What is NATO?

 

What is NATO?

 

19.01.2010

Source: Pravda.Ru

URL: http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/conflicts/111727-what_is_nato-0

 

Why doesn't NATO take Russia's approaches on a new security pact seriously? Because the Freedom, Democracy, Stability and Prosperity labels attached to the Organization are no more than outer packaging which hides the reality within: NATO is no more and no less than an instrument which serves the interests of the arms lobby. Russia's approaches for a bilateral security treaty, which would inevitably pass by a serious and long-standing binding bilateral agreement on friendship and non-aggression, will not be accepted by NATO for one reason alone: NATO is not about collective security any more and has not been since the Warsaw Pact was disbanded on July 1, 1991. Last month, Andres Fogh Rasmussen, the non-elected Danish Secretary-General of the non-elected NATO (which nevertheless still dictates the foreign policy of its member states), declared "There can be no doubt whatsoever that NATO will remain our framework for Euro-Atlantic security". In a nutshell, there is no space for collective agreements with Russia because NATO continues to focus its attention on the Western Europe-Atlantic space common to the Cold War. It is old hat. NATO has not moved on. It is an anachronism. NATO provides jobs for the boys. NATO serves the interests of the arms lobby which gravitates around the Pentagon and which has its tentacles deep within US foreign policy. NATO is a stone around the neck of the taxpayers not only of the United States of America but also of its member states. Who, after all, funds its operations? Just in Afghanistan and Iraq, the operations of NATO countries have cost almost one trillion dollars (one thousand billion, or 1,000,000,000,000). How many hospitals and schools could be bought with that? Where NATO could move forward, reinventing itself and including Russia would be by respecting its pledges over the years not to expand (yet NATO's word means nothing), by fighting international terrorism, by fighting piracy and by fighting international crime, including trafficking of drugs, human beings and weapons, side by side with Russia or any other nation wishing to modernise its objectives and fight what exists, instead of inventing ghosts to justify the self-perpetuation of the anachronism. Yet while NATO likes to mention these areas, it maintains its Euro-Atlantic stance, freezing Russia out, not paying attention to Russia's concerns and all the time aiming for an expansion into central and Eastern Europe, where there are plenty of customers for weaponry. And why should NATO reinvent itself when all it is today is the instrument to implement the policies of the arms lobby? NATO's strategy is clear in its breach of a pledge given to Russia in 1998 not to station "substantial combat forces" on territory formerly belonging to the Warsaw Pact. Why then did it expand? Who can give one single military reason for the expansion onto territory the Organization promised not to enter? And what is NATO doing in Afghanistan? Today, Afghanistan produces twice as much heroin as the entire world produced in the year 2000 before the military invasion, by NATO, against the Taliban. Given that the cultivation of the opium poppy funds the Taleban and Al-Qaeda, what exactly is NATO doing? In recent years, instead of diminishing, the heroin production on Afghanistan has grown not two-fold. Not three-fold, not ten-fold, not even by twenty times. Today, the heroin production from Afghanistan is 40 times higher than it was in 2000. In 2009, heroin produced in Afghanistan killed over 90.000 people around the world. Everybody knows that NATO pays the Taliban not to attack, so is the priority to allow them to produce heroin so that they can afford to pay, to keep NATO's losses down? In which case, what is NATO? Timothy BANCROFT-HINCHEY PRAVDA.Ru

 

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http://english.pravda.ru/hotspots/conflicts/19-01-2010/111727-what_is_nato-0

 

Ethnic Lobbies in America: Outsourcing U.S. Foreign Policy?

Eugene IVANOV (USA)

 

Ethnic Lobbies in America: Outsourcing U.S. Foreign Policy?

It's fashionable to say these days that the world is entering the era of post-Americanism. Few can explain what that means in reality, but the gist is that U.S. influence in world affairs is gradually declining, and sooner or later, another country – most likely, China – will become the only world superpower.

We shall see. However, today it's hard to think of any major global problem – be it climate change or aid to poor countries – can be solved without at least the financial involvement of the United States. Besides, should the U.S. screw up big time – a number of great examples are available over the past decade – no one would be immune.

This keeps making Washington DC a natural target of numerous ethnic lobbies trying to promote their agendas through U.S. foreign policy institutions. According to John Newhouse¹, "nearly one hundred countries rely on lobbyists to protect and promote their interests [in the U. S.]."

As Zbigniew Brzezinski explains², the influence exerted by ethnic lobbies originates from the very nature of the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process. It's generally believed that the president has the upper hand in designing and implementing foreign policy. However, the entire executive branch of the U.S. government lacks a central planning organ responsible for this task. Theoretically, this role should be played by the National Security Council, but in practice, the NSC is so busy with day-to-day coordination of policy (between the presidential administration, Department of State, Department of Defense, CIA, etc.) that it simply has no time for strategic planning, resulting in a decentralized and fragmented decision-making process that is open to external influence.

Besides, presidential prerogatives to direct foreign policy are often challenged by Congress. Due to its composition and structure, Congress is especially susceptible to the influence of special interests, including ethnic lobbies. This is reflected in countless congressional resolutions and legislative amendments introduced and lobbied by special ethnic interests (which, in the process, have become very skillful in using campaign funds to win congressional support for their causes). A common place is congressional caucuses identified with specific ethnic interests; so are congressmen and senators serving as spokesmen for specific ethnic lobbies. For example, the Congressional Caucus on India and Indian Americans, one of the largest of this kind, includes over 150 members, none of them being Indian. Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton, in her days as U.S. Senator, used to co-chair the Senate India Caucus.

In their daily activities, ethnic lobbies perform a number of functions. First, they serve as subject-matter experts and sources of information to members of Congress and other branches of government. Second, they participate in drafting legislation and providing policy oversight. Third, they organize media and public campaigns to advertise and promote their pet issues. Naturally, special attention is being paid to providing campaign contributions to elected officials through political action committees (PAC).

It's important to point out that not every ethnic group living in the U.S. forms a functional lobby. Addressing this issue, James Lindsay³ identified a number of factors that could predict a transformation of an immigrant group into a bona fide ethnic lobby. First, immigrants who came to the United States as political refugees (e.g. Cubans) are more likely to be politically active than those who came for "purely" economic reasons (e.g. Italians). Second, immigrants whose homelands are threatened by their neighbors (e.g. Armenia or Israel) are more likely to lobby for their homeland than those who came from "un-threatened" countries (e.g. Norway, Sweden, or Germany). Third, the most efficient ethnic lobbies are formed by economically successful ethnic groups (such as Jewish, Armenian, Cuban, and Greek Americans). Fourth, ethnic lobbies are the most successful in their activities when the issues that they promote are supported by U.S. political elites. Obviously, they are least successful if their issues go against of what is perceived as American national interest.

