November 30, 2006

Ltr in Response to Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie






Ltr in Response to Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie




Unpublished
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
 

"The bombing of an ally of two world wars by NATO was a disgraceful abuse of power." 
 
Globe and Mail
 
Letter to the editor(s)
 
24 November 2006
 
In his 22 November 2006 article, "Go big, go bold, and get it done," retired Major General Lewis MacKenzie made a convincing case for increased support by NATO nations for the mission in Afghanistan.  He contrasted the lack of significant support by some NATO members to the unity shown in the NATO operation in Bosnia/Kosovo.  However, because his focus was clearly on the Afghanistan mission, he did not elaborated on why, in 1999, he "was an outspoken critic of NATO's ill-conceived bombing campaign against Serbia/Kosovo."  Basically, NATO military operations in Afghanistan met the requirement of Article 5 of the NATO Charter; Bosnia/Kosovo did not.
 
The 19-member nations which comprise 900 million members, bombed tiny Yugoslavia, with a population of 10 million in violation of the NATO Charter.  In the event that anyone doesn't remember, NATO was the agreement between member nations that should one nation be threatened or attacked by the Soviet Union, the other nations would go to their defense.  I know of no NATO nation, nor any nation that Yugoslavia attacked, or even threatened.
 
With the fall of the Soviet Union, NATO needed a new mission, and what better mission than the Serbs of Yugoslavia?  Instead of NATO's mission for defense, it assumed the mantra of an offensive force by unjustly bombing a sovereign nation back to the stone age.
 
The bombing of an ally of two world wars by NATO was a disgraceful abuse of power.
 
Colonel George Jatras, USAF (Ret)
USA



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November 25, 2006

Bitterness, Irony, and Hope

















Bitterness, Irony, and Hope







by Nebojsa Malic








Bosnia, Year 11


Eleven years since the Dayton
Accords
were finalized at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio, Bosnia-Herzegovina
is not at peace. Though military operations stopped in 1995, hostility among
the country's ethnic communities – Muslims, Serbs and Croats – has not diminished
much. Politics turned out to be the continuation of war by other means.


Six weeks after general
elections
in October brought to power Serbs determined to preserve their
autonomy and Muslims determined to destroy it, and divided the Croats, the country
has a new presidency and one chamber of the parliament, but a new cabinet (Council
of Ministers) still has to be appointed. The outgoing PM, Adnan Terzic, chose
to end his tenure with a denunciation of the country's Serbs to the UN General
Assembly. Local authorities throughout the Muslim-Croat Federation are also
slow to emerge, and when they do it is usually at the expense of constitutional
requirements for ethnic representation. Corruption is endemic and widespread,
while a crushing value-added
tax
, levied even on charitable donations, is bleeding the fledgling economy
dry. Few things are left unsullied by politics. But when humanity does assert
itself, it shines so much brighter against the oppressive drudgery of statism.


A Functioning Government


By Nov. 10, the Bosnian Serb Republic (RS) had
convened its new parliament. All the seats set aside for Muslims and Croats
under a constitutional quota system were filled. The only exception was the
position of deputy speaker, since the largest Muslim party refused to nominate
a candidate. (The party is Haris Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia, which advocates
the destruction of the RS.) The new president of RS took office as well, and
since Milorad Dodik remained prime minister, his cabinet will likely undergo
only minor changes.


On the other hand, in the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there
was a chronic deficit of Serbs and Croats in Muslim-majority areas. According
to the Sarajevo daily Oslobodjenje,
three Serb seats in cantonal parliaments were left vacant (out of 17), and the
House of Nations in the Federation parliament had only 12 out of 19.


On Nov. 15, a report in Oslobodjenje about the innumerable difficulties
in setting up the new governments in the Federation actually used the phrase
"a better system of government" to describe the RS arrangement. This
is unprecedented. For, while it's obvious to everyone that the Federation is
a cumbersome, dysfunctional, wasteful, and prohibitive arrangement, Muslims
and Croats persist in blaming the RS for Bosnia's troubles, and demanding centralization
as a way to resolve inefficiencies of government.


The outgoing PM of the joint government, Adnan Terzic, did just that at the
UN General Assembly, earning a tongue-lashing from Dodik, who called him an
"ordinary fool." When he appeared as a guest in a news program on
Nov. 13, Terzic proved Dodik right, by rambling incoherently and using "logic"
that would embarrass kindergartners.


Conspiracy Theories


On Nov. 20, members of the new national parliament
were sworn in: 28 from the Federation, 14 from the RS. The session was adjourned
almost immediately, as there had been no agreement on electing the speaker or
the Council of Ministers.


One of the MPs is Sefer
Halilovic
, retired general and wartime chief of staff for the Army of the
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, established by the Izetbegovic regime in 1992.
Before that, Halilovic was the military commander of the Patriotic League, a
Muslim militia organization supporting Izetbegovic's drive for independence.


As part of a series of interviews conducted with high-ranking ARBH officers,
shown on Federal TV for the past month, Halilovic has spoken in detail about
his role in the early days of the war, including disagreements with Izetbegovic
and people around him. Not surprisingly, he credits the Patriotic League with
a key role in "defense from genocidal aggression from Serbia," while
accusing Izetbegovic's party cronies of "betraying the Bosniak people."


Halilovic's tale, pitting him and a faction of the Bosnian Muslim "patriots"
against both the "genocidal Serbian aggressors" and "back-stabbing
traitors" in the SDA party, is falling on fertile ground among the Bosnian
Muslims. Persistent cronyism, corruption, venality, and incompetence have soured
many on the SDA, but Izetbegovic's historical and political framework of the
Bosnian conflict – as a war of Serbian aggression and genocide against the peaceful,
defenseless Muslims, which the West observed but did not intervene until much
too late – remains absolutely
dominant
among them.


As a result, in today's Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslims overwhelmingly believe
the Dayton agreement shortchanged them and "rewarded genocide," demanding
its revision and establishment of a centralized state in which they would be
dominant (on account of their plurality). This idea is as unacceptable to Serbs
and Croats today as it was in 1992, and attempts to impose it can only lead
to renewed bloodshed. By nurturing the fiction about "back-stabbing and
betrayal," Sefer Halilovic is basically laying the groundwork for more
young Bosnian Muslims to become "shaheed,"
as most of the 28,000 soldiers who died
in the last war are labeled.


Consider just this quote:


"There is no Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina today, unfortunately. Bosniaks
are in one big
Srebrenica
… only 25 percent of Bosnian territory. The rest is practically Serbia and Croatia."
(from the November 12 show)


Givers and Takers


Many soldiers that Halilovic and his successors
sent in human waves into a hail of shot and shell stayed alive, but at a great
cost. Tens of thousands of people in Bosnia today are missing limbs because
of shrapnel injuries or land mines. Some of them defy that disability by playing
Paralympic sports – such as the men of Spid,
a Sarajevo-based sitting volleyball club.


The men of Spid have traveled to tournaments in ordinary buses they chartered;
because most buses in Bosnia still lack wheelchair-accessible technology, this
involves a fair bit of discomfort. Earlier this year, the club received a donation
from the EU: two handicap-accessible vans.


Unfortunately, Bosnia's legislation demands that they pay the import tariffs
and VAT for the donation, for a total cost of some 14,000 Bosnian marks (KM)
– almost $10,000. The club does not have that kind of money. The 17
percent VAT
established this year, as part of centralization reforms, was
supposed to provide funds for social welfare programs. One should ask the men
of Spid how that has turned out.


Humanity Prevails


Mostar, the capital of Herzegovina, got its name
from an old Ottoman bridge spanning the churning waters of the river Neretva.
During the war, its Serbs were expelled, while Muslims and Croats battled over
the city, reducing large portions of it to rubble.


The Old Bridge, destroyed by Croat artillery, was restored
in 2004. But the city remains divided into Muslim and Croat halves, separated
by an invisible wall of hatred.


One resident of Mostar, a young man named Sanel Hrnic, was badly injured earlier
this year in a car crash. He is no longer comatose but needs therapy soon if
he is to regain higher brain functions. His parents can't afford the treatment.
Sanel is Muslim.


