Kostunica: Serbia not to Give up on Kosovo in Exchange for faster EU
Accession (Danas)
Serbian PM Vojislav Kostunica said in an interview with Danas that Serbia
would never accept to give up on Kosovo in exchange for a faster EU
accession and stressed that Belgrade would respond with all legal means to
an eventual independence of Kosovo. He has expressed his optimism that the
solution 'to the most difficult problem of the state' will not be
detrimental to Serbia. "A part of international community largely considers
that there is only one possible option, that is, that Kosovo should become
independent, and therefore only presents its superficial advantages. This
option has many flaws, and the solution that we advocate - the substantial
autonomy has many advantages."
When asked how serious was Tomislav Nikolic's call for defending Kosovo
militarily, Kostuica said that for him the most important thing is that the
Kosovo debate should first go through the Parliament, and the Belgrade
negotiating team would submit its report to the Serbian Parliament in early
autumn: "The Parliament is the only democratic forum for discussing Kosovo.
If we think about the worst Kosovo outcome, the position of our country
would be to conclude that Kosovo is a part of Serbia. It is not an empty
rhetoric, but a constitutional and legal formulation," said Kostunica.
According to him, Serbia has until now used arguments of legality and not of
force. "We would like to continue to do that. Arguments of force are often
on other sides, in certain parts of the international community that
sometimes condition our European integrations with giving up on Kosovo. It
is impossible. There are certain criteria for all countries that wish to
become EU members. No country has been conditioned with giving up a part of
its territory in order to join the EU. This cannot be applied to Serbia."
July 31, 2006
Serbia not to Give up on Kosovo
July 30, 2006
"Serbia Will Fight for Kosovo"
Crossfire War - Balkans - Kosovo - Countdown to Resumption of War
By Willard Payne
Crossfire War - TEHRAN WATCH - Southeast Europe Theatre - Kosovo: Tehran - Belgrade/Brussels - Vienna; "Serbia Will Fight for Kosovo" - Tomislav Nikolic - Serbian Radical Party - Countdown to Resumption of War
Night Watch: BELGRADE - Tomislav Nikolic is the leader of the increasingly popular Serbian Radical Party and chances are he is expressing what most Serbs, including Serbian leaders, are saying privately, despite their official posturing during the current series of Vienna negotiations. Nikolic represents a wave of ultra-nationalism that has been sweeping Serbia since NATO took control over the province in 1999 after a 78 - day bombing campaign, that coined the phrase "collateral damage" as a way of writing off civilian deaths. [SERBIANNA]
Most Albanians are also aware that if the UN sponsored talks result in an international declaration of Kosovo independence, war will break out in the Balkans again. Nikolic stated, "The whole world must know that. Serbia will fight for Kosovo." And that no Serbian leader will accept Kosovo independence. Albanians seem to be provoking a renewed conflict by conducting attacks against Serbian communities in Kosovo.
Nikolic continued by admitting that "if they want to take Kosovo away from us Belgrade cannot prevent that. Serbia will be peaceful as long as talks are going on but could explode in unrest in case of Kosovo independence." The only question is who will the Serbs attack first, Albanians or UN/NATO forces in the area supporting Kosovo.
Tehran does not care just as long as fighting resumes which will direct Vienna's and Brussels' attention away from Tehran and toward the war right on Europe's doorstep. In preparation for Iran's direct intervention Tehran signed, in January, a security agreement with Belgrade similar to the military-security agreements Tehran has with Damascus and Islamabad. It was a follow up to Tehran establishing relations with every capital in the divided Yugoslavia in 1992 and announcing this was their "entry into Central Europe", Iran's avenue of invasion.
I don't know what the schedule for the UN talks are but war begins again in the Balkans with the recognition of Kosovo independence unless Serbs decide to respond militarily to attacks against them that have been going on for at least a year by Albanian groups. Serbian and ethnic Albanian officials were not available for comment when asked to respond to statements from the Serbian Radical Party leader.
Regular readers of crossfirewar.com know I have long stated the conflicts here are the result of the most regressive decsion Europe ever made in its modern history when it agreed to the division of Yugoslavia in the name of the "New World Order" that was declared right after the end of the Cold War in 1990. It was supposed to be a staged crisis, orchestrated by Vienna, showing the world the new cooperation between Eastern-Western Europe. Vienna and all the 55 governments in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) assumed the crisis could be solved with a series of high profile, highly publicized diplomatic agreements and conferences, the same way they arranged crises throughout the Cold War. But this time Vienna-Brussels underestimated the impact of weapon dealers.
The division unleashed the dark forces of pagan ethnic nationalism and religious hatred, Europe's most primitive and proud mentality. It is impossible to have a more divisive influence. I had convinced myself Europe was through with map-making, but societies retain their character. Neither did Europe know Tehran would realize this is a front they can use.
Enter Persia, intelligent ancient evil, experts at using availability. The West has not confronted an enemy like Iran for quite some time, not since the Ottomans. The West will regroup around Rome. NATO will not survive. Brussels put itself completely out of position when it recognized the divided Yugoslavia. NATO will never be any threat to Iran. Rome will replace Brussels as the most important adminstration center in Western Europe. The West's new military alliance will be headquarted there. Berlin and Eastern Europe will remain in close cooperation with Moscow.
Night Watch Information Service
http://www.crossfirewar.com
http://newsblaze.com/story/20060728222959payn.nb/newsblaze/OPINIONS/Opinions.html
Copyright © 2006, NewsBlaze, Daily News
July 25, 2006
No deal in sight on Kosovo
No deal in sight on Kosovo
25.07.2006 - 09:59 CET
Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaders stuck to diametrically-opposed positions during their first direct talks on the future of Kosovo on Monday – but the EU "welcomed" the meeting which saw the Serb prime minister stay away from lunch.
Serb president Boris Tadic and prime minister Vojislav Kostunica met their Kosovan counterparts Fatmir Sejdiu and Agim Ceku in Vienna on Monday (24 July), under the guidance of UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari with US and EU envoys also in tow.
"As the first meeting of its kind, today's discussion was meant to enable both sides to present and argue their respective positions, and the meeting did achieve that objective," Mr Ahtisaari said after the talks.
"It is evident that the positions of the parties remain far apart: Belgrade would agree to almost anything but independence, whereas Pristina would accept nothing but full independence," the UN top diplomat said.
Kosovo is officially still a Serb province, but has been under UN administration since the end of the war in 1999 when NATO drove out Serbian forces ending their crackdown on ethnic Albanian separatists.
No handshaking
The two delegations on Monday entered the Viennese palace room from the opposite ends, without shaking hands.
The camps had lunch around the same table, but Mr Kostunica stayed away from his chair next to Mr Ceku, for "phone consultations" before the meeting continued in the afternoon.
The Serbian prime minister in his speech said that "in the history of Europe there can't be found any precedent which would serve as an argument to take away from Serbia 15 percent of its territory and change the internationally-recognized border against it will".
He added Serbia is ready to accept a "substantial autonomy" however, according to which Belgrade would retain power over key policies in Kosovo.
Under the proposal, Serbia would hold on to "basic elements of sovereignty" such as foreign policy, border control, customs, human rights, monetary policy and the protection of cultural and religious heritage.
The Serbian proposal also stipulates that Kosovo would be completely demilitarised , meaning there would be no Serbian or Albanian military forces, with the UN acting as a guarantor.
Alpha and omega
But Kosovo's president Mr Sejdiu said that it is time to end the status quo, which has "hampered the economic development and has provoked political tensions."
The continuation of the status-quo "is not in the interest of anybody in Kosovo, and in the region" he continued, adding that it "damages the peace and the overall stability in South-Eastern Europe".
"An overwhelming majority of Kosovan people wants Kosovo to become an independent and sovereign state", the president explained, adding "independence is the alpha and omega, the beginning and end of our position."
Ethnic Albanians represent around 90 percent of Kosovo's 2 million population.
