world. A telling illustration of
the UN’s ineptitude is the main power-station, that despite millions of euros
in international investment still leaves Pristina shivering through the winter.
Much of the Serb minority lives in depressing enclaves or in the area around
the northern part of the city of Mitrovica, which borders southern Serbia. Only
half the people of working age in Kosovo have jobs. The greatest single debacle
was the international mission’s inability to protect the Serbs in March 2004
when rioting Albanians attacked Serbs and sacked Orthodox churches. In February
2007, two Albanian student demonstrators were shot dead by UN police as they
marched in protest against the Ahtisaari plan. It is no wonder the UN is eager
to transfer authority to the European Union as soon as possible.

Kosovo's plight

Ahtisaari’s task was to negotiate the terms of the new status and the
transition. Would the Europeans be mentoring a newly independent state into the
EU, replacing the UN as overlord, or some combination of the two? The Ahtisaari
report proposed “supervised independence” for Kosovo, namely a phased-in
statehood overseen by an international civilian body with military
capabilities. The plan envisioned a multi-ethnic, broadly decentralised Kosovo
in which the minority Serbs had far-ranging rights and autonomy. In fact, so
extensive was the autonomy for minorities that politicians in neighbouring
countries (and even as far away as Spain and Belgium) worried out loud that
their minority populations might insist upon the same.

Paul Hockenos is a
journalist and author who has written about south-eastern Europe since 1989. He
is based in Berlin where he works for the European Stability
Initiative. He is the author of Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars
(Cornell University Press, 2003The plan received praise, not least from
Washington where the George W Bush administration has consistently championed
Kosovar statehood. But the United States’ position has less to do with noble
principles of self-determination than it has with extracting the US from a
remote, hopeless conflict. The US’s main priority is to free up resources for
deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan. European troops may now form the bulk of
the the Nato contingent, but Washington is impatient with the pace of progress
and is eager to wash its hands of the Balkans; the creation of a Kosovo state
will, it calculates, facilitate this. Furthermore, the American president sees
Kosovo (to Europeans’ embarrassment) through the prism of the “war on terror”,
and has said that a free Kosovo would be a positive example of a peaceful,
democratic Muslim state.



Most of the European Union’s twenty-seven members applauded the Ahtisaari plan
as well - for reasons of calculated Realpolitik. After all, there is no EU
support for statehood for countless other small peoples who also suffer
discrimination or worse - among them the Kurds, Basques, Ossetians, Chechens,
Abkhaz, and Tibetans. But in the western Balkans, the factor that trumps all
others is stability: Kosovo’s fate is critical to the entire region. After the
bloodshed in Croatia and Bosnia in the early 1990s, which the then
fifteen-strong European Community failed to stem, the European Union invested
enormous energies and funds in pacifying the Balkans and bringing the region
under its wing. Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia have joined the EU, and Croatia
will follow. But this energy flagged with the defeat of the constitutional treaty
in 2005 and “enlargement fatigue.” The EU’s commitment wavered and this was
felt by the pro-European forces in the western Balkans.

Today, the stakes are again high. Kosovo is the linchpin that connects
ethnic Albanian communities in four problem-states: Serbia, Montenegro,
Macedonia, and Albania. Any kind of civic unrest or armed conflict in Kosovo
would surely drag these countries in, upending a decade of painstaking,
expensive progress. There is the real fear that Greece, Bulgaria, and Bosnia
would also become implicated, as would all of Serbia’s neighbours, including
Croatia, Hungary, and Romania; the multiple tremors could easily damage fragile
arrangements with ethnic minorities and cause the EU to split again over a
response. This is why Brussels just recently pushed through relaxed visa
requirements for the western Balkan states to enter the European Union,
something that should have been done years ago. Now it could be too little, too
late.



The Ahtisaari plan - and, implicitly, the idea of non-negotiated independence
for Kosovo - has forceful opponents too. Russia is first among them. The
Ahtisaari-led negotiations proceeded under the assumption that in the end
Russia would be on board. Although Moscow had firmly opposed the idea of
non-negotiated independence in the past and had taken the side of the Serbs
repeatedly over the 1990s, the negotiators claimed that there were clear
signals from Moscow indicating that Russia would consent to the process and
even to an independent Kosovo.

The turning-point, argue some, was the Bush administration’s decision in
early 2006 to station an anti-missile defence system in Poland and the Czech
Republic, territory that had been part of the Soviet bloc and still considered
sensitive by Russia for security reasons. President Putin may have been willing
to “trade” cancellation of the missile programme for Kosovar statehood - though
the possibility was never explored by Washington.

It is also possible, however, that for reasons of state (and not out of any
solidarity with its eastern Orthodox brothers in Serbia) Russia was never going
to accept an independent Kosovar state. The principle of territorial integrity
is not just etched into the UN charter; it is critical to sprawling,
multinational Russia. The Kremlin is well aware of the precedent that
recognising a breakaway region would set for far-flung and disenchanted
national groups (such as the Chechens) in its own sovereign territory. “The
principle of the territorial integrity of states, member states of the United
Nations, is one of the foundations of international law”, stated Russia’s UN
ambassador in summer 2007, explaining Moscow’s opposition to the Ahtisaari
plan. “There is a very strong political motivation not to reward aggressive
separatist inclinations.” This naked self-interest explains Moscow’s motives
much better than speculation about Russian designs in the Balkans, pan-Slavic
brotherhood, or geo-strategic jockeying in the “new cold war”.

The deep uneasiness of a handful of EU states - among them Spain, Romania,
Cyprus, Greece, and Slovakia - to awarding statehood to “breakaway minorities”
also has little to do with Kosovo and everything with their own minorities.
These states could, like the Russians, tolerate an independent Kosovo if it had
the blessing of both parties, the Serbs and the Albanians, as did the
Czech-Slovak and Serb-Montenegrin “negotiated” divorces. The positions of the
holdout EU countries become vitally important should (as in one current option)
the EU opt to circumvent the Security Council and recognise Kosovo’s
independence together with the United States. Since the deployment of an EU
mission to Kosovo requires a full consensus, a veto by even one state could
throw everything back to square one.

Serbia's secret

The government in Belgrade claims that the Ahtisaari plan was a
straightforward attempt to rob them of Kosovo. The vehement reaction defied
Ahtisaari’s assumption that the Serbs would passively accept his proposal if
enough compensatory “sweeteners” in the form of EU development funds and other
incentives were dangled in front of them. But once Belgrade’s nationalists saw
that Russia wasn’t going along, they retreated to a hardline position. Serbia’s
leadership turned the future of Kosovo into a symbolically loaded cause, a
test-case of national loyalty, in a way that made being “soft” on the issue
impossible for any political party.

But how important is Kosovo to the Serbs in reality? There is a dark joke
inside Serbia that if a Kosovo under Serbian rule would mean (on
equal-opportunity grounds) Albanians being granted one-fifth of places in the
national parliament, on hospital boards, in the judiciary, the education
system, then the Serbs would turn and run in the other direction. The imbalance
in birthrates is a horror-scenario for Serb nationalists. In fact, many Serb
citizens (and off-the-record, even politicians) acknowledge that Serbia would
benefit enormously from cutting loose Kosovo and concentrating on its own
problems. But saying this aloud in Serbia is treasonous.

