consortiumnews.com

DIANA JOHNSTONE: Serbia's Organized Chaos

21–26 minutes

---

Serbia has been racked for months by disruptive protests largely attributed to students, opposition leaders and university authorities. Are these organic protests?

Anti-government protest in Belgrade, Slavija Square, Dec. 22, 2024. (Stefan Miljuš /Wikimedia Commons/ Public Domain)

By Diana Johnstone
Special to Consortium News

Serbia is a small country which used to be a favorite of Western Allied powers like France and Britain for its heroic resistance to Austrian and German invasion in two world wars. 

They liked it so much that in redrawing European boundaries at Versailles in 1918, they enlarged it into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes which later became Yugoslavia.

Some Serb leaders at the time felt that this was too much, but at the time, Croat and Slovene leaders were glad to leave the Austro-Hungarian Empire and join the winning side. 

All this changed abruptly in the 1990s. Germany had been reunited and began to drop its humble post-World War II foreign policy.  With German support and encouragement, the Yugoslav republics (states) of Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence, with the intention of joining the club of the rich: the European Union.

This shift enabled the two richest Yugoslav states to stop paying development funds for poorer regions such as Kosovo and to receive development funds from the EU.  The debt crisis of the 1970s had strained relations among the republics.  

But according to the secessionists, their sole motivation was to escape from "Serbian nationalism."  A great champion of this interpretation was the late Otto von Habsburg, an influential member of the European Parliament. As heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, dismantled as a result of World War I, he naturally held a personal grudge against Serbia.

As the Yugoslav disintegration grew confused and violent, Western media and government enthusiastically echoed the Habsburg line, not as such, but as defense of Western values and self-determination.

Western media put all the blame for everything on the Serbs, evoking the inevitable Hitler analogy to describe Serbia's besieged leader, Slobodan Milosevic, as a "dictator" and to liken his failing efforts to keep Yugoslavia together with the Third Reich's massive invasion of the rest of Europe. 

"Heroic little Serbia" was transformed into the Pariah of the Western World.

A Nation in Limbo

The concrete result of the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia was to transform the "defensive" alliance into an aggressive force; to deliver the historic Serbian province of Kosovo to armed ethnic Albanians; and to build an enormous U.S. military base in the province. 

But NATO nations framed it as conspiratorial to say that such were the aims of the NATO bombing. No, the official purpose was "the right to intervene" on grounds of human rights, to "save the Kosovars" from a "genocide" that was never a real possibility. That's what everyone in the West has been told, over and over.

NATOland and "Western values" do not — not any longer — dominate the whole world. But Serbia is situated, geographically and psychologically, in the West. 

Serbia was part of Yugoslavia,  an independent, nonaligned socialist country, not part of the Soviet bloc.  But Serbs have an historic friendship with Russia, as fellow Orthodox Christians, dating back to Serbia's struggle to free itself from the Ottoman Empire. Serbs are in fact torn between, or attached to, both East and West.

They are in a perfect situation to be friends with everyone, which is what the current government in Belgrade of President Alexander Vucic is trying to do.

From its history and natural inclinations, Serbia should be a bridge between East and West.

 Vucic with journalists during the 2018 European People's Party Congress in Helsinki. (European People's Party /Wikimedia Commons /CC BY 2.0)

Vucic was elected president of Serbia in 2017 and he and his Serbian Progressive Party have won a number of elections since by wide majorities. His economic development policies have made a bad situation better.

After Western companies took over Serbian industries only to shut them down, Vucic has welcomed Chinese investments which are reviving Serbian industrial production and mining. The economic growth rate accelerated to a comfortable 3.9 percent in 2024. Higher education for students who pass entrance exams is free, and Serbian universities enjoy high international ratings.  

In contrast to its neighbors, Serbs are staying in their native land, while others are leaving. (Bosnia Herzegovina has lost half of its population to emigration, relatively prosperous Montenegro 24.4 percent, North Macedonia 31.6 percent and Serbia only 7 percent, indicating that life prospects there are relatively promising.)

Serbia's relations with China have long been friendly and profitable. Vucic's foreign policy tries to balance between East and West, but the rise in hostility between the EU and Russia makes this difficult.

But the same Western supremacists who destroyed the natural "bridge" function of Ukraine by insisting on its "NATO destiny" are working to subvert all potential bridges to Russia — distant Georgia, Moldova and nearby Serbia. 

As an applicant to join the European Union, Serbia is kept under constant observation to see whether it is adapting to EU standards, economic and political. To satisfy Brussels, Vucic has supplied weapons to Ukraine but refuses to enforce sanctions against Russia, which provides Serbia with gas.

He has rejected EU demands to recognize the independence of Kosovo, as any Serbian leader must do to remain in office until tomorrow. But his domestic critics consider him not tough enough.

EU Parliament on Jan. 19, 2011, the day members approved a reform package, the EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Agreement, designed to move the country toward EU membership. (European Parliament/Flickr/ CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

Vucic defied EU threats by flying to Moscow to attend the May 9 ceremonies celebrating the 80th anniversary of the defeat of Nazi Germany's war of conquest.  Otherwise, he would have been hotly condemned at home for slavish subservience to the EU.  Instead, his enemies can cry "Putin's puppet."

Josip Tito's policy of nonalignment was a great success and Vucic appears to emulate the former Yugoslavian leader's approach. But his balancing act exposes him to criticism from both sides.

Protests Against…Whatever

Strangely, for months Serbia has been rocked by massive student protests and blockades, not over foreign policy or over any specific government policies, but primarily in response to tragic events with no obvious political significance.

In Belgrade on May 3, 2023, a 13-year-old boy armed with pistols and Molotov cocktails attacked his school, killing eight children and a security guard. The under-age shooter was eventually sent to a psychiatric hospital and the parents were charged.

On the evening of the very next day a 20-year-old man drove through two villages in central Serbia firing an automatic assault rifle, killing nine people and wounding 12 others.  He fled but was caught and eventually sentenced to 20 years.

This was shocking in a country where gun ownership is high but shooting incidents rare. Large protest demonstrations were held in major cities for several months. Opposition leaders created a protest movement "Serbia Against Violence" which blamed Vucic for creating "an atmosphere" responsible for the killings.

This is surely an exaggeration. In fact, police repression in Serbia is relatively mild, and Vucic can hardly be blamed for the mood of violence that prevails in the world today. Former Prime Minister Ana Brnabic also risked exaggeration by claiming that the protests were "fueled by foreign intelligence services."

Candidates for "Serbia Against Violence" won 24 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections on Dec. 17, 2023, just half the 48 percent won by the coalition supported by Vucic. 

Serbia Against Violence, or SPN, coalition representatives in front of the National Assembly of Serbia on Nov. 3, 2023. (Wikimedia Commons/CC BY 3.0)

In February 2024, a delegation headed by Marinika Tepic of "Serbia Against Violence" and Radomir Lazovic of the "Serbian Green-Left Front" went to Strasbourg to complain to the European Parliament that the elections had been stolen.  

Enjoying minimal legislative power, the European Parliament asserts itself mainly by adopting virtuous resolutions condemning human rights violations in foreign countries on the basis of often unverified complaints.

As was to be expected, by an overwhelming vote of 461 to 52 the European Parliament promptly adopted a strong resolution calling for an international investigation into "election irregularities" and threatening to stop EU funding. The main complaint was that by campaigning, President Vucic had unfairly influenced voters.

Marinika Tepic declared to Politico that "if something doesn't change now, we will completely slide into a dictatorship." 

EU's Missionary Work

Protests against recognizing the December 2023 elections reached such proportions that many feared a replay of the 2014 Maidan demonstrations that led to war in Ukraine. 

Pavle Cicvaric, who had learned organizing skills in numerous programs and workshops funded by Western foundations, led the student protests in Belgrade. The young leader's parents are both deeply involved in the work of NGOs. 

His mother, Dr. Jelena Žunic Cicvaric, is project coordinator of the NGO "Regional EU Resource Center for Civil Society in Serbia," a key channel for the redistribution of European Union funds, allocated only to those actively working on raising awareness of "European values."

His father, Radovan Cicvaric, a long-time politician campaigning for Euro-integration, is also promoting "European values" as director of the NGO Užice Center for Child Rights (UCPD) founded in 1998. 

While the UCPD focuses on children, another influential NGO, the Belgrade Open School (BOS), founded in 1993, sponsors programs for students and young professionals, including "training of social change agents."

Both are part of the "Youth Umbrella Organization of Serbia" which receives significant funds from international donors such as USAID, the Soros' Open Society Foundation, and various European Union programs. 

They organize workshops, training sessions, and projects aimed at strengthening the capacities of local NGOs and promoting European values. "Transition" countries applying for EU membership must listen to instructions on how to be worthy Europeans. 

This educational task is undertaken by the European Fund for the Balkans (EFB), a joint initiative of European foundations that envisions, runs and supports initiatives aimed at strengthening democracy and fostering European integration. 

Significantly, the EFB is sponsoring a "Joint History Project" to produce and spread a unified version of regional history, with the kind support of the German Foreign Office.  

The Balkan Trust for Democracy (BTD) is a foundation based in Belgrade. It was founded in March 2003 by the German Marshall Fund, USAID, and the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation. Other donors include the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Tipping Point Foundation, Robert Bosch Foundation, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, and the foreign affairs ministries of Denmark and Greece. The BTD supports grant donation, policy dialogue, and leadership development. 

If you want to be a leader, you know where to go.

It is hard to imagine that these Western-financed organizations have not contributed to the zeal and skill of Serbian student protesters.

A Deadly Collapse

Novi Sad is Serbia's second-largest city, a major stop on the new high speed railway route between Belgrade and Budapest being rebuilt with Chinese aid. 