His plight drew the attention of Nada Zovko, who owns a small business. She
launched a campaign "Today we work for Sanel": on Nov. 21, every participating
business in Mostar would donate one day's worth of proceeds to Sanel's therapy
fund. Zovko is a Croat.


http://www.antiwar.com/malic/?articleid=10057

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November 24, 2006

Go big, go bold, and get it done - Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie






Go big, go bold, and get it done - Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie




 


"A few months after the negotiated end to the bombing, my branding as an opponent to NATO's intervention got me invited to a debate in the U.S. with General Wesley Clark, the NATO commander in charge of the campaign, regarding the wisdom of NATO's actions."
 
Go to link to read comments (however, it is still early - you need to check back later)  Stella
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Go big, go bold, and get it done
Globe and Mail (Canada) ^ | November 22, 2006 | Maj. Gen. Lewis MacKenzie

Posted on 11/23/2006 2:29:31 PM PST by Doctor13

Tip-toeing won't work. We need another 30,000 NATO troops to protect Afghans while they get their country on its feet.

In 1999, I was an outspoken critic of NATO's ill-conceived bombing campaign against Serbia/Kosovo. For anyone playing close attention to the events leading up to the campaign, it was pretty obvious that the independence- seeking Kosovo Liberation Army - which, according to the CIA, was a terrorist organization - and its retained U.S.-based, public-relations support had played the West like a Stradivarius. This culminated with NATO volunteering to be the KLA's air force.

A few months after the negotiated end to the bombing, my branding as an opponent to NATO's intervention got me invited to a debate in the U.S. with General Wesley Clark, the NATO commander in charge of the campaign, regarding the wisdom of NATO's actions.

Following the debate, Gen. Clark shared a story that still resonates today regarding our mission in Afghanistan. He recalled that mid-way through the bombing campaign, he was exchanging small talk with Greece's ambassador to NATO. Gen. Clark opined to the ambassador, "This must be quite difficult for you, as I understand there is a good deal of controversy in your country regarding our bombing of Serbia." Without hesitation, the ambassador replied, "No, Gen. Clarke, there is no controversy. We are all against the bombing!" He could have gone on to say (unnecessary, considering his audience): "But we are a member of NATO and that means you can rely on us even if we don't agree with the mission."

Fast forward to today and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's first operation involving combat inside or outside of Europe. No one has rewritten Article 5 of NATO's Charter since April 4, 1949. It still reads, in part: "The parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force ..."

Article 5 was invoked by NATO's leadership following the attacks of 9/11, and as required by the same article, the decision to use armed force was reported to and endorsed by the United Nation's Security Council. NATO now finds itself fighting a major counterinsurgency campaign in three of the 34 Afghanistan provinces, one of which, Kandahar, is the responsibility of our Canadian battle group. With an area half the size of Nova Scotia, an all-too-modest number of Canadian troops are not just trying to keep the lid on the insurgency, they are trying to defeat it.

To make matters worse, they have a porous border with Pakistan staring them in the face. Replacements for Taliban killed in Afghanistan don't even need to sneak across the border through the mountain passes. They drive across in the backs of trucks with their kit in broad daylight.

General David Richards, commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan, expressed his dismay with the resources at his disposal shortly after taking command in August. He quite rightly indicated he had no reserve capacity to exploit or secure successes on the battlefield and requested an additional 2,500 NATO troops be provided at the earliest opportunity.

As someone who has watched each and every UN mission since the end of the Cold War - in Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East Timor etc. - stumble, and in all too many cases, fail due to overly optimistic best-case scenarios and subsequent undermanning and underbudgeting of the UN force, followed by hesitant and inadequate reinforcement as the mission became mired, I am surprised Gen. Richard's request was so modest. Perhaps he hoped that once the reinforcement flow was kick started, it could be increased. Other than Poland, no NATO member raised its hand to help in any significant way. On the contrary, some nations ignored the example mentioned above that was set by Greece and treated the requirements of Article 5 as if they were multiple choice. Select what you feel like, ignore the rest.

"Sure, we will come to Afghanistan but don't ask us to leave our comfortable [and safe] firm base after the sun goes down."

Or, "Sure, our troops will be there shoulder to shoulder with the rest of you, just don't ask us to participate in any combat actions!"

Mind you, at least the countries that insist on the so-called caveats are actually in Afghanistan, which is more than you can say for the NATO leaders with at least three-quarters of a billion troops at their disposal who refuse to respond to the Alliance's pleas for help while troops from across the Atlantic Ocean and English Channel bear the brunt of a fight with inadequate resources.

In my opinion, based on a recent visit to Afghanistan and too many years operating with chronically undermanned UN forces, Gen. Richards does not need 2,500 more soldiers. He needs to double his force with 30,000 more front-line troops. Adequate headquarters are already on the ground to look after a massive infusion of combat power "outside the wire." If we want to protect the local Afghans while they reconstruct their country and create their army and local and national police forces, we can't tip-toe toward a solution.

The time has come to be bold. With NATO's future hanging in the balance, fence-sitting NATO partners have to be convinced, coerced, intimidated to live up to their end of the contract they signed when they joined during more peaceful times. Failure to do so will signal the end of a 57-year-old alliance that failed when faced with its first real test in the field.

Retired major-general Lewis MacKenzie was the first commander of UN peacekeeping forces in Sarajevo.

Letters@globeandmail.com




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Kosovo is dysfunctional cesspool

Kosovo is dysfunctional cesspool



Kosovo is dysfunctional cesspool


Your Nov. 8 editorial, "Same old Serbia," lacked clarity regarding what's really going on in what used to be Yugoslavia.

Perhaps when discussing Bosnia-Herzegovina, the concern should not be as much about the political divisions there but focus more on the fact that for the past 10 years Bosnia has become fertile territory for global jihadists. One has to look no further than the machinations of the Clinton administration to know how that came to be. This information is readily available on the Internet.

The editorial mentioned that the United Nations "wants to unload Kosovo to the EU." But why does the U.N. want to unload Kosovo? Because anyone who has paid any attention can plainly see that Kosovo post-1999, and the U.S.-led "humanitarian" bombing and takeover, is a dysfunctional cesspool of organized crime, murder, and mayhem, and a fellow with a murky track record is its so-called prime minister.

Since 1999, more than 150 ancient Christian holy places have been desecrated, severely damaged, and, in most cases, completely destroyed by marauding bands of intolerant Albanian Muslims. Simultaneously, hundreds of new mosques are being built, many of them carrying plaques acknowledging funding from Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates.

Interestingly, this registers nary a blip on the West's radar screen. Could it be that the U.S. and its UN/NATO allies have made such a mess in Kosovo that the less said in that regard the better? And then they have the audacity to recommend Kosovo's independence.

Your editorial took the easy road by blaming Serbia for the problems in the region. The blame rests closer to home.

LIZ MILANOVICH
Edmonton, Alberta

<
http://www.toledoblade.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20061113/OPINION03/61112003>

--------------------------------------------------------------

Article published Wednesday, November 8, 2006

Same old Serbia


RECENT developments in Serbia, the Serbian part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo continue to stand as barriers to Serbia's joining the European Union and reaping for its people the economic benefits of that partnership.

Two votes last month highlighted the problem. The first, general elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina Oct. 1, including the election of the Serb, Muslim, and Croat presidents who together make up the country's presidency, showed continued loyalty on the part of the three groups to nationalist, separatist representatives.

The Serb president, Nebojsa Radmanovic, and his party oppose the abolition of the political divisions incorporated in the 1995 Dayton peace accords that ended the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is generally considered that the EU would be reluctant to move toward membership for Bosnia-Herzegovina with the current divisions intact.

The second vote was an Oct. 29 referendum on Serbia's new constitution, which includes an assertion that Kosovo is an "integral part of Serbia." The referendum was approved by 96 percent of the voters.

The problem is that the United Nations, which has governed Kosovo since 1999, wants to unload it to the EU by the end of the year. The United States currently has 1,000 troops in Kosovo.

A solution would involve granting Kosovo independence, or some form of self-government, perhaps with continued international oversight. The new arrangement would be dominated by the 90 percent of the people who are Albanian, but the rights of the Serbs, who account for less than 10 percent, will need to be guaranteed.

Serbian resistance to change in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, in addition to its refusal to turn over two prominent former Bosnian Serb leaders to international authorities for trial, continues to be a barrier to Serbia's progress toward adherence to the EU as well.

Serbia can be respected for its independence, but its approach to the problems of the region does not seem to be in its people's best interests.