Among openDemocracy's articles on Kosovo and and the future of Serbia:



Vesna Goldsworthy, "Au revoir, Montenegro?" (23 May 2006)



Peter Lippman, "Kosovo:
approaching independence or chaos" (30 October 2006)



Eric Gordy, "Serbia's
elections: less of the same" (23 January 2007)



TK Vogel, "Kosovo:
a break in the ice" (2 February 2007)



Marko Attila Hoare, "Kosovo:
the Balkans' last independent state" (12 February 2007)



Vicken Cheterian, "Serbia
after Kosovo" (18 April 2007)



Neven Andjelic, "Serbia
and Eurovision: whose victory?" (25 May 2007The
Kosovars' fate

What of the people - or peoples - of Kosovo themselves? The
Belgrade leadership has treated the 200,000 Serbs who live in Kosovo as pawns
in a cynical geopolitical gambit: instructing them to impede diplomacy, boycott
elections, and believe that one day Kosovo will return to some kind of pre-1999
situation. But despite its absolutist position for home consumption, Belgrade
has long been angling to partition Kosovo, ensuring that the north remains
under its control.



This would most probably entail transferring all Kosovar Serbs in central and
southern Kosovo to refugee camps north of the Ibar River - to join the 600,000
other refugees in Serbia, the by-product of Slobodan Milosevic’s territorial
wars. Belgrade’s policies reveal that its real interest is what it has been for
nearly a century: the territory of Kosovo, not the people who live there.

For their own part, the Kosovar Albanians want independence - and will take
to arms to get it. Kosovo was joined to Serbia in 1912, in the aftermath of the
first Balkan war. Since then the ethnic Albanians have experienced one form or
another of discrimination at the hands of different Serb regimes: monarchist,
socialist, and nominally democratic. Now they have an opportunity to remove the
sovereign hand that made this possible, and they are not going to miss it.



So even in the absence of international agreement on Kosovo’s future, the
Albanians will probably declare independence in the near future. The question
is just what kind of statehood they will get. If their declared polity is
internationally contested, deprived of a United Nations seat, with its border
to the north blocked by Serbia, then Kosovo could be worse off than it is now.



Will post-independence Kosovo look more like Taiwan, northern Cyprus, or Gaza?
The Kosovar Albanians’ biggest illusion is that the United States will put
everything right for them. They believe Washington is really acting in their
interests and not purely in its own. In the end, they could find themselves
quite alone, carping that the great powers have left them in the lurch once
again.

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The Dismantling of Yugoslavia: A Study in Inhumanitarian Intervention

The Dismantling
of Yugoslavia: A Study in Inhumanitarian Intervention (and a Western
Liberal-Left Intellectual and Moral Collapse)

Edward S. Herman and David Peterson

Part I | Part II | Part
III | Part IV | Notes | Glossary | Timeline

Part I :

The breakup of Yugoslavia provided the fodder for what may have been the
most misrepresented series of major events over the past twenty years. The
journalistic and historical narratives that were imposed upon these wars have
systematically distorted their nature, and were deeply prejudicial, downplaying
the external factors that drove Yugoslavia’s breakup while selectively
exaggerating and misrepresenting the internal factors. Perhaps no civil
wars—and Yugoslavia suffered multiple civil wars across several theaters, at
least two of which remain unresolved—have ever been harvested as cynically by
foreign powers to establish legal precedents and new categories of
international duties and norms. Nor have any other civil wars been turned into
such a proving ground for the related notions of “humanitarian intervention”
and the “right [or responsibility] to protect.” Yugoslavia’s conflicts were not
so much mediated by foreign powers as they were inflamed and exploited by them
to advance policy goals. The result was a tsunami of lies and
misrepresentations in whose wake the world is still reeling.

………… “Why would Serbs be expelling Croatians
from Croatia if they’re not expelling them from Serbia?” Markovic asked the
court. “Why would Serbs be expelling Albanians from Kosovo if they’re not
expelling them from Belgrade and other parts of Serbia?.........

CONTINUED: http://www.monthlyreview.org/1007herman-peterson1.htm

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KOSOVO | Squaring off for the wrong fight

KOSOVO

Squaring off for the wrong fight

By
Humphrey Hawksley

Published: November 8, 2007

PRISTINA, Kosovo:

It's almost nine years since NATO air strikes
freed Kosovar Albanians from Serbian control, yet the official status of the
province is still undecided. A deadline of Dec. 10 has been set for the
diplomatic process to deliver. It's expected to fail, after which Kosovo's
semi-autonomous government says it will make a unilateral declaration of
independence.

While Kosovo was a defining issue of post-Cold
War global leadership, there is now a gaping silence from all global powers -
except Russia - on an acceptable way forward. Kosovo's two million citizens
interpret this as a signal that the United States and much of Europe would
support its independence.

Kosovo, therefore, is in danger of falling victim
to the type of opaque diplomacy that has been behind some of the gravest global
conflicts. One of the more recent is Saddam Hussein's belief that the United
States would not object to Iraq's 1991 invasion of Kuwait.

Too much is at stake for international policy to
be misread again. The West must declare
clearly what it will or will not do if Kosovo declares independence, and it
must avoid enveloping Kosovo in a clash with Russi

Since the NATO intervention in 1999, the United
Nations has administered Kosovo. Stability remains underwritten by a
16,000-strong international force, and apart from a surge of anti-Serb unrest
in 2004 and sporadic ethnic attacks, Kosovo is seen as an intervention success
story.

In January, the UN special envoy, Martti
Ahtisaari, put forward proposals that would allow Kosovo official separation
from Serbia. He deliberately avoided using words such as
"independence" or "sovereignty." The new nation would be
monitored by the European Union and the international military force would
stay. In many respects, it would be similar to the status quo.

Serbia rejected the proposals, saying it would never
accept Kosovo's separation. Russia gave this its full support.

Serbia insists that it should not be punished for
the atrocities of a former dictator. The brutality of the 1990s was carried out
under the regime of Slobodan Milosevic, they say; Serbia is now a democracy and
the issue should end there.

Russia's blunt declaration, however, has taken
the question of Kosovo's status to a higher level. What began as a humanitarian
mission to stop ethnic-cleansing has become part of a new balance of power in
Europe. Kosovo's future is linked to the Czech and Polish missile
defense-shield dispute, energy supplies, and a basket of issues on which a
revitalized Kremlin is testing the will of the European Union and the United
States.

Should Kosovo declare independence, it would
almost certainly not be recognized by the UN because of a veto by Russia in the
Security Council. The entire EU is unlikely to accept Kosovo's independence
because of opposition from governments in Greece, Cyprus, Romania and others.
Without UN or EU recognition, the new Kosovo might have less legitimacy than
the present one.

Opinion polls have found that more and more Serbs
are questioning where their future lies. At present, they are split 50-50
between Russia and the EU. But, increasingly, Moscow is seen to be delivering
more than Brussels, particularly by way of security and a sense of belonging.

A new illegal Serb militia group is reported to
be mobilizing to protect Kosovo's 100,000 Serbs, should independence be
declared. It calls itself Tsar Lazar after the hero of an epic Serbian poem
about reclaiming Kosovo. In Kosovo itself, the banned Albanian National Army
recruits members to fight the Serb militia. What's new is that one of these
insurgent groups believes their ultimate backer is Moscow, and the other
Washington.

