Southern Serbia, or the Albanian "Motive-Hunting"

http://www.axisglobe.com/article.asp?article=809

Axis

24.04.2006

Southern Serbia, or the Albanian "Motive-Hunting"

Can Karpat, AIA Balkan Section

Their reasons are numerous: they are Albanians and the majority, the region is deliberately left undeveloped and poor by Serbia, their history and fate should be linked to Kosovo�s, they have the right to take their destiny into their own hands. One thing is certain: They want to have a �special status� within Serbia and they need a �motive� for this. Do the Albanian politicians of southern Serbia try to turn the Kosovo issue into a wider Albanian question in the Balkans?A meaningful timing
Those, who are acquainted with Shakespeare, know how difficult it is to analyse Iago, the wonderful villain of �Othello�. The puzzling question about Iago is the question �why�. Famous Shakespeare scholar, Samuel Taylor Coleridge uses the expression of �motive-hunting� for Iago, who seems not to know his main motive even himself, and who, with numerous soliloquies, tries to justify his deed.Nowadays the Albanian politicians of southern Serbia (the three towns of Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja) seem to be in a similar �motive-hunting� process. They want to be granted a �special status� within Serbia and for this they need a convincing motive, so that the international community could commit themselves on their behalf as they did on behalf of Kosovo in the past. However the international community prefers to consider the Kosovo case as a sui generis. As it is known, the US administration convinced Moscow not to oppose to Kosovo�s independence with the guarantee that this will not set a precedent for Chechnya or elsewhere. Western powers do not wish a further ethnic-based atomisation in the Balkans. Yet, the Presevo Valley Albanians continue to look across the mountains at Kosovo, where they see the prospect of an independent Albanian state. And this is a great hope for the Albanians of southern Serbia, who have never been really happy to be just a minority in a Slavic majority state. The platform, which was adopted on 14th January by council members from Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja, �respecting the will of the citizens to define the Presevo Valley as a constitutional and territorial region�, demands for a �special status�, which definitely goes beyond standard autonomy. According to this platform, the Presevo Valley must have special relations with Kosovo, including the possibility of joining Kosovo. As the negotiations for the final status of Kosovo go on, a great opportunity offers itself to theAlbanian politicians of Serbia. The acting mayor of the Presevo Valley and the president of Democratic Albanian Party (DPA) Ragmi Mustafa stated: �Since Rambouillet, the parleys should have been attributed an Albanian-Serbian character, for the Albanian question concerns the whole ex-Yugoslavian territory. Since 1999, problems of those Albanians in Montenegro, the Presevo Valley and Macedonia should have been discussed�. As to the moderate president of Albanian Party forDemocratic Action (PDD), the most influential Albanian party of southern Serbia, Riza Halimi assured the international community that their demand to join the Kosovo negotiations does not mean that they demand the unification of these three municipalities with Kosovo. Yet, since the appearance of the Albanian National Army (ANA) in 2001, the Albanian political scene in southern Serbia has been radicalised. As a result, local parties have become more nationalistic. Politicians such Riza Halimi, who favours cooperation with Serbia and moderation are not popular any more. In November 2005, Ragmi Mustafa tried to oust Riza Halimi, who has been the mayor of Presevo since 1992. Along with Mustafa, Skender Destani, president of Democratic Union of the Presevo Valley and Orhan Rexhepi, president of Party of Democratic Progress pointed out that Halimi was an obstacle to their cherished goal, which is to unite to Kosovo the three municipalities in Serbia with large Albanian communities. That is why, today, the statement of Halimi does not gain much support among the southern Serbia�s Albanian politicians.This month, thousands of Albanians gathered in Bujanovac and Presevo in order to display their general dissatisfaction against the Serbian authority. Some shouted out �Presevo Valley is Kosovo�. According to rumours, southern Serbia�s Albanians expect an exchange of territory between northern Kosovo and southern Serbia. Northern Serbia, being a de facto Serbian enclave, is one of the main bones of contention between Belgrade and Pristina. Although every party involved refute these rumours, even the existence of such rumours is per se very interesting. This is a risky bluff. Pristina is careful not to unveil its position about the demand of the Presevo Valley to participate in the negotiations. This demand, which is disapproved by the international community, may harm Kosovo�s cause. Even Hashim Thaci, ex-chief of Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), now - the president of Democratic Party of Kosovo, emphasised that their aim is to have an independent Kosovo, not a �Greater Albania� nor a �Greater Kosovo�. Will the new Kosovo Prime Minister, Agim Cheku, ex-UCK�s chief of staff, behave differently? Probably he will not. Kosovo politicians will avoid any radical attitude in order to obtain what they have ever wanted: full independence. However it is probable that the Kosovo politicians hold this card as a trump against the Serbs during the negotiations. If Belgrade insists on the partition of Kosovo, Pristina will not hesitate to demand about the status of the Albanians in the Presevo Valley. Whether the establishment of such a direct link between the Serbs of Kosovo and the Albanians of southern Serbia will be blessed by Western powers, which are determined to conclude the Kosovo question by the end of 2006 at any price is another interesting question. All the more as there is already a great pressure upon Belgrade. The signals coming from the politicians from Pristina and Presevo would be an ultimate �stick� to Serbia: �Our demands will be more radical if only Kosovo is divided�. Maybe not physically, but spiritually the Presevo Valley seems to weigh on the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina. An artificial problem?The Albanians of southern Serbia are culturally and economically identical to those of Kosovo. Until 1946, when a decision by the Yugoslav government to separate these three municipalities from Kosovo and place them under direct Serbian Republic jurisdiction was taken, southern Serbia was a part of Kosovo. With the beginning of the unrest in Kosovo during the 1990s, the Albanians of southern Serbia organised an unofficial referendum in which they voted nearly unanimously to re-attach the Presevo Valley to Kosovo. In 2000, the unrest began, this time in southern