Kosovo independence would be ‘nightmare’ for Serbia





FT.com / World / Europe - Kosovo independence would be ‘nightmare’ for Serbia

Kosovo independence would be ‘nightmare’ for Serbia





By Tom Burgis in Brussels





Published: November 23 2006 14:06



| Last updated: November 23 2006 14:06





Independence for Kosovo would visit a “nightmare” on Serbia’s government by bolstering supporters of the late dictator Slobadan Milosevic, the country’s foreign minister has warned.

Vuk Draskovic said the centre-right administration could be outflanked by nationalists if the final status of the province is imposed on Belgrade by the international community.

“I am very afraid of the consequences of an imposed solution,” Mr Draskovic told the Financial Times in an interview. “It will strengthen the hands of the [ultra-nationalist] Radicals. This is my nightmare.” There was already pressure to cut ties with any state that recognises an independent Kosovo, he said.

Kosovo has been a ward of the United Nations since Nato troops drove Serb forces from the Albanian-dominated province in 1999. Martti Ahtisaari, the UN’s special envoy to Kosovo, has delayed making his recommendations on the province’s future until early next year after Belgrade called snap elections for January. In October, Serbs voted to adopt a new constitution describing Kosovo as an “intergral part” of the nation.

Mr Draskovic said there remained time to find a compromise solution that would see Kosovo gain full autonomy but remain within Serbian territory without the right to join Nato or the UN.

However, the Contact Group of nations marshalling negotiations has promised a solution “acceptable to the people of Kosovo”. One Western diplomat said that “any Belgrade proposal offering autonomy is unlikely to fulfil that”.

Belgrade argues that allowing the 2m Kosovans - among them 100,000 Serbs - to secede would set a precedent. “An imposed solution will have to respect the right to self-determination of Kosovans,” Mr Draskovic said. “But what happens when the next day the Serbs in Bosnia say: ‘We also want to use that right’?” Separatists in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Taiwan might follow suit, he added.

In a meeting with Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Nato secretary general, in Brussels on Wednesday, Mr Draskovic will demand unconditional Serbian entry to a Partnership for Peace cooperation agreement. A pact with the treaty body could hasten the arrest of former Bosnian Serb army chief Ratko Mladic by demonstrating to his supporters that “they have lost the battle for the future”, Mr Draskovic said. However, Nato has made Serbian compliance with the tribunal a precondition of partnership.

The European Union has frozen talks with Belgrade on an accession agreement, widely seen as a waystation to membership, while Mr Mladic - wanted by the UN’s war crimes tribunal for the 1995 Srebrenica massacre - remains at large.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006

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November 20, 2006

Homo Balkanus






Homo Balkanus




Homo Balkanus
Sam Vaknin, Ph.D. - 11/22/2006
Written: August 18, 1999

Could have been written today

How does one respond to a torrent of belligerent correspondence from Balkanians arguing against the belligerence of Balkanians asserted by one in one's articles? Were it not sad, it surely would have been farcical. Only yesterday (August 17th, 1999 - five months after the Kosovo conflict) Macedonian papers argued fiercely, vehemently and threateningly against an apparently innocuous remark by Albania's Prime Minister. He said that all Albanians, wherever they are, should share the same curriculum of studies. A preparatory step on the way to a Greater Albania perhaps? In this region of opaque mirrors and "magla" (fog) it is possible. And what is possible surely IS.

I do not believe in the future of this part of the world only because I know its history too well. every psychologist will tell you that past violent behaviour is the best predictor of future recidivism. Homo Balkanus is lifted straight off the rustling pages of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) IV-TR (2000) - the bible of the psychiatric profession - when it defines the Narcissistic Personality Disorder.

Narcissism is a result of stunted growth and of childhood abuse. It is a reactive pattern, the indelible traces of an effort to survive against all odds, against bestial repression and all-pervasive decay. Brutally suppressed by the Turks for hundreds of years and then by communism in some countries and by cruel, capricious banana republic regimes in others - Homo Balkanus has grown to be a full fledged narcissist.

The nation state structure and ideology enthusiastically adopted by Homo Balkanus in the wake of the collapse of the rotten Ottoman edifice - has proven to be a costly mistake. Tribal village societies are not fit for the consumption of abstract models of political organization. This is as true in Africa as it is in the Balkans. The first allegiance of Homo Balkanus is to his family, his clan, his village. Local patriotism was never really supplanted by patriotism. Homo Balkanus shares an Ottoman unconscious with his co-regionists. The "authorities" were and are always perceived to be a brutal, menacing and unpredictable presence, a natural power, to be resisted by the equal employment of cunning and corruption. Turkish habits die hard. The natives find it difficult not to bribe their way through their own officialdom, to pay taxes, not to litter, to volunteer, in short: to be citizens, rather than occupants or inhabitants. Their passive-aggressive instincts are intact and on auto pilot.

The Balkanian experiment with nation states has visited only misery and carnage upon the heads of its perpetrators. Borders tracked convulsively the movements of half-nomad populations. This instability of boundaries led to ethnic cleansing, to numerous international congresses, to fitful wars. In an effort to justify a distinct existence and identity, thousands of "scholars" embarked on herculean efforts of inventing histories for their newly emergent nations. Inevitably, these histories conflicted and led to yet more bloodshed. A land fertilized by blood produces harvests of bloated corpses.

In the Balkans people fight for their very own identity. They aspire to purity, albeit racial, and to boundaries, albeit of the abstract kind. It is, perhaps, the kernel of this Greek tragedy: that real people are sacrificing real people on the altar of the abstract. It is a battle of tastes, a clash of preferences, an armageddon of opinions, judgements, lessons. Armies are still moved by ancient events, by symbols, by fiery speeches, by abstract, diffuse notions. It is a land devoid of its present, where the past and future reign supreme. No syllogism, no logic, no theory can referee that which cannot be decided but by the compelling thrust of the sword. "We versus They" - they, the aliens. Threatened by the otherness of others, Homo Balkanus succumbs to the protection of the collective. A dual track: an individualist against the authorities - a mindless robot against all others, the foreigners, the strangers, the occupiers. The violent acting out of this schizophrenia is often referred to as "the history of the Balkans".

This spastic nature was further exacerbated by the egregious behaviour of the superpowers. Unfortunately possessed of strategic import, the Balkan was ravaged by geopolitics. Turks and Bulgarians and Hungarians and Austrians and Russians and Britons and Germans and Communists and the warplanes of NATO - the apocalyptic horsemen in the mountains and rivers and valleys and sunsets of this otherworldly, tortured piece of land. Raped by its protectors, impregnated by the demon seeds of global interests and their ruthless pursuit - the Balkan was transformed into a horror chamber of amputated, zombie nations, a veritable hellish scene. Many a Pomeranian grenadier bequeathed their bones to the Balkans but Pomeranian grenadiers came and went while the people of the Balkan languished.

Thus, it was not difficult to foster a "We" against every "They" (or imagined "They"). A crossroads of faultlines, a confluence of tectonic clashes - the Balkan always obliged.

Religion came handy in this trade of hate. Orthodox Serbs fought Muslim Serbs in Bosnia (the latter were forced to convert by the Turks hundreds of years ago). Catholic Croats fought Orthodox Serbs. And Bulgarians (a Turkic tribe) expelled the Turks in 1989, having compelled them to change their Muslim names to Bulgarian sounding ones in 1984.

Race was useful in the agitated effort to prevail. Albanians are of Illyrian origin. The Greeks regard the Macedonians as upstart Slavs. The Bulgarians regard the Macedonians as rebel Bulgarians. The Macedonian regard the Bulgarians as Tartars (that is, Barbarian and Turkish). The Slovenes and the Croats and, yes, the Hungarians claim not to belong in this cauldron of seething, venomous emotions.

And culture was used abundantly in the Balkan conflicts. Where was the Cyrillic alphabet invented (Macedonia, Greece, Bulgaria) and by whom (Greeks, Macedonians, Bulgarians). Are some nations mere inventions? (the Bulgarians say this about the Macedonians). Are some languages one and the same? Minorities are either cleansed or denied out of existence. The Greek still claim that there are no minorities in Greece, only Greeks with different religions. The Bulgars in Greece used to be "Bulgarophone Greeks". The Balkan is the eternal hunting grounds of oxymorons, tautologies and logical fallacies.