EU future
Despite the deep divisions, EU officials welcomed the meeting, while urging both Belgrade and Pristina "to engage constructively and show flexibility."
"The meeting is welcome. Clearly, there are divided views on the status question but it is important that with this meeting a new phase of the talks has begun," EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana's spokeswoman said.
"This process in our view should lead to a Kosovo which is multi-ethnic, democratic and secure for all citizens, which can contribute to regional stability and which is able to make progress towards the EU," she added.
The international community is keen to settle Kosovo's final status by the end of the year, but it is unclear if future bilateral talks will follow the same format or take place at a lower political level.
"It is a bit premature to start speculating on the timeframe," the UN's Mr Ahtisaari indicated, adding that a more detailed schedule might emerge following internal UN meetings in mid-September.© 2006 EUobserver, All rights reserved
July 24, 2006
"Kosovo: The Power of Compromise" by Aleksandar Mitic
TRANSITIONS ONLINE (www.tol.cz)
Kosovo: The Power of Compromise
by Aleksandar Mitic
21 July 2006
A true, balanced, and negotiated compromise on Kosovo's future status would swing the pendulum of Balkan stability towards the European path.
A manipulated, one-sided, and imposed decision would, however, open a Pandora's box of secessionist movements in the world and release the ghosts of a nationalist past in the Balkans.
As we approach the beginning of talks on the future status of the Kosovo province, it becomes crucial to grasp the full complexity of the Kosovo status issue.
There has been an attempt in the last year and a half to close down international debate before the status talks had even begun by suggesting that only independence is a viable solution for Kosovo.
The truth is, the issue of Kosovo's status is dependent on so many historical, legal, political, religious, economic, and demographic elements that it deserves, at the very least, a wide international debate on possible solutions and their implications.
To argue thus that only one solution is possible is not only flawed reasoning, but a dangerous and explosive recipe for future frustration, tension, and conflict.
There has also been an attempt to refocus and spin the talks in the direction of Kosovo's independence, from those who say that these are not really talks on the future status but rather on the terms of Kosovo's future independence to those who argue that the negotiations should be only about the position of the Kosovo Serbs in an independent Kosovo. Some also argued that the talks will be about finding a way to impose independence upon Belgrade. While there are a few officials who have, often privately rather than publicly, indicated their preference for such approaches, it must be said that these are completely contrary to international law.
RISKY BUSINESS
The aim of the talks on Kosovo's future status is to finally provide a fair, stable, long-term solution for this crisis region. The majority Kosovo Albanians must get a maximum of opportunity and real means to manage their future without feeling threatened, but also without endangering the welfare of Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians. The interests of Serbia, of which Kosovo is a part, the stability of the Balkans, and the worldwide impact of these negotiations are also crucial factors which must be taken into account.
Within the principles of international law and the preset recommendations of the international community's informal "Contact Group" – no return to the pre-1999 Milosevic-era situation, no joining of neighboring states, no partition – a number of possible solutions for the future status of Kosovo deserve to be examined.
There is also a number of pre-conditions for successful talks that must be met: artificial deadlines such as end of 2006 must not be used to the detriment of a sound solution; and the outcome should be an agreed, negotiated compromise, not an imposed, one-sided decision.
The breaching of international law and the creation of worldwide precedents should be avoided for the sake of regional and world security.
In this regard, it is of paramount importance that double standards must not be allowed to win over universal standards.
To claim that the Kosovo situation features "unique" characteristics and that its independence would not represent a precedent for triggering other crises elsewhere in the world is unlikely to convince everyone in the international community. What is it that makes Kosovo so unique? Ten years of institutional discrimination? Several thousand victims of a conflict between a repressive state security force and a separatist guerilla force? A majority ethnic group actively seeking independence? But the very same characteristics are shared by dozens of similar regions around the world. If every such case is seen as unique, international law becomes irrelevant.
Independence for Kosovo would indeed be a risky, unilaterally-imposed and ultimately wrong solution. Why would one side get it all, the other one lose all? Why reward seven years of Albanian violence in post-war Kosovo? Why break up Serbia, the most ethnically diverse country in the Western Balkans and create a second ethnic-Albanian state on one part of its territory? Where is the logic of European integration in this pursuit of Balkanization of the Balkans?
A BLUFFER'S GUIDE TO INDEPENDENCE
Bluffs and spin must not be used as arguments. To say, for example, that Serbia already lost Kosovo in 1999 is only an interpretation and does not stand in any single international document, let alone in the UN Security Council resolution 1244 that ended the conflict. In the resolution, "self-governing" is mentioned three times, "self-government" four times, "self-administration" once, "substantial autonomy" three times, whereas neither "self-determination" nor "independence" are mentioned at all. Did NATO intervene in 1999 to protect human rights or to provide the basis for secession? If Kosovo was lost to Serbia in 1999, why did it not obtain independence then? As far as the so-called moral argument that it is the violence of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic which lost Kosovo for Serbia, the Kosovo Albanians should be least inclined to favor it since their massive and systematic violence and repression of the Serb community in the last seven post-war years has taken all the "moral credit" out of their hands.
The same goes for the often heard assertion that Serbia should choose between Kosovo and the European Union. In fact, under the EU Thessaloniki agenda on the Western Balkans, Serbia has a clear European perspective and as the Western Balkans' largest country, it certainly won't remain a black hole inside the EU. To suggest that Serbia should give up a large part of its territory – which has been the cradle of its civilization, culture, and religion for nine centuries now – for the sake of possibly entering a supranational integration process two or three years earlier does not make much sense. No international or domestic campaign aimed at convincing Serbian public opinion on this one would succeed.
One of the most common arguments for the independence of Kosovo is that if the ethnic Albanians do not get what they want, they will stage mass violence against the Serbs, other non-Albanians, and the international troops. The argument points to the massive riots in March 2004 as a warning of what could happen if ethnic Albanian desires are not satisfied. But is the world really so afraid of such threats that it does not dare stand up to them? NATO seems ready to call this bluff. The Alliance's Secretary-General has warned on several occasions that violence as means of promoting political objectives in the status talks would this time be met with a robust response from 17,000 NATO troops in the province. Indeed, threats of violence must not be legitimized nor used as arguments.
Finally, it is most worrying to suggest that some sort of "conditional independence" should be the outcome of the status talks.
This empty formula is even presented by some as a compromise solution, because ethnic Albanians will have to wait a few more years for independence and give up on the idea of Greater Albania. Many of its backers suggest "conditional independence" means that Kosovo will be granted independence in phases, provided the majority ethnic Albanians finally start respecting the human rights of the Serbs and other non-Albanians. But this option is an insult to negotiators and 21st-century human-rights standards. If Belgrade is resolutely opposed to immediate independence, why would it accept independence two or three years from now? If even the most basic standards of human rights are not respected under international supervision, why should we expect that they would be in a conditionally independent Kosovo? And doesn't the "conditional independence" concept introduce a new kind of trade-off: respect for human rights in exchange for territory?
COMPROMISE: A WIN-WIN SOLUTION
Looking at the situation realistically and fairly, the most sustainable and just solution for the future status of the province lies between the standard type of autonomy, which ethnic Albanians now reject, and independence, which clashes with international law and is unacceptable for the Serbs in general and Serbia as a state.
A solution that would provide for a maximum of autonomy for Kosovo within the borders of Serbia could satisfy all the legitimate demands, including the Kosovo Albanians' demand to be self-governing, and it can protect the interests of non-Albanians in Kosovo and the interests of Serbia as a state. Such a solution would also comply with the principle of the inviolability of international borders.
Kosovo would enjoy full legislative, executive, and judicial capacity, a limited external representation – in particular regarding its full direct access to the international financial institutions – and most importantly, normalized relations with Serbia.
On the other hand, Serbia still has many positive things to offer Kosovo, including a strong push in its macroeconomic revival, a common market for goods, an integrated energy, electricity and infrastructure network, access to its health and education systems, a common fight against organized crime, and a joint contribution to regional stability and European integration.
