March 25, 2009
Cancer: NATO’s time bomb in the Balkans
24 March, 2009, 22:23
Tuesday marks the 10th anniversary of the beginning of the three-month NATO bombing campaign of the former Yugoslavia - and a decade later, the wounds of the war are still felt.
Throughout the areas which have been affected by NATO bombings, hundreds of people are dying of cancer. Experts say that this may be a result of uranium shells being used.
A little cemetery in Bratunac, Eastern Bosnia became the final resting place for a number of cancer victims. A local resident, who preferred to remain anonymous, gave RT the names of some who are buried there. He says they all died of cancer.
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Djoko Zelenovic, who worked in the local military repair factory, died from the disease at the age of 65. The 35 year-old mother of two small children also rests here.
There used to be no more than one or two funerals a year in this small Serbian village in Eastern Bosnia. Since NATO dropped bombs on Sarajevo in the summer of 1995, the number has climbed to as many as one or two deaths a month.
Nikola Zelenovic’s parents are buried here. He says they were healthy until the NATO bombings and is now spearheading an investigation.Nikola says that "my family lived throughout the war years in the town of Hadjici. My father was working in one of the factories there when NATO bombed it. His health problems started soon afterwards. He died from lung cancer. My mother died a year and a half after him from Leukemia. My parents were never sick before."
Starting on March 24th, 1999, for three months NATO bombed Serb targets in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Four years earlier its forces had bombed Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Their aim was to end the fighting between Serbs and Albanians who lived in the areas.
But they left a time bomb behind them. In the years that followed, hundreds of people living in the areas that were hit have died of cancerIn Kosovo, the number of cancer patients has grown three times over the last ten years, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina, already more than a thousand people have died from cancer.
Doctor Slavko Zdrale has treated several cancer patients over the past years and boldly advances theories on the subject: He told RT that “a few years ago we started noticing that there was as many as five times the number of people dying of different kinds of cancer as compared to the number of people who had been sick before the war.”
“We worked out that 90% of them came from areas NATO had bombed and from areas where ammunition with uranium was used. Nobody in the international community took much notice until Italian soldiers who were stationed in those areas started dying from cancer-related illnesses.”
In Pale, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the war crimes court is recording evidence of an increased number of cancer patients. The court says that the pieces of ammunition found in the bombed areas had a much higher level of radiation than is internationally allowed. Investigators are convinced that this radiation is the underlying cause of cancer.
Simo Tusevljak, the coordinator of the Research and documentation of war crimes, stated that “we believe that this was a deliberate attempt by NATO forces to kill as many people as possible. It was also a chance for the West to test new weapons.” .
“But there is nothing we can do," he added. "We cannot file any complaint against NATO because all those involved have diplomatic immunity. A NATO soldier can kill and never be prosecuted. But perhaps one day some senior officials from NATO who ordered the bombings will be prosecuted. I believe the order came from high up."
NATO hasn't commented on the claims and has dismissed Serbian and Italian investigations.There has been no other independent research conducted on the subject.
The little cemetery in Bratunac is already full. But locals fear the number of cancer victims will continue to grow for at least the next fifty years, or for as long as it takes for the air to clean.
Ten years after the NATO bombings, the alliance still has a lot to answer for. But no matter when those answers come (or whether they will come at all) they will be too late for the cancer victims.
http://www.russiatoday.ru/Top_News/2009-03-24/Cancer__NATO_s_time_bomb_in_the_Balkans.html
February 28, 2009
`Hushing up disappearances in Kosovo is betrayal`
`Hushing up disappearances in Kosovo is betrayal`
19 February, 2009, 08:55
Covering up the atrocities committed in Kosovo against the non-Albanian population is ultimately a betrayal of hopes of building a civilised society in Kosovo itself, believes independent filmmaker Ninoslav Randjelovic.
For the last decade Randjelovic has been producing films on the human rights of minorities living in Kosovo. His work has been shown all around the world.
RT: Where did the idea for your work come from?
NR: The essence of it has been an effort to document cases of severe human rights violation that was affecting and that has been affecting civilian population of Kosovo and Metohia particularly Serbian and the non-Albanian ethnic minority in Kosovo. To have it recorded as much as it can be recorded and brought to attention of whoever wants to see it.
RT: You say that you are drawn to this work because were hearing reports that people had gone missing, but how in fact did this information even come through?
NR: Here in Belgrade I would learn about that only occasionally even though 1,300 people in such a short period of time had been kidnapped. Sometimes there were no photos of these people of course in the newspapers, sometimes names and nothing much more, or maybe a location where they were seen last time. In 1998 I went down there and tried to collect some information from the family members and that's how it all started – with the hope that if we bring to the world's attention what really is happening in these remote villages of Kosovo maybe the suffering of people will cease
RT: From the data that you collected what do you understand happened to these people? How did they go missing?
NR: Well, you know, lots of them had been just kidnapped outside. They were stopped at the road and then just abducted like that. But at that time it was like devastating for me even though I did record these facts, it seemed like nobody really cared about it. The lack of media attention to what was really going on in Kosovo is something that I think we can say made space for such terrible things to happen at the first place.
RT: Who did you understand kidnapped these 1,300 non-Albanians and why?
NR: According to the people I talked to, most likely paramilitary troops, KLA troops were the ones who were involved in this kidnapping process. But you know, the thing is, not a single person came back alive that we know of, so we can’t know that for sure.
RT: What did people suspect happened to them?
NR: We see that they have been killed Now there is legitimate concern that some of them were used to take organs from the body and killed later on.
RT: How lucrative a business is the trafficking of human organs and who's involved in it?
NR: Well now people say that – you know I don't know. But that's what I read that ahuman body is worth a million euros on the black market. If you have one body so to say worth a million euros, imagine 1,300 bodies or anything like that! And that brings another issue like I mean I'm not saying that is something that we will know, but at least we must ask ourselves and we must look into the lack of media coverage of these crimes and atrocities suffered by the civilian population of Kosovo is part of the reason why these things could have happened.
RT: Why was there such a lack of media coverage then?
NR: Because somehow politics in a certain way obscured certain issues such as these atrocities suffered by the Serbian civil population, because simply it was considered maybe politically incorrect to talk about sufferings that the Serbian and not the Albanian civil population experienced.
RT: Politically incorrect by whom, the Serbian authorities?
NR: Well, I guess not by the Serbian authorities but by the world media. But the thing is I'm more concerned – much more – by the lack of interest shown by the Serbian media.
RT: How do you explain that there was so little Serbian media interest?
NR: There's no ready explanation. I cannot explain that. But I think it's because the Milosevic regime wanted to show itself as in control of the region, as being powerful enough to protect Serbian interests in Kosovo that was jeopardised by, let's say, Albanian terrorists. Then, showing how ineffective Belgrade is in protecting people in Kosovo will undermine the message that he wanted to send. On the other hand, after the Milosevic regime was gone, the lack of interest in the problem – the suffering of the Serbian and non-Albanian population – continued. The lack of interest from the Serbian media is something that really makes it hard for me to come up with any kind of explanation.
RT: It's now 10 years later and obviously Milosevic is no longer on the scene, but from what you seem to suggest, the issue of human rights and non-Albanians in Kosovo still remains an issue and the media is still not interested in covering this. So how do you explain it?
NR: Well, actually, explanation is kind of a hard word. But the fact is we do still have such a serious issue as the lack of freedom in human rights. Basically it was again politically incorrect for the Belgrade regime to address that issue from that angle. Only two weeks ago we heard that an elderly couple a few kilometres from the border in Kosovo had been killed, and people are guessing whether it is because they didn't sell their house.
What about this tragedy from a human angle? From a human point of view? And how much do we really know about the fate of these people now? It is more important than ever now especially that the EULEX is coming to Kosovo. It is more important than ever to raise this issue of safety and who's going to do it? So, for example, with the help of Greece and Russia I hope that three of my films will soon be translated into 10 languages, six of which will be official UN languages, and in that sense this will be used to show how serious the issue of safety has been in Kosovo.
RT: These people are not safe from whom? The new Kosovo government? Or random acts of violence?
NR: Random acts of violence. Such numerous things. I mean lots of objects that have been destroyed and have not been rebuilt yet. People have not returned to their houses or rebuilt their houses. Hundreds of thousands of them!
RT: It's all very well. You're talking about Greece and Russia, but why is the Serbian government today not doing enough to assure their safety?
NR: It is a hard question for me to explain. For example, right now I'm in the process of trying to convince them after all these years. If the Serbian government is not pressing these particular issues, what will happen with people who still live there in Kosovo, non-Albanians, then who will?
RT: Are you surprised with what happened regarding Kosovo? That the Serbian government did not put up more of a fight to prevent Kosovo from declaring independence?
NR: I'm kind of surprised that the Serbian government has not developed this argument more. What matters to Serbia down in Kosovo are people. Ultimately it's not about history. It is not about identity. It is not about religion. It's about loyalty to a fellow human being. By betraying them – and betrayal is if you don't talk about someone who's dying and who's been killed and who's yours – we are actually losing ground in becoming a civilised society here in Serbia. We must ask about them. They must be the number one thing in the minds of our politicians. Because if they are not, then what else is? And that's why I think we’ve failed so far as a country to convince the world what it is really that we are fighting for, because we have not stood together for these people.
RT: Is this issue only about Kosovo or is it an international issue?
NR: The international community arrived in Kosovo to stop killings and to help create a multi-ethnic society that is civilised. That's how we will measure the success of this international mission – the implementation of all this money, weapons and political will. Is it going to result in a better life for an ordinary citizen of Kosovo?
