February 01, 2010

Blair’s Monstrous Consistency

Blair's Monstrous Consistency

Posted on January 30th, 2010 by Daniel Larison

But the failure to achieve a second, explicit, U.N. resolution was a political problem, not a legal obstacle. Few of the anti-war movement care to recall that the Kosovan War was, if anything, predicated upon a flimsier legal case than the Iraqi intervention. ~Alex Massie

 

One of the reasons why I keep revisiting the illegality and immorality of the intervention in Kosovo long after most people have forgotten about it is precisely because so many opponents of the Iraq war don't want to acknowledge that Kosovo was every bit as unjustifiable and wrong as Iraq was. By endorsing the war in Kosovo even now, as Obama did again in Oslo, many opponents of the Iraq war have opened themselves up to the attack that Iraq hawks were using from the beginning. If someone pointed out that invading Iraq would violate international law and not have U.N. sanction, the hawks would throw the precedent of Kosovo in his face. Unless he was a principled progressive or antiwar conservative, the opponent of the invasion was always at a loss to respond. If invading Iraq was based on phony or exaggerated intelligence about WMDs, Kosovo was based on lies about preventing genocide and protecting human rights. Unless you are among the fairly small percentage that opposed both, the odds are that you are outraged over invading Iraq in inverse proportion to how outraged you were over bombing Serbia.

Inexplicably, Kosovo is remembered across much of the spectrum, especially the center-left, as a great success, despite having been disastrous for the very people it was supposed to help and despite being based on lies every bit as blatant and outrageous as the invasion of Iraq. As it hapened, Blair was Prime Minister during Britain's participation in both wars of aggression. As far back as 1999, he has been the chief proponent of liberal interventionism aimed at subverting the normal protections of international law afforded to sovereign states, and he continues to be an outspoken advocate for killing foreigners for their own benefit. What is disheartening about all this is not just that Blair will never be held to account for his responsibility for the war in Iraq, but that he has never had to answer for or defend his decision to support an unprovoked, unnecessary war of aggression against Serbia.

Even though the air war led to the expulsions of Albanians from Kosovo it was meant to prevent, and even though the "negotiations" at Rambouillet involved delivering an intolerable ultimatum designed to start a war, this criminal operation continues to enjoy support or indifference from most Westerners. There were no allied casualties, and the war was brief, so there was little time for the publics in NATO nations to grow weary and disgusted with their criminal leaders. The war was over relatively quickly, so the media lost interest in the false atrocity stories that the Clinton administration used in its war propaganda, and the previous decade of constant anti-Serb coverage made the public receptive to whatever lies the administration wanted to tell.

What I can say about Blair is that he has been quite consistent. State sovereignty and international did not matter to him in 1999, and they didn't matter to him later in 2002-03. Given his remarks at the Chilcot inquiry about Iran, I am quite sure that he would have no difficulty supporting and even joining in an illegal attack on Iran were he still a minister in the British government. This makes him one of the most unabashed, unapologetic advocates of aggressive war alive today, and I'm not sure that this requires much courage when there have been and continue to be absolutely no consequences, legal or otherwise, for his actions.

Filed under: foreign policy, politics

7 Responses to "Blair's Monstrous Consistency"

  1. NauticalMongoose, on January 30th, 2010 at 10:52 pm Said:

I am finding it unusually difficult to find a good source discussing the Kosovo War (I am woefully ignorant about this event). Does anyone have any suggestions? I would prefer a 'just the facts' account from which I can draw my own conclusions.

  1. David Tomlin, on January 31st, 2010 at 1:34 am Said:

[The Kosovo intervention was] disastrous for the very people it was supposed to help . . .

I was always opposed to the Balkan interventions, but I am at a loss as to what this is about. Do you mean the ethnic cleansing of the non-Albanians?

For the Kosovo Albanians, we might speculate on whether they would have fared better absent the intervention. I don't know of any facts that would remotely justify describing their present situation as 'disastrous'.

  1. David Tomlin, on January 31st, 2010 at 1:51 am Said:

Sorry, I wrote the previous comment before finishing the post. My curiosity was piqued by the quoted sentence, and I was assuming it referred to the outcome of the intervention rather than events during the intervention itself.