At the same time, an autonomous Kosovo would still need to improve its treatment of the Kosovo Serbs and other non-Albanians. A wide-scale decentralization including a horizontal linkage of Serbian municipalities, which would benefit from the education, social, and health system of central Serbia, is a precondition for the survival of Kosovo Serbs, as suggested by UN special envoy Kai Eide.
This horizontal linkage is not a model for partition and conflict but, on the contrary, a model for integration and survival, as these municipalities would be fully integrated in the autonomous Kosovo system run from Pristina, while keeping some political links with Belgrade.
Considering all this, an autonomy for the Kosovo Serbs within a maximum autonomy for Kosovo inside Serbia appears as the most reasonable and viable long-term solution.
More than anything, it is a win-win solution. The Kosovo Albanians would finally get the means to manage their future and so will the Kosovo Serbs; Serbia would not have its borders changed and its historical and religious cradle amputated; Macedonia and Bosnia will receive guarantees that border changes in the Balkans are no longer tolerated; the EU would obtain regional stability and be able fully to take charge of its European perspective; the United States would be able to disengage its troops without losing its diplomatic leverage in both Pristina and Belgrade; Russia, China, India, and many other countries in the world would appreciate not having to deal with a dangerous secessionist precedent; the UN will see a major crisis issue resolved peacefully and with full respect for international law.
It is time to respect international law; it is time to find a long-term solution for Kosovo; it is high time to be patient, fair, sound, and consistent.
It is time for a successful compromise for the first time in Kosovo's long history.
Aleksandar Mitic is a Brussels-based journalist and one of the authors of the CD-ROM and Internet project "Kosovo 2006: The Making of a Compromise."
July 23, 2006
Serbia: Between Empire of Heaven and Empire of Earth Again
http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=1000
Serbia: Between Empire of Heaven and Empire of Earth Again Can Karpat, AIA Balkan Section Tomorrow the Kosovo final status talks enter a brand new phase. For the first time since the war, the leaders of Kosovo and Serbia meet in order to present their positions on status of Serbia’s breakaway province. There is no reason to believe that while seven purely technical rounds have failed, these new highly political rounds would succeed. Does it mean that the international community has switched to the Plan-B, namely the “Diktat solution”? Is this the beginning of the end for Serbia...
Serbia's choice
Knez Lazar
“The Downfall of the Serbian Empire” is one of the best known Serbian epic songs, which tells the choice of Knez Lazar on the eve of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. “Lazar, glorious Emperor, which is the empire of your choice? Is it the empire of heaven? Is it the empire of the earth?” If Lazar chose the empire of the earth, the Ottoman army would all perish. However, the empire of the earth would be nothing but temporal. If Lazar chose the empire of heaven, he and his men would all die, but ensured their place in heaven. “And the emperor chose the empire of heaven above the empire of the earth”. Because the empire of the earth is eternal.
For centuries long this song on Lazar’s choice had been a sweet consolation for the Serbs, who had been defeated by the Turks in the Battle of Kosovo. It comforted the Serbian psyche: They were not defeated; they chose to be defeated, for no less than a secure place in heaven.
The Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica should better prepare himself for such a fatidic choice today. When Kosovo will be a lost cause for Serbia, Prime Minister should be able to tell his people that heaven is waiting for them to sooth their wounded pride. This time heaven may not be that spiritual, however, as it was in case of Prince Lazar. EU membership would be Serbia’s earthly compensation.
Today the Kosovo final status talks enter a new top-level phase. Kosovo Albanian and Serbian high-level leaders are to meet face-to-face in order to present their positions on the future of Serbia’s breakaway province.
The Serbian President Boris Tadic will sit opposite Fatmir Sejdiu, the President of the province that still, though de facto, belongs to Serbia. And Vojislav Kostunica will sit in front of his counterpart Agim Ceku, whom Serbia has been accusing of serious war crimes for years.
One must not be a clairvoyant to guess the outcome of this new second phase: dialogue of the deaf and failure.
The beginning of the end
There is no reason to believe that while seven purely technical rounds have failed, these new highly political rounds would succeed. From now on, the two sides will discuss the future status of Kosovo, and not the peripheral issues like decentralization, the economy or protection of the Serbian cultural heritage and religious sites in the province.
Not even the question of the protection of the Serbian culture in Kosovo, definitely one of the softest issues on the agenda, could be resolved during the seven rounds of talks.
Even the Special Envoy for the Kosovo Future Status Process Martti Ahtisaari stated that he did not expect the talks to generate any concrete results and added that this would likely have to wait until after the next UN General Assembly session in September.
Thus Martti Ahtisaari confirmed the general belief that the talks are only a necessary transition period, which will serve as a confirmation of the failed status talks. As soon as the failure of the second phase of the talks is totally confirmed, the Kosovo case will be transferred to the UN Security Council (UNSC), which will probably impose its decision as an “international Diktat” to the two sides.
The attitude of Russia and China, the two permanent members of the UNSC, will be decisive since all the others are in favour of some form of independence for Kosovo. However, as long as Russia is concerned, the international community receives highly contradictory signals from Moscow.
Until very recently Russia has totally backed the Serbian cause. However, now, Moscow is keen to change its policy on Kosovo in light of the precedent it would set for other regions like, not unexpectedly, Georgia's breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and Moldova's breakaway region of Transdnestria.
The USA and Great Britain insist that a comparison cannot be drawn between Kosovo and Georgia and Moldova. However, sooner or later they will have to assure Russia’s vote in the UNSC. And the price of the Russian vote is now well known. Since according to the Western powers Kosovo’s independence will be the key to the total pacification of the Balkans, it would be not a big surprise if, at the end of the day, Russia gets at least some kind of assurance for a similar deal for South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdnestria.
The elections of the year
Meanwhile party leaders in Serbia are discussing possible dates for the next general elections. While Vojislav Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) prefers elections left to next spring, Boris Tadic’s Democratic Party (DS) prefers this autumn. In any case, the elections will be held probably before the Kosovo issue is resolved.
Vojislav Kostunica’s minority government is losing blood every day, namely its working majority in Parliament. On the one hand, since the death of their leader, Slobodan Milosevic in The Hague Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) has threatened to withdraw their support from the government if any other forcible extraditions take place. On the other hand, the Europhile-technocrat liberal party G 17 Plus warns the government that they will pull out of the coalition by October if pre-accession talks with the EU are not resumed.
Serbia goes through an extremely difficult year. On 3rd May the EU suspended pre-accession talks with Serbia after Belgrade failed to deliver General Ratko Mladic to The Hague. On 21st Montenegro seceded from its state union with Serbia and became independent. The Presevo Valley, Sandzak and Vojvodina may be the next regions, which would bedevil the political atmosphere in Serbia. And of course, Kosovo.
Unsurprisingly the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) exploits this situation to the extreme. No less than 37 percent of the Serbian people support this party at the public surveys. A particularly sad picture since nothing but the mentality of SRS and alike were responsible for this desperate no-way-back situation in Kosovo in the first place.Very hard times are waiting for moderate nationalist Vojislav Kostunica. How will he persuade his voters that he is the reasonable Prince Lazar, and not the treacherous Vuk Brankovic, whose betrayal, so the Serbs like to believe, supposedly condemned the Serbian kingdom to defeat before the Turks in 1389? How will the new epic song look like?
In his open letter on 13th July, Vojislav Kostunica himself made this point clear: “Can such a country, by any measure a democratic one, survive the forcible taking of 15 percent of its territory? What democratically elected government could explain to its voters after such an act that they should continue to believe in the principles of tolerance, liberalism and the sacrosanct will of the people - the values of enlightened Western civilization, in the name of which they toppled an evil, authoritarian regime?”
Unlike DS, DSS and other pro-Western parties, SRS is able to give its supporters very simple and clear messages. And in times of political suffocation people, who lost their confidence even in themselves, often prefer this kind of simple and clear messages. Sad but history can testify to this.