RT: Thank you for talking to us on RT.
http://www.russiatoday.com/Top_News/2009-02-19/_Hushing_up_disappearances_in_Kosovo_is_betrayal_.html
February 17, 2009
One year after independence, Kosovo needs 'a revolution'
One year after independence, Kosovo needs 'a revolution'
Kosovo proclaimed independence on 17 February 2008 (Photo: Wikipedia)
Today @ 06:59 CET
EUOBSERVER / BRUSSELS – One year after its declaration of independence, Kosovo has surprised observers by remaining stable but it has yet to tackle the profound reforms it needs to make it a viable state.
When it unilaterally seceded from Serbia on 17 February 2008, many voiced fears about the future of the young state and about possible outbursts of violence between Kosovo's Albanian majority and its minority Serb population, loyal to Belgrade.
This is why "the stability that was preserved" is undisputedly Kosovo's main achievement during this one year, Ilir Dugolli, Kosovo's envoy in Brussels, told EUobserver.
"We have to go back more than a year ago and think about all the warnings that were coming ahead of the declaration of independence. That it would be a criminal state, a state that cannot sustain itself, or that there were going to be waves of refugees, expelled [Kosovo] Serbs and so on," Mr Dugolli said, highlighting the contrast between those "dire scenarios" and the reality on the ground.
But despite the relatively stable security situation acknowledged by many observers, Kosovo still has considerable challenges to face, both internally and internationally.
It has only been recognised by 54 out of the United Nations' 192 members, including the US and 22 EU member states, but excluding five EU countries – Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia.
This significantly impedes Kosovo's access to international institutions.
In addition, analysts note that economically and socially Kosovo has in fact changed very little during its first year of existence as an independent state.
'Revolution' needed
"Many of the big problems that were there before… have not been addressed, obviously," said Verena Knaus, a Pristina-based analyst from the European Stability Initiative (ESI) – a non-profit policy institute known for its analyses and research work on South East Europe.
Electricity problems, bad infrastructure, poor rural and economic development, high levels of poverty and unemployment still exist, she pointed out noting that a dramatic improvement in education is needed to build "a competitive Kosovo.".
For ESI chairman Gerald Knaus, it is also "striking how little has changed" in the country in terms of its development in the past year.
"Kosovo as it is today needs a revolution. It needs a social revolution, an economic and institutional revolution," Mr Knaus told EUobserver.
"What you really need is that in 50 years, people in Kosovo all do different things from what they do today. They know different skills, they produce different goods, [and] the institutions work differently," he added.
Meanwhile, Dutch Green MEP Joost Lagendijk, in charge of the Kosovo dossier for the European parliament, was cautiously optimistic.
Despite the "enormous amount of work still to be done…things have started working," Mr Lagendijk said.
He notably pointed out that although "the EU took a very long time" to react in Kosovo, it now "finally seems to be moving" and could assist Kosovo in its reforms.
EULEX – the EU's police and justice mission to Kosovo – is one element of the bloc's presence in Kosovo that could eventually be "a success," the MEP stressed.
After several delays, EULEX has been fully operational throughout Kosovo since 9 December, taking over police, justice and customs tasks from United Nations personnel.
But the fact that it was slow to start, in addition to Belgrade's intervention in the process, means that the EU mission has lost some credibility on the ground, Ms Knaus said.
An EU future for Kosovo?
Alongside its internal problems, another important stumbling block for the young country today is the EU's failure to unanimously recognise it as an independent state.
"The problem of Kosovo one year after independence is that it still lacks a credible EU perspective," which it cannot be given "as long as the EU is divided on what Kosovo is," Mr Knaus said.
Such an approach risks "deepening the isolation of Kosovo," he warned.
For his part, Mr Dugolli admitted the lack of full EU recognition was an important issue, but expressed confidence that it would eventually be solved, paving to way for Pristina's full membership of the bloc in the long term.
A Gallup survey published last November revealed that among the citizens from the western Balkans, Kosovars were the most optimistic in terms of their country's EU future.
They were almost unanimously in favour of EU membership – at 89 percent. But Mr Dugolli warned that if there is no "specific concrete progress" then this support is likely to diminish.
No World Cup yet
Together with the lack of unanimity among EU members on recognising the continent's youngest country, the more general lack of consensus in the United Nations has also creating practical hurdles for Pristina.
Kosovo has no area code today, and if one wants to reach somebody in Kosovo by phone, they have to dial Serbia's area code for landlines, and Monaco's for mobiles.
In addition, Kosovars cannot enjoy the privilege of cheering for their football team during the Euro or World football championships, because Kosovo must be a UN member in order to be allowed into both UEFA and FIFA.
"First of all, it is unfair to those people for whom sports is their life. It is unfair to be prevented, to be isolated," said Mr Dugolli, himself a sports fan.
But he was confident this would progressively change and could "certainly" imagine a match between Kosovo and Serbia one day in the future.
For its part, Serbia has repeatedly said it would never recognise its former province as a sovereign state and has vowed to block it from membership to international institutions.http://euobserver.com/9/27621/?rk=1
January 25, 2009
Madam Secretary of State and the Balkans
CLINTON AND THE BALKANS
Madam
Secretary of State and the Balkans
By
Georgy
Gounev
January
24, 2008
What could be easily predicted on the eve of the beginning of Mrs Clinton’s
service in her capacity of diplomat number one of the United States is
the fact that the Balkans won’t be in the focus of her attention. Obviously,
according to her, everything in the Balkans is in order, and true to the
principle “if something isn’t broken don’t try to fix it”, the dynamic
Madam Secretary won’t pay attention to the area unless something dramatic
happen,( as a new massacre, for instance).
The only context, within which such important and volatile area as the
Balkans has been mentioned during Mrs Clinton’s unsuccessful bid for the
Presidency of the United States, was the fairy tale involving her heroism
when she bravely crossed an airfield while unidentified bullets were raining
around her. It was a lie, of course, but the bulk of the American media
ignored it. The unusually kind reporters accepted Mrs Clinton’s explanation
that she “misspoke” while describing the above mentioned episode. With
the exception of Mrs Clinton and her illustrious husband however, the rest
of the world would assume that if you say that you were under fire while
as a matter of fact no one was shooting at you, such statement can’t be
qualified in any other way but as a lie.
It would represent some interest to try to take a look at the image
of the Balkans that exists in the mind of the future American Secretary
of State. To start with, it has been the area where her husband while enjoying
her full support, heroically saved from a brutal ethnic cleansing the Albanian
majority of the Kosovo province. He was the one who created the necessary
pre-conditions that made possible the emergence of the new independent
state of Kosovo. Due to the activities of President Clinton, again fully
supported by his wife, the United States were successful in proving to
the Muslim world that the Americans are able to protect a Muslim community
from the ethnic cleansing exercised by the armed and police forces of a
Christian state.
There are though, some important dimensions of the Balkan situation
missing from Mrs Clinton’s list of American achievements. From political
point of view, the actions of the Clinton administration against Serbia
violated one of the most important principles regarded as an absolutely
necessary condition for the preservation of the peace on the continent-
the inviolability of the borders established at the end of WWII.
From strategic point of view the lack of reciprocity in Washington’s
actions with regard to the ethnic conflict in Kosovo created the impression
among the Christian population of the Balkans that the entire might of
the United States is behind the Albanian community and the American actions
were directed not just against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic, but, rather,
against Serbia and the Serbians. This fact contributed immensely for the
expansion of the anti- Americanism throughout the Balkans.
From a moral prospective this feeling has been reinforced by the way
Serbia was virtually bombed out of an area that historically, culturally
and emotionally always has occupied a particularly important place in the
heart of the Serbian people. It was the place where one of the most important
battles has been fought by a Christian force against the ferocious assault
of the Turkish invaders- a fact completely ignored, or much more probably,
never learned by Mrs Clinton.
In all fairness, it is true that the actions of Clinton administration
have made America popular with the Albanian people and the Albanian communities
of Kosovo and Macedonia. At the same time, there could be a little doubt
that Albania and Kosovo are the only Muslim populated areas where the United
States is a popular country. No Muslim statesman or leader outside the
Balkans has expressed gratitude for the American protection of the fellow
Muslims.
The other side of the coin is that regardless of everything done by
America for Albania and the Albanians, neither Kosovo is able to function
as a democratic and economically viable state, nor the Americans have managed
to find some effective way to suppress the drug producing and drug trafficking
activities of the Albanian Mafia.
The very first statement of Mrs Clinton made even before the formal
confirmation of her new position was to call Afghanistan a” narco state”.
Well, so is Kosovo, and so is Albania. In addition to that, an even more
important than drugs threat by the name of Radical Islam is advancing throughout
the Balkans.
This is only a part of the complex Balkan situation the new American
Secretary of State most probably will try to ignore. It remains to be seen
for how long…
New Publication: Kosovo and Metohija. Living in the Enclave
Contents
Foreword...................................................................................................... 7
DušanT. Bataković
Kosovo and Metohija: Identity, Religions & Ideologies................................... 9
Miloš Luković
Kosovska Mitrovica: Present and Past......................................................... 83
Helena Zdravković
Historical Victimage of Kosovo Serbs and Albanians...................................107
Valentina Pitulić
Folklore in the Serb Enclave: Preserving Identity in Hostile Environment....131
Harun Hasani
Migrations of Goranies................................................................................143
Radivoje Mladenović
The Sirinićka Župa: Štrpce Municipality-Historical Background
and Current Field Research....................................................................... 155
Mirjana Menković
The Enclave of Velika Hoča: Cultural Heritage as a Means
of Socio-economic Renewal and Preservation of Serbian Identity in Kosovo and Metohija ..............................................................................................175
Miloš Luković
Tzintzars in Uroševac, Lipljan, Obilić, Priština and Kosovska Mitrovica.......225
Dušan T. Bataković
Surviving in Ghetto-like Enclaves: The Serbs of Kosovo
and Metohija 1999—2007.......................................................................... 239
Appendix
Chaos and disorder: Kosovo and Metohija four years later by Fr. Sava Janjić...........................................................................................................265
Roma in Kosovo and Metohija: Arguments against independence
of Kosovo and Metohija oy Rajko Djurić......................................................283
Belgrade Valedictory: March 1 2007 by Julian Harston...............................287
Kosovo and Metohija at the Crossroads by Fr. Sava Janjić........................ 293
.