Ironically though, both Kosovo and Serbia are
embryonic democracies, with an immediate goal to join the EU. That alone would
make sovereignty increasingly irrelevant.

Kosovo's argument that it cannot clear the litter
and fix the roads without independence is nonsense. It is, in essence, facing
the choice of whether it wants to resemble the bloodied Palestinian territories
or glittering Taiwan.

Serbia, too, must decide whether it wants to end
up as a client state of an authoritarian Russia or sign on to the democratic
values entrenched within the European Union.

It is time for politicians in both Serbia and
Kosovo to lead their people away from the contentious issue of independence.
The West must also send an unequivocal message that the way forward is to
deliver not nationalistic symbolism but good governance.

The legitimacy of both Serbia and Kosovo will
come not from their ability to protect historical legends, but to provide
health, education and a thriving economy for their citizens.

Humphrey Hawksley is a BBC correspondent and
the author, most recently, of "The History Book." Reprinted with
permission from YaleGlobal.

http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/08/opinion/edhumph.php

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Encouraging separatism

Letters

The Washington Times

Washington, D.C.

November 5, 2007

http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071105/EDITORIAL/111050008/1013/EDITORIAL&template=nextpage



Encouraging separatism



As Turkey is currently embroiled in fighting Kurdish
separatists and the United States risks losing a NATO ally in the process, we
(and Turkey) would do well to re-examine Western support for Kosovo's Albanian
separatists, lest we further encourage separatists the world over
("Kurdish terror and the

West," Op-Ed, Tuesday).

There are many deep symmetries between the Albanian
and Kurdish irredentists in their efforts to wrest control of territory from
sovereign nations, except that the Albanians already have a homeland —

Albania — whereas the Kurdish people (who live in portions of Iran, Iraq and
Turkey) do not. In both cases, illegally granted independence would unravel

both the Balkans and the Middle East, inciting far worse conflicts and
instability for generations.

Illegal independence will also create economic and Islamic
extremist black holes/safe havens wherein unstable governments will be unable
to fully control "their" territories (such as in Afghanistan) and
tribal laws will go into effect, creating further confusion and chaos.

Turkey and the United States should support Serbia's
sovereignty over Kosovo, as the Kurds, with

no recognized homeland, have an even stronger case for their independence and
we risk far greater consequences in violating sovereign nations and

international law. We also risk destroying our relationship with Turkey.



MICHAEL PRAVICA

Henderson, Nev.

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U.S., Russia: The Kosovo Bargaining Chip

U.S., Russia: The Kosovo Bargaining Chip

November 01, 2007 18 00 GMT

Summary



While Russia and the United States continue to tango over issues of missile
defense and Iran, one issue has yet to be resolved: Kosovo. But as rumors swirl
of U.S. concessions to Russia, the Kosovar issue might just be added to the
tally of compromises.



Analysis



While the United States and Russia continue their heated tango, rumors of U.S.
concessions to Russia have been flying, with talk of compromises over ballistic
missile defense and the Conventional
Forces in Europe treaty. In exchange for these concessions, the United
States would expect Russia to cease its support for Iran and possibly help pass
new sanctions targeting Iran's nuclear program. But another volatile bargaining
chip between Russia and the United States is sitting in the shadows: Kosovo.



Negotiations
between the United States and Russia have changed focus in the latter half of
the year. Russia countered the U.S. moves into Eastern and Central Europe with
its very public support for Iran, complicating U.S.-Iranian negotiations over
Iraq. This is a major shift from the July meeting between Russian President
Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush in Kennebunkport, Maine, when
one of the more
important items on the agenda was Kosovar
independence.



This issue has been on the table since 1999, when the United States and its
NATO allies, angered over Serbian behavior in Kosovo, ignored Russian
objections and waged a 60-day air war against Yugoslavia. Now, Moscow is
outraged at the possibility of an independent Kosovo -- not because it
considers Serbia an ally, but because a successful effort by the West to impose
its will on Serbia against Russian wishes would signal the end of Russia's
influence in Europe. It also would signal that the West believes Russian
objections can be easily swept under the rug.



But nothing has moved on the prolonged negotiations over the small Balkan
secessionist region, and now Kosovo is threatening to declare independence Dec.
10. Although it would seem the issue of Kosovo has gotten lost in the shuffle
between the world powers, it could be one of the issues thrown into the pot of
concessions.



Though neither Russia nor the United States has mentioned Kosovo much of late,
small items in the Serb and Kosovar media indicate that the issue is still very
much alive inside the negotiations. Talks resumed between Pristina and Belgrade
in Vienna this week, and Pristina went in with the assumption that a decision
would be made, given that Dec. 10 is only six weeks away. But the talks only
proved that the U.S., EU and Russian troika is staunchly divided. Moreover,
they show that the U.S. and EU positions are fractured.



Until this week, the United States and European Union were unified in their
position that Kosovar independence not only was inevitable but also would be
achieved this year. This has always been Kosovo's trump card against Russian
and Serb opposition to independence. However, on Oct. 29, the United States
suddenly proposed a new option of freezing Kosovar independence for another 12
years -- much to Pristina's horror. On top of this, the next proposal to be
considered at the troika meetings with Serbia and Kosovo is designed by none
other than Russia -- and of course, it would halt any moves for Kosovar
independence.



Additionally, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates let it slip during an Oct. 27
press conference on Afghanistan that the United States is considering pulling
its troops from the NATO coalition in Kosovo (KFOR).



These announcements could mean one of two things: Either the United States
simply has too much on its plate and needs to pull back somewhere, or Kosovo
has just become another concession Washington is willing to give Moscow.



As far as the first option, the United States does have its fingers in many
pies with its obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan -- not to mention its growing
concerns over Iran and Russia. In the 1990s, the United States stepped into the
Kosovar crisis when the Europeans could not handle it. But that was back when
the United States was not as busy. Pulling back diplomatically and/or
militarily from Kosovo would leave the issue in the Europeans'
lap, and geographically, they have a greater vested interest in a
resolution in the Balkans.



But the timing of the announcement seems to point to the second option. The new
proposal comes at a time of critical moves among the United States, Iran and
Russia -- and as rumors of U.S. concessions are leaking. Allowing the Europeans
to handle the Kosovar issue pushes the United States out of the Russian line of
fire. Also, it can be added to the tally of things Washington has set aside in
order to keep its balance with Moscow as the game continues.

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=297675

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Comment: Europe's Balkan Travesty - and How to Fix It

EU indecision over Kosovo and Bosnia threatens to revive the experience of the 1990s not as tragedy, but as farce.

By Edward P. Joseph in Washington

The Balkan crisis of a decade ago was tragedy. Unless diplomats meet
today’s twin crises in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina with real
determination, the stage is now set for travesty – with the potential
for yet more tragedy. The plot stands like this:

Act 1: Kosovo.
Because of European indecision, Moscow and Belgrade have managed to
string out the charade of “negotiations” over Kosovo, sanctimoniously
invoking the “principle” that any solution to Kosovo must be based on
agreement. (The farce works because we, the audience, understand that
no agreement is possible.)

A December 10 “deadline” for the
talks to end now appears once again to be merely one more opportunity
to further postpone the inevitable day of reckoning when Kosovo’s
status must be settled. The fact that delay only prolongs stagnation in
both Kosovo and Serbia is lost on many actors.