In their influence exerted on contemporary American political life, no ethnic lobby can rival the Jewish-American lobby (The Israel Lobby, as John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt call it in their highly-publicized 2007 book⁴). Many consider its power comparable with that demonstrated by such titans of American lobbyism as National Rifle Association (NRA) and American Association of Retired Persons (AARP).

Thanks to the tireless efforts of Jewish-American lobby (organized under the aegis of American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)), Israel has been the largest recipient of U.S. economic and military aid since WWII: over $140 billion in 2004 dollars. Israel receives about $3 billion in direct assistance each year, roughly one-sixth of the total U.S. foreign aid budget and worth about $500 a year for every Israeli – not a bad deal for a wealthy industrial state with a per capita income in the top 30 countries in the world.

In addition, the U.S. provides Israel with consistent diplomatic support: between 1972 and 2006, the U.S. has vetoed 42 of the U.N. Security Council's resolutions critical of Israel. What makes the Jewish-American lobby so successful is its commitment, unity, resources, and political skills. (The last two factors, when combined, are especially powerful: it is said that presidential candidates from Democratic Party depend on Jewish support for as much as 60% of campaign contributions). The "ideological" unity obviously distinguishes the Jewish lobby from the Arab-American lobby, which has been hurt over the years by national and religious divisions. However, one cannot also discount the fact that the Jewish lobby faces almost no opposition to its actions because it advocates policies that are considered (rightfully or not) as fully aligned with American national interests.

Recent years have witnessed the impressive rise of the India lobby, whose influence may one day become comparable to that of the Jewish lobby. Perhaps, non-coincidentally, both ethnic groups share a number of similarities: Indian Americans are also well educated, financially successful, and strongly inclined toward political activism. (Add the real or perceived military threats to India from Pakistan and China). The India lobby also benefits from strong ties to the U.S.-India Business Council, an umbrella organization for 200 companies doing business with India or otherwise having Indian connections. (As pointed out by John Newhouse, 20% of all companies in Silicon Valley are owned by Indian Americans).

So far, the most visible demonstration of the strength projected by the India lobby has been last year's congressional approval of the U.S.-India "123 Agreement" on civil nuclear cooperation. Concerns were raised in the arms control community that the agreement will increase India's ability to produce fissionable material for its nuclear weapons program. To ensure the passage of the controversial deal, the lobby joined forces with the U.S.-India Business Council, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and two U.S. companies producing nuclear reactors, General Electric and Westinghouse.

Speaking of successful ethnic lobbies one must mention two more: Cuban and Armenian.

The power wielded by the Cuban exile lobby (associated with the Cuban American National Foundation, CANF) in Washington is even more impressive given that Cubans are concentrated primarily in only one location: Miami, FL. However, the special role played by Florida in the politics of presidential elections has allowed a bunch of noisy but politically savvy anti-Castro immigrants to completely hijack – and for decades dominate – the U.S. policy debates on Cuba.

The Armenian lobby (and its flagship group, Armenian Assembly of America) has made Armenia one of the highest per capita recipients of U.S. aid – thanks largely to Sen. Mitch McConnell, the Republican Senate minority leader and a ranking member of the Senate Appropriations Committee responsible for the distribution of foreign aid. On the other hand, the lobby has so far failed to reach its most cherished goal: a congressional resolution condemning Turkey for the 1915 Armenian genocide. In 2007, the victory was close, as having secured support of the House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, the lobby almost succeeded in setting up the vote for a genocide resolution. However, prodded by the furious Turkish government, the White House intervened and persuaded Pelosi to shelve the resolution. Naturally, in its communication with the Bush administration, the Turks used some help too: former heavy-weight Congressmen Bob Livingston and Dick Gephardt lobbied on Turkey's behalf.

Among other ethnic groups, the Central and Eastern Europeans do possess a significant voting strength (for example, there are more than 10 million ethnic Poles in the United States), but their lobbies lack the financial resources available to their Jewish or Armenian counterparts. Nevertheless, the Polish lobby (through the Polish American Congress) or the Baltic lobby (represented in part by the Baltic American Freedom League (BALF) and the Joint Baltic American National Committee (JBANC)) have been instrumental in promoting the admission of their respective countries in NATO (Poland in 1999; Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 2004). It is a little secret to anyone in Washington that the noisy anti-Russian hysteria fueled by the Polish and Baltic lobbies is partly responsible for the negative image of Russia in the United States and worsening of U.S.-Russia relations.

Experts disagree on whether ethnic lobbies have positive or negative impact on U.S. foreign policy. Some⁵ consider ethnic lobbies as a welcomed sign of "globalization" of U.S. national politics and believe that ethnic lobbies will help spread "American values" around the globe. Others are not so sure expressing the concern that "privatization" (as John Newhouse puts it) of the U.S. foreign policy further corrupts American political system and diminishes its attraction to the rest of the world. An even more extreme point of view was expressed by Mearsheimer and Walt, who asserted that due to the actions of the Jewish lobby, U.S. policy in the Middle East serves the national interest of Israel rather than that of the United States.

In their turn, American politicians are mum on the subject. Used to campaign contributions from various special interests – the pharmaceutical lobby, the energy lobby, the agribusiness lobby, etc. – they don't seems to be concerned with taking money from their ethnic counterparts. And is there any difference, anyway?

______________________

¹ John Newhouse, "Diplomacy, Inc. The Influence of Lobbies on U.S. Foreign Policy", Foreign Affairs, May/June 2009.

² Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership" (2004) Basic Books, New York.

³ James Lindsay, "Getting Uncle Sam's Ear", Council on Foreign Relations (Winter 2002).

⁴ John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy" (2007) Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux.

⁵ Yossi Shain, "Marketing the American Creed Abroad (Diasporas in the U.S. and their Homelands" (1999) Cambridge University Press.

http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2711

Recasting Serbia's Image, Starting With a Fresh Face

Christoph Bangert for The New York Times

"When you're young, and when you come and they see you for the first time, a lot of them are just kind of surprised. They say, 'Who's this kid?'"

