euobserver.com

Serbia and the EU: Stability over democracy

Steve Crawshaw

6-8 minutes

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There were more headlines over the weekend praising the fact that the new out-and-proud Serb prime minister, Ana Brnabic, took part in a gay pride march in Belgrade.

And yes, that is in itself good news, given the disturbing context of homophobic violence that we have seen over the past years.

The implication of this new flurry of cosy headlines about Serbia, and about Ana Brnabic, is that Serbia is now a place where rights are more generally taken seriously at last. But, on that point, many Serb activists would beg to differ.

Brussels may be reluctant to criticise Serbia because of geopolitical considerations on Kosovo and other issues. This is what the European Commission likes to call Belgrade's "constructive role in the region", but Serbian activists would point out that their country's role has often been far from constructive.

They believe that Brussels' reluctance to speak out has damaging consequences for Serbia and the region.

However, there are indeed some scraps of good news that may seem to justify the new warmth.

Scraps of warmth

Serbia did recently gain its first female and first lesbian prime minister - in a country that has been plagued by homophobic violence.

Serb leader Aleksandar Vucic - prime minister between 2014 and 2017, and newly elected president - often speaks of EU membership as a "strategic priority".

The Balkan wars seem long ago. Slobodan Milosevic - ousted in 2000 after a bloody decade in power - was delivered to The Hague and died behind bars in 2006.

The bombed-out defence ministry building on one of Belgrade's central boulevards still stands as a conspicuous reminder of the Nato bombing in 1999, but such eyesores can seem like an archaeological relic. Some Serb voters were, after all, barely born at that time.

But the appointment of a gay prime minister (welcome though that is), and the official trumpeting of "European values" do not mean that Serbia now has a government committed to tolerance, justice and rule of law.

On the contrary: for those who dare to speak out, the problems are real and growing, even while Brussels and Washington turn a blind eye.

In the late 1990s, Vucic was information minister and chief media enforcer for Milosevic. But Vucic insists his approach has changed since that time, when troublesome journalists risked being murdered.

In Vucic's own words, "only donkeys don't change".

But the Independent Association of Journalists in Serbia recorded 69 attacks on journalists last year - and there has been a sharp increase in recent years.

The Association this month highlighted the government's silence, yet there are still more death threats - and this time against journalists at an independent news website.

No media freedom

The state television news and the majority of privately owned channels provide a steady drumbeat of unquestioning support, where little to no criticism of government policies can be heard.

Media ownership is often opaque, and demonising alternative voices is routine.

Anita Mitic, Belgrade director of the Youth Initiative for Human Rights, says she and her colleagues have given up reporting the death threats: "The police don't even call us back."

Under Vucic, the language used to criticise those who speak out is disturbingly reminiscent of his former master's voice.

Pro-government headlines accused the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) and KRIK, the Crime and Corruption Reporting Network, of being "liars" and "mercenaries".

For the moment, such attacks have subsided. More broadly, however, the pressure has not.

The apartment of a KRIK reporter, Dragana Peco, was ransacked last month in what Ljiljana Smajlovic, of the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom, described as a "brazen attempt to intimidate".

In a bid to keep European governments sweet, Vucic and his allies have regularly played the "Russia card" - in effect "If you don't love us, Moscow will" - including with regard to ongoing negotiations on the status of Kosovo. As a result, despite a range of human rights concerns, Brussels is much keener to praise than to criticise.

For Serbs who still dare to put their heads above the parapet, that self-censorship is a core part of the problem.

Serbia's stabilitocracy

"Stabilitocracy", a newly-coined Balkan buzzword, describes an all too familiar problem.

In the words of Jovo Bakic, a Belgrade sociologist: "The EU prefers stability to democracy or human rights. The EU made its choice. I think it's very shortsighted."

Dragana Zarkovic-Obradovic, Belgrade director of the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network argues: "They are allowing [Vucic] to poison the public - and that will backfire. He is feeding [them] all the worst things, and destabilising the country."

Anita Mitic of the Youth Initiative for Human Rights believes that the failure to speak out can have destabilising consequences for the future: "We are promoting European values more than Europe itself does. I'm frustrated that I can risk my life for European values - and the European Union abandons me, for the sake of a deal."

But none of this is new, of course.

Slobodan Milosevic himself, the arch-destabiliser, was at one point regarded by Western leaders not as part of the problem but as part of the solution. Or, as Milosevic himself once told me, while the war in Bosnia was getting underway: "I am for peace."

After thousands more lives were lost, Western illusions about Serbia's then strongman were eventually shattered. It is time to shatter today's illusions, too.

President Vucic, in welcome contrast to his one-time mentor, is no unleasher of wars.

But the bottom line remains: human rights and stability are not alternatives but two sides of the same coin - and the rule of law is essential for both. We cannot afford to ignore that simple truth.

Steve Crawshaw is a senior advocacy adviser at Amnesty International, and a board member of the Balkans Investigative Reporting Network.

 

balkanist.net

In Conversation: Milorad Pupovac, Leader of Croatia's Serbs

13-16 minutes

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Over the weekend, a group of far-right protesters in Croatia burned copies of the Serb minority newspaper Novosti in front of the publication's office in Zagreb. The far-right group had a chilling warning for Milorad Pupovac, the leader of the Serb National Council (SNV) that publishes Novosti: it would be "dangerous" for him if the fascist Ustaša slogan za dom spremni (for the homeland ready) was removed from a Croatian Defense Forces (HOS) plaque near the WWII Jasenovac concentration camp, as he and others have suggested. On Monday, Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović drew criticism and further attention to the issue when she described za dom spremni as "a traditional Croatian greeting".

Pupovac, who in addition to serving as the president of the SNV is the leader of Croatia's Independent Democratic Serb Party and a member of the Sabor, has been an outspoken critic of the plaque.

Balkanist spoke with Milorad Pupovac, leader of Croatia's Serbs, about the controversial plaque, the intense public and media scrutiny he and his party have faced in recent weeks, and Croatia's current ruling coalition, of which he and his Independent Democratic Serb Party are a part.

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Balkanist: You and your party have recently been subject to intense public and media scrutiny in Croatia due to your stance on the HOS plaque in the vicinity of the Jasenovac Memorial Center. What's your response to this?

Pupovac: The plaque is found on the side of a building where the heads of the Ustaša concentration camp in Jasenovac were based. The fact that it was placed there represents the symbolic return of the Ustaša to the location of the Jasenovac concentration camp, and the connotations that this has go beyond the complex itself. For us, this represents an intense form of desecration; it defiles a place that was the site of the most monstrous crimes committed during World War II in Croatia and on the territory of occupied Europe. Therefore, any civilized government, any government that feels a moral obligation towards that level of suffering should feel that it's imperative that the plaque to be removed. Such plaques should not be allowed anywhere in Croatia, especially not in the vicinity of Jasenovac.

Balkanist: How does this fit into the platform of the political party you represent?

Pupovac: We are a party that has an anti-fascist political orientation, with a tradition that draws heavily on the anti-fascist tradition of Croatia and the former Yugoslav federation. Because of this aspect of our political philosophy we have a special sensitivity to the desecration of places that have seen a lot of suffering at the hands of fascist movements. We are sensitive to the relativization of crimes committed by fascist formations, in this case Ustasa formations. Our party is actively involved in confronting historical revisionism and confronting the denial of crimes committed during the Second World War – it's one of the key components of our political engagement.

Members of Croatia's far-right burn copies of the Serb minority newspaper Novosti in front of its headquarters in Zagreb.

Balkanist: What is the current situation regarding the plaque?

Pupovac: The plaque will be removed in the coming weeks, and the government has agreed on the procedure for the plaque's removal. The procedure, as it stands now, will give those who put the plaque up the opportunity to remove it on their own initiative and replace it with a different plaque that is acceptable. If this is not done, then government institutions will step in.