The general elections in Serbia will be by far the most important elections in the Balkans this year. If the two major Serbian parties DS and DSS cannot find a common ground to cooperate, not only Serbia would stray from the path that leads towards democracy, but the Western powers would also have to deal henceforth with negotiators that they never dreamt of in their worst nightmares at the status talks in Vienna.
Related items:
From the Wisdom of Suffocating Serbia (22.06.06)
Kosovo: Riddle whose Answer everyone knows (06.06.06)
Serbia - Independent despite Herself (25.05.06)
The Great Kosovo Riddle (08.05.06)
Serbian Radical Party: The Hubris of Serbian Political Scene (04.05.06)
Kosovo: A New State or a New Bone of Contention in the Balkans? (26.11.05)
July 20, 2006
UNSC set to break Kosovo status quo
UNSC set to break Kosovo status quo
With talks between Belgrade and Pristina over Kosovo's final status set to fail, the UNSC is ready to make the decision itself by the year's end, a diplomat says.
By Ekrem Krasniqi in Brussels for ISN Security Watch (20/07/06)If Kosovo's ethnic Albanian leaders and the authorities in Belgrade fail to reach an agreement over the status of Serbia's UN-administered province of Kosovo by the end of the year, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) will make the decision on its own, an EU diplomat told ISN Security Watch.
And Kosovo's independence looks like a done deal, especially with Russia seemingly on board at the UNSC, though not without its own game plan.
UN-mediated Kosovo status talks between Belgrade and Pristina are expected to take place later this month, but EU diplomats in Brussels have said that if the two sides failed to reach an agreement, the UNSC would step in and make it for them.
"The Contact Group prefers an agreed solution," but if that does not happen, "then the Security Council will have to take up its responsibilities," a European diplomat told ISN Security Watch on condition of anonymity.
UN special envoy for Kosovo talks, former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, is trying to organize the first high-level meeting between Kosovo and Serb leaders in Vienna on 24 July, hoping to bring in Serbian President Boris Tadic, who has already agreed to attend, and Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica, who has not net responded, and their counterparts from Kosovo, Fatmir Sejdiu and Agim Ceku.
The meeting in Vienna would open the second phase of the talks on the future of Kosovo.
Since the beginning of the year, negotiations on decentralization (the creation of more municipalities for the Serbian minority and the shift of power from the central government to municipal authorities), the economy (the privatization of Kosovo's enterprises, property rights, citizens savings, pensions, etc) and culture (ensuring the cultural heritage and religious sites of Serbs) failed to bring about any significant results.
But even if partial agreement could be reached on some of these issues, there is little chance that Pristina and Belgrade would agree on dueling status proposals, and there are not any new options on the table: Kosovo's ethnic Albanians will settle for nothing less than independence, while Belgrade insists that independence is not an option and is willing to go only as far as granting the province greater autonomy.
What is most likely to happen is that the Vienna meeting will serve only as a confirmation of the failed status talks, which will allow the "Kosovo File" to be sent directly to the UNSC to decide on how best to end the status quo.
The US and Britain are pushing for the independence, with US President George W Bush saying that the solution should reflect the demand of the majority, but must also respect the rights of the minorities.
Washington says the Kosovo status chapter must be closed as soon as possible, as the status quo can no longer be maintained and any further delays keep the economy in limbo and could lead to renewed unrest among ethnic Albanians.
Implications for Belgrade
But handing the decision over to the UNSC - which is likely to result in a declaration of independence for Kosovo later this year or early next year - could be problematic.
One question Western leaders will have to answer is how to sell Kosovo's independence to the Serbian people to avoid internal instability. This comes at a time when radicals are leading the polls with a 40 percent popularity rating. Declaring an independent Kosovo would certainly give radicals a further boost and could be the downfall of the current government.
The Serbian leadership is hoping to convince the UNSC to delay its decision by a few months, at least until after elections, which are tentatively planned for the end of this year.
Serbian President Tadic, a moderate who on several occasions has acknowledged that Kosovo was moving toward independence, said after meeting with top EU officials Tuesday in Brussels that he would prefer extraordinary elections in Serbia before Kosovo's status was decided.
But over all, what Belgrade really wants is a temporary solution for Kosovo, such as "essential autonomy" inside Serbia, and a postponement of final status for up to 20 years - an idea that already has been categorically rejected by Western governments.
The question of Russia
For the West, the political implications for Belgrade seem to hold less importance than Russia's demands, however. After all, elections will come and go in Serbia and regardless, Belgrade will have to make a touch decision between holding on to Kosovo and pursuing its path of Euro-Atlantic integration.
Russia, on the other hand, would use Kosovo independence to win the backing of Western governments for independence for Georgia's breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and Moldova's breakaway region of Transdneistria.
Russian authorities have been quite vocal about the precedent Kosovo's independence could set.
At least for now, Britain and the US have maintained that a comparison cannot be drawn between Kosovo and Georgia and Moldova, but that could change as Kosovo's independence would require Russia's vote on the UNSC - a vote it is not likely to give without some assurance of a similar deal for South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transdneistria.
In Brussels, the ISN Security Watch's EU source echoed sentiments in London and Washington, saying that "all issues should be resolved according to their specifications," but he said he doubted Russia would move to bloc the UNSC vote on Kosovo's final status.
Russia's apparent readiness to accept Kosovo’s independence in light of the precedent it would set represents a marked change in Moscow's position.
Earlier, Russia had rejected the idea of independence for Kosovo as it feared it would strengthen the case for the independence of its Northern Caucasus republic of Chechnya.
But now, diplomats are cautiously optimistic that Russia will not abandon Contact Group statements saying that the solution for Kosovo "must be acceptable to Kosovo people” - a statement Western diplomats interpret as meaning "acceptable to the ethnic Albanian majority," or independence.
Observers also believe that with Russia on board - though it is not clear if Moscow's demands will be met - Kosovo independence is a done deal.
“The Russians believe that Kosovo’s independence will help their case in the three regions,” Nicholas Whyte from the International Crisis Group (ICG) told ISN Security Watch.
There have been diplomatic rumblings in Brussels that the UNSC was planning to "invite" member nations to recognize Kosovo's independence in the fall, though this has not been independently confirmed.
But if the West fails to agree on Russia's hoped-for concessions, complications could erupt at the UNSC, he suggested.
Since Moscow's change in position, the Serbian leadership has been lobbying other Contact Group members, including China, to vote against Kosovo independence. But so far, those lobbying efforts seem to have made little headway.
Regional implications
Since Montenegro's declaration of independence from the state union with Serbia in May, Bosnian Serbs have stepped up their calls for a similar right to self-determination - a call that has been categorically rejected by Western officials. The Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia split the country into two administrative entities, the Bosniak- and Croat-dominated Federation entity and the Bosnian Serb-dominated Republika Srpska entity.
The Serbian government has repeatedly warned that a declaration of independence for Kosovo could threaten regional stability in the western Balkans.
But EU and US officials have remained adamant that whatever the solution for Kosovo, the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be changed.
Some also have warned of potential consequences for Serbia's internal borders, with Serbs in northern Kosovo threatening partition, which could in turn provoke the ethnic Albanian majority in the south of Serbia (Presevo Valley) to seek to join a newly independent Kosovo. Others warn that it could also incite new tensions in Macedonia (the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), where the Albanian minority forms a quarter of the population.
The Contact Group has made it clear that an independent Kosovo could not join any parts or countries in the region, referring to northwestern Macedonia, southern Serbia and Albania.
EU boosts Kosovo independence hopes
On Monday, Kosovo's independence was boosted further when EU officials released a report to member states' foreign ministers signaled the bloc would begin to treat Kosovo as an independent state.
The report says Kosovo is to move toward the EU as an independent country from Serbia by building bilateral relations as Brussels does with other aspiring countries of the western Balkans region.
The EU’s foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, and Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn said the 25-nation bloc expected Kosovo authorities to work hard on meeting the criteria set for accession. They also said Brussels should be ready to grant to Kosovo all contractual relations for this purpose.
