Kosovo vs South Ossetia

Kosovo vs South Ossetia

The international community is vague about why Kosovo and South Ossetia cannot be compared, and the answers lie in geopolitics rather than principles of self-determination and international law.

Commentary by Jen Alic for ISN Security Watch (15/11/06)

In Western media offerings on South Ossetia's recent referendum for independence from Georgia there is an unwavering tone that suggests the breakaway republic either does not deserve, or should for unexamined reasons, not be granted , independence.

The opposite is true for Western media reports concerning the status of Serbia's UN-administered province of Kosovo. These reports adopt a tone that cheers for and approves of independence.

The international community has long strived for an independent Kosovo and is set to make a decision on the province's status early next year. That decision is most likely going to be independence, though conditional and gradual. At the same time, the international community opposes independence for South Ossetia, citing the unfairness of the Sunday referendum that did not include ethnic Georgians in the breakaway republic.

It has been impossible to find any arguments as to why South Ossetia should not be allowed to pursue self-determination. When questioned on this, Western officials have generally responded by saying that Kosovo and South Ossetia cannot be compared. End of story, no further explanation needed.

But perhaps they can be compared.

Neither South Ossetia nor Kosovo has ever been an independent nation, as far back in history as is rationally warranted to look. Both have at times enjoyed various levels of autonomy. Both have minorities whose rights may not be ensured and whose safety is anything but guaranteed. South Ossetia is home to 14,000 ethnic Georgians, while Kosovo is home to an estimated 120,000 Serbs, who live in fear in UN-guarded enclaves. There is no indication that either minority will be offered adequate protection or adequate rights. And conflict could result from a decision either way.

On Sunday, some 99 percent of South Ossetian voters backed independence from Georgia. The 14,000 ethnic Georgians living in a handful of villages in the breakaway republic were not allowed to vote, as registration required a Russian passport, which all Ossetians have been granted. This was unfair, as the international community has pointed out, but the ethnic Georgian vote would not have changed the outcome.

Furthering the comparison, neither Kosovo nor South Ossetia are necessarily prepared for independence, though Kosovo can expect help from its kin in neighboring Albania and the international community, while South Ossetia can expect some, though likely limited, aid from neighboring Russia. In economic terms, it is unclear how either could support their populations, however small. Industry is for all intents and purposes absent in both locales, while the majority of income is rumored to be made on the black market, largely through arms and drug smuggling.

What has been lacking throughout is an honest debate on these issues, which can easily be compared, despite vague statements to the contrary.

And the honest debate necessarily involves geopolitics.

South Ossetia is a buffer for Russia against the Western-leaning Georgia, while Georgia is a buffer for the US against Russia.

While Russia has played coy with the South Ossetia issue, refraining from recognizing its last declaration of independence in the 1990s and officially supporting Georgia's territorial integrity, it has clearly supported the separatists there. The US must do more than pay lip service to Georgia's territorial integrity, as the country moves toward NATO membership and continues to build its Western alliances.

And of course, there is energy to consider. The Caspian Basin is a place of intense competition, with the US, Russia and China all vying for a stronger foothold. In July, the US$4 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline was inaugurated. The BTC pumps Caspian Sea oil to the Turkish Mediterranean, bypassing Russia and Iran. It should supply 1 million barrels of oil per day by 2009. It passes through the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, and also runs rather close to South Ossetia.

BP, formerly British Petroleum, has a 30.1 percent stake in the pipeline. The pipeline was commissioned by a BP-led consortium that includes energy companies from the US, Norway, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Japan, France and Italy. The BTC is a key to Western energy security. Upsetting Georgia - a major player in this energy security - by allowing South Ossetia to declare independence and be internationally recognized would be risky.

As far as Kosovo is concerned, granting independence is much easier. Serbia is of no strategic value to the West, and the international community has no bones about playing with fire there, despite some low-level concerns that granting Kosovo independence could be so unpopular in Belgrade that it would see a return to power of radical forces.