Balkanist: If these symbols are under consideration to be made illegal and be banned in Croatia, why has a situation arisen in which these symbols, primarily symbols associated with the NDH, are being placed in public areas and used by political and veterans' organizations in Croatia?

Pupovac: With regard to the veterans' organizations, some of them, during the war in Croatia in 1991-1995, used symbols of the NDH as a part of their brand and image, and this was primarily something done by the HOS formations. Unfortunately, they were then able to formalize these symbols and make their crests and emblems "legal". The current HOS emblem, with the slogan Za dom spremni on it, was registered in 2001 during the mandate of a coalition government which included SDP and other liberal parties, including HNS. Therefore, this plaque that bears the symbol of the HOS has the legally and officially accepted emblem of the organization on it, an emblem that was accepted by the government in 2001. We are paying the consequences for that today.

This legal discrepancy between what are considered legally accepted symbols and the laws that sanction the greeting Za dom spremni lead to complicated situations. So on the one hand you have the fact that in Metkovic, during an event on the Neretva River, you saw ships with the Za dom spremni greeting on their flag disciplined by the police within a short period of time, or people being arrested for chanting "Za dom spremni" on the anniversary of Operation Storm this year. On the other hand, you have this situation, where these veterans' organizations with a legally recognized logo putting up this plaque in the most sensitive location in Croatia.

Now, two things need to be done. First, we need to remove that greeting from the emblem in the area of Jasenovac. And second, the legal framework in Croatia has to be changed so that it bans any action which glorifies the Ustasa regime or movement or the NDH.

Balkanist: What do you think the reactions to the establishment of such a legal framework will be, keeping in mind what the reactions have been to the issue of the plaque?

Pupovac: It will surely cause certain reactions, just like the issue of Jasenovac has. You do not need to look much further than at the statements made by certain political representatives such as Zlatko Hasanbegovic and others, and there is no doubt that such a thing would pass without reactions. On the other hand, the governing coalition and the government need to defend the fundamental values of Europe after WWII, the fundamental values of today's Europe, as well as that which has been formalized by legal precedents in Croatia – which is the sanctioning of the Ustasa slogan Za dom spremni. The removal of the plaque itself would not be without precedent, as was demonstrated by the case of the removal of the plaque bearing the Za dom spremni slogan on a monument dedicated to members of the HOS in Split.

Balkanist: Would you agree with the assessment that your position on this issue, or rather the position of your party, is being used as a reason to incite offensive rhetoric against the Serbian minority in Croatia?

Pupovac: Unfortunately, yes. Situations such as this or reactions to this situation often lead to an increase in anti-minority rhetoric, especially with regard to the Serbian minority. An anti-Serbian atmosphere and anti-Serb sentiments become more widespread, and we see an increase in attacks against our representatives and our organizations, which sometimes take the form of insults and threats in various forms, so we see a wide range of negative reactions. But we see this as a continuation of a certain wave of Croatian politics and public discourse that became particularly evident in 2014 and then in the years that followed, until the fall of the government led by Tihomir Oreskovic and Tomislav Karamarko. This "current" of political thinking in Croatia wasn't really halted until Andrej Plenkovic's government was formed. Now that mainstream political rhetoric has shifted slightly, certain segments of Croatian society, including certain elements from the Catholic Church, certain political circles, certain veterans and veterans' organizations, want to rekindle the rhetoric from the 2014-16 period, and they tend to do so by demonizing both the political representatives of the Serbian minority as well as the Serbian people.

Balkanist: What is the current situation with regard to the Serbian minority in Croatia and how do situations like this affect the ability of your party to work on improving the living situation and advancing the rights of Serbs in Croatia?

Pupovac: Situations like this negatively affect the way Serbs feel in Croatia, the extent to which they feel safe here, and their belief in a perspective and a future in Croatia – especially with regard to their children. On the other hand, this taxes the relationships between Croats and Serbs and contaminates the general atmosphere in Croatia. It also adversely affects the relationship between Croatia and Serbia, as well as general relations between Croats and Serbs in the region.

But more importantly, this negatively affects the things that Croatia should be dealing with instead, such as the strengthening of the rights that Serbs have lost over the years in Croatia, the continued implementation of laws and the constitution, the continued implementation of international agreements such as the Erdut Agreement, and other agreements which are tied to fulfilling and respecting the rights of Serbs in Croatia.

Balkanist: How do the goals and the platform of your party fit with the goals and the platform of your coalition partners – one can presume that when you entered into the coalition that SDSS is part of at the moment that you did this with the conviction that you could best serve the interests of the Serbian minority in Croatia?

Pupovac: There are two things that need to be said in this context. We entered into that coalition because we wanted to help swing the government of Croatia more towards the center, in contrast to the heavily right-wing government that existed before it. We wanted to prevent heavily right-wing tendencies, or ultra-conservative and – not rarely- pro-Ustasa tendencies from dominating the Croatian government.

On the other hand, we entered the coalition because we agreed with Prime Minister Plenkovic that certain important issues be incorporated into the government program, issues that are important for all national minorities, including the Serbian minority. These include questions such as adequate education for minorities, language rights, and especially the question of development in the communities where minorities live – and this has become a part of the official government program, these 16 points that were agreed upon in the negotiations prior to the formation of the government and these issues are important to members of Croatia's national minority groups.

So all of that has been agreed upon, including the issue of participation of minorities in institutions of government, from the local to the national level. The problem is that "scandals" like this, the plaque and the strengthening of historical revisionism, and of ethnic and religious nationalism, hamper this whole process and therefore it was only a question of time until issues such as the plaque in Jasenovac would cause discord in Croatian society and need to be resolved.

Balkanist: Incidents like this one often negatively affect the relationship between Croatia and Serbia. I presume you are aware of the manner in which your stance on the issue of the plaque has been perceived in the Serbian media, and that it has been reported on widely. How would you comment on that?

Pupovac: It is sad there seems to be no way for us to overcome the experiences of our recent wars, and the traumas associated with the recent wars, which sometimes leads to a return to "wartime rhetoric" in the public sphere – as was the case in Croatia in 2014 and 2015. We believe it's imperative that Croatia and Serbia sit down and discuss the unresolved issues between them, which actually mostly involve the position and the situation of the Serbian minority in Croatia. There hasn't been a serious conversation for a long time. The upcoming talk between Croatian President Kolinda Grabar Kitarovic and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic could bring certain improvements to the situation, especially if the governments on both sides are included, because the current situation is frustrating not only for Serbs in Croatia but for the entire population of both countries.

Balkanist: But just to clarify – how would you comment on the fact that your clearly progressive stances are used by unprogressive actors in Serbia, which definitely do not agree with your progressive opinions with regard to anti-fascism primarily and other opinions, which republish your statements in the media merely because you are, in a way, opposed to the general views of the Croatian government and mainstream opinion in Croatia – and therefore in a sense offer them a "jab at the Croatian government"?

Pupovac: With regard to the way my statements or our statements are received and reverberate in Serbia or elsewhere in the region, we are aware of the fact they are interpreted in a way that is different from what we would like. We are aware that they can often be made confrontational and retaliatory, and we cannot control whether our statements are used for this purpose.

On the other hand, I know that there is a readiness for these difficult questions to be discussed, and for us to sit down and agree on how to deal with the past in a way that will change the current situation, in which both Croatia and Serbia are hostages to ethnic nationalism and the constant return to the past.

 

BALKANIST

Balkanist is an experimental, occasionally bilingual platform featuring politics, analysis, culture, and criticism for a smart international audience underwhelmed by what is currently on offer.Our aim is to provide bold, uncompromising coverage of the Balkan region and everything to its East.

 

balkaneu.com

Serbian opposition criticize Belgrade-Pristina talks

3-4 minutes

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It seems that the government led by Aleksandar Vucic dupes all citizens of Serbia, including people in Kosovo – Sanda Raskovic-Ivic (photo), the parliamentary leader of the conservative "Movement for the salvation of Serbia –New Serbia", commented on the new round of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue in Brussels.