By NICHOLAS KULISH

Published: January 15, 2010

BELGRADE, Serbia

THE public face of Serbia for years has been that of a wizened war criminal in the dock in The Hague. Now, as the once-outcast country presses for membership in the European Union, it is increasingly represented by the gap-toothed grin of its energetic young foreign minister, Vuk Jeremic, all of 34 and a graduate of Cambridge and Harvard.

It is not just appearances. He is a minister in the most westward-leaning government Serbia has ever had, one that is aggressively pursuing membership in the European Union and good relations with the United States. Yet at the top of his agenda stands the issue that brought so much trouble to Serbia: the breakaway province and self-declared nation of Kosovo.

To the consternation of powerful supporters of Kosovo's independence, including the United States, the Serbian obsession runs much deeper than a handful of ultranationalists from the generation of Slobodan Milosevic. Even young liberals like Mr. Jeremic, whose fluent English sounds more Bronxville than Belgrade, cannot let go of Kosovo, though it could endanger Serbia's chance to move beyond its recent troubled past.

"The fact that this kind of fervent, pro-European politician in Serbia happens to have this position on Kosovo confuses a lot of people," Mr. Jeremic said in an interview on the eve of the Orthodox Christmas here last week.

"This place, Kosovo, is our Jerusalem; you just can't treat it any other way than our Jerusalem," he said.

As if to underscore the point, his mentor and psychology teacher two decades ago at the First Belgrade High School, the current Serbian president, Boris Tadic, spent the holiday at the Visoki Decani monastery in Kosovo, under guard amid protests by local ethnic Albanians.

Mr. Jeremic quickly added that Serbia was not pressing its case through the use of arms, directly or in the form of paramilitary groups, but through institutions like the International Court of Justice, which will rule on the manner in which Kosovo declared independence. But the stakes are different, with vastly improved relations with the European Union and an end to Serbia's isolation on the line.

Mr. Jeremic is at pains to explain to Western audiences that Serbia's reputation from the Milosevic years had overshadowed the reality that it is now a democracy, and one whose voters twice chose pro-Western candidates in the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2008 — despite the inflamed nationalist sentiment in the wake of Kosovo's secession.

He was appointed foreign minister at 31, too young and inexperienced in the eyes of many Serbs to be trusted with their most important national issue — the impending secession of Kosovo. Yet, he has fought hard for Kosovo, lobbying governments around the world against recognizing its independence and becoming along the way one of Serbia's most popular politicians.

Mr. Jeremic's stridency on Kosovo has led his opponents to charge that he was a closet nationalist, talking one line when he was abroad and quite a different one at home in the Balkans. "Personally, I don't think I'm a nationalist," he said. "I'm half Bosnian and half Serb."

Mr. Jeremic's great-grandfather on his mother's side was Nurija Pozderac, a prominent Muslim politician before World War II who joined Tito's Partisans to fight the Nazis and was killed in 1943. His paternal grandfather was an officer in the king's army and spent much of the war as a prisoner at Dachau. Once he was liberated by the Allies, he returned to Serbia on foot, Mr. Jeremic said.

HE described a normal childhood in Belgrade, including a close relationship with his psychology teacher, Mr. Tadic. But his father, who worked for the state-owned oil company, and his mother went into exile after running afoul of the regime, and Mr. Jeremic finished high school in London before moving on to Cambridge, where he studied theoretical physics.

His time at Cambridge, which coincided with the war in Bosnia, helped him to understand Serbia's image abroad in a very personal way. "It was hard to explain that you come from Serbia and you're not a children-eating radical," said Mr. Jeremic, who had family members fighting on both sides of the war in Bosnia.

Mr. Jeremic opposed the regime of Mr. Milosevic and was a founder of the Organization of Serbian Students Abroad in 1997, but it was during the NATO bombing of Serbia that he hardened his resolve to work for his country. He said he had high school friends who were also opposed to Mr. Milosevic's reign but were called up for compulsory army service at the time of the airstrikes in 1999. Once they were wearing their uniforms, they were "legitimate targets," as he put it ruefully, and some were killed.

He recalled thinking at the time: "This regime, this government, this guy, Slobodan Milosevic, he has to be removed, because he's going to get us all buried. If he stays, he's going to get us all buried."

Mr. Jeremic traveled to Serbia to support the student movement there, known as Otpor, the Serbian word for resistance. After Mr. Milosevic's ouster Mr. Jeremic followed Mr. Tadic through a succession of ministries as an adviser, taking a break for a degree from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, before himself becoming foreign minister.

With Serbia's scant resources and tattered public image, his options for fighting the diplomatic might of countries supporting Kosovo, like the United States, Germany and Britain, seemed limited. But Mr. Jeremic, who still looks and sounds a bit like an overachieving college class president, turned himself into a one-man road show, traveling to 90 countries in the two years since becoming foreign minister. Last year alone he spent 700 hours in the air, or roughly 29 days, much of that in a 30-year-old French-built Falcon 50 jet that was bought for Tito.

MR. JEREMIC sees his age, which many consider a weakness, as one of his assets. "When you're young, and when you come and they see you for the first time, a lot of them are just kind of surprised. They say, 'Who's this kid?'

"That's actually a good thing because it opens up their minds. They're curious. They want to hear what you have to say to them because you're different," he said. An afternoon with Mr. Jeremic, whose wife, Natasa Lekic, is a news anchor on Serbian public television, is a pleasant but intense experience, not complete without a glass of Serbian Carigrad red wine and a stream of articulate defenses of the country's claim to Kosovo.

Smoking a cigar and sipping his wine, Mr. Jeremic refused to say what Serbia would demand if it managed to force Kosovo back to the negotiating table by winning its case before the International Court of Justice. He insisted that the mistake the United States and its allies made before Kosovo's declaration was dictating rather than discussing terms.

Their other big mistake, he said, was expecting Serbia simply to acquiesce to the loss of the province, cowed in the face of American and Western European recognition for Kosovo. "This energy we invested, you know, in going around the world, has surprised a lot of people," Mr. Jeremic said. "A lot of people didn't expect us to dare to try."

http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/16/world/europe/16jeremic.html

Bill Clinton’s Statue Is in Kosovo

Bill Clinton's Statue Is in Kosovo

 

January 15, 2010 | From theTrumpet.com

 

But who's really responsible for the breakaway republic?

