The Africanization of the Balkans

The
Africanization of the Balkans

The
lessons of Zimbabwe are lost in darkest Kosovo.



By Denis Boyles

The report in Le Figaro that a trio of today’s big powers — including Russia, the U.S., and the European Union — was at loggerheads in the Balkans, has a certain cold air of familiarity about it, right down to the annoying Serb nationalists at the center of it all. The sudden chill between Russia and what we can now again call “the West” is the result of the collapse of talks between the Serbs and the Kosovars a couple of days ago. Their negotiations were supposed to be the “last chance” at working out a “settlement” — ostensibly of what relationship the Serbian province of Kosovo should have with Belgrade. In reality, the two sides were negotiating the terms of Serbian surrender demanded by the Kosovar terrorists they had once fought. The Serbs were willing to continue to come up with something, as the IHT reports today, but most think it would be an empty exercise: On December 11, the international community will impose a “solution” and grant Kosovo the independence its leaders demand. The Serbs will be scarred and Russia might not like it, but they both had their chance to do something about it eight years ago, and they missed it. Serbia was being run by a dangerous buffoon and the Russians were broke. Now the Russians are rich as czars and everybody’s worried about what they might do — including, I guess, the Russians: Le Figaro’s reporter says the Russian foreign minister is “very alarmed” at the consequences of forcing Serbia to accept Kosovo’s independence. That Russian alarm was matched by American concern. Our negotiator, Frank Wisner, told Le Monde that “tensions are obvious.” Sorting out the Balkans should be a snap. The countries there are little and cute. But the “Balkan powder keg” is a local trademark, and for good cause. The place is a mess; for starters, the air war against Serbia left affairs in a state of perilous improvisation. The feebleness of Russia a decade ago is what permitted the bulldozer diplomacy of heavy-handed men like Richard Holbrooke, whose famous Dayton agreement criminalized not only Serbia’s actual criminals, including especially Slobdan Milosevic, but also the entire Serbian nation. As the architect of America’s diplomacy in the Balkans, Holbrooke left a legacy of lean-tos and shanties. The Dayton Accords ended the conflict in Bosnia by enshrining fractured politics in a state dominated by Muslims, and where today, consequently, “hundreds of mujahadeen fighters…are successfully spreading their fundamentalist Islamist views” at the expense of Bosnian Serbs, according to Der Spiegel. As in Kosovo, the international community will eventually force a settlement on the Bosnian Serbs. In fact, tensions will rise this weekend, as the Islamic presidency seeks to impose reforms that will eliminate the semi-autonomy Dayton had granted the Serbs, Muslims, and Catholics, in favor of the Muslim majority. The resulting Islamic state may well drift further toward the Wahhabism now firmly taking root there. Kosovo may travel a similar path path. During the last eight years of often ineffective NATO occupation, Kosovar Serbs have been effectively cleansed from all but the very northernmost districts. This constitutes an ironic end to a conflict that only came to America’s attention when Milosevic’s army tried to solve a backyard terrorism problem by driving Albanian Kosovars, including members of the Marxist-inspired Islamic Kosovo Liberation Army, back to Albania (a country that desperately didn’t want them). The goal of the KLA, of course, was to cleanse Kosovo of Serbs, as newspapers and magazines — including NRO and The New York Times, in dispatches like this one and others from the 1990s — occasionally noted. The Republican in the White House may think the KLA is heroic now, but in 1999, the party felt differently, as this Senate Republican Policy Committee report makes clear. The current Kosovo government is populated by the former terrorist leaders mentioned in that report, including Hashim Thaci, whose radical party defeated a more moderate one, and carried the elections that were held in the province on November 17. According to the BBC, Thaci, who’s married to an Albanian mafia princess (Pristina’s a long way from Queens), has long been associated with racketeering in Kosovo. He was also widely known as a ruthless opponent of the late Ibrahim Rugova, Kosovo’s popular moderate leader who died in 2006. Wary of the ex-KLA leaders’ ambitions, and maybe knowing a few things we don’t, most Albanians avoided the election (turnout was around 45-percent, and Kosovar Serbs boycotted the vote entirely.) But an independent Kosovo under the leadership of former KLA commanders is apparently a done deal, no matter what the Russians want. The statements from the Kosovar leadership imply the threat of violence if they are not appeased. Violence against whom? The few remaining Kosovar Serbs? The Independent’s ill-formed “big question” is “Would the Balkans flare up again if Kosovo declared independence?” That’s the wrong question, of course. The question is will violence flare up again if they don’t declare independence? The Kosovars may not want to make the mistake the Serbs made. The “war” in Kosovo was widely supported in the U.S., largely on the basis of genuine outrage at what Milosevic was doing, and if the press made mistakes in reporting, as some claim they may have in Radac, for example, there’s no escaping the fact that in Kosovo, the Serbs deserved to lose. And lose the Serbs did. It was a neat, Clintonian kind of war, led by a general only Clinton could really love, Wesley Clark (Peter J. Boyer’s entertaining New Yorker profile from 2003 is here), in which civilians may have been bombed in Belgrade but our casualty list was fairly short. Some wondered why we were cluster-bombing people in a country that had been our ally in two wars (at no small cost, either) instead of boycotting them into compliance with civilized norms, and exactly how much punishment Serbia deserves. But the larger question is why we were there at all. Kosovo became America’s problem only because the Europeans were no better at solving Balkan crises than they are at negotiating with Iranians. As Ed Morrissey recently observed in his Captain’s Quarters blog, “[Kosovo] is, and should always have been, a strictly European affair.” Maybe, but when there’s a spliff of moral outrage to be passed around, nobody wants to miss the buzz. So enthusiasm in the U.S. for an independent Kosovo comes from right and left. William Finnegan’s lively piece in the current New Yorker captures the mood about Kosovo in blue-state America perhaps better than it does the mood in Kosovo itself, judging from those election turnouts. But The Wall Street Journal also has demanded quick independence for Kosovo and lately has taken to giving Kosovo’s current prime minister, Agim Ceku, op-ed space not just once, but twice in three months (but each time inviting James Jatras of the lonely American Council for Kosovo to write a letter to the editor, the most recent of which is here). Richard Holbrooke, one of the most authoritative American advocates of independence for Kosovo, endorsed Thaci, telling the Sueddeutsche Zeitung that he had known the chap “for about ten years” and had found that he had a “remarkable” way about him. No doubt. Holbrooke and others are irritated by suspicions that an Islamic Kosovo might pose a security risk. They shrug off concerns by claiming, rightly, that most Kosovars are secular Muslims and that the place will never be an al-Qaeda base or a haven for extremists. But they say that about Bosnia, too. Besides, what was Assistant U.S. Attorney Brian Frazier telling that jury in the Jose Padilla trial? Something, Reuters reported, about “al Qaeda-affiliated groups” fighting in Kosovo in the ‘90s? I guess they were our allies, back in the day. Any friend of Thaci’s… If 55-percent of the Kosovo citizens couldn’t bring themselves to vote at all, how rushed are they for independence? Maybe they realize that independence isn’t as simple as a slogan, and that they’ll have to live with whatever happens next. And maybe they too think there may be other ways to go, as this Christian Science Monitor article proposes. Kosovo’s neighbors, including Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania itself, are deeply concerned about the implications of an independent Kosovo, and the whole idea of a “greater Albania.” It’s Europe’s Kurdistan in some ways. The Balkan crisis recalls more than just Sarajevo, 1914. It also smacks of Salisbury, 1980, and a dozen other African capitals upon achieving an expeditious, politically convenient independence, in which something bad was replaced by something arguably worse. The common complaint about colonialism wasn’t how it began but how it ended: When it was time to go, the retreating colonial power gave the keys to the guy with the most guns and ran for it, rather than trying to take the time to fight for a more careful solution that required careful thought, and saved lots of lives. Thus, the history of post-colonial Africa is littered with murderous tyrants, the most notorious of which is Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe (a recent NRO piece describing his early support from an unthinking international community is here). Kosovo’s not a colony and southeastern Europe isn’t Africa. But in Zimbabwe, we enthroned a known criminal. The result was much, much more criminality. Do we really want to do the same in the Balkans? — Denis Boyles, author of Vile France and the upcoming Superior, Nebraska.

