nationalinterest.org

What the Evolution of NATO's Missions Means for the Future

by Ted Galen Carpenter

8-10 minutes

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Throughout the Cold War, American and European leaders consistently portrayed NATO as a defensive alliance. They emphasized the peaceful nature of their cooperation in contrast to the Kremlin’s record of belligerence and aggression. Moscow’s brutal suppression of even modest political deviations within its East European satellite empire helped confirm the proclaimed difference. Soviet tanks rolled into East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in 1968 to crush reform movements. Western insistence that the Soviet Union was a dangerous aggressor while NATO was a purely defensive association was quite credible.

Unfortunately, post-Cold War NATO’s image as a collection of democracies pursuing defensive objectives corresponds less and less to reality. Robert W. Merry, former editor of Congressional Quarterly, the National Interest , and the American Conservative , aptly observes that instead of appreciating how the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union was a boon to the security of the West, U.S. and NATO leaders “turned NATO into a territorial aggressor of its own.” He concludes that NATO today is “a danger, not a guarantor of peace.”

Avoidance of offensive actions and objectives disappeared early in the post–Cold War era. The interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo emphatically transformed NATO from a defensive alliance designed to deter or repel an attack on its members into an organization with an offensive orientation. In Bosnia, the Alliance used force simply to prevent a secessionist movement from succeeding; no aggression against a NATO member had taken place. Four years later, NATO attacked a sovereign state, Serbia, recognized by the international community, to detach one of its provinces, Kosovo. Once again, the target of NATO’s military wrath had not committed the slightest act of aggression—or even threatened to do so—against any Alliance member.

The rationale for NATO military action had expanded dramatically. Citing a security justification for the interventions in the internecine Balkan conflicts flowing from the breakup of Yugoslavia required a major stretch of logic. Even most NATO partisans knew better than to emphasize such a far-fetched rationale. Instead they focused on the alleged need to prevent a humanitarian tragedy . Even that justification failed to hold up to any serious scrutiny.

A few NATO traditionalists were decidedly unhappy about the Alliance’s new missions or expanded geographic focus. Writing at the time of the Kosovo war, Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer was caustic about the increasing focus of the “new NATO” on out-of-area missions. “What was wrong with the old NATO?” he asked rhetorically. “For the clever young thinkers of the [Clinton] administration,” Krauthammer added sarcastically, the Alliance’s traditional deterrence mission apparently was “too boring.” He accused them of suffering from “Acheson envy,” by wanting to create a memorable new international order. Worse, he saw them as wanting to refashion NATO as “a robust, restless alliance ready to throw its weight around outside its own borders to impose order and goodness.”

Krauthammer’s observations were extremely perceptive, but even with his prominence in the American foreign-policy community, his concerns about NATO’s new focus and the dangers it posed, went largely unheeded. NATO continued to become an increasingly offensive alliance with an ever-expanding out-of-area orientation.

Indeed, as transformative as the Bosnia and Kosovo interventions were, they at least occurred in Europe, albeit outside the formal boundaries of the Alliance. Even during the Cold War, NATO (and especially the United States) maintained informal, but important, security ties to Yugoslavia. Washington also made it clear to Moscow that any military aggression against Yugoslavia would be considered a serious threat to the transatlantic community, even though the country was not a NATO member.

But other NATO military missions now take place far outside the European theater. That point became evident following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States when NATO members invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which proclaims that an attack on one member will be considered an attack on all. Thereafter, Germany and other Alliance members sent forces to assist the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan.

The new missions reflected a dramatic expansion of NATO’s geographic coverage. It had become a misnomer even to regard the Alliance as a “transatlantic” organization to protect the security of Europe and North America. Indeed, as the Afghanistan operation confirmed, the focus increasingly was on problems outside those two regions. That point was reinforced when a majority of NATO members joined the U.S.-led assault on Iraq to oust Saddam Hussein. It became evident again in 2011, when the United States backed its European allies, especially Britain and France, to launch military attacks against Libya. The ostensible purpose of the aircraft and cruise missile strikes was to thwart a bloodbath that Muammar el-Qaddafi’s regime might unleash on innocent civilians. The reality was that the intervention was another regime-change war.

The proliferation of such far-ranging missions has not been healthy either for NATO’s European members or the United States. Sending troops to Afghanistan entangled European forces in a messy, intractable war in a country that posed little threat to any of the European countries. In essence, NATO governments signed on to an amorphous, armed nation-building venture that Washington was pursuing. Conversely, a divided Obama administration signed on to a regime-change war in Libya that France and other European allies were pushing. In both cases, the resulting policies were ill-considered ventures that did not benefit the best interests of either the United States or its European partners.

