November 24, 2007

Mr. Ceku's Disorderly House



http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119561138717200039.html?mod=googlenews_wsj



Mr. Ceku's Disorderly House

November 21, 2007; Page A17



The recent column by Agim Ceku ("Kosovo Wants Independence," Nov. 15)
presents the critic with what military planners would call a target-rich
environment. Virtually every assertion about Kosovo's prospects as an
independent state screams out for rebuttal.



For the sake of brevity, let us focus on just one: Mr. Ceku's suggestion that
Kosovo, under his U.N.-supervised administration, has "put our structures
in place and our house in order." This month's report by the European Commission
tells a very different story:



"Due to a lack of clear political will to fight corruption, and to
insufficient legislative and implementing measures, corruption is still
widespread," the report said. "Civil servants are still vulnerable to
political interference, corrupt practices and nepotism" and "Kosovo's
public administration remains weak and inefficient," the report added.



Furthermore, "the composition of the government anti-corruption council
does not sufficiently guarantee its impartiality," and "little
progress can be reported in the area of organized crime and combating of
trafficking in human beings."



War crime trials are being "hampered by the unwillingness of the local
population to testify" and "there is still no specific legislation on
witness protection in place," according to the report. "Civil society
organizations remain weak" and "awareness of women's rights in
society is low."



If this is the "house" Mr. Ceku claims "is in order" in
advance of what he hopes will be conferral of independence, one shudders to
think what disorder would look like. To be sure, Mr. Ceku makes use of the
usual dodge that Kosovo's progress is limited by the absence of "clarity
on our future status," namely independence. But Taiwan, by contrast, has
gone without such clarity for over half a century and is nothing like the
disaster over which Mr. Ceku presides.



Instead of falling for his fairy tales about Kosovo's fitness for sovereignty
the international community needs to open its eyes to the reality of this
corrupt, criminal, and nonviable entity. Granting independence to Kosovo, which
would mean handing de jure power to those responsible for this state of
affairs, can only turn a disaster into a catastrophe.



James George Jatras

Director

American Council for Kosovo

Washington





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First Kosovo, and then what?



First Kosovo, and then what?



November
20, 2007



EUROPE
STILL has a Balkans problem. This is the message to take away from the victory
of former guerrilla leader Hashim Thaci's party in Saturday's parliamentary
elections in Kosovo - balloting that was boycotted by the 10 percent of
Kosovo's population who are Serbs.



The UN-supervised region is officially part of Serbia. But ever
since NATO went to war in 1999 to force Slobodan Milosevic to end his ethnic
cleansing of Albanian villages in Kosovo, the region's Albanian majority have
set their sights on separation from Serbia. Recently, American, Russian, and
European mediators have been trying to craft a formula for autonomy or phased
independence that would be acceptable both to Serbia and the Albanian Kosovar government.



The
mediators are due to report to United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon by
that date, and Thaci has threatened to declare independence unilaterally if
they do not recommend independence for Kosovo. But any such unilateral action
could set off instability across the Balkans and beyond.



While
20 of the EU's 27 members favor independence for Kosovo, nearly all dread a
unilateral declaration. That prospect conjures up memories of Europe's careless
acceptance of declarations of independence from Yugoslavia by Slovenia,
Croatia, and Bosnia in the early 1990s. Those acts ushered in horrific wars and
crimes against humanity.



A
unilateral lunge for independence by Kosovo could spur Serbs in Bosnia and
Herzogovina - half that country's population - to follow suit. And Kremlin
warnings against the imposition of any Kosovo formula not acceptable to Serbia
raises the specter of Russian backing for independence movements in Georgia,
Moldova, and even Ukraine. This would be a prescription for armed conflict
around the periphery of Europe.





Some
European diplomats also worry about the United Nations carving new countries
out of older countries' provinces. They recognize that separatist reflexes
persist in regions such as Catalonia and the Basque country. Even the Flemish
and Walloon populations of tiny Belgium may want a nationalist divorce.



The
Kosovo majority's impatience for independence is understandable, particularly
since it has been subjected to a corrupt and inefficient UN tutelage. But the
European, American, and Russian mediators should keep Serbia and the Kosovars
at the negotiating table as long as it takes to hammer out a resolution to
which both sides agree.



This
may mean incorporating the Serbian-populated area of Kosovo into Serbia proper,
along with Serbian monasteries and holy sites. It may entail minor population
transfers. But whatever the eventual solution, it should be accepted by the two
peoples and not imposed by outsiders.



© Copyright 2007 Globe
Newspaper Company.



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Kosovo, and then what? - The Boston Globe











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