It is here that intellectuals usually step in (see my article: "The Poets and the Eclipse"). But the Balkan has no intelligentsia in the Russian or even American sense. It has no one to buck the trend, to play the non conforming, to rattle, to provoke, to call upon one's conscience. It does not have this channel to (other) ideas and view called "intellectuals". It is this last point which makes me the most pessimistic. The Balkan is a body without a brain.

http://www.globalpolitician.com/articledes.asp?ID=2320&cid=3&sid=10

 

Sam Vaknin, Ph.D. is the author of Malignant Self Love - Narcissism Revisited and After the Rain - How the West Lost the East. He served as a columnist for Central Europe Review, PopMatters, Bellaonline, and eBookWeb, a United Press International (UPI) Senior Business Correspondent, and the editor of mental health and Central East Europe categories in The Open Directory and Suite101.

Until recently, he served as the Economic Advisor to the Government of Macedonia. Sam Vaknin's Web site is at http://samvak.tripod.com

You can download 22 of his free ebooks in our bookstore


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Kosovo Serbs: Humanitarian catastrophe

 Kosovo Serbs: Humanitarian catastrophe



Kosovo Serbs: Humanitarian catastrophe 19 November 2006 | 10:47 | Source: Beta
 
KOSOVSKA MITROVICA -- Kosovo Serb representatives Marko JakÅ¡ić and Milan Ivanović say there is a “humanitarian catastrophe” in Kosovo today.

In a press conference called in reaction to power cuts that lasted for hours and to what he called vandalism toward Telekom’s equipment in Kosovo, JakÅ¡ić said that UNMIK chief Joachim Ruecker was acting like “a Kosovo government member, rather than a high UNMIK official”.

“He [Ruecker] is one of those who authored the looting privatization and the economic discrimination against Serbs and Serb-owned companies, and is charged with driving everything that even reminds of Serbs and the Serb state away from Kosovo“, JakÅ¡ić said.

In his words, “out of 190 privatized companies in Kosovo not a single one is owned by a Serb, which means that the property belonging to one nation is taken and given to another”.

JakÅ¡ić said that beside the physical violence and persecution that the Serbs suffer at the hands of the Albanians, UNMIK is undertaking “torture on the economic level”, and called on Ruecker to “stop jeopardizing Serb interests making the lives of Serbs impossible.”

Serb National Council (SNV) president Milan Ivanović said that the situation in the province has deteriorated and dubbed it a humanitarian catastrophe.

Ivanović said the Montenegrin opposition leaders would be visiting Kosovo on Monday, as well as that he expected them to, after being acquainted with the situation in Kosovo, “support the only just solution, Kosovo’s future as a part of Serbia”.
 



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November 18, 2006

Consider Kosovo's History (Ltr in WP by Michael Mennard

Consider Kosovo's History (Ltr in WP by Michael Mennard



 

 

Consider Kosovo's History

Saturday, November 18, 2006; Page A19


Regarding the Nov. 10 editorial "Here Comes Kosovo":

Americans don't understand or like history, which most other cultures accept and study as an invaluable source of knowledge and experience. Americans generally look at history as an unnecessary burden that can have only a negative influence on the present.

Your editorial regarding Kosovo, the very cradle of Serbia, showed such ignorance. Nowhere did it note that Kosovo has been part of Serbia since the Serbs moved to it in the sixth century, four centuries before any Albanians were heard of in the Balkans.

Moreover, the editorial said, "By incorporating Kosovo into a new constitution, Serbia's leaders staked out yet another of the reckless nationalist stands that have caused their country so much damage in the past 15 years."

Wrong. It is ignorance of historic facts displayed by The Post and other similarly inspired American publications that has caused so much damage to a small but brave nation and a loyal ally in two world wars. The Serbs do not want what belongs to others, but they will not give away what is rightfully theirs.

The United States and its citizens would react in the same way if someone suddenly decided that Southern California or New Mexico should secede just because Spanish-speaking Mexicans live there.

As for your specter of 2 million Albanians in Kosovo being enraged, they should just go back where they came from -- neighboring Albania. Most Albanians came to Kosovo during World War II or during the rule of Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, which maintained an open border with Albania, its fellow communist neighbor. Since then the incoming Albanians have systematically pushed untold numbers of Kosovo Serbs out of Kosovo.

Your editorial writers should study history to ensure more meaningful and more accurate editorials.



-- Michael Mennard

Potomac Falls






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November 16, 2006

INTEVIEW WITH DR. SRDJA TRIFKOVIC

INTEVIEW WITH DR. SRDJA TRIFKOVIC




INTEVIEW WITH DR. SRDJA TRIFKOVIC

 
KEY FEATURES OF SERBIA'S NEW CONSTITUTION:
Serbia is a state of Serbs and all citizens
Serbian territorial integrity remains inviolable
 
By Boba Borojevic
 
The adoption of the new constitution of the Republic of Serbia on November 10 was an important moment in that country's modern history. It followed the referendum held on October 27-28, which Serbia's voters supported with a simple majority vote. We asked Srdja Trifkovic to comment the significance of this event.
Dr. Trifkovic is Foreign Affairs Editor of Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture and a leading expert on U.S. foreign policy and Balkan politics . This is an edited transcript of the interview aired on "Monday's Encounter" on CKCU 93.1 FM on November 13. He points out two key elements of Serbia's new constitution, of which the first is that Serbia was defined as the nation state of the Serbian people, as well as the state of all other ethnicities within its boundaries:
 
"In other words Serbia is a country of its citizens but also it is defined as the country of the Serbs. Some people of the supposedly 'pro-Western' liberal persuasion have claimed that this was a retrograde concept, the one that was becoming obsolete in the rest of enlightened of contemporary Europe. This is simply not true, however. If you look at the newcomers to the European Union, notably the former communist countries of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, or Latvia… they all defined themselves as nation-states of those particular ethic groups, as well as countries of all citizens who live within their boundaries. Those who object to the definition of Serbia as the nation state of the Serbian people – in addition to those who inhabit it – are not well informed about the constitutional tradition and the constitutional formulations that are prevalent in today's Europe. The Preamble of the French Constitution starts with "t he French people" – not "the people of France"! Likewise, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 starts with the Spanish Nation. We could go on…  If you were to tell the French and Spaniards, liberal as they are and multicultural as they are, that their countries should be redefined so as to exclude any reference to the French or Spanish nation from Constitution, they would say that you are talking nonsense."
 
Trifkovic points out that the provision of Serbia's new constitution that received most prominence in the Western media is that confirming the inviolability of the country's territory, which explicitly includes the province of Kosovo and Metohija. He insists that there is nothing remarkable about such postulation, because each country's constitution presumes, at least implicitly, the inviolability of its sovereign territory:
 
"This is regarded as 'controversial' only by those who'd like to deny or forget that Kosovo and Metohija has belonged continuously to Serbia since the First Balkan War in 1912. Those who think that there is something contentious about such designation are effectively denying the concept of sovereignty, territorial integrity and the legacy of the international law that goes back at least to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. For the Serbs themselves this is not a contentious issue, not any more than it would be for Canada's constitution to postulate that the province of Ontario is part of Canada. In Kosovo and Metohija's case, no mechanism for separation is constitutionally allowed. What the Constitution allows for are different forms of autonomous mechanisms in line with the latest achievements of other democratic states, whether they be in the European Union or not. If you are to allow in your Constitution the possibility of secession, the possibility of amputation of your sovereign territory, then you would be indeed setting up a precedent that no other country has done anywhere, ever."
 
To claim that this reflects some 'hard-line nationalist' position is plain nonsense, Trifkovic concludes. Nevertheless, we have commentators who claim that what the Serbs say is simply irrelevant; but Trifkovic stresses that the will of the people of Serbia cannot be willfully ignored by "the international community":
 
"It is remarkable that the proponents of an independent 'Kosova' belittle Serbia's constitution and the referendum – yet at the same time they insist that Kosovo's independence has to be based on the will of Albanians living there. So, eight million Serbs can be overruled and ignored, but one and a half or two million Albanians who are supposed to want independence, on the ground of their plurality in their given locality, must be obeyed, and their views are legitimate! It is simply absurd."

There are many foreign NGOs, such as the International Crisis Group (ICG), who are dissatisfied with Serbia's Constitution and claim that the document is too nationalistic and authoritarian, and will therefore bring instability in the Balkans. Trifkvic argues that we should not give any undue weight to whatever the ICG has to say:
 
"It has been and still is primarily an anti-Serb lobby group that favors each and every Muslim cause in the Balkans – and I would include the independence of Montenegro into the list of 'Muslim causes.' The ICG has been advocating Kosovo's independence for over a decade. It was very vocal in their support of the Muslims faction in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is not interested in a peaceful resolution of this or any other dispute, it is not looking for durable and lasting solutions that would guarantee stability in a long-suffering part of Europe. It is interested in pursuing its particular political agenda. That is obvious from the posture of Martti Ahtisaari , who is not only former president of Finland, but also a former and current member of the ICG board of directors."
 