http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=OGIzYTMzM2JkODg0ZjczNjkzOWU2NDg0OTc1NzY2NDk=

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Serbia won't accept 'rogue' Kosovo

Serbia won't
accept 'rogue' Kosovo

Serbia's prime minister has said the country will never
recognise an "illegal and rogue" independent Kosovo, with no sign of
any likely deal on the eve of a final round of deadlocked talks on the future
of the province.

Serb and Albanian delegations are to meet in Baden, Austria
for a three-day attempt at a compromise on the status of the disputed province.

The negotiations so far have produced no agreement.
Mediators from the US, EU and Russia are to report to the UN Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon by December 10 about the process.

In the past several meetings, leaders of the ethnic Albanian
majority in Kosovo have rejected even considering anything short of
independence, while Serbia refuses to let go of its separatist region.

Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica said Serbia will never
recognise an independent Kosovo, calling it "an illegal and rogue
creation". "Serbia will show that unilateral independence means
absolutely nothing," he said.

The US and its allies have backed independence for Kosovo,
suggesting they might recognise the region as an independent nation if talks
with Serbia fail altogether. Russia however, has backed Serbia in its efforts
to keep Kosovo.

Mr Kostunica said "a recognition by America or any
other country cannot change anything and turn an illegal act into a normal and
regular thing".

Kosovo formally is part of Serbia, although Belgrade has had
no authority over the region since 1999, when a Nato bombing forced Serbia to
end a crackdown against the Kosovo separatists and pull its troops out.

The province has been run by the United Nations and Nato
since June 1999.

President Boris Tadic said Belgrade believes that a
compromise is possible, and will again present a proposal for what he termed
"essential autonomy" for Kosovo. "We are going there fully
convinced that we are right, and we will defend our position very firmly and
carefully," he said.

http://news.uk.msn.com/Article.aspx?cp-documentid=6802470

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Mr. Ceku's Disorderly House

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119561138717200039.html?mod=googlenews_wsj



Mr. Ceku's Disorderly House

November 21, 2007; Page A17



The recent column by Agim Ceku ("Kosovo Wants Independence," Nov. 15)
presents the critic with what military planners would call a target-rich
environment. Virtually every assertion about Kosovo's prospects as an
independent state screams out for rebuttal.



For the sake of brevity, let us focus on just one: Mr. Ceku's suggestion that
Kosovo, under his U.N.-supervised administration, has "put our structures
in place and our house in order." This month's report by the European Commission
tells a very different story:



"Due to a lack of clear political will to fight corruption, and to
insufficient legislative and implementing measures, corruption is still
widespread," the report said. "Civil servants are still vulnerable to
political interference, corrupt practices and nepotism" and "Kosovo's
public administration remains weak and inefficient," the report added.



Furthermore, "the composition of the government anti-corruption council
does not sufficiently guarantee its impartiality," and "little
progress can be reported in the area of organized crime and combating of
trafficking in human beings."



War crime trials are being "hampered by the unwillingness of the local
population to testify" and "there is still no specific legislation on
witness protection in place," according to the report. "Civil society
organizations remain weak" and "awareness of women's rights in
society is low."



If this is the "house" Mr. Ceku claims "is in order" in
advance of what he hopes will be conferral of independence, one shudders to
think what disorder would look like. To be sure, Mr. Ceku makes use of the
usual dodge that Kosovo's progress is limited by the absence of "clarity
on our future status," namely independence. But Taiwan, by contrast, has
gone without such clarity for over half a century and is nothing like the
disaster over which Mr. Ceku presides.



Instead of falling for his fairy tales about Kosovo's fitness for sovereignty
the international community needs to open its eyes to the reality of this
corrupt, criminal, and nonviable entity. Granting independence to Kosovo, which
would mean handing de jure power to those responsible for this state of
affairs, can only turn a disaster into a catastrophe.



James George Jatras

Director

American Council for Kosovo

Washington

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First Kosovo, and then what?

November
20, 2007

EUROPE
STILL has a Balkans problem. This is the message to take away from the victory
of former guerrilla leader Hashim Thaci's party in Saturday's parliamentary
elections in Kosovo - balloting that was boycotted by the 10 percent of
Kosovo's population who are Serbs.

The UN-supervised region is officially part of Serbia. But ever
since NATO went to war in 1999 to force Slobodan Milosevic to end his ethnic
cleansing of Albanian villages in Kosovo, the region's Albanian majority have
set their sights on separation from Serbia. Recently, American, Russian, and
European mediators have been trying to craft a formula for autonomy or phased
independence that would be acceptable both to Serbia and the Albanian Kosovar government.

The
mediators are due to report to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon by
that date, and Thaci has threatened to declare independence unilaterally if
they do not recommend independence for Kosovo. But any such unilateral action
could set off instability across the Balkans and beyond.

While
20 of the EU's 27 members favor independence for Kosovo, nearly all dread a
unilateral declaration. That prospect conjures up memories of Europe's careless
acceptance of declarations of independence from Yugoslavia by Slovenia,
Croatia, and Bosnia in the early 1990s. Those acts ushered in horrific wars and
crimes against humanity.