As part of this project, Novi Sad's 60-year old modernistic railroad station was recently renovated, leaving in place a long concrete canopy across its entrance side. On the morning of Nov. 1, 2024, the concrete canopy suddenly collapsed, killing a total of 16 people.

The Serbian government declared a nation-wide day of mourning, a number of officials resigned, including the Serbian construction minister and the mayor of Novi Sad. Investigations of the causes are continuing.  

Portion of the canopy of the main railway station in Novi Sad, Serbia, that collapsed onto people walking and sitting underneath on Nov. 1, 2024. (Mishyac /Wikimedia Commons/ CC0)

For the student activists, the collapse was seen as clear proof of corruption, not only in construction work on the station but throughout society. Declaring that what happened in Novi Sad is proof that Serbia is overwhelmed by crime, violence, corruption and despair, the students have given themselves the task of changing this "unbearable social reality" to build a new Serbia. 

An apparently leaderless movement organizes student plenums which privately decide by consensus what to do next. They have shut down university faculties and schools, preventing students from attending classes for months.

Students who want to attend classes are treated like traitors. Even hospitals have been blockaded. It has been observed that the activist students tend to come from well-to-do families and are not joined by working class youth.  It is an elite revolt calling for equality.  

Students blocking traffic are protected by police. The government clearly suspects provocation and has been avoiding the sort of violent repression used by the French government of Emmanuel Macron to put down the Yellow Vests movement.  

Transition to What?

March during the general strike in Belgrade on Jan, 24, 2025. The banner in the foreground says "Only Student Save the Serbs," a play on the national slogan "Only Unity Saves the Serbs." (SergioOren / Wikimedia Commons / CC BY 4.0)

Serbian students under 26 were not born when NATO bombed Serbia.  

Serbian youth has grown up torn between the scars of the NATO bombing and the persistent dominant Western view of Serbs as the guilty party for the destruction of Yugoslavia.  No wonder that this creates some confusion.

It is understandable that a portion of middle class Serbian, urban youth find it unbearable to be excluded from "the West" by Serbia's imposed Pariah status.

Youth can be very conformist in their rebelliousness, seeking to join together in defiance of their elders. However confused the West may be, it still excels most in selling itself as something marvelous. 

A significant way it does this is through its massive web of non-governmental organizations. 

In April, EU auditors issued a report noting a "lack of transparency" in granting some 4.8 billion euros to some 5,000 NGOs during the 2021-2023 period, in addition to Member State grants of some 2.6 billion euros to around 7,500 NGOs from EU funding sources.  

It is not clear which countries benefited, but Marta Kos, the Slovenian EU commissioner for enlargement, has mentioned Serbia. 

Kos during confirmation hearings as European commissioner for enlargement, Nov. 7, 2024. (CC-BY-4.0: © European Union 2024– Source: EP)

In a March 28 interview with Slovenian RTV, Kos rejected as "unacceptable" suggestions by President Vucic that EU-funded NGOs are encouraging student protests aimed to overthrow him. Kos nevertheless noted that she was "much more in contact with the NGOs I met in Brussels than with the Serbian government or its president." 

She said:

"Many NGOs in Serbia would not survive without our support, and it is precisely because of the exceptional importance of NGOs that I have decided to allocate an additional €16 million to them for the period from this year until the end of 2027."

"Without the participation of civil society, there can be no enlargement process," Kos said, adding that she trusts the Serbian people to "guide their politicians so that Serbia can become a member of the European Union." Kos feels qualified to provide guidance. 

Aleksander Vulin is a prominent Socialist who has held various ministerial posts.  But no more.  "I hope that Mr. Vulin will not be a member of the new government, because those who act in an anti-European manner cannot lead Serbia into the EU," said Kos. She got her way. 

Among his sins, Vulin favors joining BRICS and had called for a law revealing NGO financing by foreign governments. (When Georgia adopted such a law, EU leaders mobilized to stop it, but failed.)  

On the other hand, Vucic defied dire threats by the EU against daring to attend the May 9 celebrations of the Allied Victory over Nazi Germany. He flew around Baltic States blocking his flight and showed up in Moscow, along with the courageous Slovak prime minister, Robert Fico.

 Vucic in Moscow on May 9, on his way to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin. (Ramil Sitdikov, RIA Novosti, Presidet of Russia)

Such is the Vucic balancing act. As a result, Vucic is denounced as "pro-Putin" in Brussels while his domestic adversaries denounce him for weakly giving in to EU demands.

The student protesters are still more ambiguous.

They clearly don't want to give credence to government accusations that they are manipulated by EU NGOs. The EU flag has been tacitly banned from the huge student demonstrations, with only Serbian flags being waved, as if to demonstrate national independence. 

However, this spring a contingent of student protesters created a spectacle by setting out to take their grievances to EU institutions, ostensibly on bicycles.  They were warmly welcomed as they complained that everything in Serbia was absolutely awful. 

On May 6, Serbia's leading newspaper Politika reported that visiting Serbian blockaders in the European Parliament gallery listened meekly as they were lectured by a Croatian nationalist, Steven Nikola Bartulica, who told them that "European values mean also a confession of guilt for everything Serbia did to Croatia." 

(In the summer of 1995, Croatia expelled about 200,000 Serbs from their homes in the Krajina region of Croatia, in the largest ethnic cleansing of the Yugoslav wars.) 

Bartulica claimed Serbia was not a European-style liberal democracy and would not be normalized until it accepted paying reparations to Croatia.

Members of the European Parliament expressed satisfaction that the students had chosen "Europe" against Russia, and called for overthrowing Vucic and Fico for having gone to Moscow.

At home, however, the protest demonstrations seem to be losing momentum, to the extent that students have stopped demanding everything! now! and are retreating to the demand for elections.

Boosted by his trip to Moscow, where his delegation held serious talks with President Vladimir Putin, Vucic held a patriotic rally in the city of Nis where he declared that the students' demands are over and do not interest him any more. He dismissed the blockaders as a very loud minority of mobbing bullies terrorizing the majority of citizens who want peace, work and unity. 

By suddenly demanding snap elections, he assumed that they were simply seeking another opportunity for violent outbursts, since elections will always be declared stolen by the opposition.  Elections will be held normally in a year or so, he said.  

On May 22, Belgrade received a visit from Kaja Kallas, an Estonian chosen by Ursula von der Leyen to be high representative of the EU for foreign affairs.  Having no diplomatic experience, Kallas' most visible qualifications are being a young woman with an unsurpassed hatred of Russia.

Kallas, center, EU high representative and vice president of the European Commission, at a NATO meeting in Brussels on April 4. (NATO /Flickr/ CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

While in Belgrade, the EU's top diplomat met, in a strange twist, with the president and the prime minister to tell them what to do.  But she met  with representatives of student protesters to listen to what they had to say. 

She praised her meetings with "civil society" and youth activists. "I heard their call and their aspirations – for fairness, for accountability so that Serbia can fulfill its full potential," she said. "Their energy is needed to find a way forward." 

In contrast, Kallas scolded Vucic for meeting Putin in Moscow. Serbia's future acceptance into the EU, she stressed, depends on the country's "strategic choice" between East and West.

Putin, by contrast, accepts Vucic's balancing act and has no objection to Serbia joining the EU. Variety is consistent with a multipolar world. But for the West, "you are with us or against us." Between East and West, there are no bridges allowed.   

Perplexity & Fear

In Belgrade, some people think the protests are petering out. Perhaps, but in the past they have died down only to revive over some incident. Since the causes are unclear, so are the solutions. 

The difficulty, Dragan Pavlovic, a Serbian commentator, told me is that the protests are expressed in "very general demands for a 'better life,' which obviously does not offer any concrete basis for understanding what is essentially wanted or what should be done to calm the protests." Such demands can go on forever. 

"It is probably an orchestrated, mass hysteria, caused by the nuclear threat, the genocide in Gaza, the prolongation of the crisis in Kosovo and the actions of non-governmental organizations," he suggests. 

Journalist and writer Mara Knezevic Kern considers it impossible to understand these incredible events. "I do not believe that it is possible to describe this new variant of an attack on the state — it has not happened anywhere else yet." In the 1990s, Yugoslavia served as an experimental laboratory for regime change.  Many fear that this is happening again, in Serbia.

Diana Johnstone was press secretary of the Green Group in the European Parliament from 1989 to 1996. In her latest book, Circle in the Darkness: Memoirs of a World Watcher (Clarity Press, 2020), she recounts key episodes in the transformation of the German Green Party from a peace to a war party. Her other books include Fools' Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions (Pluto/Monthly Review) and in co-authorship with her father, Paul H. Johnstone, From MAD to Madness: Inside Pentagon Nuclear War Planning (Clarity Press). She can be reached at diana.johnstone@wanadoo.fr

The views expressed are solely those of the author and may or may not reflect those of Consortium News.

 

intellinews.com

Serbia negotiates new long-term gas deal with Russia

By Tatyana Kekic in Belgrade May 19, 2025

4–5 minutes

---

Serbia will continue negotiations this week with Russia's Gazprom on a new long-term gas agreement, the general director of Srbijagas, Dusan Batajtovic, said on May 18 during a guest appearance on TV Prva.

The talks, aimed at securing a new long-term supply arrangement, come as the current gas contract between Serbia and Russia is due to expire on May 31.

"The deadline of the contract is now being negotiated," said Bajatovic during an interview with TV Prva on May 18. "I hope that the final agreement will be reached by May 31."

Discussions began earlier this month when Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic visited Moscow for the May 9 Victory Day parade, marking the 80th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory in World War II. During the visit, Vucic held high-level talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, including preliminary negotiations on gas pricing.

"The first part (of the negotiations) was general, we understood who wanted what... We won't have a problem with quantities for sure; the only issue is the term of the contract, which will not be less than three years," Bajatovic said.