Act 2: Bosnia.
Emboldened by the Kosovo fiasco and ever more energetic Russian
support, Belgrade has gone to neighbouring Bosnia and called in a
supporting player: Bosnia’s Serb entity, RS. Its government in Banja
Luka under Premier Milorad Dodik now seems inclined to defy the
international community’s top official in Bosnia, High Representative
Miroslav Lajcak, and challenge his decision to impose important changes
designed to cut through Bosnia’s gridlock.

The farce here
involves Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica shouting to the
world that Lajcak’s reasonable measures “threaten the vital interests
of the Serb people.” The fact that a dozen years of frustration have
proven that Bosnia’s structure locks its Serbs, Croats and Muslims into
a zero-sum relationship is lost on many actors.

Act 3 is about
to be written. In the 1990s, the play was scripted, after some initial
reluctance, by the US. Now, the pen is shared fully with Europe. If
European diplomats do not find the current performance funny, here is
what they need to do – urgently – with their American colleagues:

1.
Recognize the true nature of the Russo-Serbian challenge. Make no
mistake; the stakes now are quite high – in a strategic sense, larger
than in the Milosevic-Tudjman era when the Serbian and Croatian
strongmen dominated former Yugoslavia. Effectively, Moscow is mounting
a challenge through Belgrade to Europe’s ability to decide the nature
and pace of South-East Europe’s integration.

For the moment,
Kostunica has snubbed NATO alone. But the Serbian Premier’s talk of a
“third way” between Europe and Russia is really a nod to a
fundamentally new Eastern orientation. Delay on Kosovo strengthens the
Russo-Serb position. Delay also keeps Kosovo’s Serbs and Albanians in
an unproductive state of limbo. Whether or not Kosovo “explodes”, no
one can predict. But what no one can deny is that Kosovo’s structures
cannot develop properly until its status is decided. Nor can the
Balkans fully integrate into Europe.

2. Forget about EU “unity”
over Kosovo. The truth is that there is not even Scandinavian unity on
Kosovo. Former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari’s Swedish neighbours
have not shown much enthusiasm for his plan for supervised independence
for Kosovo.

EU unity is a chimera. The endless search for it
only renders Brussels child’s play for a game of divide-and-delay
tactics by Russia. Instead of unity, jittery EU diplomats should keep
in mind the bed-rock interests of those European capitals that have so
far resisted moving forward on Kosovo’s final status.

Athens,
in particular, can ill afford a permanently languishing, unstable
Kosovo on its doorstep. Would Greece (and, for that matter, Cyprus)
really subvert the development of an independent Kosovo? And if the
answer is no, then why should any other EU state, with even less of a
direct stake in a stable South-Eastern Europe? Instead of unity, the EU
needs leadership.

3. Don’t be bamboozled into “saving the
moderates” in Serbia. On his recent trip to Washington, Serbian Deputy
Premier Bozidar Djelic invoked the standard warning: “if you push us
too far on Kosovo, you will undermine President Tadic, and you might
get the Radicals.”

The truth is that as well-intentioned as
Tadic and Djelic may be, what they can achieve is strictly limited by
the realities of Serbian political dynamics. So far, the “deliverables”
from the moderates are rather modest. Pushing forward with independence
for Kosovo may indeed produce substantial turbulence in Serbia. But
outsiders cannot refrain from long-overdue decisions because of the
fear of holding back political reform there.

The evidence from
both Croatia and Macedonia is that true political reform comes when the
main nationalist party undergoes a thorough transformation, purging its
ranks of extreme nationalists and embracing fully the EU and NATO
accession agendas. While Europe trembles about the political
consequences in Serbia, nobody worries about Croatia’s elections next
month.

This is because the governing HDZ, under Prime Minister
Ivo Sanader, has taken on the colour of many European center-right
parties. When Kostunica’s DSS undergoes the same transformation,
jettisoning its retrograde nationalism, then Serbia’s moderates like
Tadic will be able to realize their vision for the country.

4.
Stop thinking that EU accession is a panacea. EU accession is a crucial
step for every state in the Balkans -- a catalyst for reform, a conduit
for aid, a signal for investment, and a point of strategic orientation.
But it is time to recognize its limitations.

The sad truth is
that EU accession does not make states forget about borders. Banja Luka
has made it painfully clear that when it comes to a choice between the
RS and the EU, the Serbs choose the RS. Likewise, Serbia has made it
clear that when it comes to fulfilling EU conditions, Brussels can
wait. EU accession, vital as it is, cannot substitute for tackling
over-arching political questions, nor can it achieve its goals if
Brussels gives waivers on core principles.

5. Stand by Lajcak –
to the end. Some EU capitals worry that the High Representative will
not be able to stand up to Banja Luka’s challenge to his use of the
"Bonn Powers" to impose legislation on Bosnia. They may demand a
“compromise”, i.e. an embarrassing climb-down by Lajcak.

Such a
step would render not only the High Representative, but the wider
international community, mostly impotent. Those European diplomats with
both experience and wisdom will remember the sad case of Hans Koschnik,
the EU Administrator in Mostar who was emasculated when the EU failed
to back him in 1996, following a violent challenge from hard-line
Croats. There is no need for Koschnik’s tragedy to be repeated as farce
in Lajcak’s case.

The truth is that power is about the
perception of power. As long as the EU and Washington stand together
for their principles – and not allow Moscow and Belgrade to divide them
with cynical pseudo-principles – these twin crises can be weathered.
The alternative is tragicomedy.

Edward P. Joseph is Visiting
Scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of International Studies,
Washington DC. He spent over a decade in the Balkans from 1992-2003,
serving in Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Kosovo, during which he
served as UN Deputy Administrator in Mitrovica, Kosovo. Balkan Insight
is BIRN`s online publication

http://www.birn.eu.com/en/109/10/5398/?tpl=30&ST1=Text&ST_T1=Article&ST_AS1=1&ST_max=1

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Quest for Kosovo compromise

Financial Times

By James Blitz in London

Updated: 5:11 a.m. ET Oct 26, 2007

Wolfgang Ischinger, the ­German
ambassador to ­London, could be forgiven for thinking of himself as the man at
the centre of the diplomatic dispute over the future of Kosovo.

For the past four months, Mr
Ischinger has been the European Union's representative on a "troika"
of diplomats - from the EU, US and Russia - charged with resolving the
stand-off over Kosovo. The talks have been gruelling, he concedes in an
interview. But the "endgame" is approaching, he says. "We are
entering the most critical phase."

To many, the Kosovo stand-off
looks insoluble. Kosovo Albanians demand full independence but Belgrade insists
the territory should merely enjoy a form of loose autonomy within Serbia.
"If they stick to these initial positions there is no imaginable way you
could forge agreement between them," Mr Ischinger says.

He still believes that a
negotiated agreement can be reached before the troika is obliged to present its
­conclusions to the United Nations on December 10. But he insists this will
happen only if the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians steel themselves for tough
compromises to avoid disastrous failure.

"The two sides have to
realise they cannot get 100 per cent of their demands. They have to realise
that if they settle for just 50 per cent, it is a much more desirable outcome
for both than no agreement at all."

The Kosovo stand-off has long
been a diplomatic football between the US and Russia. The US has indicated it
will recognise an independent Kosovo if the negotiations fail. Russia has stood
firmly by its Serb ally.