 

Stephen Flurry

In November, former U.S. President Bill Clinton attended the unveiling of an 11-foot bronze statue of himself before a large crowd of cheering Albanians in downtown Pristina, the capital of Kosovo.

"I am profoundly grateful that I had a chance to be a part of ending the horrible things that were happening to you 10 years ago," Clinton said in front of the adoring crowd, referring to nato's 1999 bombing campaign against Serbia. The U.S.-led campaign forced Slobodan Milosevic's army to evacuate its sovereign territory in the province of Kosovo, effectively paving the way for Kosovo's secession.

NATO, we should note, was established in 1949 as a defensive alliance among 10 European nations, the United States and Canada. Under terms of the alliance, nato members agreed to defend any member state invaded by an enemy nation.

In October 1998, however, nato "expanded" its mandate to include missions that would extend "freedom" and "human rights" throughout Europe—even if it meant going beyond the boundaries of nato member states.

Like Kosovo, for example.

With its newly revised mandate, nato immediately set its sights on Serbia, which had been cracking down on separatist forces in Kosovo throughout 1998. This culminated in the 78-day aerial campaign that President Clinton authorized in early 1999.

It is, however, Germany that is responsible for both starting and ending the war in Kosovo. From the beginning of Yugoslavia's dissolution, the German government covertly supplied separatist forces in Kosovo, known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (kla), with military intelligence, training and weapons. The KLA had also been linked to the Albanian mafia and various Islamic terrorist groups, including Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda.

"Without any questions," the kla is a "terrorist group," said President Clinton's special envoy to the Balkans, Robert Gelbard, on Feb. 23, 1998. "The future of Kosovo is within Yugoslavia," Gelbard added, after meeting with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic for several hours. The Clinton administration set up the Belgrade meeting with Milosevic to inform him that the United States was ready to reward Yugoslavia for its "good will" in implementing the peace accords the U.S. had brokered in 1995. Milosevic took that as his cue to stamp out the separatist rebellion in Kosovo.

Then, practically overnight, America—after being pressured by Germany—hung Milosevic out to dry.

Just three weeks after the Belgrade meeting, the State Department accused Milosevic of ethnically cleansing Albanians from Kosovo. President Clinton threatened the use of force against Serbia if violence in Kosovo didn't simmer down.

When asked by Congress if he still considered the kla a terrorist group, Gelbard told lawmakers that while the kla had "committed terrorist acts," it had "not been classified legally by the U.S. government as a terrorist organization" (emphasis mine throughout).

They committed acts of terrorism, but were no longer terrorists!

"Unfortunately and tragically, terrorist acts have occurred," said Gelbard, "and they have provided an excuse for Milosevic here. But, as I said, there is no question at all that the overwhelming, brutal, repressive, despicable violence—the criminal actions, I believe, committed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia here—are responsible for the tragedy we have at hand right now."

Three weeks earlier, there had been no question that the kla was responsible for the violent unrest in Kosovo. Now, no question, it was Milosevic.

Germany, the kla's primary state sponsor, had spoken. And the United States abruptly switched sides in the Balkan conflict.

A few days before Gelbard's flip-flop at the congressional hearing, the so-called "contact group" of Germany, Britain, France, Italy, Russia and the United States met for an emergency meeting in London to discuss Kosovo. During the meeting, the group of six decided to punish the Milosevic government with sanctions intended to pressure Yugoslavia into granting broad autonomy to the Albanians in Kosovo.

This, just two weeks after an American envoy assured Milosevic that the future of Kosovo is within Yugoslavia!

"This time, we must respond before it is too late," said U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. "When the war in the former Yugoslavia began in 1991, the international community did not react with sufficient vigor," she remembered.

Of course, as our regular readers know, it wasn't the international community's failure to act in the Balkans that caused war to break out in the former Yugoslav republics. It was our failure to stand up to Germany (and the Vatican) after it insisted on moving forward to recognize Slovenia and Croatia, despite strenuous protests (initially) from the United States, the European Union and the United Nations.

As much as the U.S. might want to forget about this history, the new, German-backed breakaway states haven't forgotten. In 1993, for example, Croatia erected a bronze statue in honor of German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the first diplomat to recognize Croatian independence.

According to the Associated Press, the onetime foreign minister "championed Croatia's independence in 1991 and pushed a hesitant Europe to recognize its secession from federal Yugoslavia" (June 3, 1997).

Kosovo's 2008 declaration of secession was merely the final chapter of Germany's Balkan conquest. Besides disempowering its traditional enemy Serbia, "Berlin was able to successfully reassert its claim as hegemonic power in Southeast Europe," wrote German-Foreign-Policy.com.

There may be a bronze statue of President Clinton in Kosovo commemorating the American firepower that ousted Milosevic from his former Yugoslav republic. But Germany is the one responsible for the breakaway.

This is why, when they declared their independence in 2008, Kosovars waved German flags alongside their American counterparts.

And this is why, on one of the banners celebrating Kosovo's proclamation, it read, "Thank you Germany!" •

 

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Rifkind: Britain must be prepared to defend its place in the world

"Britain has been at war for almost the whole of the past 12 years of Labour government. Two of these wars, in Iraq and in Kosovo, could, and should, have been avoided."

It is a great pity Sir Malcolm is not in charge of the Tories - instead twits like William Hague are more likely to be spouting the usual stuff we have seen recently.

Britain must be prepared to defend its place in the world

A new defence review must reflect foreign policy, not budgets, says Malcolm Rifkind.

By Malcolm Rifkind

Published: 6:19PM GMT 01 Jan 2010

Comments 101 | Comment on this article

Britain has been at war for almost the whole of the past 12 years of Labour government Photo: EPA

It was once remarked that "a diplomat is a person who can be disarming even though his country isn't". While I was serving as minister of defence and then as foreign secretary, I was acutely conscious of this strong and proper relationship between diplomacy and military capability. The Armed Forces do not exist in a vacuum. They are the ultimate means by which, when other methods have failed, a country's vital interests can be protected or enhanced. It was with that in mind that Churchill observed that "jaw-jaw is better than war, war".

Awareness of this relationship is crucial at a time when we are at war in Afghanistan; when the Ministry of Defence budget is in crisis; and when there is all-party agreement on the need for a defence review.

 The priority, however, is for a wide-ranging review. Decisions cannot be taken on frigates and aircraft carriers, on fighter aircraft or on infantry regiments without knowing the kinds of wars that we may have to fight. Could they be at sea, like the Falklands; in the air, as with Kosovo; on land, as with the Taliban; or with tanks, as in the Gulf War for the liberation of Kuwait? Will future wars be fought against other states, against insurgents, or terrorist organisations?