Raskovic-Ivic compared Vucic's role in talks with the one of the late president Slobodan Milosevic in 1990's. During that period of Yugoslav wars, the West regarded Milosevic as the main cause of the crisis; however, at some point West supported him allegedly for the sake of peace.

"It is quite obvious that Aleksandar Vucic needs negotiations in order to preserve his rule and play the role of 'the factor of peace', just like Milosevic after 1995", she said.

According to Raskovic-Ivic, Vucic and his Kosovar homologue Hasim Taci "are negotiating on what has already been dealt". The talks are senseless because the Brussels agreement was already signed.

And, by signing the Brussels agreement back in 2013, Vucic has "withdrawn the state from Kosovo". Now, he cannot provide even the "leftovers" for Serbia, she went on.

"Vucic is not the president (at the talks), nor the negotiator; to me, he looks rather like moderator… Vucic should care about the interest of the country, as well as the interests of both Serbian and Albanian people but without breaching the constitution", Raskovic-Ivic said stressing that Taci is "war criminal" and that Vucic humiliated Serbia by accepting to talk with him.

Borko Stefanovic, the leader of Serbian Left and former head of Belgrade' team in talks with Pristina, said that none of the elements of the Brussels agreement have been implemented. In his words both Vucic and Taci are "buying alibi". "They are 'doing favor' to Mogherini (Federica) by demonstrating that there are no conflicts", Stefanovic said alluding to EU's high representative for foreign policy.

At the same time, Vucic strives to hide – in front of the Serbian public - the fact that Serbia has transferred its judiciary to Pristina, Stefanovic said. He concluded that Kosovo issue "is to big stake" for both governments and that they just want to "cover themselves" before their voters./IBNA

 

pravdareport.com

Spy scandal: NATO uses Macedonia against Serbia

23.08.2017

 

 

Intelligence services of leading NATO countries have recently intensified their subversive activities against Serbia. Today, this is the only republic of the former Yugoslavia that does not want to join the North Atlantic Alliance. Belgrade accuses its neighbor Macedonia of espionage with the participation of a foreign factor, which is, of course, NATO. Will Belgrade be able to maintain its independence in the struggle?

Today, Serbia is the only bastion on the territory of the former Yugoslavia that remains opposed to NATO's expansion in the region. All other republics of the former Yugoslavia have either already joined the North Atlantic Alliance (Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro), or are only going to do it (Macedonia).

It is no coincidence a big diplomatic scandal has recently broken out between Serbia and Macedonia. Serbian President Alexander Vučić said he had irrefutable evidence to prove that Macedonia launched large-scale intelligence activities with the participation of a foreign factor in Serbia.

Although Serbia does not point directly at NATO, there is no doubt that it goes about efforts of the North Atlantic alliance and the CIA to conduct subversive activities against Serbia in order to change the balance of power in the country. Today, 80% of the Serbian population stands against Serbia's accession to NATO: the Serbians still remember how NATO bombed them.

Therefore, the NATO headquarters in Brussels and the CIA headquarters in Langley developed a joint secret plan to conduct intelligence and propaganda work in Serbia in order to change the attitude of the Serbs to NATO.

On 20 August 2017, the Serbian Ministry for Foreign Affairs withdrew its embassy staff from Macedonia to Belgrade for consultations. However, the Macedonian government rejects Serbian accusations of espionage on the Serbian territory. In addition, it became known that Macedonian intelligence agencies were illegally tracking down Serbian diplomats in Skopje.

Skopje does not have a unified position on the upcoming vote at the UN regarding Kosovo's accession to UNESCO. Earlier, Prime Minister of Macedonia, Zoran Zaev, stated that as a sign of solidarity with Serbia, Macedonia would abstain from the vote on this issue.

However, other Macedonian officials did not exclude that Macedonia will express solidarity with the position of the majority of EU countries regarding the accession of Kosovo to UNESCO. In other words, if EU countries vote in favor of Kosovo's membership, Macedonia will support this position too.

In this regard, Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic reminded that Serbia could change its position regarding the name of Macedonia and "support the majority of EU countries that recognize Macedonia as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia." Belgrade chose Skopje's version of the name - the Republic of Macedonia.

However, brushing aside the current scandal between Serbia and Macedonia, it looks like Belgrade succumbs to the influence of the EU and the US when it comes to the current phase of sharp confrontation between the West and Russia.

Here is a specific example. In October 2016, under the pressure of NATO and the CIA, Serbia deported several Russian citizens who were unfoundedly accused of spying on the Montenegrin Prime Minister. It was reported that Serbian intelligence identified Russian spies who "used sophisticated equipment to track the movement of Montenegro's Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic."

Naturally, publicizing such "evidence" against Russia, a brotherly nation that has always been on the side of Belgrade since 1991, could not but cast a shadow over bilateral relations between Russia and Serbia.

On the one hand, Serbian President Vučić says that "Serbia will always maintain friendly relations with the Russian Federation, despite pressure from the outside." On the other hand, Vučić recently announced that it was necessary "to seek a compromise in the conflict with the Albanians around Kosovo."

The latest statement from the leader of Serbia may mean that the EU leadership is exerting pressure on Belgrade. The EU gives Serbia vague promises to accept it into the European Union. Will  Belgrade take the side of the European Union on the issue of friendship with Russia and the status of Kosovo? We will find this out in the near future.

Aydin Mehdiyev
Pravda.Ru

 

sputniknews.com

NATO's Balkan Dream: 'Gaining Access to Key Strategic Facilities'

Sputnik

3-4 minutes

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Europe

10:58 20.08.2017(updated 11:57 20.08.2017) Get short URL

The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has ruled that the Veliki Zep military facility in the country's Serb-dominated Republika Srpska is owned by the state. In an interview with Sputnik, Serbian political analyst Andjelko Kozomara said the decision could help Bosnia move toward NATO membership

"NATO wants to gain access to key strategic facilities. The Yugoslav Army always deployed its bases at strategic locations and by registering them as "prospective military property," the Bosnian authorities are making them available to NATO, which plans to station its forces there," he said.

He added that the Constitutional Court's ruling violates the terms of the 1995 Dayton Accordspeace accord under which 49 percent of the country's territory belongs to Republika Srpska.

By re-registering Veliki Zep and other military installations the Court is actually downsizing the territory of the country's Serb-dominated entity.

Re-registration of the so-called "prospective military property" is the final step in Bosnia and Herzegovina's bid to join NATO, the so-called "Membership Action Plan."

"Just like Serbia, the majority of Bosnian Serbs do not want to join NATO. If Serbia does not want to join NATO, then Republika Srpska will not let Bosnia and Herzegovina join this military alliance. We fear, however, that things may develop just as they did in 1992 when Croats and Bosnians voted in a referendum to break away from Yugoslavia. The Bosnian Serbs did not vote, but the international community still recognized the results of that plebiscite," Andjelko Kozomara continued.

Meanwhile, the vice speaker of Republika Srpska's parliament, Nenad Stevandic said that the re-registration of military property will by no means facilitate Bosnia and Herzegovina's integration into NATO because the Bosnian Serb Republic will not abide by the Court's ruling, which violates the terms of the Dayton Accords and creates a new crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

He added that in a situation like this Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be able to join any alliances.

"They are pressuring us to set off a new crisis and blame it all on the Serbs. They have been using this practice since 1992 by making decisions we can't subscribe to because they deprive us of our legitimate rights, and then blaming us for 'destabilizing the situation'", Nenad Stevandic told Sputnik.

Commenting on the situation in an interview with Republika Srpska's news agency, the Russian ambassador to Sarajevo Pyotr Ivantsov said that matters directly pertaining to one of the country's entities cannot be decided without its consent.