In fact, says Mr Ischinger,
Moscow and Washington have been more flexible than is sometimes suggested.
Russia long insisted it was in no hurry to resolve the issue of Kosovo's status
but, last month, Moscow signed up to a contact group statement that "a
solution has to be found ... without delay".

The
tabular content relating to this article is not available to view. Apologies in
advance for the inconvenience caused.

Mr Ischinger also insists the US
has a more nuanced approach than many think. "America's definition of
independence is identical to the EU 's definition: we are not thinking about
independence as something unrestrained." Instead,Kosovo will continue to
be "strongly supervised" by the presence of EU and Nato missions with
the ultimate power to make decisions.

Compromises will have to be made
if a political settlement is to be reached in the next 45 days.

"The leadership in Pristina
understands that a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo is not good
enough to lead them into paradise. They do not live on an island in the
Pacific. Where will they be, for example, if - the day after independence -
Serbia decides to close its border with Kosovo? This is why an agreement is
important for Kosovo's prosperity.

"Serbia must accept that
eight years have gone by in which they've had no authority over Kosovo. The
situation now is not one in which they can realistically expect that Kosovo
will come back under their tutelage."

Mr Ischinger hopes both sides
have the will to reach a deal by December 10. But he is a realist. "A
declaration of independence by Kosovo, without any accompanying agreement with
Serbia, is a real possibility."

His fear, shared by many, is that
such an outcome would not heal the wounds of post-Yugoslavian conflict but
would create a huge new burden for the EU.

Copyright The Financial Times Ltd. All rights reserved.

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21481555/

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UNILATERAL DECISION ON KOSOVO ISSUE WILL BE DESTRUCTIVE FOR THE BALKAN REGION

UNILATERAL DECISION ON KOSOVO ISSUE WILL BE DESTRUCTIVE FOR THE BALKAN REGION

As December 10th — when the Troika mediators in charge of the Kosovo settlement, including the United States, Russia and the European Union, is to submit to the UN Security Council a report about the results of its work – is approaching , the situation is becoming more and more tense in the Kosovo Province. Moscow has repeatedly warned though that a unilateral granting of independence to the Kosovo Albanians will be destructive not only for the Balkans but also for the other parts of the world.

And this is exactly what Russia’s deputy foreign minister Vladimir Tikhonov said while touring the Balkan states recently. He underlined how important it was to observe Resolution No. 1244 of the UN Security Council, which provides for the preservation of Serbia’s territorial integrity. A formula that would be acceptable to both the Serbs and the Kosovo separatists should be based on the Security Council’s resolution. Moscow is of the opinion that any artificial time limit for the settlement of the Kosovo problem is inadmissible.

Russia’s Western partners in the Troika mediators are ready in advance to discuss Kosovo’s independence, which makes the situation at the talks nervous enough. And this is exactly what Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said, speaking at the UN General Assembly:

"When individual countries, including the ones that are represented in the mediation Troika, make public statements to the effect that no matter what the talks may result in, Kosovo’s independence is inevitable, one of the negotiating sides faces the temptation to make no concessions at all. Should the situation remain as it is, nothing will turn out. We are against such “prompts”. The parties concerned must find a solution to their liking. There’s no other way… The settlement of the Kosovo issue must be based on international law."

And it is exactly the ignorance of the international law standards that make the local extremists speak about Kosovo’s independence as if it were an accomplished fact. But those who favour the so-called “Kosovo scenario” are not well aware of the fact that the Kosovo issue may create a dangerous precedent for nearly 40 territorial disputes in many parts of the world.

And the Republic of Cyprus that remains divided into the Greek and the Turkish communities for 50 years now is a good example. Turkey is ready to realize the “Kosovo scenario” there as well, which means that it is ready to declare the independence of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, bypassing the UN resolutions. Thus, this may trigger a chain reaction of separatism Russia warns against. Therefore, patience is needed for resolving the Kosovo issue, and finally, a mutually acceptable compromise will be reached.

Alexander Vatutin

19.10.2007

Commentary:

MATERIALS ON THE THEME


19.10.2007, 15:30 UNILATERAL DECISION ON KOSOVO ISSUE WILL BE DESTRUCTIVE FOR THE BALKAN REGION
15.10.2007, 12:13 Serbia and Kosovo again point out major differences on the province’s final status
13.10.2007, 14:23 ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS ON KOSOVO: A COMPROMISE IS STILL FEASIBLE
12.10.2007, 10:50 Russia: no end of Kosovo talks in sight
11.10.2007, 11:18 Wolfgang Ischinger criticizes U.S statements on a unilateral recognition of Kosovo’s independence
10.10.2007, 18:17 Russian UN Ambassador is against a proposal to set a two-month time limit on talks between Serbia and Kosovo
10.10.2007, 14:53 WEST TRIES TO BRING AHTISAARI PLAN BACK TO LIFE
10.10.2007, 11:02 No time limit for Kosovo talks
09.10.2007, 18:27 UNSC to hold closed door Kosovo consultations
09.10.2007, 16:02 UN SECURITY COUNCIL HOLDS CLOSED TALKS ON KOSOVO
09.10.2007, 15:49 Kosovo: no breakthrough as yet
08.10.2007, 16:24 Sergey Lavrov and the EU representetive for Kosovo meet in Moscow for consultations
06.10.2007, 15:42 RUSSIA, KOSOVO
03.10.2007, 10:41 A delay in the determination of Kosovo status may deprive the UN administration of confidence in the region
01.10.2007, 17:12 KOSOVO ISSUE SHOULD BE RESOLVED AT THE TABLE

http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=eng&q=17573&cid=67&p=19.10.2007


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The Russian option

The Russian
option

Oct 18th 2007 | BELGRADE AND MITROVICA

From The Economist print edition

Some Serbs dream of a Russian
alternative to the European Union

DOTTED across the Serbian north of the divided city of
Mitrovica are pictures of its hero: Vladimir Putin. Russia, Kosovo's Serbs
believe, has saved them from the independence demanded by its Albanians
(Kosovars), who make up 90% of Kosovo's 2m people. It is too early to be sure
they are right. But Western diplomats are worried by Serbia's dalliance with Russia.

Marko Jaksic, a member of Serbia's Kosovo negotiating team,
helps to run northern Kosovo. He is a deputy leader of the party of Vojislav
Kostunica, Serbia's prime minister. If America and many European Union
countries recognise a unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, he
expects Serbia to offer Russia military bases “in Serbia, and especially on the
border of Kosovo”. He adds that Serbia should abandon its bid to join the EU,
and claims that Mr Kostunica thinks similarly but has less freedom to talk
openly.

Such talk is meant to send chills down Western spines. If
Serbia gave up trying to join the EU, not only would it return to the isolation
of the 1990s but it could also drag the whole region down with it. How serious
is the risk? Mr Kostunica's party is aligned with Mr Putin's United Russia
party, and its official position is that Serbia should be neutral. Mr Kostunica
has disparaged a potentially independent Kosovo as nothing but a “NATO state”.

A source close to President Boris Tadic, whose party is in
uneasy coalition with Mr Kostunica, concedes that, if Kosovo's independence is
recognised, it will be hard to instil “European values” in Serbia. Even Serbs
who would secretly like to be shot of their troublesome southern province fear
that full independence would be disastrous. They predict that Mr Kostunica
would, if not formally end the country's bid for EU membership, at least slow
it down, as well as trying to punish countries that recognise Kosovo and
companies that trade there and in Serbia.