A
unilateral lunge for independence by Kosovo could spur Serbs in Bosnia and
Herzogovina - half that country's population - to follow suit. And Kremlin
warnings against the imposition of any Kosovo formula not acceptable to Serbia
raises the specter of Russian backing for independence movements in Georgia,
Moldova, and even Ukraine. This would be a prescription for armed conflict
around the periphery of Europe.

Some
European diplomats also worry about the United Nations carving new countries
out of older countries' provinces. They recognize that separatist reflexes
persist in regions such as Catalonia and the Basque country. Even the Flemish
and Walloon populations of tiny Belgium may want a nationalist divorce.

The
Kosovo majority's impatience for independence is understandable, particularly
since it has been subjected to a corrupt and inefficient UN tutelage. But the
European, American, and Russian mediators should keep Serbia and the Kosovars
at the negotiating table as long as it takes to hammer out a resolution to
which both sides agree.

This
may mean incorporating the Serbian-populated area of Kosovo into Serbia proper,
along with Serbian monasteries and holy sites. It may entail minor population
transfers. But whatever the eventual solution, it should be accepted by the two
peoples and not imposed by outsiders.

© Copyright 2007 Globe
Newspaper Company.

First
Kosovo, and then what? - The Boston Globe

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It's hard to imagine a worse outcome for the Balkans

The prospect of another war and more
savage ethnic cleansing shows just what a fine mess we created eight years ago




Simon
Jenkins

Wednesday November 21, 2007

The Guardian

This one we can see coming. On December 10 the second round
of so far abortive talks on Kosovan independence will expire, bringing to a
crisis the unfinished last chapter of the west's 1990s "Balkanisation of the Balkans". In
Brussels this week European ministers will make a final effort to forestall the
decision of the newly elected Kosovan government to declare unilateral
independence of Serbia. Since Serbia is equally determined not to grant it,
irresistible force has met immovable object.

This is not a clash of tinpot
dictators but one of democratic outcomes. Kosovo's independence is the clear
wish of its electors, just as it is not the wish of Serbia's. The latter have
long regarded Kosovo as part of their emotional and historic integrity. The auguries
presage a return to conflict.

The instinct of British politicians and media is to declare that something
must be done. It is usually then to do nothing and then something messy, and
finally to say that something should have been done earlier as it would not
have been so messy. This is what happened successively in Croatia, Bosnia and
Kosovo in the 1990s. In each case militant separatists were encouraged, with
varying degrees of enthusiasm, to seek independence from whatever regime ruled
in Belgrade, which they duly obtained with considerable shedding of blood.

Faced not just with the break up of Tito's wider Yugoslavia but with the
defection of the core provinces of Bosnia, Montenegro and Kosovo, Serbs under
Milosevic tried to hold them by force. They treated the Kosovans so cruelly
that the outside world was moved to intervene. While most countries, including
America, tut-tutted and for three months dropped bombs, probably hastening the
carnage in Kosovo, Tony Blair rightly divined that only a ground invasion could
reverse a humanitarian outrage. In this he was successful.

But what did he expect to happen next? As in Afghanistan and Iraq, Britain
is, like the US, inclined to shoot first and plan afterwards. In Kosovo the
outcome was to reward "terrorist" separatists with a country of their
own, albeit smaller than Wales. Men who, were they Serbs, would be hauled
before a war crimes tribunal are now hailed in the west as heroes.

For eight years Kosovo has enjoyed de facto autonomy under the protection of
17,000 Nato troops. These have allowed the regime to
"reverse-cleanse" the province of half its Serbs, including virtually
all the 40,000 who once lived in the capital, Pristina. There are barely
200,000 left, just 10% of the population. Although the new prime minister, the
former guerrilla Hashim Thaci, declares that "Kosovo is ready for
independence", he cannot mean it. Kosovo
is a Nato protectorate under UN administration, with more aid per head than any
state in Asia or Africa. What Thaci wants is not independence but the luxuriant
post-intervention dependency enjoyed by Bosnia, Sierra Leone and the embattled
regimes in Baghdad and Kabul.

To this the Serbs remain implacably opposed. Even moderate opponents of
Milosevic's reign regard the enforced dismemberment of their nation as
excessive punishment for the barbarities committed by the Serb army in 1998.
Nor will they let it rest. Like the Basque country for Spain and the Falklands
for Argentina, Kosovo will always be a cause celebre for Serbia.

Independence for Kosovo clearly accords with current realpolitik, but
realpolitik is seldom the end of the matter in the Balkans. Russia says it
would veto Kosovo's acceptance into the UN, and to that extent Kosovo would be
an illegitimate state.

Nor is Russia's attitude purely due to Slav solidarity. Moscow is
understandably averse to western troops coming to the aid of separatist
movements wherever there is insurrection or cries of genocide, least of all
within bombing distance of the Caucasus. Russia is supported in this view by
Spain, Greece and Cyprus, each with separatist problems. And what does Britain,
so keen on Balkan partition, say to the Pashtuns or the Kurds when they demand
independence?

These are not diplomatic niceties. Already guerrillas of the shadowy
Albanian National Army are reportedly roaming the Serbia/Kosovo border, partly
financed by a massive heroin trade. Already Serbian militias are arming against
them, preparing to defend their compatriots under siege inside Kosovo.

At best, resumed hostilities would mean further savage ethnic cleansing and
a repartition of Kosovo. At worst, it would mean a long-running border war,
with western troops sucked into defending Kosovan irregulars and Russia into
defending Serbia's sovereignty. It is hard to imagine a worse outcome to
Britain's glorious "mission accomplished".

Any visitor to the Balkans soon learns that what in Westminster seems a
landscape of black and white, goodies and baddies, is in truth all grey.
Britain has been party to the military partition of a sovereign European state
at the instigation of its separatists, albeit with justice and local majority
opinion on their side. Such self-determinations are never straightforward, as
the English know in their dealings with Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

The prospect of war has commentators screaming that "something must be
done". I have not read one sensible answer to the question: what? Had Nato
negotiated some sort of delegated sovereignty for Kosovo with the post-Milosevic
government in Belgrade, Pristina hardliners might have been faced down and
Serbia's notional integrity preserved.

That day has passed. It is easy to "hope" that Thaci and the
Serbian prime minister, Vojislav Kostunica, might see the virtue of compromise
and agree to go their separate ways under some sort of UN "sovereignty
umbrella" (once proposed for the Falklands). But with Russia behind the
Serbs, and Europe and America behind the Kosovans, why should leaders in either
Belgrade or Pristina risk the wrath of their electorates by compromising? Once
steeped in such dependency, no one feels any pressure to back down.