UCPMB patch
Serbia, with the terrorist attacks of the Liberation Army of Presevo-Medvedja-Bujanovac (UCPMB). Between March and May 2001, following intense NATO and US-led diplomacy, the international community brokered a peace agreement between the Albanians and Serbs that led to the disbanding of the UCPMB (Konculj Agreement) and to the famous Covic Plan. The Covic Plan foresaw economic, social and political amelioration of the region. Five years have been passed since the creation of this plan and the region, with an unemployment rate of about 33 percent, is still one of the poorest in Serbia. Presevo is the most undeveloped municipality, with a GDP per capita that is a sixth that of Serbia's average. Many Albanians are persuaded that Serbia deliberately condemns the region to chronic poverty. However the Serbian government has already invested 300 million Dinars (around 3.5 million Euros) this year in the three south Serbian municipalities and around 3.435 billion Dinars (about 40 million Euros) in the past four years. An additional 1.55 billion Dinars (18 million Euros) has come in foreign grants and donations, which makes a total of more than 5 billion Dinars (60 million Euros). Yet, it is true that most of the funds were spent on infrastructure, with little direct investment in the economy. No new jobs have been created in southern Serbia as a result of the investment. And although privatisation plays a key role in Serbia�s economic policy, not a single local public company has been privatised yet. These are the facts, though there is no clue that Serbia has any deliberate purpose in delaying the privatisation process. That the Albanians of southern Kosovo have serious problems is a fact. Yet, their case is definitely not comparable to that of Kosovo during the 1990s. Serbia is not the Serbia of Slobodan Milosevic any more. On the contrary, Serbia today wants to be a part of Europe as it never wanted before. And whereas there was once an open war in Kosovo, there is only a general dissatisfaction in southern Serbia. And this is not enough for the international community to multiply the Kosovo example. According to the EU officials, the Albanian youth would prefer to stay in Serbia, which will be a member of the EU and enjoy some visa facilities in the future. According to the same officials, only the elderly Albanians wish the annexation of the Presevo Valley to Kosovo. And after all, as they already dominate the town council, ethnic Albanians have little to gain from further divisions of the resources of an already impoverished community. And finally, the Albanians of southern Serbia, who did not support the UCPMB as a whole as the Kosovo Albanians supported the UCK, certainly will not approve of the use of violence to resolve their problems. The international community emphasised more than once that the Kosovo negotiations will only handle the Kosovo question and nothing else. The problems of southern Serbia will probably be dealt with in the framework of the democratisation and decentralisation process within Serbia. If the standards of minority rights are harmonised and generalised during the Kosovo negotiations, this will be a positive and productive evolution for the stability of the whole region. If these standards are the same in Serbia as well as in Macedonia and Montenegro, this will sure prevent further probable ethnic-based conflicts. So it seems that the international community will not let the Kosovo question be degenerated into a wider Albanian question in the Balkans. However the upcoming local elections in southern Serbia and the improbability in the Kosovo negotiations may prepare some unpleasant surprises for Serbia. �The situation in the south of Serbia is dramatic and I am afraid that serious incidents might affect security situation�, stated Riza Halimi this month. Local elections for Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja municipalities have not been scheduled yet, and they should, according to the law, take place in July. So this summer will be a turning point for Serbia as well as for the international community. One will see if the Albanian voters share the radical views of some of their politicians.