"We will have a capacity of 2.5bn cubic metres of gas per year, we reached a good price, but I am not sure now how much it will amount to according to the oil formula. We did not reach an agreement because we strive to reach an agreement that will be valid for ten years."

Serbia, an EU candidate country, has increased efforts to diversify its energy sources – securing alternative supplies, including from Azerbaijan – but still remains heavily dependent on Russian gas. The country currently pays $275 per 1,000 cubic metres, a figure significantly below European market rates.

The long-term nature of the proposed deal raises concerns about Serbia's energy security and relations with Brussels. The EU has announced plans to phase out Russian gas imports by 2027 in response to Russia's war in Ukraine. A long-term agreement with Moscow could expose Serbia to legal and political risks, including potential EU and US sanctions.

Serbia's sole oil company NIS, majority-owned by Gazprom and its subsidiary Gazprom Neft, already faces the threat of secondary sanctions from Washington. Maintaining a direct bilateral gas deal with Russia could deepen those vulnerabilities.

Bajatovic has acknowledged these risks but remains cautiously optimistic. "There is one very important question. Europe wants to ban Russian gas in 2027, but maybe there will be an agreement between the Russians and the Americans," he told RTS on May 13, suggesting that geopolitical shifts could alter Serbia's energy options.

Bajatovic said Serbia intends to preserve the interstate nature of the contract, bypassing intermediaries, but declined to disclose the final agreed price. A formal agreement is expected to be signed by the end of May.

 

thepeacemonger.substack.com

The Ukrainians failed to confront ultranationalists to secure peace in the Donbas

Ian Proud

14–18 minutes

---

In a recent interview, Boris Johnson admitted that the Minsk 2 agreement fell apart because 'the Ukrainian nationalists couldn't accept the compromise' that President Zelensky wanted to agree with President Putin. It also failed because sanctions policy against Russia both disincentivized Ukrainian compliance, and actively incentivised Ukrainian non-compliance.

Claiming that Russia reneged on the Minsk Agreements has been a standard attack line from the west in the past, including from Johnson. Johnson has simply revealed what many already knew, that it was also wilfully inaccurate.

A lot of people talk about the so-called Minsk Agreements, but few understand the background. They refer collectively to three sets of peace proposals between June 2014 and February 2015, which culminated in the signature of the second Minsk agreement, commonly known as Minsk 2. They had several aims, including to end the fighting in the Donbas, the limitation on the use of heavy weapons by both sides and to seal Ukraine's border. Critically, all three proposals sought to maintain the territorial integrity of Ukraine by offering some form of devolution or special status to the separatist oblasts of Luhansk and Donetsk.

It's important to state up front that the basis for the Minsk agreements was initiated by the Ukrainian side. After violence in the Donbas erupted in February 2014 following the deposal of former President Yanukovych, the separatist leaders in Luhansk and Donetsk orchestrated referenda on 11 May, which ruled in favour of self-rule.

These referenda voted in favour of separation from Kyiv but were roundly criticised as illegitimate. The Ukrainian armed forces went on the offensive in a so-called Anti-Terror Operation. However, on 21 June, President Petro Poroshenko advanced a peace plan that included creation of a military buffer zone on either side of the line of contact, the restoration of public services in Donetsk and Luhansk, an amnesty for separatists who had taken up arms.

Critically, the Ukrainian government advanced the notion that the two oblasts comprising the Donbas would be offered some form of special status. In addition to some form of self-rule, special status would also have afforded protection of the use of the Russian language. Special status would have kept Donetsk and Luhansk within the Ukrainian state.

This offer was welcomed by the Russian side and every indication at that time was that Russia's primary goal was the protection of the Russian speaking population in Ukraine, with no desire to incorporate the Donbas given the huge cost.

By the start of July, the OSCE monitoring mission was reporting on an intensified Ukrainian military operation against the separatists. 5 July is the first time the OSCE reports on the deaths of civilians caused by the military operations, including the death of a five year old girl. By 6 July, Ukrainian forces have recaptured the towns of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. They approach Donetsk city and a fierce battle erupts around the airport which is destroyed. Fighting then breaks out on the outskirts of Luhansk city.

By mid-July heavy military equipment is being moved into the Donbas from Russia, to resupply the separatists. On 17 July amid heavy fighting, flight MH17 is downed with the deaths of all 298 persons on board.

Throughout this period, the Ukrainian military operation continues with barely any let up in intensity. Doctors in Luhansk report 250 deaths and 850 injuries, including civilians during June and July 2014. The OSCE mission moves out of Luhansk on 21 July because of heavy Ukrainian shelling of the city. Severodonetsk falls to the Ukrainian military advance on 22 July. On 29 July, Ukrainian troops at a checkpoint fire warning shots at an OSCE vehicle in Luhansk.

That day, Poroshenko announces a 20km ceasefire to allow access to the MH17 site which has been inaccessible because of ongoing military operations. In early august, Luhansk authorities report that citizens in the affected area are no longer receiving Ukrainian state salaries and pensions. Ukraine is now using military aircraft for strikes on targets in urban areas destroying electricity supply in Luhansk. On 10 August the head of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic proposes a ceasefire to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe. Shelling of urban areas continues from the Ukrainian side with reports of deaths and injuries to civilians.

On 16 August OSCE is trying to corroborate reports of Russian military convoys moving into the Donbas. Donetsk's water supply is affected by Ukrainian shelling and further civilian casualties are reported. Towards late August, human rights abuses by ultra-nationalist Ukrainian Aidar battalion are being reported by the OSCE. Amnesty international later reports that Aidar has committed widespread abuses, including abductions, unlawful detention, ill-treatment, theft, extortion, and possible executions, some of which allegedly amount to war crimes. On 26 Augst there are reports that Ukrainian personnel are abusing members of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow Patriarchy.

By late August, almost daily shelling of urban areas in Luhansk and Donetsk is taking place, basic services are disrupted and access to food is restricted. On 29 August, the Ukrainian army surrounds a town of Ilovaisk, with the order – according to the BBC - to 'wipe out' the separatists within. However, what are believed to have been Russian army formations have encircled the Ukrainian troops encircling the town. Up to 400 Ukrainian soldiers are killed in the ensuing firefight as they struggle to escape.

Amidst signs that the Russian army is playing a more direct role in the conflict, the first Minsk agreement is signed on 5 September. It contains similar provisions to Poroshenko's earlier peace plan, including the decentralisation of power, an amnesty for separatists and an inclusive 'national dialogue'.

The line of contact between the Ukrainian armed forces and the separatist controlled parts of the Donbas largely stays firm over the coming months. However, there are repeated violations of the ceasefire and casualties on both sides, including civilian casualties in the separatist areas. At the start of 2015, Wagner troops from Russia assist in closing a pocket along the frontline at Debaltseve, a small transport hub, in a bloody battle that lasts for several weeks.

This prompts German Chancellor Angela Merkel and President of France, Francois Hollande to become directly involved in mediation. They meet with Presidents Poroshenko and Putin in Minsk on 14/15 February 2015, leading to the signature of the second Minsk Agreement, which people often refer to as Minsk 2. Two days later, the UN Security Council unanimously endorses the Minsk 2 agreement.

This second Minsk agreement is similar to previous agreements but, at Russian insistence, contains more extensive language on the need for devolution in the Donbass, including through the creation of a new Ukrainian constitution. Clauses 4, 8, 9, 11 and 12 all contain detailed provision about sequencing in devolution and resealing the border between Ukraine and Russia.

From British Embassy contacts with Russian officials, it is clear that there is still no desire on the Russian side to annex the Donbas, and that Minsk II is seen as resolving an essentially Ukrainian domestic problem.

Throughout the seven-year period to the start of war in Ukraine in February 2022, President Putin talks often about the need for the Ukrainian side to meets its obligations on devolution under the Minsk II agreement.

But the Ukrainian government never fulfils its obligations. A law on special status was initially passed in Ukraine on 16 September 2014 after the first Minsk agreement was signed. This passed with a narrow majority of four votes. Promised elections in the Donbas were not held and the laws faced immediate resistance including street protests involving the same nationalist groups liked Svoboda, the right sector and others.

It is quickly clear that there is little political appetite in Ukraine to tackle the increasingly powerful nationalists head on and push forward with special status in the Donbas. The reading of the special status law in the Verkhovna Rada in 2017 causes scuffles to break out and further street protests in Kyiv. When newly elected President Zelensky proposes adoption of a devolution law in 2019 he faced further public protests by nationalist elements in Kyiv and elsewhere. He quickly abandons any attempt to advance the matter. Just three weeks before war breaks out, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba says in a press interview there will never be special status for the Donbas.

However, over the same period, European Union sanctions against Russia had been linked to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreement. Russia was not a party to most of the clauses of the Minsk agreement, which depended on Ukrainian policy in the Donbas. As such, Russia was on the hook for sanctions on the basis of decisions taken in Ukraine, in circumstances that disincentivised Ukrainian action. Clear action to make good on the promise of devolution in Donetsk and Luhansk would have led to widespread domestic political resistance in Ukraine while at the same time offering Rusia sanctions relief. That was neither in Poroshenko nor Zelensky's interest. Their lack of delivery on Minsk was also underwritten by the US and UK governments in particular that stuck to the narrative that Russia bore full responsibility for implementing Minsk. Western governments stay practically silent on the issue of Ukraine's failure to meet its obligations.

The 'Russia reneged on Minsk' narrative remains powerful even today in western mainstream media coverage of the Ukraine war, in the context of efforts by the US to negotiate a peace. Boris Johnson has finally revealed the line to be wilfully inaccurate.

Share The Peacemonger

A copy of the Minsk 2 agreement is below. It is worth a read, to understand what exactly the Ukrainian government committed itself to deliver.

A list of measures to fulfil the Minsk Agreement, 15 February 2015

1. Immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine and its strict implementation as of 15 February 2015, 12am local time.