The new Serbian Constitution by itself will not impact the thinking of the great powers one way or the other; it will be the balance of forces in the wider outside world. In this context, Trifkovic thinks that the overall position for the Serbs has improved considerably in the last few months. In his view this was due primarily to the realization by the Russians that, no matter what they do vis-à-vis Kosovo, they are not likely to get the acceptance of the principle of reciprocity:
 
"They will not be allowed to treat pro-Russian enclaves, such as Ossetia, Abkhasia, Transdnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, as de facto independent entities based on Kosovo's precedent. The realization by the Russians that – even if they are cooperative on the issue of Kosovo's independence – they are not going to get anything in return, has been important in directing Moscow to a more principled stand. Another positive development is the realization in China that the model of Kosovo's independence could be used for the independence of Taiwan, or even the demand for Tibet's renewed independence, not to mention the context of the separatist movement among the Turkic-Muslim population of Northwestern China bordering the former Soviet Central Asia, the Xinjiang province."
 
On balance, Trifkovic concludes, the debate on the future of Kosovo will be determined by the balance of forces in the world rather than on the basis of what Serbia does or says, but it nevertheless helps, in symbolic and psychological terms, to have the will of the people expressed so unambiguously as has been done by the Serbs who have supported their country's new constitution.
=======
www.chroniclesmagaz ine.org/cgi- bin/newsviews. cgi
www.trifkovic. mysite.com


 




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November 15, 2006

Kosovo vs South Ossetia

Kosovo vs South Ossetia





Kosovo vs South Ossetia

The international community is vague about why Kosovo and South Ossetia cannot be compared, and the answers lie in geopolitics rather than principles of self-determination and international law.

Commentary by Jen Alic for ISN Security Watch (15/11/06)

In Western media offerings on South Ossetia's recent referendum for independence from Georgia there is an unwavering tone that suggests the breakaway republic either does not deserve, or should for unexamined reasons, not be granted , independence.

The opposite is true for Western media reports concerning the status of Serbia's UN-administered province of Kosovo. These reports adopt a tone that cheers for and approves of independence.

The international community has long strived for an independent Kosovo and is set to make a decision on the province's status early next year. That decision is most likely going to be independence, though conditional and gradual. At the same time, the international community opposes independence for South Ossetia, citing the unfairness of the Sunday referendum that did not include ethnic Georgians in the breakaway republic.

It has been impossible to find any arguments as to why South Ossetia should not be allowed to pursue self-determination. When questioned on this, Western officials have generally responded by saying that Kosovo and South Ossetia cannot be compared. End of story, no further explanation needed.

But perhaps they can be compared.

Neither South Ossetia nor Kosovo has ever been an independent nation, as far back in history as is rationally warranted to look. Both have at times enjoyed various levels of autonomy. Both have minorities whose rights may not be ensured and whose safety is anything but guaranteed. South Ossetia is home to 14,000 ethnic Georgians, while Kosovo is home to an estimated 120,000 Serbs, who live in fear in UN-guarded enclaves. There is no indication that either minority will be offered adequate protection or adequate rights. And conflict could result from a decision either way.

On Sunday, some 99 percent of South Ossetian voters backed independence from Georgia. The 14,000 ethnic Georgians living in a handful of villages in the breakaway republic were not allowed to vote, as registration required a Russian passport, which all Ossetians have been granted. This was unfair, as the international community has pointed out, but the ethnic Georgian vote would not have changed the outcome.

Furthering the comparison, neither Kosovo nor South Ossetia are necessarily prepared for independence, though Kosovo can expect help from its kin in neighboring Albania and the international community, while South Ossetia can expect some, though likely limited, aid from neighboring Russia. In economic terms, it is unclear how either could support their populations, however small. Industry is for all intents and purposes absent in both locales, while the majority of income is rumored to be made on the black market, largely through arms and drug smuggling.

What has been lacking throughout is an honest debate on these issues, which can easily be compared, despite vague statements to the contrary.

And the honest debate necessarily involves geopolitics.

South Ossetia is a buffer for Russia against the Western-leaning Georgia, while Georgia is a buffer for the US against Russia.

While Russia has played coy with the South Ossetia issue, refraining from recognizing its last declaration of independence in the 1990s and officially supporting Georgia's territorial integrity, it has clearly supported the separatists there. The US must do more than pay lip service to Georgia's territorial integrity, as the country moves toward NATO membership and continues to build its Western alliances.

And of course, there is energy to consider. The Caspian Basin is a place of intense competition, with the US, Russia and China all vying for a stronger foothold. In July, the US$4 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline was inaugurated. The BTC pumps Caspian Sea oil to the Turkish Mediterranean, bypassing Russia and Iran. It should supply 1 million barrels of oil per day by 2009. It passes through the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, and also runs rather close to South Ossetia.

BP, formerly British Petroleum, has a 30.1 percent stake in the pipeline. The pipeline was commissioned by a BP-led consortium that includes energy companies from the US, Norway, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Japan, France and Italy. The BTC is a key to Western energy security. Upsetting Georgia - a major player in this energy security - by allowing South Ossetia to declare independence and be internationally recognized would be risky.

As far as Kosovo is concerned, granting independence is much easier. Serbia is of no strategic value to the West, and the international community has no bones about playing with fire there, despite some low-level concerns that granting Kosovo independence could be so unpopular in Belgrade that it would see a return to power of radical forces.

Russia, for its part, would be more than happy to see Kosovo granted independence - this, despite its support for its Serb allies and Serbia's territorial integrity - if only because it would set a precedent for similar moves in South Ossetia, Abkhazia (Georgia's other breakaway republic), and Moldova's breakaway republic of Transdneistr.

So, the question here is not really whether Kosovo or South Ossetia has a right to self-determination - which is indeed a romantic notion that is easy to digest in terms of principles - but why there has been a lack of honest debate at an official level.




Jen Alic is the editor in chief of ISN Security Watch.

The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the author only, not the International Relations and Security Network (ISN).





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Kosovo's identity crisis

Kosovo's identity crisis



Kosovo's identity crisis



Guardian Weekly

In a referendum at the end of last month the Serbs voted in favour of a new constitution, reaffirming Belgrade's inalienable sovereignty over Kosovo. Their decision disregards the fact that the region has been under international rule since June 1999, when the Nato campaign ended Serbia's brutal repression of the Kosovar Albanian guerrillas.

"Why do the Serbs keep living in the past? Everyone knows where they ended up with their nationalist policies," says Agim Osmani. A year ago he and his wife, with their six children, bought and rebuilt a house in Caglavica, in the outskirts of Pristina, along the road to Macedonia. Previously it belonged to a Serb, now in Belgrade.

 
"We are all free to choose. There is plenty of room for everyone," adds Osmani.

In fact, along the 5km stretch between Caglavica and Pristina there is increasingly less room. In just a few years the fields have filled with Albanian-owned warehouses, filling stations and shops. Most of Osmani's neighbours are Serbs, but for how much longer? The average age of Kosovo's 130,000 Serbs is 54, compared with 28 for their 2 million Albanian neighbours.

Stamenko Kovacevic, 82, lives just behind Osmani's house, scraping by on his miserable Elektro Kosova pension. He hopes to end his days in this village of 1,500 people, all Serbs until recently. His children have left the province, which always been one of the poorest parts of the former Yugoslavia.

"Agim takes care of me, he brings me food and takes me to the doctor's," says Kovacevic. But he nevertheless voted "yes" in the referendum, "because it has always been that way".

In the distance the antiquated power station at Obilic belches poisonous smoke. Kovacevic has few illusions about the benefits of the new constitution, hurriedly drafted in Belgrade to replace the 1990 text.

Slobodan Milosevic, the former president of Serbia, was determined to end Kosovo's relative autonomy in a Yugoslav union that was already disintegrating. Fighting in Kosovo only flared up at the end of the 1990s, after Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. But unlike the former republics which have gained independence - joined by Montenegro a few months ago - the fate of the former autonomous region of Kosovo is still undecided.