Indeed, a major reason why Islamic radicals have attacked targets in Europe is because of the involvement of those countries in U.S.-led wars in the Muslim world, especially Iraq and Syria. The perpetrators of the December 2015 terrorist attack on the Bataclan concert hall in Paris shouted out: “This is for Syria!” France had joined with its NATO allies to back the U.S.-dual campaign to oust Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad and eradicate ISIS. French aircraft had been bombing ISIS-controlled areas for more than a year. The Paris attacks were bloody payback—as have been subsequent incidents in multiple NATO countries.

If increasing their exposure to America’s wars in the Middle East and Central Asia is now a crucial requirement of alliance burden-sharing, the Europeans would be wise to opt-out. That step might or might not cause the Trump administration to reconsider the U.S. commitment to NATO, but as Washington pushes the Alliance to adopt an increasingly offensive focus, and one outside of Europe at that, the allies could be making a major, self-destructive blunder to follow Washington’s lead.

At the same time, responding favorably to European calls for humanitarian or regime-change missions in the Balkans and North Africa, or for a needlessly confrontational policy toward Russia, is not in the best interests of the American people. The growing uneasiness on both sides of the Atlantic is evidence both of a fraying consensus about NATO’s proper role and the reality of a divergence in European and American security interests. The “old NATO” of the Cold War era is obsolete, and the “new NATO” of military interventions with vague justifications and a nearly boundless geographic coverage is a meddlesome aggressor.

Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow in security studies at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at the National Interest , is the author of twelve books and more than 750 articles on international affairs. His latest book is Gullible Superpower: U.S. Support for Bogus Foreign Democratic Movements (2019).

 

blogs.lse.ac.uk

Assessing the revival of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans

8-10 minutes

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Several efforts aimed at giving greater impetus to the EU enlargement process in the Western Balkans took place in 2018, but without securing substantive results. Anna Nadibaidze outlines some of the major challenges that remain for the process as the EU seeks to balance its aspirations for influence in the region against concerns over what future enlargement might mean for the EU's own stability.

Last year was supposed to demonstrate a significant revival of EU interest in the Western Balkans, with several key events designed to give new life to the region's European accession process. Under the Bulgarian presidency of the Council of the European Union, the European Commission revealed its new Enlargement Strategy paper, President Jean-Claude Juncker completed a tour of the region's capitals, and a top-level EU-Western Balkans Summit took place in Sofia in May.

As Austria took over the presidency, Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) agreed on a deal to change the latter's name to Republic of North Macedonia – an issue which acted as an obstacle to Macedonia's EU and NATO accession path. Both Serbia and Montenegro opened new chapters in their negotiation processes, and the EU hosted several ministerial meetings for Serbian and Kosovo officials as part of their normalisation dialogue.

Despite these developments, there were also major setbacks in the region last year, many of which remain unresolved. Albania and Macedonia's accession processes have been delayed by a decision of the 2018 June European Council due to their lack of progress in reforms.

Tensions between Serbia and Kosovo sparked over a controversial border swap deal, the details of which remain unclear, despite EU Foreign Affairs High Representative Federica Moghereni's efforts at providing a platform for dialogue. The conversation stalled as Pristina imposed 100 per cent tariffs on Serbian goods, despite the EU condemning the move. In December, a decision of the Kosovo parliament to launch a military structure sparked further problems with Belgrade, and attracted warnings from the EU.

 

Federica Mogherini and Serbia's Aleksandar Vučić at the 2015 Western Balkans Summit, Credit: EEAS (CC BY-NC 2.0)

Romania, which took over the EU presidency in January, is seeking to maintain the region on its agenda. It is understandable why consecutive EU presidencies keep enlargement on their priority list. Enlargement is strategically important for the Union as a whole, because the Western Balkans continue to be crucial for the security of the EU's borders.

Brussels cannot ignore the fact that challenges such as migration, concerns over radicalisation, organised crime and the arms trade have an important impact on Euro-Atlantic security. European Parliament President Tajani said during his visit to Serbia last year, "Your security is our security," while Juncker warned, "Not too long ago, the region saw a fierce war. If we take away the Western Balkans' accession perspective, that could soon repeat itself."