2. Withdrawal of all heavy weapons by both sides by equal distances in order to create a security zone of at least 50km wide from each other for the artillery systems of caliber of 100 and more, a security zone of 70km wide for MLRS and 140km wide for MLRS Tornado-S, Uragan, Smerch and Tactical Missile Systems (Tochka, Tochka U): -for the Ukrainian troops: from the de facto line of contact; -for the armed formations from certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine: from the line of contact according to the Minsk Memorandum of Sept. 19th, 2014; The withdrawal of the heavy weapons as specified above is to start on day 2 of the ceasefire at the latest and be completed within 14 days. The process shall be facilitated by the OSCE and supported by the Trilateral Contact Group.

3. Ensure effective monitoring and verification of the ceasefire regime and the withdrawal of heavy weapons by the OSCE from day 1 of the withdrawal, using all technical equipment necessary, including satellites, drones, radar equipment, etc.

4. Launch a dialogue, on day 1 of the withdrawal, on modalities of local elections in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine "On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions" as well as on the future regime of these areas based on this law. Adopt promptly, by no later than 30 days after the date of signing of this document a Resolution of the Parliament of Ukraine specifying the area enjoying a special regime, under the Law of Ukraine "On interim self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions", based on the line of the Minsk Memorandum of September 19, 2014.

5. Ensure pardon and amnesty by enacting the law prohibiting the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.

6. Ensure release and exchange of all hostages and unlawfully detained persons, based on the principle "all for all". This process is to be finished on the day 5 after the withdrawal at the latest.

7. Ensure safe access, delivery, storage, and distribution of humanitarian assistance to those in need, on the basis of an international mechanism.

8. Definition of modalities of full resumption of socio-economic ties, including social transfers such as pension payments and other payments (incomes and revenues, timely payments of all utility bills, reinstating taxation within the legal framework of Ukraine). To this end, Ukraine shall reinstate control of the segment of its banking system in the conflict-affected areas and possibly an international mechanism to facilitate such transfers shall be established.

9. Reinstatement of full control of the state border by the government of Ukraine throughout the conflict area, starting on day 1 after the local elections and ending after the comprehensive political settlement (local elections in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions on the basis of the Law of Ukraine and constitutional reform) to be finalized by the end of 2015, provided that paragraph 11 has been implemented in consultation with and upon agreement by representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group.

10. Withdrawal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under monitoring of the OSCE. Disarmament of all illegal groups.

11. Carrying out constitutional reform in Ukraine with a new constitution entering into force by the end of 2015 providing for decentralization as a key element (including a reference to the specificities of certain areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, agreed with the representatives of these areas), as well as adopting permanent legislation on the special status of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in line with measures as set out in the footnote until the end of 2015.

12. Based on the Law of Ukraine "On interim local self-government order in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions", questions related to local elections will be discussed and agreed upon with representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the framework of the Trilateral Contact Group. Elections will be held in accordance with relevant OSCE standards and monitored by OSCE/ODIHR.

13. Intensify the work of the Trilateral Contact Group including through the establishment of working groups on the implementation of relevant aspects of the Minsk agreements. They will reflect the composition of the Trilateral Contact Group.

 

balcanicaucaso.org

Serbia: corruption, arrests and protests

Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso

10–12 minutes

---

Drawing of Vučić, during the protests, Serbia, February 2025 © Aleksandra.Vitorovic/Shutterstock

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has been calling for a generic "fight against corruption" for twelve years. Until a few weeks ago, this was just empty rhetoric. Now, to calm the protests, some arrests have been made, but they remain unconvincing and the protests are not subsiding

Protests have been going on in Serbia for months, demanding political accountability and for the State to investigate and prevent corrupt practices such as those that led to one of the greatest tragedies ever in the country. The government is trying in every way to divert attention from the problem and to convince the public, or at least its supporters, that corruption did not cause the tragedy of Novi Sad, promising "zero" tolerance for the corrupt.

For years now, the President of Serbia has been announcing a "fight against corruption". We have heard many times that "the biggest campaign to fight organised crime and corruption will be launched soon", but until a few weeks ago nothing has been done.

President Vučić, as usual, announced the launch of an anti-corruption campaign in the media, before the public opinion learned about it from the police, the prosecutor's office and other competent authorities.

At the end of 2024, Vučić stated that "the state policy will be based on a fierce fight against corruption". Then, in early February, he specified that "the fight will be a daily one, prosecutors will do their job, they have full powers, it will be difficult for us, very difficult. Citizens must have faith in their country, and those who have become immoderate... what can I do?".

Vučić has announced a broad, relentless fight against corruption since he came to power twelve years ago. However, the only "broad" action taken was against Miroslav Mišković, a Serbian businessman and owner of the Delta company, who was eventually acquitted of all charges.

Since then, no investigation into "high-level corruption" has been launched, despite the fact that Serbia, according to citizens, is a highly corrupt country. In its latest annual report, Transparency Serbia highlights that the country "continues to slide in the world's most important ranking of countries based on the perception of corruption in the public sector", placing it at 105th, its worst result since the current survey method was introduced in 2012.

Corruption is eroding every pore of society, students, citizens and the opposition have been saying for months. That corruption is the cause of the collapse of the roof of the Novi Sad station – think of the rules circumvented, the multi-million Euro contracts secretly signed, the countless subcontractors hired, the dramatically increased costs of the work – is clear to everyone except the prosecutor's office and the courts, who apparently do not even follow the money flows related to the reconstruction of the Novi Sad station.

Arrests

In an attempt to calm the situation, over the past month, what the government calls the fight against corruption has been reduced to a series of almost indiscriminate arrests across Serbia.

The day after Vučić's announcement, Milorad Grčić, former director of the Serbian Electricity Company (EPS) and president of the Obrenovac municipality, was arrested. The Belgrade Prosecutor's Office accuses Grčić of damaging EPS by more than one million Euros.

Fourteen other people were arrested along with the former EPS director, including controversial businessman Dejan Papić, who was allegedly involved in the misappropriation of EPS funds.

"This is just the beginning of a large and announced anti-corruption campaign and I expect new actions in the coming days", said Chief Prosecutor Nenad Stefanović.

Former mayor of Niš Dragana Sotirovski was also arrested on charges of damaging the city budget by almost four million Euros. On Wednesday, March 5, eleven of the sixteen people suspected of damaging the National Geodesy Institute for about 100 million dinars (just over 9 million Euros) were arrested.

The arrests for suspected embezzlement also involved the Military Medical Academy in Belgrade, a public company in Senta (in northern Vojvodina), while in Kraljevo an entrepreneur, a certain Cicmil, owner of the Promont company that controls several luxury hotels in Vojvodina, was arrested on charges of money laundering. In addition to these suspects, their assistants and accomplices were also arrested.

The arrests will not end here, at least according to what was announced by the president and the chief prosecutor. The action - designed to deflate student and civic protests, divert attention from other issues, or at least try to demonstrate that no one is untouchable, not even among those in power - have not produced the desired effect.

The protests show no signs of abating, and citizens who do not support the regime perceive the recent anti-corruption action not so much as a real fight against corruption, but rather as an intervention aimed at arresting "small fish" in a large chain of corruption.

Even Vučić's supporters, with the exception of loyalists and the hard core of his party, are skeptical that these arrests can stop corruption, and continue to accuse everyone except Vučić of criminality and corruption, believing that the president is unaware of these practices and that if he were, he would not allow them.

NGOs

Meanwhile, at the end of February, the Belgrade prosecutor's office opened preliminary investigations into several non-governmental organisations, based on allegations by some American officials about the improper use of funds that the United States, through the development agency USAID, had allocated to Serbia. To date, however, no official request for an investigation has been received from the United States.

However, Trump's fight against USAID is also being felt in Serbia, where authorities are hoping for good cooperation with the US administration.

The police have raided the offices of several NGOs, including Civic Initiatives, CRTA, the Center for Practical Policy and the Trag Foundation. Prosecutor Stefanović said that "the police must seize all documentation related to USAID donations to determine whether there was any misuse of the money".

The tabloids published the news about the "suspicious activities" of the aforementioned NGOs even before the police knocked on their doors. The evening before the operation, President Vučić announced it in a broadcast on Happy TV. "Well, there is BRAVO, Sviće, NDNV, NUNS, MUNS, UNS, all paid from abroad. We will help the FBI, we will provide all the information that the FBI will ask us for".

Officially, neither the FBI nor the US administration asked their Serbian colleagues to investigate how USAID donations were spent. However, Vučić, the Speaker of the Parliament and the Chief Prosecutor listened attentively to the statements made by the US President and his close associate Elon Musk on the other side of the ocean. It is therefore not surprising that a few days ago, in a speech, Trump cited Serbia as an example of the squandering of Uncle Sam's dollars, marvelling at the amount of fourteen million dollars earmarked for improving public procurement in Serbia.

Both authorities and non-governmental organisations in Serbia have benefited from USAID funds. In addition to improving public procurement, USAID has also supported Serbian institutions in other areas, including judicial reform, environmental protection, economic competitiveness, and protection of the rights of national minorities.

Non-governmental organisations have received funding for various projects and campaigns, and the total value of donations since 2001 is estimated to have exceeded $937 million.

Ana Brnabić, Speaker of the Belgrade Parliament, who previously worked for USAID (as per Wikipedia), said she has nothing against foreign funding, as long as it is transparent. Brnabić said she does not understand why organisations that work for the rule of law are funded, when those same organisations have called for not adopting constitutional changes that "guarantee the independence of the judiciary and the prosecution".

The Speaker of the Parliament went on to explain that "Serbia came into the news after the US administration revealed how much money was spent to destabilise Vučić and a democratically elected regime".

Journalist Branko Čečen believes that we are witnessing the instrumentalisation of the police for political purposes by investigating the finances of non-governmental organisations, while the laundering of large sums of money through state projects is ignored.