"This is a fundamental principle of the federal makeup of Bosnia and Herzegovina," Ivantsov emphasized.

Sarajevo and Brussels have been discussing Bosnia's NATO membership since the mid-2000s.

Bosnia and Herzegovina joined NATO's Partnership for Peace program in 2006. It was expected to join NATO by 2011, but the plan hit a snag over the need to hand over more than 60 military facilities to the federal government.

 

The EU must show the Balkans they still have a chance of joining

Charlemagne

The EU must show the Balkans they still have a chance of joining

Europe's inner courtyard is drifting towards crime and authoritarianism

Jul 13th 2017

 

SQUINT, and you can just make it out. In a quiet suburb of Belgrade, a small European Union flag flutters from the seventh floor of a concrete tower block. Almost 20 years ago, during the dark days of Slobodan Milosevic, an engineer-turned-journalist called Zoran Cvijic hung the standard from his balcony to express his hope that Serbia might one day join the club whose values he so admired. Soon afterwards NATO jets pounded Belgrade to halt Serbian atrocities in Kosovo. Gordana, Cvijic's wife, feared the flag would bring the family unwelcome attention, yet it stayed in place. Cvijic died in 2015, still optimistic that his country would eventually take its seat at the EU table.

In 2003 the Balkan countries were told that their future lay inside the EU. Yet these days the hopes of Serbia and five other aspirants—Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro—are as faded as the yellow stars on Cvijic's flag. Weary of the endless rows that pass for politics in the Balkans, and burned by what looks like the premature accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, the Europeans have little appetite to expand their club further, especially as Brexit obliges them to manage its contraction. In 2014 Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, said there would be no enlargement during his five-year term, a pointless gesture that weakened the hands of Balkan reformers. Today, just 43% of Serbs say they want to join the EU, down from 67% in 2009. Young people are notably hostile.

What has gone wrong? Accession would force the region's corrupt elites to allow media freedom, strengthen the rule of law and liberalise their economies, thus diluting their powers of patronage. Few want to do any of these good things. And their countries lack the strong bureaucracies that could drive through change. Of the six, only Serbia and Montenegro have begun accession talks. Albania hopes to start soon, Macedonia is hamstrung by its dispute with Greece about its name, Bosnia is mired in inter-ethnic squabbling, and Kosovo is not even recognised by five EU members. "They don't believe it any more when we lie to them about accession, and we don't believe them when they lie to us that they will commit" to EU rules, says Vessela Tcherneva of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank.

In place of hope, there is insecurity and even a fear of returning to bloodshed. The past year has provided several jumpy moments, from a political crisis in Macedonia that, with help from provocateurs in the Russian media, threatened to spill into violence, to tensions between Serbia and Kosovo that terrified European diplomats at the start of the year. If the region has lately calmed down (partly owing to the efforts of American diplomats), Germany in particular fears fresh conflagrations. Federica Mogherini, the EU's foreign-policy chief, has been furiously working the Balkan diplomatic treadmill.

That means dealing with leaders like Aleksandar Vucic, who has run Serbia since 2014, first as prime minister and now president. Mr Vucic, a minister under Mr Milosevic, today paints himself as a pro-EU reformer and a credible economic manager. European officials say they have no choice but to work with him. Angela Merkel met Mr Vucic a few weeks before the presidential election in April. This infuriates liberal Serbs, who say the Europeans are indulging an authoritarian who engages in anti-democratic practices. Civil-society groups talk of an increase in mafia crime, the crushing of independent institutions and campaigns of harassment in state-controlled tabloids.

Where Europeans once pinned their hopes for transforming this region of 20m people on the accession process, today they place their trust in trade and investment. The Balkans are blighted by low growth and sky-high youth unemployment, and citizens vote with their feet. One-fifth of Macedonia's population lives abroad, and skilled Serbs are pouring into the EU. A summit in Trieste this week attended by the leaders of France, Germany and Italy sought to tackle these trends with plans for a regional common market and EU funds for infrastructure. As ever, lip-service was paid to the Balkans' "European perspective". But the EU's appetite for bringing about political change has evaporated.

Don't give up

The Balkan states are tiresome partners, beset by political bickering, crony economies and border quarrels over slivers of water or rocky mountain tops. But the EU should not give up on its dishevelled inner courtyard, if only because of the risks inaction poses. Parts of the Balkans are already established routes for human and drugs-trafficking into the EU, and weapons from the wars of the 1990s were used in the Paris terrorist attacks of 2015. Islamist extremism is popping up in parts of Bosnia and Kosovo. In this environment, the cynical games of local leaders, who often stoke crises in order to play peacemaker, could easily spin out of control.

Europeans often talk up the malign influence of external powers in the western Balkans. But the region's economic, political and cultural ties to the rest of Europe put Russia, Turkey and the like in the shade. Most leaders know they have no destiny outside the EU. That calls for a two-track approach: leaning harder on governments that tolerate lawlessness or illiberalism, and renewing the commitment to enlargement. But all this requires suspending the scepticism that has become ingrained after years of disappointment. Perhaps, if she wins re-election in September, Mrs Merkel could spend a bit of diplomatic capital on the Balkans.

At Trieste there was much talk of the Balkans at a "crossroads". In truth the region is on a never-ending roundabout of unfulfilled promises and bureaucratic wheel-spinning. Like most of her compatriots, Ms Cvijic is sceptical that Serbia will ever join the EU. She distrusts Mr Vucic's government and decries the dishonesty of Europeans who provide it with succour. But she has vowed to keep the tatty flag flying from her apartment's balcony. Her husband never gave up hope. Why should she?

This article appeared in the Europe section of the print edition under the headline "Acceding expectations"

 

https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21725020-europes-inner-courtyard-drifting-towards-crime-and-authoritarianism-eu-must-show?zid=307&ah=5e80419d1bc9821ebe173f4f0f060a07

Serbia's President: 'I am Prepared For a Compromise Solution for Kosovo'

novinite.com

Serbia's President: 'I am Prepared For a Compromise Solution for Kosovo' - Novinite.com

3-4 minutes

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Serbia's president vowed to start a nationwide debate next month on unresolved relations with Kosovo and Albania, saying a "compromise" would fix most of his country's political problems for a century and open the way to European Union membership, according to Bloomberg. 

Aleksandar Vucic, speaking on Pink TV late Wednesday, said he was ready for the process despite political challenges it may create for him at home, where most of Serbia's 7.1 million citizens oppose accepting Kosovo as a sovereign country. Political parties that have called for its recognition have done poorly in elections.

"I know, whichever compromise you make, Serbia will not forgive you, and I know what the personal and political consequences can be for those who take part," Vucic said. "If we create an axis of peace and stability along the north-south line in the western Balkans, between the two biggest peoples, Serbs and Albanians, we will have solved 80 percent of our political problems for the next 100 years."

In the past few weeks, Vucic and other Serbian politicians have increasingly  spoken of their desire to move forward as EU-mediated talks between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians are expected to resume following months of little visible progress. Finding a solution is a key EU condition for Serbia before it can join the bloc. A resolution would also unlock greater cooperation with Albania, Vucic said. Unlike Serbia and Russia, most EU member states have recognized Kosovo's independence, which it declared in 2008 following the 1998-99 war.

Serbia's most popular politician, Vucic became president in May after three years of serving as premier. He has burnished his image as a pro-EU administrator who's trying to modernize the largest former Yugoslav republic's economy, a departure from when he was information minister for war-time leader Slobodan Milosevic in the 1990s. Vucic said it was "important to have good relations with Albanians and to sort them out once and forever, instead of keeping a frozen conflict."

Debate within Serbia would help outline the negotiating position before talks begin. Changes that need to be addressed include amending Serbia's constitution, which says that Kosovo must remain part of the country, Vucic said. A two-thirds majority in parliament would be needed to do so. Out of 250 lawmakers, Vucic's party controls 131.