Once the final status has been decided the EU will take over the mandate of the United Nation's Mission (UNMIK) and is to supervise Kosovo's "limited" independence, while NATO will continue to run the security mission, but with reduced troop numbers.
As such, EU member states will assume the main role in Kosovo, with a European police mission that is expected to help local authorities provide security guarantees for minorities.
Ekrem Krasniqi is ISN Security Watch’s senior correspondent at the EU, UN, and NATO in Brussels, where he has been based since 1992. Has has worked for the Kosovo weekly magazine Zeri and the daily Zëri i Ditës. Krasniqi is the founder of DTT-NET.COM press agency and serves as the outlet’s editor-in-chief.
J. Bissett -Letters to the editor..BALAKAN REALITIES
http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20060719-081857-6783r_page2.htm
Letters to the editor
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
July 20, 2006
New York
Balkan realities
Tod Lindberg is right that the EU and NATO countries should not turn
their backs on Balkan countries wishing to share in the peace and prosperity
of the new Europe. However, he is wrong to suggest that it was only Slobodan
Milosevic's "genocidal policies" that set the Balkans in flames in the early
1990s and wrong to condemn Serbian determination to maintain Kosovo as an
integral part of its territory ("Where Milosevic's butchery held sway,"
Op-Ed, July 11).
It has become fashionable to blame Milosevic and Serbia for everything
that went wrong in the former Yugoslavia while overlooking the concerns of
the Christian Serbian population in Bosnia and in Kosovo at the grim
prospects of having to live in Muslim-dominated states.
Alia Izetbegovic, the Muslim Bosnian leader, was an Islamist extremist
who made no attempt to hide his plans for destroying the Christian entity in
Bosnia, writing, "There can be no peace or co-existence between the Islamist
faith and non-Islamist institutions." As for Agim Ceku, the so-called prime
minister of Kosovo, the Canadian military knows what crimes he is guilty of
even if the Hague Tribunal refused to indict him.
In 1993, Mr. Ceku commanded Croatian forces that violated a
U.N.-brokered cease-fire and overran three Serbian villages in the Medac
pocket. When the Canadians counterattacked and re-entered the burned
villages, they discovered all of the inhabitants and domestic animals had
been slaughtered. Mr. Ceku later also ordered undefended Serbian villages
shelled in violation of the rules of war, causing heavy casualties among the
civilian population.
In 2002, Mr. Ceku was indicted by Serbia for responsibility as a Kosovo
Liberation Army commander for the murders of 669 Serbians and other
non-Albanians during the fighting that broke out in Kosovo in 1998. The
indictment includes murder, abduction, torture and ethnic cleansing of the
non-Albanian population from Kosovo. This is the man recently invited to
Washington to meet with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, a meeting
obviously planned to show U.S. support for Kosovo independence.
For many outside observers, including this writer, the continued support
by the United States for an independent Kosovo is incomprehensible. Granting
independence to Kosovo would be a serious violation of Serbia's territorial
integrity, which is one of the most cherished principles of international
law and is enshrined in the United Nations Charter. U.S. violation of this
principle would have far-reaching implications for the very framework of
international peace and security.
Independence for Kosovo also would create a criminal and terrorist state
in the heart of the Balkans. This is not a happy prospect in today's world.
Kosovo independence would set a precedent for other aspiring ethnic
groups for independent status and would destabilize not only the Balkans,
but many other parts of the world. It also would mark a low point in U.S.
foreign policy. It is difficult to be held up as the champion of the rule of
law, of democracy and the global war on terror, while at the same time
giving support to war criminals and terrorists.
JAMES BISSETT
Former Canadian ambassador
to the former Yugoslavia
Ottawa
Serbian News Network - SNN
news@antic.org
http://www.antic.org/
Blind Eyes Over Kosovo
The original Monastery of the Holy Archangels was destroyed in the 16th Century by the invading Turks. Four centuries later the Orthodox Church constructed a small church, residence, and workshop among the ancient ruins. Two years ago a mob of 600 descended from Prizren, just 1.5 miles away, burning down the buildings and destroying anything that remained. Earlier they wrecked churches, the presiding bishop's residence, a seminary, and private Serbian homes in town.
Although the monastery was nominally guarded by German soldiers serving in the international Kosovo Force (KFOR), most of them packed up when the crowd began crossing the shallow creek separating the monastery from the road. They took the monks along but left the buildings and contents unprotected; a few remaining soldiers played tourists, photographing the monastery's destruction. This shocking behavior was the norm on a day of violence around Kosovo. Complained Rachel Denber of Human Rights Watch: "In too many cases, NATO peacekeepers locked the gates to their bases, and watched as Serb homes burned."
Since then the Church has built a small two-story building on the site of the workshop, where Brother Benedict and five other monks worship, eat, and sleep. The site is now surrounded by barbed wire, though Brother Benedict has little confidence in his supposed protectors. After the monastery's destruction the German commander downplayed a mob attack on one of his units as it guarded a German TV crew. After the monks publicized the incident, their "protectors" left them isolated for two weeks. Even now the KFOR soldiers refuse to escort the monks to buy food in Prizren, suggesting instead that they turn to the Kosovo Police Service -- which includes many former Kosovo Liberation Army guerrillas. Instead, the monks drive substantially further to the nearest Serbian community for supplies.
Unfortunately, any Serb who travels outside of few remaining enclaves does so at his own risk. At the quasi-border dividing Serbia from Kosovo (which nominally remains part of Serbia), drivers routinely replace their Serbian license plates with ones marked Kosovo to disguise their identities. To do otherwise would risk not only their cars but their lives.
Even foreigners are at risk. Some British tourists recently were roughed up and their car was destroyed because the vehicle had been rented in Belgrade. Had they been Serbian their lives probably would have been forfeited. More than 900 Serbs have been murdered since the allies took control and ethnic killings continue in the territory. But you will look long and hard to find an ethnic Albanian jailed for committing the crimes.
HIGHLIGHTING THE PLIGHT OF THE MONKS at the monastery, as well as other Christians in Kosovo, is a delegation led by Bishop Artemije (Radosavljevic) of Raska and Prizren, which is visiting the U.S. this week at the invitation of the Religious Freedom Coalition. The visitors are hoping to slow the apparent administration rush to grant independence to Kosovo.
Kosovo is an unpleasant bit of unfinished business that the West would prefer to forget. A fair and sensible resolution is well nigh impossible, especially since the behavior of Washington and NATO has been truly disgraceful. Far from creating a tolerant democracy, the allies have presided over one of the largest episodes of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans. And if the U.S. continues on its present course, virtually everyone expects the ethnic majority to complete the job in just a few more years, if that long.
Like most of the Balkans, the problem of Kosovo goes back centuries. Serbian identity is rooted in both Kosovo's military history, particularly the 1389 defeat by the Turks in the Battle of the Blackbirds, and spiritual significance, represented by ancient churches and monasteries.
Over the years history was unkind to the Balkans, torn by conflict as the Ottoman Empire declined and in both World Wars, and then mostly dominated by communist regimes until the end of the Cold War. During the 1980s the territory (in Yugoslavia) enjoyed substantial self-rule and resulted in ethnic Albanian mistreatment of Serbs (behavior covered in the New York Times, among other publications). Roughly two decades ago Slobodan Milosevic launched his grab for power with a speech in Kosovo that played upon Serb nationalism. Then it was Albanians who suffered, leading to an increasingly bitter guerrilla war and NATO military intervention in March 1999.
The 78-day air war never made sense. Over the years most European states had mirrored Yugoslavia in fighting to suppress secessionist movements.
Although the conflict was ugly, it was nothing compared to the simultaneous humanitarian disaster in Sierra Leone, which killed a quarter of a million people but was ignored in the U.S. and Europe. Moreover, it was NATO intervention that sparked the worst Serbian crackdown and the mass Albanian exodus.