For the Citizens' Initiatives, the intervention of the police and the prosecutor's office is "a serious attack on fundamental human rights, which continues to exert illegitimate pressure on civil society". Other non-governmental organisations, media and individuals also believe that this is a politically motivated action.

Meanwhile, the European Union has issued a statement saying that "civil society plays a fundamental role in the development of a democratic and pluralistic society and should function freely, instead of being constantly subjected to pressure".

 

b92.net

On this day, 26 years ago, the NATO aggression against FR Yugoslavia was launched

Tanjug

71–90 minutes

---

According to the data of the Ministry of Defense of Serbia, during the 78 days of aggression, 1,031 members of the Army and the police were killed, and around 2,500 civilians, including 89 children, were killed. About 6,000 civilians were wounded, of which 2,700 were children, as well as 5,173 soldiers and policemen, and 25 people went missing.

As it was presented to the world public, the reason for the aggression was the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, i.e. the severe humanitarian crisis in that area, and the order for the attack was given by Javier Solana, then Secretary General of NATO, to US General Wesley Clark.

The events in Racak on January 15, and then the failure of the alleged negotiations conducted in Rambouillet and Paris, were used as an excuse for NATO aggression.

After the Serbian Parliament confirmed that it does not accept the decision on foreign troops on its territory, along with the proposal that the United Nations monitor the peace settlement in Kosovo and Metohija, NATO began airstrikes.

In reality, a series of terrorist acts committed by the so-called KLA took place in Kosovo and Metohija, both against the security forces of Serbia and the FRY, the highest police force, and against numerous civilians, not only Serbs but also Albanians, infrastructure facilities, Serbian sacred churches as well.

According to the first announcement of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, on March 24 at around 8:45 p.m., more than 20 objects were targeted in the first raid.

The first missiles fell on the barracks in Prokuplje at 19:53. This was followed by an attack on Priština, Kuršumlija, Batajnica, and Straževica. NATO began bombing from ships in the Adriatic, as well as from four air bases in Italy.

During the 11 weeks of aggression, there is almost no city in Serbia that was not targeted. NATO carried out 2,300 strikes and dropped 22,000 tons of missiles, including 37,000 banned cluster bombs and those filled with enriched uranium.

According to the findings of the relevant services of Serbia, 18,168 air flights were recorded until June 10, 1999. According to NATO sources, there were 38,004 sorties, of which 10,484 were fire operations, while the rest were reconnaissance, air raids and the like. At first, around 70 combat aircraft participated in the operations daily, and later that number would be around 400 daily.

In addition to attacks from ships in the Adriatic, as well as from four air bases in Italy, operations were carried out from bases in Western European countries and from the USA.

A large part of the country's infrastructure, economic facilities, schools, health facilities, media houses, cultural monuments, churches and monasteries were destroyed. All together, it is estimated, about 50 percent of Serbia's production capacity.

About 25,000 residential buildings were destroyed or damaged, 470 kilometers of roads and 595 kilometers of railways were disabled.

14 airports, 19 hospitals, 20 health centers, 18 kindergartens, 69 schools, 176 cultural monuments and 44 bridges were damaged, while 38 were destroyed.

A third of the country's power capacity was destroyed. Refineries in Pančevo and Novi Sad were bombed, which had incalculable environmental consequences. NATO used, allegedly for the first time, so-called graphite bombs to disable the power system.

The Chinese embassy in Belgrade was destroyed on May 7, 1999.

The RTS building in Belgrade was destroyed on April 23. 16 people died and the same number were wounded. The Novi Sad Television building was destroyed on May 3, 1999, on the International Media Freedom Day.

Various data were presented about the material damage caused during the NATO aggression. The then authorities in Belgrade estimated the damage at approximately one hundred billion dollars, and the group of G17 economists estimated the damage at 29.6 billion dollars at the time.

NATO denied that it had suffered any losses, and there were claims from Belgrade that dozens of aircraft had been shot down. The Russian news agency APN announced that NATO lost more than 400 soldiers and over 60 aircrafts, while US President Bill Clinton stated in a speech on June 10, 1999 that NATO had no casualties.

The remains of downed F-117, F-16, unmanned aerial vehicles, and cruise missiles are preserved in the Aviation Museum in Belgrade. The F 117 aircraft, the so-called "invisible" previously symbol of the superiority of American technology, ended up in a field in the atar of the village of Budjanovci in Srem.

Military aggression against Serbia, allegedly due to the situation in Kosovo and Metohija, was threatened almost a decade earlier, actually from the very beginning of the crisis in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and was actively prepared during 1998.

In the book "Modern Warfare", Wesley Clark did not hide that, as he put it, the planning of the NATO aggression against the FRY "was well under way in mid-June 1998".

The decision to adopt the order for the activation of forces was made by the NATO Council on October 12, 1998.

The next day, Slobodan Milosevic signs an agreement with Richard Holbrooke. It is planned to reduce the number of members of the Yugoslav Army in the area of ​​Kosovo and Metohija to the number from the beginning of 1998. It has also been agreed that OSCE observers will monitor the peace process in Kosovo and Metohija. At the same time, it was determined that no one can be held responsible for criminal acts related to the events in Kosovo and Metohija.

Regardless of the agreement, after the meeting of the NATO Council on January 30, 1999, it was officially announced that NATO was ready to launch strikes against the FRY.

The aggression itself was preceded by the additional deployment of NATO troops in Albania and Macedonia.

Then the so-called negotiations were staged in Rambouillet and Paris from February 6 to March 19, 1999. The FRY delegation did not sign the final text offered.

This was followed by another theatrical arrival of Richard Holbrooke in Belgrade on March 22 to talk with Slobodan Milošević, as a manifestation of alleged good intentions for the international public.

Madeleine Albright herself, the main architect of the military aggression against Serbia, did not hide that the level of demands sent to Belgrade grew all the time, to a level that was impossible to accept.

According to Vladislav Jovanović, announcements of bombings have been around for ten years, since the time when Bob Dole promised independence in Pristina.

Bill Clinton, then President of the USA, told the delegation of American Serbs that he himself would not sign what was demanded of Milosevic. Henry Kissinger expressed himself similarly.

Without a doubt, the aggression of 19 NATO members on Serbia, i.e. the FRY, took place with the aim of seizing Kosovo and Metohija from Serbia, and it was air support for the terrorist KLA, which by then had already committed countless crimes.

Bill Clinton, then president of the USA, spoke the same evening about the need to "intimidate Serbia and Yugoslavia" and "destroy Serbia's military capacities", so that, as he said, "actions against the Kosovo Albanians would not be taken".

Tony Blair, Prime Minister of Britain, stated that the NATO aggression was undertaken because it was requested by the "people of Kosovo", by which, as he openly stated, he meant the Albanians.

On May 27, 1999, in the wake of the aggression against the FRY, the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia published an indictment and issued arrest warrants for Slobodan Milošević, Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić and Vlajko Stojiljković for alleged crimes in Kosovo.

The suspension of NATO aggression came after the signing of the Military-Technical Agreement near Kumanovo on June 9, 1999.

This was preceded by visits to Belgrade by Martti Ahtisaari and Viktor Chernomyrdin in order to put additional pressure on Milosevic. The German chancellor at the time, Gerhard Schroeder, credits the diplomatic successes of Joška Fischer, the then German foreign minister, in his memoirs for the integration of Russia into the policy of the US and NATO regarding Kosovo. At the time, the US and Britain were openly considering a NATO ground invasion of Serbia.

Victor Chernomyrdin, Martti Ahtisaari and Strobe Talbott met in Bonn at the very beginning of June to prepare for the performance at Milošević's. According to Ahtisaari, NATO then set the deadline for solving the crisis until the G8 meeting in Cologne on June 7 and 8. Otherwise, a land invasion would follow. They agreed on June 2, in the form of a 10-point agreement, based on which Martti Ahtisaari and Viktor Chernomyrdin left for Belgrade on June 3.

Viktor Chernomyrdin acted particularly harshly in Belgrade at that time, presenting the proposed proposal to Milosevic as an ultimatum. Boris Yeltsin, the then president of Russia, then interpreted that Chernomyrdin "did everything he could" and that he "stopped the war" with the assessment that "Milošević behaved absolutely unprincipled" and that, according to Yeltsin, this "pushed Russia into a military and political confrontation with the West".

Three days after the signing of the Military-Technical Agreement near Kumanovo on June 9, 1999, the withdrawal of Serbian and FRY forces from Kosovo and Metohija began. The agreement stipulated the establishment of the United Nations mission, UNMIK.

On June 10, 1999, Javier Solana, then Secretary General of NATO, issued an order to stop the bombing.

The last missiles fell on June 10 in the area of ​​the village of Kololeč, near Kosovska Kamenica, at 1:30 p.m., and on the barracks in Uroševac around 7:35 p.m. It was the 79th day of the NATO aggression against Serbia, that is, the FRY.

The UN Security Council then adopted Resolution 1244. As part of the KFOR mission, 37,200 soldiers were sent to Kosovo and Metohija.

The highlight of the entire process was the unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence on February 17, 2008, which was recognized by the countries that participated in the aggression against Serbia in 1999.

proizvođač je iznenađen potražnjom za karavanom M5 – očekivao je veću proizvodnju limuzine, ali trenutno su obe varijante ravnopravne.

BBC

 

Deteriorating state crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina

boell.de

Deteriorating state crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina | Heinrich Böll Stiftung

By Edo Kanlić and Paola Petrić

10–12 minutes

---

Commentary

The judiciary of Bosnia and Hercegovina issued arrest warrants for the President of the Republika Srpska (RS), Milorad Dodik and two other RS officials, due to violation of the constitutional order. The current political crisis is a big test for the state institutions and the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is facing its most severe crisis since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. In 2024, the European Council decided to open accession negotiations with BiH, a historic breakthrough after years of stagnation in the country's European integration process. However, the current crisis highlights that the decision was driven more by shifting geopolitical realities than by concrete reforms or achievements of the now-collapsed state-level governing coalition.

