October 28, 2005

"Kosovo: Many Options But Independence"

 

 TFF 
 Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research 
 Transnationella Stiftelsen för Freds- och Framtidsforskning 
 http://www.transnational.org 
 Vegagatan 25 
 S - 224 57 Lund 
 Sweden 
 
 Phone +46 46 14 59 09 
 Fax + 46 46 14 45 12 
 Email TFF@transnational.org 
 Public not-for-profit charity 
 Organisationsnummer 845001-4637 
 
 TFF Guide, News & Themes 
 http://www.transnational.org/sitemap.html 
 
 _/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/_/ 

 

Kosovo: Many options
but independence

 

PressInfo # 228

 October 27 2005

By

Jan Oberg, TFF director & Aleksandar Mitic, TFF Associate

The Serbian province of Kosovo, largely populated by the Albanian separatist-minded majority, has failed to meet basic human rights and political standards set as prerequisites by the international community, but it should nevertheless enter in the months to come talks on its future status.

This basic conclusion of the long-awaited report by UN special envoy Kai Eide was approved by the UN secretary general Kofi Annan and fully supported by the EU and the US, but it fails to demystify the paradox.

Only two a half years ago, the international community had charged that talks on status could not start before a set of basic human rights standards was achieved.

Since then, however, as it became clearer that the Kosovo Albanian majority was unwilling to meet the criteria and the UN unable to enforce them, there was a permanent watering down of prerequisites, until the proclaimed policy of "standards before status" was finally buried with Mr. Eide's report.

Why has it failed? Is it because of the fear of the Kosovo Albanian threat of inciting violence if talks on status did not start soon, or was this policy a bluff from the start?

What kind of signal does it offer for the fairness of the upcoming talks? Will threats of ethnic violence in case "the only option for Kosovo Albanians - independence" - is not achieved again play a role? Or will the international community overcome its fear and offer both Pristina and Belgrade reasons to believe that the solution would negotiated and long-lasting rather than imposed, one-sided and conflict-prone?

Advocates of Kosovo's independence such as the International Crisis Group, Wesley Clark, Richard Holbrooke and various US members of Congress argue "independence is the only solution." The U.S. has more urgent problems elsewhere. But full independence cannot be negotiated, it can only be imposed. "Independent Kosova" implies that the Kosovo-Albanians achieve their maximalist goal with military means while Belgrade and the Kosovo Serbs and Roma would not even get their minimum --- a recipe for future troubles.

It would be also counterproductive for Europe and the U.S.: to side with the Kosovo-Albanians and isolate Serbia - a highly multi-ethnic, strategically important, constitutional state with a market of 10 million people - would be foolish. Keeping punishing Serbia and Serbs collectively for Milosevic's brutality would be immoral.

An "independent Kosova" would set a dangerous precedent for the region, not least in Bosnia and Macedonia, for international law, for European integration. And if Kosovo, why not Taiwan, Tibet, Chechenya, Tamil Eelam, Kashmir? The world has about 200 states and 5,000 ethnic groups. Who would like 4,800 new states? The future is about human globalization and integration.

Independence would also violate UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999 on Kosovo. Not even liberally interpreted does it endorse independence. Independence would reward Albanian extremists who have been behind the ethnic cleansing campaign against the non-Albanian communities, encourage those who exported violence from Kosovo to the neighbouring southern Serbia and to Macedonia. The 'disarmed' protectorate of Kosovo was a major player in all that.

The results of Milosevic's authoritarian policies clearly prevent Kosovo from returning to its pre-1999 status. Belgrade recognizes that today. The international community on its side refuses to see that the UN, NATO, EU and OSCE in Kosovo have failed miserably in creating the multi-ethnic, tolerant and safe Kosovo that it thought the bombings would facilitate. There has been virtually no return of the 200,000 Serbs and tens of thousands of other non-Albanians who felt threatened by Albanian nationalists and terrorists in 1999-2000.

Proportionately this is the largest ethnic cleansing in ex-Yugoslavia. Half a million Serbs in today's Serbia, driven out of Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo, make up Europe's largest - but ignored - refugee problem. The economy of Kosovo remains in shambles - 70% unemployment -and mafia-integrated.

Would you be reading this now,
if it wasn't useful to you?
Get more quality articles in the future

There is never only one solution to a complex problem. Between the old autonomy for Kosovo and full independence is a myriad of thinkable options - combining internal and regional features. They should all be on the negotiation table: a citizens' Kosovo where ethnic background is irrelevant, cantonisation, consociation, confederation, condominium, double autonomy for minorities there and in Southern Serbia, partition, trusteeship, independence with special features such as soft borders, no army and guarantees for never joining Albania. Least creative of all is the "only-one-solution" that all main actors today propose - completely incompatible with every other "only-one solution."

Finally, no formal status will work if the people continue to hate and see no development opportunities. If we ignore human needs for fear-reduction, deep reconciliation and economic recovery, independent Kosovo will become another failed state, perhaps consumed by civil war. Even an ethnically pure, only-Albanian Kosovo is no guarantee for regional stability. It could soon become a dangerous burden on the EU.

Kosovo is about the future of that province and of Serbia, but also about the region and the EU. Indeed, Kosovo is about global politics. In this 11th hour, the UN, EU and the U.S. should re-evaluate their post-1990 policies and recognize the need for much more intellectually open and politically pluralist approaches than those that have been promoted so far. Rigidity, lack of principle and wishful thinking could once again prove to be the enemies of sustainable peace in the region.

 

TFF has been conducting conflict-mitigation work in all parts of ex-Yugoslavia since 1991. TFF teams served in the 1990s as goodwill advisers to both Yugoslav governments and the Kosovo-Albanian leadership of present President Ibrahim Rugova.


Yahoo! FareChase - Search multiple travel sites in one click.

October 26, 2005

News From the Milosevic Trial

Slobodan Milosevic Freedom Center

Last updated:
October 25, 2005

Mr. Nice Loses His Mind and Accuses Milosevic of "Allowing" the NATO Bombing
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - October 25, 2005

Judges Deny Milosevic's Request for More Time
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - October 20, 2005

Another Prosecution Witness Discredited
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - October 19, 2005

NATO Bombing Caused Kosovo Exodus
www.slobodan-milosevic.org - October 18, 2005

Serbs Betrayed By UN Decision On Kosovo



http://www.plenglish.com/article.asp?ID=%7B510B8DD5-9B1F-45E5-8E74-395C6BB0284C%7D)&language=EN


Prensa Latina (Cuba)
October 25, 2005


Serbs Dissatisfied with UN Decision on Kosovo


Belgrade - The UN announced conditions are ripe for
negotiations on the future of Kosovo, but although
Albanians are the majority, the Serb government
insists it is the cultural cradle of the nation and
cannot be independent.

Kosovo has been under international control since 1999
when NATO subjected Serbia to 78 days of uninterrupted
aerial attacks in a supposed humanitarian intervention
[on behalf of] Albanian terrorists.