Vucic said Serbia, which has tried to juggle its EU hopes with keeping good ties with Russia, is under international pressure over the balancing act. 

"It's impossible to show up anywhere in the West without being asked about Russians, or Russians finding fault that we haven't done something that they consider to be in their interest, and which the West is opposed to," he said.

 

sputniknews.com

Ukraine Mulls Repetition of Croatia's 'Reintegration' of Serb Krajina in Donbass

Sputnik

4-5 minutes

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Europe

13:14 05.08.2017Get short URL

On August 4, 1995, Croatia launched "Operation Storm" against the Serb-inhabited territory of Krajina. As a result, the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina ceased to exist, thousands of people were killed and over 220,000 driven from their homes. More than two decades on, the Ukrainian leaders are mulling a similar scenario for Donbass.

Model disciples

© AFP 2017/ LIONEL BONAVENTURE

The idea of emulating the Croatian experience of "reintegration" in the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics has been circulating in Kiev's corridors of power since the start of the armed conflict in Donbass three years ago.

"Croatia is a good example. While tolerating the existence of Krajina for three years, the Croats built up their economy and armed forces and then, in a matter of hours, their tanks wiped the separatists off the face of the earth," Yuriy Lutsenko, then President Poroshenko's political advisor, wrote on Facebook in 2014.

In 2016 Ukraine and Croatia set up a working group to provide consultative assistance to Ukraine on "reintegration of occupied territories." Croatia's then Prime Minister Andrej Plenkovic said that his country was ready to share its experience of winning back lost territories.

The move invited an angry rebuff from Moscow.

"The casualties inflicted by the large-scale military operations in Croatia in 1995 – Operation Lightning and Operation Storm – are well known, as is the resulting forced exodus of around 250,000 Serbs who permanently resided there. We have reason to fear that recommendations by foreign "consultants,", which might encourage dangerous illusions among the Kiev leadership that a military solution is possible in Donbass, will do anything but improve security in Ukraine's southeast," the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

Unfazed by this, Ukraine's Prime Minister Volodymyr Groisman said in June 2017 that Ukrainian officials should emulate the experience of Croatia, which "after a bloody war provoked by the regime of Slobodan Milosevic managed to take back lost territories and restore peace."

In an interview with RT, Yevsei Vasilyev, an expert on international security at the Russian State Humanitarian University in Moscow, said that Kiev was citing the Croatian experience in order "to apply its military aspect to the disobedient Ukrainians in the east."

"There are two reasons why the Croatian model is so appealing to Kiev. First, because it would help solve the problem with the help of a large-scale military operation, and, secondly, it would absolve them from any responsibility for the loss of civilian lives, because 'the winner gets it all,'" Vasilyev said.

© Sputnik/ Valeriy Melnikov

"Advised by their Western and NATO mentors, the Ukrainian authorities would like to use the 'Croatian scenario to get rid of the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics and bring Donbass back under Kiev's control. This is exactly what happened to the

Republic of Serbian Krajina

, which Croatia clawed back in 1995-1998," the expert continued.

He added that, just like the Croatia of the 1990s, Ukraine was now run by nationalists leaning back on Western assistance in their standoff with Russia.

"However, there is one big difference between the Croatia of 1995 and present-day Ukraine, and this is Russia, which will not allow any repetition of the Western scenarios of war crimes against civilians, much less in the vicinity of its borders," Yevsei Vasilyev emphasized.

The Donbass conflict erupted in April 2014 as a local counter-reaction to the Western-sponsored Maidan coup in Kiev that had toppled President Viktor Yanukovych in February.

Residents of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions held independence referendums and proclaimed the People's Republics of Donetsk and Lugansk. Kiev has since been conducting a military operation, encountering stiff local resistance.

 

Oy Canada!

jpost.com

Oy Canada! - Opinion - Jerusalem Post

Efraim Zuroff

8-10 minutes

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Only time will tell whether the good news this past week that the Canadian citizenship of Einsatzgruppe D member Helmut Oberlander was again (for the fourth time!) revoked will mark the beginning of a satisfactory conclusion to this very frustrating and infuriating episode in the annals of attempts to bring Nazi war criminals to justice.

In certain respects, the Oberlander case is a symbol of the relative futility of Canadian efforts to take legal action against Nazi perpetrators and collaborators who were admitted to Canada during the decade following the end of World War II. To be fair, Canada was not the only country forced to face this issue. In fact, practically all the major Anglo-Saxon countries which fought against the Axis forces during the war made the same mistake of admitting Nazi war criminals afterwards.

In some cases, like in the United States, about 150 of these individuals were actually sought out for their unique expertise, like the Nazi rocket scientists and engineers who worked on the V-2 rockets and other similar projects. At least several dozen others, natives of countries which had come under Communist rule, were chosen for espionage tasks behind the Iron Curtain or as potential CIA agents.

Most of the Nazis’ helpers admitted to the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand, however, most of whom were from Eastern Europe, simply posed as innocent refugees fleeing Communism. At this point in time, it was easier to hide their role in the Holocaust, since the common perception in the West was that most of the victims of the Shoa had been murdered in death camps like Auschwitz or concentration camps like Dachau, Mauthausen, Buchenwald and Bergen-Belsen, all of which had been run by Germans and Austrians and liberated by Allied troops.

It was only in the late Sixties and early Seventies that reports began to surface that there were numerous Nazi collaborators among the refugees admitted to Anglo-Saxon democracies in the immediate aftermath of World War II. These revelations were initially publicized in the US, where several members of Congress, particularly Elizabeth Holtzman of Brooklyn and Joshua Eilberg of Philadelphia, took up the cause, and prompted official government investigations which confirmed the existence of a serious problem.

At that point, however, these criminals could not be prosecuted for their crimes, since they had been committed outside the United States, and their victims were not American citizens. So rather than change the Constitution, the US government decided to try these individuals for immigration and naturalization violations (for lying on their immigration and citizenship applications regarding their service in or with the forces of the Third Reich), which were punishable by loss of citizenship and deportation from the country.

Eventually, after a somewhat rocky start, a special agency, called the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), was established in 1979 to handle these cases and the Americans began to win case after case. Their successes focused attention on the important role played by the Nazis’ collaborators in Eastern Europe, which led to similar revelations regarding the entry of Nazi war criminals posing as refugees to Canada, Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand, and the establishment of official government inquiries on this issue in each of these countries. Ultimately, all of these countries with the exception of New Zealand passed special legislation to allow criminal prosecution of Nazi war criminals resident in their country, which brings us to the Canadian chapter of the story.

The first case tried in Canada was that of Hungarian gendarmerie captain Imre Finta, who had played a major role in the deportation to Auschwitz in spring 1944 of more than 8,000 Jews from the Hungarian city of Szeged.

Despite the fact that Finta’s sole defense was superior orders, which had hitherto never been accepted in any trial of Nazi war criminals anywhere in the world, and that he had previously lost two libel cases with regard to the same accusations, he was acquitted, and the verdict was subsequently upheld by the Canadian Supreme Court, a decision which doomed criminal prosecution of Nazi perpetrators in Canada to failure. Under these circumstances, the Canadian authorities to their credit did not cease their efforts, but switched to the American model of prosecuting suspected Nazis for immigration and naturalization violations.

The Canadians first applied this remedy in 1994-1995, when they stripped 10 suspected Nazis of citizenship, among them Helmut Oberlander. The next step was to obtain deportation orders against the eight who refused to leave the country voluntarily, as did Hungarian police officer Laszlo Csatary, who helped deport over 15,000 Jews from Kosice to Auschwitz, and Mamertas Maciukas, who served in a Lithuanian murder squad which killed thousands of Jews in Lithuania and Belarus, in actions similar to those carried out by Oberlander’s unit. The problem is, however, that to this day, not a single one of those eight who opted to contest their deportation from Canada has been deported, and in the process, seven have already died in the country.