NATO�s Invasion of Kosovo & Apologetics for State Violence

http://blog.zmag.org/node/2562

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NATO�s Invasion of Kosovo & Apologetics for State Violence


Z Sustainer: In an interview on Irish television (RTS News �On the Iraq War and Rendition Flights�, January 19, 2006) you were asked some questions about NATO�s �humanitarian intervention� in Kosovo. The interviewer quoted the executive summary of the OSCE report KOSOVO � As Seen, As Told concluding that the Serbian forces� �intent to apply mass killing as an instrument of terror, coercion or punishment against Kosovo Albanians was already in evidence in 1998�. You responded �They didn't say that. What they said is that they had contingency plans to carry out atrocities if they were under attack�. I haven't been able to find any mention of �contingency plans� in this report.
Noam Chomsky: Hard for me to remember exactly what was said in an interview 3 months ago, particularly one like this, which was mostly a tirade in which I was barely able to get a word in edgewise. However, what you cite -- "intent to apply mass killing" -- is a contingency plan, in that context: intent under certain circumstances, if they arise. That wasn't in question. It would have been unnecessary to add, redundantly, that the intent if those circumstances arise was formalized in a contingency plan. That's taken for granted. If the US and UK "intended" to invade Iraq, they had "contingency plans" to do so. That seems elementary. And note that after the period you are referring to, there was a tentative settlement, which more or less held until it was broken by the KLA guerrillas, and was maintained, in fact, until NATO announced the intention to bomb and withdrew the monitors and the KLA escalated its attacks (the OSCE reported)
When I wrote about this at the time and since, I mentioned that obviously the Serbs had contingency plans, as every sane person knew. The US has contingency plans to invade Canada. Israel has contingency plans to expel Palestinians, and few sane people doubt that they would carry them out if under attack. That&undefined;s what military planners do for a living.
The OSCE (and other Western) records are reviewed in some detail in my book A New Generation Draws the Line. I don&undefined;t know of any other detailed review. Later, I also reviewed the British Parliamentary Inquiry, which reached the remarkable conclusion that up to January 1999, most of the atrocities -- ugly, but at a low level, by international standards -- were committed by KLA guerrillas attacking Serb targets in the hope of eliciting a harsh response, and we know from OSCE and other sources that nothing substantial changed from then until the announcement of the bombing. The OSCE records describe an upsurge in KLA attacks when the monitors withdrawn were withdrawn in preparation for bombing (March 20). In that book I reviewed the kind of material selected from the OSCE report by the Irish TV announcer, but also reviewed the material that would have been selected by his exact counterpart in Belgrade, and the full conclusions. You can check and see.
There are a few serious scholarly studies by supporters of the bombing, which I&undefined;ve cited, in particular Nicholas Wheeler&undefined;s. Unlike almost everyone, he reports the timing of atrocities accurately. He draws the astonishing conclusion that of the 2000 killed in the year up to the bombing, 500 were killed by Serbs. That&undefined;s even more extreme than the British Parliamentary Inquiry. You can find citations in my Hegemony or Survival.
Z Sustainer: In the interview you also talk about �the entire Western documentation�. Is there any mention of �contingency plans� or any suggestion that the atrocities committed against the Kosovo Albanians were the product of the Serbs� implementation of �contingency plans� that were only set in motion because the Serbs �were under attack� in these documents? Or anything that amounts to same thing (in other words)? Your interpretation seems reasonable, but is there anything that suggests that the documentation (or NATO or the political leadership) interpreted the events the same way?
Noam Chomsky: That's constant, throughout, including the phrase you quote from the interview. Throughout, the record reviews possible "intent" -- that is, contingency plans. After the bombing, with the anticipated atrocities, it was commonly argued that the Serbs were going to carry them out anyway, so that the US and its allies are not responsible for the atrocities which, they anticipated, would result from the bombing. There was one explicit discussion of contingency plans (instead of just "intent," which is about the same thing, under the assumption of sanity). After the bombing elicited the anticipated atrocities, there was a leak of an alleged contingency plan -- Operation Horseshoe -- which was brought forth to show that the atrocities would have taken place anyway. Nato commander General Clark was asked about this, and said he had never heard of it. Even if true, it's irrelevant anyway, since it was not "known" before the bombing was undertaken, and therefore couldn&undefined;t have been a motive. The "Operation" was soon exposed as a probable intelligence fabrication. You can find details in my book. However, after exposure, and despite the transparent irrelevancy even if true, it continues to be evoked as a justification for the atrocities that were the anticipated consequence of the bombing.
As to NATO interpretation, in the same book I reviewed the official story. Once the standard inversion of the historical record is corrected (the timing of the bombing and the anticipated atrocities), the US official justification reduces to preserving "the credibility of NATO," which of course means "credibility of the US." For the meaning of "credibility," ask your favourite Mafia Don.