Russia, for its part, would be more than happy to see Kosovo granted independence - this, despite its support for its Serb allies and Serbia's territorial integrity - if only because it would set a precedent for similar moves in South Ossetia, Abkhazia (Georgia's other breakaway republic), and Moldova's breakaway republic of Transdneistr.

So, the question here is not really whether Kosovo or South Ossetia has a right to self-determination - which is indeed a romantic notion that is easy to digest in terms of principles - but why there has been a lack of honest debate at an official level.

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Jen Alic is the editor in chief of ISN Security Watch.

The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only, not the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).

Romancing the Independence
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=16920

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Kosovo's identity crisis

Kosovo's identity crisis

Guardian Weekly

In a referendum at the end of last month the Serbs voted in favour of a new constitution, reaffirming Belgrade's inalienable sovereignty over Kosovo. Their decision disregards the fact that the region has been under international rule since June 1999, when the Nato campaign ended Serbia's brutal repression of the Kosovar Albanian guerrillas.

"Why do the Serbs keep living in the past? Everyone knows where they ended up with their nationalist policies," says Agim Osmani. A year ago he and his wife, with their six children, bought and rebuilt a house in Caglavica, in the outskirts of Pristina, along the road to Macedonia. Previously it belonged to a Serb, now in Belgrade.

 

"We are all free to choose. There is plenty of room for everyone," adds Osmani.

In fact, along the 5km stretch between Caglavica and Pristina there is increasingly less room. In just a few years the fields have filled with Albanian-owned warehouses, filling stations and shops. Most of Osmani's neighbours are Serbs, but for how much longer? The average age of Kosovo's 130,000 Serbs is 54, compared with 28 for their 2 million Albanian neighbours.

Stamenko Kovacevic, 82, lives just behind Osmani's house, scraping by on his miserable Elektro Kosova pension. He hopes to end his days in this village of 1,500 people, all Serbs until recently. His children have left the province, which always been one of the poorest parts of the former Yugoslavia.

"Agim takes care of me, he brings me food and takes me to the doctor's," says Kovacevic. But he nevertheless voted "yes" in the referendum, "because it has always been that way".

In the distance the antiquated power station at Obilic belches poisonous smoke. Kovacevic has few illusions about the benefits of the new constitution, hurriedly drafted in Belgrade to replace the 1990 text.

Slobodan Milosevic, the former president of Serbia, was determined to end Kosovo's relative autonomy in a Yugoslav union that was already disintegrating. Fighting in Kosovo only flared up at the end of the 1990s, after Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. But unlike the former republics which have gained independence - joined by Montenegro a few months ago - the fate of the former autonomous region of Kosovo is still undecided.

Kosovo has its own president, elected parliament and government, which raises taxes in euros. It also has a civil defence corps, more akin to an army than a pioneer group. Not many young Albanians speak Serbo-Croat any longer, as was the case for the previous generation brought up in Tito's Yugoslavia. The number plates on their German saloons and Yugo bangers are all marked KS and none of them are in any doubt about their imminent independence. "Only the Serbs shut their eyes so as not to see the elephant in their sitting room," says Veton Surroi, a Kosovar writer.

Milan Ivanovic, on the other hand, is among those who reject the idea of independence. Seated on the terrace of the Dolce Vita café, in the northern quarter of the divided town of Mitrovica, in northern Kosovo, he persists in maintaining that the province "was, is and always will be Serb. Nor will any Serb leader wreck his political career by abandoning Kosovo". "What is happening at present is temporary. In the medium term Serbia will regain control of Kosovo," he adds. He does not explain how, but then the democratic process is not his cup of tea.