Although supposedly the Albanians were expelled en
masse, according to Serbian official records it was
the indiscriminate NATO bombing that caused them to
flee.

When it was over, organized crime, despite the 20,000
NATO soldiers present, obliged more than 250,000
Serbians and other non-Albanian ethnic communities in
Kosovo to leave the province.

Ex-President of Finland Martti Ahtissari was announced
by the UN Security Council Monday as official
representative of Secretary General Kofi Annan for
negotiations of the future of Kosovo.

The UN special envoy, Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide, has
evaluated the international standards for Kosovo and
recommended immediate discussions with all concerned
parties, believing it will not help anyone to postpone
the process.

Eide, while admitting that neither the Kosovo police
nor its legal system is able to cope with the ethnic
violence or organized crime, and said it is necessary
to maintain international political and military
presence in the region.

Inter-ethnic relations are very bad in the province,
he said, with frequent battles and no freedom of
movement.

In addition, the [non-]Albanians have not returned and
10,000 Serbian suits of illegally confiscated property
are pending, Eide explained.

It is generally recognized that more Serbs left the
province for lack of security than returned, and they
need more institutional support to begin life again,
as well as guarantees to preserve the Serbian cultural
patrimony in Kosovo, the UN special envoy noted.




October 11, 2005

Defining Kosovo by Tim Judah

Defining Kosovo by Tim Judah

With talks on the disputed UN-administered Serbian province of Kosovo poised to begin in December, all sides are hedging their bets - Belgrade to maintain its sovereignty over the province as possible and Pristina to win nothing short of full independence - while observers worry of rising tensions that could lead to more bloodshed.

By Tim Judah for ISN Security Watch (10/10/05)

Talks on Kosovo’s status will, more than likely, begin in December and move to some sort of climax possibly as early as next spring. However, as one of the most senior diplomats involved in the Kosovo issue has told ISN Security Watch, “turbulence can be expected”.

After six years under UN jurisdiction it is safe to say that the disputed province is now moving towards a new chapter in its history, but it remains unclear what the outcome of the talks will be.

The disputed province

Kosovo’s future status is bitterly disputed between Serbs and Albanians. Of its 2 million people, more than 90 per cent are ethnic Albanians who have consistently demanded independence. The Serbian government’s current policy is “more than autonomy but less than independence”.

While the province enjoyed relative autonomy under the Yugoslav Communist government in the 1970s, the 1980s were characterized by rising ethnic tensions, with both Serbs and Albanians complaining of discrimination. In August 1987, as the Communist regime was taking its final breath, rising Serbian politician Slobodan Milosevic visited the province, setting the stage for what was to become a bloody conflict. In 1989, Milosevic stripped Kosovo of its autonomy. Mass unrest and the slaughter and forced removal of Kosovo Albanians ensued during the war of 1998-1999.

Since the end of the Kosovo war in 1999, after NATO’s military action against Serbs, the province has been under the jurisdiction of the UN, although technically sovereignty has remained with Serbia.

In the months that followed NATO’s military action in 1999, large numbers of Kosovo Serbs fled the province to Serbia. The minority that decided to stay have since lived in enclaves, some of them guarded by international forces. Serbian Orthodox religious sites and institutions have been under the constant threat of attack by Albanians since then.

Lessening the blow to Serbia

The decision to begin talks in December comes days after the EU agreed to begin talks with Serbia on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), the first step towards EU membership for western Balkan nations. Diplomats have told ISN Security Watch that they decided not to let the outstanding issue of Ratko Mladic - the fugitive wartime Bosnian Serb army general wanted by the UN’s war crimes tribunal in The Hague - stand in the way of those talks.

Instead, they are hoping that the good news of the conclusion of an SAA agreement next year may help counteract the simultaneous bad news of the final loss of Kosovo and the secession of Montenegro from the state union with Serbia.

On 7 October, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan wrote to the UN Security Council recommending that long awaited talks on the province’s future begin soon.

Annan’s recommendation was made in a letter, which accompanied a report on the situation in the province made for him by Kai Eide, Norway’s ambassador to NATO.

In the document, Eide said progress in implementing a series of standards devised by the UN, which cover everything from free elections to minority rights, was “uneven” but pointed out that “there will not be any good moment for addressing Kosovo’s future status…nevertheless an overall assessment leads to the conclusion that the time has come to commence this process”.

Annan said he would initiate preparations for the appointment of a special envoy to lead the future status process - preparations that are already advanced - and it is widely expected that former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, who has considerable Balkan experience, will be chosen for the job.

The UN Security Council is now scheduled to meet on 18 December to discuss Kosovo.

According to diplomatic sources, the UN envoy will have three deputies: one from the US, one from the EU, and one from Russia.

The next phase

Following a series of interviews with ISN Security Watch over the last few weeks in London, Belgrade, and the Kosovo capital of Pristina, it is possible to envisage the talks scenario, at least for the next few months. Most of those who talked to ISN Security Watch on this topic did so on condition of anonymity.

Security Watch sources believe that the person chosen to head the talks, along with his deputies, will initiate a period of shuttle diplomacy in December.

The initial round of talks will not be face to face, but it is possible that working groups could be set up to look at several specific issues. After a period of intensive shuttling, the envoy may then withdraw with his team to compose an initial draft agreement on Kosovo.

Once this draft is completed, it is expected that Serbian and Albanian negotiators could be summoned to meet, rather like the failed 1999 talks at Rambouillet outside Paris.

Austria takes over the EU presidency from Britain at the beginning of next year and diplomats have suggested that Vienna should be used by the UN Kosovo envoy as a base.

That remains to be seen but, what is conceivable says Veton Surroi, the Kosovo Albanian publisher, opposition leader, and member of the Kosovo Albanian negotiating team, is that the face-to-face discussions begin in “let us say, a castle in Austria in May”.

One very senior diplomat outlined a scenario in which he expected the Serbian delegation would fight extremely hard to make sure that all the safeguards they want for Kosovo’s Serbs and the Orthodox Churches and monasteries were securely in the final document.

In this, they will have been given a boost by the fact that Eide has already recommended much of what they say they want.

For example, he has suggested an extensive decentralization plan in which Kosovo Serbs would be given competences “in areas such as police, justice, education, culture, media, and the economy”. He has also recommended that “protective space” should be created around Serbian Orthodox religious sites and institutions and that ways should be found to place them “under a form of international protection”.

The fact that the Serbian side may well succeed in getting much of what it wants in terms of the internal organization of Kosovo does not of course mean it will succeed in getting what it wants in terms of the broader picture.

Serbian government policy, as outlined by Sanda Raskovic-Ivic, the head of Serbia’s Coordination Center for Kosovo, is that Kosovo can have judicial, executive, and legislative autonomy, but that sovereignty must remain with Serbia.

In the scenario outlined for ISN Security Watch, what may happen is that after Serbia has succeeded in packing the draft agreement with all the safeguards it seeks and in having its interests acknowledged in certain areas, the Serbian delegation may then refuse to endorse the plan because it also points the way to Kosovo’s independence at a sooner or later date.