If one compares the biographic profile of the Nazi war criminals who emigrated to Canada with those who entered the US, their wartime service was virtually the same. Almost all of them hail from Eastern Europe, where collaboration with the Nazis included active participation in mass murder, and they served in similar positions, whether as local security police or murder-squad operatives or camp or ghetto guards. Since both countries apply the same civil rather than criminal remedies, the important question is why have the Americans been so much more successful in maximizing justice than the Canadians? (To date, the US has denaturalized 86 Nazi war criminals and deported, extradited or expelled 67, whereas the number of persons forced to leave Canada because of World War II crimes is less than a dozen.) Perhaps the answer might be that fewer Nazi perpetrators emigrated to Canada, but even if that is true (and no one to this day knows the exact figures for either country), there is a glaring discrepancy between the results achieved in Ottawa and those obtained in Washington.

There are numerous factors which have affected the belated efforts to take legal action against Nazi war criminals in the Anglo-Saxon democracies. Probably the most important has been the existence of political will, which is often dependent on the size and political strength of the local Jewish community on the one hand, and on the other hand of the émigré communities among whose members the suspects are found. Thus in Canada, I think that it would be very difficult to totally discount the fact that the Ukrainians are the country’s largest ethnic minority, and that their leadership, along with that of the emigres from the Baltic countries, vigorously opposed the investigation and prosecution of suspected Nazis.

This might well explain, why the Americans ultimately made special efforts to facilitate prosecution of Nazi war criminals (once the process was finally launched) by, for example, streamlining the appeal process, and there were no equivalent steps taken in Canada.

Thus the good news from Ottawa about the revocation of Oberlander’s citizenship should make us happy, but who knows if he will ever be deported, let alone prosecuted, for his service in one of the most horrific death squads which actively sought to implement the Nazis’ plan for the total annihilation of European Jewry.

The author is the chief Nazi-hunter of the Simon Wiesenthal Center and the director of the center’s Israel office and Eastern European affairs. His most recent book, with Ruta Vanagaite, Musiskiai; Kelione Su Priesu (Our People; Journey With an Enemy), has been published in Lithuania and Poland.

 

washingtonpost.com

Democracy in the Balkans is under siege, and the West is looking away

By Vuk Jeremic

6-7 minutes

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DemocracyPost

Opinion

Opinion A column or article in the Opinions section (in print, this is known as the Editorial Pages).

By Vuk Jeremic

DemocracyPost

Opinion

Opinion A column or article in the Opinions section (in print, this is known as the Editorial Pages).

July 13

Vuk Jeremic, Serbia's foreign minister from 2007 to 2012 and president of the U.N. General Assembly from 2012 to 2013, was a candidate in Serbia's 2017 presidential election.

Events in the Western Balkans twice cast a long shadow across Europe in the past century — first in 1914 and then in the 1990s. Both times, the forces unleashed by the carnage could not be contained within the existing international order. And in both instances, proffered solutions failed to resolve the underlying tensions that brought about the conflicts in the first place.

Located at the midpoint between Berlin and Istanbul, the Western Balkans is the most direct physical link between Europe and the Middle East. We were reminded of its strategic importance during the recent European refugee crisis, when the region served as the main land route for millions of migrants fleeing violence in Syria and Iraq. If we look at the political map of Europe, we see that the Western Balkans — notwithstanding its strategic location — remains outside the European Union. Some refer to it as the black hole of Europe.

Engulfed by a plethora of challenges, the European Union has clearly relegated the integration of the Western Balkans to the back burner. This is one of the most shortsighted strategic decisions made by this generation of E.U. leaders.

The region's increasingly distant European perspective has eased the way for local autocrats to seize power through populist rhetoric, dismantling the achievements of nascent liberal democracies. Consider Serbia's new president, Aleksandar Vucic, who served under Slobodan Milosevic as information minister in the 1990s.

He seems to have reached a tacit agreement with various Western decision-makers: In exchange for appearing to maintain stability, Vucic was de facto given free rein to suppress fundamental rights and freedoms. As a consequence, the divide separating Serbia from the E.U. has further deepened. Yet both sides seem content with maintaining the illusion that accession negotiations remain steadily on track, even though there is no end in sight.

Such trade-offs are not only morally questionable; they are also contrary to the strategic interests of the region and the whole of Europe. Under Vucic's increasingly iron-fisted, despotic rule, Serbia has experienced rigged elections, seen opposition leaders slanderously vilified without consequence and witnessed media outlets surrender their objectivity and independence to autocratic demands of fealty and subservience. This is hardly surprising, given that such methods were widely used the last time Vucic was in power, in the 1990s. Meanwhile, foreign investment levels are falling. Corrupt and incompetent cronies have taken over all positions of significance. And record numbers of young and educated people are leaving the country.

The situation is not much better in other countries, such as Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where there have been massive street demonstrations, often violent, over the past few years. One also hears again calls for the creation of a Greater Albania, which presupposes forcible changes in borders — something that is hardly imaginable without triggering serious tumults.

Things are especially bad in Kosovo, which holds the infamous European distinction of supplying the largest number of fighters per capita to conflicts in the Middle East. There, the new prime minister is likely to be Ramush Haradinaj. A few years ago, Haradinaj was acquitted by the Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia of gruesome charges, including the murder and torture of Serb civilians, after witnesses either recanted at the last minute or died under mysterious circumstances. His main rival is Albin Kurti, one of the most radical populist politicians in all the Balkans.

Vucic and other Balkan autocrats operate on the assumption that state institutions must not serve as barriers to the exercise of their will to power and that it's perfectly legitimate to manipulate public opinion to serve their own selfish interests. Such practices neither represent a good foundation for the achievement of long-term political and economic stability; nor do they contribute to establishing sustainable regional cooperation — much less reconciliation. Lending credence to such tendencies can make sense only if the goal is to entrench the Western Balkans as a sort of no-man's-land buffer zone between the E.U. and the Middle East, in the context of the refugee issue and much else besides.

Nonetheless, I believe that a stable and prosperous Western Balkans that increasingly looks like the rest of Europe is an eminently reachable goal in this generation. The region is blessed with a favorable geographical position, abundant natural resources, and perhaps most importantly, smart and creative people who possess the wherewithal to compete at a global level in their respective fields. It has the potential to catch up with Central Europe in terms of economic development and continental standards.

Yet this can be achieved only if the free exchange of ideas, thoughtful debate and meritocratic advancement can flourish within a genuinely democratic framework.

DemocracyPost

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Fake News on Russia in the New York Times, 1917-2017 | Dissident Voice

Herman's great article mentions systematic fake news/propaganda related to the destruction of Yugoslavia.

 

http://dissidentvoice.org/2017/07/fake-news-on-russia-in-the-new-york-times-1917-2017/

 

 

Srdja Trifkovic on the Trump-Putin meeting, Syria, and much more

Srdja Trifkovic on the Trump-Putin meeting, Syria, and much more.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3rFUQPp5aYY&feature=youtu.be

Transcript:

RT: President Vladimir Putin has addressed the media after two days of talks with the world leaders at the G20 summit in Hamburg. Srdja Trifkovic joins us now live… Putin says that the forthcoming ceasefire in Syria was very positive, in fact that it was a breakthrough. But there was a question how to monitor the ceasefire zone in Syria. Russia's foreign ministry says there would be Russian military police on the ground. Do you expect there would be a backlash from the Syrian rebels because of that?