Kosovo has its own president, elected parliament and government, which raises taxes in euros. It also has a civil defence corps, more akin to an army than a pioneer group. Not many young Albanians speak Serbo-Croat any longer, as was the case for the previous generation brought up in Tito's Yugoslavia. The number plates on their German saloons and Yugo bangers are all marked KS and none of them are in any doubt about their imminent independence. "Only the Serbs shut their eyes so as not to see the elephant in their sitting room," says Veton Surroi, a Kosovar writer.

Milan Ivanovic, on the other hand, is among those who reject the idea of independence. Seated on the terrace of the Dolce Vita café, in the northern quarter of the divided town of Mitrovica, in northern Kosovo, he persists in maintaining that the province "was, is and always will be Serb. Nor will any Serb leader wreck his political career by abandoning Kosovo". "What is happening at present is temporary. In the medium term Serbia will regain control of Kosovo," he adds. He does not explain how, but then the democratic process is not his cup of tea.

Dr Ivanovic runs the local hospital and chairs the Serb National Council. A radical, with closely cropped hair and a steely gaze, he forecasts more violence: "It's inevitable. The only unknown quantity is its scale. As Serbs we could never accept Kosovo's independence. We will block the roads in the north and stop the Albanians coming here. If need be we'll organise our own referendum to ratify our independence, inside Kosovo. On the other hand, if Kosovo is not granted its independence, the Albanians will be angry because the international community promised it six year ago."

He recalls the rioting in March 2004 and the violence that claimed a dozen lives. Albanian extremists attacked isolated Serb homes and burned Orthodox churches, prompting villagers from around Mitrovica to take refuge in the town. The international community is terrified a similar uprising might engulf the whole of Kosovo - either spontaneously or stirred up by one of the opposing forces.

"We will defend ourselves against any attacks," warns Ivanovic, who has rejected any moves since 1999 that might bridge the gap between the two communities. Here in Mitrovica the health service, schools and university are all an integral part of the Serb system and completely dependent on Belgrade.

"Our politicians are heading for disaster," says Milos, a Serb studying philosophy at the local university. "They adopt an extremist line because they are paid by Belgrade. If things go wrong, they have a fallback solution, but I don't. My future is here," he adds, lowering his voice to express views shared by a silent minority.

Most of the customers at the Dolce Vita are bulky skinheads who claim to be the "guardians of the bridge", a reference to the bridge across the Ibar river that separates the Albanian districts, to the south, from their Serb counterparts, to the north. There has been no communication between the two sides since Nato forces arrived in June 1999.

Milos does not much like the idea of an independent Kosovo. He says: "We have lost touch with our Albanian neighbours, but if we can have reasonable security and autonomy, then perhaps we can live together. I certainly do not fancy the sort of security the 'guardians of the bridge' are offering."

"Fortunately there is little fighting between the two communities now," says Romuald Pilchard, a political adviser to the commander of the KFOR international force deployed since 1999. The presence of 16,000 foreign troops and the setting up of a local police force have helped keep the peace. But other factors are also at work. "Now that they have almost achieved their goal of independence, the Kosovar Albanians are playing it safe. They have nothing to gain from upsetting negotiations on final status," says a European diplomat. "But there is a limit to their patience, and the politicians say it is increasingly hard to keep control of the more unruly elements," he adds. Many think the outburst of violence in 2004 was in fact salutary because it reminded the international community that Kosovo still existed.

During a visit to Paris last month the Kosovar prime minister, Agim Ceku, underlined his people's "concern" at the delay to negotiations. "People are fed up. They get the impression nothing is happening, whereas the situation is dramatic," says Nehad Islami, a moderate Albanian writer. "Almost half the population is unemployed and the others are living below the poverty line. They may blow their top at any time," warns Avni Zogani, of the Cohu! (Wake up!) organisation, which is trying to raise civic awareness among Kosovars.

Albanian politicians are keen to keep things calm but they lack the necessary credibility. "Most of them are corrupt and the political parties all have links of some sort with organised crime, which has infiltrated most official bodies," says Zogani.

He adds: "The public sector is more of a welfare operation, doing favours for specific groups, with 70,000 officials. That is three times more than in Slovenia for a comparable population. Added to which the UN Mission in Kosovo [known as Unmik] people turn a blind eye. They have already packed their bags and do not want any problems. We are increasingly fed up with our politicians but also with the international agencies."

"The only solution is independence, but it is like a lover you've been waiting for too long: part of the charm has gone," says Linda Gusia, a professor of sociology at Pristina University. "Daily life absorbs all our energy. We have no time to think of anything else. We realise that not having an international status is part of the problem, but we also know it will not solve all our woes, as if by magic, particularly the power cuts in the winter."

With a salary of only €150 a month, she has to do several jobs to feed her family. She says: "I feel humiliated at not being able to provide for my children, at not having a passport or being able to buy books on the net, because Kosovo is not a state. It isn't even Kosovo here, it's Unmikistan, and we're trapped."

www.lemonde.fr

http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardianweekly/story/0,,1948467,00.html




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November 14, 2006

N. Malic: The [diplomatic] battle for Kosovo not over yet

[ From Antiwar.com ]


November 9, 2006
The Battle for Kosovo

by Nebojsa Malic

[Adapted from remarks given before the Njegos Endowment for Serbian Studies, Columbia University, New York, Nov. 3.]

Not Decided Yet

If one were to be informed strictly by the mainstream media in the English-speaking world, it would be very hard to harbor any doubts about the future status of Kosovo. The occupied Serbian province though, of course, never referred to as such, but always as a region with a 90 percent Albanian majority is expected to declare independence within months, if not weeks, with the full support of Washington, London, and Brussels.

Could it be, however, that these tireless tirades about the "inevitability"
of Kosovo's separation are an effort to counter the fact that it is by no means inevitable, perhaps not even as likely as it would have been several years ago?

Albanian arguments for secession are well known: majority of the population, a claim to self-determination, allegations of Serb repression, atrocities, "ethnic cleansing," etc. Most of this is fiction, the rest quite irrelevant.
There is only one real argument, that of force. NATO's
1999 intervention and the subsequent occupation of Kosovo have created a "reality on the ground." But since the civilized world still hesitates to endorse naked aggression, the case for "Kosova" is dressed in humanitarian clothing and the rhetoric of "liberation."

Logic favors the Serb arguments, though. If the borders of the Yugoslav republics were declared sacrosanct in an effort to deny the Serbs west of the Drina their right of self-determination in the 1990s, then Serbia's borders ought to be sacrosanct, too, no matter how loudly the KLA complains or how violent it gets. ICG founder Morton Abramowitz dismisses this as "Serbs seeking perfect reasoning," but there's nothing perfect about it. It is simple logic, unlike the completely irrational "logic" of the Empire, which proclaims one rule today and a completely different one tomorrow to suit its own caprices. As Doug Bandow once remarked, the only rule in the Balkans seems to be "the Serbs always lose."

For what it's worth, then, the law is firmly on Belgrade's side as well; no other country in the world has been forced to give up a part of its territory to a separatist minority, especially not through illegal occupation as a result of illegal aggression. It took the post-Milosevic leadership in Belgrade five years to understand this basic concept, but they appear to have lined up behind it to the best of their ability.

This is why the Contact Group an abomination resurrected from the ashes of Europe's dark past has organized the "negotiations" on Kosovo's status as a way to pressure Serbia to voluntarily surrender its occupied territory. In the words of one commentator, it is an offer to declare rape consensual.

Power and Control

What happened in 1998 and 1999 was not a result of Albanian lobbying. It came about as a result of joint policy by imperialists in America and Europe who saw Serbia as an obstacle to their control of "Southeastern Europe."
Albanians were used as a weapon against Serbia. This is why Kosovo did not become independent in 1999, and has not become independent yet.

The 1999 war was more than just a distraction from Clinton's sexcapades; other people were involved as well. Many principals of NATO's endeavor are still around, or have been promoted. Take for example Javier Solana, then secretary-general of NATO, now the de facto foreign minister of the EU.
More to the point, the worldviewimposed by NATO in 1999 the asserted "right" of those with military power to attack anyone, anywhere, on a fabricated pretext, in direct violation of international law, conventions, and treaties is dominant today.

The destruction of Yugoslavia was partly engineered certainly encouraged by imperialist politicians in Europe and America, as a way to claim more power, escape the confines of international law, and flex their newfound imperial muscle. In 1990, a German who dared envision the Bundeswehr occupying a portion of Serbia following the Luftwaffe bombing of Belgrade would have been arrested on charges of glorifying the Nazi past. Yet both of those things came to pass and were praised as "progress." Today, the German military is girding for more foreign intervention, without a word of protest.