Moreover, the slow progress of EU engagement with the region over recent years has encouraged other players, notably Russia, Turkey, and China, to get more involved. Serbia and Montenegro have a historically close relationship with Moscow, as demonstrated by President Vladimir Putin's visit to Belgrade on 17 January.

Feeling threatened by the EU's enlargement towards its traditional spheres of influence in Eastern Europe, Russia has been showing interest in building stronger connections with the Balkans. Although Moscow's actual political and economic attractiveness remains limited compared to the EU, Brussels will have more leverage in the region if it is prepared to engage with and respond to these external challenges.

The obstacles on the road to accession

The rationale for the Enlargement Strategy and other EU efforts is clear, but whether they have produced the desired results, or whether they will be effective in the near future, is debatable.

There is a whole laundry list of challenges in the region, the two main ones being the need for reforms and good neighbourly relations. For Serbia, the major obstacle is normalisation of relations with Kosovo, with the EU expecting to see a legally-binding agreement before Belgrade can finalise its accession. Border disputes remain unresolved, and the EU has been clear that it does not intend to import these conflicts. It already has to deal with tensions between two EU members, Slovenia and Croatia, who are unable to resolve their border issue.

Dealing with these problems will likely take many years, which leads to another challenge: accession fatigue. With the process having already taken a prolonged period of time, citizens of many Western Balkan countries are growing increasingly tired of politicians pushing for reforms, while not meeting expectations. In 2018, according to the Balkan Opinion Barometer, 26 per cent of the region's population believed that accession will never happen, 14 per cent expected accession to be in 2030, 24 per cent said it would happen in 2025, and only 12 per cent said 2020. While these dynamics vary from country to country, rising Euroscepticism should be counted as a challenge.

The EU's enlargement dilemma

On the European side, member states remain divided on the issue of enlargement, partly because of a concern about the consolidation of EU norms in countries that joined in 2004 and 2007. Recent flashpoints, such as Poland and Romania's judicial reforms, Bulgaria's corruption problems, as well as Hungary's turn towards 'illiberal democracy', cast doubt on these countries' willingness to implement EU laws. This inevitably leads to the fear of further clashes if some Western Balkan countries join the Union too quickly.

Public opinion also appears to be divided. A recent Eurobarometer poll shows 43 per cent of the EU public support "further enlargement of the EU to include other countries in future years," while 45 per cent are against. The support is mostly concentrated in 'new' member states from Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, many EU leaders want to first reform the EU before moving on to enlargement. For instance, French President Emmanuel Macron mentioned that he was not in favour of widening the Union before deep reforms were carried out.

Brussels faces the dilemma of accommodating different positions in its enlargement plans. Some form of credible commitment to the Western Balkans is necessary to strengthen the attractiveness of the European model, deal with external influences, and importantly, show the EU's vitality after Brexit. The UK's departure will have an impact on the EU's redefinition of its global role, and engagement with the Western Balkans is one of the ways to demonstrate Brussels' willingness to remain a relevant actor.

At the same time, as it cannot push the process too quickly given many member states' reservations, the Commission's approach seems to be to keep the Western Balkans in a state of limbo, where the EU confirms the European perspective of the region, but where accession developments are based on merit and any time frames remain indicative.

Enlargement policy remains a powerful mechanism in the EU's foreign policy toolbox. It allows the bloc to have considerable leverage over its neighbourhood if the prospect of joining is credible. As seen with the recent efforts, the EU is aware of the Western Balkans' importance and tries to make use of its tools to address regional concerns, mostly over security.

But progress is being held back by problems in the region, and by internal EU disputes and fears of admitting more unstable countries into the club. Given these obstacles, the Commission will have to limit itself to statements and summits without making any firm promises, and continue engaging with the region, but without securing substantive results.

Please read our comments policy before commenting.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics.

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About the author

Anna Nadibaidze – Open Europe
Anna Nadibaidze is a research and communications associate at the think tank Open Europe. She holds an MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics.

 

 

valdaiclub.com

Serbia as Vanguard of Russia's Policy in the Balkans

7-8 minutes

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On January 17, 2019, Russian president Vladimir Putin was warmly welcomed in Serbia. It was Putin's fourth visit to Belgrade – he came to Serbia twice as president and once as prime minister. According to Alexander Pivovarenko, Ph.D. in History, Senior Research Associate, RAS Institute of Slavonic Studies, today Russia's positions are highly dependent on the overall situation and a broad set of ties and interconnections in Southeast Europe.