Since March 2025, the leadership of the Republika Srpska (RS) entity has taken a series of decisions that undermine BiH's sovereignty and constitutional order. RS authorities have passed laws prohibiting the work of state-level judicial and law enforcement institutions (the Court of BiH, the Prosecutor's Office, and the State Investigation and Protection Agency — SIPA) on the entity territory, while establishing entity-level judicial and prosecutorial councils, effectively usurping state competencies. The RS Criminal Code was amended to allow for the prosecution of civil servants from RS who continue working in BiH-level institutions, and a "Foreign Agents" law was introduced to target media and NGOs funded from abroad — the same foreign sources that have supported the development of RS institutions for decades.

These decisions were a response to the first-instance verdict against RS President Milorad Dodik, who was sentenced to one year in prison and banned from holding public office for six years for failing to comply with decisions of the High Representative — the international authority overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. However, this was not a spontaneous reaction to the ruling, but rather the execution of a long-standing separatist agenda. For years, these ambitions remained largely rhetorical, but the swift and coordinated adoption of new laws suggests they were carefully prepared in advance, with the verdict serving as a trigger rather than a cause. Instead of using his right to appeal, Dodik chose to escalate the political conflict, with RS authorities initiating constitutional changes and adopting a law on the "protection of RS constitutional order," further eroding state-level competencies and dismantling decades of reform aimed at state-building and Euro-Atlantic integration.

The crisis deepened further when Dodik, the President of RS, along with the Prime Minister of RS, the Speaker of the RS National Assembly, and other RS officials, ignored summonses and refused to comply with legal proceedings. In response to the judiciary's decision to issue arrest warrants, RS authorities escalated tensions by announcing the creation of an RS border police force, directly encroaching on state competencies and further undermining BiH's constitutional order.

The Impact of RS Decisions on the State and Regional Stability

BiH is a complex state with a constitutional framework that ensures the supremacy of state law over entity laws. Republika Srpska's recent legislative actions represent an attack on the constitutional and legal order, as they unilaterally claim jurisdiction over state-level matters. This threatens the functionality and legitimacy of state institutions, raising concerns about a gradual institutional split or even de facto secession.

Two primary mechanisms exist to counter these threats: the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which defines offenses related to violations of constitutional order and territorial integrity, and the Constitutional Court, which has temporarily suspended the contested RS laws. In addition, state judicial institutions have promptly launched an investigation into the violations, with the highest RS officials refusing to cooperate. Their detention, as ordered by the BiH Court, is widely perceived as a significant security challenge. The response of state institutions will be a critical test of their capacity to uphold the rule of law. Clear and timely communication from judicial institutions will be crucial to counter misinformation and prevent inflammatory rhetoric from domestic and regional political actors, particularly from Serbia, whose officials have previously criticized BiH judiciary decisions.

Institutional Resilience and the Role of International Actors

Given BiH's aspirations for EU membership, it is essential that the EU and its member states closely monitor the security situation and provide unequivocal support to state institutions in upholding the rule of law. The recent deployment of additional EUFOR forces demonstrates the EU's commitment to maintaining stability. However, the future of the EUFOR Althea mission remains uncertain, as its mandate is subject to annual renewal at the UN Security Council, where Russia's stance is unpredictable. While RS authorities have openly called for the mission's termination, the focus should be on closely monitoring EUFOR's activities in BiH and the ongoing diplomatic efforts to ensure its continued presence.

As 2025 marks the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Agreement, the ongoing crisis presents an opportunity to reassess the role of international actors in BiH. The expectation that domestic institutions should take greater responsibility for enforcing the Dayton framework is a positive response to the country's long-standing challenges—one that should have been implemented in practice long ago. However, this process must be gradual and accompanied by international support to strengthen institutions, rather than a sudden withdrawal of international engagement, which could further destabilize the country.

External Influences and Geopolitical Dimension

Aleksandar Vučić, the President of Serbia, continues to provide political support to Milorad Dodik, reinforcing his secessionist rhetoric and undermining Bosnia and Herzegovina's sovereignty. While Vučić recently canceled Dodik's planned address to the National Assembly of Serbia due to domestic political tensions, this does not signal a retreat from his broader strategy. On the contrary, Serbian authorities increasingly use the situation in BiH to divert attention from internal crises. All key Serbian officials have condemned the actions of BiH's judiciary in the Dodik case, making unsubstantiated claims that institutions based in Sarajevo, along with Bosniak political representatives, pose a security threat. Simultaneously, state-controlled and tabloid media outlets have intensified their efforts to build a narrative of Serb victimhood in BiH, echoing propaganda tactics from the 1990s with potentially dangerous consequences. The lack of a decisive EU response to such behavior by an EU candidate country raises serious questions about the Union's credibility in promoting stability and the rule of law in the region.

Hungary continues to act outside the framework of EU institutions in BiH, openly supporting Dodik and challenging the legitimacy of BiH's judiciary. In addition to political backing, Budapest is increasingly mentioned as a potential destination for Dodik should he seek to evade legal consequences, following the precedent set by former Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski. This approach further undermines the EU's credibility, as the Union shows no willingness to sanction a member state for actions that contradict the rule of law and European values in BiH.

Russia has once again openly backed Dodik, directly undermining BiH's institutions and further destabilizing the situation. Pro-Russian Telegram channels are systematically spreading panic and predicting conflict in BiH, employing well-rehearsed disinformation tactics seen in other crisis areas. Given the ties between RS authorities and radical pro-Russian paramilitary groups, this development poses not only a security threat to BiH but also to the EU. A prolonged crisis in BiH serves Russia's strategic interests by diverting the EU's attention away from Ukraine and other security challenges. This weakens the EU's influence in the Balkans and undermines Western unity. However, key actors—Dodik, Vučić, and Russian authorities—may have miscalculated the firm stance of the United States, which remains steadfast in its support for BiH's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Crisis as a Turning Point?

The current crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina represents both a significant threat and a potential turning point for the country's future. It exposes the urgent need for a comprehensive reassessment of BiH's constitutional structure and the international community's role in overseeing its implementation. The escalating tensions, particularly the undermining of state institutions by the Republika Srpska leadership, challenge the very foundations of BiH's sovereignty and constitutional order, threatening a breakdown in its state-building and reform efforts.

Simultaneously, this crisis serves as a critical test for the European Union's capacity to act decisively within its own neighborhood. BiH's stability has become a litmus test for the credibility of the EU's enlargement policy, especially given the influence of external actors such as Serbia, Russia, and Hungary in fueling separatist agendas. The EU's response to these developments will play a pivotal role in determining whether BiH can remain on a path toward Euro-Atlantic integration or if the country risks further fragmentation. Such fragmentation could destabilize the region and have far-reaching consequences for peace and security in the Balkans. The outcome of this crisis will ultimately shape BiH's future trajectory, either reinforcing its European aspirations or leading to deeper division and prolonged instability.

 

swp-berlin.org

The EU's Raw Materials Diplomacy: Serbia as a Test Case

Melanie Müller; Lea Maria Strack; Marina Vulović

62–79 minutes

---

In July 2024, the European Union (EU) and the Serbian government signed a strategic raw materials partnership. For the EU, this cooperation represents an important step towards diversifying its supply chains and strengthening economic partnerships in its neighbourhood. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić has a geopolitical interest in this cooperation, which he also wants to use to further consolidate his already extensive power domestically. The signing of the partnership agreement has triggered massive protests in Serbia. Critics fear that the implementation of the raw materials partnership could further undermine already fragile rule-of-law structures, as well as environ­mental and social standards. The case of Serbia illustrates that the EU can only exert limited influence on the country's authoritarian government in a geopolitically tense context. However, it must strategically use its available leverage to mitigate the existing risks.

In 2024, the EU adopted the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) to ensure the col­lective supply of so-called strategic raw materials – resources that are "of significant importance for the EU and exhibit very high supply risks". To enhance supply security and, in particular, to reduce the high level of dependence on Chinese raw material imports, the EU aims to expand European capacities in mining, processing, and recycling while diversifying its import sources.

To achieve this diversification, the EU has signed several partnership agreements with resource-rich countries in various regions of the world. The raw materials partnership with EU accession candidate Serbia is of particular interest for two reasons. First, Serbia has significant deposits of lithium, which is a strategic raw material crucial for battery produc­tion. Second, this partnership would allow the EU to expand its geopolitical influence in the Balkan raw materials sector, where China has become increasingly active in recent years.

The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the EU-Serbia raw materials partnership was publicly celebrated at the Serbian Critical Raw Materials Summit in July 2024. The MoU, which is not legally binding, consists of five components: cooperation in developing value chains for raw materials, batteries, and electric vehicles; research and inno­vation; high ESG (environmental, social, governance) standards; the mobilisation of financial instruments; and the development of skills for high-quality jobs in the raw materials and battery sectors.

Serbia and the EU are currently developing a joint roadmap that will list specific activities for cooperation and identify entry points for collaboration between companies. Additionally, the aim is to implement projects while adhering to high, transparent sustainability standards. This includes a com­mitment to high governance standards, social and environmental criteria, and the enforcement of Serbian environmental and mining laws.

The central element of the raw materials partnership is the planned lithium mining project in the Jadar Valley, a project that is being pursued by the British-Australian company Rio Tinto. The company has been active in Serbia since the establishment of its subsidiary Rio Sava Exploration in 2001, and it has positioned itself as a partner to the EU for the European supply of raw ma­terials. There are very few European corpo­rations capable of implementing a project of this scale. Rio Tinto has relatively little experience in lithium mining, but it aims to secure a larger share of the battery metals market and expand its portfolio.