ST: It is important that [Putin] specifically mentioned "the authorities in Damascus" as one of the parties essential to this deal working. He even mentioned President Bashar al Assad by name, which means that the Russian side most certainly will not accept any more of that old "Bashar-must-go" mantra. It is important that he mentioned Turkey and Iran in the same breath, as being on the same side, reading from the same page. We have two important hints here. One is that Ankara and Tehran are perceived by Moscow as being in the same camp of gradual pacification. The other is that it will no longer be possible for someone in Washington suddenly to remember, "and by the way, Bashar must go!" Unless it is accepted – even tacitly, quietly – that Bashar is part of the solution and not part of the problem, there will be no real breakthrough.

RT: Vladimir Putin also said that the U.S. position on Syria is "more pragmatic." Does that mean that there will be no more incidents like when the U.S. shot down a Syrian plane in Raqqa?

ST: On the whole, paradoxically as it may seem, the Trump administration's attitude is more pragmatic than Hillary Clinton's would have been, or even that of the hawks in the Obama administration. The launching of 59 cruise missiles at a Syrian airfield and the shooting down of the Syrian plane were not followed – as the hawks in Washington had hoped – by an escalation, by mission creep, by the announcement that there were no-fly-zones and so on. These episodes, unpleasant as they were, proved to be one-off incidents that did not reflect an overall strategic change, a gearshift in Washington.

RT: The Russian president says of Donald Trump… this is one of the most interesting lines from his press conference, that "the man we see on television is different from what we see in the meeting," the real man essentially. Do you think that Moscow and Washington will be able to mend the rift which was pretty apparent during the Obama administration?

ST: I am pleasantly surprised by the fact that the meeting went as well as it did, considering the absolutely histerical atmosphere in the American media and inside-the-Beltway establishment. You had a feeding frenzy by the sharks, telling Trump that unless he brought Fiona Hill along into the room, who is critical of Putin, unless he told Putin this, that, and the other, unless he read him the riot act, that Putin would win. The Washington Post went so far as to say, two days ago, that if there is an understanding, if there is a new dialogue, then Putin wins. In other words, everybody in Washington's establishment treated this as a zaro-sum-game: if Trump doesn't overcome Putin's resistance and makes him admit that, indeed, Russia had meddles, then Putin wins. I am glad that Trump has turned out to be an adult in this situation. I am also glad that Putin perceives this. He understands that Trump is in a very difficult position, that any rapprochement, any détente, will be immediately grabbed by the media pack and the Democrats, and the neoconservative Republicans such as Lindsey Graham and John McCain, as proof that Trump has succumbed, that Trump has – in the words of a CNN commentary – "fallen into Putin's trap." He is really between rock and a hard place. Considering the circumstances, Trump has done well and Putin has given him credit for that.

 

theduran.com

Did Bloomberg push fake news about Serbia's future ties to Russia?

Alex Christoforou

3 minutes

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Good propaganda is not about what you say, but about what you omit.

In the case of Serbia, and recent statements from it's new PM Ana Brnabic, EU cheerleading and Russian downgrading may have been the exact context Bloomberg was looking to push to its readers.

Two days ago The Duran reported on a Bloomberg report that Serbia's Prime Minister, Ana Brnabic, said she'd continue a path started by her predecessor, President Aleksandar Vucic, to make the country ready for EU membership by the time her term ends in 2020.

Bloomberg reported that Ana Brnabic said, "if Serbia is forced to choose between closer ties with Russia and joining the European Union, it will side with the latter, the country's new prime minister said."

According to Bloomberg, Brnabic said sentiments towards Russia can't be disregarded, "but our strategic path is the EU.''

"The EU is where we're going – that's clear.''

"We do have emotional ties with Russia because of tradition, culture and religion. There are many people in Serbia who completely perceive Russia as our big brother, our protector."

Bloomberg reported that "Brnabic's statement was the clearest yet on the Balkan state's direction as it seeks to re-integrate itself with western Europe while keeping hold of its tight relationship with Russia."

Now reports from Serbia and Russia show that PM Brnabic's words were taken out of context by Bloomberg, with much of her statements about Serbia's relations with Russia, and policy towards the EU, conspicuously omitted by the US mainstream media outlet.

The Serbian PM proved this point by passing along a full transcript of her recent interview with Bloomberg to Russia's ambassador in Belgrade, Aleksandr Chepurin.

The review of the Bloomberg transcript was announced on Thursday by Maria Zakharova, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

B92 reports…

TASS reported late on Thursday that Zakharova said Chepurin met with Brnabic "to determine what exactly she said (during the interview)."

During her meeting with Chepurin, Brnabic "assured Russia's ambassador that her words about the country's alleged choice of the European Union (membership, over closer ties with Russia) were misinterpreted by US media," TASS reported, and quoted Zakharova as saying:

"The Serbian prime minister said her words had been misinterpreted by the US news agency, and handed over a full transcript of her interview with Bloomberg, which had no words attributed to her. We judge by these explanations."

 

Openly Gay Serbia Premier-Designate to Head Pro-Russia Gov't

usnews.com

Openly Gay Serbia Premier-Designate to Head Pro-Russia Gov't | World News

4-5 minutes

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June 27, 2017, at 8:28 a.m.

Openly Gay Serbia Premier-Designate to Head Pro-Russia Gov't

 

In this photo taken Friday, March 24, 2017, a former Labor Minister Aleksandar Vulin, right, stands behind Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, in Belgrade, Serbia. Serbia's future first woman and openly gay prime minister Ana Brnabic has proposed the staunchly pro-Russian official, and former Labor Minister Aleksandar Vulin as the defense minister, damping hopes in the west that her nomination signals the country's shift away from Moscow's influence. (AP Photo/Darko Vojinovic) The Associated Press

By DUSAN STOJANOVIC, Associated Press

BELGRADE, Serbia (AP) — Serbia's future prime minister on Tuesday proposed a staunchly pro-Russia official as the defense minister, damping hopes in the West that her nomination signaled a shift away from Moscow's influence.

State TV said Prime Minister-designate Ana Brnabic proposed a list of Cabinet ministers for adoption by parliament. It included Aleksandar Vulin, a former labor minister, to head the Defense Ministry.

As a government minister, Vulin has called NATO — which bombed Serbia in 1999 over its crackdown against ethnic Albanian separatists — an "evil" organization and has taken part in numerous verbal clashes with officials in neighboring Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia that fueled ethnic tensions in the Balkans.

Brnabic's list also includes several other openly pro-Russian and anti-Western officials, including Foreign Minister Ivica Dacic.

Brnabic, who would be conservative Serbia's first female and openly gay government leader, is expected to take office this week after a vote in parliament, which is considered a formality.

When Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic earlier this month nominated the U.S.- and U.K.-educated Brnabic to succeed him as prime minister, it was seen as his attempt to calm Western concerns that Serbia was getting too close to Russia despite its proclaimed goal of joining the European Union.

It was always clear that by nominating Brnabic, who gained no real political experience as local administration minister in Vucic's government, the autocratic leader would retain power from his presidential position, which is formally ceremonial.

"If it's true that Vulin will be the defense minister, whose decision is that?" Vuk Jeremic, a former foreign minister who was a candidate in the April presidential election, told N1 television.

"If this is her choice of people, that is not an encouraging start," Jeremic said.

Serbia, along with Bosnian Serbs, remains the only real Russian ally in the Balkans. The Kremlin has promised to boost Serbia's military and has launched a major propaganda campaign to keep it away from Euro-Atlantic integrations.

Copyright 2017 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

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NATO member-states to be sued for 1999 attack on Serbia

b92.net

NATO member-states to be sued for 1999 attack on Serbia - Society

7-9 minutes

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A legal team is being put together in order to file lawsuits against NATO countries that took part in the 1999 bombing of Serbia.

Source: Sputnik Thursday, June 8, 2017 | 13:13

 

(Getty Images, illustration purposes, file)

These countries will be sued for material and non-material damage inflicted on individual citizens.

Sputnik is reporting that the forming of the team has been proposed by the Serbian Royal Academy and is planned to bring together the best lawyers from Serbia, but also from EU states, Russia, China, and India. The team of experts will be led by Srdjan Aleksic, a well known Nis-based lawyer.