Reluctantly, perhaps the Albanians then would be compelled to accept more in terms of Serbian rights in Kosovo than they would have done otherwise, but they would accept this under international pressure as the high price of independence.

Serbia’s leaders, none of whom want to take responsibility for losing Kosovo, can also say that, at this point and having fought as hard as possible, Kosovo was taken away from Serbia but not with Belgrade’s consent.

Defining independence

The question now arises as to what form of independence Kosovo will have, and at what stage. Significantly, the Eide report never uses the phrase “final status”, as opposed to “future status”, and the last lines of the report leave the door open for several options.

While arguing that “the international community must do the utmost to ensure that whatever the status becomes, it does not become a ‘failed status’”, it also says: “Entering the future status process does not mean the last stage, but the next stage of the international presence.”

Although Eide was not asked to comment on the question of ultimate sovereignty he does make various suggestions that broadly chime with mainstream diplomatic opinion about the fate of Kosovo. That is that there should be a follow-up mission to KFOR, the current NATO-led force there, that at least some US troops should remain, and that the EU take on a role in the police sphere at the very least.

Certain elements of the Bosnian model look set to be borrowed, too: for example, the installation of a High Representative with considerable powers, if not across the board, then in the field of inter-ethnic relations. In this sense, the independence that many diplomats and analysts are assuming Kosovo will get will be “conditional”.

It may well be that the document of reference to consult now is the International Commission on the Balkans of last April, which outlines a four-stage transition to full independence over an unspecified period culminating in Kosovo joining the EU.

Belgrade sobering up

Although conditional independence does indeed look likely for Kosovo, its Albanian leaders - who have done little so far to prepare for talks and seemingly have been lulled into a false sense of security by such a widespread assumption - are perhaps more concerned with their place in history than the tough negotiations ahead.

In this they have underestimated the sobering-up that has taken place in Belgrade in the last few months. Although it is true that for the moment it is unclear who will have the last word in Belgrade on what can or cannot be agreed, it is clear that there is now a far more realistic idea of what might be achieved in Kosovo than there was several months ago.

For example, experienced diplomats with a deep knowledge of Kosovo, such as Dusan Batakovic, who currently advises Serbian President Boris Tadic, are now gaming various scenarios for talks and preparing positions.

This does not mean that the Serbian side can stave off the ending of their sovereignty over Kosovo, but it does mean that Serbia stands a better chance of doing so than it did before. One (reserve) aim may well be to see whether the issue of sovereignty can be left open or at least left extremely unclear for the foreseeable future.

Such an option would be unacceptable to the Kosovo Albanians, whose negotiators will be looking over their shoulders at developments back home. In this context, the “joker” in the pack is Albin Kurti, a 30-year old former student leader and political prisoner.

Studying the techniques of the young people who organized the overthrow of their former regimes in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine, Kurti is currently organizing people in a bid to ready them to come out onto the streets to protest against the future talks.

His argument is that talks aim at compromise and that there can be no compromise on Kosovo’s independence. In other words, negotiations can only take place when Kosovo is independent and thus an equal of Serbia.

His slogan - “No Negotiations! Self Determination!” - is already plastered all over Pristina, but his strength is as yet untested. If, however, at a crucial point in talks, one of the Albanian parties - for example, the Democratic Party of Kosovo of former guerrilla leader Hashim Thaci - decides to swing his support behind Kurti then the outcome of talks, especially if a wave of anti-Serbian ethnic cleansing similar to that of March 2004 also breaks out again, cannot be predicted.


Tim Judah is a senior international correspondent for ISN Security Watch. He is also the author of The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia and Kosovo: War and Revenge, both published by Yale University Press.
http://kosovareport.blogspot.com/2005/10/defining-kosovo-by-tim-judah.html

Kosovo: The need for a neutral peace envoy

Kosovo: The need for a neutral peace envoy
11 October 2005

At long last, it appears as if the process to determine the final status of Kosovo is about to begin. After several months spent on the ground reviewing the situation, Kai Eide, the Norwegian diplomat appointed to prepare a study of conditions in Kosovo, has returned his report to the UN Secretary-General. It makes for troubling reading. Although improvements are noted in various areas, it is clear from the text that there are a wide range of concerns about the pace of reform and development in the province.

For example, the report notes that while structures of governance have been established, there is no Serbian representation due to a Serb boycott. Moreover, the Serbian community has retained its own health and education structures. As a result the interethnic situation in the province is 'grim', with little respect for property rights. As for the economy, again improvements have been made. However, unemployment remains high and the situation is still 'bleak'. On the topic of law and order, the report notes that the police appear unable to handle the widespread corruption, organised crime and interethnic problems that exist. Indeed, the report refers to the police and judiciary as 'fragile institutions'.

And yet, despite the concerns expressed about developments in the province, Kofi Annan appears to have agreed with the assessment made by Eide that the start of final status talks must begin in the near future. Speaking to the press in Switzerland, Annan made it clear that he would like to see formal negotiations begin soon. Indeed, the report has been sent over to the Security Council, which will take responsibility for deciding the next steps. This is almost certain to mean a seal of approval for the start of formal negotiations.

Once he has secured permission from the Security Council to begin negotiations, the first task facing the Secretary-General will be the appointment of a special envoy to lead the talks. The choice is critical. Whoever is appointed will be at the forefront of efforts to broker a deal between Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanians. This will be far from easy. There is currently no common ground between the two sides and little appears likely to develop. While the Serbs have said that they are prepared to consider anything but independence, Albanian leaders in Kosovo have stated that they will accept nothing short of full statehood for the province.

Already, potential candidates to handle this tricky process are emerging. The most prominent name so far suggested is Martti Ahtisaari, the former president of Finland. On the face of it, this would seem to be a good choice. Over the past decade, Mr Ahtisaari has carved out a reputation as a strong advocate for international peace and has taken a lead role in trying to bring stability to the Balkans. He is also familiar with the Kosovo situation, having led efforts to broker an end to the 1999 Kosovo Crisis.

However, despite his credentials, Mr Ahtisaari is seen by many as a tainted candidate. Specifically, concern has been expressed about the fact that he was, until 2004, Chairman of the International Crisis Group (ICG), a leading think tank that has been at the forefront of efforts to promote an independent Kosovo. Since then, he has retained a position as chairman emeritus of the organisation, which, through reports and editorial pieces, has strongly advocated statehood for the province. Critics have also pointed out that another of the leading lights of the ICG is Wesley Clark, the former NATO commander who led the bombing of Kosovo, who has also written several pieces supporting independence and was endorsed by the US Albanian community in his run for the US presidency in 2004.

In view of this, it is little wonder that Belgrade has raised serious questions about Mr Ahtisaari. For example, Sanda Raskovic Ivic, the President of the Co-ordination Centre for Kosovo, the main body of the Serbian Government handling Kosovo, has openly raised concerns about his impartiality. It is likely that more questions will follow from across the Serbian political spectrum.