  1. Brett, on January 31st, 2010 at 2:36 am Said:

I always figured the intervention was basically the US and European way of trying to avoid letting "humanitarian intervention" completely die on the vine. It had already taken body blows from the 1994 Rwandan genocide that they'd ignored, as well as the Bosnian civil war that they ignored until multiple massacres later – hardly signs of people supposedly dedicated to intervening to stop such things. One more blow, or perceived blow (since that was what it was) might have irrevocably damaged it, and that was unacceptable to that crowd.

  1. herb, on January 31st, 2010 at 1:44 pm Said:

Please expand on the "lies" NATO used to illegally fight an air war against Serbia.

I know a lot about this subject, and it's only in the last year or so that I've heard any of this "Kosovo was illegal" stuff, mostly from you.

You mentioned "false atrocity stories that the Clinton administration used in its war propaganda." Do you have any examples?

I know for a fact that "false atrocity stories" were used by all sides in the Yugoslav conflict, but I also know that there are many very true atrocity stories that came out of Vukovar, Srebrenica, Osijek, and Sarajevo.

  1. Daniel Larison, on January 31st, 2010 at 2:08 pm Said:

The "massacre" at Racak was a key part of Clinton's justification for intervening. The massacre was staged by the KLA. It never happened. There is no evidence that there was a systematic or extensive policy of ethnic cleansing in the works. The Serbs had been fighting a low-level counterinsurgency against a rather nasty gang of criminals for a year, and that was it. The administration had even labeled the KLA a terrorist group the year before it took their side, because this is what it was.

Clinton portrayed intervention as something he did grudgingly to halt genocide, but there was no genocide to halt. He had given the Serbs an ultimatum to let NATO have the run of their country, and like any self-respecting state they refused. Then the bombing began shortly afterwards. If you have never heard arguments that bombing Serbia was illegal until the last year, I submit that you haven't followed the discussion about it very closely.

As for the remark about being a disaster for the people it was supposed to help, I was referring to massive refugee crisis that the war created as hundreds of thousands of Albanians were driven out of Kosovo by a combination of the air campaign and Serbian military units. The mass expulsions that the campaign was designed to prevent were the very things that the campaign hastened and facilitated. Soon thereafter, the Albanians returned to Kosovo, but I would call the effort a pretty dramatic failure if the goal was to prevent the mass expulsion of Albanians.

What bombing Serbia achieved was to detach part of its own territory by force and establish a de facto partition that Western powers then formalized with their recognition of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence in early 2008. That in turn contributed to the escalating conflict between Russia and Georgia, as Russia aimed to exact some revenge on one of our satellites for what we had done to one of theirs. All in all, Western policy on Kosovo has been appalling, and it has created a horrible precedent for the future. Of course, it was precisely that precedent that Russia exploited in the 2008 war with Georgia.

Serbia was penalized for attempting to suppress a separatist rebellion inside its own borders. It was a purely internal affair, and no state or alliance of states had any right, legal or otherwise, to launch military strikes against Serbia. It was never sanctioned by the Security Council in any way, and the war violated both the U.N. Charter and had no authorization under the North Atlantic Treaty. In addition, the President had no constitutional authority to wage war against Serbia, but why get hung up on technicalities like that?

  1. David Tomlin, on January 31st, 2010 at 3:45 pm Said:

Forensic teams from various countries went in right after the NATO forces, counting bodies and exhuming mass graves (defined as any grave with more than one body). Within months it was clear that the death toll was a fraction of that claimed by the KLA, and repeated uncritically by the Clinton administration and the media.

In one case a disused mine allegedly used to dispose of bodies was examined, and no bodies nor any trace of decomposition fluids was found.

The Kosovo 'genocide' was as thoroughly debunked as the Iraqi WMD, but, as Larison noted, by then media interest had moved on.

If anyone wants sourcing, Google is your friend.



http://www.amconmag.com/larison/2010/01/30/blairs-monstrous-consistency/

 

Kosovo - okay, really, what next?