"We will sue NATO member-states, participants in the 1999 aggression on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The 20 countries that directly or indirectly took part in the aggression. The lawsuits will be filed against individual member-states of the alliance," Aleksic explained for Sputnik.

The legal process will not take place before the International Court of Justice - but in each of the sued countries, individually.

"We consider their courts to have jurisdiction, because these countries have violated, above all, Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, that prohibits aggression against any country. NATO has violated Articles 5 and 6 of its own statute, because it is a defensive, not an offensive alliance. International law has been breached, above all those conventions prohibiting aggression and use of force against a sovereign country," he continued.

The legal team will put together nearly 20 cases backed by firm material evidence, collected from medical documents that indicate a causal relationship between NATO's use of (depleted) uranium ammunition, and the increased number of cancer cases in Serbia.

"Between 10 and 15 tons of uranium have been dropped on the territory of then Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The number of those ill with cancer is alarming. 2.5 percent of Serbia's population is diagnosed with malignant diseases each year, i.e., 33,000 people. One child is diagnosed every day. Since 1999, the number of cancer patients has grown five times. The population is falling ill on a mass scale, especially in southern Serbia and in Kosovo and Metohija," Aleksic said.

He stressed that during the aggression, so-called hazard facilities - chemical and petrochemical industry sites - have also been targeted, although this is prohibited by international law of war.

"Our prominent scientists, doctors, oncologists - above all Dr. Danica Grujicic and toxicologist Radomir Kovacevic, who have been researching this for years - will take part in preparing the lawsuits. The fact that a court in Italy found the state guilty for sending their Carabinieri to Kosovo and Metohija, to locations attacked with depleted uranium, speaks in favor of the veracity of our claim. 45 soldiers got cancer, and Italy has been paying big damages for this. Between EUR 200,000 and 1.2 million per soldier. Our claim is based precisely on this - that even the soldiers who took part in the aggression have gotten sick, and that their countries have been paying damages because of this. There is a soldier in Great Britain who was in contact with uranium in Serbia, and there is a ruling ordering Britain to pay damages to him," says Aleksic.

The lawsuits will also cover the consequences of NATO's use of cluster bombs, that resulted in the deaths of a great number of people, and the bombing of chemical and petrochemical facilities, that resulted in large oil and gasoline spills.

According to Aleksic, "it is very important to study and prepare the lawsuits well" - because some others filed against NATO members have been thrown out in the meantime.

 

Serbia and the Balkans Wars: The Future Belongs to Those Who Do Not Surrender

globalresearch.ca

Serbia and the Balkans Wars: The Future Belongs to Those Who Do Not Surrender | Global Research

By Milos Kovic

6-8 minutes

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How accurate is the theory that there are tragic events of exceptional strength that really shape the identity of a nation? How is this happening and what if we do not learn a lesson out of those experiences?

– The prominent French writer Renan wrote in his lecture "What is a Nation?" that people are often connected by memories of shared suffering, and Serbs are no exception. Today, when Yugoslavia is no more, there is no reason why Jasenovac should not be brought back to the center of the Serbian identity, just like the Jews did with Auschwitz.

During the Balkan wars and the First World War, we had a great victory, but also a lot of suffering. We were always criticized for building our identity on suffering, defeat, and therefore, for hardly looking towards the future.

Milos Kovic

– When Americans ask you a question like that, then they should be reminded of the Hollywood spectacle "300" about Leonidas, that they filmed and earned a great amount of money. What are the ethics taught in this film? It's not about celebrating only defeats. Battles are fought to be won. Nobody wants to die. War ethics require courage, wisdom and victory. And defeats teach us lessons and they should make us wiser.

If we draw a parallel between the behavior of the Allies in the First World War and what happened in the nineties, we can see that in both cases the Serbian interests were crushed and betrayed, but despite all harmful decisions for us, we still walk persistently toward the European integration.

– In 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Empire had a stick in one hand, and in another it had a bag, and they offered Serbia integration, better roads, better health care, better schools. The only condition was to give up independence. The EU today is having the same behavior, even worse. The stick is thicker and the carrots are thinner. It is interesting that, after all, at present a large percentage of Serbs are ready to plunge the country into the EU and to give up sovereignty and freedom, and in 1914 it was unthinkable.

Why was it unthinkable?

– The answers are within ourselves. We are subject to special treatment by the great powers who applied similar methods in Hawaii, the Philippines, the Wild West, in India. But we cannot always blame someone else. The Serbian honor was famed by Serbs from the Republika Srpska and the former Republic of Krajina (in Croatia). Just look at the unfortunate Montenegro, the former Serbian Sparta. Or our desolate Belgrade, which is still acting as if it was the capital of Yugoslavia. Compared to our ancestors, we are really distinguished by cowardice, fatalistic passivity and laziness. All this, however, can change quickly. Vladislav Petković Dis (Serbian poet) lamented in the same way over the Serbian vices, on the eve of the big victories 1912-1918. We only need determination, intelligence and courage.

Nowadays many people believe that our defeats from the end of the 20th century are somehow rooted in victories from the Balkan wars and the First World War, because at that time we got a new State?

– I would say that this kind of debate relates only to the nineties. The generations fleeing the military mobilization and protesting against their own country, at a time when the Serbs across the Drina river were fighting for survival, are now running from their own weakness and are accusing their grandfathers and great-grandfather. Those fathers plunged a mighty sword into the hard stone, and their sons, not being able to pull out that sword, are accusing their fathers for of it. Our grandfathers left us a great Yugoslav State. We, our generation, we were not able to preserve it. It is easy to blame the dead for our own weakness. Let's look in the mirror and answer the question about where we were and what we did in the nineties when Yugoslavia was broken down and what we are doing today when they are trying to break down our Serbia.

What actually happened to the Albanians in 1912, 1913, 1914, and after 1941?

– It was offered to the Muslim Albanians, who were a privileged class in the Ottoman Empire, to live in a relatively well-ordered and modern Yugoslav State instead of the Ottoman Empire. As equal citizens with their former serfs. Unfortunately, most of them refused. The hostility of Albanians towards the new State was based on class and religious grounds. That is why in the forthcoming World War, the majority sided with the occupiers and enemies of the Serbian people and they again committed genocide against the Serbian people in Kosovo and Macedonia, but also against the Macedonians.

To what extent is the issue explored in the Serbian historiography? Were there any punishment and reprisals in the Serbian army?

– Yes, there were. There are preserved commands from officers during the retreat across Albania stating that any robbery of Albanian civilians would be severely punished. In the short story "Resimić the drummer" Dragisa Vasic describes one such case, when the starving Serbian recruits, while crossing Albania, steal fowl in an Albanian village, and at the request of peasants, the Serbian officer shoots dead those kids. It was a real historical event.

Simon Sebag Montefiore in his "Jerusalem", considers the Albanians very seriously and notes that they have grown as a strong ethical group since the beginning of the 19th century. By what means did we underestimate them as a group and a political power?

– It must be said that Belgrade really underestimated the Albanian nationalism and that it was generally despised. We were unable to encourage professionals for Albanian studies. There were some, but not enough. It is still difficult to find one who would deal with this important question. Unlike Albanians who, at least in Kosovo and Metohija, were learning Serbian, we were not learning Albanian. So, there has been some underestimation, especially of the Albanian nationalism, and we paid the price. Nevertheless, we must not waste time on blaming ourselves, we must not lose faith in our own strength and we should not forget that the future belongs to those who do not surrender.

 Milos Kovic is Assistant professor at the Department of History, Faculty of Philosophy, Belgrade University. He is the author of  "The only path: Entente Powers and the defense of Serbia in 1915."

Translated from Serbian by Svetlana Maksovic

Original:

Source: ZURNALIST.RS 31.05.2017.

The Duran, English