In any case, Western officials, starting with American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, developed policy in a dream world. They thought that a couple days of bombing would bring Belgrade to heel, completely missing the nationalism that animated most Serbs, even democrats and human rights advocates. Worst, the allies believed that they would be able to concoct a multi-ethnic Kosovo in which Albanians and Serbs would join hands singing Kumbaya around communal campfires. In fact, having used their American-supplied air force to eject the Serb military units, the victorious ethnic Albanians saw no need to compromise.
After the war -- under the occupation of the West -- the Albanian community kicked out a quarter million Serbs, Roma, Jews, and non-Albanian Muslims. Over the next five years isolated Serbs were killed, beaten, and kidnapped. Even Serbian enclaves were vulnerable to drive-by shootings.
Although Serbs disappeared from much of Kosovo -- roughly 40,000 in the capital of
Human Rights Watch's Rachel Denber observed that "This was the biggest security test for NATO and the United Nations in Kosovo since 1999, when minorities were forced from their homes as the international community looked on. But they failed the test." The events two years ago resulted in much hand wringing, but little else. No one was prosecuted and jailed for their crimes. Today many Serb refugees remain in small camps, unemployed and living in containers turned into homes.
The Albanian political leadership includes guerrilla leaders almost certainly guilty of atrocities. No one denies the explosion of organized crime, including sex trafficking, in Kosovo, which has been called the "black hole" of Europe. Radical Islam, too, may be on the rise -- more than 200 mosques have been built since 1999, and some unashamedly fly the Saudi Arabian flag. "Sex, crime, terrorism, it's all there," opines one U.S. diplomat stationed in Belgrade.
AS A POLITICAL ENTITY, KOSOVO is less ready for independence today, based on its commitment to a multi-ethnic republic with human rights guarantees, than when it was "liberated" in 1999. Warns Joseph Griebowski of the Institute on Religion and Public Policy, "the present record of rule of law, protection of the rights of religious and ethnic minorities, and the return/resettlement of internally displaced people by the Provisional Authority of Kosovo -- all of which are indispensable for democratic governance -- have been gravely unsatisfactory."
So what to do? Final (or future) status negotiations have begun under the tutelage of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, and it is obvious that officials in the West would like to take credit for their "success" in Kosovo, run a victory lap, and go home. The U.S. and Europeans have been pressuring the Serbs to voluntarily yield Kosovo and collect EU membership as their reward. Tod Lindberg of Policy Review reflects the conventional wisdom when he argues that "Serbia needs to decide whether its future is Western integration or instead a return to dead-end nationalist politics." Some Europeans have spoken of finding a win/win, or at least win/no lose, solution.
However, it doesn't exist. Roughly two million ethnic Albanians now live in Kosovo -- it's hard to know how many for sure, since the local authorities have no incentive to prevent a large in-migration, further strengthening their hold over the land. Understandably, none of them want to live under Serbia.
Moreover, no sane Serb (or Roma) in Kosovo wants to live under Albanian rule. Indeed, the Serbs who now dominate Mitrovica, north of the Irba River and close to the rest of Serbia, probably would forcibly resist Albanian rule. Even the Crisis Group, which remains dedicated to the mythical ideal of a multi-ethnic Kosovo, admits that the allies would have to make integration happen, somehow (the group suggests -- and I am not making this up, to quote humorist Dave Berry -- a PR campaign.)
Allied officials continue to talk in grand terms. Last year Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns told Congress that "Failure to secure a multi-ethnic Kosovo would be a failure" of years of effort. Yet the likely result of full independence is clear. A top U.S. official told me on my visit that he figures not a Serb will remain within five or ten years after independence, or even the status quo. That is, granting Kosovo independence means completing the process of ethnic cleansing that started seven years ago. Worse, since the West has been in charge, granting independence means ratifying the very process that the allies went to war to prevent.
IN ORDER TO GET AROUND this rather embarrassing dilemma, Western governments are talking about conditional independence, that is, independence only after ethnic Albanians meet certain standards. Perhaps proponents of this perspective are so naive as to verge on the delusional; more likely, they are cynically maneuvering to get out of Kosovo with a minimum of public embarrassment.
After all, if things are, as claimed by Kosovo's allied occupiers, better today than in 1999 or 2004, it is mostly because so many Serbs and other minorities have fled. The easy ethnic cleansing already has been done. There is less opportunity and reason to target minorities.
However, despite all the right public promises from Albanian officials, there is little reason to believe popular attitudes have changed. Bishop Artemije sadly observed simply: "Crimes happened not just seven years ago but are happening now as we speak." One resident of a refugee camp who fled deadly mobs two years ago told me that "we see people living in our homes and sleeping in our beds talking about how good democracy is."
And if seven years of tutelage by the allies under military occupation isn't enough to teach the majority Albanian community good human rights manners, how will a few verbal promises and some corresponding paper threats do the job? Nor will any conditions be enforced. The idea that the allies would get tough and block
At the same time, conditional independence, by leaving the issue formally open while effectively dispossessing the Serbs, is likely to radicalize both parties. Ethnic Albanians have been growing impatient. The group Self-Determination! has been leading non-violent protests against UN targets (for which some demonstrators actually went to jail, in contrast to those who murdered Serbs). More ominously, there have been attacks on allied vehicles, and resentment at more years of apparent indecision could spark more serious assaults on KFOR and UN personnel. Leading Kosovar political figure Adam Demaci has threatened the allies with "violence of such dimensions that 17 March 2004 will be forgotten."
As for Serbia, detaching Kosovo is likely to bring down the Kostunica government. Waiting in the wings is the Serbian Radical Party, a populist-nationalist movement headed by Vojislav Seselj, now awaiting trial for war crimes at The Hague. The U.S. will not even allow diplomatic personnel to meet with Radical members of parliament, terming the party "undemocratic." Yet some polls show it with 40-plus percent support, putting it within easy reach of dominating a new coalition government.
What a pretty picture this all would be. Ethnic Albanians step up attacks on Serbs and begin targeting allied forces in Kosovo. Serbs in Mitrovica fortify their enclave and look north to Belgrade for support. Hard-core, anti-Western nationalists take power in Serbia. Then what?
Like so many conflicts, it was a lot easier to get into Kosovo than it will be to get out. But there's still time to draw back from the brink. The West should insist on a genuine negotiation in which a variety of options are freely considered. An allied diktat, especially one mandating independence, will not be fair. Nor will it bring the regional stability that everyone desires. Only the residents of Kosovo and the rest of Serbia can find a lasting solution.
Doug Bandow is the author of Foreign Follies: America's New Global Empire (forthcoming, Xulon). A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan, he is a member of the Advisory Board of the American Council for Kosovo.
July 19, 2006
Dividing the Pannonian Sea
Dividing the Pannonian Sea
By Russell GordonIf those who aspire to the fulfillment of the Wolfowitz Doctrine were nonplussed by the termination of the 50-year Cold War with the Soviet Union, existent blowback may be the answer to their hegemonic prayers.
The West has finally forced Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s hand, with Russia now supporting the North Korea-Iran/Syria Axis. Zbigniew Brzezinski’s less than stellar protégés have indeed revived the Cold War: by pushing NATO eastward, humiliating and bombing the Serbs, isolating Russia from its near-abroad through thinly-veiled, anti-democratic “color revolutions”, and covertly supporting al Qaeda terrorists in Chechnya. Russia, in turn, has escalated its support of Iran, Syria, possibly North Korea and some Iraqi insurgents, Columbian Marxist guerillas, and others in opposition to US global policies.
Blowback - intended or otherwise - is nothing new to the US foreign policy establishment. The US helped create the Viet-Minh while materially backing the French, thus setting the stage for French loss of former colonial possessions in Indochina, and US entry into the region. In a similar vane, the US heavily-armed the most extreme of Afghan and foreign mujahedeen factions, which helped lead to the Soviet Union’s demise, but as forecasted, created a stateless nemesis whose future eradication will prove much more tenuous.
And indeed, if Washington gives independence to Albanian Islamo-fascists in the Serbian province of Kosovo, Foggy Bottom may become up to its’ deaf ears in unforeseen consequences. Or are they?