Kosovo is a western protectorate. There is no pressing need for de facto
autonomy to become de jure independence. Pristina has as much autonomy as it
can use and should be ordered to tone down its senseless confrontation and
leave Serbia a shred of pride - on pain of a genuine independence it would
certainly not like. In any resumed war, Kosovo would not be a winner.

simon.jenkins@guardian.co.uk

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First Kosovo, and then what?

Email|Print| Text size –
+

November 20, 2007

EUROPE STILL has a Balkans problem. This is the message to take away from
the victory of former guerrilla leader Hashim Thaci's party in Saturday's
parliamentary elections in Kosovo - balloting that was boycotted by the 10
percent of Kosovo's population who are Serbs.

The UN-supervised region is officially part of Serbia. But ever since NATO
went to war in 1999 to force Slobodan Milosevic to end his ethnic cleansing of
Albanian villages in Kosovo, the region's Albanian majority have set their
sights on separation from Serbia. Recently, American, Russian, and European
mediators have been trying to craft a formula for autonomy or phased
independence that would be acceptable both to Serbia and the Albanian Kosovar
government.

The mediators are due to report to United Nations Secretary General Ban
Ki-moon by that date, and Thaci has threatened to declare independence
unilaterally if they do not recommend independence for Kosovo. But any such
unilateral action could set off instability across the Balkans and beyond.

While 20 of the EU's 27 members favor independence for Kosovo, nearly all
dread a unilateral declaration. That prospect conjures up memories of Europe's
careless acceptance of declarations of independence from Yugoslavia by
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia in the early 1990s. Those acts ushered in
horrific wars and crimes against humanity.

A unilateral lunge for independence by Kosovo could spur Serbs in Bosnia and
Herzogovina - half that country's population - to follow suit. And Kremlin
warnings against the imposition of any Kosovo formula not acceptable to Serbia
raises the specter of Russian backing for independence movements in Georgia,
Moldova, and even Ukraine. This would be a prescription for armed conflict
around the periphery of Europe.

Some European diplomats also worry about the United Nations carving new
countries out of older countries' provinces. They recognize that separatist
reflexes persist in regions such as Catalonia and the Basque country. Even the
Flemish and Walloon populations of tiny Belgium may want a nationalist divorce.

The Kosovo majority's impatience for independence is understandable,
particularly since it has been subjected to a corrupt and inefficient UN
tutelage. But the European, American, and Russian mediators should keep Serbia
and the Kosovars at the negotiating table as long as it takes to hammer out a
resolution to which both sides agree.

This may mean incorporating the Serbian-populated area of Kosovo into Serbia
proper, along with Serbian monasteries and holy sites. It may entail minor
population transfers. But whatever the eventual solution, it should be accepted
by the two peoples and not imposed by outsiders.

© Copyright 2007 Globe Newspaper Company.

http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/editorials/articles/2007/11/20/first_kosovo_and_then_what/

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Kosovo: The Fuse on the Balkan Powder Keg

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=298431



Stratfor

Kosovo:
The Fuse on the Balkan Powder Keg

November 16, 2007 21 55 GMT

Summary

Kosovo's expected Dec. 10 declaration of independence from Serbia is already
inspiring minor violent incidents throughout the Balkans. If tensions erupt
over the issue, the fighting is almost certain to spread beyond Kosovo and
Serbia.



Analysis



Kosovo is set to hold parliamentary and local elections Nov. 17 amid tensions
surrounding talks on the region's status and the boycott of the elections
called by the Serbs. Leading up to Kosovo's expected Dec. 10 declaration of
independence from Serbia, small sparks of violence are surfacing not only in Kosovo
and Serbia, but also in other Balkan states -- illustrating that if this powder
keg blows, the explosion will not be limited to Kosovo and Serbia.



Though the international community is completely
split on the issue of Kosovar independence -- and has been since the
region's 1999 provisional break from Serbia -- the small secessionist
government has said it will not wait any longer. Serbs consider Kosovo the
birthplace of their national identity and view Kosovar Albanians as little more
than a recent infestation, though the province's population is now more than 90
percent Albanian and less than 5 percent Serbian. The Kosovars want nothing
less than independence, and the Serbs want to give them anything but.

Kosovo had expected the West
to continue supporting what it called the inevitability
of Kosovar independence. However, that inevitability is now lost in the shuffle
of a larger
political battle between global power players such as Russia, the European
Union and the United States, and Serbia and Kosovo are left with only
uncertainty.

All sides fear this uncertainty
will turn volatile -- and possibly bloody. If an explosion of violence does
occur, it will not be contained within Serbia and Kosovo's borders; it could
destabilize the entire Balkan region. Minor incidents of violence and
instability have already
been seen in Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.



Serbia and Kosovo



Serbia and Kosovo seem to have avoided violence on the scale of that seen in
the late 1990s, mainly because the Radicals did not come to power during Serbian
elections and because Kosovar independence was continually put on the back
burner this year. This does not mean, however, that such violence can be
avoided altogether, especially as each side gets more fed up with the
situation. Small-scale violence has been seen and is not unexpected. Tensions
are high between Kosovars and Serbs and within each ethnic faction as well.



The Serbs within Kosovo do not make up enough of the population to attempt any
meaningful military operations, but there are other threats. The most obvious
-- but not the most likely -- is that Serbia could do what it did in 1999 when
it wanted to reassert full control over Kosovo: send in the army. But the
military is not in the shape it was in then. Moreover, the Serbs within Serbia
proper are too fractured; some are willing to forgo Kosovo to gain EU
membership, while others are willing to fight to the end for the small
province. That is enough to cause trouble, since only a few radicals are needed
to form paramilitary groups like those seen during the war.



There are also small Serbian terrorist groups that have been operating
periodically in Serbia and Kosovo. The best known is Tsar Lazar's Guard, which
was a joke when it first formed but has been gaining support -- and reportedly
weapons -- as Dec. 10 approaches. Serbs are not the only group reported to have
militants working for their cause; the Albanian National Army militant group
reportedly has been recruiting new members and equipment recently.



Kosovar Albanians also have been stirring unrest inside the recently
independent Montenegro. The small Albanian population in Montenegro on the
Kosovar border has already been stirred up, however; a handful of Albanians
were arrested in Ulcinj, Montenegro, and Kosovar Albanians began flooding over
the border and stormed the police station in protest.



Montenegro understands what it is like to push for independence from Serbia,
but unlike Kosovo the country is still
very divided over whether it is content with its new independence.
Approximately 40 percent still consider themselves ethnically Serbian --
especially since they share the same church and same language -- and are thus
loyal to Belgrade. Some Montenegrin Serbians have already pledged to help fight
if Kosovo gets its independence.