No defence review can answer such questions. The chiefs of staff can give their advice to governments only when the Cabinet has decided the foreign policy of the United Kingdom for the years ahead. In particular, we need to determine whether it is to continue to be a global foreign policy or one that confines itself to the defence of our territory and that of our immediate allies.

Of course, Britain is not a superpower and has no aspirations to be one. That status is reserved for the United States. It will one day include China. The United Kingdom is, however, one of a small number of countries that do have a global foreign policy and have either the military power or economic strength with which to advance it.

In Europe, only France, because of its armed forces, and Germany, because of its economic strength, share that role with Britain. Italy and Spain, though comparable in size, do not. Put simply, the question for the British people, as well as for the politicians, is whether we wish to remain a power like France and Germany, or have a greatly reduced role like Italy and Spain.

I hope, therefore, that the Conservative Party will commit itself to an unprecedented joint foreign and defence policy review to be begun immediatly after the general election. Furthermore, I hope the outcome of that review will be the recognition that we continue to have global interests that need both a diplomatic and defence capability no smaller than we have at present.

Before addressing the affordability of such a policy, one has to justify why it is necessary for Britain to remain a global player. It is not because of nostalgia for our imperial past, when much of the world was coloured pink on the map.

Nor is it a desire, as with Tony Blair, to impose regime change and a so-called ethical foreign policy at the end of the barrel of a gun. Britain has been at war for almost the whole of the past 12 years of Labour government. Two of these wars, in Iraq and in Kosovo, could, and should, have been avoided. Only Afghanistan was forced upon us and the international community by the terrorist attacks of September 11 in the United States.

The reasons why we need to retain a global foreign policy are twofold. First, as a relatively small island trading nation, our security and our prosperity benefit from international stability, the rule of law, open trading markets and democratic accountability.

Second, our ability to help deliver these objectives is far greater than most other countries around the world. Uniquely, we can help shape events by the combination of our permanent membership of the UN Security Council; our major influence in Nato; our leading role, along with France and Germany, in the European Union; our status in the Commonwealth; our membership of the G8; and our substantial military capability. Indeed, other than the United States, only Britain and France can deploy serious military strength to any part of the world.

Few, if any, other countries combine these major assets, which enhance our ability to determine events. As a stable, democratic nation we would be failing in our duty not only to ourselves and to our own interests, but also our duty to the international community if we did not play our part to the maximum of our capability.

But that brings us to the question of affordability. The objectives may be worthy but can we, in our current straitened financial circumstances, do what we ought and would like to do?

So far as diplomacy is concerned, affordability is not a serious issue. The Foreign Office budget of just over £2 billion is only 0.5 per cent of Government spending. While the Treasury will, understandably, not exempt the Foreign Office from spending cuts, any savings will make an insignificant contribution to reducing the public deficit.

The Ministry of Defence is another matter. The defence budget can hardly expect to be totally immune when the public finances are in such a mess. But nor can our national interests in a dangerous world be ignored or endangered. Four principles must be rigorously applied.

First, the costs of the Afghan war must not be funded, even in part, from the core defence budget. Bob Ainsworth has been the first defence secretary, Labour or Conservative, in living memory to have failed to block the Treasury's grasping hand in such a situation. He is competent, but politically weak. The Armed Forces are suffering as a result.

Second, the most serious problem has been the inability of the Ministry of Defence to control the escalating costs of procurement. The recent Gray Report has made excellent recommendations which need to be implemented urgently. Procurement decisions and costs must be controlled from the very top of the Ministry of Defence. They cannot continue to be the result of the competing demands and aspirations of the individual Services, who do not have ultimate responsibility for the defence budget.

Third, where reductions in capability may be unavoidable, they should be restricted to low priorities and, in particular, should exclude reductions in our fighting strength, which would be irreversible even when the health of the public finances has been restored.

Fourth, we should recognise that any major military operations will be in alliance with our closest friends in Nato and Europe. There are areas where we do not need each Nato country to duplicate what others already have. This could provide major savings. While the United States will remain our closest ally, we need more substantial partnerships with France and other serious European military states, such as the Dutch, the Poles and the Danes.

For 300 years, the United Kingdom, both as an island state and as the British Empire, has helped shape the world we now live in. The British public continues to have a world view shaped by that accumulated experience. It is a valuable asset, which serves not only our own interests but those of our allies in the United States, in Europe and in the Commonwealth.

So our diplomats should still be disarming when appropriate. But our Armed Forces must not be disarmed unless and until the global lions learn to live with the global lambs.

Sir Malcolm Rifkind was Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary between 1992 and 1997. He is MP for Kensington and Chelsea

Broken Bosnia needs western attention

Uh-oh! OR Ha-ha?

 

