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MOSCOW. (Pavel Kandel for RIA Novosti) - Martti Ahtisaari,
the UN's special envoy for Kosovo, recently submitted his plan on the status of
the Serbian province to the UN Security Council. This signifies the beginning
of the "last battle of Kosovo." Can anyone win it? And if so, what
would victory and defeat mean?
The United States, which, along with NATO and the European
Union, has initiated a speedy process to grant independence to Kosovo, has
expressed support for a draft Security Council resolution based on the
Ahtisaari plan of granting the province internationally supervised sovereignty.
Europeans are divided over the American idea. The EU, which
is working hard to achieve its own unity, fears that any new dispute might
cause it to split apart once again. In addition, Brussels is not prepared to
quarrel with Washington over Kosovo.
A decision to give the EU control over Kosovo for the
transitional period, and to entrust it with the task of stabilizing the
Balkans, was made long ago. But now the EU needs an international mandate,
without which external supervision over Kosovo would not be legitimate and
developments could spin out of control.
Europe is acting out of fear that violence in Kosovo will
flare up again. If anti-Serbian pogroms begin again in that tumultuous
province, Europe will be seen either as a passive observer and sponsor of
violence, or will have to use force against the instigators, thus indirectly
recognizing the futility of its policy in the region and getting a mini-Iraq in
its own backyard.
This explains the EU's attempts to shift responsibility for
potential violence if the Ahtisaari plan is rejected onto Moscow and Belgrade.
Europe is like a corrupt cop who blames the victim, claiming that the bandits
politely asked her to hand over her purse, but she acted
"unconstructively" by refusing to comply with their request.
Serbians are not prepared to calmly accept the loss of a
province that means so much to their national awareness. This makes sense, and
Serbia's arguments are quite justified in terms of international law. The
majority of the Serbian elite does not want to protect Washington and Brussels
from the possible failure of their biased anti-Serbian policy, because such
assistance might provoke a political crisis in Belgrade. Therefore, Serbians
are playing for time and proposing continued talks in a new format.
Russia's representative to the UN, Vitaly Churkin, has put
forth a proposal to evaluate the implementation of Security Council Resolution
1244 and send an investigative mission to Belgrade and Pristina, the capital of
Kosovo. This plan is aimed at changing the issue under discussion so as to
again attract public attention to unsettled problems that nobody is addressing.
However, the battle for the preservation of ineffective
Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo may be a short-lived tactic. In the longer
term, the province is as good as lost for Serbia because it cannot be
re-integrated. Moreover, Kosovo has become a white elephant for demographic,
economic and political reasons.
Given the high birth rate among Kosovo Albanians, the
population density and shortage of jobs in the province, Kosovo, if
re-incorporated into Serbia, would become a source of demographic expansion,
carrying the risk of major changes in the ethnic composition of Serbia.
Serbia would be unable to subsidize the underdeveloped
economy of Kosovo, which was a pocket of ethnic and political conflicts under
tsars and under Yugoslavian dictator Josip Broz Tito alike.
And lastly, Serbia must solve the Kosovo problem in order to
be admitted to the EU.
Therefore, the most it can hope to accomplish is postpone
the solution of that problem until its admission to the EU ceases to be a dim
promise. The most probable compromise stipulates the recognition of Kosovo's
sovereignty on the condition that Serbia retains control of its northern part
and enclaves where its historical and cultural monuments are situated, and the
allocation of substantial compensation to refugees and forced migrants.
The Kosovo problem, however, is not only important to Serbia
and Europe, but could also affect international security.
The Western advocates of independence for Kosovo argue that
the province is a unique case. That argument does not hold water because the
history of the world is made up of a multitude of "unique" cases,
which does not mean they are not interdependent or similar. However, if we
admit that the Kosovo problem is indeed unique, that means we must find a
unique solution to it, such as the division of the province into parts that
will suit both the Kosovo Albanians' striving for self-determination, and the
Kosovo Serbians' desire to retain their homeland and its sacred historic and
religious sites.
These are the underlying principles of Russia's stance on
the issue of Kosovo. By protesting against a decision that is being forced on
Serbia, Moscow will strengthen its prestige both in the Balkans and the rest of
the world. The United States and the EU have not shown the will to compromise
with the other side, and it is counter-productive to give in to a partner who
is not willing to meet you halfway.
Russia could use just about any of the solutions to the
Kosovo problem, as well as a decision to postpone a settlement, to promote its
interests in the former Soviet republics. But would this be constructive?
Washington and Brussels can talk until they are blue in the
face about how the solution to the Kosovo problem will not create a precedent.
It only means that the United States and the EU, while admitting to such a
possibility, will not recognize the legitimacy of similar solutions to similar
problems.
However, the power of precedent does not depend on the will
of even great powers. If Kosovo gains independence, its example will soon have
many followers, from Catalonia and Flanders to Kurdistan, not to mention many
African and Asian countries.
Moscow has warned more than once about the dangerous
consequences of such a decision. It has been suspected of trying to create a
precedent in order to use it to solve conflicts in former-Soviet states.
However, it is not Russia but its opponents who are pushing the problem towards
a dangerous solution.
Pavel Kandel is head of the department of ethno-political
problems at the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and
do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20070402/62974760.html
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