Charading as Wilsonianism, the Wolfowitz Doctrine has shown itself to be a cheap knock-off of Bismarkian and Hitlerian doctrine, amplifying Bismarck’s Mittel-Europa to a global scale. Washington’s foreign policy elite have effectively shown any and all comers who might have defensible interests that all bets are off in regards to morality, justice, civility, ethics, nobility, and even logic. To say that the US global policies are even in defense of US strategic interests is presumptuous, given the obvious long term consequences.
In the short-term, the US already is seeing negative results. US forces are bogged down in Iraq, squaring off against Islamist and local insurgent forces supported by Sunni and Shi’ite entities – local and regional. Russia, China, Iran and former Soviet Central Asian states have formed a counter-veiling bloc via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Iran is saber rattling atomic capabilities, and playing the Hezbollah trump card to counter-balance Sunni Arab control in the Middle East.
Common misperception is that the Russians are the Serbs historical friends, but as the Serb saying goes, “God help us if the Russians arrive.” Indeed, as no nation has friends, but rather allies of immediate convenience, Putin is ready to sacrifice Kosovo to set a precedent for Trans-Dniestr, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and other regions, some of which will prove troubling for US plans in dominating the Caucasus oil supply. Moreover, Kosovo independence will affirm to countless separatist groups worldwide that military escalation combined with public relations will eventually yield results, thus making increased local warfare inevitable.
In the Balkans, it appears that Washington wishes not the continuation of Belgrade's current “collaborative” policies, but rather to force Serbia into a corner, thus driving the Serbian populace towards the Radicals, and thereby creating a justification to isolate Serbia yet again, all the while claiming the Serbs have “chosen the forces of darkness and isolation over a brighter European future.”
With the release of Muslim war criminal Naser Oric from ICTY Hague detention, and continued demands for the arrest and extradition of Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic, the Serbian populace may have achieved final proof that the international policy bias was not a series of mistakes, but rather intended as deliberate. Provoking Serbian inat – self-defeating spite –will again enable a free hand to Washington militarists to exact further reprisals in a continuing message to global rivals, and conveniently causing further disunity in Europe. As for the Serbs, damned if they do, and damned if they don’t.
Predictably, the US can then jump back into pre-determined paradigm of breaking Serbia up more by demanding special status for Sandzak/Raska, Presevo area, eastern Montenegro, Voivodina, and western Macedonia. Undoubtedly media war, and Albanian terrorist actions, will be employed as provocations, and already US Marines are training with maps of Montenegro, to 'intervene to stop a “genocide” against Albanians.' The humiliating psychological conditions are not too dissimilar to those imposed on Germany at Versailles, and may yet contribute to armed conflict at a later date. As far as NATO is concerned, this may be in their perceived interests.
Unfortunately, many Serbs are still stuck in outdated paradigms themselves, appealing to logic, reason and decency which have long since been forgone in the halls of power in Washington and the capitols of the co-opted. One Western analyst opined that “most Serbian politicians are fighting over money….” With gauleiters unwittingly assisting in a phased plan of dismemberment, time may be running short.
Possible encouraging signs include the appointment to DCI of Gen. Michael Hayden, who along with his mentor Gen. Charles G. Boyd has been outspoken in his criticism of US policy and media bias against the Serbs, singling out CNN and the New York Times by name for their duplicity. But as one intelligence analyst noted, Hayden may become “boxed into a corner [at the CIA] in five minutes.” Ohio National Guard troops are training Serbian Army troops in Serbia, and two US F-16’s recently touched down in a courtesy call to the Serbian military – sans accouterments explosives of 1999. Clearly there is some diversity of opinion in Washington and Langley.
But as one Serbian-American publisher said, “a conspiracy of silence continues” about the reality of the previous and current Balkan conflicts, which could prepare the way for US public support for continued US moves against Serbia -- should darker forces win out.
July 18, 2006
Independent Kosovo a model for breakaway regions worldwide
Independent Kosovo a model for breakaway regions worldwideJuly 18, 2006 8:42 AM
BRUSSELS, Belgium-Serbia's president warned Tuesday that if the province of Kosovo is allowed to secede, it could create instability in the Balkans and set a precedent for independence movements around the world.
President Boris Tadic also indicated he had not decided whether to attend an unprecedented round of direct talks with Kosovo's ethnic Albanian leaders next week in Vienna, as proposed by U.N. mediator Martti Ahtisaari.
Belgrade strongly opposes the possible independence for the region of two million people, which has been a de facto international protectorate since NATO forced Serbia's then-dictator Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw his troops from the province in a brief war in 1999.
But ethnic Albanians, who account for 90 percent of the province's people, are demanding independence, insisting they can never again be ruled by Belgrade.
Serbia's new democratic government has proposed granting the province self-rule backed by international guarantees, while formally retaining it within the borders of Serbia.
"From my point of view (independence) is not going to be a useful solution," Tadic said at a news conference with European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso.
"An independent Kosovo would be a precedent, it is going to be a problem for regional stability not only for the Balkans but for other regions in the world," Tadic said.
Analysts have said that if Kosovo is allowed to break away from Serbia, whose province it has been since the early Middle Ages, this would almost certainly be used by many other territories to justify their own secessionist designs.
These potentially include regions as diverse as Spain's Catalonia and the Basque country, Georgia's breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia statelets, Moldavia's rebellious Trans-Dniester, Azerbaijan's disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, and Indonesia's war-torn provinces of Aceh and West Papua.
Ahtisaari, the U.N. envoy, is currently trying to bridge the differences in talks on Kosovo's future status being held in Vienna. On Monday, he said he would try to bring the presidents and prime ministers of both Kosovo and Serbia together for the first time to discuss political issues.
Kosovo's President Fatmir Sejdiu and Prime Minister Agim Ceku have agreed to attend, but Tadic and Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica have not yet confirmed.
"We are expecting that Mr. Ahtisaari will send us some conditions for the talks," Tadic said without elaborating. "We will then decide whether to participate."
Tadic visited Brussels a day after Kostunica briefed EU leaders on the details of a new plan to track down and arrest fugitive war crimes suspect Gen. Ratko Mladic.
Serbia's failure to arrest Mladic, wanted on charges stemming from the 1992-95 war in Bosnia, and hand him to the U.N. tribunal in The Hague, Netherlands, led the EU to suspend talks on a so-called Stabilization and Association agreement. This is a stepping stone to possible membership in the bloc, and is considered crucial for the country's stability and economic growth.
Although no details of the new three-page plan were released, officials said it details measures to apprehend Mladic, who is wanted on charges of involvement in genocide during the 1992-95 Bosnian war. It also calls for the appointment of a government coordinator to put the plan into effect, who would have daily contact with U.N. prosecutors.
The plan is closely modeled on a similar document presented by neighboring Croatia last year, when Zagreb's talks with the EU were jeopardized by its failure to catch an army general indicted for crimes against humanity.
Belgrade is hoping the bloc will accept its assurances and restart negotiations even if Mladic remains at large, just as it did in Croatia's case.
Barroso welcomed the plan, but stopped short of endorsing a resumption of talks before Mladic's capture.
He underlined, however, that if full cooperation with the U.N. court is achieved, "there is still time to achieve the Stabilization and Association Agreement by the end of the year."
"It is not fair for the Serbian people that because of one or a few (individuals) that are accused of being war criminals, that the democratic and European future of Serbia is put on hold," Barroso said.
July 17, 2006
The dream of a Greater Albania
Kosovo gone, Montenegro gone: what is left for Belgrade?
The dream of a Greater AlbaniaBy Jean-Arnault DĂ©rens and Laurent Geslin
The Albanian minister of foreign affairs, Besnik Mustafaj, caused alarm when he said in March, “If Kosovo is divided, we can no longer guarantee its borders with Albania, or the border of the Albanian part of Macedonia” (1). Kosovo’s changed status has raised again the question of Balkan borders: nobody can predict what will happen.