Yet the Russian alternative does not look appetising. The
prospect of Russian bases in Serbia is “very unlikely”, says Ivan Vejvoda, who
heads the Balkan Trust for Democracy, a big regional donor to good causes.
Serbia is surrounded by the EU and NATO. “The Russian thing is a temporary,
opportunistic thing, a balloon which will burst once we are over Kosovo,” he
says. There is much excitement in Serbia about Russian companies moving in. On
the list for privatisations that may interest them are JAT Serbian airlines,
Belgrade airport, a mine in Bor and NIS, Serbia's oil company. Alexei Miller,
head of Russia's energy giant, Gazprom, met Serbian leaders to discuss
potential pipelines on October 9th. But so far Russian companies (except for
Lukoil) have been notable by their absence. Russia is only the 18th-biggest
investor in Serbia; the country's largest single exporter is owned by US Steel.
The EU has poured lots of money into rebuilding Serbia. If Serbia kept on
track, a lot more cash could come—and Russia offers little.

On October 15th Montenegro signed a “stabilisation and
association agreement” with the EU, normally a step towards membership. Serbia
could soon do the same. But a negative report to the EU from Carla Del Ponte,
chief prosecutor at The Hague war-crimes tribunal, means that it must first be
seen to do more to catch the fugitive Ratko Mladic. Ms Del Ponte will visit
Serbia soon to check progress (the government has posted a reward for the
missing general, 12 years after he was indicted). This suggests that the
Russian option is, as one diplomat puts it, “loose talk”—for now. If many EU
countries recognise an independent Kosovo next year, it will be their turn to
call Serbia's bluff.

http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9993395&fsrc=RSS

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EU moving away from US on Kosovo, says Belgrade

15.10.2007 - 17:33 CET |
By Lucia Kubosova

EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS - The Serbian minister on Kosovo affairs
claims the EU has slightly changed its stance on the Kosovo issue away from
insisting on the province's independence to a better understanding of
Belgrade's position.



Speaking at an event by a Brussels think-tank just a day after the second round
of talks between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians on Monday (15 October), Mr
Samardzic said that although it was not "marvellous" there has been
some positive outcome to the current diplomatic initiative, led by a trio of
EU, US and Russian envoys.

"We have seen progress from nothing to something," he said.



He pointed out that while the previous UN-led talks focused on issues other
than the future status of the province, the troika negotiations have gone to
the core problem.



The current diplomatic round was launched after Russia, a permanent member of
the UN's security council, earlier this year blocked UN envoy Marti Ahtisaari's
plan to set the 90-percent ethnic Albanian province of 2 million inhabitants on
the road to independence.



The trio of envoys are due to report back to the UN about the results of the
negotiations on 10 December, with Serb and Kosovo Albanian officials set to
meet again on 22 October and up to four more meetings scheduled throughout
November.



Less US-oriented?

Mr Samardzic maintained that until six months ago, "the EU followed
exclusively the US approach on Kosovo" while now it is trying more to
consider its own interests in the region and is "more in favour of
continuation of talks to reach a compromise than before."



He suggested that this EU policy is "still being just formulated" and
urged Europe to find a "specific European solution" more quickly.



But it is also Belgrade which is resisting time pressure and is against the
December deadline for finding a solution.



Wolfgang Ischinger, EU's envoy in the troika on Kosovo, said on late Sunday (14
October), that international negotiators found some "encouraging
elements," concerning the approach of Belgrade and Pristina but certainly
"not enough."



"We must get them to recognize the fact that they are still too far and
there is still quite a distance to be covered if really we want to get to an
agreement. This distance will also require some painful decisions by one or by
both sides".



Early death of EU foreign
policy?

For Serbia, a "European-kind of solution" for Kosovo would be "a
kind of autonomy," says Mr Samardzic, as he thinks it is "a classical
European solution on how to solve minority problems."



He explained that within such an autonomy there would be "a big room for
experiments possible" on the details of power-sharing.



Limited autonomy is unacceptable for Kosovo Albanians however who have
announced they are planning to declare independence unilaterally shortly after
the troika talks are due to end in December.



While the US has signalled it would recognize such a unilateral move, Belgrade
is hopeful that the EU would not follow suit due to disagreements over the
issue among its member states.



"A unilateral move by some states recognising Kosovo without a common EU
position would be disastrous for its foreign and security policy, it would be
the end of it," commented Mr Samardzic.



For their part, EU officials try to use eventual European membership as
political leverage for both sides to find a solution.

• Back
• To the top

© 2007 EUobserver, All rights reservedhttp://euobserver.com/9/24970/?rk=1

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Kosovo: toward the end of the experiment?