Of course, none of this is to say that Mr Ahtisaari is not an accomplished diplomat. His experience in this regard is beyond question. Nor is his standing being challenged. Instead, the appointment of someone who is so closely linked with an organisation that has so openly and strongly called for an independent Kosovo naturally taints his candidacy. Under other circumstances, Mr Ahtisaari may have been an ideal choice. However, in this case the Secretary-General needs to find someone whose impartiality, either real or perceived, cannot be challenged so easily.



Recent Commentary and Analysis


  Croatia: The continuing problem of property restitution
  Turkey: Growing concerns about EU membership
  Cyprus: Renewing the peace process



http://www.civilitasresearch.com/publications/view_article.cfm?article_id=63








October 08, 2005

World according to Dubaya

 




 Bush: God told me to invade Iraq
 
http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/article317805.ece

######
 Most of President Bush's speech on terrorism at the National Endowment for Democracy on October 6 was rhetoric-significant for what was said and what was omitted.

http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/cgi-bin/newsviews.cgi/Islam/2005/10/07/President_Bush_s_Sp

CHRONICLES ONLINE
News & Views, Friday, October 7, 2005

PRESIDENT BUSH'S SPEECH ON TERRORISM:
MEANING AND IMPLICATIONS

Srdja Trifkovic

President Bush's speech on terrorism at the National Endowment for Democracy on October 6 had been billed by the White House as a major policy address that would include unprecedented detail. In the end the only piece of hard news concerned his claim that ten serious al-Qaeda terrorist plots have been disrupted since 9-11, including three plots to attack targets inside the United States, and at least five more "efforts to case targets in the United States, or infiltrate operatives into our country." The rest was rhetoric, significant for what was said and what was omitted. The results give cause for serious concern. (NB: Mr. Bush's words are in * italics *)

* In this new century, freedom is once again assaulted by enemies determined to roll back generations of democratic progress. Once again, we're responding to a global campaign of fear with a global campaign of freedom. *

The parallel the President is making here is with the Cold War rather than World War II. Either way is flawed primarily because it misdiagnoses the nature of the campaign. The Cold War was waged between two clearly defined military-political alliances. Even when escalating their confrontation to dangerous levels (Berlin twice, Korea, Cuba) they played by a set of mutually recognized rules. The rationality of the adversary could be assumed, and the costs and benefits of any given course of action quantified. By contrast the conflict "in this new century" is not "a global campaign of fear" - an amorphous and inappropriate description - but a prime example of fourth-generation warfare (4GW) in which it is inherently hard to target the enemy and to evaluate results. The reason is that the enemy is something other than a military force organized and operating under the political control of a national government, that it transcends national boun
daries, and that its actual or poten!
 tial fifth-columnists are present in large numbers in the target countries.  The granularity, decentralized pattern of the enemy, makes counter-measures additionally difficult. There is no command and control system to disrupt among autonomous, self-motivated groups of young people, often embedded inside the target-nations.

* And once again, we will see freedom's victory. *

That victory is impossible in the sense of eliminating the phenomenon of terrorism altogether, but the "war on terrorism" can be successfully pursued to the point where America (and the rest of the West, if it follows) are made significantly safer than they are today by adopting measures - predominantly defensive measures - that would reduce the danger of such incidents to as near zero as possible. The victory will come not by conquering Mecca but by disengaging America from Mecca and by excluding Mecca from America; not by eliminating the risk but by managing it wisely, resolutely, and permanently.

* Recently our country observed the fourth anniversary of a great evil, and looked back on a great turning point in our history. We still remember a proud city covered in smoke and ashes, a fire across the Potomac, and passengers who spent their final moments on Earth fighting the enemy. *

The definition of "a great turning point" has to entail a paradigm shift in self-perception, which has not taken place in the United States after 9-11. The global strategy of the United States still suffers from two primary flaws: the quest for global hegemony that is divorced from a pragmatic notion of national interest, and the inability and/or unwillingness of the elite class to establish whether the sacred texts of Islam, its record of interaction with other societies, and the personality of its founder, Muhammad, provide the clue to the motives, ambitions and methods of modern terrorists.

* We still remember the men who rejoiced in every death, and Americans in uniform rising to duty. *

The remembrance of "the men who rejoiced" needs to include Paterson, New Jersey, and other Muslim enclaves in the Western world, with all the attendant implications for this country's immigration policy and the ideology of multiculturalism imposed by the elite class. As we have ssen with the Rushdie affair 17 years ago, even when it refrains from open rejoicing, the Muslim diaspora in the West overwhelmingly condones religiously justified acts of terrorism - which were openly advocated in Rushdie's case - that challenge the monopoly of the non-Muslim host-state on violence. The non-Muslim establishment of the host-state typically responds by trying to appease the Muslim diaspora, or else it shies away from confronting the problem by pretending that it does not exist. Mr. Bush routinely does both.

* And we remember the calling that came to us on that day, and continues to this hour: We will confront this mortal danger to all humanity. *

The notion of "the calling that came to us on that day" is messianic kitsch. His belief that "history has called America and our allies to action" was stated with equal firmness in his first State of the Union address almost four years ago. The conclusion, that he sees himself as an anointed agent of divine providence, seems inescapable and it is alarming in the extreme. The notion that one is on the right side of history is dangerous not only because it breeds irrational belief in the correctness of one's own intuitive judgment but also because it prompts megalomaniacal decisions and policies inimical to the political and constitutional tradition of the United States. The historicist fallacy that "history" is an entity on a linear march has bred gnostic ideologies that find it easy to murder those who are deemed to be on its "wrong" side. Sooner or later this mindset results in the destruction of the over-expanded, over-extended bearer of the divinel
y appointed task. To dea!
 l with the terrorist threat effectively and on the basis of leadership willingly accepted by those who are led, Mr. Bush should discard the pernicious notion of his or his country's exceptionalismLast but by no means least, "this mortal danger to humanity" cannot be confronted unless the nature of the threat to America is properly diagnosed first.

* We will not tire, or rest, until the war on terror is won. *

"Winning" is impossible unless 1.3 billion Muslims are either secularized or else converted to something other than Islam. To put it crudely, "winning" means either that Muslims have been "westernized" - that is to say, made as willing as Christians to see their religion first relativized, then mocked, and its commandments misrepresented or ignored - or else Christianized, which of course cannot happen unless there is a belated, massive, and unexpected recovery of Western spiritual and moral strength.