On the evening of 21 May Montenegrin and Albanian flags flew side by side in Ulcinj, the southernmost town of the Montenegrin coast. Montenegro has become independent mostly because of the way the national minorities voted. The 50,000 Albanians living in the tiny republic have long been convinced citizens of the Montenegrin state.
According to Ibrahim Cungu, former police commissioner for Ulcinj and local leader of the Social Democratic party: “It is possible to be Albanian and a citizen of Montenegro.”
But the Montenegrin Albanians are an exception in the Balkans. In Macedonia, Albanians and Macedonians view each other with suspicion. The political and cultural rights of the Albanians have been recognised, and the Ohrid agreement of August 2001 ended the violent conflict between Macedonian security forces and the ethnic-Albanian National Liberation Army of Macedonia. Like the Macedonian Slavs, the Albanians are now considered a “second constitutive people” of the Macedonian republic. Albanian is the second official language in any commune where Albanians are over 20% of the population. “Before 2001 Albanian high school pupils had trouble getting into university, but the situation has improved since then,” said Afrim Kerimi, headmaster of the Albanian high school in Kumanovo.
The 2001 conflict has left deep scars, however. Many people are disappointed by the peace agreement and the guerrillas are itching to fight again. An elastic amnesty further feeds resentment and small guerrilla groups, often linked to criminal interests, are constantly springing up. One group formed in 2003 is led by Avdil Jakupi,“Commander Cakalla”; another, headed by Agim Krasniqi, occupied the village of Kondovo outside Skopje for six months in 2004.
Albanians living in Serbia’s Presevo valley are also dissatisfied with the peace. They want to take part in the Kosovo negotiations as they fear they may be completely passed over in a regional settlement.
Albanian guerrilla movements arose in Macedonia and the Presevo valley in 2001 because of Kosovo. By igniting local conflict, radical militants and supporters of a Greater Albania sought to remind the world that the international protectorate did not solve the Kosovo question. If future international decisions on Kosovo do not suit them, they will have no problem inflaming the whole region.
The Albanian nationalist movement developed only at the end of the 19th century, far later than those of the other Balkan peoples. After the Balkan war of 1912-13 Kosovo was divided between Montenegro and Serbia, with Serbia also getting a large area of Macedonia. The Treaty of London established “little Albania” on approximately the territory now occupied by Albania, but it left many Albanian people outside the new state.
There are two distinct ideas in Albanian nationalist rhetoric: Greater Albania and ethnic Albania. Greater Albania designates the lands that at various times were peopled by Albanians or their supposed ancestors, the Illyrians. Ethnic Albania corresponds to the regions where Albanians are the majority of the population (2). The nationalists tend to forget an important factor: that other communities live side by side with the Albanians in those regions.
After the dangerous ambitions of a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia, is it now the time for a Greater Albania? A number of radical, but marginal, militant networks openly campaign for it, but they may not have much popular support. There is still considerable distrust between the citizens of the republic of Albania and the Albanians from former Yugoslavia, long separated by history.
The only response to the challenge of a Greater Albania, as with a Greater Serbia, is full European integration. The prospect of a national unity that requires border changes is potentially dangerous for the region. Nevertheless the issue of a national trans-border “Albania” is a reality.
It should be possible for anyone writing a book in Shqiptari to address likely readers in Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, while an ethnic Albanian student should be free to study in Tirana, Tetovo or Pristina. But the borders will have to be far wider open than they are today.
July 16, 2006
Prof. Raymond K. Kent: THE KOSOVO TRIAL
Politicized Mythology
The Kosovo Dimension
R.K.Kent, Historian
In its llth July 2006 edition, the New York Times published a report from Paris by Marlise Simons, entitled “War Crimes Trial Begins for 6 Milosevic Aides,” (p. A3)
While the text seems to be a “matter-of-fact report,” it is marred by a priori judge-ments, skewed optics and tell-tale perceptions. Together, they suggest what the verdict is likely to be even if it will not be easy to prove the alleged centerpiece of collective sin a “secret plan” to expel all Albanians from Kosovo Her text also shows that there is hardly any depth to presumed knowledge of the subject..
The first inaccuracy is that “7,000 to 9,000 people were killed” at Kosovo while leaving no doubt that it was a one-way killing of Albanians by the Serbs. Numerous examinations, starting with the Helsinki Watch and terminating after NATO troops took over in Kosovo, came up with what should be considered as a defining verdict. There were about 3,000 casualties with a ratio of two Albanians to one Serb.
The second one consists of the assertion that “Serb terror” “drove out” of Kosovo an estimated 800,000 … Albanians..” Two facts remain unbreakable. The mass exodus of Albanians from Kosovo took place only after NATO began its bombing missions and not before. Moreover, a variety of sources, including Jewish spiritual leaders in Kosovo’s urban centers, reported that the so-called “Kosovo Liberation Army” agents actively urged the more sophisticated town dwellers to join the ranks of mainly rural refugees so as to swell the numbers. The purpose was to pave the ground for an eventual independence of a Kosovo under total Albanian control. The Serb Third Army and Police units jumped on the opportunity to “assist” the exodus by providing all sorts of transportation out. It was not “Serb terror” but rather a spontaneous accord between
legitimate Serb military and police and Albanian extremists, with different aims in mind..There, equally, can be no way to overturn the fact that no mass exodus of Albanians took place before NATO bombs and missiles began to drop from the sky over Kosovo itself. It does not really matter what Milosevic said in his defense. The facts stand out with Milosevic dead or alive and no “tribunal “ can change them.
The skewed optics derive from the fact any reader can verify. The “Kosovo Liberation Army” is mentioned nowhere in the article. Defined once as a terrorist organization by the State Department, the KLA became ”freedom fighters” overnight. As a surrogate of U.S. power “NATO” did not wish to put American soldiers on the ground and switched to the KLA for potential substitutes. The most ardent supporters of this switch were Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and General Wesley Clark, Commander of NATO.
(2)
Although numerous recent statements by members of the U.S. Government have made it clear that self-defense is inalienable as a right that belongs to all human groupings, the so-called “Hague Tribunal” has denied it to the Serb authorities at Kosovo. The KLA ambushed and killed about 300 Serb policemen before NATO entered into the matter.
But, the most glaring omission in the article, probably not deliberate, is the testimony of a German head of European Observers at Kosovo who sent daily, weekly, monthly and very detailed reports to the European Union. As he testified at the “Hague Tribunal” at lenth and in mufti, Herr Hartwig placed the entire blame for turmoil at Kosovo on the KLA and completely exhonorated the Serb authorities in respect to any criminal or “genocidal” charges. Hartwig stressed in his testimony that he was astonished after leaving Kosvo to find out what the media were “reporting” while his massive and meticulous reports compiled from hundreds of subordinate European observers never had any publicity at all.
The tell-tale sign comes from the so-called “secret plan” for total “ethnic cleansing” of
all Kosovo Albanians. It proved to be a forgery of Bulgarian Secret Services working for its German analogue (BDN) and “floated” by a German General. The Germans have had
a long association with Albanian extremists going back to WWII and the Albanian SS Skender Beg Division which initiated massive killings and expulsions of Serbs from Kosovo. It began to alter the Serb demographic advantage at Kosovo by the mid-Fortiies. There is not much doubt that our own policies in the break-up of Yugoslavia, while siding with former enemies of the US owe a great deal to influence of the Forth Reich on the CIA and the Pentagon as well as the State Department responding to our own Solons who had much support from Albanian PACs in the U.S..
It is amazing to those of us who have followed the details of the fratricidal drama in ex-Yugoslavia that self-admitted and externally documented men who butchered the Serbs
get away from jails in the Hague or return home after light sentences. Meanwhile any Serb in uniform at Kosovo and elsewhere gets a great deal of attention as a “criminal” with almost pre-determined sentences at the Hague. What is entirely lacking in this structured “set-up” is a sense of history as it does not pay in the long run to punish one’s certified and long-time friends while favoring their and our enemies, for whatever momentary and /or strategic reasons .stay hidden and away from home publics.