Macedonia



The militants in Kosovo have also been linked to Albanians crossing the border
from Macedonia. Albanians are the ethnic minority within Macedonia but hold the
majority of the northwestern part of the country. The Macedonian-Kosovar border
is mountainous and incredibly porous, leading to large border crossings that the
already weak Macedonian military cannot prevent. These Albanians and Kosovar
Albanians have been seen actively engaging in violence on both sides of the
border, proving that the wounds from the 2001 Macedonia conflict -- in which
the Albanians within the country began attacking Macedonian forces -- are still
fresh.



Internally, Macedonia has been politically unstable because of the main
Albanian party actively pushing against the government as it keeps its eyes on
Kosovo. Macedonia is trying to keep a lid on any large-scale violence because
of its aspirations to join the EU, but hostilities have broken out within
Macedonia's borders. On Nov. 7, Macedonian police killed four Albanians in an
operation called Mountain Storm on Mount Sar Planina. Macedonian police said
the Albanians were planning a major terrorist act that would destabilize both
Kosovo and Macedonia.



Bosnia-Herzegovina



Bosnia-Herzegovina
could be a flashpoint in the struggle over Kosovo. Bosnia-Herzegovina is split
between two autonomous regions -- the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Republika Srpska (the Serb Republic) -- and three ethnic groups: Muslim
Bosniaks, Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs. In short, the country does not
have a comfortable ethnic, social, historic or political mixture. The U.N.
administrative presence is the only thing keeping relative peace and general
unity in the country.



However, control is being transferred from the United Nations to the European
Union -- something many radical Serbs within the country are not happy with
because it means the loss of Russia's voice in Bosnia's future (Russia is on
the U.N. Security Council and supports the Orthodox Serbs). The Muslims within the
country do not want EU supervision, claiming the Union is not friendly to
Muslims. Republika Srpska has criticized the transfer, since they pledge their
loyalty to their brother Serbs next door and to their more numerous Orthodox
brothers in Russia.



The Muslim Bosniaks and Serbs -- with the Croats in flux -- are keeping the
country from moving toward any political unity or a real constitution. But with
Kosovo in play, the Serbs from Republika Srpska are threatening to declare
their own independence. It is no secret that the majority of Serbs within
Republika Srpska want Serbia proper to annex their region, though many Serbs in
Serbia proper look upon them as radicals or country bumpkins. Serbs in
Republika Srpska could become very problematic if they either split from
Bosnia-Herzegovina or decide to flood across the border to fight with their
fellow Serbs. NATO -- which commands the European forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina
-- is rumored to have a contingency plan to sweep into Republika Srpska if
either of these events happens, taking the government buildings and media
outlets and blocking the main roads into Serbia.



The Threat of Greater -- and Spreading -- Violence



Contagion effects of Balkan violence are well known; they were seen both in the
early 20th century and in the 1990s, and the recent outbursts are following the
same pattern. Since EU and NATO forces are present, there have been no large
wars declared by the states themselves. But if the region does ignite, Western
forces could face many problems. First, those forces are a mere shadow of what
they were during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s -- during which it took four
years to get the region generally under control. European and U.S. forces are
deployed only in the non-Serbian section of Bosnia-Herzegovina and within
Kosovo, not throughout the region. Furthermore, NATO and the United States are
bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq and trying to juggle threats larger than
the Balkans -- namely Iran and Russia.



To put it plainly, the West is not paying much attention to the Balkans other
than as a bargaining chip with other global players such as Russia. But with or
without the world watching, the actors in the Balkans are ready to move.

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Kosovo's contested future

Kosovo's contested future

Paul
Hockenos

The international community is due to deliver its verdict on the future
status of Kosovo on 10 December 2007. But the interests of the international
actors deciding the disputed territory's fate is part of the problem, says Paul
Hockenos.

16 - 11 - 2007

It can be exasperating to hear people from the Balkans blame “foreign powers”
with hidden agendas and geopolitical ambitions for their troubles, as if they
themselves bear no responsibility for their fortunes. But it would be easier to
refute this counterproductive thinking if it hadn’t so often been the case over
history - and is the case today, particularly when it comes to Kosovo. The
problem of determining the “final status” of a province that is still legally
part of Serbia but whose population is 90% ethnic Albanian was always going to
be difficult. What makes it even harder is that international policy toward the
disputed territory is being driven by the interests of external actors rather
than those of the people of Kosovo, including the Kosovar Serbs. The main obstacle to a settlement is that
these powers - the United Nations, the European Union member-states, the United
States, and Russia - are themselves deeply divided, for reasons that have
little to do with Kosovo itself.

The current eleventh-hour talks follow a year of United Nations-sponsored
negotiations headed by former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari, which came
exasperatingly close to a reasonable conclusion but ran aground in the UN
Security Council, upon the threat of a Russian veto. The ongoing diplomacy, led
by a “troika” of Russian, United States, and European Union envoys, is likely
to get no further. Yet, a bitter irony not lost on the province’s increasingly
resentful people: there is a general consensus in the international community
that independence for the Kosovar Albanians is both inevitable and, ultimately,
the best option (among many unappealing options) for everyone involved - even for
Serbia. But the trick is how to get there; and on this almost no one agrees.



The road's end



The United Nations, after eight years of running Kosovo as a protectorate,
urgently wants to pack up and leave, regardless of Kosovo’s status. The UN
mission in Kosovo (Unmik) derives its authority from the Security Council,
which stipulated that an interim UN mission administer a broadly autonomous
Kosovo, and that the territory remain part of Serbia. Future talks would
determine a “final status” for Kosovo thus relieving the UN of its watch. The
UN was never meant to stay in Kosovo forever, point out UN officials, the way
it got stuck in Cyprus for thirty-odd years.

Since June 1999, the UN has run one of the most expensive, worst
administered missions of the many around the world. A telling illustration of
the UN’s ineptitude is the main power-station, that despite millions of euros
in international investment still leaves Pristina shivering through the winter.
Much of the Serb minority lives in depressing enclaves or in the area around
the northern part of the city of Mitrovica, which borders southern Serbia. Only
half the people of working age in Kosovo have jobs. The greatest single debacle
was the international mission’s inability to protect the Serbs in March 2004
when rioting Albanians attacked Serbs and sacked Orthodox churches. In February
2007, two Albanian student demonstrators were shot dead by UN police as they
marched in protest against the Ahtisaari plan. It is no wonder the UN is eager
to transfer authority to the European Union as soon as possible.

Kosovo's plight

Ahtisaari’s task was to negotiate the terms of the new status and the
transition. Would the Europeans be mentoring a newly independent state into the
EU, replacing the UN as overlord, or some combination of the two? The Ahtisaari
report proposed “supervised independence” for Kosovo, namely a phased-in
statehood overseen by an international civilian body with military
capabilities. The plan envisioned a multi-ethnic, broadly decentralised Kosovo
in which the minority Serbs had far-ranging rights and autonomy. In fact, so
extensive was the autonomy for minorities that politicians in neighbouring
countries (and even as far away as Spain and Belgium) worried out loud that
their minority populations might insist upon the same.