* The images and experience of September the 11th are unique for Americans. Yet the evil of that morning has reappeared on other days, in other places -- in Mombasa, and Casablanca, and Riyadh, and Jakarta, and Istanbul, and Madrid, and Beslan, and Taba, and Netanya, and Baghdad, and elsewhere. *

This inclusion of Beslan in the list of islamist terror attacks is a welcome novelty, in view of the notorious ambiguity of the American decision-making community over Chechnya. The recognition by the President that attacks by Chechen separatists on Russian airplanes, metro stations, theaters, hospitals and schools are terrorist in character and Islamic in the method of execution was long overdue. It will be interesting to observe the reaction of the apologists for Chechen terrorism in America gathered around the American Committee for Peace in Chechnya (ACPC). They include Richard Perle, Elliott Abrams, Kenneth Adelman, Midge Decter, Frank Gaffney, Michael Ledeen, Norman Podhoretz, Joshua Muravchik, Morton Abramowitz, Richard Pipes, Robert Kagan, and William Kristol. From now on Mr. Bush should also cease offerring hospitality to top Chechen leaders who stand accused of masterminding terrorist attacks. He needs to do so because we need Russia as an ally in the global strugg
!
 le against jihad

* Some call this evil Islamic radicalism; others, militant Jihadism; still others, Islamo-fascism. *

It is encouraging that Mr. Bush is moving away from the misnamed Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), with its concomitant confusion of the enemy's preferred technique with the enemy himself, and in the direction of associating the problem with the Islam-related adjectives. The "War on Terror" is hardly better: the enemy here is an emotion, a target even more elusive than the technique. Yet another misnomer, "global struggle against violent extremism" (G-SAVE) favored by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, suffers from the same defect. And President Bush's attempt in August 2004 to pinpoint the actual physical enemy bordered on the surreal: "We actually misnamed the war on terror. It ought to be the struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake the conscience of the free world."

* Whatever it's called, this ideology is very different from the religion of Islam. This form of radicalism exploits Islam to serve a violent, political vision: the establishment, by terrorism and subversion and insurgency, of a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious freedom. *

Mr. Bush is simply wrong. "This ideology" is immanent to Islam. While it is possible to dispute the details of al-Qaeda's theological justifications for terror, it is not possible to dispute that its arguments are based on standard Islamic sources, precedents, and methods of deduction. Those sources and principles are independent of any dubious or capricious interpretations of the Kuran or the Hadith. The jubilant Muslim masses thronging streets to celebrate 9-11 may not have known much about theology and jurisprudence, but their imams and madrassa teachers did. Even if the latter disproved of bin Laden's methods, they would be hard-pressed to reject his fundamental claim that his guidance is rooted in the orthodox Islamic scripture and tradition.

* These extremists distort the idea of jihad into a call for terrorist murder against Christians and Jews and Hindus -- and also against Muslims from other traditions, who they regard as heretics.*

Contrary to what Mr. Bush seems to be suggesting, "the idea of jihad" does call for terrorist murder against Christians and Jews and Hindus and it is a distortion of that idea to suggest otherwise. "The idea of jihad" is a highly developed doctrine, theology, and legal system of mandatory violence against non-believers. It made Islam the first political ideology, already in Muhammad's lifetime, to adopt terrorism as a systemic tool of policy, not as a temporary and unwelcome expedient.

* Many militants are part of global, borderless terrorist organizations. in places like Somalia, and the Philippines, and Pakistan, and Chechnya, and Kashmir, and Algeria.*

. and London, Madrid, Milan, Montreal, Buffalo NY, Portland OR, Lodi CA, Boca Raton FL, etc. In any group of 1,000-plus Muslim immigrants whose lives are centered on a mosque two things can be predicted with near-certainty. The first is that a sizable percentage - around a quarter - will sympathize with the motives of Al-Qaeda and its ilk, if not with their methods. The second is that some smaller percentage of that group - between one-in-ten and five percent - especially among the Western-born young, will support those methods as well, and prove willing to apply them in practice.

* First, these extremists want to end American and Western influence in the broader Middle East, because we stand for democracy and peace, and stand in the way of their ambitions. *

If the desire to end American influence in the Middle East were a defining motive for terrorism, we are in deep trouble as nine-tenths of Muslims would like to see that happen. The reason is not "because we stand for democracy and peace" but - overwhelmingly - because we are perceived as hopelessly biased in the problem of Israel-Palestine

* The terrorists regard Iraq as the central front in their war against humanity. And we must recognize Iraq as the central front in our war on terror. *

That is true, but Mr. Bush is ignoring the fact that his administration's policies have transformed Iraq into that "central front." There had been no terrorist training camps under Saddam, period.

* These radicals depend on front operations, such as corrupted charities, which direct money to terrorist activity. They're strengthened by those who aggressively fund the spread of radical, intolerant versions of Islam in unstable parts of the world. *

Both accusations are well founded, but both of them are far more applicable to America's "ally" Saudi Arabia than to either Iran or Syria.

* The militants are aided, as well, by elements of the Arab news media that incite hatred and anti-Semitism, that feed conspiracy theories and speak of a so-called American "war on Islam" -- with seldom a word about American action to protect Muslims in Afghanistan, and Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, Kuwait, and Iraq. *

To boast of "American actions to protect Muslims" in Bosnia and Kosovo defies belief, as if those actions were something to be proud of and as if they had not secured a resilient base for jihad in the heart of Europe.

* We didn't ask for this global struggle, but we're answering history's call with confidence, and a comprehensive strategy. *

A "comprehensive strategy" in the war against Islamic terrorism would demand disengagement of America from Islam and the exclusion of Islam from America, but that is the exact opposite of what Mr. Bush advocates. He and his national security team do not accept that in this kind of 4GW the best offense is defense. The victory will come not by eliminating the risk but by managing it wisely, resolutely, and permanently. By learning to keep her distance from the affairs of the Muslim world, and by keeping the Muslim world away from her shores, America would do a huge favor to the Muslims and, more importantly, to herself.

* Together, we've killed or captured nearly all of those directly responsible for the September the 11th attacks; as well as some of bin Laden's most senior deputies; al Qaeda managers and operatives in more than 24 countries; the mastermind of the USS Cole bombing, who was chief of al Qaeda operations in the Persian Gulf; the mastermind of the Jakarta and the first Bali bombings; a senior Zarqawi terrorist planner, who was planning attacks in Turkey; and many of al Qaeda's senior leaders in Saudi Arabia. *

In very similar terms General Westmoreland boasted of body counts in Vietnam. Many of Viet Cong's 1965-68 cadres were dead by 1970, but twice as many came into its ranks and more than made up the shortfall. In 4GW body counts are largely meaningless because this type of warfare cannot be understood, let alone conducted, in conventional military terms and with undue reliance on military force. Yes, hundreds and perhaps thousands of terrorists are behind bars or dead, and moving money around has been made more difficult, but the potential and actual human assets of the enemy, his reach and operational capability are growing. A phenomenon initially based on local groups that have acquired global reach is morphing into a global network of autonomous cells with local reach but with a global cumulative potential. Al-Qaeda and its loosely linked offshoots, or fully independent cells merely inspired by it, are fielding a second generation of operatives. What Mr. Bush is not sa
ying i!
 s that many of them are Muslim immigrants and their Western-born offspring seemingly integrated into the Western society.