In 1991, Americans wanted a "peace dividend" from four decades of gearing up for war with the Soviet Union. What they got was a "benevolent global hegemony" that seeks to insert American money, troops, and bombs into every corner of the globe that a handful of policymakers in Washington believes crucial to ongoing American world supremacy.

If rumors about Ahtisaari's proposal are true, the Empire is trying to establish a Bosnia-style arrangement in Kosovo, which would give Albanians independence on paper but make them a dependency of the EU in fact. As said here before, this sort of "solution" is the worst of all worlds; the Albanians would continue to blame everyone else for the barbaric state of their society and economy (for which they have only themselves to blame), taking that anger out on the few remaining Serbs who will be cut off from Serbia and trapped in "diversity reservations" much as they are now and the transient imperial bureaucrats, who will cower in their compounds much as they do now and issue statements about how democracy and human rights in "multi-ethnic" Kosovo are doing just fine, thank you very much. This isn't about Serbs or Albanians; it's about power and control.

Soul of a Nation

Kosovo is much more than 15 percent of modern Serbia's territory, or a depository of mineral wealth, as some materialistic analysts dub it. It is the birthplace of Serb ethnic identity. Every nation has its own "creation myth." Americans celebrate their own every 4th of July: the Declaration of Independence, George Washington and the Continental Army, the Boston Tea Party For Serbs, it is a hot summer day in 1389 when their quarrelsome nobles rallied to offer battle to the invading Turks. Perhaps the actions of Prince Lazar and his nobles were not so pure as the oral tradition made them out to be but they nonetheless inspired such a tradition, and ensured that a spirit of liberty and honor persevered for the next 400 years under the cruel Ottoman yoke. This tradition infuriates the modern "liberals" and "democrats," who true to their Communist roots fear and despise religion, deny objective morality, and wallow in relativist drivel. It is not a coincidence that the loudest and most obnoxious Serb-haters in Serbia itself are formerly privileged members of the Old Regime and their young protgs.

The Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, Imperial or Nazi Germany, the Comintern, or the American Hegemony: every force that saw Serbia as a threat throughout its modern history has sought to deprive the Serbs of Kosovo in some way, recognizing its value to the Serb identity sometimes more than the Serbs themselves.

A Matter of Values

On Oct. 29, Serbian voters narrowly approved a new constitution, which asserts in the preamble that Kosovo is an integral part of Serbian territory. The constitution is far from ideal; it is too long, too cumbersome, too vague, and suffers from political correctness and welfare-statist nonsense. And it alone will not preserve Kosovo, nor make Serbia a better country. The American Constitution was written over two centuries ago, and is still one of the best in the world yet the U.S government has bent it out of shape for decades. Had any of the Founding Fathers imagined the modern federal bureaucracy and the taxation it requires to stay afloat, they would have surely chosen to remain English.
If it does not embody the values and beliefs of the population that created it, a constitution is nothing more than a scrap of paper. It is the values and beliefs or lack thereof that matter.

If Serbs truly value Kosovo, they have to assert not just sovereignty over the territory, but also a desire to live there. Otherwise, what is the point of keeping it in the first place? The biggest advantage the Albanians have in claiming Kosovo is that they want it. They also want other parts of Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Greece, but they can't even dream about any of that without Kosovo.

Liberty is a big part of Serb tradition. And property rights are inseparable from liberty. According to land registers, vast portions of the province are the outright property of the Orthodox Church (the name Metohija means "church land," after all). Yet how can Serbia claim Kosovo on that basis, while refusing to restore the property rights of the Church at home, or those of people whose possessions were seized by the Communists in 1945?

Not Theirs to Give

Struggling to rediscover their identity, culture, and tradition after decades of Communism, the Serbs need to decide whether to rebuild it on the already existing foundation of Kosovo, or choose something else altogether.
One alternative being offered is "Euro-Atlantic integrations,"
democracy, and human rights a worldview appealing greatly to the residues of Communist thinking.

A Serb poet commented last year: "If Kosovo is not ours, why are they asking us to give it up? If it is theirs, why are they taking it by force?
And if they can take it by force, why they are so circumspect about it?"

The Empire is pushing hard for the ruling circles in Belgrade to give up Kosovo, declare the rape of 1999 consensual, and abandon claims to law and principle in favor of temporary expedience. It is not a trade; the Empire is not offering anything. To take Kosovo, the Empire needs Serbia's consent.
Much as some people in Belgrade would be happy to oblige, that consent is not theirs to give.

The battle for Kosovo is not over yet.



Serbian News Network - SNN

news@antic.org

http://www.antic.org/

November 13, 2006

Ltr in response to "Kosovo cannot wait." Financial Times

Ltr in response to "Kosovo cannot wait." Financial Times



 
The Financial Times
 
Letter to the Editor(s)
 
13 November 2006
 
Regarding "Kosovo cannot wait," of 13 November, it never ceases to amaze me how generous other people are with other people's sovereign property, considering today that there are more practicing Muslims in Britain than there are practicing Anglicans, where British banks no longer give piggy banks as gifts for fear of offending the Muslim community, or where Muslims have openly declared, "We will replace the Bible with the Koran!" and where signs were carried in front of British Parliament saying, "Islam.  Our religion today; your religion tomorrow!
 
It may not be too long before Britain will have the same problem as there exists in Kosovo between Muslims and Christians and where today Kosovo is a region dominated by Muslim war criminals engaged in sex slavery, prostitution, murder, kidnapping and drugs. 
 
I wonder how generous the advice from The Financial Times will be when (not "if") the Muslim population outnumbers Britain's Christian citizens upon their demand for either autonomy or independence.
 
Be careful what you wish for.  You just may get it!
 
Stella L. Jatras
USA
****************************************************************

The following is from today’s Financial Times.

Kosovo cannot wait              http://www.ft.com/cms/s/3ba4939a-72bb-11db-a5f5-0000779e2340.html

Published: November 13 2006 02:00 | Last updated: November 13 2006 02:00

The international deadline set for the settlement of the Kosovo question - the last big territorial issue left by the collapse of Yugoslavia - is starting to slide. On Friday, Martti Ahtisaari, the United Nations' Kosovo talks envoy, postponed the announcement of his settlement proposals until 2007, abandoning plans to act before the year-end.

While a few weeks' delay is tolerable, any longer postponement could undermine hopes of a peaceful settlement and of a brighter future for one of Europe's most troubled regions.

Kosovo's majority ethnic Albanians want independence for a province that has been UN-ruled since 1999, when Nato troops forced out Slobodan Milosevic, former Serb leader. But Kosovo remains legally a part of Serbia - and Serbs insist it must remain so.

Mr Ahtisaari is expected to propose conditional independence in which Kosovo wins limited de facto sovereignty minus the full trappings of statehood. But even this will be too much for most Serbs. So he has delayed his announcement until after Serbian elections on January 21 - for fear that his plans would fuel extremist support.

Moderate Serb leaders are playing for time. Their tactics are not utterly hopeless. Russia, Belgrade's old ally, is pursuing more assertive foreign policies in every quarter - Kosovo is no exception. Moscow has signalled it sees the Ahtisaari plan as only a draft. With the US favouring early independence, the real bargaining is yet to come.

There are risks in imposing an early settlement. Belgrade could stir up Kosovo's Serbs, break transport links and - just possibly - provoke violence. But it must see that only the Serb-majority zone in northern Kosovo could possibly benefit. Serb communities in the south would face total isolation, or worse.

However, the dangers of international inaction are greater. Delay poisons Kosovo by preventing ethnic Albanians taking responsibility for their future and hampers economic development, as few companies will invest in a stateless zone. And, worst of all, it risks provoking renewed violence from frustrated ethnic Albanians.

An early settlement would give maximum political benefit to moderate ethnic Albanian leaders, creating the best environment for them to deal in future with Kosovo's Serbs and with Belgrade.

The likely settlement would also, rightly, impose tough conditions on Kosovo, including the presence of foreign troops and of a European Union supervisory mission. Local Serbs would have a lot of autonomy under decentralisation plans. Kosovo would be forbidden from merging with next-door Albania or the ethnic Albanian region of Macedonia. There must be no talk of Greater Albania.

Belgrade must be wooed with pledges of more solid EU ties. The Union faces huge challenges in the region. It must show it is still ready to shoulder the burden. The former Yugoslavia is too close to home to ignore.

