November 16, 2006

INTEVIEW WITH DR. SRDJA TRIFKOVIC

INTEVIEW WITH DR. SRDJA TRIFKOVIC




INTEVIEW WITH DR. SRDJA TRIFKOVIC

 
KEY FEATURES OF SERBIA'S NEW CONSTITUTION:
Serbia is a state of Serbs and all citizens
Serbian territorial integrity remains inviolable
 
By Boba Borojevic
 
The adoption of the new constitution of the Republic of Serbia on November 10 was an important moment in that country's modern history. It followed the referendum held on October 27-28, which Serbia's voters supported with a simple majority vote. We asked Srdja Trifkovic to comment the significance of this event.
Dr. Trifkovic is Foreign Affairs Editor of Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture and a leading expert on U.S. foreign policy and Balkan politics . This is an edited transcript of the interview aired on "Monday's Encounter" on CKCU 93.1 FM on November 13. He points out two key elements of Serbia's new constitution, of which the first is that Serbia was defined as the nation state of the Serbian people, as well as the state of all other ethnicities within its boundaries:
 
"In other words Serbia is a country of its citizens but also it is defined as the country of the Serbs. Some people of the supposedly 'pro-Western' liberal persuasion have claimed that this was a retrograde concept, the one that was becoming obsolete in the rest of enlightened of contemporary Europe. This is simply not true, however. If you look at the newcomers to the European Union, notably the former communist countries of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, or Latvia… they all defined themselves as nation-states of those particular ethic groups, as well as countries of all citizens who live within their boundaries. Those who object to the definition of Serbia as the nation state of the Serbian people – in addition to those who inhabit it – are not well informed about the constitutional tradition and the constitutional formulations that are prevalent in today's Europe. The Preamble of the French Constitution starts with "t he French people" – not "the people of France"! Likewise, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 starts with the Spanish Nation. We could go on…  If you were to tell the French and Spaniards, liberal as they are and multicultural as they are, that their countries should be redefined so as to exclude any reference to the French or Spanish nation from Constitution, they would say that you are talking nonsense."
 
Trifkovic points out that the provision of Serbia's new constitution that received most prominence in the Western media is that confirming the inviolability of the country's territory, which explicitly includes the province of Kosovo and Metohija. He insists that there is nothing remarkable about such postulation, because each country's constitution presumes, at least implicitly, the inviolability of its sovereign territory:
 
"This is regarded as 'controversial' only by those who'd like to deny or forget that Kosovo and Metohija has belonged continuously to Serbia since the First Balkan War in 1912. Those who think that there is something contentious about such designation are effectively denying the concept of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the legacy of the international law that goes back at least to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. For the Serbs themselves this is not a contentious issue, not any more than it would be for Canada's constitution to postulate that the province of Ontario is part of Canada. In Kosovo and Metohija's case, no mechanism for separation is constitutionally allowed. What the Constitution allows for are different forms of autonomous mechanisms in line with the latest achievements of other democratic states, whether they be in the European Union or not. If you are to allow in your Constitution the possibility of secession, the possibility of amputation of your sovereign territory, then you would be indeed setting up a precedent that no other country has done anywhere, ever."
 
To claim that this reflects some 'hard-line nationalist' position is plain nonsense, Trifkovic concludes. Nevertheless, we have commentators who claim that what the Serbs say is simply irrelevant; but Trifkovic stresses that the will of the people of Serbia cannot be willfully ignored by "the international community":
 
"It is remarkable that the proponents of an independent 'Kosova' belittle Serbia's constitution and the referendum – yet at the same time they insist that Kosovo's independence has to be based on the will of Albanians living there. So, eight million Serbs can be overruled and ignored, but one and a half or two million Albanians who are supposed to want independence, on the ground of their plurality in their given locality, must be obeyed, and their views are legitimate! It is simply absurd."

There are many foreign NGOs, such as the International Crisis Group (ICG), who are dissatisfied with Serbia's Constitution and claim that the document is too nationalistic and authoritarian, and will therefore bring instability in the Balkans. Trifkvic argues that we should not give any undue weight to whatever the ICG has to say:
 
"It has been and still is primarily an anti-Serb lobby group that favors each and every Muslim cause in the Balkans – and I would include the independence of Montenegro into the list of 'Muslim causes.' The ICG has been advocating Kosovo's independence for over a decade. It was very vocal in their support of the Muslims faction in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is not interested in a peaceful resolution of this or any other dispute, it is not looking for durable and lasting solutions that would guarantee stability in a long-suffering part of Europe. It is interested in pursuing its particular political agenda. That is obvious from the posture of Martti Ahtisaari , who is not only former president of Finland, but also a former and current member of the ICG board of directors."
 
The new Serbian Constitution by itself will not impact the thinking of the great powers one way or the other; it will be the balance of forces in the wider outside world. In this context, Trifkovic thinks that the overall position for the Serbs has improved considerably in the last few months. In his view this was due primarily to the realization by the Russians that, no matter what they do vis-à-vis Kosovo, they are not likely to get the acceptance of the principle of reciprocity:
 
"They will not be allowed to treat pro-Russian enclaves, such as Ossetia, Abkhasia, Transdnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, as de facto independent entities based on Kosovo's precedent. The realization by the Russians that – even if they are cooperative on the issue of Kosovo's independence – they are not going to get anything in return, has been important in directing Moscow to a more principled stand. Another positive development is the realization in China that the model of Kosovo's independence could be used for the independence of Taiwan, or even the demand for Tibet's renewed independence, not to mention the context of the separatist movement among the Turkic-Muslim population of Northwestern China bordering the former Soviet Central Asia, the Xinjiang province."
 
On balance, Trifkovic concludes, the debate on the future of Kosovo will be determined by the balance of forces in the world rather than on the basis of what Serbia does or says, but it nevertheless helps, in symbolic and psychological terms, to have the will of the people expressed so unambiguously as has been done by the Serbs who have supported their country's new constitution.
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www.chroniclesmagaz ine.org/cgi- bin/newsviews. cgi
www.trifkovic. mysite.com


 




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