The Visoki Dečani Monastery Land Issue by Visoki Dečani Monastery .....305
Kosovo Future Status by Joseph K.Grieboski............................................. 315
Abstracts.........................................................................
www.balkaninstitut.com/pdf/izdanja/posebno/Enklave.pdf
http://www.balkaninstitut.com/eng/news/news.html
November 16, 2008
LETTER TO EDITOR: Kosovo quagmire
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/nov/15/kosovo-quagmire/
LETTER TO EDITOR: Kosovo quagmire
Saturday, November 15, 2008
ASSOCIATED PRESS FILE PHOTO Kosovo's president, Fatmir Sejdiu (left), joined by Kosovo's head of parliament Jakup Krasniqi, is shown signing the newly independent nation's constitution in June.
Samuel Hoskinson laments that the Serbian province of Kosovo, which poses as an independent country despite the refusal of most nations to recognize it, is a poverty-stricken backwater plagued by self-serving contenders for power. ("Kosovo again in peril?" Commentary, Nov. 2). He then tries to blame Kosovo's woes on one politician who is not in power (Veton Surroi) while exonerating "former freedom fighter Hashim Thaci," who heads the illegal separatist administration.
Despite billions of dollars in aid, Kosovo's only viable "industry" remains organized crime. Mr. Hoskinson's "freedom fighters" -- commanders of the former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) -- are also kingpins in the Albanian mafia's drug, slave and weapons rackets. The KLA destroyed more than 150 Serbian Orthodox Christian churches and eradicated two-thirds of Kosovo's Serbs. Mr. Thaci's administration is stonewalling Serbian investigators and Human Rights Watch trying to account for some 300 Serbs who, according to former Hague Tribunal prosecutor Carla Del Ponte, were kidnapped by the KLA and dissected alive for their marketable organs.
Mr. Hoskinson's vendetta against Mr. Surroi -- who never has been accused of the kind of atrocities committed by KLA "freedom fighters" -- raises another question. Mr. Hoskinson identifies himself as former president of the Alliance for New Kosovo, a pro-independence group. He omits that the Alliance for New Kosovo was a creature of Mr. Hoskinson's registered client, controversial businessman Behxhet Pacolli. Is Mr. Hoskinson still working for Mr. Pacolli? If not, whose interests is he advancing? By contrast, I am more than pleased to disclose that I work for Kosovo's Serbs under their spiritual leader, Bishop Artemije of Ras and Prizren.
However dismal the situation is in Kosovo under the misrule of Mr. Hoskinson's "freedom fighters," what should concern us as Americans is our government's misguided support for them, first under President Clinton, then under President Bush, and no doubt to continue under President-elect Barack Obama. This policy has brought no benefit to the United States but has earned us an unprecedented degree of world isolation as measured by last month's vote in the U.N. General Assembly to refer the Kosovo question to the International Court of Justice. The United States was supported by a mighty coalition of just five countries: Albania, the Marshall Islands, Palau, Nauru and Micronesia.
JAMES GEORGE
JATRAS
Director
American Council for Kosovo
Washington
October 29, 2008
Russia, Serbia and the Kosovo Problem
17:27 | 28/ 10/ 2008
(John Laughland for RIA Novosti) - Every evening at 5pm a group of demonstrators meets on Republic Square in central Belgrade to protest "against the occupation of Kosovo" by the European Union.
For these people, the apparently harmless transfer of power from one international administration (the United Nations, which has governed Kosovo since 1999) to another (the EU) - a transfer which is supposed to take place formally in December, but which is already being implemented as EU personnel are even now being deployed to the province - is in fact a matter of principle. The EU treats Kosovo as an independent state, whereas the UN administration is based on a Security Council Resolution which proclaims it to be part of Serbia.
The nightly demonstrations are notable for two things. First, the turnout is very low - perhaps twenty or thirty people in a city of nearly two million. The Western-backed destruction of Yugoslavia has been going on for sixteen long years now (since 1992) and most Serbs are now so exhausted and demoralised by it that they are incapable of offering any further resistance. Second, the demonstrators carry Russian flags and sing the Russian national anthem. Vladimir Putin is said to be the most popular politician in Serbia, and Russia generally is regarded now (by anti-EU Serbs at least) as their only remaining hope.
However understandable, this hope is shortly to be dashed. Ever since the violent overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic on 5 October 2000, Serbia has had an uninterrupted line of pro-Western governments and presidents. This pro-Western orientation has brought Serbia only further sales of the country's economic assets to foreigners, and the further stripping of territory from Belgrade's control. In 2006, Montenegro proclaimed its independence from democratic Serbia, only to be followed by Kosovo this February. Both acts were encouraged by the West. Serbia is therefore damned if she opposes the West (as she did from 1990 to 2000 under Milosevic) and damned if she supports it (as she has done did since 2000 under Prime Ministers Vojislav Kostunica and Zoran Djindjic and the current president, Boris Tadic). No wonder some Serbs look to Russia.
Moreover, in order for the Western (EU and US) policy on Kosovo to take effect, the existing United Nations Administration in Kosovo must be dissolved. This can happen only with a vote in the Security Council and therefore only with Moscow's consent. Moscow has said that it will not agree to anything which Belgrade opposes, and Belgrade does indeed currently oppose both the independence of Kosovo and the transfer of authority to the EU.
However, people who are in the know in Belgrade - including those who have exercised the highest offices of state - are certain that the present government's public opposition to the transfer of power from the United Nations Mission in Kosovo to EULEX (the acronym given to the EU administration), and indeed to the independence of Kosovo itself, is merely cosmetic. The present Foreign Minister of Serbia, Vuk Jeremić, said recently in a private meeting with the US State Department officials responsible for Kosovo that his government's only problem was how to find a way of sugaring the bitter bill of Kosovo independence in such a way that Serbian public opinion could be convinced to swallow it.
The Belgrade government has indeed inched towards an acceptance of EULEX and therefore of the independence of Kosovo. It has said that it will accept EULEX on three conditions - if it is approved by the United Nations Security Council; if it is neutral towards the status of Kosovo; and if it does not implement the Ahtisaari plan for (internationally supervised) Kosovo independence. Although it is difficult to see how these last two conditions can ever be met (the EU mission is inseparable from the change in status, otherwise there would be no need to install it in place of the current UN administration), it is obvious from his acts that President Boris Tadic is prepared to pay any price for Serbia's entry ticket to the EU. Serbia's appeal to the International Court of Justice for an advisory ruling on Kosovo (whose independence has been recognised by less than one third of the member states of the UN), an appeal which was successfully accepted at the beginning of this month, is likely to lead to an ambiguous judgement which is any case will be non-binding and which will probably be overtaken by events in the meantime.
Some sort of fudge - of the sort which the European Union is already a world expert at concocting-will therefore be produced between now and December to square the circle between Belgrade's declared opposition to Kosovo independence and its de facto acceptance of it. Such a fudge is certainly very dangerous for the province itself, since government and policing cannot function without very clear lines of authority - as an UNMIK policeman said to me last week, "How can you arrest someone if you do not have the clear right to do so?" Crime and corruption, already rampant in Kosovo, will only prosper even more so. But if Moscow currently does hold the key to Kosovo in virtue of its veto in the Security Council, and if Russia therefore represents a beacon of hope for patriotic Serbs, there is little she can do with this power if Belgrade itself is determined to throw it away.
John Laughland is a British historian and political scientist, Director of Studies at the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation in Paris.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20081028/117995277.html
October 28, 2008
Kosovo: Lost to Serbia and to the West
From the desk of John Laughland on Mon, 2008-10-27 21:12
laughland-controversies.gif
A few days spent in Belgrade feels like an age. Although I have been here more times than I can remember (albeit not for five years or so) the country remains almost insuperably foreign. There is something radically different about the Balkans, with respect to the rest of Europe, and there are few more quintessentially Balkan states than Serbia.
Where else, for instance, would you meet a man with the wonderful name of Slobodan Despot who smiles and hands you a copy of “The Road to Revolution” by Thomas Kaczynski, a.k.a. the Unabomber? Mr. Despot is a publisher previously worked for a conservative pro-Serb publishing house in Paris and the other titles in his own list now include a consolidated calendar of Orthodox and Western saints, and the memoirs of a woman who opened a sex shop in Paris in the early 1970s.
And where else would you find yourself on a sofa sipping wine and talking to a civilised young professor of medicine who was himself ethnically cleansed from his home town of Urosevac in Kosovo in June 1999, as NATO guards transported Albanian guerrillas in their Hummers across the province to commit their vicious and systematic arson, murder and rape? Where else – especially in Europe – would you meet a monk whose 25 parishioners (in one of the main towns of Kosovo) have to run the gauntlet every Sunday in order to avoid getting killed on the way to Mass?