Kosovo - okay, really, what next?

With 2009 having ended much as it began, the international community must continue to pursue a peacekeeping approach to the north in order to keep alive the possibility of a negotiated outcome.

By Gerrard Gallucci

Keywords: Serbia, Kosovo, EULEX, ICJ, Ahtisaari   TransConflict
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Za tekst na srpskom jeziku, pogledajte ovde


Over the last few months, I have tried to present various facets of the difficult question of what to do about north Kosovo within the context of an overall status settlement. I have emphasized the continuing need to take a peacekeeping approach to the north – e.g., not seeking to settle political issues through force – to keep the door open for a negotiated outcome. Such an outcome might include a differential approach to implementing the Ahtisaari Plan, i.e., vigorous implementation of decentralization (plus allowed links to Belgrade) for Serb-majority municipalities south of the Ibar and an "Ahtisaari Plus" framework for the north (as an alternative to outright partition).

However, on the ground, 2009 ended much as it began. Having assumed the status-neutral mantle of the UN in November 2008, EULEX failed to act to implement the UN Secretary General's proposed six-point plan for addressing practical issues – such as courts, customs and transportation links – by implementing practical, non-political measures. EULEX decided it was better not to offend the Albanian majority by reaching accommodations with local Serb institutions and communities that appeared to accept the status quo of continued deep divisions over Kosovo independence. Indeed, EULEX stood back from, and in some cases assisted, Albanian efforts to bully the Serbs into accepting the Kosovo institutions that they dominate. EULEX allowed electricity blockages of southern Serbs and facilitated a forced, unilateral return of Albanians to a sensitive area (Brdjani) of north Mitrovica. Results were mixed. Under pressure, enough southern Serbs voted in the 2009 municipal elections to give them minimal credibility. But in the north, turning off the electricity simply led to "electricity partition" with Serbia stepping in to fill the gap and now even to start collecting fees.

Instead of seeking to work out status-neutral practical arrangements on customs and the courts, EULEX placed officers at the northern customs gates and in the Mitrovica court with the intention of introducing there Kosovo law, staff and links to Pristina. Urged on by the Albanians, EULEX and KFOR threatened use of force to implement such plans. However, EULEX in December formulated a strategy for winning space in the north for rule from Pristina (http://outsidewalls.blogspot.com/2010/01/kosovo-eu-strategy-for-north.html) that appears more political. It assumes that the northern Serbs have grown tired of resistance to Kosovo independence and will come to accept Pristina as they are freed from the baleful influence of "radical" local leaders. The EU also appears to be relying on President Tadić, eager for the political benefits of entering the EU, to help by removing the "radicals" and acquiescing to the gradual transition of the north to EULEX and then to Pristina. Both seem questionable assumptions. Serb resistance to Kosovo independence is deep and near universal and unlikely to disappear soon. The southern Serbs may be more accommodating as they have no alternative. But the northern Serbs have the alternative of remaining part of Serbia – as they functionally are – and Tadić is in no position to be seen giving them up. But at least the EU looks to be trying.

So, despite all the huffing and puffing from Pristina about "illegal" and "parallel" institutions and a commitment to "dissolve" them, in 2009 Kosovo remained divided at the Ibar. What about 2010? The watershed event may be the ICJ decision on the legality of independence. This could offer Pristina some benefit as anything less than an outright rejection of the declaration as illegal – unlikely – will help free up a second wave of recognitions; countries sympathetic but reluctant to recognize as long as a decision against independence remains possible will be able to move forward. However, a significant number will continue to refuse for their own reasons, probably including at least some of the EU holdouts. Thus the final status issue and the question of the north are unlikely to be settled by the ICJ decision alone. This will only get done by an eventual new round of negotiation. It could be that Pristina and friends seek a final solution in the north through the use of force. But as this would risk provoking a wider crisis, we can expect the EU to hold back as long as the northern Serbs themselves do not outright surrender. So, the status quo may continue in the north. This is not all bad as it also allow for the possibility of a negotiated outcome.