Both current Chancellor Olaf Scholz and the European Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security, Maroš Šefčovič, have publicly pledged that Germany and the EU will support the successful implementation of the project. Rio Tinto has asked the Euro­pean Commission to recognise the Jadar Project as a "strategic project" under the CRMA, as it would contribute to the diver­si­fication of European raw material im­ports. Although such recognition does not typi­cally involve financial support, it can facil­itate access to low-interest loans and pro­vide political backing from the European Commission and EU member states.

Resistance and protests against the "Jadar Project"

The project has long been highly controversial in Serbia: Even before the signing of the partnership agreement with the EU, pro­tests had erupted as critics feared severe negative consequences for the environment and local communities. The protest move­ment has gone through various phases. It is now directed not only against the project itself but also against the EU's project-relat­ed support for the Serbian government. The protest has reached a scale that threat­ens the implementation of the raw ma­terials partnership with Serbia.

First phase (2004–2022): Criticism of the mining project and a short-lived protest victory

As early as 2004, Rio Sava began the geo­logical exploration of the Jadar Valley, which is a predominantly agricultural region in western Serbia near the small town of Loz­nica. Over the following years, Rio Sava conducted around 500 exploratory drillings and discovered Jadarite, a mineral that is unique in the world due to its com­position. Jadarite is rich in lithium and boron and can be used for the production of lithium carbonate, boric acid, and sodium sulphate.

According to estimates by the German Mineral Resources Agency (DERA), the planned production volume of 58,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate per year could cover between 10 and 15 per cent of Europe's lithium demand by 2030.

In 2017, the Serbian government and Rio Sava signed an MoU, which included the estab­lishment of a joint working group to im­plement the Jadar Project. The first pro­tests in the region emerged in 2020, when the government adopted the regu­lation for the "Spatial Plan of the Special Purpose Area for the Implementation of the "Jadar" Project of Exploitation and Pro­cessing of Jadarite Mineral". The protesters criticised the lack of transparency and the absence of a public debate regarding the planned expansion of the mining sector in Serbia; the environmental risks associated with the extraction and processing of the mineral and the storage of industrial waste; and the uncertainties encountered by land­owners who might face expropriation if they refused to sell their property voluntarily.

In September 2021, the protests reached the capital, Belgrade. After sustained and increasingly nationwide pressure on the government, the authorities revoked all permits previously granted to Rio Sava in January 2022, including the spatial plan, and declared that the project would not be realised.

Second phase (2022–2023): Criticism of the government's reversal and the lack of trans­parency and participation

However, shortly after, President Vučić declared that halting the project had been his "biggest mistake". This statement – made immediately after his victory in the parliamentary elections – led critics to suspect that the previous suspension of the project had been merely a tactical move for electoral purposes.

Three further developments fuelled doubts about the finality of the project's cancellation. A petition submitted to the National Assembly in June 2022, signed by about 38,000 people, calling for a poten­tial ban on the exploration and mining of lithium and boron in Serbia was declared "lost". This raised concerns, since the National Assembly is legally required to respond to petitions with more than 30,000 signatures. Additionally, the Ministry of Mining and Energy did not terminate the licensing process for the mining permit as legally required. Instead, it extended the deadline for completing the required docu­mentation 18 times without providing any justification. Furthermore, in September 2023, the Serbian government signed an initial Letter of Intent with the European Commission to establish a strategic raw materials partnership, which was formalised into a more concrete MoU in July 2024. These events gave parts of the population the impression that the project was being pushed forward – despite the official halt – by the Serbian government, the EU, and espe­cially Germany, whose automotive indus­try has a strong interest in Serbian lithium.

The lack of response to the petition and the partnership agreement with the Euro­pean Commission further deepened frustra­tion over the lack of transparency and the inadequate level of participation by civil society.

Third phase (since 2024): Resumption of the project, pro­tests against the government and the EU

In July 2024 – shortly before the signing of the EU-Serbia raw materials partnership – the Serbian Constitutional Court invalidated the January 2022 decision to annul the already approved spatial plan. It justified this by stating that the government had ex­ceeded its competencies with the project's suspension and had therefore acted un­constitutionally.

Two of the ten judges of the Constitutional Court criticised the Court's hasty deci­sion and the fact that a ruling had been made without initiating a formal procedure – an occurrence that had only happened twice in the past 11 years. Nevertheless, shortly thereafter, the Serbian government issued a decree reinstating the previously suspended spatial plan for the Jadar Project.

This decision triggered another wave of major protests across the country, to which the government responded with increasing levels of repression in the form of police raids, arrests, and the public defamation of opponents of the project.

A bill introduced by the opposition in September 2024 to ban lithium mining in Serbia was rejected by a majority in par­lia­ment. This further intensified the frustration of the protesters, who by now were not only criticising the government's actions but, since the signing of the partnership agreement, were increasingly directing their criticism towards the EU as well.

Dismantling of the rule of law and democracy

The Serbian government's course of action shows that the EU has chosen a difficult partner. The government in Belgrade has systematically weakened democracy and the rule of law over the past 10 years, as evidenced by rankings in the Rule of Law Index, the Corruption Perception Index, and reports from Freedom House. Signifi­cant setbacks have also been recorded in terms of freedom of speech and press: The political opposition, critical civil society actors, and the media are increasingly coming under pressure.

However, experiences from the mining sector show that an open climate for civil society actors and support from the popu­la­tion (the social licence to operate) are cru­cial for the successful implementation of projects. In the long term, a culture of trans­parency and monitoring is also necessary, as significant negative impacts can arise even in the later phases of projects, which are often designed to last for decades; continu­ous oversight is therefore indispensable.

Serbia is far from achieving this: In December 2024, Amnesty International reported that Serbian authorities had planted spyware on the mobile phones of activists and journalists as well as on the phones of individuals protesting against the lithium project. Activists advocating for environmental protection and freedom of expression have been increasingly pres­sured by the regime since 2024. Many have been arrested, threatened, and targeted with public smear campaigns. A planned legal amendment that would have effec­tive­ly criminalised activism was only abandoned due to public pressure.

Although the EU criticised these develop­ments in Serbia in its 2024 Rule of Law Report, it has few effective levers and has shown little willingness to push Serbia towards serious reforms. The EU accession negotiations, which have been ongoing since 2014, have effectively stalled in recent years. Serbia is only making slow progress with the necessary reforms.

Critical voices therefore suspect that the government in Belgrade is now pushing for the rapid implementation of the raw materials project, as the 2023 elections – which had to be repeated in some areas due to allegations of election fraud – have con­firmed the government and strengthened its position. Vučić seeks to expand his power by diversifying his political and economic ties while simultaneously curbing domestic criticism through economic integration with the EU. The openly aggressive actions that have been taken against critical voices illustrate that Vučić has little concern that restrictions on democratic fundamental rights could jeopardise the partnership agree­ment with the EU.

However, these developments are increas­ingly becoming a risk for the EU, as criticism of the planned lithium mining project has now taken on a transnational dimension. At the same time, the project has become a focal point for broader domestic political conflicts. The protests are symptomatic of a deep-seated distrust concerning the government's willingness and ability to uphold the rule of law and properly manage such high-risk projects. This mistrust was further reinforced by an accident in Novi Sad in November 2024 when 15 people lost their lives due to a col­lapsed train station canopy. Critics are ques­tioning how a government that cannot even ensure the safety of basic infrastructure can responsibly oversee a venture such as the Jadar Project.

The way in which the Jadar Project has been pushed forward in Serbia – and re­inforced through government repression – has mobilised people who are criticising in particular the EU's silence on the actions of the Serbian government.

This benefits the nationalist forces that have joined the protest against the project and are using this silence as a justification for their fundamental opposition to Serbia's EU accession. German and US diplomats allege that these forces are being influenced due to Russian interference, which aims to discredit the project and thereby prevent Serbia from establishing closer ties with the EU. However, they have not yet publicly provided any evidence to support this claim. And even if this suspicion were to be confirmed, it would be overly simplistic to attri­bute the protest solely to a potential disin­for­mation campaign, given the valid criti­cisms of the project. The social and environmental risks of the project are well documented – and they highlight potential areas in which improvements can be made.

Ecological and economic risks of implementing the raw materials partnership

Environmental risks

According to Serbian law, mining projects must undergo an environmental impact as­sessment under certain conditions in order to evaluate their potential effects. The scope and content of the assessment are determined by the relevant authorities.

In November 2024, Serbia enacted new laws on Environmental Impact Assessments and Strategic Environmental Assessments. However, these laws are not yet fully aligned with corresponding EU directives, and the bylaws required for their application are still pending. Furthermore, the European Commission has repeatedly pointed out significant deficiencies in the implementation of these laws and emphasised the need for structural reforms to strengthen admin­istrative capacities at the national and local levels, in regulatory authorities, and within the judiciary.

In November 2024, the Ministry of En­viron­mental Protection defined the scope and content of the environmental impact assessment for the underground mine in the Jadar Valley. Rio Tinto is obliged to sub­mit the required study within one year. How­ever, the ministry's decision has been criticised. Rio Tinto only submitted an application for an assessment of the under­ground mine, even though environmental impact assessments are also required for the processing plant and the tailings storage facility.

Therefore, the Belgrade-based Renew­ables and Environmental Regulatory Insti­tute (RERI) fears that Rio Tinto intends to avoid an evaluation of the project's overall impact through this artificial segmentation, a practice known as "project splitting", numerous cases of which have already been documented in Serbia. In some instances, companies have allegedly acted with the knowledge and support of the responsible state authorities in an effort to obscure cumu­lative environmental impacts or entirely bypass the requirement for an environ­mental impact assessment.