* Second, we're determined to deny weapons of mass destruction to outlaw regimes, and to their terrorist allies who would use them without hesitation. The United States, working with Great Britain, Pakistan, and other nations, has exposed and disrupted a major black-market operation in nuclear technology led by A.Q. Khan. *

To claim that Pakistan was a partner in this operation is ridiculous. Pakistan is a major violator of the ban on nuclear proliferation. In 2003 Dr. Khan stunned the world when he admitted on television to leaking nuclear weapons secrets to - among others - North Korea, Libya, and Iran. He claimed that he had acted "without authorization" from Gen. Musharraf's government, but he was lying. This was followed by Musharraf's point blank refusal to hand any documents to any international agency, or to allow members of the UN's Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into Pakistan to investigate the affair. He declared that his is a sovereign country and therefore "no document will be given, no independent investigation will take place." Vowing never to roll back Pakistan's nuclear assets, Musharraf even blamed the United States for not warning him of Khan's activities in a more timely manner.

* Third, we're determined to deny radical groups the support and sanctuary of outlaw regimes. State sponsors like Syria and Iran have a long history of collaboration with terrorists, and they deserve no patience from the victims of terror. *

Instead of naming Syria and Iran for the second time, Mr. Bush should have taken a closer look at such pillars of America's anti-terror alliance as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey. He should be developing an alternative strategy to pragmatic pacts with unreliable allies. The absence of such strategy is both remarkable and baffling. It reflects the fact that this country's links with some of the least pleasant regimes on earth continue to be clouded by establishmentarian denials and the feigned optimism that have characterized Washington's relations with the "friendly" and "moderate" part of the Muslim world for decades.

* Fourth, we're determined to deny the militants control of any nation, which they would use as a home base and a launching pad for terror. For this reason, we're fighting beside our Afghan partners against remnants of the Taliban and their al Qaeda allies. For this reason, we're working with President Musharraf to oppose and isolate the militants in Pakistan. *

In the meantime Musharraf is running with the hare and hunting with the hounds. Suicide attacks in London on July 7 2005, masterminded by a young British-born Pakistani, and that country's long list of proven or suspected links with numerous other terrorist attacks in recent years, should focus attention on the ambivalent role of Pakistan and its leader in the war on terrorism. The myth of Pakistan as a staunch American ally is in need of critical scrutiny. Musharraf's government has backtracked on its promise to control the Islamic schools that are grooming new terrorists. Pakistan remains the epicenter of global jihad, a breeding ground for the new echelons of "martyrs," and it meets the criteria for a slot on the Axis of Evil. Pakistan is an enormous campus in which some ten thousand madrassas prepare over one million students for the rigors of jihad. When pressed, Musharraf announces the closure of some of the schools where "the eggs of the
snake of terrorism are incubat!
 ed," only to let them re-open later. It can hardly be otherwise in a country founded on the pillars of Islamic orthodoxy.

* Some observers look at the job ahead and adopt a self- defeating pessimism. It is not justified. With every random bombing and with every funeral of a child, it becomes more clear that the extremists are not patriots, or resistance fighters -- they are murderers at war with the Iraqi people, themselves. *

That alleged clarity has not diminished their ability to recruit fighters, including suicide bombers, or to maintain the dynamics of their attacks at a level unimaginable three years ago.

* In contrast, the elected leaders of Iraq are proving to be strong and steadfast. By any standard or precedent of history, Iraq has made incredible political progress -- from tyranny, to liberation, to national elections, to the writing of a constitution, in the space of two-and-a-half years. *

The "standard or precedent of history" is not encouraging in Iraq when compared and contrasted to Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Nicaragua after the Sandinistas, Spain after Franco, South Korea after the generals, Argentina after Galtieri.

* With our help, the Iraqi military is gaining new capabilities and new confidence with every passing month. At the time of our Fallujah operations 11 months ago, there were only a few Iraqi army battalions in combat. Today there are more than 80 Iraqi army battalions fighting the insurgency alongside our forces. Progress isn't easy, but it is steady. And no fair-minded person should ignore, deny, or dismiss the achievements of the Iraqi people. *

On the other hand Pentagon officials told Congress last week that only one of Iraq's 100 battalions is able to fight without U.S. support. The top U.S. commander in Iraq, General George Casey, has admitted that the number is down from three battalions, supposedly because standards for the highest readiness rating have become more rigorous during the past few months.

* Some observers question the durability of democracy in Iraq. They underestimate the power and appeal of freedom. We've heard it suggested that Iraq's democracy must be on shaky ground because Iraqis are arguing with each other. But that's the essence of democracy: making your case, debating with those who you disagree -- who disagree, building consensus by persuasion, and answering to the will of the people.*

Really problematic for the United States is not the area of disagreement among Iraqis but a key point on which they agree: that Islam is to be the foundation for all laws, and that any proposal that contradicts Islamic religious teachings will be removed from the statute book. "Islam is a main source for legislation and it is not permitted to legislate anything that conflicts with the fixed principles of the rules of Islam," the draft states, and these principles are reported to have been approved by American diplomats in Baghdad. This may reflect excessive eagerness in Washington to maintain some momentum on the political front, at a time when large areas of Iraq remain affected by an open-ended guerrilla insurgency. Nevertheless, the Administration's acceptance that Islam is to be the foundation of Iraq's democracy is light years away from the concept of "spreading democracy in the Middle East" that has been used as a justification for t
he war in Iraq. Its ultimate fruit m!
 ay well be an Iraq that is more implacably detrimental to the interests of the United States than Saddam's regime had ever been.

* Some observers also claim that America would be better off by cutting our losses and leaving Iraq now. This is a dangerous illusion, refuted with a simple question: Would the United States and other free nations be more safe, or less safe, with Zarqawi and bin Laden in control of Iraq, its people, and its resources? Having removed a dictator who hated free peoples, we will not stand by as a new set of killers, dedicated to the destruction of our own country, seizes control of Iraq by violence. *

There is another way, but it requires patience, creativity and skill: to try and create a split within the ranks of Iraqi insurgents between those who are driven primarily by nationalist and tribal motives, and people like Zarqawi who don't give a hoot for Iraq as such but simply want to use it as an episode in the global anti-American jihad. Establishing a working rapport with alienated secular-minded Sunni leaders demands overcoming distaste for a dialogue with former Baathists and Saddam loyalists. They may be tainted, but a truce and a deal with them is possible, while with the jihadist hard core it is not. "Nationalism" is not the problem, compared to jihad it is the solution. The deal with them could contain the promise of amnesty and a timetable for U.S. disengagement clearly predicated on improved security situation. American troops could then be gradually replaced with the contingents from those few relatively reliable partners we have in the regio
n, notably Egypt a!
 nd Jordan.

* There's always a temptation, in the middle of a long struggle, to seek the quiet life, to escape the duties and problems of the world, and to hope the enemy grows weary of fanaticism and tired of murder. This would be a pleasant world, but it's not the world we live in. *

No such temptation will ever bother Mr. Bush's neoconservative advisors, however. Their view of America as a hybrid, "imagined" nation and a pliable tool of their global design demands constant, neurotic activity. A psychotic quest for dominance is their driving force and the "nationalist" discourse is merely its justification. Bill Kristol's "national greatness" psychosis seeks to create an eminently unpleasant world, and right now it is the world we live in.