Negotiations will not come easy. Both sides will have to give up something. Carefully calibrated compromise could leave the north nominally in Kosovo but substantially in Serbia. But this may be beyond the parties and the mediators. Partition would be the less elegant solution. But it would have the virtue of requiring both sides to give up something they value: Serbia would of course lose Kosovo but the Albanians would have to accept loss of the north.

2010 may be the year that Kosovo status, and that of the north, really gets settled. Or maybe it will just be more of the same divided status quo. Either would be better than renewed conflict but negotiations would be best and everyone may come to see this after some further theatre.

Gerard M. Gallucci is a retired US diplomat. He served as UN Regional Representative in Mitrovica, Kosovo from July 2005 until October 2008. The views expressed in this piece are his own and do not represent the position of any organization. You can read more of Mr. Gallucci's analysis of current developments in Kosovo by visiting http://outsidewalls.blogspot.com

http://www.transconflict.com/News/2010/January/Kosovo_Okay_Really_Whats_Next.php

Jasenovac – Holocaust promoted by Vatican

Jasenovac – Holocaust promoted by Vatican

 

1/27/2010

Author : Ari Rusila

 

Jasenovac was third biggest extermination camp during WWII and probably the cruelest. The brutality may be explained with its more religious aspect that others. Vatican played important role during events involving afterwards money laundry and covering up war criminals.

 

The UN General Assembly chose January 27 as the official day for the commemoration, as it was on this day in 1945 that Soviet troops liberated the Auschwitz extermination camp, the last such camp still functioning. Throughout Europe, tributes will be paid to the 53 million people who died during World War II, of whom 31 million were civilians. Commemoration has linked usually also to International Holocaust Remembrance Day.

 

Auschwitz-Birkenau was the largest extermination center created by the Nazis. It has become the symbol of the Holocaust and of willful radical evil in our time. Few people know that 3rd biggest extermination center was Jasenovac. Two reasons maybe explain this: 1st it is located in Croatia and 2nd the main part of victims were Serbs. The death tolls in extermination centres vary but rough estimations are following (source Wikipedia):

 

    *

 

      Auschwitz II 1,400,000

    * Belzeg 600,000

    * Chelmno 320,000

    * Jasenovac 600,000

    * Majdanek 360,000

    * Maly Trostinets 65,000

    * Sobibor 250,000

    * Treblinka 870,000

 

 

Background

 

Upon the occupation of Yugoslavia, the German Nazis and the Italian Fascists formed an "independent" state in Croatia, which was basically a Nazi puppet state. Immediately upon the establishment of its puppet government, the Ustashe set up militias and gangs that slaughtered Serbs, Jews, Romas and their political foes. Catholic priests, some of them Franciscans, also participated in the acts of slaughter. The cruelty of the Ustashe was so great that even the commander of the German army in Yugoslavia complained. The partisans, led by the Croat Communist Josip Broz Tito, and the Chetniks - Nationalist Serb royalists - fought the Ustashe.

 

 

Under the leadership of the Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic's right-hand man Andrija Artukovic, who earned the nickname "the Himmler of the Balkans," the Ustashe set up concentration camps, most notably at Jasenovac. According to various estimates, about 100,000 people were murdered at the camp, among them tens of thousands of Jews (it is interesting to note that some of the heads of the Ustashe were married to Jewish women). Throughout Croatia about 700,000 people were murdered.

 

 

Jasenovac

 

Located in Croatia 62 miles south of Zagreb, Jasenovac was Croatia's largest concentration and extermination camp. Jasenovac, was a network of several sub-camps, established in August 1941 and dissolved in April 1945. Jasenovac was not the only place where Serbia's neighbour Croatia ran several concentration camps where Jews, Serbs and Roma have been murdered. Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians were allies of Hitler as well. (More about Jasenevac in my document library under headline Croatia )

 

In April 1945 the partisan army approached the camp. In an attempt to erase traces of the atrocities, the Ustaša blew up all the installations, killed most of the internees and tried to hide all evidence about brutalities in Jasenovac, all material evidence disappeared as if there had not been any camp in that place. Later – during Tito's time – the state and the authorities tried to implement "Brotherhood and Unity" motto, with the aim of creating tolerance between the nations and the crime had to be forgotten as soon as possible.