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2006




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November 11, 2006

Kosovo: False calm before the real storm?

Kosovo: False calm before the real storm?



Kosovo: False calm before the real storm?

By M. Bozinovich

In the immediate aftermath of the successful referendum in Serbia on its new constitution, the EU foreign Minister Javier Solana congratulated Belgrade on referendum's orderly conduct and suggested that it is an important step in aligning Serbian legal structure with that of the European Union whose membership Serbia covets. In Washington, likewise, there was an approval of the referendum, while both, the EU and US stressed that the Kosovo status process must go on and Serbia is obligated to accept the results of the negotiating process.

Solana's and Washington's favorable reaction to the Serbian constitutional referendum was immediately objected by Albania, Kosovo Albanians and the International Crisis Group.

Albania blasted the Serbian constitutional referendum as "unacceptable" because it complicates the diplomatic negotiation on Kosovo at a time when, presumably, the UN Security Council is suppose to vote on amputating Kosovo from Serbia, and Serbia, finally got itself a constitution that major powers recognize and will have to consider what it says for any decision making process.

Albanian President Alfred Moisiu then raised the specter of violence with a claim that in case the Serbian referendum complicated the decision on Kosovo and precludes its independence then such "postponement of the decision on the final status of Kosovo will activate the extremist forces in the two countries." The countries Moisiu was referring to that will turn violent and extremist is Albania and Kosovo.

Kosovo Albanians dutifully dismissed the referendum as "not deserving a comment" so that by keeping their silence, Kosovo Albanians endorsed Moisiu's threat of violence and thus escalated their hostility against Serbia with whom Kosovo shares the longest border in case it ever becomes independent.

The International Crisis Group, however, sought to produce, at least some, civilized evidence for this forlorn dud and join the ethnic Albanian political body in malevolent attacks of spite on the Serbian state. In it's media release titled Serbia's Constitutional Referendum: A Question Of Validity, the Group sought to delegitimize Serbian referendum by making claims that it has witnesses that saw mass voter fraud although the only authoritativeness of that press release may be the appearance of a colon in the title that imitates serious analysis.

So says the Group: "Witnesses and videotape evidence indicate that many voters were permitted not only to vote without providing photographic identification," writes the Group and adds that "entire referendum process was deliberately skewed in advance by the authorities."

That ethnic Albanian political leadership is, indeed, seriously upset by the Western endorsement of the new Serbian constitution was expressed by ICG’s Belgrade director, James Lyon, who roared in his blog on the web site of B92 with a Stalinist parody of the Serbian referendum.

Anywho…

Land-for-protection offer

The EU appears less alarmed by the ethnic Albanian threats of violence then Washington.

"The issue of the future status of Kosovo is a different matter that is being dealt with by [UN envoy] Martti Ahtisaari," said European Commission spokeswoman Krisztina Nagy and left the matter at that.

Washington, however, was quick to send its envoy Frank Wisner to Kosovo while some "unnamed" diplomats told the Kosovo Albanian newspaper Ekspres that UN is prepared to take away Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo but was not willing to grant full independence.

"Although the draft solution on the status of Kosovo, presented to the Contact Group by the mediator in the negotiations Martti Ahtisaari, does not contain the term independence, it provides for authorizations that could lead to conditional independence", wrote the daily citing some unnamed source who may have spoken in order to lay some ground work in advance of Frank Wisner's discussion with Kosovo Albanians.

Nevertheless, this is a significant development because it is the first time that, supposedly a Washington-based, unnamed source has altogether sidelined independence, unconditional and conditional, from the negotiating table.

In the past, this "unnamed" source close to the Contact Group was first promising an unconditional independence, then a "precisely worded" Security Council Resolution that will recognize Kosovo independence once some 13 criteria are met by Albanians, then rumors floated of a supervised independence and now the independence is sidelined altogether and replaced by administered sovereignty.

The point here is that there is a gradual and sustained reduction in the levels of independence that the Contact Group is offering to Kosovo Albanians and that for every reduction in the independence offer we have an escalation of independence rhetoric in the media in order to compensate for the anger the reduction may cause to the ethnic Albanian political leaders.

Exhausting All Independence Options

It then emerges that the deadline that Washington is chasing may be more for military reasons then for any practical matters of diplomacy that sound logic dictates.

"You need only three people, one landmine, one flag and a press communique to have an incident," says Macedonian Foreign Minister Antonio Milososki after talks with EU officials. Then he added that it is always best to take difficult decisions in the Balkans in winter before the snows melt and fighters can take to the mountains.

Since the Serbian army is mostly a mechanized mobile force that prefers to stay away from mountains, it follows that whatever the tough decision Contact Group makes, that decision will trigger Kosovo Albanian military reaction against the NATO troops on the ground.

It is perhaps this forward diplomatic knowledge of the effects of the actual decision that prompted NATO to sign military withdrawal rights through Serbia last year while using media to raise Kosovo Albanian expectations through the heavens not that they will ever be delivered but in order to tranquilize and perhaps set the most extremist elements of the Kosovo Albanian leadership in power and for a dramatic fall.

It is unlikely that the 1,100 US military personnel will institute the fall because they are there to stay. Recent beating of an American serviceman by Kosovo Albanians in a gas station demonstrates the precariousness of these troops that are afraid to even retaliate for that brutal beating although many know the names of these Kosovo Albanian drug-military gangsters that did the beating.

Before and if any military action breaks out in Kosovo, Washington appears to be engaged in a demonstration to the Kosovo Albanian leadership that it is willing to explore all diplomatic venues and thus exhaust all independence options. Given that independence is taken off the table, Washington has delinked sovereignty from independence and is publicly peddling that mantra.

Promising that he will press on the issue of an administered sovereignty with Belgrade, Wisner probably asked Kosovo Albanians in his recent visit for some additional token bargain that he could offer once he arrives in Belgrade.

According to a UPI report, once in Belgrade, Wisner said that in an independent Kosovo minority Serbs will be the best protected national group in the Balkans although, a wise diplomat that Wisner is, he should have known how ridiculous this "land-for-protection" offer sounds.

Wisner then proceeded to real business of reminding Serbia that status decision is near, a code word for urging Belgrade to quickly ratify the constitution because the idea of writing a new Serbian constitution suddenly became a paramount issue in Serbian politics only after Serbian President Tadic's visit to Washington in early October.

As the showdown on the decision on Kosovo status rapidly approaches the Security Council table, Washington and the British are also refining their promises to Kosovo Albanians arguing that, despite Russian and Chinese promises to veto independence, the Security Council will allow other states to recognize Kosovo Albanian independence.

“The Security Council would issue a mandate for a mission led by the European Union and invite individual countries to recognize Kosovo,” says said Anthony C. Welch of Britain, the coordinator of a review of Kosovo’s future security needs commissioned by the United Nations.

In other words, Kosovo Albanians are no longer promised any independence and, based on the track record of broken promises, a sane Kosovo Albanian politician now in power should not believe anything that the West is saying.

Instead of independence then, Washington and London are telling Kosovo Albanians that the Security Council will veto independence, that the EU will come in to rule Kosovo and perhaps, if they are good pets, individual countries may recognize them.

Will there be criteria for recognition? If so what is it? Is there a time line and if so what is it? Kosovo Albanians have no answer to any of these concrete questions yet they are blindly believing anything that Washington and the British promise to them.

According to a Reuters report, Agim Ceku expressed this blind trust in Western powers to grant Kosovo independence by the end of 2006.

“We trust the international community to drive this process through to the correct conclusion," Ceku said in a speech at Chatham House, the foreign policy think-tank, after meeting the British government on final status talks.

According to another unnamed senior European diplomat in the Kosovo capital Pristina the Security Council will offer Kosovo Albanians a solution proposal that only appears to have characters of independence but in reality, Kosovo Albanians will not get it.

“He doesn't mention independence but Ahtisaari is describing the criteria which characterise an independent country,’ the unnamed one said.

As a result of a Security Council deadlock, no independence but only promises, Kosovo Albanians would unilaterally declare independence and thus instigate a crisis with Serbia.

At that point, the Resolution 1244 would be suspended because it would be replaced with another. The language of the resolution that replaces the 1244 will dictate what happens after Kosovo Albanians unilaterally declare independence.
http://www.serbianna.com/columns/mb/052.shtml


                                   Serbian News Network - SNN

                                        news@antic.org

                                    http://www.antic.org/




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