We know have a more authoritative source, however. From the highest level of the Clinton administration: Strobe Talbott, now director of the Brookings Institution, who was the lead American negotiator and director of a joint National Security Council-Pentagon-State Department task force on diplomacy during the bombing. Talbott wrote the foreword to a recent book on the war by his director of communications, John Norris. In it, Talbott writes that thanks to Norris�s book, anyone interested in the war in Kosovo �will know...how events looked and felt at the time to those of us who were involved� in the war. That sounds fairly authoritative. Presenting the position of the Clinton administration, Norris writes that �it was Yugoslavia�s resistance to the broader trends of political and economic reform � not the plight of Kosovar Albanians � that best explains NATO�s war.� That had been surmised, but is now confirmed from a very high level.
Z Sustainer: Another Kosovo question. In a review of your book The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo Adrian Hastings writes the following: �Doubtless without intervention there would not have been hundreds of thousands of Kosovars fleeing the country within weeks, but there were already - as Chomsky admits - several hundred thousand internal refugees and an extensive policy of torching Albanian homes. There is no reason to think that this would not have continued and grown worse. The refugees were bound to abandon the country in ever-increasing numbers with no likelihood of return and the permanent destabilisation of neighbouring states. A Kosovo left in the hands of Milo�evic would have continued in a state of bitter conflict unless it became one in which over a number of months the majority of Albanians were ethnically cleansed. The growing flow of Albanian refugees all across Europe would have been as big a problem as that of Bosnians had been a few years earlier. Chomsky repeatedly claims that the bombing �failed� in that it greatly escalated the refugee flow; but its failure in that regard was only temporary. It in fact ensured the rapid return of the refugees, undoubtedly to miserable conditions but not to worse conditions than they had experienced in the months before the bombing, and essentially to a situation which would improve rather than indefinitely deteriorate.�Noam Chomsky: The word "admit" gives the game away. There's no "admission," any more than there is an "admission" that the KLA committed atrocities. Rather, I reviewed the record prior to the bombing. The book that infuriated him said virtually nothing about the decision to bomb; it was about a different topic, as the title indicates. But in my next book, when the record was available from impeccable Western sources, I did review it, infuriating the Hastings of the world even more.
Z Sustainer: 1. How would you respond to this kind of �it had to get bad before it could get better� argument? 2. Is the argument sensible if we make the assumption that diplomacy was not � and could not ever be � an option (just like our leaders)?
Noam Chomsky: I rarely bother to respond to vulgar apologetics for state violence. We can put aside Hasting's surmises, which have no interest or credibility. What we do know is that there had been a steady low level of violence, with some surges and declines, and that nothing special happening up to the bombing, apart from the KLA escalation right before the bombing, reported by the OSCE. We also know that according to the British parliamentary inquiry, most of the violence (as noted) was provoked by the KLA guerrillas seeking (as they openly said) to provoke a harsh response that they could use to elicit Western intervention, and that the bombing was undertaken with the clear anticipation that it would lead to an escalation of atrocities, as it did. This much was already clear from the Milosevic indictment, relying on US-British intelligence: with one exception, the charges were after the bombing -- which also elicited the first refugee flow out of the country sufficient for the UNHCR to begin issuing reports. Hasting also knows -- but would never say -- that there were two diplomatic options on the table at the time when NATO bombed, a NATO proposal and a Serb proposal, and that after 78 days of bombing, a compromise was formally reached between them, ending the war (I add "formally" because NATO instantly violated it, as he also knows). That at least suggests that peaceful means were still available, had NATO (meaning the US and UK) not been intent on military action -- for reasons that are now conceded publicly. Of course, if we adopt the North Korean stand and worship our Dear Leaders without question, then there were no diplomatic options.
To see how depraved such arguments are, consider a comparable one. Suppose that the relative military strength of Iran and Israel were the same as that of NATO and Serbia. Suppose that an Iranian Hastings were to advocate bombing of Israel, knowing that it would lead to an escalation of atrocities against Palestinians and probably expulsion of Palestinians, but saying that it doesn't matter because after Israel was forced to capitulate after heavy bombing the Palestinians could return. How would we react? How is this different?
It is also worth adding that the hypocrisy of the pretense of concern for the fate of the Kosovar Albanians is so colossal that it takes a really well indoctrinated educated class to suppress it. To mention only the obvious (discussed in New Military Humanism, but scrupulously ignored by outraged reviewers), at the very same time, the US and UK were not only tolerating comparable or worse atrocities, but were actively participating in escalating them -- including a major case that was not "at the borders of NATO," as the Hastings and others like him lamented, but right within NATO. To "overlook" all this and shed tears for the victims of the crimes of others takes a really impressive level of vulgarity and disciplined subordination to power.
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About Noam Chomsky
Biography
Linguistics Professor at MIT, critic of US foreign policy, anti-capitalist, and long time advocate of liberation and justice, Noam Chomsky lives in Lexington, Massachusetts. Author of dozens of books and hundreds of essays, the content of this blog is drawn largely from the ZNet Sustainer Forum where he answers queries from members of the ZNet Sustainer Program.