The Balkans are not mentioned in Russia's 2016 Foreign Policy Concept (as distinct from the 2013 concept). Today Russia's positions are highly dependent on the overall situation and a broad set of ties and interconnections in Southeast Europe. As distinct from other countries, Russia's presence in the region is primarily limited to Serbia. In this way, Russia differs from Turkey, which can gather at the same table Aleksandar Vučić and the leader of the Bosnian Muslims Bakir Izetbegović, and carry out economic projects in Serbia's southern areas with considerable Muslim presence (Sanjak Region, and the Preševo, Bujanovac and Medvedja). Under the circumstances, it is only possible to talk about tactical goals, such as the launch of the TurkStream or one or two investment or infrastructure projects.

Consequences of Putin's visit for Serbia's prospects of joining the EU

Out of all the six Balkan countries (along with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania and the Republic of Kosovo), Serbia is the most likely candidate for the admission to the EU. Today, 2025 is mentioned as the year of Serbia's potential accession to the EU. Meanwhile, even if Serbia fulfils all of Brussels' requirements on Kosovo (full diplomatic recognition on the basis of the principle of inviolability of borders) its entry will not be guaranteed if the EU deems it inappropriate to expand again.

During the latest Russia-Serbia summit, the sides signed over 20 intergovernmental agreements, including those on nuclear power and IT. This is good progress because relations are becoming more diversified and less dependent on the oil and gas agenda. Recommendations of the experts who insisted on the diversification of bilateral relations were taken into account. However, their implementation may be complicated because one of the EU requirements is that Belgrade does not use the advantages from its decision not to join the anti-Russian sanctions.

Be that as it may, a broad package of agreements meets Belgrade's interests by giving it extra room for manoeuver in relations with Brussels and Washington. Belgrade can use this as a trump card by increasing or winding down the intensity of its cooperation with Moscow depending on how its relations with Brussels evolve.

Putin's visit may facilitate Belgrade's concessions to Kosovo

Paradoxically, this visit may facilitate Belgrade's concessions to Kosovo Albanians because official Belgrade is interested in resolving the Kosovo issue as soon as possible, even if this requires further concessions. In the past year and a half, Belgrade was subjected to diplomatic pressure from Brussels and Washington, while Aleksandar Vučić announced the start of a "sincere dialogue" that should eventually lead to the recognition of "the existing reality" and the elaboration of a "pragmatic peace treaty" with the Albanians.

Holding early parliamentary elections in spring, which was announced in late December, may be a possible scenario of developments in Serbia. The aim of the ruling party is to establish an overwhelming parliamentary majority that will result in automatic decisions, including on Kosovo. If this happens, it is possible to expect changes to be made to the Constitution of Serbia, namely in the provision on Kosovo and Metohija being an inalienable part of its territory. Today Vučić is facing considerable opposition that objects both to his style of running the country and his version of the agreement on Kosovo. Rallies take place in the center of Belgrade every day. Furthermore, Vučić does not enjoy the support of a number of high-ranking hierarchs in the Serbian Orthodox Church.

It is possible to say that the election campaign in Serbia has already started. Russia's support for the Serbian leaders during the January 17 visit, gives them a certain all-clear to make decisions that they deem expedient.

Serbia's role in TurkStream

The South Stream experience shows that it is too early to talk about a role before the project is launched. However, Serbia's position has not changed. It is from its territory that gas will be transported to the rest of the EU. Serbia's location also allows for the construction of branches to neighboring countries from its territory. A decision to expand the Banatski Dvor underground gas storage shows that Serbia can become a major hub for the Russian energy.

Meanwhile, like in the situation with the previous project, Serbia's position is dependent and this time not only on Bulgaria but also on Turkey, whose role has increased considerably since the launch of the TANAP gas pipeline. Its role will become even bigger after the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) is put into operation. Its readiness is estimated at 82 percent. TAP will pass through the territory of Greece and Albania. Considering the EU's positive attitude to the Turkish project, branches are likely to be built to the north towards Croatia, thereby creating competition with the Russia-Serbia route. All this will make Belgrade more receptive towards the position of Ankara, Washington and Brussels.

It is important to remember the US plans to build an LNG terminal in Croatia and the development of the shelf on Cyprus, over which Turkey and the EU have now clashed. The future of all these projects should become clear in 2019.

 

Serbia After Putin's Visit

The most important political event at the beginning of this year in Serbia was the official visit by President of Russia Vladimir Putin and the Serbian authorities' muscle flexing, designed to show the EU, Kosovo and the opposition that Moscow loves Serbia. The Serbian authorities plan to use this situation to win the upcoming elections this spring and also to strengthen their position in relations with the EU and the United States.