Paul Hockenos is a
journalist and author who has written about south-eastern Europe since 1989. He
is based in Berlin where he works for the European Stability
Initiative. He is the author of Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars
(Cornell University Press, 2003The plan received praise, not least from
Washington where the George W Bush administration has consistently championed
Kosovar statehood. But the United States’ position has less to do with noble
principles of self-determination than it has with extracting the US from a
remote, hopeless conflict. The US’s main priority is to free up resources for
deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan. European troops may now form the bulk of
the the Nato contingent, but Washington is impatient with the pace of progress
and is eager to wash its hands of the Balkans; the creation of a Kosovo state
will, it calculates, facilitate this. Furthermore, the American president sees
Kosovo (to Europeans’ embarrassment) through the prism of the “war on terror”,
and has said that a free Kosovo would be a positive example of a peaceful,
democratic Muslim state.



Most of the European Union’s twenty-seven members applauded the Ahtisaari plan
as well - for reasons of calculated Realpolitik. After all, there is no EU
support for statehood for countless other small peoples who also suffer
discrimination or worse - among them the Kurds, Basques, Ossetians, Chechens,
Abkhaz, and Tibetans. But in the western Balkans, the factor that trumps all
others is stability: Kosovo’s fate is critical to the entire region. After the
bloodshed in Croatia and Bosnia in the early 1990s, which the then
fifteen-strong European Community failed to stem, the European Union invested
enormous energies and funds in pacifying the Balkans and bringing the region
under its wing. Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia have joined the EU, and Croatia
will follow. But this energy flagged with the defeat of the constitutional treaty
in 2005 and “enlargement fatigue.” The EU’s commitment wavered and this was
felt by the pro-European forces in the western Balkans.

Today, the stakes are again high. Kosovo is the linchpin that connects
ethnic Albanian communities in four problem-states: Serbia, Montenegro,
Macedonia, and Albania. Any kind of civic unrest or armed conflict in Kosovo
would surely drag these countries in, upending a decade of painstaking,
expensive progress. There is the real fear that Greece, Bulgaria, and Bosnia
would also become implicated, as would all of Serbia’s neighbours, including
Croatia, Hungary, and Romania; the multiple tremors could easily damage fragile
arrangements with ethnic minorities and cause the EU to split again over a
response. This is why Brussels just recently pushed through relaxed visa
requirements for the western Balkan states to enter the European Union,
something that should have been done years ago. Now it could be too little, too
late.



The Ahtisaari plan - and, implicitly, the idea of non-negotiated independence
for Kosovo - has forceful opponents too. Russia is first among them. The
Ahtisaari-led negotiations proceeded under the assumption that in the end
Russia would be on board. Although Moscow had firmly opposed the idea of
non-negotiated independence in the past and had taken the side of the Serbs
repeatedly over the 1990s, the negotiators claimed that there were clear
signals from Moscow indicating that Russia would consent to the process and
even to an independent Kosovo.

The turning-point, argue some, was the Bush administration’s decision in
early 2006 to station an anti-missile defence system in Poland and the Czech
Republic, territory that had been part of the Soviet bloc and still considered
sensitive by Russia for security reasons. President Putin may have been willing
to “trade” cancellation of the missile programme for Kosovar statehood - though
the possibility was never explored by Washington.

It is also possible, however, that for reasons of state (and not out of any
solidarity with its eastern Orthodox brothers in Serbia) Russia was never going
to accept an independent Kosovar state. The principle of territorial integrity
is not just etched into the UN charter; it is critical to sprawling,
multinational Russia. The Kremlin is well aware of the precedent that
recognising a breakaway region would set for far-flung and disenchanted
national groups (such as the Chechens) in its own sovereign territory. “The
principle of the territorial integrity of states, member states of the United
Nations, is one of the foundations of international law”, stated Russia’s UN
ambassador in summer 2007, explaining Moscow’s opposition to the Ahtisaari
plan. “There is a very strong political motivation not to reward aggressive
separatist inclinations.” This naked self-interest explains Moscow’s motives
much better than speculation about Russian designs in the Balkans, pan-Slavic
brotherhood, or geo-strategic jockeying in the “new cold war”.

The deep uneasiness of a handful of EU states - among them Spain, Romania,
Cyprus, Greece, and Slovakia - to awarding statehood to “breakaway minorities”
also has little to do with Kosovo and everything with their own minorities.
These states could, like the Russians, tolerate an independent Kosovo if it had
the blessing of both parties, the Serbs and the Albanians, as did the
Czech-Slovak and Serb-Montenegrin “negotiated” divorces. The positions of the
holdout EU countries become vitally important should (as in one current option)
the EU opt to circumvent the Security Council and recognise Kosovo’s
independence together with the United States. Since the deployment of an EU
mission to Kosovo requires a full consensus, a veto by even one state could
throw everything back to square one.

Serbia's secret

The government in Belgrade claims that the Ahtisaari plan was a
straightforward attempt to rob them of Kosovo. The vehement reaction defied
Ahtisaari’s assumption that the Serbs would passively accept his proposal if
enough compensatory “sweeteners” in the form of EU development funds and other
incentives were dangled in front of them. But once Belgrade’s nationalists saw
that Russia wasn’t going along, they retreated to a hardline position. Serbia’s
leadership turned the future of Kosovo into a symbolically loaded cause, a
test-case of national loyalty, in a way that made being “soft” on the issue
impossible for any political party.

But how important is Kosovo to the Serbs in reality? There is a dark joke
inside Serbia that if a Kosovo under Serbian rule would mean (on
equal-opportunity grounds) Albanians being granted one-fifth of places in the
national parliament, on hospital boards, in the judiciary, the education
system, then the Serbs would turn and run in the other direction. The imbalance
in birthrates is a horror-scenario for Serb nationalists. In fact, many Serb
citizens (and off-the-record, even politicians) acknowledge that Serbia would
benefit enormously from cutting loose Kosovo and concentrating on its own
problems. But saying this aloud in Serbia is treasonous.