 

 

Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, edited by Yisrael Gutman, vol. 1, 1995, pp. 739-740 gives following description about problems to find exact numbers:

 

    "It is difficult to establish the number of victims killed in the Jasenovac concentration camp, since many documents were destroyed. The prisoners' files were destroyed twice (at the beginning of 1943 and in April, 1945) and even if they had been preserved, they would have been of little help discerning the truth, because the Ustasha often killed the newly arrived prisoners immediately, without putting their names into the files. This is particularly true of those who arrived from Slavonia, Srem and Kozara, because it was only noted down that 9,830, or 155 wagons had arrived. For instance, a very small number of Gypsies was filed, only a few hundred, while it is known that all 25,000-35,000 of them from the NDH were killed in Jasenovac. The Jewish community in Yugoslavia has established the number of 20,000 Jews that were killed in Jasenovac. The numbers of killed Serbs are truly varied. The sources from abroad mention numbers from 300,000 to 700,000. Be that as it may, most of the people killed in Jasenovac were Serbs. Exact number being still unknown, but it surely amounts to several hundreds of thousands. The National Committee of Croatia for the investigation of the crimes of the occupation forces and their collaborators stated in its report of November 15, 1945 that 500,000-600,000 people were killed at Jasenovac. "

 

The Yad Vashem center claims that over 500,000 Serbs were killed in the NDH (now Croatia), including those who were killed at Jasenovac, where approximately 600,000 victims of all ethnicities were killed.

 

A documentary film "Jasenovac - the cruellest death camp of all times" can be found from here!

 

 

Religious aspect

 

While for Nazi-Germany Jasenovac was more a tool for ethnic cleansing for Ustashe religious aspect played crucial role. The aim and its implementation efficiency is described differently by people who actually were in Balkans during that period. Ustashe leaders declared they would slaughter a third of the Serb population in Croatia, deport a third and convert the remaining third from Orthodoxy to Roman Catholicism. Anyone who refused to convert was murdered.

 

 

One may claim that the religious motivation and the brutality of butchers were leading principles in Jasenovac. The fact that 743 Roman Catholic priests were members of the Ustashi and personally murdered Serbs, Jews and Gypsies. Jasenovac was for a time, run by Fr. Filipovic-Majstorovic, a Catholic priest who admitted to killing "40,000 Serbs with his own hands." So at one point, a Franciscan monk was camp commandant of what the second largest concentration camp of the war.

 

The Jasenovac system of Croatian camps also included a camp for children run by Catholic nuns who used toxic soda to save bullets.

 

Roman Catholic priests who participated in the killing of tens of thousands of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies and the running of Jasenovac escaped Europe through the "Vatican Ratline" run by Fr. Draganovich, a Croatian Catholic priest who helped morons like Clause Barbe escape from Europe. Those Catholic priests escaped to Argentina where they also escaped justice.

 

 

Vatican connection

 

 

In 1999 a class action law suit was filed at a court in San Franciso against the Vatican Bank (Institute for Religious Works) and against the Franciscan order, the Croatian Liberation Movement (the Ustashe), the National Bank of Switzerland and others to recover $100 million in damages for the Vatican's participation in these war crimes and money laundering the proceeds from their Serb, Jewish and Roma victims. The suit was filed by Jewish, Ukrainian, Serb and Roma survivors, as well as relatives of victims and various organizations that together represent 300,000 World War II victims. The plaintiffs demanded accounting and restitution.

 

Franciscans in Rome helped smuggle the Ustasha Tresury and assisted Ustasha war criminals in escaping justice. The Vatican Bank is alleged to have laundered a portion of the Ustasha Treasury. The Vatican not only hoarded the gold the Croats looted, it also helped them escape - with a nod and wink from the OSS and MI6. In 1986 for example, the US government released documents that revealed the Vatican had organised the Ustasha leader Ante Pavelic's safe-flight from Europe to Argentina, along with 200 senior officials of his regime. Pavelic was given refuge by the Vatican, fascist Spain, and Peronist Argentine. The Ustasha Minister of the Interior, Artukovic, lived openly in California from 1949-1986 when he was finally deported to Yugoslavia and convicted of murder. Thousands of Ustasha escaped justice for their crimes due to their wealth and influence and the backing of the Roman Catholic Church and who along with certain rogue elements in the US and UK governments portrayed these war criminals as anticommunist freedom fighters.