Follow the link

© Sputnik/Mikhail Klimentyev

 

ips-journal.eu

The Balkan Blues

7-9 minutes

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Read this article in German.

It has been more than twenty years since the Yugoslav Wars and the European Union has maintained a strong presence in the Balkans ever since. It has taken on direct military and political responsibility in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUFOR terrestrial force) and Kosovo (EULEX rule of law mission) respectively. Then there are the accession assurances to all six West Balkan states and active negotiations with two of them – Serbia and Montenegro. Last but not least, the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 anchored the EU in the region. Yet the results of the last two decades are hardly encouraging: the Balkan remains the powder keg it has always been, and not even the two member states Romania and Bulgaria have been able to apply European standards and drive economic development forward.

By and large, this unsatisfactory state of affairs can be attributed to two factors. Firstly, the region is still riven by a range of ethnic and national divides. Secondly, other external powers such as Russia and Turkey, but also China and some Arab states, are increasing their presence in the Balkans, clashing with NATO expansion and the US role in the region which seeks to uphold stability at almost any cost.

Taken in the context of the stagnating or, in some cases, retrograde development of democratic structures and socio-economic conditions in the region, these factors represent a latent threat to the security of a Europe already facing enough crises on its eastern and southern flanks. A policy focussing on preventing and avoiding conflict in south-eastern Europe must therefore be a strategic priority for the EU.

The EU-US-Russia triangle

So how can conflicts in the region be diffused? To start with, Brussels would have to give some contours to its strategic interests in the area. The Strategy for the Western Balkans of February 2018 focusses, as usual, on EU enlargement. However, the block needs to move away from its emphasis on integration in favour of transformation, as outlined in a study by the FES South-Eastern Europe Office in April 2018. Considering that the EU's prevailing wisdom of 'a credible accession perspective being key to transformation' is eminently dubitable, it's more important to create a sustainable framework for genuine political stability – rather than the superficial kind which currently passes muster.

The primary interest of the EU in the Balkans, however, is stability.

Moreover, there should be more clarity about the divergence in US and EU strategic interests vis-à-vis the Balkans. With the caveat that no-one can really know what interests Donald Trump is pursuing in the region, it's already obvious that strategic thought in the US State Department and the Pentagon is still very much dominated by the Cold War doctrine of containing Russia. As such, their goal is to keep up the pace of NATO expansion into south-eastern Europe with the aim of pushing Russia out. The integration of Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Montenegro into the North Atlantic alliance has already gone some way towards achieving this objective. Macedonia is next up.

It's also evident that Moscow will not simply sit back and watch this happen. Only recently, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov warned countries in the region of 'succumbing to the false dilemma' of feeling forced to opt for either Moscow on the one hand of Washington and Brussels on the other.

The Balkans are a geopolitical chessboard

These geopolitical considerations are nothing new in the Balkans. In 1904, British geographer Halford Mackinder, one of the fathers of political geography as a discipline, defined eastern Europe as a core region from which the Eurasian landmass could be dominated – and, by extension, the world.

In his book The Grand Chessboard, American political scientist and security advisor to President Jimmy Carter, Zbigniew Brzezinski, followed Mackinder's line of thought and argued that NATO's eastwards expansion was essential to American dominance in Eurasia. Yet this strategy only worked for as long as Russia under Boris Yeltsin was bereft of power. Under Vladimir Putin, the state of play has changed markedly. Now, Moscow too is scrabbling to erect its own spheres of influence, having first and foremost beefed up its military capabilities quite substantially.

The primary interest of the EU in the Balkans, however, is stability. And indeed, it has already managed to at least achieve an appearance of it – at the price of subordinating its noble aims of establishing democracy, human rights, and pluralistic societies to the reality of the mostly corrupt and authoritarian elites of the region.

The most striking example of this process is Montenegro, where Milo Đukanović – who, in a variety of functions, has ruled the country for a quarter of a century now – has managed to morph from a pro-Russian satrap to the Darling of the West without losing his grip on power.

The EU could, and therefore should, act as the go-between here, aiming to erect a regional security architecture which includes Turkey and Russia – and doesn't side-line Moscow.

Then there are the EU's quasi-protectorates Bosnia and Kosovo, where problems are simply piling up: without the protection of the US, for instance, the Kosovan leadership would be up before the International Court of Justice in Den Haag. According to Europol, the country has become the continent's hub for Afghan heroin as the international (primarily European) administration looks on.