All these things happened to me – and much more – in the space of a very short stay last week. Ever since the United Nations took over Kosovo in 1999, indeed, the province’s endemic corruption has exploded, as I was able to confirm by talking to two American policemen who work for the international administration there. “Every level of society is corrupt,” one of them said. “Every single aspect of the society is criminal.” This is largely because the Kosovo Liberation Army, the US-backed Contra-style guerrilla force which runs the province and which controls the government, the army and the police, is also notorious for its role as a powerful organisation running drugs, guns and sex slaves to Western Europe.
If organised crime is a way of life in Kosovo, so is the systematic destruction of churches: more than 150 churches and monasteries have been blown up on the UN’s watch in the last nine years, as Albanians seek not only to expel all Serbs from the province but also to eradicate any physical record of their ever having been their in the first place. Kosovo, one should never forget, is the original heartland of medieval Serbia, the Serbs having migrated North to Belgrade and the Pannonian plane beyond as a result of the Turkish invasions. Images of an angry mob pulling down crosses and stamping on them, such as were filmed on 17 March 2004, have not been seen since the early years of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia; just under a century later they are now, once again, part of Europe’s present.
In spite of these atrocities, which include the pogrom conducted against Serbs in March 2004 – a killing spree which went largely unreported in the West and which is now completely forgotten about – the European Union and the United States have pushed Kosovo to proclaim its own independence unilaterally, even though international law clearly forbids such a step. In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected Quebec’s right unilaterally to secede from Canada, on the grounds that the inhabitants of Quebec had full civil and political rights within Canada. Since Kosovo has been governed by the UN since 1999, their proclamation of independence now can only mean that they did not have full political and civil rights under that administration – the very body thrust onto Serbia by the “international community” in the name of human rights and democracy.
In the remaining months of this year, the Western powers (the EU and the US) will try to finesse a way of transferring power from the UN administration to one run by the European Union. The main obstacle comes from Russia which has a veto in the UN Security Council, the only body which can relinquish authority over the province. For the time being, the Belgrade government says that it opposes EULEX because EULEX was created as a vehicle for the independence of Kosovo, and Russia has said it will support Serbia. In private, however, Serb ministers admit that they will do anything to get into the EU, including accepting the amputation of 15% of their state territory.
However the circle is squared, the likely fudge of authority between the EU and the UN will cause what little government there is in Kosovo to break down completely. As one of the American policemen said to me, “How can you arrest someone if the lines of authority are unclear?” This unclarity will of course again further benefit the gangsters, pimps and drug-runners who currently constitute the government of Kosovo, and who have been the West’s allies since 1998.
Kosovo is therefore now decisively lost to the Serbs, and therefore to Christian civilisation. A war waged in the name of human rights in 1999 has led to nothing less than genocide – the wholesale eradication both of the Serb population of Kosovo since then (the few remaining Serbs live in ghettos) and of the historical memory of that population. In 1999, to justify the attack on Yugoslavia, the US State Department published a document called “Erasing History” which documented the alleged genocide against the Albanians. Now we know that the bulk of that document was war propaganda, its claims unproven despite years spent trying to prove them at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. Yet “erasing history” is precisely what the Albanians have done in Kosovo since NATO occupied the province, and on its watch. They have also erased democracy, human rights, and all the basic tenets of common human decency. The history of the last ten years in Kosovo is nothing but tragedy and hypocrisy blended into one – a true death of the West and all it stands for.
http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/3614
October 12, 2008
Kosovo blunder goes to court
GLOBE EDITORIAL
Kosovo blunder goes to court
October 12, 2008
MUCH OF THE resentment President Bush brought upon America can be traced to his contempt for international institutions and the legitimacy they may confer. International institutions have reason to feel the same way about Bush's decisions.
On Wednesday, the United Nations General Assembly agreed to Serbia's request to have the International Court of Justice in the Hague determine whether Kosovo's secession from Serbia is legal. Seventy-seven countries voted in favor of the request. The United States was among only six countries that voted against it.
But then, Bush decided to invade and occupy Iraq without authorization from the United Nations Security Council. He also dismissed the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and rejected the International Criminal Court.
When the administration asked for and received UN authorization for its prolonged occupation of Iraq, it seemed Bush had belatedly learned his lesson about the benefits of international legitimacy. But then came Bush's rash decision last February to recognize the independence of Kosovo from Serbia despite a failure to obtain UN Security Council authorization. The Kremlin pointed to that dubious precedent when it recognized independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia after the August war with Georgia.
There is a case to be made for Kosovo's independence. But there is no less of a case for the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia - as well as Tibet, and Taiwan, and Kurdistan, and the Tamil regions of Sri Lanka. The alternative to deciding all these cases by violence is international legitimacy. We hope this is a lesson the next US president will not have to learn all over again.
© Copyright 2008 The New York Times Company
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2008/10/12/kosovo_blunder_goes_to_court/
October 09, 2008
Kosovo and the Crisis of Ignoring International Law and Global Opinions
Kosovo and the Crisis of Ignoring International Law and Global Opinions
By Lee Jay Walker
Tokyo Correspondent
Kosovars celebrate their independence in Pristina and show off their new flag. Photo Courtesy of Getty Images
Kosovo obtained part independence when America and many European nations gave the go ahead for the creation of this new nation. However, it is clear that things are not plain sailing because many other nations did not support this elitist adventure, therefore, the wider international community was ignored. So today we have a situation where some nations support this new state (47 nations currently support this nation), however, the majority of nations in Africa, Asia, and South America, have not given their consent. Also, the Russian Federation, Spain, and some other European nations, refuse to accept this American led adventure. So what does the future hold for Kosovo and international law?
Firstly, the current status of limbo is a shock to America and many European nations because they believed that the majority of other nations would follow suit, however, at the moment this isn`t happening. Therefore, the influence of the Russian Federation, China, India, and other nations who are against the independence of Kosovo, is much deeper than America imagined. Also, many nations are aghast by the elitism of this new venture and of course many nations worry that the same may happen to them.
Another negative side effect is the fact that Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia have clear justifications to claim the same rights, with regards to the American model of bypassing international law and the United Nations. So if America can violate international law so easily, then America should expect other nations to follow suit. Therefore, many other would be nations in other parts of the world also claim to have the same natural rights. Of course the United States, the United Kingdom, and others, are claiming that Kosovo is unique, but this is not based on reality because you have too many conflicts all over the world. So a "can of worms" is the real cause and effect of this naive policy.
Nations which are against this American led venture have stated clearly that they are very unhappy with the blatant attitude of elitist Western nations. The Foreign Minister of Argentina, Jorge Taiana, stated "if we were to recognise Kosovo, which has declared its independence unilaterally, without an agreement with Serbia, we would set a dangerous precedent that would seriously threaten our chances of a political settlement in the case of the Falkland Islands."
The newly elected President of Cyprus, Dimitris Christofias, was even more outspoken because he stated "The one thing that Kosovo and Cyprus have in common, as far as the situation in these regions is concerned, is that in both cases, the basic principles of international law and legality, as well as UN decisions, are constantly being violated." A similar comment was made by Miguel Angel Moratinos, the Spanish Foreign Minister, because he made it clear that "the Government of Spain will not recognise the unilateral act proclaimed by the assembly of Kosovo [...] We will not recognise because we consider [...] this does not respect international law."
Therefore, this issue is very important and complex and it is not about denying either the majority Kosovo Albanians independence or supporting minorities like the Serbians, Roma, and other minorities in Kosovo. It is about a deeper issue and this applies to international law. So if America and her supporters can justify Kosovo then what about creating new independent nations for the Abkhazians and South Ossetians in Georgia, Palestinians, Karen in Myanmar, Tamils in Sri Lanka, West Papuans in Indonesia, Basques in Spain, Balochis in Pakistan, and the list can go on and on; so do these ethnic groups deserve independence?
This is the problem because you can not seriously claim that Kosovo is special or unique. After all, you have countless conflicts in the world and many ethnic groups face terrible persecution. Therefore, many other ethnic groups are aghast by events and Yasser Abed Rabbo, a Palestinian politician, stated "Kosovo is not better than us. We deserve independence even before Kosovo, and we ask for the backing of the United States and the European Union for our independence. If things are not going in the direction of continuous and serious negotiations, then we should take the step and announce our independence unilaterally."
Also, the international community, on a whole, is saying that this colonial attitude is really not warrented and of course major institutions, like the United Nations, have been violated and the same applies to international law. So we have a genuine dilemma over this issue and again if the United Nations and international law can be violated, then why have either? Sadly, nations like the United States believe that they are above the international community because they also bypassed international law when they attacked Iraq and bombed the former Yugoslavia.
You also have problems within Kosovo itself and major divisions still exist. This especially applies to northern Kosovo because the Serbian community is relatively sizeable throughout this region. Therefore, you still have major flashpoints and Serbians, the Roma, and other minorities, feel isolated or abandoned. Also, the international community must still guard and protect Serbians, the Roma, and other minorities, throughout the whole of Kosovo. This in itself is evidence that the institutions of Kosovo are weak.
Therefore, the longer this situation remains in limbo the worse it will get because we have already seen convulsions in Georgia based on the Kosovo model. Whereby nations can now clearly state that America, the United Kingdom, France, and others, violated international law, therefore, other nations can follow suit and support their own self interests. So what does the future hold for Kosovo, countless other conflicts throughout the world, the United Nations, and international law?