Among openDemocracy's articles on Kosovo and and the future of Serbia:



Vesna Goldsworthy, "Au revoir, Montenegro?" (23 May 2006)



Peter Lippman, "Kosovo:
approaching independence or chaos" (30 October 2006)



Eric Gordy, "Serbia's
elections: less of the same" (23 January 2007)



TK Vogel, "Kosovo:
a break in the ice" (2 February 2007)



Marko Attila Hoare, "Kosovo:
the Balkans' last independent state" (12 February 2007)



Vicken Cheterian, "Serbia
after Kosovo" (18 April 2007)



Neven Andjelic, "Serbia
and Eurovision: whose victory?" (25 May 2007The
Kosovars' fate

What of the people - or peoples - of Kosovo themselves? The
Belgrade leadership has treated the 200,000 Serbs who live in Kosovo as pawns
in a cynical geopolitical gambit: instructing them to impede diplomacy, boycott
elections, and believe that one day Kosovo will return to some kind of pre-1999
situation. But despite its absolutist position for home consumption, Belgrade
has long been angling to partition Kosovo, ensuring that the north remains
under its control.



This would most probably entail transferring all Kosovar Serbs in central and
southern Kosovo to refugee camps north of the Ibar River - to join the 600,000
other refugees in Serbia, the by-product of Slobodan Milosevic’s territorial
wars. Belgrade’s policies reveal that its real interest is what it has been for
nearly a century: the territory of Kosovo, not the people who live there.

For their own part, the Kosovar Albanians want independence - and will take
to arms to get it. Kosovo was joined to Serbia in 1912, in the aftermath of the
first Balkan war. Since then the ethnic Albanians have experienced one form or
another of discrimination at the hands of different Serb regimes: monarchist,
socialist, and nominally democratic. Now they have an opportunity to remove the
sovereign hand that made this possible, and they are not going to miss it.



So even in the absence of international agreement on Kosovo’s future, the
Albanians will probably declare independence in the near future. The question
is just what kind of statehood they will get. If their declared polity is
internationally contested, deprived of a United Nations seat, with its border
to the north blocked by Serbia, then Kosovo could be worse off than it is now.



Will post-independence Kosovo look more like Taiwan, northern Cyprus, or Gaza?
The Kosovar Albanians’ biggest illusion is that the United States will put
everything right for them. They believe Washington is really acting in their
interests and not purely in its own. In the end, they could find themselves
quite alone, carping that the great powers have left them in the lurch once
again.

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The Dismantling of Yugoslavia: A Study in Inhumanitarian Intervention

The Dismantling
of Yugoslavia: A Study in Inhumanitarian Intervention (and a Western
Liberal-Left Intellectual and Moral Collapse)

Edward S. Herman and David Peterson

Part I | Part II | Part
III | Part IV | Notes | Glossary | Timeline

Part I :

The breakup of Yugoslavia provided the fodder for what may have been the
most misrepresented series of major events over the past twenty years. The
journalistic and historical narratives that were imposed upon these wars have
systematically distorted their nature, and were deeply prejudicial, downplaying
the external factors that drove Yugoslavia’s breakup while selectively
exaggerating and misrepresenting the internal factors. Perhaps no civil
wars—and Yugoslavia suffered multiple civil wars across several theaters, at
least two of which remain unresolved—have ever been harvested as cynically by
foreign powers to establish legal precedents and new categories of
international duties and norms. Nor have any other civil wars been turned into
such a proving ground for the related notions of “humanitarian intervention”
and the “right [or responsibility] to protect.” Yugoslavia’s conflicts were not
so much mediated by foreign powers as they were inflamed and exploited by them
to advance policy goals. The result was a tsunami of lies and
misrepresentations in whose wake the world is still reeling.

………… “Why would Serbs be expelling Croatians
from Croatia if they’re not expelling them from Serbia?” Markovic asked the
court. “Why would Serbs be expelling Albanians from Kosovo if they’re not
expelling them from Belgrade and other parts of Serbia?.........

CONTINUED: http://www.monthlyreview.org/1007herman-peterson1.htm

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KOSOVO | Squaring off for the wrong fight

KOSOVO

Squaring off for the wrong fight

By
Humphrey Hawksley

Published: November 8, 2007

PRISTINA, Kosovo:

It's almost nine years since NATO air strikes
freed Kosovar Albanians from Serbian control, yet the official status of the
province is still undecided. A deadline of Dec. 10 has been set for the
diplomatic process to deliver. It's expected to fail, after which Kosovo's
semi-autonomous government says it will make a unilateral declaration of
independence.

While Kosovo was a defining issue of post-Cold
War global leadership, there is now a gaping silence from all global powers -
except Russia - on an acceptable way forward. Kosovo's two million citizens
interpret this as a signal that the United States and much of Europe would
support its independence.

Kosovo, therefore, is in danger of falling victim
to the type of opaque diplomacy that has been behind some of the gravest global
conflicts. One of the more recent is Saddam Hussein's belief that the United
States would not object to Iraq's 1991 invasion of Kuwait.

Too much is at stake for international policy to
be misread again. The West must declare
clearly what it will or will not do if Kosovo declares independence, and it
must avoid enveloping Kosovo in a clash with Russi

Since the NATO intervention in 1999, the United
Nations has administered Kosovo. Stability remains underwritten by a
16,000-strong international force, and apart from a surge of anti-Serb unrest
in 2004 and sporadic ethnic attacks, Kosovo is seen as an intervention success
story.

In January, the UN special envoy, Martti
Ahtisaari, put forward proposals that would allow Kosovo official separation
from Serbia. He deliberately avoided using words such as
"independence" or "sovereignty." The new nation would be
monitored by the European Union and the international military force would
stay. In many respects, it would be similar to the status quo.

Serbia rejected the proposals, saying it would never
accept Kosovo's separation. Russia gave this its full support.

Serbia insists that it should not be punished for
the atrocities of a former dictator. The brutality of the 1990s was carried out
under the regime of Slobodan Milosevic, they say; Serbia is now a democracy and
the issue should end there.

Russia's blunt declaration, however, has taken
the question of Kosovo's status to a higher level. What began as a humanitarian
mission to stop ethnic-cleansing has become part of a new balance of power in
Europe. Kosovo's future is linked to the Czech and Polish missile
defense-shield dispute, energy supplies, and a basket of issues on which a
revitalized Kremlin is testing the will of the European Union and the United
States.

Should Kosovo declare independence, it would
almost certainly not be recognized by the UN because of a veto by Russia in the
Security Council. The entire EU is unlikely to accept Kosovo's independence
because of opposition from governments in Greece, Cyprus, Romania and others.
Without UN or EU recognition, the new Kosovo might have less legitimacy than
the present one.

Opinion polls have found that more and more Serbs
are questioning where their future lies. At present, they are split 50-50
between Russia and the EU. But, increasingly, Moscow is seen to be delivering
more than Brussels, particularly by way of security and a sense of belonging.