Kosovo: toward the end of the experiment? by Umberto Pascali

Global Research, September 25, 2007

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What is going to happen in Kosovo? The official spokesmen, the experts have been wrong so many times in the last many months that they have achieved, paradoxically, a positive result: normal people have lost any remaining confidence in their credibility. The once omnipotent Marti Ahtisaari had put his hand on the fire proclaiming the unstoppable “independence” of the province. He lost that hand. Washington political and diplomatic leaders from George Bush on down had spoken in the curt language characteristic of the “sole superpower” that the Olympus had taken a decision and minor gods (such as those lingering around the UN Palace) had to accept the fait accompli or else. The European gnomes from London to Berlin to Paris, like the cat in Pinocchio kept repeating the last words of the US fox explaining to the naïf Balkan natives the unchangeable and unchallengeable nature of the decision taken by the supreme powers: “It’s a done deal, see? Nobody can change the decision.” Instead, it was all but a done deal! Ahtisaari has been forced to abandon the stage where he tried to play the part of the hero in an historic drama. On the contrary, rotten eggs, tomatoes, and cat calls have put an end to a pathetic farce of corruption and shame. Still, no “done deal”. It was the moment, then, to deploy the local messengers of Olympus. The “experts” dutifully obliged writing in newspapers and enjoying the sound of their voice on TV: there is nothing anybody can do., Kosovo will be “independent.” Is there the risk that this will become a precedent that destroys some basic tenets of international law? So what? The antiquated discussion on what is right and what is wrong has been abandoned long ago. It is a new world now. For our own good, the rule now is Might Makes Right. Still, no “done deal”. Then the threat arrived: If you people do not accept what has been decided for you then there will be an explosion of violence. The UCK – remember the UCK – could reemerge bigger and bloodier than ever. The Albanians could start mass violence if they do not get what they want. And you Macedonians, do you remember how things started in Tanusevci after the Kosovo war of ’99? Things can start again, and who will defend you then? Better you push for an immediate and unconditional implementation of the decisions. This threat was accompanied by the sub-threat of the partition of Macedonia if the “independence” of Kosovo was not realized according to the decisions. If, for example, an area of Kosovo was to be administered by the Serbian population. And still, no “done deal”. On the contrary, Serbia, that had been democratized and westernized, now seems not be even interested in the offer of membership in NATO and European Union that once were the idols in front of which all the former so-called eastern European countries would genuflect and pray. Now, the Serbian leaders are challenging the decision taken in Washington. They are closing ranks with Russia and are openly accusing Washington of establishing, not an independent and democratic regime in Kosovo, but … a NATO puppet state. The revelation of the secret everybody knew but no official leader dared to say began with Aleksandar Simic, an adviser to Serbia’s Prime Minister Kostunica: “it can be concluded that the implementation of Ahtisaari’s plan would call for Bondsteel to practically be the capital city of an independent Kosovo.” Of course, Camp Bondsteel, is the enormous US military basis whose construction started when Kosovo and Serbia were still smoking from the 1999 bombing (i.e., the blueprint must have been ready before the Kosovo war). The Macedonian public knows very well how strategic is the position of Bondsteel in the context of the transportation corridors and pipelines running north-south and east-west in the Balkans. Few can believe that such a gigantic base would be built only for a temporary operation and then, the sovereignty would be given to the independent Kosovo government. Before going to Moscow to discuss the Kosovo issue, the Serbian Minister for Kosovo Slobodan Samardzic urged Washington to give up "the project of creating a satellite, army barrack, state on foreign territory.” The "creation of the NATO state" was the real goal of NATO's 1999 air war against Serbia over Kosovo." And the spokesman of Kostunica, Branislav Ristivojevic insisted in his nationalist rhetoric: "We won't give up Kosovo, nor one inch of Serbian territory, for any kind of international integration process, whether it's NATO, the European Union or anything else… Kosovo's real capital would be Camp Bondsteel.” Behind Serbia, the Russia of Vladimir Putin stands firm with its warning of using its veto power in the UN if the issue of independence is put to vote. China, one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council is reportedly ready to do the same. The US, that fought its most ferocious war (1861-65) to stop the secession of the southern states, tried to threaten a unilateral recognition of Kosovo’s “independence.” It soon had to back down and deny it ever did so. Meanwhile, Russia is stating every day in more clear terms its opposition to any unilateral declaration of independence, and the more the US and the Euro-bureaucrats call for respect of the decision, the more a subtle but increasing split is becoming visible in Europe. Officials in several European capitals are expressing their opposition to the hard line on independence while in publish the dissent is taking the form of the research of a not-better-defined compromise. Why is the Sole Superpower not able to impose a “done deal”? Why does the normalized Serbia talk back to Washington and say publicly what was supposed to be discussed only in private? And more in general: how come that until now the Anglo American strategy ended up winning all the games and now it is shooting more and more blanks? End of the Hegemony The answer to this question is the solution to the present Kosovo paradox. The Kosovo situation is not the consequence of local factors, just as it was not local factors that produced the main wars and strategic cataclysms in the Balkans since before WWI. The main cause was the clash of several empires fighting for supremacy in that geo-strategically crucial area, often manipulating local population to fight each other, and always determined to keep the area divided, “balkanized”. After the fall of the end of the Soviet Union, there was only one cowboy left with a big gun in the global saloon: the Anglo-American pistolero. No matter how short sighted, wild, and brainless, the lone gunman started and won all the fights he felt like provoking. The international institutions set up as compensation chambers among the international powers (read U.N.) came to resemble more and more the impotent drunk sheriff of old western movies. The Anglo-American gunman created new justification for his undisputed hegemony. A vast and unbridled propaganda machine could transform overnight an old tool (e.g. Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden) into the personified evil, perfect to justify a war with any means and no legalistic restrictions. All the other unarmed cowboys would fall on each other in the attempt to propitiate the gunman. All over the globe, and in Europe and in the Balkans in particular, several semi-demential experiments were set up with the declared purpose to reshape the map of the world. Countries were to be dismembered, ethnic and religious groups incited to fight each other, powerful imperial bases placed as control centers in the most strategic areas (such as Camp Bondsteel), no obstacle, even a potential one could have been allowed to survive. Every too strong a country was to be cut into pieces, defanged and boxed into a “defensive alliance” (NATO) dominated by Washington and London. In the crucial area of the Balkans it was not difficult to find ethnic, religious, cultural differences to be manipulated. After the first moment of euphoria in which the victorious US forces brought democracy and freedom to the oppressed people taking over the historical mission from the impotent Europeans, the “oppressed peoples” began to realize that they had been given neither freedom, nor democracy. Rather, they had been boxed in to an unstable situation in which the future was always more dangerous and scary than the present. The Kosovo war, for example, was followed by the surfacing of the UCK Mafioso-terrorist structure that had acted as a paramilitary force in the army of Wesley Clark and Madeleine Albright. The post-war became more dangerous that the pre-war. The UCK took over Kosovo and pushed away any moderate force. At this point Kosovo is a mixture of military power mostly emanating from Bondsteel and a mafia-like economy that includes every sort of criminal and illegal activity one could find in a penal code. As always, a mafia structure is contagious, the corruptive power of huge sums of money rapidly accumulated in the hands of the top criminals is infecting broader and broader areas. The booming opium production in the liberated Afghanistan is distributed in the form of heroin by the Albania or Kosovo mafia. Misery, instability, oppression presented as freedom, pending threats of future violence and wars is the daily reality. This has been the result of the great experiment organized by Washington and London. Like in the old horror movies when the mad scientist conducts his atrocious experiments, Kosovo “independence” was just a necessary step toward a greater horror. However, something strange happened. The guinea pigs refused to follow the script and begin to rebel. No independence. The power of the mad scientist is called into question. The experiment is stopped. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization The reason that the independence scenario has been blocked for the moment at least, is not due to a moral rebellion -- to the fact that what has been imposed is repulsive and criminal. The very large majority in Macedonia and many other countries knew how wrong and immoral the scenario was. Various unharmed prophets repeated things that were well known. This, however, did not stop the criminality. What stopped it was the creation of a counter power, the arrival in the global saloon of another armed cowboy. This new counter power, this bizarre Machiavellian prince, took the form a of an alliance between Russia and China, the two final victims of the worldwide balkanization plans. China and Russia started a series of meetings seven years ago creating a progressively more institutionalized organization that includes also four other Asian countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The last meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) took place in the middle of August in Kyrgyz Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The official observer countries included India, Pakistan, Iran and Mongolia. A total of ten presidents of member and candidate countries were present. Many others sent observers and asked to be considered for membership. The novelty this year was that the SCO also became a military alliance -- Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) -- and Vladimir Putin and the Chinese President Hu Jintao presided over substantial military maneuvers, “Peace Mission 2007,” with mostly Russian and Chinese troops that intended to demonstrate that local countries are going to defend and patrol” their strategic space, without need of US or NATO. Reportedly, the US asked to participate as observers. But their request was rejected. At the end of the first ever military maneuver of this kind, Putin announced: “I have decided that Russia's strategic aviation will resume patrols on a permanent basis. At midnight today, August 17, 14 strategic missile carriers, support and refueling aircraft took off from seven air force bases in different parts of the Russian Federation and began a patrol involving a total of 20 aircraft. As from today, such patrols will be carried out on a regular basis. These patrols are strategic in nature." The US and European media were not able to come out with a clear line on the Shanghai group. Political and military spokesmen were at a loss to quantify what had just happened. Someone called it, the NATO of the East. Others called it a new Warsaw Pact. But such definitions are, both at the same time limitative, and overblown. The new alliance is just making the first steps and it is not comparable to either NATO or the defunct Warsaw Pact. At the same time, the implication of such an alliance (with many countries formally allied with the US knocking insistently at the door of the new organization to be accepted. First of all, it is remarkable that China and Russia concluded such a substantial alliance. The traditional mistrust between the two countries is well known. Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon were able in the 70’s to play the China Card against the Soviet Union playing on that mistrust. It was the beginning of the end for the Soviet empire. Recently an insider observed that the Shanghai Group was exactly what Kissinger and Nixon did everything to prevent. And yet, the crazy Anglo-American cow boy succeeded in forcing Moscow and Beijing to overcome any disagreement and conclude a solid alliance. More solid than the wild mixture known as NATO. The new alliance is not an ideological entity. Its raison d’etre is, first and foremost, the necessity to defend oneself from the unchained and irrational hubris of the present Anglo-American elites. The Russian elite indeed tried to become “capitalist.” To accept privatizations and rock& roll, free market and McDonald’s. We know how the Yeltsin adventure ended up: a bankrupt country, taken over by corruption and organized crime and ready, in the opinion of geopolitico supremo, Zbigniew Brzezinski, to be partitioned into several chunks and used as a producer of raw materials controlled by Western companies. China was to end up in the same way. The Russian elite does not have any doubt, at this point, that the Anglo-American elite does not hate communism, it hates Russia. A similar way of thinking dominates in Beijing. This is why no matter which threats will be unchained against the new alliance, Russia and China will not surrender. They have already done that and they know that they would be smashed. No diplomatic magic can change that. A superficial observer could conclude that the China-Russia alliance corresponds to a simplistic East versus West scenario. Accustomed to the reductionist formulas of the dominating propaganda, a geographic location becomes an ideology and a philosophy. In fact, there are plenty of leaders, factions, institutions in the West that are looking with great hope to the new counter-power. Anything but the destructive irrationality of the crazy cowboy. The more, for example, Putin confronts his strategic rivals, and the more the so-called Atlantic solidarity shows cracks and breaks. The question of Kosovo made the point clear. Just few weeks ago Europe was aligned and obedient. Now, after Moscow repeated that unconditional independence is not going to be accepted, we see different opinions and dissent, both in private and publicly. What can Washington do? The fait accompli of unilateral recognition? It would lose even more allies. Military means? A campaign of boycott and propaganda against Putin the “dictator”? Already tried; and it doesn’t really work. It doesn’t work because now, contrary to 1999, there is a real force capable of defending itself on several fronts: diplomatic, political, propagandistic, and military. This is going to decide what will happen in Kosovo. Even the option of unchaining violence through UCK and other mercenary forces is not a totally practicable option. Special operations such as non-orthodox warfare can only work if there are none capable or willing to react. by denouncing. When there is an institutional entity with intelligence and media capabilities, a special operation could easily become a liability because it can be publicly revealed and its controllers unmasked. This is the objective limit in the use of terrorist cut out. It could lead to its controllers. Even if some form of independence is accorded to Pristina, it will not be the end of a process; it will be the beginning of a new confrontation because there is an independent power able and willing to challenge the fait accompli. To be noted that the only Asian country totally aligned with the Anglo-American elites, Japan, has recently dropped its anti-China line and called publicly through its new Prime Minister for closer relations with Beijing. China’s Nuclear Option Indeed the clash between the former Sole Superpower and the new emerging Russian-Chinese alliance does not concern only the political and military aspect. Actually the most important front is the economic and financial one. The Anglo-American elite took a decision long ago to de-industrialize their countries, use cheap (or slave) labor from Third World countries, mostly China, and thus stop paying normal wages to their countrymen. In the immediate term this meant gigantic profits. China was producing goods for almost nothing. But in so doing, the genial economists achieved two things; first, they all but destroyed their qualified labor, and second, they gave to China the goose that that lays the golden eggs, i.e. their productive apparatus. The masochistic geniality of these financial experts contemplated also the idea of issuing an infinite number of US Treasury Bonds that could finance an increasing mountain of debts. Who would buy it? Well, mostly the Chinese. So, in a sort of vicious circle, the Chinese labor would do most of the work from which US companies would extract a large profit. The money accumulated by the Chinese would then go to finance further US debt. This system, presented here in a simplified form, could work while the dollar system could impose itself with the political and military strength controlled by Washington. There is only one Achilles heel in all of this. If China, or all the other countries that have huge reserves in US treasury bonds and dollars (Russia, Saudi Arabia, European Countries, and every rich producer of oil and raw materials including Venezuela and Iran) decide one day to dump them, then the whole genial scheme that allowed them to become rich without working, would collapse. This, however, was not even considered a possibility. The military power of the US was without comparison and anybody who could even remotely challenge it would be smashed. Besides, there was a grand strategic design that would put the whole world under their direct control. Once the Soviet Union had been dismantled, it was time to smash the most populous and doggedly cohesive developing countries, the Muslim countries. It was called the Clash of Civilizations. Then, once the last vestige of independence in those countries was canceled and there was no obstacle to full looting of oil and other materials, it was the moment to start the long march to take over Russian and China. The countries would have been partitioned, balkanized and then used as a reserve of raw material and semi-slave labor. The Balkan strategy with the enlargement of NATO was only part of a new Operation Barbarossa to encircle, isolate and then take over Russia. No raw materials were to be exported from Russia independently, without the mediation of an Anglo-American company. This made Kosovo and Macedonia, -- points of transit for transportation corridors and pipelines -- crucial locations. Even if the continental European countries do not know it or try not to see it, they were the last stage in this deranged grand design. All of this depended on the ability to prevent the establishment of even a limited form of independent power. But the clumsy strategists relied mostly on computer and formal logic, forgetting history and culture. In 1999, it was the NATO/US victory in Kosovo that triggered deep changes inside the Russian leadership that had concluded that Washington could not be trusted. The result was the rapid eclipse of Yeltsin and the emerging of the unknown Putin who took over Russia with the mission of re establishing its independent power with every means. But already during the last phase of the Kosovo war, the Russian military had taken over the Pristina airport. Their determination, even at that low point gave a healthy scare to the British General Michael Jackson who refused the order given by the American general in charge, Wesley Clark, to stop the Russians with the words: "I'm not going to start the third world war for you," Eight years later, the danger highlighted by the British general, is possibly more real than it has even been during the whole cold war. China and Russia (and possibly silent partners in high places in Europe and elsewhere) have put together an unrefined but effective military power and are expanding it as fast as they can. It is a desperate race in which they think they cannot surrender. The military dimension, again, is only a part of the game. The financial side of this war is even more important. China gave a demonstration of it. After having been pressured by US to continue its role of playing sewer system for US debts and after having been asked to sacrifice its economy and risk financial destabilization by buying the worthless sub-prime mortgage, the Chinese went for the “nuclear option”. If the US insists in destabilizing our financial system, the academician He Fang stated, Beijing “could be forced to sell the dollar... which may lead to a mass depreciation of the dollar. Another official, Xia Bin, declared that the huge Chinese reserves in dollars and treasury bonds could be used as “bargaining chips.” The pressures on China stopped for a while, while a campaign on the danger of Chinese produced toys was launched in the US media. However, in the US stock market the Dow Jones index went down after the statements. The US monetary authorities were forced to go for a policy of low interest rates that will provoke a growing inflation. When the worthless sub prime mortgage collapsed, Beijing announced proudly that they had disinvested from that sector. The threat this time had not worked. An immense self created weak flank, the growing mountain of treasury bonds and dollars that can be dumped at time, has become a reality of the ongoing war.

Global Research Articles by Umberto Pascali

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