Lee Jay Walker Dip BA MA
http://journals.aol.com/leejaywalker/uk/
http://theseoultimes.com/ST/?url=/ST/db/read.php?idx=7364&PHPSESSID=427d3e996468f1e01b149e5641fa17e3
October 05, 2008
Arbitrariness in Power
2008/10/03
BELGRADE/PRISTINA/BERLIN
(Own report) - Because of a Serbian UN initiative, Berlin's Kosovo policy is threatened with serious defeat. Belgrade is requesting that the UN General Assembly petition the International Court of Justice in The Hague (ICJ) for an advisory opinion on Kosovo's secession from Serbia. The Assembly is expected to vote on Wednesday. Germany was unsuccessful in mobilizing a majority against Serbia's initiative. For the first time, UN member states have announced the intention of reversing their recognition of Kosovo, if the ICJ should confirm its secession was illegal. While EU functionaries declare that the International Court's decision would be of no consequence to them, Berlin is continuing its aid in consolidating Kosovo's illegal sovereignty. State officials, who, with Western help, had been brought to power in Pristina, are confronted with new accusations. According to reports, new evidence has surfaced pertaining to criminal trade in human organs in Kosovo. Kosovo's "prime Minister" is suspected to be implicated in this crime. One of Pristina's designated "ambassadors" to a European country is also accused of serious crimes.
Serbia has placed a demand that the UN General Assembly petition the International Court of Justice in The Hague (ICJ) for an advisory opinion concerning the secession of its southern province. For the time being, Belgrade is therefore renouncing legal action against Pristina and those states that have recognized its secession. The UN General Assembly is expected to vote on Serbia's request on Wednesday. A simple majority will suffice. Already back in July, the Serbian Foreign Minister, Vuk Jeremić, pointed out that "never before" [1] has "the General Assembly prevented a member state from seeking an ICJ advisory opinion." But governments of several Western states are attempting just that.
Refusal of Loyalty
German and US American attempts to prevent the ICJ advisory opinion are doomed to failure. Western pressure, which already last summer were the topics of interviews in the media,[2] could not prevent the Serbian government from introducing its resolution in New York. And all attempts to tone down the formulation of the resolution have failed. Washington and Berlin plan to either vote "No" or abstain. But in a test vote, approximately two thirds of the 192 UN member states are refusing loyalty, endorsing an ICJ advisory opinion on Kosovo's secession.[3] The Serbian President reported a few days ago that Western states continue their efforts to obstruct the vote by trying to induce more states to recognize Kosovo's independence. In spite of massive pressure from large EU member countries and the United States, only 47 countries - not even a fourth of the UN member states - have recognized Kosovo as a sovereign state.
Latest Tricks
Berlin is therefore faced with a serious defeat. Since the legal questions are clear - Kosovo's secession was obviously in violation of the UN Charter - the West is uncertain about how to prevent an ICJ ruling in Serbia's favor. According to Christian Tomuschat, professor of law in Berlin, there would be possibilities when the concrete formulation of the demand is decided in the UN General Assembly's sub-commission, where controversial questions are often excluded. Then "the ICJ would not even have the possibility of formulating an opinion on the primary issue."[4] The sub-commission will be convened on Monday. If Serbia's formulations still pass, the only thing left would be massive pressure on the ICJ.
Creating Facts on the Ground
If this option is also unsuccessful, German experts are pleading for disregarding international jurisprudence. Neither the ICJ nor the UN can create facts on the ground, alleges the political advisor, Franz-Lothar Altmann. "A nation's independence can only be established through recognition by individual states."[5] The EU's special emissary to Kosovo subscribes to the demand that the arbitrariness of the mighty be lifted to the global principle of design in central questions of sovereignty. "Kosovo's independence is a fact and cannot be changed, even if Serbia's ICJ initiative should prove successful."[6] Until now the larger EU nations and the USA have been relatively isolated in this standpoint. Now nations that had already recognized Kosovo, are beginning to serve notice that in the case of a negative ICJ verdict, they would consider rescinding their recognition.[7]
Abetting
All of the dispute notwithstanding, the German government is creating facts on the ground and is pushing the establishment of an independent "Kosovo" nation. Alongside the political accompaniment, in mid-September Berlin had promised further support for the development of the infrastructure of Kosovo and earmarked a total of 40 mil. Euros from its development budget for the rest of the current year. For 2009, 60 mil. Euros more have been reserved. These measures are not limited to construction aid, but extend to the consolidation of Pristina's quasi-state structures. For example, 600,000 passports and 400,000 driver's licenses that the Interior Ministry in Pristina has begun to issue have been produced by the Giesecke and Devrient Corp. in Munich. "By issuing passports, we are establishing the legal basis for a sovereign Kosovo," declared Kosovo's "Interior Minister" - providing an indication that the criminal accusation of abetting an illegal act of secession can be raised not only against the government, but even against employees of private firms.[8]
Trade in Human Organs
Serious accusations are recurringly being raised against Kosovo's new ruler, placed and maintained in power by Berlin. Extensive press research has reinforced the suspicion that the former Kosovo terror militia, UCK, killed Serbian prisoners and sold their organs.[9] Months ago this was reported by Carla del Ponte, former head prosecutor of the International War Crimes Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, citing numerous witnesses. Pristina's "Prime Minister" and former head of the UCK, Hashim Thaci, is said to be implicated in this affair.[10] There is also controversy over the "ambassadors" Pristina wants to dispatch to several European nations and to the USA. Kosovo's designated "ambassador" to Switzerland is being accused of having collected money in Switzerland to finance the UCK's war on Serbia and thereby run into conflict with the Swiss authorities. It is alleged that even blackmail was involved.[11] The Swiss Foreign Ministry denies however that these accusations have any meaningful bearings on existent reservations concerning this "ambassador." The accreditation nevertheless is still pending.
Not Isolated Cases
The accusations against members of Pristina's elite are not isolated cases. As just recently reported in an appraisal of Kosovo's human rights situation by the OSCE, it is not only a question of grave shortcomings of application in conditions of rule of law.[12] Particularly the struggle against organized criminality and the slave trade [13] are making limited progress. On the other hand, the new political elite is interfering to a growing degree in the workings of the justice, the police and even the media. The new power in Pristina is creating its realm of the arbitrary.
Please read also Imperial Consummation, A Sort of Resurrection for Yugoslavia, Self Determination, Out of Control, Political Friendships, "Thank you Germany!" and Pure Chaos.
[1], [2] "Wir sind fest entschlossen, Mitglied der EU zu werden"; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 25.07.2008
[3] Westliche Kosovo-Politik kommt auf Prüfstand; Handelsblatt 28.09.2008
[4], [5] Serbien wirbt vor der UNO für Gerichtsvotum zu Kosovo; Deutsche Welle Fokus Ost-Südost 25.09.2008
[6] "Kosovo-Teilung eine Möglichkeit"; Wiener Zeitung 30.09.2008
[7] Belgrad: Einige Staaten könnten Anerkennung des Kosovo revidieren; Der Standard 02.10.2008
[8] Giesecke und Devrient liefert Reisepässe und Führerscheine für Kosovo; www.behoerden-spiegel.de
[9] Family Denies Organ Harvesting Allegations; Spiegel Online 22.09.2008
[10] see also Organhandel
[11] Umstrittener Kosovo-Diplomat; Basler Zeitung 25.09.2008
[12] OSCE Mission in Kosovo: Background Report. Human Rights, Ethnic Relations and Democracy in Kosovo, September 2008
[13] see also Unter deutscher Aufsicht and Enorme Gewalt
http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/en/fulltext/56189?PHPSESSID=1h90nhrn0mc712u3dn5g21g534
September 07, 2008
JATRAS: Kosovo prelude to Georgia?
JATRAS: Kosovo prelude to Georgia?
James George Katras
Sunday, September 7, 2008
COMMENTARY:
In anticipation of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, President Bush said "Georgia's territorial integrity and borders must command the same respect as every other nation's."
Critics of Russia's action include Sens. Barack Obama, Joseph Biden and Joseph Lieberman; Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice; former United Nations Ambassador Richard Holbrooke; and many others in the bipartisan establishment.
Among the specific criticisms are Russia's violation of the sovereign territory of Georgia, a fledgling democracy and a member of the United Nations; a disproportionate response to Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili's attempt to settle South Ossetia's status by force, including Russian military operations well outside of South Ossetia; and Moscow's tardiness in withdrawing its forces under a deal brokered by French President Nicolas Sarkozy.
Evidently irony is not much appreciated in Washington. It seems critics have forgotten President Bush's recognition of the independence of Kosovo, a province of democratic, U.N. member Serbia. President Bush's reference to "every other nation" whose "territorial integrity and borders must command the same respect" apparently has at least this one exception. If he can violate the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, which guarantee sovereign borders, what right does he have to accuse others of doing the same?
If Moscow stepped over the line in its crushing military response to Mr. Saakashvili's offensive, what do we call 78 straight days of NATO's bombing throughout Serbia, destroying most of that country's civilian infrastructure? If Russia is to be faulted for imperfect implementation of the Sarkozy agreement, what can be said about Washington's violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which ended the 1999 Kosovo war and reaffirms Serbian sovereignty in the province?
The standard reasons cited for making Serbia an exception to the rule we demand in Georgia is that NATO intervened to stop genocide of Kosovo's Albanians and that they will never again accept being part of Serbia. But after the war actual casualties among all ethnic groups - whether by military action, atrocities committed by both Serbs and Albanians, and the toll of NATO's bombing - proved to be far fewer than those cited in justification for the war. Compared to South Ossetia's much smaller population, mutual accusations of genocide against South Ossetians and Georgians, respectively, are proportionally larger than those at issue in Kosovo. And are South Ossetians and Abkhazians less adamant that they will not submit to Tbilisi's rule than Kosovo's Albanians are with respect to Belgrade?