Dr Ivanovic runs the local hospital and chairs the Serb National Council. A radical, with closely cropped hair and a steely gaze, he forecasts more violence: "It's inevitable. The only unknown quantity is its scale. As Serbs we could never accept Kosovo's independence. We will block the roads in the north and stop the Albanians coming here. If need be we'll organise our own referendum to ratify our independence, inside Kosovo. On the other hand, if Kosovo is not granted its independence, the Albanians will be angry because the international community promised it six year ago."

He recalls the rioting in March 2004 and the violence that claimed a dozen lives. Albanian extremists attacked isolated Serb homes and burned Orthodox churches, prompting villagers from around Mitrovica to take refuge in the town. The international community is terrified a similar uprising might engulf the whole of Kosovo - either spontaneously or stirred up by one of the opposing forces.

"We will defend ourselves against any attacks," warns Ivanovic, who has rejected any moves since 1999 that might bridge the gap between the two communities. Here in Mitrovica the health service, schools and university are all an integral part of the Serb system and completely dependent on Belgrade.

"Our politicians are heading for disaster," says Milos, a Serb studying philosophy at the local university. "They adopt an extremist line because they are paid by Belgrade. If things go wrong, they have a fallback solution, but I don't. My future is here," he adds, lowering his voice to express views shared by a silent minority.

Most of the customers at the Dolce Vita are bulky skinheads who claim to be the "guardians of the bridge", a reference to the bridge across the Ibar river that separates the Albanian districts, to the south, from their Serb counterparts, to the north. There has been no communication between the two sides since Nato forces arrived in June 1999.

Milos does not much like the idea of an independent Kosovo. He says: "We have lost touch with our Albanian neighbours, but if we can have reasonable security and autonomy, then perhaps we can live together. I certainly do not fancy the sort of security the 'guardians of the bridge' are offering."

"Fortunately there is little fighting between the two communities now," says Romuald Pilchard, a political adviser to the commander of the KFOR international force deployed since 1999. The presence of 16,000 foreign troops and the setting up of a local police force have helped keep the peace. But other factors are also at work. "Now that they have almost achieved their goal of independence, the Kosovar Albanians are playing it safe. They have nothing to gain from upsetting negotiations on final status," says a European diplomat. "But there is a limit to their patience, and the politicians say it is increasingly hard to keep control of the more unruly elements," he adds. Many think the outburst of violence in 2004 was in fact salutary because it reminded the international community that Kosovo still existed.

During a visit to Paris last month the Kosovar prime minister, Agim Ceku, underlined his people's "concern" at the delay to negotiations. "People are fed up. They get the impression nothing is happening, whereas the situation is dramatic," says Nehad Islami, a moderate Albanian writer. "Almost half the population is unemployed and the others are living below the poverty line. They may blow their top at any time," warns Avni Zogani, of the Cohu! (Wake up!) organisation, which is trying to raise civic awareness among Kosovars.

Albanian politicians are keen to keep things calm but they lack the necessary credibility. "Most of them are corrupt and the political parties all have links of some sort with organised crime, which has infiltrated most official bodies," says Zogani.

He adds: "The public sector is more of a welfare operation, doing favours for specific groups, with 70,000 officials. That is three times more than in Slovenia for a comparable population. Added to which the UN Mission in Kosovo [known as Unmik] people turn a blind eye. They have already packed their bags and do not want any problems. We are increasingly fed up with our politicians but also with the international agencies."

"The only solution is independence, but it is like a lover you've been waiting for too long: part of the charm has gone," says Linda Gusia, a professor of sociology at Pristina University. "Daily life absorbs all our energy. We have no time to think of anything else. We realise that not having an international status is part of the problem, but we also know it will not solve all our woes, as if by magic, particularly the power cuts in the winter."

With a salary of only €150 a month, she has to do several jobs to feed her family. She says: "I feel humiliated at not being able to provide for my children, at not having a passport or being able to buy books on the net, because Kosovo is not a state. It isn't even Kosovo here, it's Unmikistan, and we're trapped."

www.lemonde.fr

http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianweekly/story/0,,1948467,00.html

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