Date: Tuesday, December 29, 2009, 9:25 PM http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bf60a826-f4af-11de-9cba-00144feab49a.html Broken Bosnia needs western attention By William Hague and Paddy Ashdown Published: December 29 2009 20:14 | Last updated: December 29 2009 20:14 The 14th anniversary of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords passed unnoticed in November. The collapse of a US-EU diplomatic initiative in Bosnia-Herzegovina last month went virtually unreported too, as has the fact that Bosnia 's cold peace is under serious threat. Bosnia may seem less significant than it used to be to the US and her allies. Pressing challenges in Afghanistan and beyond need great attention. But the risk of a failed state taking root in Europe cannot be ignored by Europe or in Washington . Brussels struggles with serious Balkan diplomacy – so many capitals to confer with and tactics to co-ordinate, and so little political will to take difficult decisions. The EU hopes that its all-carrots, no-sticks approach linked entirely to the promise of an eventual EU accession process will change the domestic politics of Bosnia and neighbouring Serbia , and produce political co-operation. The US backs this approach, despite the fact that Bosnia is further from EU membership than any other aspirant country. Bosnia's economy has grown with foreign aid, but the state has not grown, and today it does not work. The Bosnian Serbs have exploited the autonomy they were granted at Dayton , relying on stalling tactics to keep the country divided, its government dysfunctional, and their hopes of secession alive, while some Bosniak leaders can be equally rigid. Some resistance has been overcome when the international high representative overseeing Dayton has insisted on it. But even this level of effort has overtaxed the patience and capacity of the EU and US. The high representative's office has been allowed to be demeaned so that none of the parties, particularly the Bosnian Serbs, heed its efforts. It is now proposed to weaken the role further by recasting the high representative as an EU special representative and stripping out real authority – the " Bonn powers". With the election season in Bosnia imminent, nationalist rhetoric will certainly increase in all parts. Even the Bosnian Croats increasingly talk of their own entity and a break with their federation with the Bosniaks. What happens in Europe's backyard matters: the consequences of Bosnia 's disintegration would be catastrophic. The breakdown of the country into independent ethnic statelets would not only reward ethnic cleansing – surely a moral anathema – but would also risk the creation of a failed state in the heart of Europe; a fertile breeding ground for terrorism and crime, and a monstrous betrayal of all those who survived the concentration camps, mass graves and displacement of the 1990s. Bosnia will not solve itself, nor will the prospect of EU integration be enough to pull the country back from the brink. Instead we must recognise that all the countries in the region are linked and cannot be dealt with in isolation. We urge the US and EU to each appoint a special envoy to the region, who would work in lockstep to deliver a united message and drive forward progress. We must impress on Bosnia 's leaders that the sovereignty of the country is unquestionable and its break-up unthinkable. But we must also say to European candidate countries Serbia and Montenegro that they are expected to uphold EU policy towards Bosnia . A robust international approach should focus on a single goal: a central government in Bosnia effective enough to meet the responsibilities of EU and Nato membership. Each Bosnian leader should have to stand for, or against, that simple idea – and face consequences for his or her answer. The international community should be prepared to use sticks as well as carrots. There is a strong argument for the threat of targeted sanctions against politicians who undermine the Bosnian state. Talk of timelines for the closure of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina is premature. The Office should only be closed once constitutional reform has been achieved. Meanwhile, the high representative must have the solid backing of the EU and US so that all parties know they cannot sit out the international presence in the country. Finally, the EU peacekeeping mission in Bosnia must be retained, and reinforced if necessary, to send a strong signal that neither secession nor violence will be tolerated. Today Radovan Karadzic is finally on trial in The Hague on charges of alleged genocide and war crimes in Bosnia . As he and others are called to account over their part in the horrendous events of the 1990s, it would be a supreme irony if their plans for carving up Bosnia-Herzegovina were to be realized simply because the international community was too busy to care. Mr Hague is UK shadow foreign secretary, Lord Ashdown is a former high representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina . This article was co-written by James O'Brien, a former US presidential envoy for the Balkans, Morton Abramowitz, former US ambassador to Turkey and a senior fellow at the Century Foundation, and Jim Hooper, a managing director of the Public International Law and Policy Group Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2009. Print a single copy of this article for personal use. Contact us if you wish to print more to distribute to others. "FT" and "Financial Times

 

Grim reality of Serbia's EU 'dream'

Federalists bleat buzzwords about Serbia's European ambitions but the EU, like Nato, only wants to force it into neoliberal line

• Comments (96)

A blizzard of platitudes has been unleashed by Europe's leaders this week as Serbia formally applies for EU membership. No opportunity to declare the occasion "historic" or to assert that Serbia has a European "vocation" is being passed up.

Yet once these asinine buzzwords have been uttered, there will be no reason to rejoice. Belgrade's treatment by some EU governments has long been characterised by a brazen hypocrisy. Until the beginning of this month, the Netherlands was blocking Serbia's efforts to strengthen its relations with the union over suspicions it was not co-operating fully with the war crimes tribunal in the Hague.

The zeal of Maxime Verhagen, the Dutch foreign minister, in insisting on accountability for offences against humanity would be praiseworthy if it was consistent with his approach to other conflicts. How odd it is, then, that Verhagen has vigorously opposed efforts to probe (never mind prosecute) alleged Israeli war crimes in Gaza.

With just two of the men on its wanted list – Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic – still at large, isn't it time that the Hague tribunal was given a fresh mandate, or even better that an entirely new investigative body is set up? This body should be tasked with finally unearthing the truth about why Nato bombed Serbia in 1999.

None of the alliance's personnel has yet been charged by an international tribunal with crimes relating to that war, even though it was conducted with the use of cluster bombs, weapons that literally slice the limbs of their victims. Nor should it be forgotten that the war lacked UN approval and helped usher in the dubious concept of "humanitarian intervention", under which military action can be taken on the flimsiest of pretexts.

I'm sure that I will soon hear or read some federalist (or should I say fantasist?) trying to wax lyrical about the significance of Serbia embracing countries that were attacking it little over a decade ago. What the fantasists won't acknowledge, though, is that Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia's then president, didn't earn his status as a favourite bogeyman of the west purely because he did dreadful things to the ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, as the official narrative would have us believe.

The west could probably have tolerated his autocratic streak if he was more favourable to its pervading ideology. But Milosevic's refusal to accept the neoliberal precepts on which the global economy is being run seem to offer a more plausible explanation as to why Bill Clinton and his then cronies in Europe insisted he must go.

Such a conclusion seems to me inescapable when you examine the fine print of what the EU and America have been pressing Serbia to do over the past 10 years. Privatising state-owned industry is now a standard condition of EU accession, as many countries in central and eastern Europe have discovered, often at enormous social cost.

But what makes Serbia unique is that many of the facilities it has been required to sell off were first damaged by Nato bombs, with the result that western firms could snatch some of them up at bargain basement prices. More than 1,800 privatisations have occurred since Milosevic was ousted; much of the country's metal industry is now in the hands of US Steel, which has been busy shedding jobs, while the national car company Zastava has been bought by Fiat.

The European commission's latest "progress report" for Serbia states that finalising privatisation is a priority for the country's "partnership" with the EU. Moreover, it indicates that the welfare state that has provided a lifeline to the country's citizens must be radically altered. It is no exaggeration, then, to say that the austerity budget rubber-stamped in Belgrade, also this week, was to a large extent written in Brussels and Washington, home to the IMF, which has so generously come to Serbia's "rescue".