It also should be kept in mind that Kosovo's legal status is very different from that of entities in the former Soviet Union. Under the Yugoslav constitution - the same authority that justified the secession of Croatia, Slovenia, etc. - Kosovo, part of Serbia since before Yugoslavia was formed, has no legal claim to independence. In contrast, the 1990 Soviet law on secession - which was the legal basis of the independence of Union Republics such as Georgia - required that autonomous entities within their borders be allowed, via referenda, to remain in the Soviet Union, and by extension its successor, Russia.
Thus, while Kosovo's status as part of Serbia is unquestionable, South Ossetia and Abkhazia can make a good case they were part of Soviet Georgia but never the current independent state of Georgia. (The same would apply to Transdniestria with respect to Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh with respect to Azerbaijan. When will they follow suit?)
By trashing the accepted international "rules of the road" on Kosovo, Washington has created what amounts to the rules of the jungle. Each power acts as it will, either to suppress restive minorities or to compromise other countries' borders: The United States tries to force Serbia to accept Kosovo's independence and pressures other countries (without much success) to recognize it; Georgia tries to subdue the Ossetians and the Abkhazians and fails; Russia moves to establish the Ossetians' and Abkhazians' independence and now also will try to secure wider recognition. In turn, the U.S.-supported separatist Kosovo Albanian administration itself threatens a miniature version of Mr. Saakashvili's South Ossetia offensive to subdue Serbian enclaves, where the remaining one-third of the province's prewar community finds refuge. Where does the logic of "big fish eat little fish" end?
In Kosovo, Washington sowed the wind, and now Georgia has reaped the whirlwind. Only a return to the negotiating table to address comprehensively Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and similar trouble spots elsewhere can prevent this malignant precedent from spinning further out of control with incalculable consequences for global peace and security. With each step down this road it will be harder to put the genie of might-makes-right back in the bottle.
James George Jatras is a lawyer and director of the American Council for Kosovo in Washington, an activity of Squire Sanders Public Advocacy, LLC, and Global Strategic Communications Group, which are registered agents for the Serbian National Council of Kosovo and Metohija. Mr. Jatras formerly served as a foreign policy analyst of the U.S. Senate Republican leadership.
August 30, 2008
Revenge of the Balkans
by Gordon N. Bardos
08.28.2008
Strategic shortsightedness—defined as mistaking problems and issues of secondary or tertiary importance for those of vital importance, and being unable to foresee the predictable consequences of specific actions—is becoming a chronic malaise in Washington. So characteristic of U.S. policy in the Balkans in the 1990s and the more recent Iraq tragedy, it is now again apparent in U.S. actions with regard to Kosovo, and their spillover effects in the Caucasus. American policy makers had repeatedly told us that Kosovo was supposed to be a “unique” case, but apparently Vladimir Putin didn’t get the memo. The ghosts of our Balkan problems, it seems, continue to haunt us.
The roots of the current crisis in U.S.-Russian relations spread far and wide, and some go back to the Balkans in the 1990s, especially the 1999 U.S. and NATO bombing of Serbia. Although little remarked upon in the West, NATO’s first war marked a watershed in Russian perceptions of the United States and Europe, and, even more importantly, in Russia’s post-Soviet evolution itself. Yegor Gaidar, one of the architects of Russia’s post-Soviet economic reforms, told U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott at the time “if only you knew what a disaster this war is for those of us in Russia who want for our country what you want.” The late Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn said much the same, noting that Russian views of the West,
started changing with the cruel NATO bombings of Serbia. It’s fair to say that all layers of Russian society were deeply and indelibly shocked by those bombings. . . . So, the perception of the West as mostly a “knight of democracy” has been replaced with the disappointed belief that pragmatism, often cynical and selfish, lies at the core of Western policies. For many Russians it was a grave disillusion, a crushing of ideals.
The consequences of this shift in Russian attitudes and perceptions, both for Russia itself and for the United States, were profound. Although it is impossible to say exactly what impact the Kosovo crisis had on Vladimir Putin’s rise to power—less than two months after the end of the Kosovo war he was appointed prime minister, and within seven months he had become president of Russia—the section of Russian elite opinion that he embodied, and how it felt about NATO’s actions in the Balkans, is clear enough.
Thus, at an historical juncture at which the primary purpose of U.S. foreign policy should have been fostering an international environment encouraging Russia’s democratic transition, American policymakers chose instead to exploit Moscow’s temporary weaknesses and engage in dubious military adventures (e.g., the bombing of Serbia) and strategic initiatives (e.g., NATO’s expansion to Russia’s borders, often in violation of previous promises made to Moscow) of questionable real value to U.S. national interests. Thomas Friedman put the matter into perspective when he recently asked “Wasn’t consolidating a democratic Russia more important than bringing the Czech Navy into NATO?”
After the 2003 U.S. attack on Iraq—importantly, without UN Security Council approval—Moscow’s concerns about U.S. unilateralism, forcefully articulated by Putin at his February 2007 address before the Munich Conference on Security Policy—were inflamed by the U.S. push to grant Kosovo independence. At the G8 summit in Germany in June 2007, then–Russian President Putin was already signaling that what he called “universal principles” had to be applied to the frozen conflicts in Kosovo and the Caucasus, and Putin would later warn that U.S. and EU support for Kosovo’s secession from Serbia was “illegal and immoral.” In the UN Security Council, Russia’s permanent representative Vitaly Churkin was trying to impress upon his colleagues the gravity with which Moscow viewed the Kosovo situation, saying that the Kosovo issue could represent the most important question the Security Council dealt with in this decade, and going to the extraordinary length of organizing a Security Council fact-finding mission to the region. The warnings from Moscow over Kosovo, however, were brushed aside by Brussels and Washington, and in both places it was widely assumed that Russia would roll over when presented with a fait accompli.
The result has been yet another questionable foreign policy initiative for the Bush administration. Six months after declaring independence, only forty-six countries have recognized Kosovo. The EU itself cannot agree on a position, with six of the twenty-seven members refusing to recognize the breakaway Serbian province. Most of the remaining countries that have recognized Kosovo include the likes of San Marino, Liechtenstein, the Marshall Islands and Burkina Faso. None of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) have recognized, nor has Indonesia (the largest Muslim country in the world), nor any of the Arab states. All told, three-fourths of the international community is following Moscow’s lead on the Kosovo issue rather than Washington’s.
In the Caucasus, meanwhile, Kosovo’s declaration of independence on February 17 led to an immediate increase in tensions. Call the Russians what you will, but you can’t say that they are not fast learners. In the current crisis, Moscow copied Washington’s Kosovo playbook in full, accusing Georgian forces of ethnic cleansing and war crimes, labeling Saakashvili a war criminal (just as Washington had done in 1999 with Slobodan Milosevic), and claiming that Georgian actions had disqualified it from ruling over South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the future. Much like NATO officials had done in 1999, Russian officials also claimed that their intervention in Georgia was based on “humanitarian” motives. In fact, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov specifically compared Russian military actions in Georgia to NATO’s actions in Serbia. According to Lavrov,
Our military acted efficiently and professionally. It was an able ground operation that quickly achieved its very clear and legitimate objectives. It was very different, for example, from the U.S./NATO operation against Serbia over Kosovo in 1999, when an air bombardment campaign ran out of military targets and degenerated into attacks on bridges, TV towers, passenger trains and other civilian sites, even hitting an embassy. In this instance, Russia used force in full conformity with international law, its right of self-defense, and its obligations under the agreements with regard to this particular conflict. Russia could not allow its peacekeepers to watch acts of genocide committed in front of their eyes, as happened in the Bosnian city of Srebrenica in 1995.
Lavrov is on strong ground here; both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have determined that many of NATO’s actions in 1999 constituted attacks against illegitimate civilian targets, if not outright war crimes.
The Russians also seem relatively unmoved by Western accusations that they are intent on “regime change” in Georgia; probably with good reason, because in the Balkans the United States and the United Kingdom have recently been involved in a bit of regime change themselves.
After Serbia’s May parliamentary elections, the American and British ambassadors in Belgrade played key roles in the formation of a coalition government that removed Vojislav Kostunica, the man who defeated Slobodan Milosevic at the polls, from the prime ministership. The parties in the coalition government these ambassadors helped bring into office—believe it or not—include Slobodan Milosevic’s former Socialist Party, and the party of the assassinated Serbian gangster-cum-warlord Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan, whose paramilitaries were involved in numerous war crimes in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo. Apart from Kostunica’s uncompromising stance on defending Serbia’s territorial integrity regarding the Kosovo issue, it is hard to see what the American and British ambassadors had against him. Perhaps they didn’t like Kostunica’s translation of the Federalist Papers. Or maybe they had some issues with his scholarly work on Rousseau and Tocqueville.
Predictably, Washington neocons are now invoking a new cold war against Russia. Russians themselves, meanwhile, are growing tired of the double standards they see Washington using against them. Former–Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, for example, summed up the feelings of many of his compatriots when he questioned the value of Russian participation in international institutions:
For some time now, Russians have been wondering: if our opinion counts for nothing in those institutions, do we really need them? Just to sit at the nicely set dinner table and listen to lectures? Indeed, Russia has long been told to simply accept the facts. Here’s the independence of Kosovo for you. Here’s the abrogation of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, and the American decision to place missile defenses in neighboring countries. Here’s the unending expansion of NATO. All of these moves have been set against the backdrop of sweet talk about partnership. Why would anyone put up with such a charade?
Why indeed? You do not have to be Russian to see the weak foundations on which so much of official Washington’s criticisms of Russia are based. As David Remnick recently noted in the New Yorker,
Even ordinary Russians find it mightily trying to be lectured on questions of sovereignty and moral diplomacy by the West, particularly the United States, which, even before Iraq, had a long history of foreign intervention, overt and covert ¬politics by other means. After the exposure of the Bush Administration’s behavior prior to the invasion of Iraq and its unapologetic use of torture, why would any leader, much less Putin, respond to moral suasion from Washington? That is America’s tragedy, and the world’s.