* This enemy considers every retreat of the civilized world as an invitation to greater violence. In Iraq, there is no peace without victory. We will keep our nerve and we will win that victory. *

Yet again Mr. Bush is trying a bit too hard to place Iraq in the context of the war against terorrism, by referring to the "enemy" (terrorists) and the "victory" (in Iraq). This is mendacious, let it be said one more time, for three reasons: Saddam was not connected to the groups that have attacked or plan to attack the United States; those who wanted to attack Iraq had wanted to do so for years before 9-11; and the consequences of the Iraqi war are deeply detrimental to the global anti-terrorist struggle. His insistence that the war in Iraq was inseparable from the "war on terrorism" was a belated substitute for the discredited claim that Iraq's "weapons of mass destruction" justified military action. Both justifications were not based on fact, and both claims originally emanated from the same source. The Project for a New American Century (PNAC).

* The fifth element of our strategy in the war on terror is to deny the militants future recruits by replacing hatred and resentment with democracy and hope across the broader Middle East.*

Mr. Bush's continuing insistence on effecting the democratic transformation of the Middle East is unattainable in practice and counter-productive in principle. In practical terms, the continuing occupation of Iraq makes the United States more thoroughly disliked, throughout the Arab world, than at any time in living memory. For that reason the classic Catch-22 of nation-building in general applies even more drastically to America's position in the Middle East today: whatever its wishes, the locals will want more of the opposite. Whoever its candidate or political force of American choice, the "street" will reject them the moment it becomes aware of the connection. In principle, even if "exporting democracy" could be developed into a workable scenario, the end result would be detrimental to U.S. security. Instead of the degenerate and scared royal kleptocrats, Usama's followers would run Saudi Arabia. Iraq would - nay, will R
11; be ruled by Shi'ite clerics. Mubaraq would be swep!
 t from power and the Muslim Brotherhood would turn Egypt into an Islamic Republic. In Algeria immediately, Morocco after a while, and eventually even Turkey, the survival of moderate and pro-Western regimes would be undermined. Mr. Bush's desire that the Middle East grows in democracy would benefit those who would never thank him for making their rise to power possible. But more serious yet is his often repeated but mistaken assertion of Islam's compatibility with democratic rule. Islam condemns as rebellion against Allah's supremacy the submission to any other form of law other than Shari'a. It is noteworthy that the term "democracy" did not have an equivalent in any Muslim language until a century ago. Its fundamental principle, equality, is equally absent from the Muslim vocabulary.

* America is making this stand in practical ways. We're encouraging our friends in the Middle East, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to take the path of reform, to strengthen their own societies in the fight against terror by respecting the rights and choices of their own people. *

On present form any attempt to democratize countries such as Saudi Arabia will not play into the hands of America's would-be friends and allies, but into the hands of Usama Bin Laden and his sympathizers. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia admittedly needs to be brought to heel. It is the most intolerant Islamic regime on the face of the earth. For decades it has been waging a worldwide proxy war against Christianity and other religions that Islam comes into contact with, like Judaism in Israel, Hinduism in India, animism in Africa, and Buddhism in Southeast Asia. Its authorities have allowed thousands of young Saudis easy access to American visas, including many bent on waging jihad against the unbelievers. America should stop pandering to Saudi whims, including the non-existent and unreciprocated "right" of its government to bankroll thousands of mosques and Islamic centers all over the Western world that teach hate and provide the logistic infrastructure to Isl
amic terrorism. Th!
 e Saudi regime may well be unsustainable in the long term, but a "democratic" alternative that would quickly turn into something akin to Tehran in 1979 cannot be contemplated with equanimity. Its carefully devised incremental change should be managed now, or observed with powerless chagrin later.

* As we do our part to confront radicalism, we know that the most vital work will be done within the Islamic world, itself. And this work has begun. Many Muslim scholars have already publicly condemned terrorism, often citing Chapter 5, Verse 32 of the Koran, which states that killing an innocent human being is like killing all humanity, and saving the life of one person is like saving all of humanity. *

Mr. Bush's Kuranic quote was a distortion of verse 5:32, which states that "if anyone slew a person - unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land [emphasis added] - it would be as if he slew the whole people." Immediately thereafter follows a list of horrid torments for those who create "mischief," including death by crucifixion. That loophole embraces all those who resist the establishment of the Muslim rule or who disobey the sharia once it is established. Furthermore, Mr. Bush should be told that one single Kuranic verse, "the Verse of the Sword" (9:5) - which gives the infidel the choice between conversion or death - abrogates all 124 earlier verses, the ones that are quoted most regularly by Islam's apologists to prove its tolerance and benevolence.

* After the attacks in London on July the 7th, an imam in the United Arab Emirates declared, "Whoever does such a thing is not a Muslim, nor a religious person." *

Usama and his followers may differ from other Muslims in the exact command for action that they derive from the Kuran and the hadith, but they all speak the same language, literally as well as legally and theologically. . The gap between the pillars of respected "mainstream" Islamic thought at Cairo's Al-Azhar University and "the Evil" of 9-11 does not compare to the gap between Pope Benedict and Eric Rudolph, but merely to that between Vladimir Ilich Lenin and Pol Pot.

* The time has come for all responsible Islamic leaders to join in denouncing an ideology that exploits Islam for political ends, and defiles a noble faith. *

It is unclear whether, when, where, and how, a reformed variety of Islam desired by Mr. Bush can emerge. Presumably it would need to be capable of reinterpreting jihad, sharia, etc. and developing the "new Islamic interpretations" that the 9-11 Commission also called for. The problem is that it has been tried before. Attempts to reformulate the doctrine of jihad in particular are not new, but they have failed because they opposed centuries of orthodoxy. The willingness of a few to become what are objectively bad Muslims, because they are willing to reject discriminatory and offensive tenets of historical Islam, may be laudable in human terms but it will do nothing to modify Islam as a doctrine. A reformed faith that should question the divine authority on which the institutions of Islam rest, or attempt by rationalistic selection or abatement to effect a change, would be Islam no longer.  For the majority of Muslims, any such attempt will smack of heresy. To them
, it is not !
 the jihadists who are "distorting" Islam; the would-be reformers are. Until the petrodollars support a comprehensive and explicit Kuranic revisionism capable of growing popular roots, we should seek ways to defend ourselves by disengaging from the world of Islam, physically and figuratively.

* With the rise of a deadly enemy and the unfolding of a global ideological struggle, our time in history will be remembered for new challenges and unprecedented dangers. *

The unprecedented danger is for us to forget that we are heirs to the greatest and best civilization the world has known, and that our inheritance is under threat. With that threat - with Islam, that is, and not some allegedly aberrant version of it - there will be no grand synthesis, no civilizational cross-fertilization. It's kto-kogo: either Islam gets Europeanized, or Europe gets Islamized. As things stand now the outcome is uncertain. All will be lost if our future, and that of our heirs, remains in the hands of people who do not understand the nature, complexity and magnitude of the challenge.