A new illegal Serb militia group is reported to
be mobilizing to protect Kosovo's 100,000 Serbs, should independence be
declared. It calls itself Tsar Lazar after the hero of an epic Serbian poem
about reclaiming Kosovo. In Kosovo itself, the banned Albanian National Army
recruits members to fight the Serb militia. What's new is that one of these
insurgent groups believes their ultimate backer is Moscow, and the other
Washington.

Ironically though, both Kosovo and Serbia are
embryonic democracies, with an immediate goal to join the EU. That alone would
make sovereignty increasingly irrelevant.

Kosovo's argument that it cannot clear the litter
and fix the roads without independence is nonsense. It is, in essence, facing
the choice of whether it wants to resemble the bloodied Palestinian territories
or glittering Taiwan.

Serbia, too, must decide whether it wants to end
up as a client state of an authoritarian Russia or sign on to the democratic
values entrenched within the European Union.

It is time for politicians in both Serbia and
Kosovo to lead their people away from the contentious issue of independence.
The West must also send an unequivocal message that the way forward is to
deliver not nationalistic symbolism but good governance.

The legitimacy of both Serbia and Kosovo will
come not from their ability to protect historical legends, but to provide
health, education and a thriving economy for their citizens.

Humphrey Hawksley is a BBC correspondent and
the author, most recently, of "The History Book." Reprinted with
permission from YaleGlobal.

http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/08/opinion/edhumph.php

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Encouraging separatism

Letters

The Washington Times

Washington, D.C.

November 5, 2007

http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071105/EDITORIAL/111050008/1013/EDITORIAL&template=nextpage



Encouraging separatism



As Turkey is currently embroiled in fighting Kurdish
separatists and the United States risks losing a NATO ally in the process, we
(and Turkey) would do well to re-examine Western support for Kosovo's Albanian
separatists, lest we further encourage separatists the world over
("Kurdish terror and the

West," Op-Ed, Tuesday).

There are many deep symmetries between the Albanian
and Kurdish irredentists in their efforts to wrest control of territory from
sovereign nations, except that the Albanians already have a homeland —

Albania — whereas the Kurdish people (who live in portions of Iran, Iraq and
Turkey) do not. In both cases, illegally granted independence would unravel

both the Balkans and the Middle East, inciting far worse conflicts and
instability for generations.

Illegal independence will also create economic and Islamic
extremist black holes/safe havens wherein unstable governments will be unable
to fully control "their" territories (such as in Afghanistan) and
tribal laws will go into effect, creating further confusion and chaos.

Turkey and the United States should support Serbia's
sovereignty over Kosovo, as the Kurds, with

no recognized homeland, have an even stronger case for their independence and
we risk far greater consequences in violating sovereign nations and

international law. We also risk destroying our relationship with Turkey.



MICHAEL PRAVICA

Henderson, Nev.

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U.S., Russia: The Kosovo Bargaining Chip

U.S., Russia: The Kosovo Bargaining Chip

November 01, 2007 18 00 GMT

Summary



While Russia and the United States continue to tango over issues of missile
defense and Iran, one issue has yet to be resolved: Kosovo. But as rumors swirl
of U.S. concessions to Russia, the Kosovar issue might just be added to the
tally of compromises.



Analysis



While the United States and Russia continue their heated tango, rumors of U.S.
concessions to Russia have been flying, with talk of compromises over ballistic
missile defense and the Conventional
Forces in Europe treaty. In exchange for these concessions, the United
States would expect Russia to cease its support for Iran and possibly help pass
new sanctions targeting Iran's nuclear program. But another volatile bargaining
chip between Russia and the United States is sitting in the shadows: Kosovo.



Negotiations
between the United States and Russia have changed focus in the latter half of
the year. Russia countered the U.S. moves into Eastern and Central Europe with
its very public support for Iran, complicating U.S.-Iranian negotiations over
Iraq. This is a major shift from the July meeting between Russian President
Vladimir Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush in Kennebunkport, Maine, when
one of the more
important items on the agenda was Kosovar
independence.



This issue has been on the table since 1999, when the United States and its
NATO allies, angered over Serbian behavior in Kosovo, ignored Russian
objections and waged a 60-day air war against Yugoslavia. Now, Moscow is
outraged at the possibility of an independent Kosovo -- not because it
considers Serbia an ally, but because a successful effort by the West to impose
its will on Serbia against Russian wishes would signal the end of Russia's
influence in Europe. It also would signal that the West believes Russian
objections can be easily swept under the rug.



But nothing has moved on the prolonged negotiations over the small Balkan
secessionist region, and now Kosovo is threatening to declare independence Dec.
10. Although it would seem the issue of Kosovo has gotten lost in the shuffle
between the world powers, it could be one of the issues thrown into the pot of
concessions.



Though neither Russia nor the United States has mentioned Kosovo much of late,
small items in the Serb and Kosovar media indicate that the issue is still very
much alive inside the negotiations. Talks resumed between Pristina and Belgrade
in Vienna this week, and Pristina went in with the assumption that a decision
would be made, given that Dec. 10 is only six weeks away. But the talks only
proved that the U.S., EU and Russian troika is staunchly divided. Moreover,
they show that the U.S. and EU positions are fractured.



Until this week, the United States and European Union were unified in their
position that Kosovar independence not only was inevitable but also would be
achieved this year. This has always been Kosovo's trump card against Russian
and Serb opposition to independence. However, on Oct. 29, the United States
suddenly proposed a new option of freezing Kosovar independence for another 12
years -- much to Pristina's horror. On top of this, the next proposal to be
considered at the troika meetings with Serbia and Kosovo is designed by none
other than Russia -- and of course, it would halt any moves for Kosovar
independence.



Additionally, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates let it slip during an Oct. 27
press conference on Afghanistan that the United States is considering pulling
its troops from the NATO coalition in Kosovo (KFOR).



These announcements could mean one of two things: Either the United States
simply has too much on its plate and needs to pull back somewhere, or Kosovo
has just become another concession Washington is willing to give Moscow.



As far as the first option, the United States does have its fingers in many
pies with its obligations in Iraq and Afghanistan -- not to mention its growing
concerns over Iran and Russia. In the 1990s, the United States stepped into the
Kosovar crisis when the Europeans could not handle it. But that was back when
the United States was not as busy. Pulling back diplomatically and/or
militarily from Kosovo would leave the issue in the Europeans'
lap, and geographically, they have a greater vested interest in a
resolution in the Balkans.



But the timing of the announcement seems to point to the second option. The new
proposal comes at a time of critical moves among the United States, Iran and
Russia -- and as rumors of U.S. concessions are leaking. Allowing the Europeans
to handle the Kosovar issue pushes the United States out of the Russian line of
fire. Also, it can be added to the tally of things Washington has set aside in
order to keep its balance with Moscow as the game continues.

http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=297675

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