Developing a serious policy for dealing with a more powerful and assertive Russia will of necessity be high on the agenda of the next presidential administration. In the 1990s, Washington policy makers may have been able to ignore Russia’s views, or to delude themselves into believing that Russia would never be a serious international player again. But those days are over. This makes it even more urgent for U.S. policy makers to better understand the strategic importance of preventing a renewed downturn in U.S.-Russian relations. Ideological rants, moral outrage and attempts to paint the world in black and white make good TV, but they are dangerous when applied to complex problems that, upon careful and thoughtful analysis, reveal themselves in shades of gray.
The late, great American diplomat and statesman (and lifelong Russia hand) W. Averell Harriman once said, “To base policy on ignorance and illusion is very dangerous. Policy should be based on knowledge and understanding.” Harriman would probably be mortified today at the thought that so much of US policy appears based not on ignorance and illusion, but perhaps on something far worse—contempt, be it for post-Soviet Russia, for “old Europe,” or for the United Nations and the Geneva Conventions. For some in Washington, perhaps, even contempt for our own democratic principles and traditions.
Gordon N. Bardos is assistant director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs.
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The West must stop bullying Russia
JAN OBERG
29.08.2008 @ 19:03 CET
EUOBSERVER / COMMENT - I was part of a TFF fact-finding mission to Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhasia in 1993. That the 7 August war would happen was predictable, albeit not the exact time.
One can see this easily if one begins to look at the wider time frame, going back some 20 years.
Let's have another look at just how successful the West was with the dissolution of the terrible Soviet Union, overseen by the visionary leadership of a man we should still all be deeply grateful to, namely Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.
Georgia currently has the highest average growth rate of military spending in the world. (Photo: KFOR, Helmut Vogl)
In 1989, Gorbachev withdraws from Afghanistan and set Sakharov free. There is no reaction in the West. His entire philosophy of change deprives the West of its beloved enemy.
Gorbachev then suggests an entirely new security structure, a 'European House' with the OSCE and the UN as centerpieces. The triumphalist West ignores it.
Gorbachev asks for economic support in the West for his perestroika and glasnost gambits, to create what would have been an open social democratic-inspired society. The G7 decides to ignores it and gambles on Yeltsin, a populist with no similar vision or charisma.
The West, understandably, wants to unite Germany, but this represents a great threat for historical reasons in the eyes of the Russians. Russia is however promised that NATO will not expand.
The Warsaw Pact is dissolved, but despite promises, NATO remains and expands rapidly. Moreover, it maintains its right to pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons.
The Clinton administration begins a huge US military expansion programme in 1992, building bases, positioning advisers and infiltrating ministries with 'advisors' and people from mercenary firms in Eastern Europe, including Yugoslavia, and all around Russia. Russia's protests about its 'near abroad' are ignored.
Serbs are cast in the role of the perennial and sole bad guys during the Yugoslav wars of the 90s - as the Russians of Yugoslavia - expansionist and dangerous vis-à-vis smaller allegedly freedom-loving democratic actors such as Croatia's Franjo Tudjman, Bosnia's Alija Izetbegovic, and Kosovo's Agim Ceku.
NATO's bombing of Serbia and Kosovo violates all international law, takes place without UN Security Council mandate and leaves a thoroughly destroyed country behind. Russian arguments for a negotiated solution are ignored.
And now we are seeing the imposition of Ballistic Missile Defence, BMD, which is not a defensive system at all, but instead allows US territory to be protected against retaliation if the US launches a nuclear attack on another country. Russia thinks it is a bad idea - as bad as a similar system set up by the Russians across the border in Mexico would appear to the Americans.
As a show of respect for democracy, the deal has been made with Poland despite a full 90 percent of the people against BMD being situated on their territory. Russian worries about the system are repeatedly ignored. The system is supposed to protect us against rogue actors such as Tehran, but when Moscow offered to site the BMD on its territory closer to Iran, the US declined the offer, confirming Russia's fears that BMD is in fact aimed at her instead.
Then this year, the US and most EU member states decide that Kosovo shall be an independent state. All substantial Russian arguments for a negotiated compromise and predictions of that secession stimulating secession elsewhere are ignored.
Russia¬ is increasingly being seen as the great new threat from whom NATO will protect us, despite the country having military expenditure that is roughly five percent of that of NATO, seven percent of that of the United States, and 13 percent of that of the EU.
US strategy and interests
Where is Georgia in all this?
As early as 1993, while visiting US offices in Tblisi, I was told that this Caucasian state was a centerpiece of US strategy and interests in the region. Georgian officials meanwhile told me that they were just waiting for Georgia to be selected to host the huge oil and gas pipelines, and then it would become a regional power to be reckoned with.
The US has since conducted a series of comprehensive train-and-equip programmes organised by the Pentagon, US Special Forces and US Marines, with Georgia becoming a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace member in 2004. One might also mention in passing that often neglected in any discussion of Georgian defence, is Israel's considerable military support for Georgia and the fact that her defence minister, Davit Kezerashvili, is a former Israeli with close links to the country's defence industry.
Despite Georgia's deep poverty, the country's military spending is substantial. In late June, the Georgian government increased the defence ministry's budget of 513 million laris (US$315 million) by 442 million laris ($US260 million), according to the Institute for War and Peace Reporting.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Georgia currently has the highest average growth rate of military spending in the world. Some independent experts are worried that the spending is not fully accounted for, while others say that it could undermine the peace processes with the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The military budget of Georgia increased 50 times over the period from 2002 (US$18 million) to 2008 (US$900 million), reaching almost nine percent of Georgia's GDP.
Georgia, a very loyal partner in the US war on terror, is also the third largest occupying force in Iraq, present also in Afghanistan and has been to Kosovo. It would be naive to think that Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili had not obtained Washington's green light for his attack on South Ossetia.
Consideration of history
This region is as complex as the former Yugoslavia, with as much history of traumas, ethnic quarrels, minorities within minorities, economic and constitutional crises and corruption. The future is bleak for us all if wars similar to those in the Balkans in the 1990s were to break out in the Caucasus once more, dragging in Russia and Europe. Bleak¬ that is, unless somebody stops to think instead of merely reacting and justifying their own participation in this sorry game of militarism and power politics.
To diffuse this crisis, there needs first to be at least a little consideration of history. Next, some little empathy with non-US and non-EU actors. There must also be recognition that Western actions are not always innocent in their consequences. We must understand the utter counter-productivity of militarisation and its psycho-political effects.
Additionally, it would be helpful if Western mainstream media would stop re-cycling the Cold War stereotypes of an ever-aggressive Russia and disseminating, Pravda-style, only what Western militarist elites say.
The art of reading and asking good questions should re-enter international journalism and foreign policy reporting, freeing the profession from complicity in any future war in the region - a war that would certainly be much larger than what we have seen thus far.
Above all, we must remember that negotiations are far superior to threats and fear-mongering.
The Russians have now said: This far, but no longer. It would be wise of the West to listen to the warning. It is not in its own best interest to continue bullying and humiliating Russia.
Jan Oberg is Director of the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research in Lund, Sweden
http://euobserver.com/9/26656/?rk=1
August 23, 2008
Serbophobia Obscures the Facts
"Bosnian Serbs were concerned with protecting the Serbs, not killing the Muslims or Croats", Phillip Corwin
Phillip Corwin: Serbophobia Prevents Reaching the Truth
Interview with Phillip Corwin by Cathrin Schütz, Junge Welt
American Phillip Corwin was the highest UN official in Bosnia from spring to summer of 1995, serving as Civil Affairs Coordinator and Delegate of the Special Representative for the UN Secretary General. Previously, from 1994 to the spring of 1995 he held the same office for the region of Eastern Slavonia in Croatia. Duke University Press published his memoirs: Dubious mandates - A Memoir of the UN in Bosnia, Summer 1995.
Q: Richard Holbrooke, Paddy Ashdown and many other Western representatives who were involved in the Yugoslav tragedy, unanimously assessed the arrest of Radovan Karadzic's as the capture of one of the most brutal war criminals of our time. What is your opinion?
PC: Holbrooke and Ashdown used the wars in former Yugoslavia to build their careers. Their phrases like "one of the most brutal" and "good Nazi" -- that's how Holbrooke characterized Dr. Karadzic just now in the Spiegel interview -- remind us of their terrible bias and the severe harm that they caused as so-called diplomats. They foment the Serbophobia even now, making a fair process against Dr. Karadzic in The Hague impossible.
Q: What do you expect from the trial of the former president of Republika Srpska in Bosnia before the ad hoc tribunal in The Hague?
PC: In any criminal process the question of the intent is of central importance. Based on my personal contacts with Bosnian Serbs, including with Dr. Karadzic, I can only say that I am convinced the issue with Bosnian Serbs was to protect the Serbs, not to kill Muslims or Croats. Incidentally, the Gypsies allied with the Serbs -- they probably still remember all too well the treatment they were given during the Second World War by the "good Nazis" on the Croat and Muslim side. The Serbs were never threatened by the Gypsies and vice versa, the Serbs never undertook anything against the Gypsies. As always in the Hague, Dr. Karadzic can't expect a fair trial. He will be accused of participating in a 'conspiracy' and they will blame him for the deeds of soldiers in the field, whom he didn't know and to whom he never issued any orders.