 

As the war ended, it is now known that the Vatican Bank and other world banks helped to launder and transfer funds out of the Reich, and helped many war criminals to escape justice in what is now nicknamed the "Vatican Ratline"

 

 

The Vatican Bank has claimed ignorance of any participation in Ustasha crimes or the disappearance of the Croatian Treasury. The Vatican has refused to open its wartime records despite requests from the US government, Jewish and Roma organizations. My main source about Vatican connection has been "Vatican Bank Claims"

 

 

A class action law suit against the Vatican Bank to recover $100 million in damages for the Vatican's participation in these war crimes and money laundering the proceeds from their Serb, Jewish and Roma victims is still ongoing. Vatican lawyers have three times tried to get this case thrown out of court. The Supreme court has rejected their claims.

 

In US District Court the case against the Vatican Bank (but not the Franciscan Order) was dismissed on grounds the Vatican Bank is an organ of a sovereign entity, the Vatican, which is immune from lawsuits. The just filed appeal however argues that the Vatican Bank is not sovereign and engages in commercial activity in the United States and therefore should be held accountable in a United States Federal Court.

 

 

Memory today

 

On Summer 2008 Israel's ambassador to Croatia, Shmuel Meirom, harshly criticized the funeral given to a head of a WWII Jasenovac concentration camp in Zagreb, saying also that it insulted the memory of those killed in the camp run by Croatia's Nazi-allied Ustasha regime. "I'm convinced that the majority of the Croatian people are shocked by the way the funeral of the Jasenovac commander and murderer, dressed in an Ustasha uniform, was conducted," ambassador Meirom said in a written statement. "At the same time, I strongly condemn the inappropriate words of the priest who served at the funeral and said that Sakic was a model for all Croats" Meirom said. (More about this in my article "Nazi's funeral shadows Croatias past")

 

 

Yearly commemoration is important remainder for fair picture of history. At least one day per year is good to think what ultra nationalism can be at its worst level, what kind of interests, power game, attitudes and hidden motivations are creating possibilities for murdering civil populations or ethnic groups.

 

Ari Rusila is a development project management expert and freelancer from Finland with a special interest in the Balkan region.

 

 

Keyword search

Croatia, Jasenovac, Holocaust, Vatican, BalkanBlog-EUROPE

 

http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/PartnerPosts/tabid/671/PostID/1087/Default.aspx

Blair the dictator bulldozed us into war

<> There was one revealing moment in Mr Blair's evidence. He said that
he had taken Britain to war on four occasions. As he said it, he seemed
to realise it was not a popular claim. He paused, and then gave his
list: Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. The question of
legality arises both in respect of Kosovo and Iraq. Like Lord Goldsmith,
Mr Blair regards the lawfulness of the Iraq action as turning on the
absence of a second UN resolution, and the reliance on Resolution 1441.<>


http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/william_rees_mogg/article7010321.ece

From The Times
February 1, 2010

Blair the dictator bulldozed us into war

Not since Churchill was a leader so determined to get his own way. But
he was fatally misguided

William Rees-Mogg


We have been told by Sir John Chilcot himself that the Chilcot inquiry
is not a trial, and that nobody will be either acquitted or found
guilty; we all know that is not true. A public judgment is being made as
each section of evidence is given. In particular a quiet judgment has
been made of Tony Blair's conduct. It may never lead to his being tried
in any court, but there is nevertheless a public verdict of his
responsibility for the British action in Iraq.

It was Mr Blair who was responsible; his evidence shows it. He was the
Prime Minister who had won two landslide elections. He could cajole,
coax, threaten, anger and flatter to get his own way, a war leader who
was the nearest thing to a parliamentary dictator since the wartime
Winston Churchill.