Meanwhile, by virtue of its extensive cannabis plantations, neighbouring Albania (now a NATO country) has come to be considered 'Europe's Colombia.' In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international administration has not yet been able to resolve the institutional logjam and the proportional ethnic representation at the heart of the Dayton agreement. Only Macedonia, with its democratic handover of power, offers a glimmer of hope in the region.

The EU needs to act as a mediator

Genuine stability in the region would mean taking a preventative approach towards solving its problems. This would mean resolving the open border issue between Albania and Serbia through a peace accord which brings together both local entities and external protagonists on the regional scene (i.e. Turkey on the Albanian and Russia on the Serbian side).

The EU could, and therefore should, act as the go-between here, aiming to erect a regional security architecture which includes Turkey and Russia – and doesn't side-line Moscow. Doing so would put pressure on the region's autocrats, but would be predicated on a moratorium on further NATO expansion and a more closely integrated European foreign and defence policy of the kind envisioned by Emmanuel Macron.

All of this would, all things told, be the only way to stop EU aid from trickling away into obscure channels, as it currently does, and ensure that it actually reaches the populations it's intended to help. This kind of security architecture would provide resolution to the Serbian/Albanian conflict and also allow the EU to surmount the current enlargement dilemma between stabilisation and democratisation.

After all, it cannot be in the interests of the citizens of the six west Balkan states to become official EU members on the back of administrative reforms without being really equipped to benefit from accession: the example of the current Romanian Presidency of the European Council, marred by the country's endemic corruption and the anaemic rule of law, should serve as a salutary lesson here.

 

What Is Orthodox Christmas?

ibtimes.com

What Is Orthodox Christmas? Facts, Photos Of Celebrations

By Vaishnavi Vaidyanathan 01/07/19 AT 6:56 AM

3-4 minutes

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Orthodox Christians in some parts of Europe and other countries including Russia, Ukraine, Georgia and Serbia celebrate Christmas on Jan. 7, two weeks after those from Western churches.

The 13-day gap is because Orthodox Christians follow the Julian calendar while majority of Christians, from other denominations, follow the modern day Gregorian calendar. Though the Julian calendar was revised and re-introduced in 1923 in order match it with the Gregorian calendar, only some countries like Cyprus and Romania have adopted it.

“December 25 for Orthodox Christians on the Julian calendar actually falls on January 7 on the Gregorian calendar. So strictly speaking, Christmas is still kept on December 25, which just happens to fall 13 days later on the Julian calendar day,” Archimandrite Christopher Calin, dean of the Russian Orthodox Cathedral of the Holy Virgin Protection said, the Christian Post reported.

The festival is also celebrated differently by Orthodox Christians. Though some aspects like the Christmas tree and giving gifts are common, Orthodox Christians focus primarily on the spiritual side of the season. This includes fasting and charity.

“We focus more on the aspect of the incarnation of Christ and the cosmic salvation it has for all mankind. While many of the external trappings are the same, like Christmas trees, wreaths, ribbons and gifts, there is an increased emphasis on the spiritual reality of this truly miraculous mystery of God becoming man, so that man may be united to God and each other,” Calin said.

They observe a 40-day fast before Christmas and avoid eating meat during the season. On the Christmas Eve, they have a meal consisting of 12 meat-free dishes — one for each of the 12 apostles. Some of the dishes includes sauerkraut (cabbage) and red perogies (boiled or deep fried dumplings) and potatoes.

“Many people observe all 40 days leading to Christmas as a way to renew their faith and relationship to God,” said Archimandrite Nathanael Symeonides of Annunciation Greek Orthodox Church of New York.

Apart from that, the Christmas Eve dinner is usually covered with white or embroidered tablecloth which symbolized the cloth that baby Jesus was wrapped in. Some people also use straws to decorate the table which symbolizes the stable where Jesus was born. Candles are also lit in order to represent the end of fasting. Extra places are also set at the table in some houses for spirits of dead family members.

Post dinner, small treats such as chocolate and cookies are distributed to neighbors and in countries such as Belarus, they go home and sing carols and dance for the neighbors. In other countries, special religious ceremonies are held near seas, rivers and lakes in order to celebrate the festival, CBC reported.

Jan.7 is a public holiday in countries like Belarus, Egypt, Macedonia, Moldova, Ethiopia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Montenegro, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine.

In this photo, a woman lights a candle at a church in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, Jan. 7, 2019. Photo: VYACHESLAV OSELEDKO/AFP/Getty Images