No doubt, the pensioners whose income has been reduced at the behest of foreign institutions aren't weighed down by the hand of history on their country's shoulder at the moment. Instead, they will face 2010 with the dreaded sensation of a hair shirt on their backs.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/22/serbia-eu-dream-neoliberal

Russian New Security Pact (Trifkovic on Russia Profile)

http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?pageid=Experts%27+Panel&articleid=a1260553754

 

Russia Profile Weekly Experts Panel:

Russia's New European Security Pact

Last week, the Kremlin published its draft of the European Security Treaty, first proposed in June 2008 as President Dmitry Medvedev's first major foreign policy initiative. Moscow has been criticized for offering few specifics of this proposal, and thus failed to move its European partners toward a meaningful discussion of its initiative. It has now taken this step by putting forward a draft treaty, consisting of 14 articles. [...] Is it possible to imagine that this treaty could serve as a viable replacement of or a substitute for the existing security structures, particularly those offering specific security guarantees, like NATO or the Collective Security Treaty? Would it improve the efficiency of the existing conflict resolution mechanisms in Europe? Would it restrict NATO's ability to operate in Europe? Would it increase Russia's influence over security decisions in Europe? Will it receive a broader discussion among European and Transatlantic powers, or will it die the quiet death of many other grand plans for European security?

Srdja Trifkovic, Director, Center for International Affairs, the Rockford Institute, Rockford, IL:

Quite apart from its details and nuances, Moscow's proposal can be taken seriously because it comes after a notable shift in U.S. rhetoric and behavior over the past year. This shift reflects U.S. President Barack Obama's evolving strategic priorities caused in part by the ongoing crisis in Pakistan and the escalation of fighting in Afghanistan. The two key elements are his U-turn on missile defense deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the quiet acceptance on both sides of the Atlantic that there will be no NATO expansion along the Black Sea coast anytime soon.

The problem is still what to do about NATO, and the Russian proposal offers ambiguous guidance. The alliance has morphed into something it was never intended to be: a vehicle for the attainment of American ideological and geopolitical objectives outside the core area. It is necessary to halt and reverse NATO's recently invented mission as a self-appointed promoter of democracy and humanitarian intervention and guardian against instability in strange and faraway places.

Bill Clinton's air war against the Serbs marked a decisive shift in that mutation. The trusty keeper of the gate of 1949 had morphed into a roaming vigilante in 1999. This event had a profound effect on Russian thinking. A decade later, the National Security Strategy approved by President Medvedev last May identified the two gravest threats facing Russia as Ukrainian accession to NATO and predatory Western designs on its energy and other natural resources. The paper explicitly called the United States a major threat to Russian national security.

Such a conclusion was unsurprising. By virtue of its location, Russia controls the crossroads of Eurasia and therefore access to its fabulous natural resource wealth. Washington craves cheap and easy access to that wealth, and under the presidency of George Bush, the United States had developed an ideology to complement such geo-strategic ambitions. Former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described it succinctly 18 months ago: in U.S. foreign policy there is no distinction between ideals and self-interest. U.S. foreign policy is its values, and America will stop at nothing to ensure that its values prevail. The world is divided into two camps: one is made up of states that share U.S. values; the other of states (implicitly Russia and China) which were consigned to a lesser status because their relations with the United States are rooted more in common interests than in common values. Washington has changed its tone since, and that change appears to be for the better. Obama now has an opportunity to execute a paradigm shift and inaugurate a process in which the East-West Security Pact would be just the first step on a long journey, not its conclusion.

In principle the Russian proposal is not ranged against NATO, but it could help the United States sort out the incoherent mess NATO has become by restoring the alliance's proper legal mission as defender of the territory of its member states. The proposal's shortcoming, however, is that it neglects the potential scope in Europe for a robust and independent EU defense capability under the auspices of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

To devise a more inclusive European security architecture - one that includes NATO, but more than just NATO - would require the establishment of an organization that would replace the moribund OSCE. A new security architecture embracing the main parts of North America, Russia and Europe, would allow for the collective reallocation of forces so as to counter threats emanating from outside: cross-border terrorism, drug trafficking, sex slavery, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and - most importantly - efforts to export jihad.

These threats, unconventional yet real, are a factor for unity from Vancouver to Vladivostok. That vast region is united above all by the moral, spiritual and intellectual values derived from the Judeo-Christian and Greek tradition, values that are far deeper than any issues which divide it. The real threat to the security of pan-Europa thus defined comes from Jihad, from the deluge of inassimilable immigrants, and from collapsing birthrates. All three are caused by the moral decrepitude and cultural decline, not by any shortage of soldiers and weaponry.

Strategy is the art of winning wars, and grand strategy is the philosophy of maintaining an acceptable peace. In considering Moscow's proposals in good faith, Western powers would display an aptitude for grand strategy, an inspired grasp of the essential requirements of the moment which has been sadly lacking in Washington for the past two decades.

The Nonexistent "Serbian Lobby"

 

http://www.novireporter.com/look/reporter/nr_article.tpl?IdLanguage=11&IdPublication=2&NrIssue=352&NrSection=5&NrArticle=4488

NOVI REPORTER, Banja Luka, No. 352, December 9, 2009.

Interview: Srdja Trifkovic

THE "SERBIAN LOBBY" IN THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT EXIST AT ALL

 

At a hearing before the Helsinki Committee of the House of Representatives last spring, at which Ivo Banac, Paddy Ashdown and others opened fire from all weapons on the Republika Srpska and [its prime minister Milorad] Dodik, demanding the abolition of the entities and the appointment of an American envoy to the Balkans, they were not countered by a single Congressman, or a representative of the [Serbian] Diaspora, or a lobbyist, or a visitor from the Republika Srpska, although they would not have been denied the platform had they asked for it.

---

For the past two decades the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia have been subjected to a hostile treatment by the Western power centers. In Serbia and the Republika Srpska alike, the attempts to correct or even reverse such trends in the U.S. and the European Union have often relied on the impact of the Serbian diaspora in the United States and in the leading countries of the EU. Such expectations and the reality are in a chronic discord, however.