Mr Blair's major speeches, among which his Chilcot evidence must be
judged, tend to follow the same pattern. As one listens for the first
time one is likely to find a speech convincing. Yet there are always
loose threads, and one is likely to start picking at them in one's mind.
In his Chilcot evidence, there were arguments that seemed convincing on
Friday, but became more doubtful as the weekend passed. He has certainly
raised more doubts than certainties in my mind.

I would accept Mr Blair's important assurance: "I believed beyond doubt
that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction." He supported this with the
argument that "no one disputed that Saddam had WMDs". Even that needs
scrutiny, since Saddam himself was claiming to have got rid of his WMD
capacity. On the historic record, it was natural for British
Intelligence to discount any claim made by Saddam.

At the time the Western governments, including those most opposed to the
use of force, assumed that Saddam still had his chemical weapons. It
would have been natural for Mr Blair to share that belief, though he
seems to have relied on low-grade intelligence sources, without being
frank with his Cabinet, Parliament or the public about the possible
weaknesses. He should have corrected the report of a 45-minute missile
threat more promptly.

However, this does not answer the question: "Why Iraq?" Mr Blair argues
that the previous policy of containing Iraq, enforced by sanctions and
overflying, had been overtaken by the attack on the twin towers. He
expressed his argument in a passage that itself calls for analysis. "Up
until 9/11, [those pursuing the policy of containment] were doing their
best"; after 9/11 "the calculus of risk had changed. Over 3,000 were
killed, an horrific event. If these people could have killed 30,000,
they would have done." Mr Blair went on to say that 9/11 "completely
changed our perception of where risks lay".

It is obvious at this stage of his evidence that he still does not
answer the central question: "Why Iraq?" It is true that al-Qaeda had
murdered 3,000 people in the United States; it was honestly but
mistakenly believed that Iraq possessed WMDs that might be a threat to
Western nations. There was no evidence that "these people" who would
have liked to kill 30,000 Americans had anything to do with Iraq or with
Saddam himself. Historically the secular Baath party had seen Islamic
fundamentalism as one of its chief enemies.

Later, Mr Blair made the reasonable point that one should look at the
character of the regime and not just at the nature of the weapons. The
Blair doctrine is that "the assessment of security intimately relates to
the nature of the regime". He believed, justifiably, that Saddam was a
"profoundly wicked, almost psychopathic, man". It is an unacceptable
risk to leave weapons of mass destruction in the hands of such a person.
That is true, but it was equally true before 9/11. It is not clear that
9/11 altered the calculus of risk. If anything it put greater pressure
on Iraq to make concessions.

Mr Blair also applied his doctrine to the current issues of Iran, where
he sees the same dangerous conjunction of WMDs and a "highly repressive
or failed" state. He does not specify the policy he would adopt towards
Iran. He did state that his judgment is "we don't take any risks with
this issue". He does not tell us which are the greater risks, taking
action against Iran, if feasible, or taking no action. Iran is more
powerful than Iraq.

There was one revealing moment in Mr Blair's evidence. He said that he
had taken Britain to war on four occasions. As he said it, he seemed to
realise it was not a popular claim. He paused, and then gave his list:
Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. The question of legality
arises both in respect of Kosovo and Iraq. Like Lord Goldsmith, Mr Blair
regards the lawfulness of the Iraq action as turning on the absence of a
second UN resolution, and the reliance on Resolution 1441.

Broad questions of international law are also involved.

They concern the monopoly of the use of force given to the United
Nations in the UN Charter. Since 1945, the conventions on torture and
genocide have opened a wider right to use force; there is a general
right to arrest those responsible for torture or to intervene to prevent
genocide. That was the justification for the Nato intervention in Kosovo.

There are still too many failures of the Iraq policy that have not been
justified. Saddam was deposed, but at high cost in allied and Iraqi
lives. We did remain loyal allies, but to an increasingly unpopular
American administration. International law has not been clarified. Brave
troops were not given the right equipment. As General Douglas MacArthur
told the US Senate in 1951: "In war, there is no substitute for
victory." In the end, Iraq was no victory for Britain.