Srebrenica Takeover: 700 Muslims Killed at Worst
Q: One of the main charges is Karadzic's alleged responsibility for the genocide of 8,000 Muslim males from Srebrenica. At the time Srebrenica was taken over by the Bosnian Serb Army in July 1995 you were the highest civilian official of the UN in Bosnia. What really happened?
PC: What happened on July 11 1995 in Srebrenica is part of a greater tragedy and cannot and must not be taken out of the context. Those who do are clearly doing it with intention to twist things to the detriment of one of the warring parties. What happened in Srebrenica was not a single massacre Serbs committed against the Muslims, but a series of bloody attacks and counterattacks during three years and escalating in 1995. The number of Muslims killed most probably was not higher than the number of the Serbs killed in the region during the previous years in the assaults of the Bosnian Muslim war commander Naser Oric. The number of missing Bosnian Muslims is also exaggerated. All this shows that the official reports are of purely political nature.
In May 1995, two months before the last battle for Srebrenica, the Croat army led the Operation Lightning in which 90 percent of the Serbs who lived in western Slavonia were expelled, i.e. they conducted the ethnic cleansing. A month after Srebrenica, 200,000 Serbs were expelled from their ancestral land in Krajina region [also in Croatia]. The international community remained silent in both cases! Srebrenica must be viewed in the context of events. If there really was a massacre -- and it seems realistic to speak about 700 victims -- then this is a war crime and the perpetrators must be held accountable. But the difference between the 700 and the commonly referred to 8,000 is not numerical -- it is political.
Recommended: Don't forget what happened in Yugoslavia, by John Pilger (NewStatesman.com)
http://byzantinesacredart.com/blog/2008/08/corwin-interview.html
August 16, 2008
Krajina, Not Kosovo
Ossetia as botched Balkans replay
by Nebojsa Malic
Six days ago, as most of the world was watching the opening ceremonies of the Olympics in Beijing, Georgian troops attacked the self-proclaimed Republic of South Ossetia. Russia quickly intervened, ousting Georgian forces from the region and attacking Georgian military bases. Despite the training and weapons supplied by the U.S. and Israel, the Georgian military quickly collapsed. President Mikheil Saakashvili, installed in power in 2003 by a CIA-sponsored "Rose Revolution," pleaded for help from his patrons, painting himself and his country as victims of "Russian aggression." Aside from empty words of encouragement and hypocritical condemnation of Russian "excessive force," the Empire had no help to give.
Over the past week, many commentators have compared Russia's intervention to protect Ossetia with NATO's 1999 attack on Serbia. The analogy does not apply, though. If there is a Balkans comparison to be made, a far better one would be with the Republic of Serbian Krajina, destroyed by Croatia in August of 1995.
Another August
There are many similarities between Ossetia and Krajina. Both are inhabited by populations distinct from the country they nominally belonged to – Ossetians and Serbs, respectively. Both were created in the aftermath of secessions; Croatia had seceded from Yugoslavia, Georgia from the Soviet Union. Both were a response to the government's attack on their people's rights: Serbs were written out of Croatia's constitution, while Ossetia was officially abolished by the regime in Tbilisi. Both came out ahead in the resulting conflicts with government troops, and both became de facto independent after armistices in 1992.
Here is where their fates diverged, however. Krajina's armistice was guaranteed by the UN and Serbia, but with the war breaking out in Bosnia, Serbia was blamed for "aggression" and sidelined by a UN blockade. When Croatian forces struck at Krajina, in August 1995, the government in Belgrade stood by and did nothing. The UN did not resist, either.
Backing both Croatia and Georgia was the American Empire. Back in 1995, it was still in its formative stages, neither ready nor willing to get directly involved in a Balkans shooting war and seeking to use Croatians as proxies in the Bosnian War. The troops that attacked Krajina in 1995 were trained and equipped by the U.S. and provided with air cover and intelligence reports. Georgia received similar help after Saakashvili came to power in late 2003.
Among the few who made this connection is Russian analyst Boris Shmelyov. As quoted in the Belgrade daily Vecernje Novosti:
"Back then, the Croats took an incredibly brutal action and killed many civilians, but the West pretended they did not see it. Now, the Georgians have done the same…"
Noting that the same U.S. military instructors were training Croats, then Albanians, and now Georgians, Shmelyov pointed out there is a powerful structure of the retired officers in the U.S., who are involved in the training of armed forces in the countries supported by the American authorities.
Could it be that Saakashvili's orders to attack Ossetia were inspired by the August 1995 Croatian "Storm"? The parallels are uncanny. However, unlike Croatia's triumphant blitz, celebrated even today with a "Homeland Thanksgiving Day," Georgia's adventure in Ossetia backfired spectacularly. For, unlike Croatia in 1995, Saakashvili was not dealing with an intimidated and blockaded Serbia, but with an angry and powerful Russian Federation.
Enter the Russophobes
It took several days for politicians and the media in the West to work themselves up into proper self-righteous lather. Once they did, however, it became obvious that Russophobia was not a Cold War relic, but rather a fashionable creed in Washington's policymaking circles. One can understand the hysterical pronouncements coming from Georgian officials about how the fate of their country – or rather, their government – was an issue of "freedom" and "democracy." But it certainly did not take long for ex-diplomat Richard Holbrooke to compare Russia to Nazi Germany. Once again, every enemy is Hitler, and it's always Munich 1938 – except when it really is, of course.
Washington commentators displayed all the symptoms of what Richard Spencer at Takimag.com called "Putin Derangement Syndrome": a delusional belief that Vladimir Putin is "not simply a totalitarian dictator at home but a super-genius strategist in foreign affairs – if anything unusual happens in his part of the world, it's all part of one of his wicked schemes."
Granted, there was some dissent. The rabidly Russophobic Washington Post did run an article by former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who condemned the Georgians for starting the war. In the Guardian, Mark Almond challenged the Cold War analogies. Charles King in the Christian Science Monitor argued the conflict wasn't entirely Russia's fault. But since when have facts stopped a good story? As Brendan O'Neill argues persuasively, both Georgians and Ossetians have been used as pawns by the West to fabricate yet another morality tale.
Familiar Stories
Despite the fact that Georgia was the clear aggressor, and that Russian intervention only followed after the razing of Ossetian capital Tskhinvali, many civilian deaths, a mass of refugees, and the killing of several Russian peacekeepers, the Western media have slowly spun the crisis as Russian "aggression." As Justin Raimondo put it:
"According to our 'free' media, the Georgians didn't invade the land of the Ossetians – they merely tried to 'retake' it, as a child would bloodlessly and even quite playfully retake a shiny red ball from a playmate. Those evil Russkies, on the other hand, invaded, plunged into, and escalated their attack on Georgia. At least, those are the words our 'reporters' are using."
That is another way in which the Caucasus war resembles the Balkans. In addition to loaded words, there are loaded images. Sharp eyes have already begun to question several photographs of Georgians mourning their dead, offering compelling evidence they were staged. There are no pictures of Ossetians mourning, of course, and only a few testimonies.
Speaking of pictures: for their "voices on Georgia" feature, the BBC somehow managed to get portrait pictures of two young Georgians, both making passionate emotional appeals. Representing the other side were an Ossetian professor and a Russian architect, both over 40. No pictures.
On Tuesday, there was even a flashback of Bosnia: several journalists were injured when a "series of sudden explosions" rocked the city of Gori, birthplace of Josef Stalin and the closest city to the Ossetian front. Once again, "it was not clear who was responsible" even though the closest Russian forces were 12 kilometers away and the fire came from "mortars firing from 1-2 km away."
Scapegoating Saakashvili?
On Aug. 12, Russian President Medvedev ordered a halt to military operations, as a peace plan proposed by French President Sarkozy was negotiated. Moscow publicly stated it had no plans to depose Saakashvili, and angrily rejected U.S. charges of plotting "regime change." However, Saakashvili's political future looks very precarious at this point.
Analysts interviewed by Reuters seem to agree that Saakashvili committed a "strategic blunder" and that Georgia is likely to lose Ossetia and Abkhazia now. The London Telegraph calls him "the man who lost it all," while the Independent painted him as a "beleaguered gambler."
The New York Times blamed "mixed messages" from Washington; supposedly, Washington urged Saakashvili privately not to attack, while publicly supporting him in full. But is that so?
At first glance, it is hard to see how Georgia's fiasco could benefit the Empire. Its strongest military and political client in the Caucasus has been neutered. The war almost endangered the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, the one source of Caspian oil under American control. Russia has asserted itself, and now looms like a shadow over the West…
Once again, keep in mind the way politics works. Saakashvili was a good client, but he failed. Now a liability, he can be written off, allowing the Empire to engage in self-righteous posturing. The very same people who invaded Iraq now thunder about "Russian aggression" and call Moscow's actions "unacceptable" with a straight face. The Empire may have suffered a defeat, but as we learned in the Balkans, it's never about what really happens – it's about managing perceptions. So a setback in the Caucasus is being spun as a proof that the West is righteous, good, and democratic, that Russia is evil and aggressive – and oh, yes, that the Kosovo war was just and right. After all, didn't Russians validate it with their actions? (No.)
Either way, the Imperial establishment has now latched on to the notion of Russian belligerence as yet another excuse for their project of global hegemony, benevolent or otherwise.
Lesson Not Learned
On the second day of the conflict, before the media received their marching orders, the New York Times carried a story about how the West misread Russia. It quoted George Friedman of analytical think-tank Stratfor:
"We've placed ourselves in a position that globally we don't have the wherewithal to do anything. … One would think under those circumstances, we'd shut up."
When told of the quote, the NYT story concludes, one senior administration official, laughed. "Well, maybe we're learning to shut up now."
It seems the lesson didn't take.
http://antiwar.com/malic/?articleid=13294