Dr. S. Trifkovic, Foreign Affairs Editor
CHRONICLES, 928 N Main Street, Rockford, IL 61103, USA
voice (815) 964-5054 fax (815) 964-9403 cell (312) 375-4044
http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/cgi-bin/newsviews.cgi

October 06, 2005

Serbia, Five Years Later


October 6, 2005
The Revolution Wasn't 
by Nebojsa Malic

Serbia, Five Years Later

The Official Truth goes that five years ago on the streets of Belgrade, the disaffected citizenry of Serbia rallied in support of the Democratic Opposition (DOS), charged the parliament, and forced the hated dictator Slobodan Milosevic out of power: a glorious, democratic revolution. As usual when it comes to the Balkans, the official truth proves to be rather different at a second glance.

Five years on, the promises of the "October Revolution" remain unfulfilled, not so much betrayed as empty to begin with. Perhaps it is because it was never a real revolution at all, merely a coup d'etatorganized by the Empire.

Almost Violent

Scions of the "revolution" disagree, naturally, claiming the real problem was the absence of "October 6," a lack of follow-through by those who betrayed the revolution – pointing the finger first and foremost at Vojislav Kostunica, the current prime minister. Facts get in the way of that story as well; Kostunica never had any real power in the post-coup regime, and what he had was quickly seized by Zoran Djindjic.

It was Djindjic, in fact, who ranthe Serbian end of the operation, even though officially Kostunica was the single candidate supported by the coalition of 19 parties that made up DOS. Kostunica was the choice of American pollsters, who realized that Djindjic enjoyed almost no support among the electorate. However, it was Djindjic who received "suitcases of cash" from the U.S. government, made contact with the criminal syndicates, and plotted a violent overthrow of the Milosevic government under the cover of "popular discontent." The demonstrations on Oct. 5 were organized by DOS following their accusation that Milosevic had "stolen" the Sept. 24 presidential election. That charge, by the way, has never been substantiated one way or another; the ballots all too conveniently perished in the fire set by the demonstrators at the federal parliament building.

Before events could spiral into bloodshed, however, Kostunica surprisingly took initiative and negotiated Milosevic's resignation. It was a political masterstroke, a defeat both for Milosevic and for Djindjic's ambitions. Unfortunately, Kostunica was never to repeat the feat. Over the next two years, he sat back and mumbled while Djindjic proceeded to seize power and smash Serbia to bits.

Absolute Power, Martial Law

Having become prime minister of Serbia in December 2000, running on a ticket bearing Kostunica's name, Djindjic did everything he could to implement his "revolutionary" agenda. Aiming to please Washington and Brussels, he ordered the arrest of Milosevic, and on June 28, 2001, orchestrated his abduction and transportto the Hague Inquisition, in clear violation of Serbian and Yugoslav law. The next target was Kostunica: by 2002, his DSS party had been kicked outof DOS, and some of its members even had their parliamentary mandates suspended. The speaker, a DSS man, was nudged out in a sex scandal. Djindjic filled the void with a naive provincial lawyer, Natasa Micic, who was then elevated to Serbian presidency when Milan Milutinovic "surrendered" to the ICTY. His control of Serbia complete, Djindjic shifted aim to Yugoslavia. In March 2002, he made a deal with Montenegrin separatists to abolish Yugoslavia, which came into effect in February 2003. Kostunica was finally out of a job and out of the picture; he had tried to runfor Serbian presidency, but Djindjic deliberately sabotaged the elections to prevent his victory. By March 2003, Zoran Djindjic had the kind of absolute power he wanted on Oct. 6, 2000. Then he was killed.

Djindjic's death unleashed the most ferocious revolutionaries in DOS, who proceeded to declare martial law, jail thousands, and impose total censorship in the media. They claimed the assassination was part of a grand conspiracyby Milosevic's allies to regain power (even though by that time Milosevic was busy defending himself at the Hague Inquisition), and even tried to frame Kostunica for "supporting" them. Eventually, the Empire had to rein them in, as they had become an embarrassment.

Without Djindjic, the DOS fell apart within months, utterly routed in the December 2003 elections by the Radicals. But it was Kostunica who assembled the new government from various political flotsam, including some parts of DOS.

Reboot

Even though DOS had crashed and fragmented into a dozen unviable parties, several of its remnants embedded themselves in the new government. The most notable has been G17 Plus, a "pocket party" dominated by a cabal of Keynesian economists who had writtenthe DOS economic platform and proceeded to implement it with disastrous results. As part of Kostunica's government, they have achieved a near-total control of Serbia's economy. Needless to say, entrepreneurship has hardly flourished as a result.

Djindjic's own Democratic Party rallied around Boris Tadic, a former phone company manager who became a DOS defense minister under careful Imperial tutelage. In July 2004, Tadic became the president of Serbia. His American-style inauguration ceremony, along with a trip to Washingtonimmediately thereafter, spelled out his loyalties quite clearly, even had there not been embarrassing lettersand endorsementsof the illegal occupation in Kosovo.

Meanwhile, Kostunica's choice of allies meant that the eccentric, paranoid, and opportunistic Vuk Draskovic came back from the political grave to become Serbia-Montenegro's foreign minister, with devastating results.

Five years after Milosevic was ousted from power, the promised prosperity has failed to materialize. On the eve of yesterday's anniversary, Philip Cunliffe of Spikedwrote:

"[T]he overwhelming sentiment is a pervasive sense of stagnation. The scale of people's political disenchantment is monolithic. … Serbs are confronted with a bewildering array of squabbling 'fronts' … and venal political leaders more concerned with chewing the bones tossed to them by the EU, World Bank and IMF, than with responding to the concerns of their electorate. …

"Serbian political leaders have repeatedly confirmed their anti-democratic impulses. They prioritise foreign relations over making connections with their own electorate, and readily submit to the programme of national humiliation espoused by the EU and UN war crimes tribunal in the [sic] Hague…."

Empire's Weapons

Those "anti-democratic impulses" should not be surprising. For all that the Imperial media attempt to paint them as "reformers" and "democrats," most Dossie revolutionaries are in fact political heirs of the old Commiesousted by Milosevic in 1987. They had been disconnected from their people then, and remain disconnected now. Their power base has always been external – in this case, the Empire they so eagerly serve.

Serbia is not unique in this respect. Throughout ReichsmarschallRumsfeld's "New Europe," the very same peoplewho now support Washington once eagerly served Moscow. Some have even served Hitlerinstead.

Serbia's "revolution" was a prototype for subsequent coups in Georgia, Lebanon, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, and a failed coup in Belarus. Georgia and Ukraine are already exhibiting Serbian symptoms: a Djindjic-like cult of Saakashvili in Tbilisi, corruption and scandals in Kiev. And therein lies the lesson of Oct. 5: "people power" and "democratic revolutions" are nothing but weapons used by the Empire to create a global Balkans. Even if Serbia refuses to learn from its own disaster, others should – so they don't suffer the same grim fate.