 

Dr. Srdja Trifkovic debunks many flawed assumptions in the Old Country about the political potential of our kin in America... He points out the remarkable inertness of the official Belgrade and Banja Luka vis-a-vis the Serbian diaspora and also regarding attempts to convince the influential Western interlocutors of the validity of arguments advanced by Serbia and by the Republika Srpska in the ongoing Balkan unravellings:

"The Serbian diaspora has no influence on the formulation of the U.S. policy. It is the least well organized among all ethnic groups of comparable size. A concrete example: when an appeal went out, some ten years ago, for the survival of Serbian studies at the University of Illinois in Chicago, barely $30,000 was collected and the chair was extinguished. On the other hand, the Lithuanian community in Chicago - far smaller than the Serbian one - threw a benefit dinner for a similar purpose and collected a million dollars in a few hours. The Serbian community has no excuse for this state of affairs. The diaspora has neither the money nor the will to work for the defense and promotion of the Serbian-American community's interests - and money as the precondition of all activity. As Mark Twain pointed out 150 years ago, America has "the best Congress money can buy!" It is naive to assume that Bob Dole, Joe Biden, the late Tom Lantos, Joe Lieberman and other Serb-haters have acted for so many years in the manner well known to us out of purely moral principles and deepest conviction. Someone had to approach them, to present the specific views to them, to motivate them to accept those views - which means money - and to promt them to act accordingly - again money! Those four steps represent the essence of lobbying. The principle is the same, regardless of whether you are advocating a centralized Bosnia-Herzegovina or Federal subsidies to dairy farmers in Wisconsin.

Novi Reporter: How do you explain the fact that, nevertheless, encouraging news has reached Serbia and the Republika Srpska of certain successes of the lobbying in the US?

 

Trifkovic: There are people in the Diaspora who are sparing no effort to project, on the Serbian public scene, an image of themselves as very influential players closely connected with various Congressmen and Senators. Having paid a few hundred dollars to their journalist contacts to write suitably intoned fairytales in some Belgrade tabloids, they flaunt those cuttings back home to prove that they are influential in Serbia’s public and political life and that they should be taken into due account in some future combinations. This reflects the infantile vanity of some diaspora leaders with bombastic-sounding titles and negligible influence, and the syndrome is well known to the American Serbs. It is noteworthy, however, that the U.S. Administration is not interested in nurturing the ambitions of any potential Serbian B-Team, because the Americans find the present government in Belgrade perfectly suited to their interests.  

 

To this very day there is no Serbian Lobby in the U.S.  it simply does not exist. The Serbian Congressional Caucus is a Potemkin's Village, which is in any event in the state of deep hibernation. The members of the Caucus merely express some interest in the Balkans, but they do not necessarily support Serbian positions on The Hague, Kosovo, Dayton... To give you but one example, at a hearing before the Helsinki Committee of the House of Representatives last spring, at which Ivo Banac, Paddy Ashdown and others opened fire from all weapons on the Republika Srpska and [its prime minister Milorad] Dodik, demanding the abolition of [the Dayton-provided] entities and the appointment of an American envoy to the Balkans, they were not countered by a single Congressman, or a representative of the [Serbian] Diaspora, or a lobbyist, or a visitor from the Republika Srpska, although they would not have been denied the platform had they asked for it.

 

Are there within the Serbian diaspora in the U.S. persons and institutions which do not act under the patronage of the well known organizations, but which nevertheless make a respectable contribution and are worthy of attention?

 

There are, but the less they act under the Serbian banner, the more effective they are. The ability to act independently is the precondition of success.

 

How would you define the key common objectives which could unite the Serbs in North America? What are the realistic, and what are the optimal potential results of their work?

 

The key objective is to articulate the interests of the Serbian community and to present it competently through the prism of American interests. The theme of the Balkans as the weak link in the war against terrorism is essential, as it may be related to American concerns. However, more than eight years after September 11, there is no “White Book” which would contain a consolidated dossier of the Sarajevan political establishments Jihadist connections. All kinds of terrorist attacks since that time, from Riyadh to Casablanca to Madrid or Bali, indicate that there is a Bosnian Connection. This remains an unused capital.

 

How do you see the relations of the Serbian diaspora in the U.S. with the political instances in Serbia and the Republika Srpska?

 

The biggest problem of the Serbian diaspora in the U.S. is the absence of legitimate authority and hierarchy. The split within the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1963 undermined its role of the moral pillar, and there is no leadership from the old country. On the other hand, it is unrealistic to expect the diaspora to achieve that which neither Belgrade nor Banja Luka are doing. Let us face the facts: official Serbian guests often come to Washington, not in order to make a serious impact on the political decision-making process relevant to the Serbian people and its interests, but to create back home a convincing illusion of the alleged results of their visit. A textbook example of this we have seen recently, in early November, with a frankly futile Republika Srpska mission to the capital of the United States. The visit was effectively a fiasco, yet it was presented in the Republika Srpska media as a success.

 

How do you evaluate the results of that visit?

 

Who are those people trying to hoodwink, or are they deluded themselves, and cherish ungrounded illusions about such visits? Who is enriching their scant itineraries with the meetings with political lightweights, or else with antagonists who only receive them in order to give them a stern dressing-down? Is the goal simply to fill in the slots, to justify expenses? Why do they deceive themselves, and others, talking of a successful mission crowned with a half-hours visit to the deputy under-secretarys aide in a windowless office? Or visits with those few members of Congress who are already known as friendly to the Serbs, but who have no influence on the formulation of policy? I am inclined to think that they are simply not up to the task, rather than mendacious. They do not defend Serbian national interests adequately, because they are not attuned to the Washingtonian discourse and therefore unable to articulate those interests in the manner that may have some operational value in the perception of their U.S. interlocutors.

 

With the current setup of the Serbian diplomacy and lobbying structure in Washington, things will not get any better. The same applies to Serbia’s foreign and every other policy. Almost two decades since the beginning of Yugoslavia’s disintegration nothing has been learned, things merely change in order to remain the same. There is an old Jewish proverb, to the effect that if you keep doing what you’ve been doing, you ll keep getting what you are currently getting. What the Serbs have got over all these years we know very well, and there should be no illusions that the slicing of the Serbian salami is by any means over. Quite the contrary!

 

What are the main causes for the lack of adequate response of the diaspora to the anti-Serb trend which is still largely present in the Western political, media, and academic elite?

 

There are three key elements of failure. The first is in the lack of strategy for defending the image and identity of the community, based on a clear methodology for the attainment of such goals. The second is the short-sighted focus of many Serbs on the reactive critique of the Western policy and its media presentation, without any strategic elaboration of alternative positions and constant advancement of new concrete solutions as an alternative to the current flawed policy.

 

And finally, the attempts to influence foreign media and political circles are characterized by complete amateurism of the leadership of organizations with impressive names which nevertheless lack true legitimacy within the Serbian diaspora community. This undermines their credibility among the policy makers and public opinion creators. The consequence is clear: the views and decisions detrimental to the Serbs could be advocated in the Western media, approved in legislative bodies, applied by governments, and verified by the academic and analytical institutions. There was a visible change of tone after October 5, 2000, but it was short lived.