It is the responsibility of Serbian authorities to prevent such improper project prac­tices and to ensure a transparent and legally compliant environmental impact assessment.

According to Energy Minister Dubravka Handanović, it could take another two years before all of the necessary permits for the project's implementation are obtained. A decision by the Assembly of the City of Loznica on the local spatial plan is also re­quired for the project's realisation. Environ­mental activists in Serbia have already announced massive protests.

Regulatory oversight by Serbian author­ities has repeatedly failed in the mining sector in recent years. One example is the Chinese-Serbian joint venture Serbia Zijin Copper DOO Bor, which operates Serbia's largest copper mine and smelting plant. According to experts, the relevant author­ities rarely hold Zijin accountable for regu­larly exceeding permissible sulphur dioxide emissions and polluting rivers.

Additionally, Zijin has been convicted seven times in the past four years for illegal construction activities; in five cases, only fines below the legally required minimum penalties were imposed. This has undermined the public's trust in the authorities and in their willingness to enforce environ­mental regulations.

Amid general criticism of the integrity of Serbian authorities, a debate has emerged regarding the information that is available on the Jadar Project. According to Rio Tin­to's current plans, approximately 220 hec­tares of land will be required for the under­ground mine and processing plant, with an additional 167 hectares needed for the industrial waste landfill.

In addition to the resulting loss of agricultural land, forests, and biodiversity, critics fear negative effects on the region's drink­ing water reservoir and on the adja­cent rivers Drina and Jadar. These risks are to be analysed in the already mentioned environmental impact assessment, with pre­liminary drafts for the assessment having been published by Rio Tinto in June 2024.

However, doubts have been raised about the credibility of these drafts. Scientists from the Faculty of Biology at the University of Belgrade, who were originally involved in preparing a report for Rio Tinto, con­cluded that the project posed significant risks to the ecosystem and distanced them­selves from the company's claims.

A study published in a scientific journal in July 2024 on the impact of the Jadar River and the soil near the exploratory drill holes, which had allegedly already been affected by the test drillings, further reinforced these concerns. Rio Tinto raised doubts about the study's data collection methodology and requested its withdrawal. However, the sub­sequent revisions made by the authors were minor, and the journal did not find fault with the methodology. Rio Tinto, on the other hand, argues that the elevated heavy metal concentrations in the Jadar River were caused by the collapse of the tailings dam at the former "Stolice" antimony mine during the 2014 floods and denies any con­nection to the exploratory drilling.

Assessing this controversy is further com­plicated by the fact that, according to Rio Tinto, one of the eight authors had repeat­edly spread false claims about the project. Additionally, in December 2023, he ran as a mayoral candidate in Belgrade for a Euro­sceptic, ultranationalist, and pro-Russian opposition coalition, raising questions about his scientific independence.

Another unresolved question is who would be responsible for cleanup costs if the project were to cause an environmental disaster. Rio Tinto has attempted to counter this criticism, stating that it models ex­treme­ly rare events, such as catastrophic floods, and designs the mine's infrastructure accordingly. Furthermore, Rio Tinto asserts that it is legally required to obtain insurance that would cover third-party damages in the event of an accident. How­ever, many Serbians remain sceptical, as the mere existence of legal regulations does not necessarily guarantee that the respon­sible authorities will actually ensure com­pliance.

There is widespread doubt among the public about both the willingness and the ability of Serbian authorities to adequately enforce environmental laws. Additionally, due to the repression of Serbian civil soci­ety, there is a lack of independent actors who can monitor the available data – espe­cially since many people in Serbia distrust the data provided by Rio Tinto. Their scep­ticism is reinforced by the fact that Rio Tinto has faced legal action and been con­victed in other countries for violations of environmental standards. As a result, many do not view Rio Tinto as a trustworthy actor.

Economic viability

The economic viability of the project has also been a subject of contention. The Ser­bian government has successfully attracted foreign investments through an active sub­sidy policy: In recent years, the proportion of targeted state aid has ranged between 2 and 5 per cent of GDP, whereas the Euro­pean average is just 0.5 per cent. In the course of Serbia's EU accession, it would be required to significantly reduce this rate. In recent years, the country has deepened its ties with China, which has now become Ser­bia's second-largest investor after the EU. The Serbian government's support for the Jadar Project can also be interpreted as a signal to the EU and the United States, in­dicating its intention to better balance its international relations and strengthen its negotiating position on the global stage.

Rio Tinto has already invested €475 mil­lion in the project and expects an additional €2.55 billion in investments, making it Ser­bia's largest foreign direct investment to date. The company plans to create an aver­age of 1,500 jobs during the four-and-a-half-year construction phase, with a peak of around 3,500 jobs. Once fully operational, the project is expected to create 1,300 per­manent positions, of which 90 per cent should be held by Serbians.

From the first year of full production, taxes and other levies could contribute around €48 million annually to the Serbian state budget, with long-term projections estimating €185 million per year, of which €24.5 million is earmarked for the munici­pality of Loznica.

Additionally, Rio Tinto plans to spend approximately €300 million annually on supplies, with 70 per cent of them expected to be sourced from Serbia.

However, a recently published report by economists and business experts casts doubt on the figures provided by Rio Tinto, arguing that the Jadar Project offers only limited economic benefits for Serbia. The authors highlight, among other issues, uncertain infrastructure costs such as for roads and wastewater systems. So far, there are no reliable estimates for the total costs nor for the distribution of expenses be­tween the Serbian government, local munici­palities, and Rio Tinto.

The government has reaffirmed its inten­tion to establish downstream industries with higher added value within Serbia. Recently, Vučić stated that at least 87.1 per cent of the extracted lithium should be processed domestically.

Currently, the government is negotiating with various companies regarding the con­struction of a cathode factory. In September 2023, Serbia signed an MoU with the Slovak battery manufacturer InoBat to build a bat­tery factory in Cuprija starting in 2025. The Serbian government has pledged €419 mil­lion in subsidies for the project. Addition­ally, companies such as Mercedes and Stel­lantis have expressed interest in establishing agreements with Serbia to develop a lithium value chain.

Thus, the implementation of the Jadar Project could serve as an impetus for in­creased European corporate activity in Ser­bia. According to EU estimates, this could create up to 20,000 jobs. However, few con­crete commitments or results have materi­alised so far. Nonetheless, further economic commitments alone will not be enough to dispel the well-founded criticisms of the project.

Conclusion and policy recommendations

Given Serbia's deficiencies in the rule of law, the increasing restrictions on speech and the media, and the strong resistance within the country, the realisation of the Jadar Project carries several risks. In recent weeks, the government has come under increased pressure due to widespread cor­ruption and a political system that is domi­nated by the ruling party. Following several weeks of mass protests, Prime Minister Miloš Vučević resigned on 28 January. This once again highlights how little trust the population has in the government's ability to uphold legislation and standards of any kind.

So far, the EU has publicly signalled its commitment to implement the raw ma­terials partnership and the Jadar Project. To maintain credibility, it must demonstrate that it is actively addressing the sus­tain­ability risks of the project and will push the Serbian government to adhere to high environmental protection standards. The EU accession process provides some con­crete, albeit limited, levers to demand this compliance. After all, environmental con­cerns and compliance with the Green Agenda (including in the raw materials sector) are not only part of Cluster Four of the acces­sion negotiations ("Green Agenda and Sus­tainable Connectivity"), but also an integral part of the EU's Growth Plan for the West­ern Balkans. This plan links the disbursement of financial aid to the implementation of reforms, particularly in the area of the rule of law.

This strategy remains effective, even if Serbia is not seriously pursuing EU mem­bership. The EU-Serbia raw materials part­nership should not be viewed in isolation from ongoing processes, but rather as a supplement to existing efforts. The EU should also leverage the ESG conditions agreed upon in the partnership agreement to strengthen institutional capacities within the responsible authorities. The implementation and enforcement of the Environmental Impact Assessments, the Strategic En­viron­mental Assessments, and measures against environmental crimes should be prioritised and made a condition for further cooperation.

Although regulatory enforcement is the responsibility of Serbian authorities, Rio Tinto has also expressed openness to being supervised by independent international experts. Given Germany's strong involvement in advancing the raw materials part­nership, it should seize this opportunity to provide expertise in environmental impact assessment and monitoring. Furthermore, Germany can support local civil society in critically monitoring raw material extraction and advocating for rapid certification under the multi-stakeholder standard of the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA).

Regarding the economic viability of the project, the European Commission could commission an independent assessment to evaluate the actual project costs, ensuring a transparent evaluation. This document should be published in Serbian. Additionally, the EU could make concrete infrastructure investment offers. Although Rio Tinto should finance the infrastructure necessary for its operations, the EU could support additional infrastructure projects through the Global Gateway initiative to provide tangible benefits to the local population.

However, these measures are only meaningful if Germany and the EU actively advo­cate for democratic rights and the rule of law, publicly and unequivocally criticise the Ser­bian government's repressive actions, and en­sure that voices in Serbia can express criti­cism without fear of intimidation or threats. The project should not be realised at the expense of civil society and its repression.

Given years of backsliding on the rule of law and limited progress in Serbia's EU accession negotiations, the EU must retain the option of withdrawing its support for the Jadar Project – whether or not it is recognised as a "strategic project" – should standards in the country fail to improve. Although this would entail geopolitical and economic losses, they remain manageable, given the possibility of geographically diver­sifying the raw materials sector if necessary.

Ultimately, what is at stake in Serbia is not just economic interests, but the EU's credibility as both a political actor and a com­munity of shared values.

Dr Melanie Müller is Deputy Head of the Africa and Middle East Research Division at SWP and co-heads the Research Network Sustainable Global Supply Chains. Lea Strack works as a Research Assistant in this project, which is funded by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). Dr Marina Vulović is a Visiting Fellow in the EU / Europe Research Division at SWP and a member of the academic staff at the University of Potsdam.